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Elizabethan Foreign Policy in the final years Raleigh- Policy was a failure due to Elizabeth’s half-hearted approach Petty scale of assistance given to the Dutch rebels and the French Huguenots- 5000 men to the Netherlands in 1585, 4000 men to Rouen in 1592, 4000 men to Brittany in 1592, 400 to Amiens in 1597- doubtful if English intervention made much difference in any cases Failure to either destroy Spanish naval power in 1589 and 1596, or to intercept Spanish silver convoys in 1591 Those who favoured a more expansive naval campaign argued that war in the Netherlands tended to be expensive and difficult and emphasised how England had experienced success with small-scale naval attacks in the Caribbean and on mainland Spain- Elizabeth only supported Hawkins proposed expedition to Portugal late in 1589- was a disastrous campaign English were unable to build on the victory at Cadiz in 1596- symptomatic of the way in which the war as a whole had been fought- no attempt to hold Cadiz or move on Lisbon where the majority of the Spanish fleet was being prepared- instead Cadiz was simply looted so that investors in the expedition could receive their dividends and then left- on the whole unprofitable mission glorified by those in London Continuing War with Spain: Elizabeth, after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, had no desire to bring about the destruction of the Spanish Empire unlike some of her councillors and military leaders- she did not wish to pursue an aggressive policy and instead sought national security above all else She required an autonomous Netherlands in order to achieve this and thus would involve direct military intervention as part of the policy here

Elizabethan Foreign Policy in the Final Years

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Elizabethan Foreign Policy

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Elizabethan Foreign Policy in the final yearsRaleigh- Policy was a failure due to Elizabeths half-hearted approach Petty scale of assistance given to the Dutch rebels and the French Huguenots- 5000 men to the Netherlands in 1585, 4000 men to Rouen in 1592, 4000 men to Brittany in 1592, 400 to Amiens in 1597- doubtful if English intervention made much difference in any cases Failure to either destroy Spanish naval power in 1589 and 1596, or to intercept Spanish silver convoys in 1591 Those who favoured a more expansive naval campaign argued that war in the Netherlands tended to be expensive and difficult and emphasised how England had experienced success with small-scale naval attacks in the Caribbean and on mainland Spain- Elizabeth only supported Hawkins proposed expedition to Portugal late in 1589- was a disastrous campaign English were unable to build on the victory at Cadiz in 1596- symptomatic of the way in which the war as a whole had been fought- no attempt to hold Cadiz or move on Lisbon where the majority of the Spanish fleet was being prepared- instead Cadiz was simply looted so that investors in the expedition could receive their dividends and then left- on the whole unprofitable mission glorified by those in London Continuing War with Spain: Elizabeth, after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, had no desire to bring about the destruction of the Spanish Empire unlike some of her councillors and military leaders- she did not wish to pursue an aggressive policy and instead sought national security above all else She required an autonomous Netherlands in order to achieve this and thus would involve direct military intervention as part of the policy hereArguments against Raleighs claim: The scale of naval expeditions of 1591 and 1596- in each case over 80 ships and 1500 men involved- failure was the result of the commanders, who disobeyed instruction in 1589 or who had no idea of what they wanted to achieve in 1596 the attempt to intercept Spanish silver convoys was never likely to succeed Problems of recruitment and training- England had no standing army and simply to increase the scale of military operations would have led to increased casualties from hardship and disease as is shown by death rates in 1589 and 1596 expeditions Lack of financial resources. England spent about 4.4 million on warfare when ordinary income was only 200,000 Burden of Ireland- The Irish Rebellion broke out in 1595 at the point when England might have spared more resources for the Netherlands Northern Netherlands independent and no foreign power involved Crown not involved in much of the privateering that went on at sea- the crown did receive some of the profit gained and Elizabeth was awarded a substantial sum following the capture of the treasure ship Madre de Dios Most of the naval expeditions in the 1590s were unprofitable for those involved and the only impact of this on the Spanish war was that Phillip had to spread his resources more thinly (fear of raiding) and thus could not pressurise the Dutch rebels to the extent needed to supress the revolt Elizabeth acted as far as was possible for the Crown on its limited financial power- from 1595 three separate attacks were launched on mainland Spain and its colonies: 1595 attack on Panama in order to seize Spanish treasure coming from Peru led by Francis Drake with the backing of the Earl of Essex- both Drake and Hawkins died on the expedition and its strategic objectives were hopelessly unfulfilled (not the fault of the Queen), 1596 expedition to Cadiz led by Raleigh and Essex achieved a significant victory with the capture of the port and destruction of the ships being prepared Relations between the English Crown and the Dutch rebels improved markedly following the death of Leicester in 1588 and the English did start to make a difference on the battlefield- Lord Willoughby led the force that achieved a victory at Bergen-op-Zoom Consistently excellent military leadership by Sir Francis Vere and the significant sum of money spent by the English Crown on the campaign in the Netherlands undoubtedly contributed significantly to the success of the rebels in recapturing the Northern provinces Assassination of King Henry III of France in 1589 and the succession of Huguenot Henry of Navarre changed the international situation and Elizabeth had to carefully consider her actions- the diplomatic side of war that those such as Raleigh did not fully understand- Henry IV in a difficult situation as most major French cities were under the control of the Catholic League assisted by Phillip II- Elizabeth reluctantly agreed to send troops (3600) and these helped Henry to assert his authority over much of Northern France- Troops sent to Brittany and Normandy in 1590 did little to help the French kings cause however- Elizabeths contribution was in fact useful in some cases despite the view of Raleigh that it was not enough Elizabeths half-hearted approach not the main problem in coping with the Tyrone Rebellion in Ireland from 1595- Earl of Tyrone had been successful against the English forces in the Battle of Yellow Ford in 1598 and, likely with the support of Phillip II, it appeared to the Government that Tyrone was on the verge of establishing an independent and Catholic Ireland- Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, was sent to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant in 1599 with a significantly large force- it was his readiness to disobey Elizabeths orders that caused him to negotiate with Tyrone without permission and return to Court- Tyrone then moved to the south hoping to link with a Spanish army The English, under Lord Mountjoy and Sir George Carew, did make significant progress against the Irish- Carew secured Cork and gradually recapture most of Munster- Mountjoy, supported by substantial reinforcements, pushed Tyrone back into Ulster- the landing of 3,000 Spanish troops prevented his destruction here- The English were triumphant in this battle and Mountjoy negotiated a peace with Tyrone in March 1603- Elizabeth was dead- James I returned to the policy of entrusting rule in Ireland to the local nobility- much of the country impoverished by the conflict, the Crown had spent huge sums of money on the war and there was a legacy of bitterness amongst the natives