Emer de Vattel

the law of nat ions

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natural law andenl ightenment class ics

Knud HaakonssenGeneral Editor


Emer de Vattel


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natural law andenl ightenment class ics

The Law of Nations,Or, Principles of the Law of Nature,

Applied to the Conduct and Affairs

of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three

Early Essays on the Origin and Nature

of Natural Law and on Luxury

Emer de Vattel

Edited and with an Introductionby Bela Kapossy and Richard Whatmore

l i b e r t y f und

Indianapolis


This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established toencourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals.

The cuneiform inscription that serves as our logo and as the design motiffor our endpapers is the earliest-known written appearance of the word

freedom (amagi ), or liberty. It is taken from a clay document writtenabout 2300 b.c. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash.

Introduction, annotations, translations, bibliographies, index 2008 by Liberty Fund, Inc.

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Printed in the United States of America

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Frontispiece courtesy of the Bibliothe`que publique etuniversitaire, Neuchatel, Switzerland.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataVattel, Emer de, 17141767. [Droit des gens. English]

The law of nations, or, Principles of the law of nature, applied to the conduct and affairsof nations and sovereigns, with three early essays on the origin and nature

of natural law and on luxury/Emer de Vattel;edited and with an introduction by Bela Kapossy and Richard Whatmore;

translated by Thomas Nugent.p. cm.(Natural law and enlightenment classics)

Includes bibliographical references and index.i s bn 978-0-86597-450-0 (hc: alk. paper) i s bn 978-0-86597-451-7 (pbk.: alk. paper)

1. International law. 2. War (International law) 3. Natural law.I. Kapossy, Bela, 1965 II. Whatmore, Richard. III. Title. IV. Title: Law of nations.V. Title: Principles of the law of nature, applied to the conduct and affairs of nations andsovereigns, with three early essays on the origin and nature of natural law and on luxury.

kz2414.a 3d7613 2008341dc22 2007048362

liberty fund, inc.8335 Allison Pointe Trail, Suite 300Indianapolis, Indiana 46250-1684


contents

Introduction ix

A Note on the Texts xxi

Acknowledgments xxv

the law of nations, or, principles of thelaw of nature, applied to the conductand affairs of nations and sovereigns 1

Additional Essays

Essay on the Foundation of Natural Law and on theFirst Principle of the Obligation Men Find ThemselvesUnder to Observe Laws. Translated by T. J. Hochstrasser 747

Dissertation on This Question: Can Natural Law BringSociety to Perfection Without the Assistance of PoliticalLaws? Translated by T. J. Hochstrasser 773

Dialogue Between the Prince of **** and His Confidant,on Certain Essential Elements of Public Administration.Translated by Kenneth Goodwin 783

Biographical Sketches of Authors Referred to by Vattel 797

BibliographyWorks Referred to by Vattel 813Writings on Vattel 827

Index 831


ix

introduct ion

Life of Vattel

Emer1 de Vattels Le droit des gens. Ou Principes de la loi naturelle, ap-pliques a` la conduite & aux affaires des nations & des souverains (The Lawof Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct andAffairs of Nations and Sovereigns ) (1758) was the most important bookon the law of nations in the eighteenth century. It was in great measurethanks to this work that the practical and theoretical influence of naturaljurisprudence was extended down through the Revolutionary and Na-poleonic eras. Indeed, it was Vattel who was cited as a major source ofcontemporary wisdom on questions of international law in the Amer-ican Revolution and even by opponents of revolution, such as CardinalConsalvi, at the Congress of Vienna.

Emer de Vattel was born at Couvet, in Neuchatel, a principality ruledby the kings of Prussia, on April 25, 1714, as the youngest son of DavidVattel and Marie de Montmollin.2 His father, ennobled in 1727 by theking of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm I, was a Protestant clergyman andhead of the local congregation of ministers; his mother was the daughter

1. Vattel was christened Emer. Modern authors have mistakenly given him aGerman name, Emerich.

2. The most authoritative biography of Vattel is still E. Beguelin, En souvenirde Vattel, in Recueil de travaux offert par la Faculte de Droit de lUniversite de Neu-chatel a` la Societe Suisse des Juristes a` loccasion de sa reunion a` Neuchatel, 1517 septembre1929, 35176; in English, the most informative account is A. de Lapradelles intro-duction to the Carnegie edition of The Law of Nations or the Principles of NaturalLaw, iiilix. For a concise summary, see also S. Beaulac, Emer de Vattel and theExternalization of Sovereignty, Journal of the History of International Law 5 (2003):23792; especially pp. 24247.


x introduction

of the principalitys ambassador to the Prussian court. From 1728 to 1730Vattel was enrolled as a student of the humanities at the University ofBasel, where he seems to have attended courses on Samuel Pufendorfgiven by the Huguenot minister Pierre Roques. In 1733 he went to Ge-neva to pursue theological and metaphysical studies; one of his teacherswas Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, and it was under Burlamaquis tutelagethat Vattel first studied in detail the principles of natural law and thelaw of nations. Little is known of the following years, but in 1740 and1741 Vattel wrote a series of essays, several of which appeared in Swit-zerlands leading literary journal, the Neuchatel-based Journal Helve-tique. 3 The same year also saw his lengthy defense of the philosophy ofLeibniz against the accusation of atheism made by the Lausanne pro-fessor of philosophy and mathematics Jean-Pierre de Crousaz.4 VattelsDefense, which he dedicated to Friedrich II (the Great), earned himan invitation from the French ambassador in Berlin to come to the courtof the prince whose subject he was by birth. However, he failed to obtaina diplomatic position and, pressed by financial difficulties, in 1743 hemoved to Dresden, where he was promised employment by CountBruhl, first minister of Elector Friedrich August II of Saxony (who asAugust III was also the elective king of Poland). Vattel spent the nextthree years in Neuchatel, writing essays and studying the works of the

3. Vattel, Apologie de la medisance; Essai sur lutilite du jeu; and Relationdun jugement rendu sur le Mont Olympe appeared in the October and December1740 issues of the Journal Helvetique. In 1741 Vattel wrote a number of essays ex-plaining the relation between self-love and friendship, in which he put forward someof the arguments later developed in his discussion of the foundation of obligation:Lettre a` Mademoiselle de M . . . sur les sentimens delicats, genereux etdesinteresses;Lettre sur la nature de lamour; and Sur la difference de lamour et de lamitie.They were included in the Pie`ces diverses (see note 5) and Le loisir philosophique (seenote 6).

4. Vattel, Defense du syste`me leibnitzien contre les objections et imputations de Mr deCrousaz, contenues dans lExamen de lEssai sur lhomme de Mr Pope. Ou lon a joint laReponse aux objections de Mr Roques, contenues dans le Journal Helvetique, par MrEmer de Vattel (Leyde: Jean Luzac, 1741). See S. Zurbuchen, Die schweizerischeDebatte uber die Leibniz-Wolffsche Philosophie und ihre Bedeutung fur Emer vonVattels philosophischen Werdegang, in Reconceptualizing Science, Nature, and Aes-thetics, ed. P. Coleman, A. Hofmann, and S. Zurbuchen, 91113.


introduction xi

German philosopher Christian Wolff, while waiting for orders fromDresden. These essays, which included his Dissertation sur cette question:Si la loi naturelle peut porter la societe a` sa perfection, sans le secours des loixpolitiques (Dissertation on This Question: Can Natural Law Bring Societyto Perfection Without the Assistance of Political Laws? ) as well as the Essaisur le fondement du droit naturel, et sur le premier principe de lobligationou` se trouvent tous les hommes, den observer les loix (Essay on the Foun-dation of Natural Law and on the First Principle of the Obligation MenFind Themselves Under to Observe Laws ), were published in 1746.5 In1747, finally, after dedicating the second edition of the Pie`ces diverses toBruhl,6 he was granted a modest annual pension of 500 ecus and sent asa permanent minister to Berne. The purpose of his mission remains un-clear; some of his compatriots speculated that it was to negotiate theacquisition of Neuchatel by the elector of Saxony,7 but it is more likelythat he was to facilitate renegotiation of a loan of 700,000 Reichsthalerthat Saxony had received from the city the year before. In fact, Vattelsstay in Berne lasted no longer than a few weeks.

For much of the next ten years Vattel remained in Neuchatel. Fromhere he sent a stream of letters to Bruhl complaining of his ill healthand dire financial circumstances. Nevertheless, this turned out to be themost productive period of his life. In 1757 he published a further col-lection of essays that included dialogues between Diogenes and MarcusAurelius and between Henry IV of France and his adviser Sully.8 Alsoduring this period he wrote his masterpiece, Droit des gens, which ap-peared in Neuchatel at the end of 1757, though the title page saysLondon1758.9 The work quickly established Vattel as a major authority on nat-

5. Vattel, Pie`ces diverses, avec quelques lettres de morale et damusemens (Paris: Brias-son, 1746).

6. Vattel, Le loisir philosophique ou Pie`ces diverses de philosophie, de morale, etdamusement (Gene`ve [in fact, Dresden]: Walther, 1747); see Beguelin, En souvenirde Vattel, 106n112.

7. Beguelin, En souvenir de Vattel, 47.8. Vattel, Poliergie ou melange de litterature et de poesie (Amsterdam: Arkstee et

Merkus, 1757).9. Vattel first mentions the work in a letter to Bruhl from March 1758; see Be-

guelin, En souvenir de Vattel, 131.


xii introduction

ural jurisprudence.10 It also changed his personal situation. In 1759 theelector of Saxony finally recalled Vattel to Dresden, appointed him tothe Privy Council, and made him chief adviser to the government ofSaxony on foreign affairs. During his stay at Dresden, Vattel publishedtwo further works, Melanges de litterature, de morale, et de politique (1760,reprinted in 1765 as Amusemens de litterature, de morale, et de politique )and Questions de droit naturel et observations sur le traite du droit de naturepar le Baron de Wolf (1764), a detailed critique of Wolff s Ius gentiummethodo scientifica pertractatum that Vattel had completed already in1753. In 1764 he married Marie de Chene, the daughter of a Huguenotnoble family, with whom he had a son. Due to ill health, Vattel wasunable to cope with his office and retired to his native Neuchatel, wherehe died in December 1767 at the age of fifty-three.

Influence of Swiss Heritage

Although a subject of the king of Prussia by birth, and a servant of theelector of Saxony by profession, Vattel was first and foremost Swiss.However, that description was more complicated in the eighteenth cen-tury than it is today. What foreign observers often referred to as the Swissrepublic was in fact a loose federation of independent and highly diverseentities, some aristocratic, some democratic, some monarchical, all ofthem small, some no bigger than a town. The federation was held to-gether by fear of foreign aggression, a complex web of treaties, jointlyruled territories, and military and trade agreements to contain conflictbetween individual cantons. Although Swiss thinkers frequentlyinvokeda universal society of nations, they remained highly suspicious of proj-ects for perpetual peace in Europe, whether a benevolent hegemony ora European federation. Instead, they saw their best chances of survivalin the more fragile order provided by a balance of power between largecommercial nations constantly in need of Swiss mercenaries for their

10. The numerous editions of The Law of Nations in French, English, German,Spanish, and Italian are listed in Lapradelle, introduction, lvilix. To these should beadded Greek, Russian, Polish, Chinese, and Japanese.


introduction xiii

armies and Swiss investments for their public coffers. Swiss attachmentto state autonomy was so great that, during the 1750s and 1760s, a smallbut highly vocal minority flirted with Rousseaus ideas of strict isola-tionism as the only way to defend Swiss liberty from the aggressivenessof modern commercial politics. Like Vattel, the majority of eighteenth-century Swiss thinkers, however, saw clear military and cultural benefitsin commercial progress and ridiculed Rousseau and his followers infat-uation with the alleged virtuousness of ancient Sparta.11 They hoped toadapt the humanist heritage of Swiss politics to the realities of a moderneconomy by showing how new forms of Christian patriotism, assistedby wide-reaching legislative reforms, were able to arrest and dissolve thedangerously unsocial tendency of commercial states.12

Vattels Theory of Natural Law asApplied to the Law of Nations

Against the background of this Swiss debate, we can understandnotonlyVattels vision of a workable European order but also the importancehe attributed to political economy for establishing and maintaining aregime of international justice. In a famous passage, Vattel claimed thatcommerce had transformed Europe from a confused heap of detached

11. See especially Vattels Reflexions sur le Discours de M. Rousseau touchantlorigine de linegalite parmi les hommes (Amusemens de litterature, de morale, et depolitique, 7989), where he attacked Rousseaus elaborate critique of the idea of so-ciability. Although Vattel, in The Law of Nations, does not mention Rousseau byname, he repeatedly rejected arguments that contemporaries immediately associatedwith the latter. See, for example, Preliminaries 10, where Vattel argued against theRousseauvian image of solitary natural man: Each individual, moreover, is inti-mately conscious that he can neither live happily nor improve his nature without theintercourse and assistance of others. See also bk. I, 113, where he defended the artsand the sciences: Let the friends of barbarism declaim against the sciences and politearts; let us, without deigning to answer their vain reasonings, content ourselves withappealing to experience.

12. For a discussion of mid-eighteenth-century Swiss reform discourse, see B. Ka-possy, Iselin contra Rousseau: Sociable Patriotism and the History of Mankind. For thewider European context of Vattels theory, see F. Stephen Ruddy, International Lawin the Enlightenment: The Background of Emmerich de Vattels Le Droit des Gens.


xiv introduction

pieces into a kind of large republic, where all members were united forthe maintenance of order and liberty (bk. III, 47). An eternal andimmutable law of nature obliged a state not only to respect and to treatother states as equals but also to provide mutual aid so far as that otherstands in real need of its assistance, and the former can grant it withoutneglecting the duties it owes to itself (bk. II, 3). Here Vattel claimedto be following Christian Wolff who, in his Ius gentium methodo scien-tifica pertractatum, derived the duty to mutual aid from analogybetweenthe state of nature and the realm of international relations: the law ofnations was simply the law of nature of individuals in the state of natureapplied to states (Prelim. 39). The primary duties of states were, first,to preserve and perfect themselves, and, second, to assist each other infulfilling those duties each state owed to itself. States should cultivatehuman society, primarily through trade, as long as the development ofcommerce did not conflict with their primary duties to themselves. Vat-tel argued that states that acted upon the principles of natural law alonewould ultimately come to form a universal republic: A real friendshipwill be seen to reign among them; and this happy state consists in amutual affection (bk. II, 12).

Although Vattel claimed that this delightful dream was derived di-rectly from human nature, in The Law of Nations he acknowledged thatmost nations aim only to strengthen and enrich themselves at the ex-pense of others (bk. II, 16). Accordingly, prudence prevented existingstates from making mutual aid the guiding principle of foreign politics.Instead, states ought to content themselves with a morally less appealing,but nevertheless workable, order based on the balance of power. Vattelexplained this acknowledgment of the realities of modern Europeanpolitics on two grounds. The first was the theoretical incoherence ofprevious natural law theories with regard to the duties of perfectly in-dependent states. Here he turned against Wolff s idea of a civitas max-ima, as we will see.13 Vattel claimed that Wolff had rightly distinguishedbetween two forms of the law of nations: first, an immutable or necessary

13. N. Greenwood Onuf, Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel, and the Fate of Re-publicanism, American Journal of International Law 88 (1994): 280303.


introduction xv

law of nations, signifying the law of nature applied to individual states;second, a voluntary law of nations, which defined the necessary limi-tations of natural law within the realm of international relations andwhich, he argued, had to be tolerated in order to avoid greater harm.14

Although states, like individuals, were bound to assist others, this dutywas limited by the perfect right of a state to self-preservation. The im-plication this had for trade was clear enough: while a state was obligedto trade with all other states and sell its products at a fair price, con-siderations of self-preservation allowed it to limit its trade, establish trad-ing companies, or even refuse commerce with another state altogether.Wolff had also rightly recognized that since the law of nations appliedto all states in the same way, those states affected by trade sanctions couldmerely point out breaches of the necessary law of nations. Refusal totrade, however, did not provide any legal ground for the commencementof military hostilities. The situation was different when a state was notjust incapable of self-preservation but lacked any resources to exchangefor vital goods. Here, the perfect right of preservation of a potentialdonor nation was bound to clash with the equally perfect right of pres-ervation of a state on the brink of starvation. It is in this context thatone needs to read Vattels often-cited justification of the appropriationof uncultivated land by European settlers in America.15

Given the increasingly economic dimension of European politics,there was a constant danger that peaceful trade would be subjected tothe logic of warfare. Vattels main task in The Law of Nations was to de-fine as clearly as possible the limits individual states were allowed to im-pose on freedom of trade. Wolff hoped to derive such understandingfrom the image of a civitas maxima, a universal republic instituted bynature, whose civil law was the expression of the right reason of civilizednations. In the preface, Vattel rejected Wolff s civitas maxima as ficti-tious and incompatible with the idea of state sovereignty (preface, 14).While civil society could be said to be natural in that it originated in

14. For a detailed treatment of Vattels theory of international law, see Emman-uelle Jouannet, Emer de Vattel et lemergence doctrinale du droit international classique.

15. Vattel, Law of Nations, I 81; II 8687, 97; Questions, 7172.


xvi introduction

human need, no such thing could be said of the relation between sov-ereign states: I acknowledge no other natural society between nationsthan that which nature has established between mankind in general(ibid.). In contrast to individuals, nations enjoyed greater autonomyandbecause of this had no pressing reason to subject themselves to a higherauthority. Furthermore, their absolute liberty was necessary properly todischarge the duties [the state] owes to herself and to her citizens (pref-ace, 15).

Vattels defense of a natural law of nations together withhis insistenceon state sovereignty earned him a reputation for incoherence, the viewof Kant, or, as many international law theorists writing after the FirstWorld War maintained, for being an unconditional supporter of reasonof state who disguised his evil intentions through words of sublimecharity.16 Although in The Law of Nations Vattel dealt with this issueonly in passing, he discussed it at length in several of his other writings,notably his Essay on the Foundation of Natural Law and on the First Prin-ciple of the Obligation Men Find Themselves Under to Observe Laws. Herehe sought to explain how humans could be under an obligation to nat-ural law even in the absence of a punitive superior. Vattels main move,primarily aimed at Jean Barbeyrac, was to derive obligation not fromany external source, but from what he claimed was mans most basicmotive, namely self-love and a desire for the happiness of a perfect soul.17

Ultimately it was from mans obligation to himself to attain the highestdegree of happiness, which in turn required commerce with other ra-tional beings, that the duty of mutual aid and friendship could be de-rived.18 This also applied to the obedience citizens owed to the state:

16. C. Van Vollenhoven, Du droit de paix. De iure pacis, 99. See EmmanuelleJouannet, La critique de la pensee classique durant lentre-deux guerres: Vattel etVan Vollenhoven, in Miskolc Journal of International Law 1 (2004): 4563. Kant, inhis Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, had famously labeled Vattel, togetherwith Grotius and Pufendorf, as sorry comforters, in Political Writings, 103. See alsoR. Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Orderfrom Grotius to Kant, 19196; and T. J. Hochstrasser, Natural Law Theories in theEarly Enlightenment, 17783.

17. Vattel, Essay on the Foundation, 752.18. See also Vattels essays on friendship from 1741 (see note 3, below).


introduction xvii

The love and affection a man feels for the state of which he is a member,is a necessary consequence of the wise and rational love he owes to him-self, since his own happiness is connected with that of his country(bk. I, 120). In The Law of Nations Vattel used the same argument withregard to states. As in the case of individuals, a nations duty of self-preservation and of self-perfection could be derived only from its basicself-interest and its desire to attain the highest level of national happi-ness. Moreover, like individuals, nations could attain national happinessonly by developing more enlightened forms of self-interest, forms thattook into account the well-being of other nations.19 Vattel claimed thatthe highest degree of national happiness consisted in true glory (bk. I,18688). It was acquired through the positive reputation a state en-joyed among well-intentioned nations, and through the respect it re-ceived from those seeking to violate the laws of nations. A truly gloriousnation, Vattel hoped, would set an example others would wish to em-ulate. In so doing, it would gradually shift the pathological rivalry be-tween states in the direction of a system based on virtuouscompetition.20

As a further measure for reducing the tensions between self-preservation and mutual aid, Vattel called upon European rulers andtheir ministers to implement a wide range of legislative reforms thatwould allow modern nations to break out of the vicious cycle of publicborrowing and taxation and to create a healthier balance betweenincomeand expenditure (bk. I, 183). Instead of relying on the distributive effectof luxury and conspicuous consumption, rulers should initiate a newculture of virtuous moderation and encourage agriculture so as to pro-cure abundance in every thing (bk. I, 73).21 Although he accepted

19. Note the revealing subtitle added to the pirated edition (Leyden, 1758), whichsuggested that Vattels treatise should be read as a work tending to display the trueinterest of powers. This additional subtitle seems to have been included only in theGerman edition of 1760, the first English translation of 1759, and the second Amer-ican edition of 1805.

20. Vattel dealt with the distinction between true and false glory at length in hisDialogue entre Pierre le Grand & Charles XII sur la gloire des conquerans, pub-lished in the Amusemens de litterature (La Haye: Pierre Gosse, 1765), 119.

21. See Vattels essay Dialogue entre le prince de **** & son confident, sur quelquesparties essentielles de ladministration publique, reproduced in this edition, p. 783.


xviii introduction

certain protectionist measures with regard to foreign trade, Vattel in-sisted that states should intervene as little as possible in the domesticeconomy and grant individual citizens the maximum amount of naturalliberty: Liberty is the soul of abilities and industry (bk. I, 74). Healso expressly recommended the role of learned societies for the dissem-ination of technological know-how (bk. I, 76). Vattel believed that ofall modern nations Britain had come closest to implementing a systemworthy of emulation, and in The Law of Nations he repeatedly singledit out as an example for the rest of Europe, not only with regard to itseconomy but also with respect to its admirable constitution. In con-trast with the constitutions of patrimonial states, Britain allowed its cit-izens to recognize themselves as part of both the nation and the universalsociety of men (bk. I, 24).22

Contemporaries would have recognized Vattels stance on perhaps thecentral issue of European politics at the time: whether Britain or Francewould prove the stronger in the international rivalry for supremacy. Insupporting Britains advocacy of an ongoing European balance ofpower, rather than French hegemony on mainland Europe that was as-sociated with the peace projects of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre and VictorRiqueti de Mirabeau, Vattel was taking a stand on the domestic stabilityof mixed government as much as he was on the consequences of sucha polity for international affairs. In advocating mixed government incommercial monarchies he was going against the grain of the majorityof writers, such as Montesquieu and Rousseau, for whom Britainsmixed government, with its parties, corruption, and factions, repre-sented an institutionalization of civil war domestically that would havedire consequences if transposed into the dominant form of state inter-nationally. Praise of Britain also allowed Vattel to emphasize the greatermodernity of Protestant states by contrast with the backwardness ofthe religious, moral, and economic practices that he associated withCatholicism. In an openly polemical fashion, Vattel often linked suchbackwardness with reason of state, or amoral policy, in the international

22. On Vattels critique of the patrimonial state, see Frederick G. Whelan, Vat-tels Doctrine of the State, History of Political Thought, 9 (1988): 5990.


introduction xix

sphere and was always ready to provide examples of the violation ofnatural law from the history of the papacy. Catholic writers were, how-ever, willing to use Vattel for his broader arguments about the indepen-dence of small states. One key example is Cardinal Consalvi at theCongress of Vienna, who employed Vattels arguments to justify thesovereignty of the Vatican over the papal states.

Vattel was convinced that if Britain played a more active role in therelations between European states, French aspirations to universal mon-archy would be countered. This was expected in turn to safeguard thesovereignty of the smaller states, and especially the Swiss republics, thelegitimacy of whose existence was increasingly questioned as publiccredit allowed the larger monarchies to employ mercenary armies toostrong for the old republics, however great their republican valor andvirtue. Vattels case for the survival of small states in the modern worldis one of his main themes, especially in The Law of Nations. Vattelsassociation of the law of nations with the defense of small states againstmore powerful neighbors was illustrated in February 1758, after the Prus-sian army had destroyed castles belonging to the duke of Saxony. Vattelannounced to Bruhl that his recently published work proved the legit-imacy of Saxonys complaints and also showed that all powers areobliged to unite and punish the one who wishes to introduce suchwickedcustoms.23 Prussia should be held accountable, he explained in a letteraddressed to the avoyer24 and Small Council of Berne, for violating theestablished rules of war that permitted armed conflict only as a last resortafter all diplomatic options had been exhausted. Given that Saxony hadnot only disarmed but even granted passage to Prussian troops, Fried-richs systematic plundering of Saxonys riches and forced enlistment ofthe entire flower of youtha practice that Vattel described as beingwithout precedent among Christian princesthreatened the very pos-sibility of peaceful coexistence among European nations.25

23. Beguelin, En souvenir de Vattel, 131; see Law of Nations, III 168.24. Bernes chief magistrate.25. Beguelin, En souvenir de Vattel, 172.


xx introduction

Conclusion

Vattels ideas of modern patriotism and encouragement of the economyare not among the most original in The Law of Nations. Nevertheless,they are important because they show the weakness of any attempt tocapture Vattels position within the analytical framework of retrospec-tive histories of international law or international relations.26 Besidesclarifying more thoroughly than previous thinkers the proper relation-ship between the natural law of individuals and of states, Vattel used hisunusually broad intellectual interests to comment on the cultural, po-litical, and economic conditions required for a viable system of inter-national justice. Vattel saw his magnum opus as a contribution to a greatEuropean debate on the science of legislation, a debate that analyzed thepossibilities available to modern nations to secure liberty and culturaladvancement against constant interruption by war. The importance ofThe Law of Nations therefore resides both in its systematic derivation ofinternational law from natural law and in its compelling synthesis of themodern discourse of natural jurisprudence with the even newer languageof political economy. These features help to explain the continuing ap-peal of this text well into the nineteenth century among politicians, in-ternational lawyers, and political theorists of every complexion.27

26. For two opposite interpretations, see A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of theLaw of Nations, 152, and Q. Wright, A Study of War, 33637.

27. For the reception of Vattel, see C. G. Fenwick, The Authority of Vattel,American Political Science Review 7 (1913): 395410; F. S. Ruddy, The Acceptanceof Vattel, Grotian Society Papers (1972): 17796; and H. Thevenaz, Vattel ou ladestinee dun livre, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch fur Internationales Recht, 14 (1957):916.


xxi

a note on the texts

English Editions of The Law of Nations

Vattels Law of Nations was translated anonymously into English severaltimes in the eighteenth century. The first edition of 1760 was based onthe French original Droit des gens of 1758. A Dublin translation of 1787is remarkably fluent and elegant, but it does not include the substantivenotes of the original nor, more importantly, the notes added to the post-humous French edition of 1773 and intended by Vattel for a second edi-tion he did not live to complete. Several English editions, including the1916 Classics of International Law edition, are similarly flawed andbasedon the edition of 1760. However, two English editions from the end ofthe eighteenth century include Vattels later thoughts. One, from 1793,contains a pagination error. This has been corrected in the revised ver-sion, London 1797, and the latter forms the basis for the present edition.The 1797 edition has the benefit of a detailed table of contents and mar-gin titles for subsections.

There is no modern edition of The Law of Nations, but facsimiles ofthe popular nineteenth-century editions by the London barrister JosephChitty have appeared in recent times. These annotated editions (first in1834) and their reissue with further notes by Edward Ingraham (first in1852) were based on the 1797 London edition. Chitty helpfully identifiedthe notes that distinguished the 1797 edition from the earlier Englishtranslation. He sought, however, to add much more to the text, as heexplained in a preface written in Chancery Lane in November 1833:

Many years have elapsed since the original work was published, longbefore the invaluable decisions of Sir William Scott, Sir C. Robinson,and Sir John Nichol, and other eminent Judges in the Courts of Ad-


xxii a note on the texts

miralty, and Prize and other Courts; and the last edition upon whichany care was bestowed, was published in a.d. 1797; since which time,and especially during the last general war, many most important rulesrespecting the Law of Nations were established. The object of the pres-ent Editor has, therefore, been to collect and condense, in numerousnotes, the modern rules and decisions, and to fortify the positions in thetext by references to other authors of eminence, and by which he hopesthat this edition will be found of more practical utility, without inter-fering with the text, or materially increasing its size.

In consequence, Chittys text is overloaded with legal citations based onthe case law of the sea that emerged in the Napoleonic era. Vattels workhad become a textbook for law students in both Britain and NorthAmerica.

Some of Chittys notes remain useful and have on occasion been in-corporated into the editorial apparatus for this edition. The present edi-tion includes new footnotes, elucidating dates, events, works, and per-sons referred to by Vattel. Posthumous additions to the French editionof 1773, which were then translated in the edition of 1797, are identifiedas such in the new notes. Translations of Vattels Latin citations havecome from the best modern editions, particularly from the Loeb Clas-sical Library. For each translation, reference to the edition used can befound in the bibliography of authors cited. In cases where no translationcould be found, or where the context of Vattels work required anamended translation, the editors undertook the translation, and this issignaled in the text by trans. Eds. All of the preceding new materialhas been added to the 1797 text as numbered notes or as double square-bracketed inserts within Vattels original notes.

Chitty lamented in 1833 that he proposed to form an Index, so as torender the work more readily accessible; but, in that desire, he has beenoverruled by the publishers. The present edition adds bibliographicaland biographical details of authors cited in the text, followingupVattelsown sometimes obscure references. The bibliography of authors citedincludes and explains the short titles employed by Vattel in his footnotes.

Page breaks in the 1797 edition have been indicated in the body ofthe text by the use of angle brackets. For example, page 112 begins after.


a note on the texts xxiii

Three Essays by Vattel

The first two essays included here, Essay on the Foundation of NaturalLaw 1 and Can Natural Law Bring Society to Perfection Without the As-sistance of Political Laws? 2 date from the early and formative phase ofVattels career and anticipate many of the themes of The Law of Nations.Both essays were originally published in the collection Le loisir philosoph-ique ou pie`ces diverses de philosophie, de morale et damusement (Geneva,1747). The second dissertation was a response to the Academy of Dijonsprize competition of 1742.

The two translations, both for the first time in English, are based onthe texts as appended to a nineteenth-century edition of the Le droit desgens: Nouvelle edition, precede dun essai et dune dissertation (de lauteur),accompagnee des notes de Pinheiro-Ferreira et du Baron de ChambrierdOleires, augmente du discours sur letude du droit de la nature et des genspar Sir J. Mackintosh (traduction nouvelle), comple`te par lexposition desdoctrines des publicistes contemporains mise au courant des progre`s du droitpublic moderne et suivie dune table analytique des matie`res, par M. P.Pradier-Fodere (3 vols.; Paris: Saint-Denis, 1863).

The third essay, Dialogue Between the Prince of **** and His Confi-dant, 3 was first published in Amusemens de litterature, de morale, et depolitique par M. de Vattel (The Hague: Pierre Gosse Junior & DanielPinet libraires de S.A.S, 1765, 2148). It is translated here in English forthe first time.

The text of this essay is important because it shows Vattel to have

1. Emer de Vattel, Essay on the Foundation of Natural Law and on the FirstPrincipleof the Obligation Men Find Themselves Under to Observe Laws (Essai sur le fondementdu droit naturel, et sur le premier principe de lobligation ou` se trouvent tous les hommes,den observer les lois ), translated by T. J. Hochstrasser.

2. Dissertation on This Question: Can Natural Law Bring Society to PerfectionWithout the Assistance of Political Laws? (Dissertation sur cette question: Si la loi na-turelle peut porter la societe a` sa perfection, sans le secours des loix politiques? ), translatedby T. J. Hochstrasser.

3. Emer de Vattel, Dialogue Between the Prince of **** & his Confidant, on certainEssential Elements of Public Administration (Dialogue entre le prince de **** & sonconfident, sur quelques parties essentielles de ladministration publique ), translated byK. Goodwin.


xxiv a note on the texts

been participating fully in the debates about economic and administra-tive reform that took place all over Europe at the time. The Dialoguealso shows that Vattels theory of international law (and especially hisassessment of Europes chances of having a workable system of inter-national justice) can be fully understood only when seen in the light ofhis ideas about domestic reform.

In all three essays the original notes have been preserved as numberednotes. New material added by the volume editors is enclosed in doublesquare brackets.


acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank Nikolas Funke, Ken Goodwin, TimHochstrasser, Amanda McKeever, Norman Vance, and Stefania Tutinofor extensive scholarly labors which have immeasurably improved thisedition. Ian Gazeley, Julian Hoppit, Istvan Hont, Michael Sonenscher,Gabriella Silvestrini, and Brian Young deserve thanks for help on specificpoints of fact. Thanks are also due to Laura Goetz, Diana Francoeur,and the editorial team at Liberty Fund, who saw the manuscript throughpress with outstanding professionalism. Support for the research under-pinning this edition was provided by the School of Humanities Re-search Fund at the University of Sussex, the British Academy, the Artsand Humanities Research Council, the Leverhulme Trust, the InstitutdEtudes Politiques et Internationales de luniversite de Lausanne, andthe Swiss National Science Foundation. As is always the case, a debt ofgratitude is owed to our wives and families, and also to our colleaguesin intellectual history at Sussex, Fribourg, and Lausanne. Our greatestdebt, however, is to Knud Haakonssen who, master editor that he is,guided us with patience and good humor through the minefield of mod-ern editorial practice.

Bela KapossyRichard Whatmore


the law of nat ions


the

LAW OF NATIONS,

or,

PRINCIPLES

of the

LAW OF NATURE,

Applied to the Conduct and Affairs

OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS.

from the french of monsieur de vattel.

Nihil est enim illi principi Deo qui omnem hunc mundum regit, quodquidem in terris fiat, acceptius, quam concilia coetusque hominum juresociati, quae civitates, appellantur.1 Cicero, Som. Scip.2

a new edition,Revised, corrected, and enriched with many valuable Notes never

before translated into English.

london:printed for g. g. and j. robinson, paternoster-row.

1797.

1. For to the Supreme God who governs this whole universe nothing is morepleasing than those companies and unions of men that are called cities.

2. Somnium Scipionis (Scipios Dream) in Cicero, De republica.


advert i sement

In undertaking this new edition of Monsieur De Vattels treatise, it wasnot my intention to give what might strictly be called a new translation.To add the authors valuable notes from the posthumous editionprintedat Neuchatel in 1773,to correct some errors I had observed in the for-mer version,and occasionally to amend the language where doubtfulor obscure,were the utmost limits of my original plan. As I proceeded,however, my alterations became more numerous: but whether they willbe acknowledged as amendments, it must rest with the reader to deter-mine. Even if his decision should be more favourable than I have anyreason to expect, I lay no claim to praise for my humble efforts, but shallesteem myself very fortunate if I escape the severity of censure for pre-senting the work to the public in a state still so far short of perfection.Conscious of its defects, I declare with great sincerity

. . . . Veniam pro laude peto,laudatus abunde,Non fastiditus si tibi, lector, ero.3

london , the ed i torMay 1, 1797.

3. I ask forgiveness not praise,I will be praised in full, if you dont despise me,reader (Ovid, Tristia I, VII).


5preface

The Law of Nations, though so noble and important a subject, has nothitherto been treated of with all the care it deserves. The greater part ofmankind have therefore only a vague, a very incomplete, and often evena false notion of it. The generality of writers, and even celebrated au-thors, almost exclusively confine the name of the Law of Nations tocertain maxims and customs which have been adopted by different na-tions, and which the mutual consent of the parties has alone renderedobligatory on them. This is confining within very narrow bounds a lawso extensive in its own nature, and in which the whole human race areso intimately concerned; it is at the same time a degradation of that law,in consequence of a misconception of its real origin.

There certainly exists a natural law of nations, since the obligationsof the law of nature are no less binding on states, on men united inpolitical society, than on individuals. But, to acquire an exact knowledgeof that law, it is not sufficient to know what the law of nature prescribesto the individuals of the human race. The application of a rule to vari-ous subjects can no otherwise be made than in a manner agreeable tothe nature of each subject. Hence it follows that the natural law ofnations is a particular science, consisting in a just and rational appli-cation of the law of nature to the affairs and conduct of nations orsovereigns. All those treatises, therefore, in which the law of nations isblended and confoundedwith the ordinary law of nature, are incapableof conveying a distinct idea or a substantial knowledge of the sacredlaw of nations.

The Romans often confounded the law of nations with the law ofnature, giving the name of the law of nations ( Jus Gentium ) to thelaw of nature, as being generally acknowledged and adopted by all


6 preface

civilised nations.* The definitions given by the emperor Justinian, of thelaw of nature, the law of nations, and the civil law, are well known. Thelaw of nature says he, is that which nature teaches to all animals:

thus he defines the natural law in its most extensive sense, not that nat-ural law which is peculiar to man, and which is derived as well from hisrational as from his animal nature. The civil law, that emperor adds,is that which each nation has established for herself, and which pecu-liarly belongs to each state or civil society. And that law, which naturalreasonhas established among allmankind, andwhich is equallyobservedby all people, is called the law of nations, as being a lawwhich all nationsfollow. In the succeeding paragraph the emperor seems to approachnearer to the sense we at present give to that term. The law of nations,says he, is common to the whole human race. The exigencies and ne-cessities of mankind have induced all nations to lay down and adoptcertain rules of right. For wars have arisen, and produced captivity andservitude, which are contrary to the law of nature; since, by the law ofnature, all men were originally born free. But, from what he addsthat almost all kinds of contracts, those of buying and selling, of hire,partnership, trust, and an infinite number of others, owe their or-igin to that law of nations,it plainly appears to have been Justiniansidea, that, according to the situations and circumstances in which menwere placed, right reason has dictated to them certainmaxims of equity,so founded on the nature of things, that they have been universally ac-knowledged and adopted. Still this is nothing more than the law of na-ture which is equally applicable to all mankind.

* Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est, jure gentium, &c. Cicero de Offic. lib. iii.c. 5.

Jus naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Instit. lib. i. tit. 2. Quod quisque populus ipse sibi jus constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est,

vocaturque jus civile, quasi jus proprium ipsius civitatis: quod vero naturalis ratiointer omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes peraeque custoditur, vocaturque jusgentium, quasi quo jure omnes gentes utantur. Ibid. 1.

Jus autem gentium omni humano generi commune est: nam usu exigente ethumanis necessitatibus, gentes humanae jura quaedam sibi constituerunt. Bellaetenim orta sunt, et captivitates secutae et servitutes, quae sunt naturali juri contrar-iae. Jure enim naturali omnes homines ab initio liberi nascebantur. Ibid. 2.


preface 7

The Romans, however, acknowledged a law whose obligations are re-ciprocally binding on nations: and to that law they referred the right ofembassies. They had also their fecial law, which was nothing more thanthe law of nations in its particular relation to public treaties, and espe-cially to war. The feciales were the interpreters, the guardians, and, in amanner, the priests of the public faith.*

Themoderns are generally agreed in restricting the appellationof thelaw of nations to that system of right and justice which ought toprevailbetween nations or sovereign states. They differ only in the ideas theyentertain of the origin whence that system arose, and of the foundationsuponwhich it rests. The celebratedGrotius understands it to be a systemestablished by the commonconsent of nations; andhe thusdistinguishesit from the law of nature: When several persons, at different times andin various places, maintain the same thing as certain, such coincidenceof sentimentmust be attributed to some general cause.Now, in theques-tions before us, that cause must necessarily be one or the other of thesetwoeither a just consequence drawn from natural principles, or a uni-versal consent. The former discovers to us the law of nature, andthe latter, the law of nations.

That great man, as appears frommany passages in his excellent work,had a glimpse of the truth: but as he had the task of extracting from therude ore, as it were, and reducing into regular shape and form, a newand important subject which had been much neglected before his time,it is not surprising, that,having his mind burthened with an immensevariety of objects, and with a numberless train of quotations which

* Feciales, quod fidei publicae inter populos praeerant: nam per hos fiebat ut jus-tum conciperetur bellum (et inde desitum), et ut foedere fides pacis constitueretur.Ex his mittebant, antequam conciperetur, qui res repeterent: et per hos etiam nuncfit foedus. Varro de Ling. Lat. lib. iv. [[The Fetiales [herald-priests] because theywere in charge of the states word of honor in matters between peoples; for by themit was brought about that a war that was declared should be a just war, and by themthe war was stopped, that by a foedus [treaty], the fides [honesty] of the peace mightbe established. Some of them were sent before war should be declared, to demandrestitution of the stolen property, and by them even now is made the foedus. Delingua Latina V.XV]]

De Jure Belli & Pacis, translated by Barbeyrac: Preliminary Discourse, 41.


8 preface

formed a part of his plan,he could not always acquire those distinctideas so necessary in the sciences. Persuaded that nations or sovereignpowers are subject to the authority of the law of nature, the observanceof which he so frequently recommends to them,that learned man, infact, acknowledged a natural law of nations, which he somewhere callsthe internal law of nations: and perhaps it will appear that the only dif-ference between him and us lies in the terms. But we have already ob-served, that, in order to form this natural law of nations, it is not suf-ficient simply to apply to nations what the law of nature decides withrespect to individuals. And besides, Grotius, by his very distinction, andby exclusively appropriating the name of the law of nations to thosemaxims which have been established by the common consent of man-kind, seems to intimate, that sovereigns, in their transactions with eachother, cannot insist on the observance of any but those last-mentionedmaxims,reserving the internal law for the direction of their own con-sciences. Ifsetting out with the idea that political societies or nationslive, with respect to each other, in a reciprocal independence, in the stateof nature, and that, as political bodies, they are subject to the naturallawGrotius had moreover considered that the law must be ap-plied to these new subjects in a manner suitable to their nature,thatjudicious author would easily have discovered that the natural law ofnations is a particular science; that it produces between nations even anexternal obligation wholly independent of their will; and that the com-mon consent of mankind is only the foundation and source of a par-ticular kind of law called the Arbitrary Law of Nations.

Hobbes, in whose work we discover the hand of a master, notwith-standing his paradoxes and detestable maxims,Hobbes was, I believe,the first who gave a distinct though imperfect idea of the law of nations.He divides the law of nature into that of man, and that of states: andthe latter is, according to him, what we usually call the law of nations.The maxims, he adds, of each of these laws are precisely the same:but as states once established assume personal properties, that which istermed the natural law when we speak of the duties of individuals, iscalled the law of nations when applied to whole nations or states.*This

* Rursus (lex ) naturalis dividi potest in naturalem hominum, quae sola obtinuit


preface 9

author has well observed, that the law of nations is the law of natureapplied to states or nations. But we shall see in the course of this work,that he was mistaken in the idea that the law of nature does not sufferany necessary change in that application,an idea from which he con-cluded that the maxims of the law of nature and those of the law ofnations are precisely the same.

Puffendorf declares that he unreservedly subscribes to this opinionespoused by Hobbes.* He has not therefore separately treated of the lawof nations, but has every-where blended it with the law of natureproperly so called.

Barbeyrac, who performed the office of translator and commentatorto Grotius and Puffendorf, has approachedmuch nearer to the true ideaof the law of nations. Though the work is in every bodys hands, I shallhere, for the readers convenience, transcribe one of that learned trans-lators notes on Grotiuss Law of War and Peace. I acknowledge, sayshe, that there are laws common to all nations,thingswhichall nationsought to practise towards each other: and if people choose to call thesethe law of nations, they may do so with great propriety. But setting asidethe consideration that the consent of mankind is not the basis of theobligation by which we are bound to observe those laws, and that itcannot even possibly take place in this instance,the principles and therules of such a law are in fact the same as those of the law of nature,

dici Lex Naturae, et naturalem civitatum, quae dici potest Lex Gentium, vulgo autemJus Gentium appellatur. Praecepta utriusque eadem sunt: sed quia civitates semel in-stitutae induunt proprietates hominumpersonales, lex quam, loquentes dehominumsingulorum officio, naturalem dicimus, applicata totis civitatibus, nationibus, sivegentibus, vocatur Jus Gentium. De Cive, c. xiv. 4. [[Again, the Natural Law maybe divided into that of men,which alone hath obtained the title of theLawof Nature,and that of cities, which may be called Law of Nations, but vulgarly it is termed theRight of Nations. (The precepts of both are alike, but because cities once instituteddo put on the personal proprieties of men, that law, which speaking of the duty ofsingle men, we call natural, being applied to whole cities, and nations, is called theRight of Nations. And the same Elements of natural law, and right, which havehitherto been spoken of, being transferred to whole cities and nations, may be takenfor the Elements of the laws, and Right of Nations. Hobbes,De Cive, ed.Warren-der, 28.]]

* Puffendorf s Law of Nature and Nations, book ii. chap. iii. 23. Book i. chap. 1, 14, note 3.


10 preface

properly so called; the only difference consisting in the mode of theirapplication, which may be somewhat varied, on account of the differ-ence that sometimes happens in themanner in which nations settle theiraffairs with each other.

It did not escape the notice of the author we have just quoted, thatthe rules and decisions of the law of nature cannot be purely and simplyapplied to sovereign states, and that theymust necessarily undergo somemodifications in order to accommodate them to the nature of the newsubjects to which they are applied. But it does not appear that he dis-covered the full extent of this idea, since he seems not to approve of themode of treating the law of nations separately from the law of natureas relating to individuals.He only commendsBudaeussmethod, saying,it was right in that author to point out,* after each article of the law ofnature, the application which may be made of it to nations in theirmutual relations to each other,so far at least as his plan permitted orrequired that he should do this. Here Barbeyrac made one step at leastin the right track: but it required more profound reflection and moreextensive views in order to conceive the idea of a system of natural lawof nations, which should claim the obedience of states and sovereigns,to perceive the utility of such a work, and especially to be the first toexecute it.

This glory was reserved for the baron deWolf. That great philosophersaw that the law of nature could not, with such modifications as thenature of the subjects required, and with sufficient precision, clearness,and solidity, be applied to incorporated nations or states, without theassistance of those general principles and leading ideas by which the ap-plication is to be directed;that it is by those principles alone we areenabled evidently to demonstrate that the decisions of the law of naturerespecting individuals must, pursuant to the intentions of that very law,be changed and modified in their application to states and political so-

* In his Elementa Philos. Pract. Note 2 on Puffendorf s Law of Nature andNations, book ii. chap. 3, 23. I have

not been able to procure Budaeuss work, fromwhich I suspect thatBarbeyracderivedthis idea of the Law of Nations.


preface 11

cieties,and thus to form a natural and necessary law of nations:*whence he concluded, that it was proper to form a distinct system ofthe law of nations,a task which he has happily executed. But itis just that we should hear what Wolf himself says in his Preface.1

Nations, says he, do not, in their mutual relations to each other,acknowledge any other law than that which nature herself has estab-lished. Perhaps, therefore, it may appear superfluous to give a treatise onthe law of nations, as distinct from the law of nature. But those whoentertain this idea have not sufficiently studied the subject. Nations, itis true, can only be considered as so many individual persons living to-gether in the state of nature; and, for that reason, wemust apply to themall the duties and rights which nature prescribes and attributes to menin general, as being naturally born free, and bound to each other by noties but those of nature alone.The lawwhich arises fromthisapplication,and the obligations resulting from it, proceed from that immutable lawfounded on the nature of man; and thus the law of nations certainlybelongs to the law of nature: it is therefore, on account of its origin,called the natural, and, by reason of its obligatory force, the necessarylaw of nations. That law is common to all nations; and if any one ofthem does not respect it in her actions, she violates the common rightsof all the others.

But nations or sovereign states beingmoral persons, and the subjects

* If it were not more advisable, for the sake of brevity, of avoiding repetitions,and taking advantage of the ideas already formed and established in the minds ofmen,if, for all these reasons, it were not more convenient to presuppose in thisinstance a knowledge of the ordinary law of nature, and on that ground to undertakethe task of applying it to sovereign states,it would, instead of speaking of suchapplication, be more accurate to say, that, as the law of nature, properly so called, isthe natural law of individuals and founded on the nature of man, so the natural lawof nations is the natural law of political societies, and founded on the nature of thosesocieties. But as the result of either mode is ultimately the same, I have in preferenceadopted the more compendious one. As the law of nature has already been treatedof in an ample and satisfactory manner, the shortest way is simply to make a rationalapplication of it to nations.

A nation here means a sovereign state, an independent political society.1. Christian Wolff, Ius naturae et ius gentium (Halle, 174046).


12 preface

of the obligations and rights resulting, in virtue of the law of nature,from the act of association which has formed the political body,thenature and essence of these moral persons necessarily differ, in manyrespects, from the nature and essence of the physical individuals, ormen,of whom they are composed. When, therefore, we would apply to na-tions the duties which the law of nature prescribes to individual man,and the rights it confers on him in order to enable him to fulfil hisduties,since those rights and those duties can be no other than whatare consistent with the nature of their subjects, they must, in their ap-plication, necessarily undergo a change suitable to the new subjects towhich they are applied. Thus we see that the law of nations does not inevery particular remain the same as the law of nature, regulating theactions of individuals. Why may it not therefore be separately treatedof, as a law peculiar to nations?

Being myself convinced of the utility of such a work, I impatientlywaited for Monsieur Wolf s production, and, as soon as it appeared,formed the design of facilitating, for the advantage of a greater numberof readers, the knowledge of the luminous ideas which it contains. Thetreatise of the philosopher of Hall[[e]] on the law of nations is depen-dent on all those of the same author onphilosophy and the lawof nature.In order to read and understand it, it is necessary to have previouslystudied sixteen or seventeen quarto volumes which precede it. Besides,it is written in themanner and even in the formalmethod of geometricalworks. These circumstances present obstacles which render it nearly use-less to those very persons in whom the knowledge and taste of the trueprinciples of the law of nations are most important and most desirable.At first I thought that I should have had nothing farther to do, than todetach this treatise from the entire system by rendering it independentof every thingMonsieurWolf had said before, and to give it a new form,more agreeable, and better calculated to ensure it a reception in thepoliteworld. With that view, I made some attempts; but I soon found, that ifI indulged the expectation of procuring readers among that class of per-sons forwhom I intended towrite, and of renderingmy effortsbeneficialto man-kind, it was necessary that I should form a very different workfrom that which lay before me, and undertake to furnish an original


preface 13

production. The method followed byMonsieurWolf has had theeffect of rendering his work dry, and in many respects incomplete. Thedifferent subjects are scattered through it in a manner that is extremelyfatiguing to the attention: and as the author had, in his Lawof Nature,treated of universal public law, he frequently contents himself with abare reference to his former production, when, in handling the law ofnations, he speaks of the duties of a nation towards herself.

From Monsieur Wolf s treatise, therefore, I have only borrowedwhatever appeared most worthy of attention, especially the definitionsand general principles; but I have been careful in selecting what I drewfrom that source, and have accommodated tomy own plan thematerialswith which he furnished me. Those who have read Monsieur Wolf streatises on the law of nature and the law of nations, will see what ad-vantage I have made of them. Had I every-where pointed out what Ihave borrowed, my pages would be crowded with quotations equallyuseless and disagreeable to the reader. It is better to acknowledge here,once for all, the obligations I am under to that great master. Althoughmy work be very different from his (as will appear to those who are will-ing to take the trouble of making the comparison), I confess that I shouldnever have had the courage to launch into so extensive a field, if thecelebrated philosopher of Hall[[e]] had not precededmy steps, and heldforth a torch to guide me on my way.

Sometimes, however, I have ventured to deviate from the path whichhe had pointed out, and have adopted sentiments opposite to his. I willhere quote a few instances. Monsieur Wolf, influenced perhaps by theexample of numerous other writers, has devoted several sections* to theexpress purpose of treating of the nature of patrimonial kingdoms,without rejecting or rectifying that idea so degrading to human kind. Ido not even admit of such a denomination, which I think equallyshocking, improper, and dangerous, both in its effects, and in the im-pressions it may give to sovereigns: and in this, I flatter myself I shallobtain the suffrage of every man who possesses the smallest spark ofreason and sentiment,in short, of every true citizen.

* In the VIIIth Part of his Law of Nature, and in his Law of Nations.


14 preface

MonsieurWolf determines ( Jus Gent. 878) that it is naturally lawfultomake use of poisonedweapons inwar. I am shocked at suchadecision,and sorry to find it in the work of so great aman.Happily for the humanrace, it is not difficult to prove the contrary, even fromMonsieurWolf sown principles.What I have said on this subjectmay be seen inBook III.156.

In the very outset of my work, it will be found that I differ entirelyfrom Monsieur Wolf in the manner of establishing the foundations ofthat species of law of nations which we call voluntary. Monsieur Wolfdeduces it from the idea of a great republic (civitatismaximae ) institutedby nature herself, and of which all the nations of theworld aremembers.According to him, the voluntary law of nations is, as it were, the civillaw of that great republic. This idea does not satisfy me; nor do I thinkthe fiction of such a republic either admissible in itself, or capable ofaffording sufficiently solid grounds on which to build the rules of theuniversal law of nations which shall necessarily claim the obedient ac-quiescence of sovereign states. I acknowledge no other natural societybetween nations than that which nature has established between man-kind in general. It is essential to every civil society (civitati ) that eachmember have resigned a part of his right to the body of the society, andthat there exist in it an authority capable of commanding all the mem-bers, of giving them laws, and of compelling those who should refuseto obey. Nothing of this kind can be conceived or supposed to subsistbetween nations. Each sovereign state claims and actually possesses anabsolute independence on all the others. They are all, accordingtoMonsieurWolf himself, to be considered as somany individuals wholive together in the state of nature, and who acknowledge no other lawsbut those of nature, or of her Great Author. Now, although nature hasindeed established a general society betweenmankind, by creating themsubject to such wants as render the assistance of their fellow-creaturesindispensably necessary to enable them to live in a manner suitable tomen,yet she has not imposed on them any particular obligation tounite in civil society, properly so called: and if they all obeyed the in-junctions of that good parent, their subjection to the restraints of civilsociety would be unnecessary. It is true, that, as there does not exist in


preface 15

mankind a disposition voluntarily to observe towards each other therules of the law of nature, they have had recourse to a political associ-ation, as the only adequate remedy against the depravity of the major-ity,the only means of securing the condition of the good, and re-pressing the wicked: and the law of nature itself approves of thisestablishment. But it is easy to perceive that the civic association is veryfar from being equally necessary between nations, as it was between in-dividuals. We cannot therefore say that nature equally recommends it,much less that she has prescribed it. Individuals are so constituted, andare capable of doing so little by themselves, that they can scarcely subsistwithout the aid and the laws of civil society. But as soon as a considerablenumber of them have united under the same government, they becomeable to supply most of their wants; and the assistance of other politicalsocieties is not so necessary to them as that of individuals is to an in-dividual. These societies have still, it is true, powerful motives for car-rying on a communication and commerce with each other; and it is eventheir duty to do it; since no man can, without good reasons, refuse as-sistance to another man. But the law of nature may suffice to regulatethis commerce, and this correspondence. States conduct them-selves in a differentmanner from individuals. It is not usually the capriceor blind impetuosity of a single person that forms the resolutions anddetermines the measures of the public: they are carried on with moredeliberation and circumspection: and, on difficult or important occa-sions, arrangements are made and regulations established by means oftreaties. To this wemay add, that independence is even necessary to eachstate, in order to enable her properly to discharge the duties she owes toherself and to her citizens, and to govern herself in the manner bestsuited to her circumstances. It is therefore sufficient (as I have alreadysaid) that nations should conform to what is required of them by thenatural and general society established between all mankind.

But, says Monsieur Wolf, a rigid adherence to the law of nature can-not always prevail in that commerce and society of nations; it must un-dergo various modifications, which can only be deduced from this ideaof a kind of great republic of nations, whose laws, dictated by soundreason and founded on necessity, shall regulate the alterations tobemade


16 preface

in the natural and necessary law of nations, as the civil laws of a partic-ular state determine what modifications shall take place in the naturallaw of individuals. I do not perceive the necessity of this consequence;and I flatter myself that I shall, in the course of this work, be able toprove, that all the modifications, all the restrictions,in a word, all thealterations which the rigour of the natural lawmust bemade to undergoin the affairs of nations, and from which the voluntary law of nationsis formed,to prove, I say, that all these alterations are deducible fromthe natural liberty of nations, from the attention due to their commonsafety, from the nature of their mutual correspondence, their reciprocalduties, and the distinctions of their various rights, internal and external,perfect and imperfect,by a mode of reasoning nearly similar to thatwhich Mon-sieur Wolf has pursued, with respect to individuals,in his treatise on the law of nature.

In that treatise it is made to appear that the rules, which, in conse-quence of the natural liberty of mankind,must be admitted inquestionsof external right do not cancel the obligation which the internal rightimposes on the conscience of each individual. It is easy to apply thisdoctrine to nations, andby carefully drawing the line of distinctionbetween the internal and the external rightbetween the necessary andthe voluntary law of nationsto teach them not to indulge themselvesin the commission of every act which theymay dowith impunity, unlessit be approved by the immutable laws of justice, and the voice ofconscience.

Since nations, in their transactions with each other, are equally boundto admit those exceptions to, and those modifications of, the rigour ofthe necessary law, whether they be deduced from the idea of a greatrepublic of which all nations are supposed to be themembers, or derivedfrom the sources whence I propose to draw them,there can be no rea-son why the system which thence results, should not be called the Vol-untary Law of nations, in contradistinction to the necessary, internal,and consciential law. Names are of very little consequence: but it is ofconsiderable importance carefully to distinguish these two kinds of law,in order that wemay never confoundwhat is just and good in itself, withwhat is only tolerated through necessity.


preface 17

The necessary and the voluntary law of nations are therefore bothestablished by nature, but each in a different manner; the former as asacred law which nations and sovereigns are bound to respect and followin all their actions; the latter, as a rule which the general welfare andsafety oblige them to admit in their transactions with each other. Thenecessary law immediately proceeds from nature; and that commonmother of mankind recommends the obser-vance of the volun-tary law of nations, in consideration of the state in which nations standwith respect to each other, and for the advantage of their affairs. Thisdouble law, founded on certain and invariable principles, is susceptibleof demonstration, and will constitute the principal subject of this work.

There is another kind of law of nations, which authors call arbitrary,because it proceeds from the will or consent of nations. States, as wellas individuals, may acquire rights and contract obligations, by expressengagements, by compacts and treaties: hence results a conventional lawof nations, peculiar to the contracting powers. Nations may also bindthemselves by their tacit consent: upon this ground rest all those regu-lations which customhas introduced betweendifferent states, andwhichconstitute theusage of nations, or the lawof nations foundedoncustom.It is evident that this law cannot impose any obligation except on thoseparticular nations who have, by long use, given their sanction to itsmax-ims: it is a peculiar law, and limited in its operation, as the conventionallaw: both the one and the other derive all their obligatory force fromthat maxim of the natural law which makes it the duty of nations tofulfil their engagements, whether express or tacit. The same maximought to regulate the conduct of states with regard to the treaties theyconclude, and the customs they adopt. I must content myself with sim-ply laying down the general rules and principles which the law of naturefurnishes for the directionof sovereigns in this respect.Aparticulardetailof the various treaties and customs of different states belongs to history,and not to a systematic treatise on the law of nations.

Such a treatise ought, as we have already observed, principally to con-sist in a judicious and rational application of the principles of the lawof nature to the affairs and conduct of nations and sovereigns.The studyof the law of nations supposes therefore a pre-vious knowledge


18 preface

of the ordinary law of nature: and in fact I proceed on the suppositionthat my readers are already, to a certain degree at least, possessed of thatknowledge. Nevertheless, as it is not agreeable to readers in general tobe obliged to recur to other authorities for proofs of what an authoradvances, I have taken care to establish, in a few words, the most im-portant of those principles of the law of nature which I intended toapply to nations. But I have not always thought it necessary to trace themto their primary foundations for the purpose of demonstration, buthavesometimes contented myself with supporting them by common truthswhich are acknowledged by every candid reader, without carrying theanalysis any farther. It is sufficient for me to persuade, and for this pur-pose to advance nothing as a principle, that will not readily be admittedby every sensible man.

The law of nations is the law of sovereigns. It is principally for themand for theirministers that it ought to bewritten.Allmankindare indeedinterested in it; and, in a free country, the study of its maxims is a properemployment for every citizen: but it would be of little consequence toimpart the knowledge of it only to private individuals,whoarenot calledto the councils of nations, and who have no influence in directing thepublic measures. If the conductors of states, if all those who are em-ployed in public affairs, condescended to apply seriously to the study ofa science which ought to be their law, and, as it were, the compass bywhich to steer their course, what happy effectsmight we not expect froma good treatise on the law of nations! We every day feel the advantagesof a good body of laws in civil society:the law of nations is, in pointof importance, as much superior to the civil law, as the proceedings ofnations and sovereigns are more momentous in their consequences thanthose of private persons.

But fatal experience too plainly proves, how little regard those whoare at the head of affairs pay to the dictates of justice, in con-junctures where they hope to find their advantage. Satisfied with be-stowing their attention on a system of politics which is often false sinceoften unjust, the generality of them think they have done enoughwhenthey have thoroughly studied that. Nevertheless we may truly apply tostates a maxim which has long been acknowledged as true with respect


preface 19

to individuals,that the best and safest policy is that which is foundedon virtue. Cicero, as great a master in the art of government as in elo-quence and philosophy, does not content himself with rejecting the vul-garmaxim, that a state cannot behappily governedwithoutcommittinginjustice; he even proceeds so far as to lay down the very reverse of theproposition as an invariable truth, and maintains, that, without a strictattention to the most rigid justice, public affairs cannot be advanta-geously administered.*

Providence occasionally bestows on the world kings and ministerswhose minds are impressed with this great truth. Let us not renouncethe pleasing hope that the number of those wise conductors of nationswill one day be multiplied; and in the interim let us, each in his ownsphere, exert our best efforts to accelerate the happy period.

It is principally with a view of rendering my work palatable to thoseby whom it is of themost importance that it should be read and relished,that I have sometimes joined examples to the maxims I advance: and inthat idea I have been confirmed by the approbation of one of thoseministers who are the enlightened friends of the human race, and whoalone ought to be admitted into the councils of kings.2 But I have beensparing in the use of such embellishments. Without ever aiming at avain parade of erudition, I only sought to afford an occasional relaxationto the readers mind, or to render the doctrine more impressive byan example, and sometimes to shew that the practice of nations is con-formable to the principles laid down: andwhenever I found a convenientopportunity, I have, above all things, endeavoured to inspire a love ofvirtue, by shewing, from some striking passage of history, how amiableit is, how worthy of our homage in some truly great men, and evenproductive of solid advantage. I have quoted the chief part of my ex-

* Nihil est quod adhuc de republica putem dictum, et quo possim longius pro-gredi, nisi sit confirmatum, non modo falsum esse istud, sine injuria non posse, sedhoc verissimum, sine summa justitia rempublicant regi non posse. Cicero, Fragment.ex lib. de Republica.

2. Vattel is probably referring to his so-called protector Count Bruhl. As Vattelconsidered Bruhl to be the very opposite of his idea of a good minister, the remarkis one of pure flattery.


20 preface

amples from modern history, as well because these are more interesting,as to avoid a repetition of those which have been already accumulatedby Grotius, Puffendorf, and their commentators.

As to the rest, I have, both in these examples and in my reasonings,studiously endeavoured to avoid giving offence; it being my intentionreligiously to observe the respect due to nations and sovereign powers:but I have made it a still more sacred rule to respect the truth, and theinterests of the human race. If, among the base flatterers of despoticpower, my principles meet with opponents, I shall have on my side thevirtuous man, the friend of the laws, the man of probity, and the truecitizen.

I should prefer the alternative of total silence, were I not at liberty inmywritings to obey the dictates of my conscience. Butmypen lies underno restraint, and I am incapable of prostituting it to flattery. I was bornin a country of which liberty is the soul, the treasure, and the funda-mental law; and my birth qualifies me to be the friend of all nations.These favourable circumstances have encouraged me in the attempt torender myself useful to mankind by this work. I felt conscious of mydeficiency in knowledge and abilities: I saw that I was undertaking anarduous task: but I shall rest satisfied if that class of readers whose opin-ions are entitled to respect, discover in my labours the traces of the hon-est man and the good citizen.


21

contents 1

preliminariesIdea and general Principles of the Law of Nations.

Sect. 1. What is meant by a nation or state, page lv2. It is a moral person, lv3. Definition of the law of nations, lv4. In what light nations or states are to be considered, lvi5. To what laws nations are subject, lvi6. In what the law of nations originally consists, lvi7. Definition of the necessary law of nations, lviii8. It is immutable, lviii9. Nations can make no change in it, nor dispense

with the obligations arising from it, lviii10. Society established by nature between all mankind, lix11. and between all nations, lx12. The object of this society of nations, lxi13. General obligation imposed by it, lxi14. Explanation of this observation, lxi15. The second general law is the liberty and

independence of nations, lxii16. Effect of that liberty, lxii17. Distinctions between internal and external, perfect

and imperfect obligations and rights, lxii18. Equality of nations, lxiii19. Effect of that equality, lxiii20. Each nation is mistress of her own actions, when

they do not affect the perfect rights of others, lxiii21. Foundation of the voluntary law of nations, lxiii22. Right of nations against the infractors of the law

of nations, lxiv

1. The page numbers in the Contents are those of the 1797 edition.


22 orig inal contents

Sect. 23. Measure of that right, page lxiv24. Conventional law of nations, or law of treaties, lxv25. Customary law of nations, lxv26. General rule respecting that law, lxv27. Positive law of nations, lxvi28. General maxim respecting the use of the necessary

and the voluntary law, lxvi

book iOf Nations considered in themselves.

chapter iOf Nations or Sovereign States.

1. Of the state, and of sovereignty, 12. Authority of the body politic over the members, 13. Of the several kinds of government, 24. What are sovereign states, 25. States bound by unequal alliance, 26. or by treaties of protection, 27. Tributary states, 38. Feudatory states, 39. Two states subject to the same prince, 310. States forming a federal republic, 311. A state that has passed under the dominion

of another, 312. Objects of this treatise, 4

chapter iiGeneral Principles of the Duties of

a Nation towards herself.

13. A nation ought to act agreeably to her nature, 414. Preservation and perfection of a nation, 415. End of civil society, 516. A nation is under an obligation to preserve herself, 517. and to preserve her members, 518. A nation has a right to every thing necessary for her

preservation, 619. She ought to avoid every thing that might occasion

her destruction, 6


orig inal contents 23

Sect. 20. Her right to every thing that may promotethis end, page 6

21. A nation ought to perfect herself and her condition, 622. and to avoid every thing contrary to her perfection, 723. The rights she derives from these obligations, 724. Examples, 725. A nation ought to know herself, 8

chapter iiiOf the Constitution of a State, and the Duties and

Rights of a Nation in that respect.

26. Of the public authority, 827. What is the constitution of a state, 828. The nation ought to choose the best constitution, 929. Political, fundamental, and civil laws, 930. Support of the constitution, and obedience to

the laws, 931. Rights of a nation with respect to her constitution

and government, 1032. She may reform the government, 1033. and may alter the constitution, 1034. Of the legislative power, and whether it can alter

the constitution, 1135. The nation ought not to attempt it without

great caution, 1236. She is the judge of all disputes relative to

the government, 1237. No foreign power has a right to interfere, 12

chapter ivOf the Sovereign, his Obligations, and his Rights.

38. Of the sovereign, 1239. He is solely established for the safety and advantage

of society, 1340. His representative character, 1441. He is intrusted with the obligations of the nation,

and invested with her rights, 1442. His duty with respect to the preservation and

perfection of the nation, 1443. His rights in that respect, 14


24 orig inal contents

Sect. 44. He ought to know the nation, page 1545. Extent of his power:prerogatives of majesty, 1546. The prince is bound to respect and support the

fundamental laws, 1547. He may change the laws not fundamental, 1648. He is bound to maintain and observe the

existing laws, 1649. In what sense he is subject to the laws, 1650. His person is sacred and inviolable, 1751. But the nation may repress a tyrant, and renounce

her allegiance to him, 1752. Arbitration between the king and his subjects, 2053. Obedience which subjects owe to a sovereign, 2154. In what cases they may resist him, 2155. Ministers, 23

chapter vOf States Elective, Successive or Hereditary,

and of those called Patrimonial.

56. Elective states, 2357. Whether elective kings be real sovereigns, 2458. Successive and hereditary states:origin of the

right of succession, 2459. Other origin of that right, 2460. Other sources, which still amount to the

same thing, 2461. A nation may change the order of the succession, 2462. Renunciations, 2563. The order of succession ought commonly to

be observed, 2664. Regents, 2765. Indivisibility of sovereignties, 2766. Who are to decide disputes respecting the

succession to a sovereignty, 2767. The right of succession not to depend on the

judgment of a foreign power, 2968. States called patrimonial, 3069. Every true sovereignty is unalienable, 3170. Duty of a prince who is empowered to nominate

his successor, 3271. His nomination must be sanctioned by at least the

tacit ratification of the people, 32


orig inal contents 25

chapter viPrincipal Objects of a good Government; and first,

to provide for the Necessities of the Nation.

Sect. 72. The object of society points out the dutiesof the sovereign:he is bound to procureplenty, page 33

73. to take care that there be a sufficient numberof workmen, 33

74. to prevent the emigration of those that are useful, 3375. Emissaries who entice them away, 3476. Labour and industry must be encouraged, 34

chapter viiOf the Cultivation of the Soil.

77. Utility of Agriculture, 3478. Regulations necessary in that respect:for the

distribution of land, 3479. for the protection of husbandmen, 3580. Husbandry ought to be placed in an

honourable light, 3581. Cultivation of the soil a natural obligation, 3582. Public granaries, 36

chapter viiiOf Commerce.

83. Domestic and foreign trade, 3784. Utility of domestic trade, 3785. Utility of foreign trade, 3786. Obligation to cultivate domestic trade, 3787. Obligation to carry on foreign trade, 3888. Foundation of the laws of commerce:right

of purchasing, 3889. Right of selling, 3890. Prohibition of foreign merchandises, 3991. Nature of the right of purchasing, 3992. Each nation to determine for herself how she will

carry on commerce, 3993. How a nation acquires a perfect right to a

foreign trade, 4094. Simple permission to carry on trade, 40

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