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‘19

‘EMPOWERING THINKERS OF TOMORROW’

Edited by

Dr. Harinda VidanageDirector, Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies

BCIS’ annual publication of the

Emerging Scholars Symposium Proceedings

Emerging Scholars Symposium

Proceedings 2019

‘IR @ 100’ Celebrating Centenary of International Relations

Edited by

Dr. Harinda Vidanage

Copy Edited by

Dr. Mihiri Senanayake

Apsara Karunaratne

Symposium Organizing Committee

Isuri Siriwardhana

Thilini Kasthuri

Senuri Samarasinghe

Publication Coordination

Isuri Siriwardhana

Printing:

Softwave Reprographers (Pvt) Ltd.

BCIS ESS Proceedings: BCIS Emerging Scholars Symposium 2019

©Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, 2021

All rights reserved. No material in this publication may be reproduced without the written permission of the publisher.

ISBN: 978-624-5506-00-2

Disclaimer:

The views expressed and the information included in this publication are the sole responsibility of the author/s and do not bear any liability on the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies.

Contents

Geopolitical Theory of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Trivan Annakkarage 1

Sri Lanka’s Naval Role Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy: National and Regional Security

A.P.A. Prasanga 10

China’s Conflict Resolution Approach in South Sudan

Shalika Dias 17

Hydropolitics in South Asia: A Destiny Shaped by Water

Vajini Herat Gunaratne 27

China’s Cyber Diplomacy under President Xi Jinping

Ruwanthi Jayasekara 37

Fighting the Holy War- Ethno-Nationalist Separatism and Religious Terrorism

Challenges and Prospects for Sri Lanka

Hasarel Gallage 45

Recent Trends in China’s Maritime Strategy in the Indian Ocean Region: An Assessment

Senuri Samalka Samarasinghe 53

The Militarization of Outer Space: A New Frontier for National Security

Inoka Perera 61

The Emerging Scholars Symposium, in its third iteration, focuses on the journey of International Relations as a discipline since 1919. 2019 is a landmark year for the discipline as it enters its centenary. The discipline is quite young and the discipline itself is emerging, thus Sri Lanka’s oldest and premier International Relations establishment, the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS) which is celebrating its 45th anniversary deems it fitting to focus on International Relations at 100 years as the core theme of the seminar for 2019.

There are clear signs of global transformations that are slowly unraveling the established global order. While there is an understandable fear of a world with no leadership or direction, the disruptions are also leading to new regional groupings, and interest in mini lateral engagements, as countries are looking to strengthen bilateral relations with partners of their choosing. Thus a world which is different to that of the 20th Century is taking shape.

Sri Lanka is increasingly pressed to comprehend and respond to the evolving regional security and strategic landscape. New regionalism and new institutions are taking shape while India, China, Japan, Australia and Indonesia are increasingly asserting their regional interests shaping politics, economic architectures and strategic compulsions of the region.

International Relations as a discipline has to adapt and adjust accordingly and respond to the big questions such as global conflict and peace, and how nationalism, geopolitics and geoeconomics of the 21st Century may radically alter fundamental assertions and theoretical foundations of the subject. While the subject is essentially in transformation, it is also surging as a formidable academic discipline of the 21st Century. If Political Science and Economics were the indispensable social sciences of the 19th and 20th Century, IR is in the running to be that of the 21st Century.

The BCIS is proud to be a longstanding educational establishment which has been part of the journey of International Relations. It is in this context that I would like to congratulate all the young scholars of International Relations who are part of the ESS 2019 and who are contributing in your own little way to nourish the discipline and engage with its 21st Century realities. I wish you all the best and I am proud of your contributions as we mark this historic milestone.

Message from the Director

Dr. Harinda VidanageDirector, Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies

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Geopolitical Theory of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Trivan Annakkarage*

ABSTRACT

The Belt & Road Initiative (commonly referred to as BRI) is a widely discussed topic today since its concept is unique to the discipline of global geopolitics. This is because the latter is the study of how one powerful nation-state applies a grand strategy to gain control over most of the world’s population and its resources. Hence, grand strategies implemented by current and former world super-powers (such as the United States of America, Soviet Union, British Empire, Dutch Empire etc.) focused on exerting their power of influence either on land or sea through political and military might. However, BRI envisioned by the Government of China focuses on spreading its influence on both land and sea through mutually benefiting economic collaborations with other nation-states. Thus, the political leadership of China proclaims BRI as a revival of the ancient Silk Route. Since China’s presence and influence will be spread through both land and sea, the geopolitical theories of Mackinder’s Heartland and Spykman’s Rimland were employed to explain the theoretical implications behind the Belt and Road Initiative. The research methodology applied was content analysis. This is because the study conducted was completely qualitative in nature, employing, information gathered through secondary sources. It was observed that China anticipates to fulfilling four objectives through the Belt and Road Initiative. They include; mitigating overdependence on existing sea lanes, developing China’s rural western interiors, creating job opportunities for China’s growing working-class population followed by exerting political, economic, socio-cultural and technological influence on those 68 nation-states that are a part of the Belt & Road Initiative. Further, it was understood that BRI poses a challenge to the existing American post-World War II and unipolar post-Cold War world order. Moreover, China’s influence through BRI has threatened the sphere of influence of regional super-powers such as Russia, Indonesia and India. Hence BRI has taken centre stage in 21st century global geopolitics and international relations.

Keywords: Belt & Road Initiative, BRI, China, Heartland Theory, Rimland Theory, Geopolitical Grand Strategy

Introduction

After an analysis of existing literature on BRI, it was observed that a substantial amount of scholarly articles have not contributed to discuss and analyse theoretical aspects behind China’s grand geopolitical strategy. Further, former and existing super-powers exerted influence either through land or sea. Hence, these super-powers can be categorised as either land-based powers according to Mackinder’s Heartland theory, or ocean-based powers as explained in Spykman’s Rimland theory. However, through BRI, China intends to exert its influence on both land and sea. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to analyse and understand the geopolitics of China’s Belt & Road Initiative through both geopolitical grand strategies; the Heartland theory and Rimland theory. As a result, the scope of the Belt & Road

Initiative in this study was limited to the two geo-political theories mentioned above. To complement the scope of the study, this research seeks to achieve two objectives. The first is to analyse and comprehend how the Heartland theory can be applied to explain China’s motive behind the Belt & Road Initiative. The second is to analyse and comprehend how the Rimland theory can be applied to explain China’s motive behind the Belt & Road Initiative.

Mackinder’s Heartland theory and Spykman’s Rimland theory continue to resonate among the scholars in the field of geopolitics (Meinig, 1956). However, the Rimland theory has captured more attention during the Cold War due to its practical relevance and wider applicability to curtail the Soviet Union (Gaddis, 1982; Meinig, 1956).

Research Article 01 Best Paper Award

* Trivan Annakkarage, Political and Economic Consultant, Bangladesh High Commission in Colombo. Email: trivan007annakkarage@gamil.com

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Heartland Theory

Halford Mackinder is an acclaimed scholar in the field of geopolitics for introducing the concept of continental power, termed Pivot Area in 1904 then rearticulating it as Heartland in 1919 and reviving it in 1943 (Elahi, 2015; Sloan, 1999). The theory was influenced by the Russian Empire’s ever-expanding territorial boundaries and thereby to warn the political elites of the British Empire of its threat to British global supremacy. According to Fettweis (2000), Mackinder believed that key positioning will lead to global supremacy because conventional military strategies were based on the idea that timely positioning in specific geographical locations were critical to victory at war.

The Heartland theory assumes the geopolitical world to comprise of three sections. Mackinder termed these three sections as the Heartland, Inner Marginal Crescent and Outer/Insular Crescent (Elahi, 2015). The heartland is the great continuous landmass which embraces Eastern Europe to the west, Siberia to the north, Western China, Mongolia and Himalayan mountain range to its East followed by Central Asia, Northern Iran, Afghanistan and inland Pakistan to the south (Meinig, 1956). According to Mackinder (1904), the Inner Marginal Crescent represented the rest of continental Europe, West Asia, Coastal belts of Iran, South Asia, South-East Asia followed by the coastal belt of Far East Asia. The Outer/Insular Crescent included other significant land masses such as North America, South America, Britain, Ireland, Japan, Australia and New Zealand (Elahi, 2015). Mackinder (1919) further labelled the combined Heartland and Inner Marginal Crescent as the World Island. The map below demonstrates the three sections defined as per the Heartland theory.

Map No. 01: Mackinder’s Heartland Theory

Source: Mackinder, H. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. The Geographical Journal, 23(4), 421.

According to Davutoglu (1997) Mackinder strongly believed in a continental super-power and thus he quoted; “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland commands the World Island and who rules the World Island commands the world” (Mackinder, 1919). Mackinder also stressed on the importance of a healthy and intellectual human resources because he mentioned that the heartland’s geographical location and natural resources alone will not support it from gaining world supremacy (Sloan, 1999).

Rimland Theory

Map No. 02: Spkyman’s Rimland Theory

Source: Sutori. (2018). Territoriality, Organic theory, Heartland theory, Rim-land theory, Allocational and Operational boundaries.

The Rimland theory on the other hand was introduced by Nicholas Spykman in 1943 through his book; The Geography of the Peace. Although Spkyman agreed the heartland to be the epicentre of global geo-political preponderance, he viewed the Inner Marginal Crescent as an important geographical section to curtailing the powers of the Eurasian Heartland (Davutoglu, 1997). Hence, Spykman proposed an alternative to Mackinder’s quote (Fettweis, 2000). He replaced the term ‘Heartland’ with ‘Eurasia’ and ‘Inner Marginal’ Crescent with ‘Rimland’ (Meinig, 1956). The quote read; “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia and who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world” (Spykman, 1944). The map above shows the two critical geographical sections defined as per the Rimland theory. Compared to the Heartland theory, the Rimland theory was found to be more lethal and practical, in formulating the policy of containment against communism during the Cold War (Elahi, 2015). The theory continues to be applied in American foreign policy even after the Cold War (Davutoglu, 1997).

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Background to the Belt & Road Initiative

President Xi Jinping first announced China’s ambitious project of reincarnating the ancient silk road and maritime silk routes to the world at the Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan and at the People’s Representative Council of Indonesia respectively in 2013 (Cai, 2017). According to The State Council: The Peoples Republic of China (2015), this road and maritime silk route was officially termed ‘Belt & Road Initiative’, and part of its mission is determined to lend a hand to those developing economies that require capital investment to boost their exports and logistic facilities. Therefore, BRI focuses heavily on addressing the infrastructure gap in many developing nation-states which are members of this initiative (Cai, 2017). Hence the governments of these nation-states have welcomed China and BRI with open arms (Xuequan, 2016). Due to this geopolitical grand strategy, BRI will enable China to connect with the world through five routes. These five routes are; West & Central Europe through Central Asia and East Europe, West Asia through Central Asia, South Asia through South East Asia, Southern Europe through South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Suez Canal and Mediterranean Sea followed by South Pacific Ocean through South China Sea (HKTDC, 2018). Further, BRI presents five benefits to its member states and they are cultural exchange, support of large-scale infrastructure projects, facilities that enable connectivity, supply-chain cooperation and bi-lateral financial cooperation (HKTDC, 2018). These opportunities are presented as a part of BRI’s mission to create mutually beneficial economic partnerships that lead all member states to economic prosperity (HKTDC, 2018). Moreover, these benefits are officially referred to as the five priorities of BRI. Hence, they are namely; policy coordination, connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people to people bonds (European Bank, 2019, HKTDC, 2018).

Moreover, BRI plans to achieve 30% of the world’s GDP followed by claiming ownership to 35% of global trade when it come into full existence (HKTDC, 2018). Since Sri Lanka was positioned as a key location in the ancient maritime silk route, the nation-state will again perform as a vital geo- strategic location for BRI. Therefore, the US$ 1.5billion worth Colombo Port City project is part of China’s dream to realize their geopolitical vision in the Indian Ocean (Perera, 2016).

Methodology

This research is qualitative in nature. Krippendorff (2013) explains that content analysis is indigenous to communication research and is potentially one of the vital research techniques in social sciences. He further states that content analysis is widely used in intelligent gathering and political studies. This is because a government’s knowledge about political developments in foreign nation-states depend on information received in the form of diplomatic correspondence, foreign broadcasts, academic articles, journalistic articles and speeches made by the political leadership of that sovereign state (Krippendorff, 2013). Hence, content analysis was suitable because the above-mentioned sources were used to gather information for this research.

Content analysis falls under unobtrusive research which means research that does not involve data collection from different people. Hence content analysis is the study of recorded human communications (Pashakhanlou, 2017, pp.447-465). This means data is gathered from secondary sources such as journal articles, books, newspapers, government reports and publications etc. Further Pashakhanlou (2017, pp.447-465) states that in content analysis there are two types of content that can be analysed, and they are manifest content and latent content. He explains that manifest content is observable content, and these are content that can be looked at or listened to. The second is latent content which is the underlying meaning of the content itself (Pashakhanlou, 2017, pp.447-465). In this study, both manifest and latent content were analysed.

Discourse analysis is another methodology applied by the researcher to conduct this study. Discourse analysis means the analysing of language used in secondary sources such as journal articles, books, newspapers, news readings etc. Since this research is based on content analysis and discourse analysis; desk research was used as a methodology and technique. As depicted by the name, desk research is the research technique which is mainly acquired by sitting at a desk. The data for conducting a desk research can be generated through the world wide web, commonly known as the internet.

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Discussion and Findings

Justification of Selecting the Heartland and Rimland

theories

From the proposed map of the BRI below it can be understood that the land-based silk route runs through Mackinder’s Heartland while the maritime silk route connects with Spykman’s Rimland. Hence BRI will be evaluated using both theories to understand China’s geopolitical grand strategy.

Map No. 03: China’s Proposed Map of the BRI

Source: Domestic Economy. (2016). China to Use Iran as Gateway to Europe. Retrieved from https://financialtribune.com/articles/domestic-economy/52735/china-to-use-iran-as-gateway-to-europe

Brinza (2018) observed that it is likely that the Government of China is applying the Heartland and Rimland theories to gain dominance over the World Island. Historically, a super-power would only be able to exert its power either on land or in the ocean (Loy, 2018). However, unlike USA or Russia that only focused on either theory for world dominance, China intends to apply both theories simultaneously to become the 21st Century’s world hegemon (Flint & Xiaotong, 2016). Harper (2017) states that China is likely to create history if BRI comes into full existence because Beijing will then exert its influence on both land and sea and therefore become the first super-power to have done so. Further, Chance and Mafinezam (2016) recommend USA while Banerjee (2016) recommends India to collaborate with BRI because they believe that China is destined to over-shadow US world supremacy in the future. It is important to note that BRI might prove it is not who dominates East Europe that dominates the World Island, but who dominates Far East Asia that will ultimately rule over the World Island. The realization of these theories will finally

pave the road to achieving Mao Zedong’s vision of the east wind prevailing over the west wind (Harper, 2017). Further China applies a strategy of mutual benefit among less powerful nation-states to gain control over the Heartland and Rimland. This geo-strategy is unlike other land-based powers such as Russia and ocean-based powers such as USA that exert influence through aggression and conspiration (Chance & Mafinezam, 2016).

China’s Objectives behind the Belt & Road Initiative

The Belt & Road Initiative is China’s grand strategy to make its mark on the global geopolitical stage (Ploberger, 2016). Curran (2016) states that the magnitude of this project is even larger than the Marshall Plan which was USA’s initiative to financially aid Western, Central, Northern and Southern European countries to rebuild their economies after WWII. However, Shen and Chan (2018) object to this argument because they believe it is too early to make such a comment. From 1948 to 1951 the Marshall Plan donated US$ 13billion to those war-torn nation-states which are now part of the collective defence agreement, NATO (Shen & Chan, 2018). The present value of the Marshall Plan is estimated as US$ 135billion (Steil & Rocca, 2018). BRI on the other hand is estimated to spend US$ 900billion to fulfil the infrastructure gap in more than 68 developing countries (Bruce-Lockhart, 2017). Therefore, if China’s Belt & Road Initiative comes into full realization it will be seven times larger than USA’s Marshall Plan.

Through this study, it was observed that China anticipates fulfilling four objectives. The first is to mitigate the over-dependency on existing sea lanes (Brady, 2017). Most of China’s trade flows through sea routes. As an ocean-based super-power, the USA dominates the Yellow, East China and South China Seas. This is a major issue for China because it must depend on the security provided by USA for shipping lines that pass through these waters. Since China is a potential rival for USA’s world dominance, the Government of China is wary of any strategic motive by its rival that can incapacitate China’s imports and exports (Harper, 2017). The second is to bridge the inconsistent economic disparity within China’s western and eastern populations.

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Most of the wealthiest population reside in the metropolitan eastern coastline while the poorest live in the rural western interior. This growing disparity is considered a threat to China’s sovereignty because separatist movements in provinces such as Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang-Uyghur blame the Government of China for the impoverishment of their people and justifies it as their cause for self-determination (Armstrong, 2012). The third is to provide employment opportunities to its growing working class (Shen & Chan, 2018) and the fourth is to exert its political, economic, cultural and technological influence on those 68 nation-states which are part of BRI (Albert, 2018).

To achieve the first objective, China has developed two geo-strategies. The first is to promote a land-based transport system that runs through the Eurasian Heartland to Europe. Hence China is currently boosting the necessary infrastructure facilities in inland cities such as Almaty in Kazakhstan, Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan, Samarqand in Uzbekistan, Dushanbe in Tajikistan, Islamabad in Pakistan and Teheran in Iran. Prominent of them all is the Khorgos Gateway in Kazakhstan which is the largest dry port in the world (Feng, 2017). This geopolitical grand strategy enables China to cement its footing and spread its influence on Mackiner’s Heartland. The second is to secure a stable presence in the Indian Ocean through the String of Pearls strategy (Townshend, 2011). This scheme includes the construction, fortification or modernization of sea ports along the rim of the Indian Ocean. These include the sea ports in Hainan and Yongxing islands of China, Kayukphyu in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Marao in Maldives, Gwadar in Pakistan, Lamu in Kenya, Port Sudan in Sudan followed by a Chinese naval base in Djibouti. This geopolitcal grand strategy will provide China to solidify its position and further spread its influence on Spykman’s Rimland. It is important to note that USA does not have a strong foothold in these locations mentioned above which are situated in the Heartland and Rimland.

The second objective is also achieved through two strategies. The first is by linking cities in the western interior to the Belt & Road Initiative. By doing so land locked cities in China such as Xi’an, Ürümqi, Kashgar, Lanzhou and Aksu have experienced radical infrastructure developments. The second is through

several mega infrastructure projects that will help to connect the rural western population with the cosmopolitan east. These include Jingjinji mega-city project, South to North Water Transfer Project, the Beijing Capital International Airport, Bohai Strait Tunnel project, the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge project and the Shenzhen–Zhongshan Bridge project. These projects will thereby enable those citizens to access resources, knowledge and expertise of the east. Furthermore, for China’s eastern corporations this is an opportunity to access and to exploit natural resources and man power of the west. Nevertherless, this will enable Beijing a clear route to access those Central Asian Countries that lie in Markinder’s Heartland.

Addressing the infrastructure gap in developing countries is China’s primary geopolitical grand strategy to achieve its third and fourth objectives. Therefore, China has taken the initiative to invest in 1700 projects which include railway systems, highways, pipelines, hydropower stations, sea ports, air ports and bridges in these nation-states (Huang, 2017). Examples of other international infrastructure projects include, the Minsk Industrial Park in Belarus, Sinopec Refinery in Saudi Arabia, Fibre optic network in Pakistan, Tavan Togoli Coal Deposit in Mongolia, Vinh Tan 01 Thermal Power Plant in Vietnam, Digital Free Trade Zone in Malaysia and the Colombo Port City Project in Sri Lanka.

By coming forward to aid developing countries in infrastructure projects mentioned above, the Chinese government deploys its nationals on those construction sites. This is because the construction of the above projects are contracted to Chinese construction firms. By doing so the Chinese government creates job opportunities abroad for its growing working-class population and hence addresses the domestic issue of insufficient employment opportunities (Shen and Chan, 2018). As a result, there were seven Chinese companies in the top 10 global contractors list as of 2017 and 2018 (ENR, 2018; ENR, 2017). They include, China State Construction Engineering Corp. Ltd., China Railway Group Ltd., China Railway Construction Corp Ltd., China Communication Construction Group Ltd., Power Construction Corp. of China, Shanghai Construction Group, and China Matallurgical Group

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Corp. Hence, it can be observed that connectivity to the Heartland and Rimland lie at the heart of China’s Belt & Road Initiative.

Qing (2015) observed that compared to the USA, China grants loans with much less terms and conditions. Hence it provides China the opportunity to approach authoritarian governments, military regimes and countries suffering from internal conflicts to promote its geopolitical grand strategy by helping them meet their infrastructure gaps. Since these nation-states are desperate for foreign assistance, they welcome infrastructure projects under the Belt & Road Initiative with open arms (Xuequan, 2016). However, since it is unlikely that these governments are able to re-pay the loans obtained, as a solution, the management of those facilities are transferred to the Government of China (Chellaney, 2017). This is a strategic move to gain a foot hold in key geographical locations in the Heartland and along the Rimland so that China can challenge the existing supremacy of the United States of America.

Challenges that arise from the Belt & Road Initiative

Although many developing nation-states benefit from BRI, this ambitious project of the 21st Century poses several challenges to other regional and global super-powers which in-turn can unite to hinder the progress of the Belt & Road Initiative. Through this study four such potential geo-political challenges were observed.

The first is China’s growing influence in Central Asia (Kirisci & Le Corre, 2018). This is threatening Russia’s existing sphere of influence in the region. The political leadership of Russia believes that it still possesses the privilege to interfere in the foreign affairs of its former Soviet states (Bakalova & Rogova, 2017). However, Swanstrom (2012) states that similar to East European nation-states, Central Asian nation-states also prefer to break away from Russian influence. The BRI initiative therefore provides a perfect opportunity to do so.

The second is India fearing it might lose the state of Jammu-Kashmir to Pakistan due to a joint military offensive by Pakistani and Chinese forces (Shah, 2017). The north Indian state of Jammu-Kashmir is a disputed territory because Pakistan claims it

as their sovereign land (Mohan, 1992). India has fought a series of wars against Pakistan over this territory in 1947, 1965 and in 1999. China on the other hand borders Jammu-Kashmir to the north. India has also confronted Chinese expansionism in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 (Graver, 2011). Lubell (2015) explains that BRI has made China very close to Pakistan due to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. According to The Economic Times (2019), to make matters worse, this corridor runs through the controvertial, Pakistan occupied territory of Kashmir. Therefore, Lubell (2015) justifies why New Delhi should be cautious against BRI as it can threaten India’s sovereignty.

The third is USA being threatened by BRI. This is because Beijing strategically uses it as a tool to undermine the naval superiority of USA through the land based economic belt (Li & Wang, 2015) and String of Pearls strategy (Townshend, 2011) followed by replacing the current Bretton Woods system established by Washington since 1944 (Ikenberry & Lim, 2017). This system is USA’s soft power instrument to control the world economy through the World Bank Group, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization (Wong et al, 2017). Through BRI, China will introduce similar financial and trade institutions of equal or larger magnitude. These institutions include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Silk Road Fund, China Development Bank and Exim Bank of China (Subachchi, 2015). According to Ikenberry and Lim (2017), these institutions currently work closely with the governments attached to BRI and it is likely that they will pose a great challenge to existing American institutionalism in the future. In other words China might equal or over-shdow the exisiting post WWII and post Cold War American unipolar hegemony.

The fourth is the collapse of regional organizations due to member-states having a divided opinion about BRI and escalating Chinese influence in the region. This phenomenon is evident in regional organizations such as SAARC and ASEAN. The regional powers of these two organizations; India and Indonesia respectively are challenged by China’s increasing power over the Indian Ocean and South China Sea (Cochrane, 2017). Further member-states are more likely to side with China which threatens the hegemonic status of these two regional powers (Daily Mirror, 2018).

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Conclusion

This study concludes that China’s Belt and Road Initiative does enable China to solidify its presence and influence in Mackinder’s Heartland and Spykman’s Rimland simultaneously. Essentially, Heartland theory explains that dominance of the Eurasian landmass will lead to world supremacy while the Rimland theory counter argues that dominance over the European and Asian coastal belt would lead to the same. Nevertheless, the Government of China does not publicly acknowledge that BRI is a geopolitical grand strategy. Instead it is a series of economic and infrastructure collaborations that help prosper and uplift living standards of developing nation-states together with China.

However, through this study it was observed that China intends to achieve four objectives through BRI. They include; mitigating overdependency on existing sea lanes, developing China’s rural western interiors, creating job opportunities for China’s growing working-class population followed by exerting political, economic, socio-cultural and technological influence on those 68 nation-states that are a part of the Belt & Road Initiative.

Furthermore, in the eyes of the United States and other regionally powerful states such as India, Indonesia and Russia, China’s political influence on the international system through the Belt & Road Initiative is seen as a foreboding threat. The United States is critical because China’s recently established global monetary institutions (i.e.: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Silk Road Fund etc.) which finance BRI are becoming increasingly influential among developing countries. Therefore it is only a matter of time that these Chinese global monetary institutions will rival and even over-shadow the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund. This situation may challenge the United States’ current position as the most powerful economy of the world. Furthermore, other regionally powerful nation-states are concerned because China through BRI is penetrating into their spheres of influence. This is because China’s involvement in Central Asia undermines the Russian sphere of influence. Moreover, China working closely with South Asian and South East Asian nation-states have challenged the political dynamic of those regions where India and Indonesia are considered

regional superpowers respectively. Nevertheless, not all nation-states in South East Asia are willing to surrender their territory in the South China Sea to China. They include Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Hence, the dispute in the South China Sea may become an opportunity for the United States and the above mentioned nation-states together with Indonesia to team up against Chinese expansionism in the region. However, other nation-states in the same region support China’s claim to the South China sea or remain neutral on the issue. These countries include Cambodia, Laos, Singapore and Thailand. This division within ASEAN helps China to proceed with its geopolitical vision as long as the dispute remains under debate.

However, through the conduct of content and discourse analysis it can be assumed that BRI helps China to realise the ultimate vision of Mao Zedong’s east wind prevailing over the west wind. Therefore, the significance of this study is that it alters Mackiner’s and Spykman’s geopolitical statements to meet present day realities. Hence, it is not who dominates East Europe or the rimland that would rule over the World, but who commands Far East Asia that will ultimately decide the destinies of the world.

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Sri Lanka’s Naval Role Beyond Gunboat Diplomacy:

National and Regional Security

A.P.A. Prasanga*

“The Best Ambassador is a Man of War.”

--Oliver Cromwell

ABSTRACT

The foreign policies of the USA and of China appear to be based on aspirations to create a unipolar world, driven by the need to access real but unevenly distributed global resources across fictitious national boundaries defended by force, giving rise to tensions. Sri Lanka straddles important maritime routes, has the world’s largest natural harbor and is a unique platform that can function as an entrepôt for capital and expertise flowing into regions of the IORA, SAARC, BIMSTEC and Antarctica. Furthermore, it can serve as a hub for transshipment of commodities, goods and services flowing out of these regions and into the global markets. The functioning of the island as an entrepôt requires the skillful balancing of global geo-strategic equations, as well as the configuration of regional ones due to the local and international politics. Within this context, naval forces play three main roles, namely: military, policing and diplomatic, and the diplomatic role of the navy can have two arms. The military arm is also called ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’, and the strategic arm is based on confidence-building and conflict resolution. This study focuses on the soft power diplomacy of the Sri Lanka Navy for the management of the complex strategic relations which require power, political will and diplomatic skill. It shows that the current historical moment offers the Sri Lankan Navy a unique opportunity to play a significant role in the task of balancing regional geo-strategic equations in ways that enable the guaranteeing of the free movement of shipping to and from the island. It also adds to the literature on Sri Lanka Naval diplomacy, aimed at the maintenance of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean Region. The paper concludes that the setting up of an Indian Ocean Treaty Organization, governing the conduct of maritime forces within the Indian Ocean, is a vital mechanism for the balancing of regional geo-strategic equations; and that the Sri Lanka’s naval soft diplomacy has a vital role to play in hosting and housing this mechanism on the island entrepôt.

Keywords: Sri Lanka Navy, Soft Diplomacy, Indian Ocean Region, Entrepôt, Indian Ocean Treaty Organization

Introduction

Historically, a tendency towards the integration of large areas of territory and their populations under a single perceptual paradigm, generates a single set of operational principles with a concomitant system of technologies and beliefs. Alliances through subterfuge, and subversion, and forceful subjugation, can be observed. The center of this centrifugal dynamic has been occupied by different structures and states at different times (Ketter, 2004). The movement itself however has been constant, with varying strengths and successes at varying times, with an overall tendency towards increasing success despite strong resistances and coordinated disruptions (Green, 2014).

The center of this movement is currently occupied by the United States of America and its allies and sympathizers, with their scientific methods and the technologies it has generated and their systems of process rather than personality-driven governance, and management bound by a set of principles codified in a document known as the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (United Nations, 2018).

The current global context makes it impossible for any single state to wield the power required to impose its political will on others. This has given

Research Article 02

* A.P.A. Prasanga, Lieutenant Commander, Sri Lanka Navy. Email: apa.prasanga@gmail.com

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rise to alliances of varying strengths. The credibility, the sovereignty and political power of an entrepôt state will depend on the success with which it relates to these alliances, and all entities that wish to avail themselves of its services (Murphy, 2017). In the Sri Lankan context, it can be argued that the state is called upon to accommodate and contribute to the geopolitical task of rebalancing regional geo-strategic equations that govern access to, and utilization of, the Indian Ocean Region (Wong, 2019).

Background to the Study

Throughout history, naval forces have played a prominent role in supporting foreign policy objectives. Navies support political objectives through cooperative diplomacy and the use of soft power, and they can also support them through coercive naval diplomacy by the use of hard power, often referred to as gunboat diplomacy (Widen, 2011).

The presence and vicinity of foreign warships, submarines, and aircrafts within the same dimensional space are potential hazards which can cause accidents and incidents in the Indian Ocean Region (Michel & Sticklor, 2012). It can be hypothesized that a naval armament modernization program can create undesirable tensions, making maritime arms control and confidence building an important aspect of maritime diplomacy (Pattiradjawane & Soebagjo, 2017).

Traditionally an entrepôt can be understood to be a port, city, or any other center to which goods are brought for import and export, and for collection and distribution (Martinus, 2015). Entrepôt trade is a trade where imported goods from one country are re-exported to another country with or without any additional processing or repackaging (Lockhart, 2014). Re-exportation is generally done without substantial transformation of the item imported at the re-exporting port (Ken, 2018).

Entrepôts usually have good harboring facilities to support shipping. These shipping facilities become the focus of power plays between various states using the entrepôt (Kaminski and Raballand, 2013). The more or less permanent presence of maritime forces of the states utilizing the entrepôt becomes

a significant feature of entrepôts (Golub, 2012). Warehousing is a major component of transshipment and bonded warehouse complexes are an essential component of entrepôts exposing large volumes of goods to risk (Kaminski & Raballand, 2013). Therefore, the presence and interaction of maritime forces are required to mitigate and manage these risks.

A large function of modern entrepôts is the provision of finance for trade. This function increasingly also moves into the financing of the manufacturing of the goods traded via the entrepôt (Fossé, 2017). The entrepôt, therefore, emerges as a platform, housing the most complex elements of the developmental process, as it impacts the regions serviced by the entrepôt and the global economy as well.

The objective of this study was to establish that the Sri Lankan Navy has the perceptual, conceptual and organizational capacity to make significant contributions towards the island’s role as an entrepôt, and to outline the nature of the contributions that it can make. The research methodology was mixed using factual data sources, and primary data gathered from interviews.

Evolution of Entrepôt Trade

Entrepôts and entrepôt trade can be traced back to medieval times, when staple ports, the earliest form of entrepôts, were established along major trade routes (Boon, 2013). Merchants were to unload their cargo at the staple port and trade with local customers within a few days, before being permitted to reload the unsold goods and travel onwards. Calais, a port in France, was designated as a staple port for wool and leather exports, and all wool sold overseas was first taken to Calais, as it had the exclusive right to trade raw wool (Feenstra & Hanson, 2014).

Entrepôts also thrived in early-modern historical periods when the maritime silk route also known as spice routes, operated with a network of sea routes, linking the East with the West and stretched from China to Middle East and Europe, passing Philippines, Indonesia, Malacca, the Bay of Bengal and Sri Lanka on the way to Europe via the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea, and to the southern coast of Africa (Bopearachchi, 2014).

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The ports along the maritime silk route not only facilitated trade, but also the exchange of knowledge, religions, languages, expertise and skills (Irwin, 1978). Traders however, were often reluctant to travel the entire, mostly perilous, route and thus relied on entrepôts along the way to sell their goods (Boon, 2013). Traders often ship their merchandise to the port of destination via another convenient port which then becomes the entrepôt trade port. The ancient natural harbors around the Sri Lanka were busy ports. These included Manthai in 3rd Century BCE to 11th CE in the northwest of Mannar, Godawaya in 1st Century BCE to 10th CE in the south a small fishing hamlet located at the mouth of the Walawe river, between Ambalantota and Hambantota and Gokanna in the east of Trincomalee and the adjacent navigable rivers facilitated trade with inland cities such as Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa (Kiribamune, 1991).

The island of Sri Lanka had previously been known by many other names, such as Lanka to the Indians, Serendib to the Arabs, Seylan to the Europeans, Taprobane to the Greeks and Ceylon to the British (Weerakkody, 1981). Fleets of Chinese ships carrying silk and ceramic-ware to the East African coast and the Arabian vessels transporting goods to Europe docked at the ports of Sri Lanka, located mid-way in the long sea-routes providing necessary potable water to seafarers (Weerakkody, 1987). In the modern era, Sri Lanka has maritime significance fitting to its strategic location as a nexus in regional and global geo-strategic equations (Sri Lanka Department of National Planning, 2018).

Strategic Factors of Indian Ocean Region

The strategic disputes generated within the Indian Ocean by the current global context and the developmental activities of the contextual economies are those of security and freedom of movement of resources. India is consolidating its position as the regional power of South Asia, China is also engaged in consolidating its position as the regional power in South East Asia, resulting in China’s increasing competition with the USA and its allies for greater global power and access to resources (Michel & Sticklor, 2012). Concurrently, there is rivalry between India and China for resource extraction in the Indian Ocean. The nuclear power imbalance

between India and Pakistan, the impact of possible changes in the strategic relationship between India and the US and the impact of disasters on strategic capacity and the limitations of perceptual capacity are required to balance regional geo-strategic equations. The political constraints and the consequent need for mass perceptual modification balance these equations. The relative strength of surface and submarine naval fleets, air force and ballistic missile capacities, the civil and military interfaces for the joint exercise of power in operational deployments, and the possibility of a strengthening of ongoing attempts to change the principles underlying the center of the integrative centrifugal dynamic, lead to an abandonment of process-governed governance in favour of governance by personality and arbitrary diktat.

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, (2010) argued that the IOR strategic issues that can rapidly escalate are centered on the instability of the petroleum exporting states. The forms of military clash that would affect the flow of petroleum to the east through the straits of Malacca include the India-Pakistan conflict that could include a serious Air-Sea conflict or even escalate to a nuclear warfare; conflict and tension between India and China as regional rivals to the north of the IOR and low level clashes that occur periodically in the Sichuan Glacier area; the struggle for influence between the US and China; the limited naval-air build up in various parts of the rest of the region; the risk of terrorism; the struggle between religious and secular rule; endemic transnational and maritime disputes and potential conflicts and disputes relating to offshore resources.

Today, the resource-rich IOR is in the midst of a major geopolitical struggle that may be viewed as a continuation of the ‘Great Game’ played out by the British government in south and central Asia (De Silva-Ranasinghe, 2011). This struggle has seen increasing resistance to the centrifugal core, arising in response to its compensatory centripetal force that affects its peripheral areas. In most cases, this resistance is expressed through attempts by the regional powers to dominate smaller states and form alliances. Such alliances may not reject the changes of the centrifugal dynamic of global civilization, or may take the form of an aggressive rejection of the global trend of civilizational development couched

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in nationalism, based on claims to the resurrection and reestablishment of past civilizations imagined as being preferable to the currently global one. In such situations, claims are often made to a sovereign right to reject global norms and principles, territorial seizure by non-State structures and attacks on supply chains. Furthermore, engaging in illegal activities by forces marginalized by their rejection of global norms and principles such as traffickers of people, arms, drugs and other elements, pirates, terrorist movements and armed campaigns for national liberation or self-determination.

Naval Diplomacy

Naval diplomacy has been used since ships were put into sea, and is one of the most pragmatic means of cooperating among countries (Le Mière, 2014). The political or diplomatic role of sea power is unique to navies and has no parallel on land, or in the air (Pilewski, 2004). Naval maritime thinkers like Mahan and Corbett have written on the preparation for, and the conduct of, war at sea. Mahan talks of naval “prestige” and “flying the flag,” while Corbett acknowledges peacetime naval employment (Widen, 2011). Political benefits of the threat of force, the use of limited force, and “showing the flag” are well known and implicitly understood.

Naval diplomacy before the Second World War was primarily for those maritime States with global ambitions (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2010). Interest in naval diplomacy as a separate topic grew in the 1970s, in the aftermath of the Cold War, transformation in world politics and reassessment of the utility of force (Le Mière, 2014). Naval diplomacy expanded with the increase in the number of maritime stakeholders. New aspects such as theatre security cooperation, HADR and enforcement of no-fly zones identified the country’s presence in world affairs as nations emerged and consolidated within maritime strategic portfolios (Ghosh, 2001).

Foreign cooperation in ancient times was based largely on maritime transport for trade and commerce (Widen, 2011). Supplies for kingdoms was fulfilled by merchants travelling overseas from continent to continent carrying goods. Diplomacy was established via merchants who represented the king, and were equipped to use force for commercial ambitions (Le Mière, 2014). Regional navies in the

present context occupy a centralised position in the Indian Ocean along maritime trade routes with numerous bays and anchorages, which provided adequate facilities for ships which are engaged in transit trade.

Naval Diplomacy in the Pursuit of Regional

Cooperation

The 21st Century will be a maritime as well as an Asian Century, due to the pervasive nature of global sea trade, and the predominantly maritime environment of the Indo-Pacific region (Ketter, 2004). A natural follow up on this area is on the utility of Navies as tools of statecraft from both hard and soft power perspectives, as well as an emerging maritime school of strategic thought in the maritime powers of the Indian Ocean Region (Ghosh, 2001). Almost all naval forces contribute to various public diplomacy efforts by applying basic tools, including humanitarian-relief operations and construction works, as well as international military education and training programs (Pilewski, 2004).

The Directorate of Sri Lanka Naval Foreign Cooperation was established under the office of Director General Operations due to the indivisibility of the above activities from operations focusing on the scope of maintaining relations with other Navies and International Organizations, liaising with Ministry of External Affairs and Foreign Affairs division of the Ministry of Defence, representing and promoting the maritime interests of the country and organizing and supporting foreign events concerned with the Sri Lanka Navy.

The Sri Lanka Navy has been conducting the annual Galle Dialogue International Maritime Conference with the partnership of the regional organizations; Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). This engagement constitutes a major platform to eradicate maritime blindness and enhance regional cooperation for the enhancement of regional peace and stability.

In addition, Sri Lanka routinely participates in International Naval Exercises such as AMAN in Pakistan, LIMA in Malaysia, IMDEX in Singapore, IMMSAREX in Bangladesh, DOSTHI in Maldives,

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MILAN in Andaman and Nicobar, India, SLINEX in alternatively in India & Sri Lanka, KAKADU in Australia, KOMODO in Indonesia and AEDEX in Abu Dhabi. This cooperation will enhance the interoperability of maritime forces, by use of hard power to fight against traditional and non-traditional security issues in the Indian Ocean Region.

A naval ship at sea is considered to hold the rights of an embassy of a sovereign territory. Ship visits to foreign nations are different in nature, with elements such as goodwill, training, logistic replenishment or operational requirements all coming into play. When a foreign naval ship visits a harbour, there are various customary good practices accorded by the host Navy as part of naval tradition. When considering the statistics of foreign naval ship visits to Sri Lanka from 2009 to 2018, there had been 437 foreign naval ships from 28 countries, which is an average of 45 ships per year. This reconfirms that, just as Sri Lanka has been a maritime hub in the past, it has the potential to become a regional maritime center in the future, and would also be called upon to balance geo-strategic equations in the Indian Ocean Region.

The Sri Lanka Navy currently conducts staff talks with the Indian Navy, Pakistan Navy and US Navy. Staff talks with other foreign navies have become one of the main and most effective means of understanding and cooperating with various aspects when dealing with foreign countries and establishing regional cohesiveness and confidence building. These staff talks have produced opportunities to engage in foreign training programs and participate in joint fleet exercises with foreign navies that invariably enhance cooperation with other countries.

Discussion

Naval diplomacy necessitates the use of naval forces in support of foreign policy objectives to build ‘bridges of friendship,’ and strengthen international cooperation on the one hand, and to signal capability and intent to deter potential adversaries on the other (Le Mière, 2014). Hence, bilateral and regional partnerships are needed to effectively engage and complement the balance of power in the Indian Ocean Region. Sound maritime cooperation is pivotal in forming and continuing strong relationships with regional and extra regional

countries. Sri Lanka’s Naval Foreign Cooperation plays an important diplomatic role among regional countries that maintain the balance of power in the Indian Ocean Region, while facilitating regional peace and stability.

What is, therefore, required for the future is a Strategic Resource Allocation Initiative (SRAI), led by Sri Lanka by virtue of its geostrategic location. This initiative will have to effectively engage the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Antarctic, under which resource allocation can be planned and regulated, and deployed by a Joint Task Force.

It shows that the current historical moment offers the Sri Lankan Navy a unique opportunity to play a significant role in the task of balancing regional geo-strategic equations in ways that enable the guaranteeing of the free movement of shipping to and from the island. This analysis and the recommendations based thereon will contribute towards the conceptualization and implementation of processes and structural mechanisms that will help balance these equations. It also adds to the literature on Sri Lanka Naval diplomacy, aimed at the maintenance of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean Region. There is a clear need for an international treaty subscribed to by all nations that use the maritime routes across the Indian Ocean. This Indian Ocean Treaty under which all participants will contribute towards and collaborate with each other, in order to maintain a collective presence in the Indian Ocean would agree that sound maritime cooperation should be regarded as pivotal in forming and continuing strong relationships among countries, in order to:

a. Ensure the free movement of their vessels and cargoes.

b. Prevent criminal activities and operations.

c. Ensure that the provisions of international maritime law prevail.

d. Ensure that submarines and other naval vessels observe clearly defined protocols when approaching or transiting the Indian Ocean.

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The emergence of Sri Lanka as an entrepôt through which capital flows into these regions via a regional ISBAC (IORA, SAARC, BIMSTEC, Antarctic and Colombo) stock exchange, and finished goods, services and resources are transshipped to global markets, via its sea and air ports; as a platform housing the strategic function of the global developmental process; as a center linking the IORA, SAARC, BIMSTEC and Antarctica; and also as a location for regional corporate headquarters and center for the housing and development of the advanced human resource required to manage the developmental process in these region, will give the island the responsibility of ensuring that such a SRAI is initiated and sustained.

This will necessitate its engagement with the global powers at a regional level, and the generation of several mechanisms. These include the ISBAC Regional Stock Exchange and a Humanitarian City at Hambantota that brings supply chains together with advanced human resources and logistical support to form a confluence that supports disaster management and risk reduction processes throughout the regions linked by the island, and several megapolises in the island’s metro regions, which are designed to house the advanced human resources required for the management of the developmental process.

In order to accomplish this task, the Sri Lankan state will have to generate mechanisms that engage these alliances and states in order to build consensual Standard Operating Processes governing access to the entrepôt and to all maritime routes that exist. These two arms must be held together, and managed by a strong and well-resourced policing mechanism to balance all those states that wish to utilize the entrepôt and contribute expertise, materials and manpower.

Conclusion

The western scientific method has exposed the unsustainable nature of the current civilization of the Homo Sapiens species, and its inherent threat to its own continued survival. Further, it has consequently

secured the commitment of the species to the transformation of this civilization into a sustainable and resilient one, driven towards clear objectives by planetary guidance systems based on inclusiveness, equity and forward vision.

Therefore, Sri Lanka should maintain supportive institutional structures and processes required for the facilitation of economic and technological competition, collaboration and cooperation for the maintenance of the peace and stability of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). To achieve this, the armed forces have important contributions to make towards the successful accomplishment; the Navy and the Air power are likely to be called upon to play a much larger role than the Army since, unlike the Army, they operate within the globally contiguous media of the ocean and the atmosphere, which do not present physical borders that can help monitor and manage the movement of men and materials.

It can be suggested that the Sri Lanka Naval diplomatic role needs to be flexible enough to cooperate with peripheral countries to play a significant role in order to address regional maritime security concerns, while aiming to maintain secure seas for all the regional and extra regional countries, and contribute for the establishment of a global maritime security framework.

The security of this complex role that is emerging for this island demands the establishment of an Indian Ocean Treaty Organization (IOTO) as a mechanism to balance the geo-strategic equations in the region, to ensure the security of these massive investments and the advanced human resources required to manage them. Therefore, Sri Lanka’s naval soft diplomacy has a vital role to play, in hosting and housing this mechanism on the island entrepôt, for the betterment of national and regional security and development.

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China’s Conflict Resolution Approach in South Sudan

Shalika Dias*

ABSTRACT

Third party intervention in internal armed conflicts has a long-history. When conflict parties realize that they cannot reach a common ground, they turn to external intervention. The success or failure of a third party involvement does not merely depend on the perception of a third party or by the parties to the conflict. Interests and capabilities of the intervener too make a profound impact. South Sudan has become China’s test-ground for its conflict resolution approaches. South Sudan has accepted China as an active third party in resolving their internal armed conflict due to China’s longstanding principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. Though, China drives a number of bilateral and multilateral mediation efforts, none of them have been successful in resolving the armed conflict. However, instead of leaving the chaotic environment, China is attempting to mediate the armed conflict as her participation in conflict resolution is an unavoidable byproduct of the increased economic engagement with South Sudan. In this backdrop, this research attempted to explore the reasons as to why China carries out mediation efforts in the South Sudanese armed conflict when there are severe security threats over their economic interests. The author objectivized to extend the current knowledge on effectiveness of China’s conflict resolution strategies, her capabilities of practicing non-interference policy in internal armed conflicts and to identify whether China can become a reliable global actor in conflict resolution by answering the above research problem.

Keywords: Mediation, Non-interference, Leverage Power, Process-based Intervention

Introduction

China’s longstanding principle of non-interference in other states’ internal affairs has resulted in South Sudan’s identification of China as a non-interfering power which is distinct from historical interventionist Western powers such as France and the United States. China’s participation in conflict resolution is inevitably a byproduct of increased Chinese economic engagement with South Sudan since 2011. Though, China drives a number of bilateral and multilateral mediation efforts, none of them have been able to bring solutions to the armed conflict. China’s financial support performs as the leverage power to bring conflict parties to the negotiation table and avoid attacks for short-periods of time. However, the leverage power has been unable to manipulate conflict parties towards a solid conflict resolution.

However, instead of leaving the chaotic environment, China is expanding its diplomatic and economic engagement in South Sudan while attempting to mediate the armed conflict. In this backdrop, this research explored as to why China carried out mediation efforts in the South Sudanese armed conflict when there are severe security threats over their economic interests.

Methodology

The mode of enquiry of the research study was the qualitative approach embedded in the philosophy of empiricism. The author primarily concentrated on secondary resources. Observations on South Sudanese armed Conflict, China’s interests in South Sudan and their actions in conflict resolution are based on facts and figures collected through subject and topic-related books, journals and electronic media. The author’s open, flexible and unconstructed approach is framed through the concepts of Peace and Conflict Studies and International Relations.

South Sudan’s Strategic Significance to China

South Sudan is strategically significant to China due to its oil wealth and geopolitical location in the East African region. These two significant aspects evolved due to the political and economic changes of South Sudan.

Converging interests of Beijing and Juba deepened economic and diplomatic relations since South Sudan’s secession from Sudan in 2005. South Sudan’s

Research Article 03

* Shalika Dias, Junior Research Associate, Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies. Email: Shalika@bcis.edu.lk

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largely untapped oil reserves provided enough incentives to China to turn towards South Sudan. Conversely, Chinese investments in oil exploration and development were indeed necessary for the South Sudanese to demonstrate to the international community that they had substantial economic capabilities to establish a sovereign state. The geopolitical location of South Sudan in East Africa became significant to China since 2013, the year in which China launched its global inter-connectivity plan, Belt & Road Initiative (BRI). Chinese investment in communication and transportation expanded and the Government of South Sudan agreed with almost all BRI investment plans due to the economic losses generated by the internal armed conflict erupted in 2013.

Oil Wealth

China removed its national red tape in open economy since 1980s under the policy of ‘Go Global’ launched by Deng Xiaoping. As a consequence of its new economic policy, China became incapable of fulfilling oil demand for national production. From 1994 to 2000, Beijing’s oil consumption increased from 55% and the country was able to produce only 11% (Craig, 2007). China had to depend on energy rich countries and it resulted in expanded foreign relations. They reached oil-rich countries via a new energy policy introduced by the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng in 1991.

Under its new energy policy, China reached oil-rich countries by extending financial aid (Blazevic, 2009) and allowing private oil companies such as China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC), China National Petrochemical Cooperation and China National Offshore Cooperation to expand its businesses abroad. Driven by the energy needs and backed by the state, national oil companies led the ‘Go Global’ March (International Crisis Group, 2017).

China had full-spectrum relations with Sudan over nearly 25 years, especially from 1995 when the Chinese-Sudanese petro-partnership began. The unified Sudan was China’s third largest trade partner in Africa, a lucrative oil theater and a political ally (Large, 2014). Mining and construction companies

joined Chinese oil companies in Sudan. CNPC and International Sudan hold the largest stakes in the country’s two most important oil consortiums. Their main producing blocks were located across the transitional North-South border zone and in Southern Sudan (Reeves, 2002). However, from 1997-1999, Chinese oil interests were severely threatened by internal armed conflict in Sudan.

Chinese businesses trickled into the capital Juba, soon after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed. The government of South Sudan required the oil revenue, the majority of which came from Chinese-operated oil fields, and accounted for 98% of South Sudan’s state revenue (Hodzi, 2017). Salva Kiir, Sudan’s first Prime Minister and South Sudan’s first President, bluntly reminded Chinese leaders during his 2007 visit to Beijing that most of oil fields lie in the South Sudan and the CPA guaranteed its right to secede. Beijing opened a consulate in Juba the following year as a consequence.

As of January 2014, South Sudan has approximately 3.5 billion barrels of proved oil reserves with an estimated value of US$38 billion based on existing oil fields making South Sudan’s oil reserve three times more than that of Sudan Two Thirds of oil reserves were under the control of Chinese state-owned enterprises such as the CNPC (Hodzi, 2017). Currently, China has become South Sudan’s major oil investor and leading importer.

Strategic Location of South Sudan in East Africa

China’s most ambitious global economic project in the 21st Century is the BRI. The Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Route connect China to Asia, Africa and Europe and their adjacent seas. China attempts to connect different continents and countries together via infrastructure such as ports, rail road, roads, economic zones and oil pipelines. A small group of African States such as South Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania are partners of BRI who have officially declared their participation. The geographical location of Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia are vital in the intercontinental plan as they connect East Africa to the Red Sea and to the Indian Ocean via Djibouti.

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Map 1- Geographical Location of South Sudan,

Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia

Source- “South Sudan, DRC Discuss Broad Security, Crises Resolution.” Journal du Cameroun, https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/south-sudan-drc-discuss-border-security-crises-resolution/

It can be argued that South Sudan’s geographical location in the East African region is vital to Beijing’s BRI plan in Africa due to two main reasons. One is, China attempts to import Juba’s crude oil to Beijing via the Red Sea and then via the Indian Ocean. Though South Sudan has 75% of oil resources, Sudan has benefited from oil infrastructure. South Sudan pays high transit charges on its oil exports to Sudan. Therefore, South Sudan and China are keen to use the potentially cheaper corridor for oil exports. Juba-Khartoum shutdown of oil production in 2012, made China aware of the necessity of alternative routes for South Sudanese oil transportation. Second, China spillover effects of South Sudanese armed conflict may destabilize other BRI African countries in which China carries out massive infrastructure projects.

Map 2- Chinese Main BRI Projects in Kenya,

Uganda and Africa

Source- Korybco, A. “The Chinese –Indian New Cold War-East Africa.” Commandeleven, https://www.commandeleven.com/the-chinese-indian-new-cold-war-east-africa/

It can be argued that oil wealth and strategic location of South Sudan in the East African Region are the two foremost reasons for China to expand economic relations with the country. Thereby, it can be hypothesized that actual or perceived security dilemma of Beijing over the protection of their economic objectives from South Sudanese armed conflict is the underlying cause of their active involvement in the peace process.

South Sudanese Armed Conflict and Impact on

China’s Economic Interests

The 2005 CPA marked the end of united Sudanese second armed conflict and paved the way to South Sudan’s secession from Sudan in 2011 to establish the territory as a sovereign state. It also paved the way to the international community to reengage with Sudan’s oil market and initiate diplomatic and economic relations with South Sudan, the newly independent, oil-rich country in the African continent. However, there was a reemergence of tension between Sudan and South Sudan over oil resources, leaders’ greed over leadership, re-marginalization of civilians on ethnicity, tribe and religion, and government’s failures in developing post-war socio-economic backwardness re-generated the fragility in Sudan and South Sudan. International community, including China- the largest trade partner of Sudan and South Sudan, had to relentlessly suffer from these impacts.

2005-2011: End of United Sudanese Second

Armed Conflict and South Sudan’s Secession

The history of Sudan and South Sudan was marred by colonization, exploitation, sectarianism and war. Sudan and South Sudan are culturally, ethnically and linguistically diverse and there are at least 19 major ethnic groups and 600 sub-groups. After gaining independence from Britain in 1956, the country witnessed four military coûps in 1958, 1969, 1985, and 1989 respectively (Safer World, 2012). In 1955, armed conflict began in the Southern regions of Sudan due to the failure to achieve autonomy

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in the South. Failure to share resources equitably, ethnic and religious differences, discovery of oil and competition over controlling oil were causes for the escalation of the civil conflict. Though the civil conflict ended with the Addis Ababa Peace Accord signed in 1972, Sudan’s second armed conflict reignited in 1983 until it was brought to an end by the CPA in 2005. The CPA provided a framework for the National Congress Party (NCP), which holds power in Sudan, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which was formed by the Government of South Sudan to pursue peace.

In pursuance of the commitment of the parties to a negotiated settlement on the basis of a democratic system of governance which, on the one hand, recognizes the right of the people of Southern Sudan to self-determination and seeks to make unity attractive during the Interim Period, while at the same time is founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, mutual understanding and tolerance of diversity within the realities of the Sudan (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005).

Despite the end of the CPA period and South Sudan’s secession in July 2011, key issues remained unresolved between Sudan and South Sudan including border demarcation and management, allocation of disputed territories, rights of citizens in two countries and sharing of debts, resources and revenues (Safer World, 2012). Due to these underlying issues, the process of implementing the CPA was only a partial success.

According to the border demarcation, while South Sudan obtained 75% of oil resources, Sudan received the major oil infrastructure. Both countries had equal bargaining power which resulted in re-escalation of tension between Sudan and South Sudan. Troops of Sudan and South Sudan destructed and looted each other’s oil properties which were not clearly demarcated by the CPA. Soon after the CPA, both countries witnessed rebellion attacks which were driven by ethnic and tribal identity. The Governments of Sudan and South Sudan supported each other’s rebellion groups as a tool of destabilization. Furthermore, due to the mutual

threat perception, the CPA period witnessed a military build-up on both sides, with oil revenues supporting the retention of troops and additional arms procurement.

Since 1980s, China developed significant economic relations with Khartoum via CNPA and Sinopec. The 2005 CPA agreement paved the way for China to initiate its economic relations with the South Sudan where there are largely untapped oil reserves. Due to the oil industrial development, a number of infrastructure development projects were backed by China. Moreover, China invested in South Sudan’s agricultural sector in order to enhance not only the post-war economy but also post-war human development.

However, it can be hypothesized that China was frustrated with their new economic plans in South Sudan since the 2005 CPA only brought a partial success. Beijing was caught in the middle of turbulent relations between South Sudan and Sudan. Oil production was halted from time to time by the South Sudanese Government due to Juba-Khartoum contradictions over right to oil resources in some areas. There was lack of South Sudanese human capacity to negotiate deals with China. This pronounced asymmetry in capacity characterizing relations posed challenges to their practical advancement (Larger, 2016).

From 2012: South Sudanese Armed Conflict

Despite the signing of the CPA, South Sudan continued to witness serious violence and challenges in establishing the rule of law. A number of well-armed militias emerged in South Sudan, and armed conflicts escalated in regions such as Jonglei, Lakes, Unity, Upper Nile, Warrap and Western Equatoria states which have large oil reserves. People who have already suffered from united Sudanese first and second armed conflict, were re-marginalized due to their ethnic, tribal and religious identity and they formulated several rebellion groups. According to the United Nations, in 2011, 600 people were killed in ethnic clashes in Jonglei state and in 2012, South Sudan declared a disaster in Jonglei State after some 100,000 clashes occurred between rival ethnic groups (BBC News, 2018).

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It is noted that the small arms and light weapons are widely available among civilians and armed groups in South Sudan and rebellions have benefited from them. As small arms and light weapons were important tools for their security, livelihoods and survival, disarmament proved extremely challenging. The Government of South Sudan’s lack of capabilities in DDR-Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation has fuelled the expansion of rebellion actions.

Power struggle between the South Sudanese President and Vice President deepened the country’s fragility. In July 2013, South Sudan President Kiir dismissed the entire cabinet and Vice-President Riek Machar in a power struggle within the governing Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). As a consequence, in December 2013, an armed conflict erupted as President Salva Kiir accused his former vice-president, Riek Machar, of plotting to overthrow him. Rebel factions seized control of several regional towns, thousands were killed and many more fled to neighboring states such as Uganda. A ceasefire was signed in January and August 2014, but violated quickly. Due to the international pressure, President Salva Kiir signed a peace agreement with rebel leader and former Vice President Riek Machar on August 26, 2015. Machar returned to Juba on April 26, 2016 and was sworn in as Vice President. However, soon after his return, violence broke out again between government forces and opposition factions in July 2016, displacing tens of thousands of people yet again. Over 50,000 people have been killed and more than 1.6 million have been internally displaced since armed conflict broke out in South Sudan in December 2013 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).

In addition to the Juba-Khartoum contradiction over oil resources, since 2013, China had to face severe security issues over their economic engagement in South Sudan due to the armed conflict. South Sudan’s oil production and revenues declined from a peak of over 430,000 barrels per day at the beginning of 2010, to under 250,000 barrels per day by the end of 2015 (Safer World, 2012). South Sudan’s oil revenue also plummeted from US$ 7.4 billion in 2011 to US$ 4.2 billion in 2016, bringing losses to both China and the government of South Sudan (Hodzi, 2017).

From time to time, oil fields in Unity and Upper Nile State were forced to shut down and the Adar Yale oilfield came under attack on several occasions. (Hodzi, 2017).

In addition China had to protect its citizens in South Sudan from attacks. For example, CNPC announced in December 2013, that it was arranging for the orderly evacuation of its workers from the affected oil fields to Juba (Reuters, 2013). In 2016, Chinese firms evacuated 330 staff from South Sudan and two Chinese Peacekeepers died from attacks (South China Morning Post, 2016).

Negative consequences of the South Sudanese armed conflict generated spillover effects to neighbouring countries where China drives massive infrastructure development projects of the BRI.

Table 1- Refugees and Asylum Seekers from South

Sudan to Neighbor Countries, 2013-2018

Country Number of South Sudanese Refugees and Asylum Seekers

Uganda 1,067,637

Sudan 766,631

Ethiopia 443,352

Kenya 114,689

Congo 92,700

Total 2,485,009

Source: Operational Portal, Refugee Situations, 2018

China’s Mediation Efforts in South Sudan

China has a growing role in the South Sudanese conflict resolution as a mediator. China has different ideology on existing methods of conflict resolution which have been internationalized by western countries. This does not mean that Beijing’s involvement in conflict resolution is totally inimical from western approaches. Beijing accepts the existing conflict resolution architecture while excluding some of its methods. The significance is that China was doing so with the absence of overarching Chinese policy on conflict-affected states.

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Chinese Foreign Policy Principles

Chinese conflict resolution ideology is driven by its foreign policy principle of non-interference. Within China, policy and research focus on civil wars and state fragility is extremely limited. As one Chinese academic notes: “The terminology of ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘post-conflict’ does not really exist.” Security issues are divided by China from development or economic co-operation because security issues are seen as too political (Safer World, 2012). Absence of overarching Chinese policy on conflict-affected states has become the policy of Chinese conflict resolution abroad. The underlying reason for this context is China’s longstanding practice of its foreign policy principle of ‘Non-interference.’

Non-interference policy has been serving China since 1954. The policy is derived from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The policy was designed to reach out to non-communist countries in Asia as well as reflect solidarity with newly independent postcolonial states in Africa, with an emphasis on territorial sovereignty defined in the most rigid and traditional Westphalian terms (Iyasu, 2013). Civil wars, matters of state-society relations, and engagement with opposition groups or rebel forces are matters strictly ultra vires Beijing’s non-interference principle (Hodzi, 2017). Although non-interference applies to military interventions and regime change, the principle has been China’s modus-operandi in its investment and economic interactions with Africa and the rest of the world (Iyasu, 2013).

‘Peace,’ ‘stability’ and ‘development’ have been central to foreign policy discourse promoting China’s role as a responsible great power. In April 2004, Hu Jintao declared the “very purpose of China’s foreign policy” to “maintain world peace and promote common development,” promising that China would “follow a peaceful development path” (Safer World, 2015).

Non-interference serves as a means through which China can maintain stable relations with host governments, usually with an eye to ensure that economic co-operation continues unaffected by political change. This Chinese model argues

that political rights cannot be imposed from the outside; instead, sovereignty is to be protected and autonomy honored to allow for indigenous development strategies. In that line, China conducts foreign relations with both democratic and non-democratic countries peacefully. The West argues that the non-interference principle undermines good governance, democratization and human rights. According to China, the main thought of the Western countries’ involvement in peace building is liberal democracy under special conditions; the international community can use active humanitarian interventions to promote democratic systems. After the end of conflicts, those measures include the amendment of the constitution, holding a general election, establishing a multi-party system, fostering the opposition party and developing civil society. These are always the panacea used by Western countries to heal conflicts. However, China believes every country has its own priorities and to promote democratic system immediately after the end of conflicts is not necessarily a must choice. Instead, measures such as reducing poverty and resolving unemployment are usually the most important tasks (Safer World, 2012).

China’s economic approach is visible in the mediation literature and is called ‘Process-based intervention.’ According to Ropers, a realistic assessment of the possibilities and limits of peaceful intervention in ethno-political conflicts cannot be made without consideration of structural framework-conditions in which such conflicts are rooted and which crucially affect the way they proceed. Socio-economic breakdown and political exclusion are prime factors of structural conditions. One of the prime requirements in regard to constructive intervention by third parties should help bring a massive improvement in the economic framework conditions in transforming societies in the world. Development is one of the crucial pre-condition for Peace. The connection between economic development and the capacity for peace appeared on the agenda at an earlier stage (Ropers, 2017).

Within this ideology, China has become a large aid provider for conflict affected countries. Moreover, the Government of China attempts to resolve conflict through negotiations and make a common ground for incompatible goals of conflict parties.

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Beijing prefers multilateralism in resolving armed conflicts than bilateralism. Most of China’s diplomatic engagement on peace and security takes place at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). China ranks as the fifteenth largest troop-contributing country in United Nations Peacekeeping and is the largest troop contributor among the five permanent members of the UNSC. As part of South – South co-operation, China has sought to present itself as a representative of developing countries, often voting on contentious issues in line with the positions of regional groupings like the African Union (AU) and the Arab League (Safer World, 2012).

Principle vs. Pragmatism

China keeps bilateral relations with leaders in the Government of South Sudan without considering whether they came into the power legally or illegally. According to the non-interference policy, China considers it as a South Sudanese internal matter. Since 2004, China had a close bilateral relationship with SPLM/S leader, Dr. John Garang and then with Salva Kiir, the first President of South Sudan. China was thus among the first countries to recognize the Republic of South Sudan on 9th July 2011.

China’s economic capabilities have brought significant leverage power to Beijing to convince conflict parties of South Sudan towards negotiation. China appears most comfortable in the role of table-setter, leveraging its political and economic influence to bring parties together. Its flexibility in providing aid has helped to ensure the quick release of small in-kind donations covering transportation and accommodation for participants in negotiations. Yet Beijing is only slowly becoming comfortable with directly setting agendas, proposing terms in agreements or drafting documents and even then tends to do so behind the scenes (International Crisis Group, 2017). The Government of China always expects protection over their economic interests in South Sudan by setting up negotiation tables. The only requirement of China from conflict parties is to stop fighting. This has resulted in temporary solutions to the South Sudanese civil conflict rather than generating solid solutions.

Several times Beijing has appointed its special envoys to South Sudan such as Zhoung Jianghu and Liu Guijin. China deploys them for conflict resolution in South Sudan via multilateral platforms such as Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) of African Union. Between 2014 and the signing of a peace agreement in August 2015, China was consistently engaged and supportive of the mediation process via IGAD. South Sudan became the first ground to test their mediation efforts for Beijing. By launching its mediation effort in multilateral layers, China expected to avoid errors and form ‘Chinese Solutions’ to global problems (International Crisis Group, 2017). Moreover, China practices its multilateral mediation via Chinese United Nation Peacekeeping Forces. China deployed its first-ever peacekeeping battalion to South Sudan in January 2015, the year in which the peace agreement was signed by the conflict parties.

China typically resists sanctions as a method of conflict resolution. Beijing retains an ideological aversion to sanction and see them as instruments of Western Coercion (International Crisis Group, 2017). When sanctions are discussed, China occasionally mediates between the government and the Western Powers. Rather than approaching sanctions for mediation, China utilizes its leverage power of economic capabilities in South Sudan. The consortium led by China’s oil cooperation accounts for most of the investments in South Sudanese national economy. In this context, conflict parties of South Sudan have to agree upon Chinese leverage power.

When the South Sudanese government and rebel groups were in negotiations, China provided financial and other support to both parties conditioned upon their guaranteeing the security of oil infrastructure or, in the case of the rebels, not attacking it. Financial support performs as the leverage power to bring conflict parties to the negotiation table and avoid attacks for short-periods of time. However, the leverage power has been unable to manipulate conflict parties towards a solid solution since 2013. Overall, China’s diplomatic engagement tends to remain cautious and Beijing was reluctant to play a proactive or visibly high profile role.

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Findings

Since 2013 China has been mediating in the South Sudanese armed conflict though there is no palpable end point to the conflict. From time to time, the Chinese national economy had to face economic losses in South Sudan due to the attacks carried out by rebellions over the oil blocks. In addition, there was growing domestic pressure for China to protect its nationals in South Sudan. Chinese companies had to evacuate their workers when there were severe attacks near their operational areas. Within this backdrop, it is quite questionable as to why China carried out mediation efforts in the South Sudanese armed conflict when there were severe security threats over their economic interests.

The cost of ‘getting out’ from mediation was higher than ‘getting in’ for China. Sudan was the Chinese oil industry’s first overseas success. Keen to tap into an undeveloped market, at the time with few competitors, Chinese nationals and companies flocked to South Sudan after it achieved independence in 2011. In 2011, China did not have assumptions that South Sudan will engage with a protracted armed conflict. Chinese companies competitively invested in South Sudan and going back with empty hands was going to make a sensible loss to the Chinese national economy. Due to the internal armed conflict in Libya, China experienced a massive loss. China did not expect the same from South Sudan as half of Chinese national oil requirements were sourced from the African continent. If China was to leave the African countries due to their internal armed conflict, China may face severe threats in driving their economy. In that line, despite the threats that China faced in South Sudan over their economic objectives, Beijing took efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully or if not at least to contain the escalation of violence.

Despite escalation of violence, China still believed that process-based intervention has the capabilities of resolving armed conflict. Beijing did not attempt to change the political system, convert the country into democracy by holding an election or resolving existing human rights issues in South Sudan as inalienable actions in resolving the dispute. The Government of China believed that South Sudanese armed conflict can be resolved only by country’s economic development due to several reasons.

Oil wealth of the country had brought both fortune and misfortune together. Opposition leader Machar and the rebellion groups fight against the Government of South Sudan was mainly to capture the authority of oil resources. With the oil revenue going to a handful of political leaders, majority of people suffer from socio-economic backwardness. China has the ideology that economic development, economic aid and human development can bring solutions to the incompatible goals of the conflicting parties.

China’s mediation efforts in South Sudan do not only test its ability to turn a hostile relationship into peaceful relationship but also test whether China is a reliable, legitimate and capable enough global peacemaker. Moreover, launching peace efforts abroad bring international reputation to China which may bring solutions for Beijing’s identity dilemma.

However, though, China orchestrates its traditional foreign policy principle of non-interference, it is quite questionable whether China practices it in South Sudan. In order to get protection over their economic objectives, China does not only financially support the Government of South Sudan, but also rebellion groups. Moreover, China’s financial aid to both parties has become China’s leverage power in bringing conflict parties to negotiations. China practices power of reciprocity that is based on the social norm of “give and take,” where one has done something for the benefit of another, the latter should feel obliged to repay the former and do something in return. The power of reciprocity is the basis for the influence tactic of exchange of benefits. In this line, China was able to assure the protection over their economic objectives in South Sudan to a certain extent. However, this approach may ensure cordial relations between China, the Government of South Sudan and the rebellion groups only. Whether this will bring about sustainable peace in South Sudan is a difficult prediction to make. Within this context, it is also doubtful whether China can become a reliable stakeholder in global peace through its different methods in mediation.

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Conclusion

This research focused on ‘China’s Role in Conflict Resolution in South Sudan.’ It discussed the strategic significance of South Sudan to China, conflict and peace dynamics of South Sudan, its impact on China’s economic interests and conflict resolution approaches driven by China as a mediator in South Sudanese armed conflict.

The prime objective of conducting this research was to explore reasons for China’s mediation efforts in the South Sudanese armed conflict when there are severe security threats over their economic interests. The objective was founded on the main argument that China’s participation in conflict resolution is an unavoidable byproduct of increased Chinese economic engagement with South Sudan. South Sudan’s oil wealth and geo-strategic location in the East African region have provided sufficient incentives to China to expand its economic and diplomatic relations with South Sudan. Poor economic and human development, negative consequences of internal armed conflict and political instability are fundamental reasons for South Sudan’s engagement with China. Consequently, converging interests of Beijing and Juba have resulted to deepen bilateral economic and diplomatic relations.

The Government of China attempts to protect its economic objectives in South Sudan while mediating in the armed conflict. Beijing prefers multilateral approaches in mediation as a table settler in negotiations. China’s traditional foreign policy principle of ‘non-interference’ is the bedrock reason for these approaches.

The cost of ‘getting out’ from mediation is higher than ‘getting in’ for China. The strategic significance of South Sudan, nature of the African continent, China’s different ideology in conflict resolution and practice of traditional foreign policy principle of non-interference and Beijing’s identity dilemma can be analyzed as reasons for China’s mediation efforts in the South Sudanese armed conflict though there are severe security threats over their economic interest.

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Hydropolitics in South Asia: A Destiny Shaped by Water

Vajini Herat Gunaratne*

ABSTRACT

The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) Basin and the Indus River Basin are two major transboundary river basins in South Asia. The GBM Basin connects five South Asian countries including India and Bangladesh while the Indus Basin majorly connects India and Pakistan. The basin communities, are mostly engaged in agriculture based livelihoods and their lives are deeply interwoven with the flow of the rivers. However, both basins support a concentration of high population density, which places tremendous stress upon the existing water resources. Apart from this, climate change has disturbed the natural weather patterns in the region and South Asia often faces the backlash of extreme climatic conditions. In an attempt to secure depleting water resources for themselves, basin countries compete with one another by constructing dams and barrages to store water during droughts and to control water flow during floods. Moreover, the disparity between upper riparian and lower riparian countries have also shaped the hydropolitics in South Asia. India, who is the upper riparian state in both the basins has been criticized by Pakistan and Bangladesh for making unilateral decisions in the management of common rivers i.e. diverting upstream water which affects the downstream river flow and constructing hydropower plants with little concern about their impacts to lower riparian countries. Due to such moves, the productivity of unique ecosystems such as The Sundarbans has also suffered. In addition to this, transboundary political tension has acted as a potential threat to water security within the region, especially between India and Pakistan. As such, the objective of the research is to study the hydropolitics in South Asia, with the focus on three major players in the region, namely, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The role of power play in the distribution of water resources in South Asian river basins will also be assessed.

Keywords: South Asia, Water, India, River Basin, Transboundary, Riparian State

Introduction

The rivers of South Asia are the veins that pump life into the region. Among the rivers that flow across South Asian nation states, Indus which connects India and Pakistan and Ganges which connects India and Bangladesh are significant. Apart from this, there are many common rivers which are shared among the states of India, an example being the Cauvery River which flows through Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. Often these rivers have become the cause of dispute and it can be seen that riverine communities have become victims in instances in which water, despite its abundance, is not allowed to be shared or when water, which was previously enjoyed, suddenly runs dry due to political, selfish reasons of another state or due to the impacts of climate change.

In terms of extent, the South Asian landmass is not exceptionally large. However, it is one of the most populated regions in the world and is home to almost one third of the world’s population. It is estimated that over 620 million people live in the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna (GBM) region alone, and is one of South Asia’s key transboundary river basins (FAO, 2011). Significantly, the GBM region also accounts for the largest concentration of poorest people in the world (FAO, 2011). As a result, increasing population pressure places enormous stress upon the existing water resources.

Research Article 04

* Vajini Herat Gunaratne, Graduate Student, University of Bangalore. Email: vajiniv2009@gmail.com

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On the other hand, South Asia is still considered to be predominantly rural with over 70% of its population living in rural areas. Out of the 70%, the majority make their living by depending on the natural resources that surround them — land, freshwater, coastal fisheries (Stabinsky, 2014). Therefore, freshwater drawn from rivers are of utmost importance to South Asian livelihoods.

The Indian subcontinent which represents the largest landmass in South Asia, shares trans- boundary rivers with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, China, Afghanistan and Myanmar. She shares the waters of rivers Ganga, Brahmaputra and Meghna (Refer Table 1), the waters of river Indus with her north-eastern states and with her north-western states, especially Pakistan (Refer Table 2). Although India has concluded water treaties such as the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 with Pakistan and the Ganges Water Treaty of 1996 (GWT) with Bangladesh, a concern that most states have been constantly raising is her tendency to use water of common rivers unilaterally without taking into account its human, social, economic and ecological aspects. For example, Bangladesh, a lower riparian state in the GBM Basin that shares 54 trans-boundary rivers with India, was skeptical about India’s construction of the Farakka Barrage on River Ganges. According to Bangladesh, from an India-centric point of view, the diversion of Ganges water, leads to the deprivation of much needed water resources from its eastern neighbour during the dry season as well as causing negative ecological and economic impacts. However, since India wields the most power in South Asia in terms of political, economic and military might, directly opposing her hegemonic designs is also not a realistic option for the other states.

Despite, GBM Basin being one of the largest river basins in the world (FAO, 2011), South Asia faces the imminent risk of water scarcity, largely due to the impacts of climate change. In fact, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are among the eight most “water-stressed” countries in the world (Mangi, Kay and Chaudhary, 2019). Apart from this, the region is also challenged by many other threats such as terrorism, poverty and climate change while the political tension between India and Pakistan continues to rise.

As the key player involved in South Asian hydro-politics, the paper focused mainly on India, and the policies she adopts in sharing water with co-riparian states such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. The two trans-boundary river basins, namely, the GBM Basin and the Indus Basin were the main focus. Apart from this, the Cauvery Water Dispute between the Indian states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu was a point of special interest. The paper also attempted to investigate the role of trans-boundary political tension as a potential threat to water-management within the region, especially between Pakistan and India. Moreover, the impacts of a warming world were examined in the paper.

Table 01: Country Areas in the GBM River Basin

(Source: https://bit.ly/2GR4yVP)

Table 02: Country Areas in the Indus River Basin

(Source: https://bit.ly/2K0VAG1)

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Methodology

In this research, a descriptive methodology has been adopted to examine the hydro-politics between selected South Asian nation states. This was a qualitative and quantitative study based on secondary data including scholarly articles, research papers, journals, newspapers, websites and reputed international information sources. The author has examined existing facts and figures through a number of secondary sources (cited in the References Section) prior to forming an opinion.

Discussion and Findings

India

Among the SAARC countries, India is the largest, in terms of landmass and population. Her population of 1.3 billion is also the second largest in the world after China (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). In the SAARC region, the strongest economy (Smith, 2018) and military (“TimesnowNews.com” 2018) rests with India and she is also a Nuclear Power. The population of India is mostly rural and their main livelihood is agriculture. Therefore, fresh water is a vital necessity and 90% of India’s freshwater is used for agricultural purposes (DownToEarth, 2018). India shares political borders with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Southern China. She also shares trans-boundary rivers with all these states. However, the heart of the GBM Basin lies in India. The Ganga and Brahmaputra rivers originate from the Chinese Himalayas and flow through India after it is joined by the Barak River, to Bangladesh from where they enter into the Bay of Bengal as the Megna River. In the case of the Indus River, it originates from the Tibetan plateau and flows to India, from where its journey continues to Pakistan. In both these cases, India as an upper riparian state, enjoys the most amount of water. India is also one of the greatest generators of hydropower through damming rivers, a fact which co-riparian states such as Bangladesh do not view in a favorable light. The construction of the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges is often antagonized by Bangladesh while Tipaimukh, a proposed dam by India on the Barak River was vehemently opposed by Bangladesh and is currently halted. India’s freshwater sources are heavily dependent on monsoonal rains. However, with the changing weather patterns as a result of climate change, India often experiences extreme

conditions. For example, the South Indian city of Chennai faced a water crisis for more than 200 days from December 2018; the worst the city has ever faced in 70 years while, the North-Eastern state of Assam, experienced a severe flood situation in July 2019.

Figure 1: Ganges –Brahmaputra-Meghna River

Basin

(Source: https://bit.ly/2YvgPoJ)

Pakistan

Pakistan, also a nuclear power, is the fifth most populated country in the world with a population of nearly 211 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). Out of her entire population, more than 60 percent live in rural areas (Trading Economics, n.d.) with most of them depending on agriculture as their livelihood. The Indus River covers about 65 percent of Pakistan and more than 90 percent of the country’s irrigation is located in the Indus River Basin (FAO, n.d.). Therefore, the river is a significant life giving source to Pakistan. India and Pakistan, both co-riparian states of the Indus river, signed the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960. According to the treaty, the three western rivers originating from the Indus, namely Indus, Jhelum and Chenab fall under the administration of Pakistan while the three eastern rivers, namely Sutleg, Ravi and Beas fall under the administration of India. The two countries have had their share of water controversies in the use of Indus water but, it is mainly Pakistan that accused India of violating the IWT by planning to construct hydropower plants on the river, especially on river Chenab which Islamabad feels will disrupt its flow to Pakistan and whose people highly depend on Indus water (The Guardian, 2017). Apart from this, the Kashmir dispute is a sensitive issue between both these states. Among the countries impacted by terrorism, the Global Terrorism Index ranks

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Pakistan in 5th place. Acts of terrorism continue to be reported from the country and India accuses the Pakistani Government of turning a blind eye on targeted attacks on the Indian military in the Kashmir region, which New Delhi claims is orchestrated by militant groups based in Pakistan territory. In attempts to cripple Pakistan, one of India’s tools has been to restrict the former’s use of Indus water.

Figure 2: Indus River Basin

(Source: https://bit.ly/2ZnK5Pp)

Bangladesh

Bangladesh is a low lying, deltaic country with a vast floodplain. The country is a littoral state of the Bay of Bengal and is also located in one of the world’s largest river deltas, created by the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the Meghna and their tributaries. Largely due to Bangladesh’s geographical position, it is affected by severe floods at least once a year. Nearly 65 percent of Bangladesh’s population is rural (World Bank, 2016, as cited in Trading Economics, n.d.) and their livelihoods mainly depend on agriculture and fisheries for which water resources are of vital necessity. India and Bangladesh share the waters of the GBM Basin at Farakka from where the rivers enter Bangladesh, and the Ganges becomes River Padma

and the Brahmaputra becomes River Jamuna after which they enter the Bay of Bengal as the Meghna. Apart from serving agricultural purposes, fish from these three major rivers provide almost 80 per cent of the Bangladeshi diet (Lovelle, 2016.). Their waters are integral for the sustenance of the Sundarbans Mangrove Forest, which is also the home of the Royal Bengal Tiger (Rogers and Goodbred, 2014). Thus, these waterways are a significant source in maintaining not only Bangladeshi food and water security, but a unique forest ecosystem and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. As such, these trans-boundary waters play a defining role in the destiny of Bangladesh, as they either ravage the country by flooding or sustain and flourish its economy and ecosystem. India and Bangladesh signed the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty at Farakka which is commonly referred to as the Ganges Water Treaty (GWT). However, disagreement on the management of Ganges water is often a point of hostility between the two states. Bangladesh accuses India who is the upper riparian state, of diverting Ganges water from flowing to Bangladesh which apart from other things, increases the levels of salinity in the lower riparian state and affects paddy cultivation as well as jeopardizing the sustenance of the Sundarbans. Meanwhile India feels that Bangladesh is never satisfied with its share of water.

Regional Tension

It can be seen that the natural mistrust, conflict, and rivalry between India and Pakistan have permeated into a governance of common water, as seen in the sharing of Indus water. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) signed in 1960 was brokered by the World Bank and accordingly, the governance of the three Western tributaries - Indus, Jhelum and Chenab was assigned to Pakistan while that of the three eastern tributaries - Sutlej, Ravi and Beas was assigned to India (The Indus Waters Treaty, 1962). However, under the IWT, India, the upper riparian state has the right to limited hydropower generation even on the western tributaries which are under Pakistan control as these rivers flow at some stage through the Indian states of Jammu, Kashmir and Punjab before reaching Pakistan, the lower riparian. India is often faulted by Pakistan for not sharing data on proposed dams on the western rivers i.e. their storage capacity (Nabeel, 2017), since the latter probably feels that by damming the rivers upstream, the flow that reaches

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downstream will reduce, impacting its agricultural sector based on water intensive crops such as rice, sugarcane, wheat and cotton (Sleet, 2019) that feed extensively on these rivers.

The Indus Basin is already under tremendous stress with the large number of population that it must support and with Pakistan’s population set to grow six times the amount that it was in 2011 in 2025 (Wheeler, 2011). The external pressure created by India on its water will be a giant-blow to Pakistanis and to its agriculture sector which is almost fully dependent on the Indus. In the recent past, there have been more attacks on the Indian troops in Kashmir by militant groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) who have their bases in Pakistan. In the 2016, Uri attacks more than 20 Indian soldiers were killed and on Valentine’s Day attack in 2019, 40 soldiers were killed in Pulwama. Although the Pakistani Government denies its role in the attacks, India accuses the former of turning a blind eye to the terror organizations active in the country.

In 2016, after the Uri attacks, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi vowed to review the Indus Water Treaty between the two countries and famously stated that blood and water cannot flow together, suggesting that India will make Pakistan pay in whichever way possible for apparently failing to control militant operations within the latter’s territory (Bagchi and Mohan, 2016). In an act of retaliation, it is reported that India has strategized a plan to maximize the usage of Indus waters under which six new projects will not only be built to generate 6,322MW electricity on the Chenab River in Indian Kashmir, but would also have huge capacity to store water that is destined to reach the low riparian country—Pakistan (Mustafa, 2018). Meanwhile, after the Pulwama attacks earlier this year, India’s Union Minister of State for Water Resources claimed that the country had stopped three of its eastern rivers from flowing to Pakistan, and is proposing to store that water for water stressed areas in Rajasthan and Punjab. If this is to continue, its impacts will be a huge blow to Pakistan’s basin community (“Pulwama Attack Aftermath,” 2019).

In further attempts to cripple Pakistan, India has pledged support to build the Shahtoot Dam on the Kabul River in Afghanistan, which is a common river shared between Afghanistan and Pakistan and a tributary of the Indus. Apart from the fact that the upstream project may affect the downstream water flow, Pakistan also fears the growing relations between Afghanistan and India. (Ramachandran, 2018). Thus, it is a wide belief among security analysts that the Modi Government may use water as a tool to bring Pakistan to heel over the Kashmir dispute.

Indo – Bangla Water Relations

Out of the 54 rivers shared between Bangladesh and India, only one river is subject to a bilateral agreement, namely, river Ganges at Farakka. The Ganges Treaty, signed in 1996 between the two parties promised equity, fairness and no harm to either party through Article IX (The Ganges Water Treaty, 1996) although Bangladesh on numerous occasion has raised concern over India’s high-handed behavior over the control of Ganges water. For example, with the construction of the Farakka barrage, India – the upper riparian state, diverts Ganges water to Hoogly River in Kolkata, which impairs its natural flow to downstream Bangladesh. Due to this fact, the agricultural riverine community in Bangladesh is deprived of precious water, especially during the dry season. As a result, Bangladesh feels that India’s actions are especially not in accordance with Article IX of the GWT. Thus, it can be analyzed that India’s strategic location as the upper riparian state, impacts downstream states such as Bangladesh and in the case of Indus River - Pakistan.

Furthermore, Bangladesh’s concern was raised on another project, whereby India was proposing to build Tipaimukh dam and generate electricity on the Barak river which is another trans-boundary river shared by the two Countries. The proposed dam has been opposed for many years by Northeastern Indian communities and Bangladeshis as this dam will be constructed on one of the most seismically volatile areas on the earth which is highly dangerous as this could trigger earthquakes and create

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downstream flooding. Reports also suggest that the dam will submerge more than 275 square kilometers of forests and displace 60,000 people in Manipur, including the indigenous Zeliangrong and Hmar communities and negatively impact 40,000 people in Bangladesh (“Tipaimukh High Dam,” n.d). Apart from this, it can be analyzed that with the Barak River being dammed upstream, the Meghna River (which becomes the Barak in Bangladesh) would probably lose its flow which will create a highly water-stressed, drought condition for Bangladesh. However, after negotiations and discussions between the two states and further within India, in 2013, India’s Ministry of Environment and Forest rejected this proposal and for the moment, the project is at a standstill.

It can be viewed that as the lower riparian state, Bangladesh is extremely vulnerable to the decisions made by upstream India where 79% of the Ganga River (Joint Rivers Commission Bangladesh, 2011, as cited by The FAO, 2011) which becomes the Padma when it reaches Bangladesh, freely flows. Apart from the envisaged impacts of climate change such as rising sea levels which might occur due to the diversion of Ganges water through Farakka barrage upstream, the reduced flow of freshwater has had negative environmental impacts in Bangladesh (Piesse, 2015). For example, a world renowned wetland ecosystem - the Sundarbans mangrove forest, has lost some of its productivity due to increased salinity; and thereby it has been identified that the upstream freshwater supply is necessary to protect downstream ecosystems (Islam & Gnauck, 2008) while forest degeneration has caused Bangladesh to reduce its timber production, creating an economic loss for the country. Apart from this, ground water aquifers which are significant drinking water sources have also been contaminated by salinity. Agriculture too, has been affected as paddy varieties are sensitive to salinity and rice farmers have turned to shrimp farming instead or have migrated to urban areas (Piesse, 2015).

The Cauvery Water Dispute

Figure 3: The Sundarbans Mangrove Forest.

(Source: https://bit.ly/31dz2ZT)

This is a selected case study from India to illustrate the manner in which South Asian livelihoods are disrupted from time to time over common rivers and to highlight the point that water feuds could occur not only between nation states but also within a single state.

It can be seen that South Asian hydro-politics are not simply limited to countries that share trans-boundary rivers, but could exist within a country as well and the best example to illustrate this point is India. It is important to note that the 29 states of India are geographically as far apart as 29 different countries and that due to India being a federal country, the power is decentralized and the states have their own governments. In addition to this, with India being an agriculturally oriented country, her states too, are possessive over their share of water and are keen to secure as much of it for themselves as possible. Among the many interstate water disputes, the Cauvery River dispute between the South Indian states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka are briefly examined in the following part.

The Cauvery River originates in Karnataka’s Kodagu district, thereby rendering it the position of the upper riparian state. The Cauvery flows to Tamil Nadu while its tributaries also cross to Kerala and the Union Territory of Puducherry. The majority of the water from this river is shared by Karnataka and Tamil Nadu and it can be analysed that the factor that dominates the water dispute is the conflicting demands for irrigation from the plateau region of Karnataka and the delta region in Tamil Nadu.

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In 2016, riots broke out in Karnataka’s capital city of Bangalore, after the Supreme Court ordered the state to release 15,000 cubic feet of water per second per day (cusecs) from its reservoirs on the Cauvery to relieve drought-stricken farmers in Tamil Nadu (Pokharel, 2016). Karnataka argued that the water was vital for the farmers of their state while Tamil Nadu claimed the same. In the riots that followed, two people were killed and the author experienced curfew in certain areas of the state while buses from Tamil Nadu were attacked by the Karnataka citizens. In the following days, the author observed heavy presence of police forces in Bangalore. Thereby, the importance of water for agricultural Indian states can be observed while the manner in which water-politics impact internal disputes within India is evidenced.

In 1924, the British presided over an agreement between the Mysore Raj (which governed Karnataka) and Madras, whereby 75 percent of the Cauvery water was allocated to Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, and only 23 percent was allocated to Karnataka (Mantri and Ram, 2018). However, post-independence, Karnataka, as the upper riparian began to enjoy more than her 23 percent of Cauvery water, while Tamil Nadu opposed Karnataka’s usage by citing her own historical claim to the Cauvery River. Due to these incidents, the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal was formed to distribute water between the two states.

Figure 4: The Cauvery River.

(Source: https://bit.ly/2ltser9)

In spite of this, the disputes continue, especially during the dry season where both states lack water. Karnataka is often ordered by the Supreme Court to release a directed quantum of water to Tamil Nadu but her response is always late as her crops too have withered leading to large scale financial distress among farmers (Aji, 2016). As such, one can assert that hydro-politics does not merely affect the international relations of India but also her relations within the country.

Threats to South Asian River Basins

The South Asian region is highly vulnerable to climate change and melting glaciers are symbolic of this phenomena. The Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin and the Indus Basin largely depend on the sustenance of the Hindu Kush and Himalayan Glaciers (HKH). During winter, water is stored in the glaciers and in summer, it is released as melt water. With rising temperatures however, the natural system is disturbed and glacial melting is severe and as a result, floods of high intensity occur, i.e. the 2010 floods in Pakistan. In the case of Bangladesh, its low lying geographical position is largely the reason as to why floods are encountered annually although glacial melt and fluctuating rainfall patterns influence the level of flood intensity. With China and India among the worst global polluters, the region’s per capita fossil fuel CO2 emissions already account for one-sixth of the global average which have contributed towards the thaw in the HKH glaciers (Chugh, 2019).

A Report by World Bank claimed that South Asia is highly vulnerable to climate change and that this trend will continue to increase, with temperatures rising and rainfall patterns becoming erratic. It is noteworthy, that extreme climatic conditions such as drought in certain areas and floods in others already impact the livelihoods of eight hundred million South Asians (World Bank, 2018), and reports suggest that by 2100, the number of climate refugees in the HKH countries could be catastrophically high (Chugh, 2019).

Among South Asian countries, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh face water scarcity. This is more true of Pakistan which despite having more glaciers than anywhere else in the world (Craig, 2016) and is located in the Indus River Basin, is at great risk since

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Karachi is nearing a “day zero situation” similar to that of Cape Town (Raza, 2018).

Water infrastructure in Pakistan is outdated and in poor condition, which wastes even more water, while little is stored because of a lack of reservoirs and sediment build-up in existing facilities. The water that is available is often unclean, having been polluted by human, agricultural and industrial waste, with little infrastructure in place to provide clean water (Sleet, 2019).

Apart from this, South Asia is one of the most populated regions in the world. The GBM Basin alone accounts for a population that exceeds 620 million while the Indus Basin sustains a population of 268 million (ICIMOD, n.d). Due to population pressure on the river Basins, the water resources have depleted and Pakistan and India are identified among the eight most water-stressed countries in the world. Therefore, apart from hydro-politics adopted by the trans-boundary states, natural disasters, climate change, poor governance and overpopulation impact the availability of water resources, which continue to hamper the agriculture-based livelihoods of the riverine communities.

On the other hand, a healthy river is symbolized by the presence of rich biodiversity. The GBM Basin and the Indus Basin provides habitat to unique species out of which, the Ganges River Dolphin in the Ganga, Brahmaputra and Meghna Rivers and the Indus River Dolphin in the Indus waters are special. However, both species are in the endangered list (EN) and are threatened by habitat shrinkage (reduced river flow, dams and barrages, receding glaciers, climate change etc.), pollution (noise pollution especially in river Brahmaputra by oil companies, agrochemicals, industrial waste etc.) poaching and fishing (IUCN, n.d. & Danks, 2018).

Analysis

The hydro-politics in South Asia is turning out to be a significant security threat to the region. Already, the two major river basins in the region, namely the Ganges Brahmaputra, Meghna Basin and the Indus Basin face the pressure of an exploding population. Apart from this, the unilateral decisions made by

upper-riparian states such as India in the sharing of common water, (diverting water before it reaches downstream riparian states with the construction of barrages etc.,) could result in South Asia turning into a significant flashpoint over water.

In India’s race to supersede China as Asia’s strongest power, she is seen to capture every opportunity to gain authority over many factors including natural resources. India is at a geographical advantage as opposed to Bangladesh and Pakistan, as she is an upper-riparian in the river basin systems and therefore has a far better chance in the manipulation of upstream water resources. Apart from this, one may argue that the existence of water treaties such as The Ganges Water Treaty and the Indus Water Treaty have not been entirely successful as the lower-riparian states have not always found their issues addressed, especially with India’s ability to dominate key decisions in spite of the treaties.

Moreover, it can be noted that the water treaties are bilateral. Even in the case of the GBM Basin, despite Nepal being the upper most riparian, the GWT does not involve her and is only a treaty between Bangladesh and India. It could be strongly argued that a multilateral basin approach involving a third party such as Nepal could have a more balanced effect upon the sharing of water since the Ganges is shared by all and because the inclusion of a third party could terminate a stalemate or address any grievances caused by the inequality in the bargaining power of the parties involved. It can be seen that in the case of India and Pakistan, other dynamics such as the Kashmir dispute affects the governance of Indus water. As per the findings of the research, there is a strong possibility that India will use water as a tool to bring Pakistan to heel. It can be analysed that Pakistan’s failure to acknowledge the operations of militant groups within her territory will be a huge blow to her in the future, which could result in water-scarcity and water-stress. Moreover, it is also evident that India will continue to capitalize on this factor.

However, it can be argued that the lower- riparian states cannot wholly blame India for their water related challenges, and that Bangladesh and Pakistan should adopt better water managing techniques and better preparedness so that during droughts,

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the riverine communities are less affected even if the water released from upstream is insufficient. Evidently, outdated farming techniques, unequal distribution of population and over exploitation have had its effects upon depleting water resources.

The same could be stated about the communities that base their livelihoods on the Cauvery River which mainly flows between the South Indian states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. In spite of the fact that the states belong to the same country, the water disputes continue, especially during the dry season, proving that water is in high demand, and that everybody wishes to lay claim to common rivers, whether they flow between nation states or are shared within a state.

The effects of climate change, generation of environmentally unsustainable hydropower plant projects such as the proposed Tipaimukh project and the diversion of upstream water before it reaches downstream states has had its toll on the degradation of ecosystems such as the Sundarbans. Meanwhile, the emission of industrial gases by South Asian states has affected the sustenance of the Himalayan glaciers, accelerating their retreat. Apart from this the health of the depleting water resources have been jeopardized by pollutants including agrochemicals and industrial waste.

Conclusion

The author would like to argue that an honest, equal and integrated basin approach, which takes the humane aspects of the riverine communities of all riparian states into consideration, and a responsibility towards protecting the ecosystems of all basin countries with the will to mitigate individual actions that may induce climate change, could seriously have a positive impact on the water management in South Asian river basins. It can be added that such an approach, based on the foundation of sound hydro-diplomacy, could also contribute towards trust building within the region. Apart from this, it can be further argued that sustainable water utilization techniques could assure better preparedness in the face of water scarcity. It is also of the author’s opinion that the mighty rivers are the property of

all, and that claiming individual ownership over the waters is unsustainable as all states are part of an interdependent system, whereby deliberate action with a view of impairing the availability of another’s natural resource will ultimately have adverse impacts upon the entire region.

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China’s Cyber Diplomacy under President Xi Jinping

Introduction

China is well-known to be an authoritarian regime and its prime motive is to maintain a monopoly in all domestic affairs, including cyber. Accounting for the largest number of netizens, securing cyberspace has indeed become a challenge for China due to two reasons. Firstly, China saw revolutions such as the Arab Spring, which provoked youth to spread extremist ideas and topple authoritarian regimes. Secondly, China saw the manner in which liberal democratic values flowed across states. These were threats to China and it can be argued that Xi feared the threats by the US will worsen the situation. China wanted to contain these issues and Xi decided to tighten and control cyberspace via a cyber-diplomatic strategy in order to ensure regime survival and to contain the US dominance in the cyber domain.

Therefore cyber mechanisms were implemented first at the domestic level to ensure national security and gradually spread beyond the borders of China to achieve foreign policy goals. Furthermore, China advocated the idea of cyber sovereignty through a multilateral approach to limit external threats to China’s cyber domain. Thus, the manner in which China has been able to improve its cyber strategy from the domestic to international levels to tackle the dominance of the United States in cyber diplomacy, in order to ensure regime survival, is interesting. It should be comprehended whether the cyber relations with the United States and other states including the UK and Russia have been assertive or accommodative and whether China has been successful in its cyber diplomatic goals. This research aimed at analyzing these questions with several case studies on science diplomacy and summit diplomacy.

China’s Cyber Diplomacy Under President Xi Jinping

Ruwanthi Jayasekara*

ABSTRACT

In an era of digital advancement, threats in cyberspace; the revelation of very credential and sensitive information, revelation of military techniques and even the usage of nuclear power can end up toppling governments as it can lead to a breach of relations. “Cyber diplomatic decisions of one country influence the decisions of others. Overall, the fabric of cyber diplomacy is thickening quickly, as cyber issues become more central to global powers’ foreign policy priorities” (Renard, 2015). Since Xi came into power, China engages more in cyber diplomacy, China being a very rational state, realized that it is posed with threats especially by states such as the US, because, it was viewed that there exists an ‘uneven distribution of Internet resources;’ where many of the resources and powers in cyberspace have been granted to the US, including the control of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and production of Chinese root servers etc. In addition, liberal democratic values spread all over the world via online platforms. These were analyzed with high emphasis as Xi did not want mass revolutions in China trying to collapse the whole system. It can be argued that within this context, China has perceived the US with its cyber dominance as a direct threat to China. China utilizes Great FireWall and the Great Cannon as mechanisms to control cyberspace at the domestic level and thereby to tackle this cyber power to an extent. With these setups as the groundwork, China carries out its cyber diplomacy via commercial and IT diplomacy through OBOR, bilateral diplomacy with the US, UK and Russia, science diplomacy in the Arctic with the US and summit diplomacy to spread the principle of cyber sovereignty. Even though these actions are displayed to be cooperative, China has been assertive at some points in order to become a dominant cyber power.

Keywords: Cyber diplomacy, Cyber sovereignty, Balancing, Bandwagoning

Research Article 05

* Ruwanthi Jayasekara, Research Assistant, Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka. Email: ruwanthi94jayasekara@gmail.com

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Term Clarification

According to the Oxford Dictionary, ‘strategy’ refers to “a plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim.” This paper investigated whether, “China’s strategy of cyber diplomacy” is indeed a long-term aim trying to ensure national security and regime survival, which is threatened by the US dominance in cyber space. The paper focused on the Chinese mechanisms which were carried out at the domestic level and spilt over to the international level, in order to become a dominant cyber player while strengthening the regime. In the context of China, the mechanisms consist of science diplomacy, summit diplomacy, IT & commercial diplomacy and bilateral diplomacy etc.

President Xi Jinping has paid more attention to ‘cyber diplomacy’ during his tenure as one of his foreign policy goals, to enhance national security and regime survival, as China feels threatened by cyber actors such as the US, Russia, UK and Europe. The research problem of the paper was to examine as to how China was able to balance these threats and the mechanisms China utilized to ensure the top national concerns of regime survival and national security to become a dominant cyber player in the world. The primary research objective of this paper was to determine China’s cyber mechanisms and to examine the success and failure of China’s cyber diplomatic policies during Xi Jinping’s tenure. The secondary objective was to analyze China’s strategy of cyber diplomacy during Xi Jinping’s tenure to contain the cyber dominance of the United States and to investigate China’s nature of tackling threats in cyberspace.

The study used the qualitative approach in its research methodology. The research utilized existing literature to analyze whether China engages in balancing or bandwagoning in conducting cyber diplomacy in order to balance threats in cyberspace. The study utilized several case studies beginning with the Great FireWall and Great Cannon and developing the system with science diplomacy, summit diplomacy and bilateral diplomacy. It used both Chinese and western scholarly ideas the intention of carrying out an unbiased analysis.

Primary data were collected via agreements, meeting minutes, speeches, official websites and other government sources, whereas secondary sources were collected via books, journal articles, web articles, magazines and news sources. Making use of these sources, the paper analyzed the manner in which China balanced the threats by the US and carried out Xi’s cyber diplomacy, by engaging in various cyber mechanisms such as science diplomacy, summit diplomacy and bilateral diplomacy.

The Significance of China’s Strategy of Cyber

Diplomacy

China, being an authoritarian state, tries its best to maintain a monopoly in all domains including cyber space. Living in a highly technological world with sophisticated online tools, it has indeed become a strenuous task to emerge as a powerful cyber state.

According to China Internet Network Information Centre, total internet users in China in 2012 were 538 million with an internet penetration rate of 39.9%. The internet users in 2017 rose to 772 million with an internet penetration rate of 55.8% (China Internet Watch, 2018). Search engine users, mobile internet users, online shoppers have increased in numbers, which proves the heavy usage of the internet by the Chinese, a fact which has led Xi to control the cyberspace with care. Due to the high involvement of Chinese in cyberspace, western values can be easily embraced by them. Thus, it can be argued that Xi is in a dilemma of engaging in cyber diplomacy while ensuring regime legitimacy, and at the same time utilizing cyber diplomacy to contain the US dominance in cyber space, since China feels threatened by the US in cyberspace.

The Theory of Balance of threats by Stephen M Walt conveyed that states seek to balance the threats. That happens either via balancing with allies to defend against threats of dominant power or bandwagoning with strong states to join together to ensure the protection from threats (Walt, 1987). At times, this can be based on ideological affinities or political purposes. The success of allies will depend on the levels of commitment varying from the highest level of sacrificing tangible assets to fulfill the commitments, moderate level of being a part of intangible costs to support the partners or the lowest

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level of being unwilling to make significant sacrifices. The level of the threat plays a major role considering factors such as geographical proximity, aggregate power, offensive power and perceived intentions (Walt, 1987). The main points on balancing and bandwagoning are briefed below:

Table 1- Features of Balancing and Bandwagoning

Balancing Bandwagoning

Alignment which takes place with not so powerful states in order to act against the threat

Alignment which takes place with the stronger side to join the threatening state to divert the threat elsewhere

Trust is necessary to an extent

Extreme trust is necessary since it is working with an offensive, powerful state

The power is balanced among allies and no dominant power upon which the rest of the states have to agree

The power is in the hands of the bandwagoner and becomes the dominant power upon which the rest of the states have to agree

The aim is the self-preservation of values already possessed

The aim is the self- extension to obtain the desired demands

Source: Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliance, Kindle Edition (Ithaca, London: Cornell University

Press, 1987), 537-615.

Non-interference in internal affairs, equal participation, development assistance and capacity building as well as competition for regional influence are the characteristics engulfed in China’s policy of cyber diplomacy (Inkster, 2016). The most prominent one is the non-interference in internal affairs which indirectly promotes the existing authoritarianism in China. However, China has violated the cyber sovereignty of other states, by attacking them in cyberspace.

Figure 1: Cyber-Attacks Launched by China in

2018

Source: Data adapted from Centre for Strategic and International Studies. “Significant Cyber Incidents.”

Accessed July 16, 2018. https://www.csis.org/programs/cybersecurity- and-governance/technology-

policy-program/other-projects-cybersecurity.

Analyzing the numbers, the biggest victim of Chinese cyber activity has been the US and it depicts a clear difference between a number of attacks targeted at other powerful states such as the United Kingdom and Russia. This implies that China has tried to pose threats to the US via cyber-attacks. It is very ironical that China which stands for cyber sovereignty has violated the sovereignty of many other states. This once more shows China’s fear of threats posed by the US and all the above cyber-attacks have taken place as a means to counter the US threats. It can be seen that the more powerful the US becomes, the more threatening it is to China.

China’s cyber diplomatic mechanisms such as science diplomacy, summit diplomacy and bilateral diplomacy, targeted at containing the US cyber dominance will be discussed below.

Science Diplomacy

It was mentioned that China’s main purpose of a cyber diplomatic strategy is to ensure national security and regime survival, which is the reason why China aims at containing the US cyber dominance as it poses threats to national security. Very strategically, Xi has paid attention to the domestic aspect as strong and powerful technology within China will ensure heavy censoring and content blocking to safeguard the authoritarianism in China, which will gradually strengthen their technology outside

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China and strongly defend threats from the US. This is the reason for Xi to further strengthen the ‘Great FireWall’ and the ‘Great Cannon,’ with the escalating number of cyber-attacks. Through this, China has attempted to stop western liberal and democratic values spurring in China, as US still remains in the domain by producing the root servers of China and manufacturing many more technological equipment day by day. This further implies the reason as to why China blocked Google in 2002 and why China has Baidu, qq, Sohu and Weibo etc. even up to date (OpenNet Initiative, 2004).

When applying the theory of balance of threats, the level of threat plays a sufficient role. Domestic technological tools of Great FireWall and Great Cannon are cyber mechanisms by China to oppose the threats by cyber power: the US. It can be argued that China has not decided to align with the aggregate and the offensive power, rather built China’s own system to be resistant to threats by the US. Thus, China has taken assertive actions to block content, attack US universities, military services etc. The level of commitment within China is very high as China has been very assertive in this strategy than any other cyber-related incident, further strengthening and implementing the domestic scientific technology.

Developing on domestic cyber space, it can be seen that China has extended it towards science diplomacy in the Arctic. Even though there is no direct tension between the US and China in relation to the Arctic, both states face threats as each state tries to strengthen the ties with Arctic countries. The best has become the annual US-China Arctic Social Science Forum, in which both states decided to cooperate on science diplomacy in the Arctic. China chose to work with the US, solely with the intention of being more powerful by sharing the resources and scientific technology of the US. This is the opportunistic nature of both the US and China, as this cannot be considered as a strong alignment, rather a cooperation strategy, being assertive to an extent.

However, what cannot be ignored is that this indeed serves as a small improvement in the US-China cyber relations, even though the assertive nature from both states still remains. Through the China Nordic Arctic Research Centre (CNARC),

a multilateral track-two platform initiated by China with scientists, researchers, academics and entrepreneurs from China once again initiated cooperation with the United States as an observer (Mayer et al., 2014). While trying to get the benefits out of cooperating with the US, China does take actions to not let the US interfere exceedingly in Arctic affairs when China does not like it and leaves the US out of it, by giving the US the position of an observer. Through this, China once again has shown assertive attitudes towards the US and contained the US cyber power and involvement.

This can be taken as an example of what Liska meant as an “opportunistic alignment” (Liska, 1962). Thus, this case study can be analyzed as a bandwagoning by China. This can be better called “Jackal Bandwagoning” (Schweller, 1994), where China as the opportunistic revisionist state attracts the US as the powerful revisionist state, mainly to get China’s needs fulfilled.

Summit Diplomacy

The second mechanism employed by Xi to promote cyber diplomacy is summit diplomacy. The concept of non-interference is often brought up by Xi at UN conferences. This is a diplomatic move taken by him to pitch cyber sovereignty at the perfect place, as the UN Charter clearly wants all the states to ensure non-interference in domestic affairs and thus secure cyber sovereignty. Through the draft International code submitted to the UN by China and Russia which was supported by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, China was able to replace the national standards with an international basis (Segal, 2018). At all events, China highlighted state sovereignty, sovereign equality, settlement of disputes by peaceful means and non-intervention in domestic affairs.

Next, the World Internet Conference; also known as the Wuzhen Conference is a prominent example of summit diplomacy by China. As the host, China has become successful first of all, as states accepted China’s invitation to attend the Wuzhen Conference including state leaders from Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and US, technological companies like Facebook and Netflix (Timmons, 2015). Secondly, China was able to once again give the message of China: respect for cyber sovereignty. The 5+4 formula (Bandurski, 2018),

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which consisted of four principles and five proposals are based on Chinese values, which highlight that the main purpose behind the summit diplomacy is to ensure the best approach in cyber governance with accommodative attitudes while respecting each and every state to ensure cyber security. However reality contradicts with this and China yearns to do both accommodative and assertive actions to secure cyber dominance by China, with the actions such as slipping a document to participants of the Wuzhen Conference on the night before the closing ceremony, to urge joint efforts on cybersecurity, fighting cyber terrorism and internet sovereignty (Segal, 2018).

Noting down the level of commitment to defend cyber threats, all the participating states at the Wuzhen except the US are engaging at a moderate level, while the US is engaging in the lowest commitment level, which is proved as US state leaders did not attend the Wuzhen Conference. Yet, the rest of state leaders attended the conference, which implies that these states have realized China is an emerging cyber player and one day China might be the “wave of the future” (Schweller, 1994) and thus forming alliances in cyber space with China is useful.

In both these incidents of UN conferences and the Wuzhen Conference, the US which is the threat, as well as the states that act against the US, are invited to the same platform. Yet the US plays a very inactive role only for the sake of attending it, but high involvement is seen from the states including Russia, Pakistan and Tajikistan. etc.

Bilateral Diplomacy

Bilateral diplomacy can be analyzed under two main sections, including; commercial and IT diplomacy and the US + China cyber diplomacy. China engages in commercial and IT diplomacy as part of the One Belt One Road initiative with the ultimate goal of building an “information silk road” via cross border communication networks, transcontinental submarine optical cable projects, and satellite communication (Consulate-General, 2018). Through various infrastructure projects, China collects data for its benefit and this is incentivized via 5G plans. By working with Nigeria to inaugurate communication networks, China collects data

on other telecommunication services available in Nigeria, such as the number of internet users and even information outside the main projects inculding the number of ships entering Nigeria, the available technology etc. and build networks with all these crucial information of other states for the benefit of future projects of China. Thus, it can be argued that through commercial IT diplomacy, many hidden agendas that make the information Silk Road very robust and vigorous have been undertaken.

Countries such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka are in close geographical proximity to China. According to Walt, the close geographical proximity poses a greater threat (Walt, 1987). Therefore, it can be argued that when the US possesses cordial relations with these states and begins to work for better cooperation, these developing states can be utilized by the US to pose threats to China, and thereby, China has taken a rational decision in going ahead with commercial and IT diplomacy with the states in close proximity.

It can be seen that China pays attention to long term commitment, like the GreatWall which China utilizes even today. Even though, the monetary results will not return for years, China does it for the strategic location and potentially valuable resources which will boost China’s economy and thus will strengthen politics. Xi has looked at these developing states, as powerful and strong states with regard to the geopolitical and strategic location, abundance in natural resources and potential and successful allies to balance against the threats by the US. Due to strict conditions laid down by the US in project proposals with environmental assessments, which consume a lot of time to produce results in these developing states and constant accusations of violation of sovereignty by the US, by engaging in domestic political affairs, these developing states feel more comfortable and accessible in working with China and they view the US as a threat.

In terms of US-China relations, one of the main tensions between the US and China is due to the difference in the principles attached to their cyber diplomatic practices as mentioned at the introduction of this chapter. The US desires a multi-stakeholder approach which is an open, secure internet and promotes US values of democracy,

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the participation of all levels in the cyber system where anyone can interfere with the domestic structures. Whereas, China desires a multilateral approach which promotes cyber sovereignty and non-interference (Bandurski, 2018). China never agrees with the multi-stakeholder approach mainly due to the US’s existing cyber hegemony in the current system, with the production network server users used in China at US companies such as Cisco Systems, Nortel Networks and Sun Microsystems etc. (OpenNet Initiative, 2004).

In paying attention to the Obama and Trump Presidencies, the most significant incident was the 2015 state visit, which made both countries, US and China agree to “international rules for cyberspace” (OpenNet Initiative, 2004). This further strengthened and led to the 2015 US-China cyber agreement, in which the leaders once again undertook not to engage in economic espionage while respecting the UN GGE report. Yet, the agreement was breached to an extent when China launched cyber-attacks on US pharmaceutical companies and the US Navy. When looked at closely it is evident that what China pursues with the US is an “opportunistic alignment” (Liska, 1962). China’s alignment with the US on cyberspace is solely for the opportunity of China to develop considerable relations with the US and keep the US away from trying to interfere with domestic affairs. Even though China had desired targets in cyber diplomacy with the US, due to the opportunistic nature it did not become a complete success. This was the reason for failed cyber diplomacy between Xi and Trump, even though they worked towards a Comprehensive Dialogue which was compiled with four pillars with one being on ‘law and enforcement in cyberspace’ (The White House, 2018). All these consisted of hidden personal agendas.

Considering the level of threat, the US was both the aggregate power and the offensive power, which made China work with the US, as China did not want any unnecessary threat from the US high-tech companies and military capabilities, trying to challenge the state of China. The issue lies with the perceived intentions, as the intentions of the US can be aggressive at any time without China’s knowledge. Thus, it can be argued that it is always

better for China to handle the US with care in the cyber domain. Xi realized both the importance of cyberspace and strategic cooperation with the US. Hence, this can be termed as bandwagoning but most importantly faux bandwagoning, since China has tried to extract greater support from its patron, rather than switch sides (Schweller, 1994).

Firstly, this is a strategic alignment with the stronger side to divert the threat elsewhere. Secondly, extreme trust is necessary between the allies and this is where the question arises in the cooperation between the US and China. China possessing assertive attitudes has never placed extreme trust in the US. At any instance such as in the current context of tension between the US and China, a threat to cyberspace can take place within milliseconds with high technological, sophisticated equipment of the US. Third point is that the bandwagoner is the dominant player where the allies have to respect the rules and norms laid by the dominant state. In this case, China and the US both try their level best to dominate each other and not abide by other’s values, rather than come into mutual agreements. This is one of the major reasons why the US-China cyber alliance has not seen much success. The aim of China is self-extension to achieve desired targets of becoming a cyber-power, making the US cordial with China to divert its focus of threat elsewhere. The slight difference is that China not only tries to achieve much, but the US also aspires to become even more dominant and strengthen its cyber hegemony. Thus, the theory and concepts clearly elaborated on the manner in which China tried to faux bandwagon with the US, being both assertive and cooperative at different times while utilizing China’s cyber diplomatic tool of bilateralism with the US.

Next, the focus was on China’s bilateral diplomacy with the United Kingdom and Russia. The annual high-level security dialogue on cybercrime and the 2016 agreement by China and the UK to respond to any request for information or assistance in relation to malicious activities (Policy Paper, 2018) are the prime examples of China’s cooperation with the UK in cyberspace. Even though, the UK possesses western values in cyber governance, at the same time the UK does not highly criticize the concept of cyber sovereignty.

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This implies China has been a successful cyber diplomat with its relations with the UK to achieve cooperation and this can be analyzed as an action taken against the US. This does not mean the UK pursues negative relations with the US continuously. It simply indicates that in the cyber domain, the UK feels threatened by the US. According to this study, China selected the UK to cooperate in cyberspace due to the fact that the UK and the US are allies and both respect western values in cyber governance, unlike China. Thus, this is an opportunity for China to attract a friend of the US, which might lead towards trust issues between the US and the UK and at the same time, these actions will pose a threat to the US.

Bilateral diplomacy exists between China and Russia. It is displayed with the agreement on cooperation in the field of international information security in 2015, following the 2011 and 2015 Codes. China and Russia sharing affinities to ideology in socialism maintain the same ideas towards western values even in the cyber domain. At this point, both Russia and China have a benefit cooperating towards cyber diplomacy.

Applying one of the reasons for alliances as Paul mentioned, the UK China alliance and China- Russia alliance are both to oppose a threat, which is the US. This has so far become successful, as it is a good opportunity even for the UK and Russia if the US tries to pose threats to them. All these prove that China has utilized the mechanism of bilateral diplomacy in cyber with the UK and Russia to contain the dominance of the US. Considering the level of commitment, both alliances can be categorized as moderate level of commitment in which both states involve intangible costs to fulfill their commitment. When applying the level of threat, the US maintains the cyber hegemony and acts as the aggregate and an offensive power with capabilities of posing threats to China, the UK and Russia. It was best for China to align with the UK and Russia and work to defend threats by the US. Considering the perceived intentions, so far China has been able to comprehend the intentions of the UK and Russia to be cooperative to a great extent even though some cyber-attacks have taken place and which are claimed to be non-governmental attacks.

Analyzing the facts, the alliances between the UK and China, and Russia and China possess characteristics of balancing. Both are formed with states with equal capacity to act against the threat in cyberspace, which is the US. Trust is embedded to a greater extent by both states and that has led towards the success of cooperation. There is no singular dominant power upon which the others have to abide by, rather both the UK and China possess equal dominance and agree by mutual consent just as China and Russia. The aim consists of the self-preservation in protecting the existing ties which should not be hindered by the threats of the US. Thus, it can be concluded that the bilateral cyber diplomacy between the UK and China, and China and Russia are balancing and more accommodative.

Conclusion

China has utilized different cyber mechanisms such as science diplomacy via domestic level technology including the Great FireWall and the Great Cannon and scientific expeditions in Arctic, summit diplomacy via the UN and the World Internet Conference, commercial and IT diplomacy and bilateral diplomacy with the US, UK and Russia. The strategy which commenced at the domestic level, has been gradually spreading beyond the borders of China, in order to contain the US cyber dominance which poses threats to China’s national security and regime survival, which are the top priorities of Xi. Many of the mechanisms have become successful in containing the US dominance in cyberspace, except for the diplomatic activities with the US as both the US and China have maintained an assertive nature. Yet, the US and China alliance in science diplomacy has become successful to an extent due to the less assertive nature.

China conducts its cyber diplomatic strategy mainly via balancing which has been the most successful method of cooperation. There remains a possibility for China for greater cooperation in cyberspace to engage in better cyber diplomacy in the future and be a recognized cyber power like the US. However, if Chinese cyber diplomacy fails, it will lead towards many issues with posing threats to regime survival and the national security of China. Thus, cyber diplomacy by Xi should be handled and controlled with great care.

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Fighting the Holy War

Ethno-Nationalist Separatism and Religious Terrorism

Challenges and Prospects for Sri Lanka

Hasarel Gallage*

ABSTRACT

Terrorism is not new to South Asia. South Asian states have been victimized by acts of terror over decades which have and continues to take the lives of thousands of people. Among the many versions of terrorism, the South Asian region has particularly been a victim of terrorism instigated by ethno-nationalist separatism. The multi-ethnic societies and the states with shared and disputed borders that South Asia is home to, have proven to be breeding grounds for an increasing number of separatist claims and terrorist groups that fight. Sri Lanka had its notable position in this security discourse of South Asia due to its long fought civil war with the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), until the latter’s defeat in 2009. Sri Lanka has been reviving from the shackles of war and violence and was focusing on fostering reconciliation among its diverse communities until the Easter Sunday attack on April 21, 2019, which claimed the lives of more than 250 people. This research is aimed at differentiating between the two types of terrorism, both conceptually and empirically. The analysis of empirical data has approbated the conceptual assumptions that these two concepts significantly vary and therefore require specific and unique counter measures.

Keywords: Ethno-nationalism, Religious terrorism, National security, Sri Lanka

China’s Cyber Diplomacy under President Xi Jinping Research Article 06

Introduction

Human history has never been devoid of bloodshed. There is no comprehensive definition for terrorism, nor does anybody know its root. Terrorism has been given a comprehensive definition by Enders and Sandler (2012) as ‘the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or sub-national groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a larger audience beyond that of the immediate non-combatant victims.’ Different forms of terrorism are witnessed in the world today with varying root causes, targets and demands. The two most common of these are ethnic-terrorism and terrorism motivated by religion. The latter has received more attention lately, especially due to the rise of terrorism in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle East. After its promulgation in 1999, for a long time, ISIS has principally operated within the Middle East. However since recent times, they have also been claiming attacks in other lands undertaken by their extremist followers. The newest addition to these is Sri Lanka, rather an unsuspected target of ISIS, since the Easter Sunday attacks on April 21, 2019. As a country which had already experienced ethnic terrorism, the Easter attacks left

Sri Lanka facing a fresh set of challenges demanding reformed security strategies and counter measures different to those used to tackle separatism. After that decisive juncture in Sri Lankan security and political landscape, this research aims to distinguish between these two forms of terrorism which have plagued the country and further to investigate which approach would best address this new security challenge.

Methodology

This research used a mixed approach by analyzing both primary and secondary data. As the first step, the present research relied on secondary data generated through the analysis of previous literature on ethno-nationalist separatism and religious terrorism to assert if they are two different concepts or are related to each other. The study aimed to collect and analyze, primary data, from a sample of 100 people representing different ethnicities, religions and geographic settings to substantiate such findings. The focus was primarily on the youth population from 18-40 years of age. An online questionnaire was developed containing both demographic and conceptual questions which was widely circulated

* Hasarel Gallage, Student, University of Kelaniya. Email: hasarelgallage@gmail.com

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through social media to ensure that the respondents were randomly distributed. The results of the two approaches are compared in the discussion.

Discussion and Findings

The concept of terrorism has plagued the world since times immemorial and has morphed into various forms and is expected to continue. Ethnic terrorism fueled by ethno-nationalist separatism was the most common of them. Ethnic terrorism can be categorized into two main types based on their motive; that which seeks independence from an occupying force such as in the case of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and that which seeks separation from an existing state such as the Basque nationalism seeking separation from Spain, or the LTTE, which sought to separate from Sri Lanka. The second variation is more common than the first, with several entities battling with a mainland for separation often along ethnic demarcations.1 These conflicts either in South Asia, Middle East or in the Central Europe have continued for decades, some ending in victory and adding themselves to the stock of nation states.

Historical sources prove that ethno-nationalist separatism started as early as first century AD with Jewish groups fighting against Roman empires (Lefebvre, 2003). Ethnicity became a driving force for demanding political autonomy and separatism notably in the colonial period which saw the birth of new states in Asia and Africa. A classic example would be the partitioning of the Indian peninsula into India and Pakistan along the Radcliff Line in 1947 which later further partitioned to see the birth of Bangladesh in 1971. Unfortunately, the separatist claims of the Indian peninsula did not cease with the birth of the new states of Pakistan and Bangladesh. The region of Kashmir is still under debate with overlapping parts of it being claimed not only by India and Pakistan but also by the neighbouring Asian giant, China adding to their implicit rivalries in the region.

Separatism entered the Middle East in a major scale in late 1940s with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 in the land of Palestine. While the creation of Israel was more in alienation with religious reasons, 2 today it has turned into a conflict between the two nations, Israel and Palestine over highly disputed borders. Both the state of Israel and the PLO have not been able to demarcate if not unwilling to negotiate its borders.

Unlike in island states, the boundaries of these countries can be eternally disputed. The feature of being landlocked along borders shared by neighbouring states and disputed historical claims have contributed to this conundrum. But above all, ethnicity has played a key role in all these separatist conflicts. A study done in 2017 to find the correlation between ethnic segregation and domestic terrorism concludes that ‘ethnic segregation has a positive and significant effect on the incidence of domestic terrorism, which indicates that countries where ethnic groups are spatially concentrated face a higher risk of suffering this type of violence’ (Ezcurra, 2017).

In that light, the East particularly stands out in its ethnic diversity in comparison to the West. Home to millions of different communities they constantly identify each other in terms of numbers either as majority or minority, one superior over the other. This is in contrast to the notion of nationality that the West upholds and even builds states on.3 Therefore confrontations between majority and minority ethnicities have been commonplace in the Asian context for a long time, resulting in periodic violence and even more demanding separatist claims.

Discrimination, inequality or mistreatment by a particular ethnicity, usually the majority, are linked with most of these demands for separatism, for it is seen as a way of being liberated from the strings of majority ethnicity, especially their power over

1 The most recent of them being South Sudan, separated from the mainland Sudan and established as a separate sovereign state in 2011.

2The State of Israel was established in 1948 by the Balfour Declaration in West Asia. Yet, its establishment and borders remain a topic of intense global debate to date. The creation of Israel in Palestinian territory is often justified by the biblical concept of ‘the promised land’ which according to the Hebrew bible was given by God as a homeland for Jewish people.

3 The Western notion of state has more to do with nationalism, a group of people identifying themselves as belonging to one nation irrespective of their ethnic origins. Even in state building, ethnicity plays limited or very minor role since the basic criteria of statehood as put forward by the Montivideo convention of 1933 states that a sovereign state should have a permanent population, defined territory, a government and international recognition.

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political decision making. It is believed by minority ethnicities and separatists that gaining full or partial autonomy and establishing a new, separate state for their own ethnicity would detach them from the stronghold of the superior ethnicity. Usually the development of this discontent happens over a large span of time, past instances of grievances and gross injustices piling over time to finally erupt, once they exceed a certain limit of tolerance. It becomes so profound that at this point, seeking violence is overly manifested, especially to draw attention to their cause when non-violence moves fail, both locally and internationally.

Ethno-nationalism relies on the grievances of a collective memory and to regain economic, political and cultural rights and by rejecting subordination and cultural assimilation (Lefebvre, 2003). Ethno-nationalist separatists devise strategies that are rather limited to realize their goals and demands. They typically operate in a given geographic area, usually a disputed territory in a mainland; have a specifically defined goal; target an identified opponent. They are also quite constrained by political and moral limitations which they cannot defy if they are to receive credibility and support from other sympathizers, especially the international communities. Ethno-nationalist separatism has been the most known and the commonest form of terrorism. However, in recent times, another type of terrorism has emerged, a terrorism based on religion.

Defining Religious Terrorism

According to Lefebvre (2003), religious terrorism is a more dangerous form of transnational and ideological terrorism backed by religious, messianic and apocalyptic organizations. For Hoffman (1995), religious terrorism is unique in its religious connotations unlike other forms of terrorism when he defines it as, ‘for the religious terrorist, violence first and foremost is a sacramental act or divine duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative. Its perpetrators are thereby unconstrained by the political, moral or practical reasons that seem to affect other terrorists.’ Hoffman’s argument is strongly supported by

Rapoport (1990) when he says that unlike in ethno-nationalist separatism, religious terrorism uses religious scriptures to justify their actions and that the former develops certain restraints on the scope of the violence they inflict unlike the latter.

On the contrary, some scholars also affiliate religious terrorism with nationalism rather than religion, calling it ‘terrorism of the right’ (Laqueur, 2007), although this interpretation is quite questionable. Some others have questioned ‘religious terrorism’ as a confusing term which may suggest a positive connotation that terrorism is a moral and religious act (Tucker, 2001). These opposing definitions bring one to the conclusion that the existing literature has no consensus on the definition of religious terrorism. But generally they agree that unlike in ethnicity driven terrorism, religious terrorism is uniquely and largely associated with religious reasons rather than retaliatory actions for past grievances, claims for political autonomy or ethnicity.

Terrorism in South Asia

Terrorism has never been new to South Asia. The South Asian states have been victimized by acts of terror over decades that had cost, and still cost lives of thousands of people. Among the many versions of terrorism, the South Asian region has particularly been a victim of terrorism instigated by ethno-nationalist separatism. The multi-ethnic societies and the states with shared and disputed borders that South Asia is home to, have proven to be breeding grounds for an increasing number of separatist claims and terrorist groups that fight on the same. From northern regions of Kashmir, Kurdish separatism in Afghanistan and the LTTE movement in Sri Lanka, South Asia has long been battling this challenge. The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) of 2018 has identified South Asia with the highest impact of terrorism at an average score of a massive 5.743, the highest on the index of any region for the past 16 years. Out of South Asian countries, only Bhutan had not recorded any death from terrorism. Sri Lanka also secured one of the lowest GTI scores (2.905) in 2017, only second to Bhutan, due to its notable fall in terrorist activities since its 2009, end of the civil war.

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Distinguishing Ethno-nationalist Separatism and

Religious Terrorism in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka recently experienced an unforeseen and unfortunate turn of events on Easter Sunday morning on April 21, 2019. One of the most sacred days in the Christian calendar next to Christmas, was marred with blood and terror when suicide bombers unleashed a series of six coordinated bombings on three renowned churches in Negombo, Kochchikade and Batticaloa and on three Luxury Hotels in Colombo. The attackers’ targets have apparently been devotees in prayer, tourists and affluent customers. The bombings claimed lives of more than 250 local and foreign nationals including 120 children. The attacks were owned by the Islamic extremist group, National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ) who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The attacks created an instant uproar both locally and internationally partly for the alleged ignorance on the part of the government to avert the attacks, despite prior warnings that have been made available by important sources. To stabilize the situation and to counter any possible retaliatory attacks by the victim communities, a series of search raids were undertaken throughout the country, indefinite curfews were imposed several times and the government declared a state of emergency. The incident also hastened the ban of full face coverings for security reasons, which has been a subject of long debate. Above all, the attacks made room for explicit and implicit animosity towards the Muslim community that has been unprecedented in recent times.

At the time, Sri Lanka was reviving from the shackles of war and violence focusing on fostering reconciliation among its diverse communities. The Easter Sunday bombings came as a shock which awoke the entire country and reignited the fears of terrorism and insecurity in civilian minds after almost 10 years, since 2009. The notable difference was that this time the focus has suddenly shifted to two other ethnicities as the perpetrators and victims, the Muslims and Christians respectively, occupy even a smaller fractions than Tamils out of the country’s total population. 4

For a state that has experienced enough of ethno-nationalist terrorism of the LTTE, religion-based terrorism of the NTJ is bound to pose an array of new challenges demanding different approaches and confrontations. In order to identify the best approach to tackle this new challenge, it was vital to distinguish between these two types of terrorism in terms of their root causes, targets and geopolitics.

Tracing the Roots

Tracing the deep roots of the LTTE movement is a difficult task with different opinions being put forward. Certain critics refer to colonial times to the British Divide and Rule Policy, which deliberately segregated the main ethnicities in Sri Lanka in terms of political representation5 creating an animosity and competition among them. Some others highlight post-colonial administrative decisions, notably the Official Language Act of 1956, which made Sinhalese the official language of the country, which excluded the other ethnic language, Tamil. The University of Ceylon Act of 1972 which significantly reduced the number of Tamil medium students eligible for tertiary education is also cited by some others. The animosity between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority came to a climax with the 1983 Black July riots, one of the darkest periods in the country’s history, when Tamils were publicly harassed and their assets looted by armed mobs aided and abetted by those in power. This incident marked the ‘eruption’ of the long sustained tolerance of the Tamils at the injustices committed on them and became a major driving force behind the birth of the LTTE. Since then the ethnic Tamils of the Northern and Eastern provinces demanded a separate state for Tamils and started ruling the regions claimed by them by establishing their own judicial, political and military structures.

On the other hand, the reasons that prompted the NTJ to launch the Easter Sunday attacks remain to be established yet, with a multitude and sometimes contradictory theories been put forward. The most common of them all states that this attack is a result of misinterpreted and extremist beliefs of Islam,

4 The general census done in 2012 by the Department of Census and Statistics reports 74.9% Sinhalese, 11.2% Tamils, 9.2% Muslims, 4.2% Indian Tamils and 0.5% of other ethnicities.

5 Communal Representation was introduced by the British to Sri Lanka in a series of constitutional reforms from Colebrook Reforms of 1833 until Donoughmore Reforms of 1931 which replaced communal representation with regional representation.

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which endorse the killing of non-Muslims or infidels (Kafirs) who reject or disbelieve in God or the tenets of Islam. This comes under the broader objective of Jihad, a holy war waged against the non-followers of Islam to make them terrorized so that the message of Islam can be propagated. While this is the popular belief, the term ‘Jihad’ itself is a disputed term which has been interpreted in different ways, some calling it a spiritual struggle within one self to eliminate evil forces, but not a physical war involving violence. The actual meaning of Jihad will not be discussed in detail for the purpose of this paper. In addition to Jihad, another important concept behind the religious terrorism of both ISIS and NTJ is Wahabism, founded by Muhammad-ibn-Abd al-Wahhab, Wahhabism aims to restore monotheistic worship or the so-called oneness to God, and is also called Tawheed.

These concepts of Islam seem to have had a major role to play in the terrorism inflicted by ISIS in the Middle East and very recently by the NTJ in Sri Lanka. Unlike the LTTE who fought for political autonomy of a state exclusive for Tamils as a resolution to the past injustices committed on them, NTJ seems to have been motivated by specifically religious reasons which have no ethnic demands. Ethnicity or past grievances cannot be thought as a reason, as it was with the LTTE, because the victims of the Easter attacks were Christians, a community that has not been in confrontation with Muslims at any time during the recent history of Sri Lanka.

Targets and Strategies and Geopolitical Demands

The primary target of terrorism perpetrated by the LTTE was the mainland controlled by the central government and they attacked its civilians by their unique tactic of suicide bombings. These attacks caused the death of civilians and public figures such as politicians who came from diverse ethnicities, including even the Tamil community. A notable example is Lakshman Kadiragamar, a leading and highly respected politician and diplomat, who was ethnically Tamil. This proves that the LTTE was not only targeting the Sinhalese in particular, the majority ethnicity who had been discriminating

against them in the past. Ethnicity was neither the only determining factor in identifying their targets nor the primary driving force behind their violence. It can be, thereby, argued that their motive was rather to inflict violence as a means of attracting attention to their cause.

The Easter Sunday attacks were significant in terms of the victims targeted, that is Christian devotees and tourists who either aligned with the West or came from the Were. Examining the reasons as to why this community were targeted, one can hypothesize that the large global presence of the Christian community, so that any attack on them is highly likely to attract global attention. In that context, unlike the LTTE for whom the ethnic identity of their victim was of less significance, for the NTJ, it was a sensitive and a determining factor to maximize their appeal. Another reason to specifically target Christians can be seem as the abhorrence towards Christian culture and western liberalism which have fueled flames in the Middle Eastern soil for a long time. If one were to assume that they were addressing their past grievances, their immediate and most probable target would have been Buddhists with whom they have had two recent confrontations connected with ethnic uprisings in 2014 in Aluthagama and the most recent being in 2018 in Kandy.

In terms of geography, the LTTE’s claim for autonomy was limited to the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, which they claimed as their traditional homelands. None of the other regions of the country came under their claim despite the dispersion of the Tamil community throughout the country, especially in spite of their high presence in the capital city, Colombo and the central highlands. LTTE terrorism was therefore limited to a specific territory which was bounded by local geopolitics. Since the ultimate goal of the ISIS is to establish an Islamic State that expands beyond the Middle East, it is not possible to assume that NTJ was primarily driven by that goal. Unlike the LTTE, NTJ is not demanding autonomy over a specific land which is exclusive for Muslims.

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In comparison to the LTTE, NTJ remains unconstrained by politics and international relations in which the former who have rather been careful in their tactics in choosing whether they targeted local or international audience, yet restrained not to estrange any of them. However, in choosing to attack Christians, NTJ has done the opposite.

Analysis of Survey Data

With the above understanding of the conceptual difference between ethno-nationalist separatism and religious terrorism, and with particular reference to the two forms of terrorism inflicted on the Sri Lankan society, by the LTTE and the NTJ respectively, it was thought to be useful and relevant to understand the public opinion on these two scenarios. Therefore, with a view to strengthening the case of this research, a survey was undertaken involving 100 randomly picked respondents representing different ethnicities and coming from various regions. The results of which are discussed below.

In keeping with this rationalization, the sample contained respondents from the main ethnicities of Sri Lanka in rough proportion (incidental) to their actual distribution as 72 percent Sinhalese, 13 percent Tamils, 11 percent Muslims and 1 percent Burghers. There were 67 per cent of male respondents and 33 per cent of females. In terms of age, 60 per cent were of 21-25 years, 30 per cent were of 31-35 years while the rest were of 31-40 years. The respondents also covered a geographic diversity incuding 16 Districts while the majority came from Colombo.

Discussion on the Main Concepts

The first three questions of the survey intended to investigate the general understanding of the respondents on the concepts of terrorism, ethno-nationalist separatism and religious terrorism. Almost half of the respondents (48.5 percent) understood terrorism as ‘violence that is premeditated to attack non-combatant targets based on their ethnicity or religion.’ This focus on ethnicity might be a result of the long exposure of Sri Lankans to ethno-nationalist separatism, with which they have associated terrorism. However, 57.6 percent of respondents have identified that ethno-nationalist separatism and religious separatism to be two different concepts, 25.3 per cent responded that they are somewhat similar while only 8.1 per cent replied that they are similar.

A majority of respondents (46.5 percent) believed ethno-nationalist separatism was ‘instigating violence to establish a separate and sovereign state with adequate political autonomy,’ while 29.3 percent associated the concept with ‘violence that aims at eliminating an opposing ethnicity.’ 66.7 percent of respondents identified religious terrorism as ‘violence instigated to eliminate another dissenting religious ideology’ and 25.3 percent as ‘violence instigated due to its endorsement by a religion as a sacred act’ while only a minimal fraction (8.1 percent) said it was aimed at achieving a spiritual state beyond life.

Figure 1. Responses on the definition of ethno-nationalist

separatism

46.5% - Instigating violence to establish a separate and sovereign state with adequate political autonomy

29.3%- Violence driven in retaliation off past injustices perpetrated by an ethnic majority

24.2%-Violence that aims at eliminating an opposing ethnicity

Figure 2. Responses on the definition of religious terrorism

66.7% - Violence instigated to eliminate another dissenting ideology

25.3%- Violence instigated due its endorsement by a religion as a sacred act

8.1% - Violence that is enacted to achieve a spiritual state beyond life

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Reasons, Strategies and Objectives

The respondents believed that the reasons such as past grievances, discrimination by the majority ethnicity and cultural heritage contribute more to ethno-nationalist separatism than religious terrorism. Their responses on the strategies used by these two forms of terrorism were however divided. Although in the conceptual analysis it was identified that ethno-nationalist separatism is constrained in terms of strategies and targets, the respondents of the survey believed that while limited violence and a confined geographic area related to ethno-nationalist separatism, it was religious terrorism which has a more limited and specific target. Seeking political autonomy and international sympathy, was believed by most of the respondents as an objective of ethno-nationalist separatism while ethnic cleansing was identified as a sacred act only relevant to religious terrorism, as demonstrated by the previous analysis (Table 1).

Table 1. The responses on reasons, strategies and

objectives as contributing to ethno-nationalist

separatism and religious terrorism.

Attribute Ethno-nationalist separatism

(%)

Religious terrorism

(%)

Reasons Past grievances 78 22

Discriminatory acts by another ethnicity, usually the majority

75 25

Cultural or historical heritage

56 44

Strategies Causing limited violence

60 40

Attacking limited and specific targets

39 61

Confining to a specific geographic area

86 13

Objectives Political autonomy 86 14

International sympathy

55 45

Ethnic cleansing as a sacred act

33 67

Relevant to the questions on LTTE separatism and the recent Easter attacks, a majority of respondents, 54.8 per cent believed that the war with the LTTE was won because of a strong security plan, 30.3 per cent attributed it to successful political coordination. Compensation of past grievances and enhanced cross cultural understanding were not identified as reasons to a significant scale. Only 8.1 percent believed that despite the end of the civil war, the actual conflict was not successfully dealt with. 47.4 percent of respondents disagreed that it was solved including the 14.1 percent who strongly disagreed.

As for the most recent Easter Sunday attacks, a majority of respondents affirmed that it took place due to the absence of a strong security plan as opposed to their belief that a strong security strategy was behind the end of the LTTE separatism. The second most cited reason was lack of political coordination, 27.3 percent; while cross-cultural understanding and unattended past grievances were given much less prominence. There were more respondents who thought lack of cross-cultural understanding to be a reason for Easter attacks than for the LTTE separatism, highlighting the essentially religious and cultural factors behind religious terrorism. Following are some of the frequently given reasons for these two examples listed in descending order (Table 2).

These data show that the respondents at large believed that a strong security plan, coupled with successful political coordination were primarily imperative to avert both forms of terrorism. However, when specifically asked on what approach would prove to be the most effective in tackling the new challenge of religious terrorism, a majority of respondents (69.7 percent) thought an ideological approach was the most appropriate. Only 17 percent believed in a military intervention and 13 percent on a political solution. This is in contrast to their previous standing that security strategies and political coordination played a major role in responding to the threat of terrorism. A reason for this contrasting opinion can perhaps be their valid understanding that since religious terrorism is largely defined in terms of extremism if not misinterpreted religious ideologies, the threat of religious terrorism also needs an appropriate and sustainable ideological solution, something forceful but which security and political strategies cannot deliver.

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Ethno-nationalist separatism of the LTTE movement

Religious terrorism of the Easter Attack by NTJ

• Long term discrimination of minority ethnicities • Extreme and misinterpreted religious ideologies

• Demand for political autonomy • Political instability

• Ulterior political agendas • Narrow political gains

• Past grievances • Ethnic polarization/lack of cross-cultural understanding

• Welfare of the Tamils • Global geopolitics to destabilize Sri Lanka

• Political instability • Absence of a security plan

• Economic inequality • Discrimination by majority ethnicity

• Mistaken ideologies • As a means of seeking attention

• Caste system in the North • Reasons unclear

Conclusion

The conceptual analysis of the two concepts; ethno-nationalist separatism and religious terrorism proved these two concepts to be different from each other. The respondents of the research survey have also more or less agreed on these conceptual definitions. The important finding of these two methods of analysis is that addressing the threat of religious terrorism has to be carefully maneuvered with more emphasis on ideological solutions. As a multi-ethnic state, Sri Lanka cannot turn a blind eye to its diverse communities which would only add to the animosity and suspicions among them leading perhaps to another and more violent conflict. The solution lies in embracing the idea of being Sri Lankan instead of crouching behind ethnicities. It is equally important to understand that the acts of a group of people who resort to extremism and violence do not always represent the views of the entire ethnicity, which was apparent in both the LTTE movement and the violence perpetrated by the NTJ. The generalization of violence committed by a few as the objective of an entire community brings nothing but hatred and more violence, instead of a solution to the real issue.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Prof. Abhaya Balasuriya and Ms. Kaushalya Ariyarathna for their guidance and encouragement throughout the process of this research.

References

Ariyarathne, K, & Munasinghe, V.P. (2019). Islamic Extremism: Clash of Civilizations or Clash within Civilization?. Colombo: Law and Society Trust

Ariyasinghe, R. (2001). Terrorism, the LTTE and the conflict in Sri Lanka, Conflict, Security & Development, 1(02), 25-50. DOI: 10.1080/14678800100590607

Bader Al-Ibrahim. (2015). ISIS, Wahhabism and Takfir, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 8(3), 408-415, DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2015.1051376

Gregg, H.S. (2014). Defining and Distinguishing Secular and Religious Terrorism. Perspectives on Terrorism, 8(2), 36-51. Retrieved from http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/336/671

Institute for Economics and Peace, (2018). Global Terrorism Index 2018. Retrieved from http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf

Lefebvre, S. (2003). Perspectives on Ethno-Nationalist/Separatist Terrorism. Conflict Studies Research Centre. Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/39989/06_Aug.pdf

Table 2. Frequently cited reasons for the LTTE movement and Easter Attacks

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Recent Trends in China’s Maritime Strategy in the Indian Ocean Region: An Assessment

Senuri Samalka Samarasinghe*

ABSTRACT

Becoming a global maritime power by projecting naval capabilities and influence far beyond its coast line is a pre-eminent ambition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Accordingly, from essentially a zero presence a decade ago, the PRC at present, is investing both diplomatically and militarily in seeking assertiveness in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Within the context of these developments, the objective of this study was to analyze China’s potential to be the predominant power in the entire IOR by evaluating the recent trends of its maritime strategy in the region. Alfred Mahan’s Theory of Sea Power and the Model of Deployment, Reception and Onward Movement of Foreign Military fleets (DROM) are used as measure sticks to assess China’s aspirations and the sea power potential in the Indian Ocean(IO). Thus the study focused on the following research questions; whether predominant sea control is a realistic goal for China in the foreseeable future, whether China has the potential to displace the US Navy as the predominant navy in the IO and what are the limitations for China to achieve sea control across the IO.

Keywords: Maritime Strategy, Indian Ocean Region, China, Sea Power

Introduction

China’s assertive role in the maritime waters beyond its coastal waters has undergone changes in terms of the geographical scope of influence as well as by the guiding strategic principles. In terms of the geographical scope, a decade ago, China had essentially a zero presence in the Indian Ocean (IO). However, today China is heavily investing both diplomatically and through military means to maintain sound management of the order of the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, China’s Defence White Paper in May 2015 outlined the nation’s ambition to become a global maritime power by improving and projecting its naval capabilities far beyond its coastline (as quoted in Chaziza, 2018, p. 16). Moreover, according to the 2017 Chinese White Paper on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific and Chinese Grand Strategy, China aims to supplant the United States as the predominant power in East Asia (Singh, 2017, p. 1). Within the context of these developments and given the increasing strategic significance of the IO as a strategic body of water, this research aimed to evaluate China’s recent trends in its maritime strategy in the IO, in order to assess China’s potential to be a predominant sea power in the IOR.

Methodology

The study adopted a qualitative descriptive analysis methodology as the study was in the realm of subjectivity. The literature study was based on both primary and secondary sources to answer the key research questions outlined in the introduction. Primary sources such as speeches made by statesmen, maritime doctrines and defense white papers were referred. A literature survey was conducted looking into secondary sources such as scholarly articles, publications, journal articles, policy briefs and annual reports. This study is an original contribution to the existing literature on recent trends of China’s maritime strategy in the IO and aims to fill the gaps in literature on assessing whether predominant sea control is a realistic goal for China in the region.

Discussion and Findings

Recent Strategic Trends of China’s Maritime

Strategy in the IO

The Great Chinese Admiral Zheng made maritime expeditions to the IO during his Seven Voyages in the Ming Dynasty. Since then, China’s presence in the IO was limited to traditional naval diplomatic

Research Article 07

*Senuri Samalka Samarasinghe, Junior Research Associate, Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies.

Email: senuri@bcis.edu.lk

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actions like goodwill visits and naval exercises with the IO littoral states (McDevitt, 2018, p. 1). However, from a decade ago, China’s traditional naval diplomacy has been combined with strategic maritime missions in the IO.

i. Military Modernization and Expansion

It can be seen that naval expansion and military modernization is a crucial component in China’s IO policy. It can be seen that the People’s Liberation Army and Navy’s (PLAN) naval military expansion in the IO, is conducted on two main pillars; by acquiring Anti-access and Area Denial (A2AD) Capabilities and improving surface and subsurface warfare capabilities.

Acquisition of Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) Capabilities is a significant component of China’s advancement as a blue water navy. It can be seen that Anti-Access is an attempt to deny the freedom of military movement and actions of an adversary in the battleground by striking their key targets utilizing attack aircraft, warships, and specialized ballistic and cruise missiles. Area Denial is the attempt to deny the adversary, the freedom of military movement and actions in an area under a friendly control by employing defensive means; air and sea defense systems (MDAA, 2019). It can be noted that since China’s accession is an assertive regional power in the Asia Pacific, it has deployed Anti-Access and Area Denial in countering the US military activities and facilities in Taiwan and the South China Sea. China is currently working on deploing these capabilities in the IO. Especially, Area Denial capabilities which are deployed currently in China’s permanent bases in the IOR, with the use of sea and air defense systems.

Improving surface and subsurface warfare capabilities is another significant component of China’s advancement as a blue water navy. China has sought to improve those capabilities by acquiring submarines and aircraft carriers. Chinese submarine warfare has been improved since the acquisition of Russian-built conventional submarines in mid-1990s to the addition of four indigenously built submarines at present

(Boomakanti & Kelkar, 2019, p. 4). In fact, a major milestone of China’s military modernization under the present CPC Government is indigenous production. With regard to the PLAN’s capabilities in the air, it already has two air craft carriers; the soviet built and PLAN completed Liaoning, and Type 002, the first indigenously produced carrier (Boomakanti & Kelkar, 2019, p. 4). China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning, provided access for Chinese military to the South China Sea, Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The carrier also provided technical support to dock the Chinese forces temporarily between domestic bases and overseas stations (Sun, 2015). It can be argued that China has long-term ambitious initiatives to improve the aircraft carriers in the future by acquiring nuclear powered carriers to be launched into the operations in the Western Pacific and the IO (Boomakanti & Kelkar, 2019, p. 4). People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which is inclusive of nuclear and missile forces, also has undergone several major improvements in terms of survivability and accuracy in order to maintain Beijing’s regional nuclear deterrence (Boomakanti & Kelkar, 2019, p. 6). Therefore, it can be argued that nuclear powered aircraft carriers would further strengthen PLAN’s surface warfare capabilities in the IO.

ii. Military Operations other than War

China is engaged in conducting military operations other than war in the Indian Ocean such as peacekeeping operations and counter-piracy operations. The main peacekeeping operations of the Chinese peacekeeping missions are in Lebanon, South Sudan, Darfur and Western Sahara. (Sun, 2015).

The PLAN is engaged in anti-piracy operations in the Arabian Sea since December 2008 (McDevitt, 2018, p. 1). Chinese Navy’s anti-piracy operations have transformed the PLAN “from maritime rookies to confident sea dogs” (as quoted in Erickson & Strange, 2015, p. 76). Counter-piracy offers PLAN multiple purposes. It gives the Chinese forces the practice needed to conduct military operation at a far distance from

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the mainland China. Also, it serves as a window into the operational patterns of the militaries of other powers enabling the PLAN to assess the strengths and weaknesses of its naval military forces in relation to the other foreign militaries (Cooper, 2018, p. 2).

The military operations other than war such as anti-piracy missions, peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief missions (HADR) and other multilateral combined military exercises executed by PLAN in the far seas in the IO are launched under the banner of peace, development and security cooperation. Therefore, they help China to assert the international soft power that China seeks. Anti-piracy operations, which are considered as PLAN’s most active service, can be seen to project China’s blue soft power in the IO region. Inter-navy exchanges and dialogue at sea, combined training, participation in multi-stakeholder dialogues on land and at sea, and port visits for replenishment and diplomatic purposes before, during, and after counter piracy missions, assist China to project their blue soft power (Erickson & Strange, 2015, p. 76).

PLAN also deploys intelligence missions during peacetime in order to prepare for potential wartime scenarios. Chinese vessels in the IO carry out surveillance, intelligence and reconnaissance missions in and around the IOR as well as in the geographical area under sea (Cooper, 2018, p. 2). These missions help PLAN to gather data on the operational behavior and patterns of other adversary militaries.

Another major military operation other than war conducted by the PLAN in the IO is facilitating replenishment facilities to the Chinese fleet. Chinese Navy has established technical service posts in the IOR which serve three purposes. Firstly, they facilitate ship fuel and material resupply; such as in Djibouti, Aden, Jeddah, and Salalah. Secondly they facilitate relatively fixed supply ship berthing and fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft take-off and landing, such as the stops in the Seychelles. Thirdly, they facilitate complete recharge to rest weaponry and take advantage of a large ship repair center, such as the stop in Pakistan (Sun, 2015).

iii. Naval-Military Diplomacy

Development of multiple local military partnerships is the cornerstone of China’s military diplomacy in the IOR. Military exchanges; training and exercises, have increased between China and other Indian Ocean littoral states such as Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Pakistan, the Maldives, Sudan, the Seychelles, Saudi Arabia, etc. These military exchanges have laid the foundation for stronger military cooperation between China and the states in the western IO and the Persian Gulf (Sun, 2015).

China also plays an active role in multilateral dialogue seeking cooperative mechanisms in international organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum, Shangri-La Dialogue, Jakarta International Defence Dialogue, and Western Pacific Naval Symposium, while also hosting multilateral forums like the Xiangshan Forum in order to strengthen multilateral dialogue on defense and security issues (as quoted in Defence Intelligence Agency, 2019, p. 19).

iv. The Belt and Road Initiative

Reviving the ancient Silk Road, President Xi’s grand strategy of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was announced in 2013. With the aim of reviving the ancient silk road, the BRI consists of two mega plans; building a land route and a sea route; named as a 21st Century economic silk road and silk road economic belt. A vast network of railroads, ports, bridges, energy pipelines, highways, streamlined border crossings, industrial projects, economic and trade cooperation zones, international free trade zones, dams, harbours, green cities and economic corridors would be built southward and westward of China connecting China with far East, Central Asia, Middle-East and Europe. 125 countries as well as 29 international organizations have signed 173 cooperation agreements with China as part of the BRI, as of April 2019. The BRI is considered the most ambitious geo-economic infrastructure project in history.

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v. Network of Indian Ocean Bases

Another major trend in Chinese maritime strategy within the IO is the network of IO bases. According to the International Business Herald, a paper published by the Xinhua News Agency reported in 2013 that Beijing would build 18 strategic support bases to protect the sea lanes of communication through which China’s energy vessels traverse in the IO (as quoted in Chaziza, 2018, p. 7). Proving this prediction true, China has established its first permanent naval base in Djibouti in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. The permanent base in Djibouti will open China to build more permanent bases required to carry out advanced military operations in the northwest IO.

Accordingly, China has plans to set up its second offshore naval base in Jiwani peninsula near Gwadar, Pakistan. Even though China has had the administrative control of the Gwadar port for over 40 years, it could be argued that China’s plan to build a base in Jiwani is driven by several strategic reasons. Jiwani is a great connecting point which connects IO with the Arabian Sea, and oil rich Middle East with Central Asia and South Asia. It is also close to the Bay of Oman, which is an important energy choke point. The already existing Gwadar port is not capable of facilitating several specific logistical needs for the Chinese fleets. According to military analysts, it is a common practice to have separate facilities for warships and merchant ships. Accordingly, the Gwadar port provided the facilities to the merchant ships and is not capable of providing the full range of maintenance and military logistical support services (Chan, 2018).

Departure or Continuation of Policy?

New trends in China’s military strategy manifest her departing from conventional principles that the PRC has committed to since its inception. Those commitments include prime focus on the protection of the core and heartland, no-first use policy, active defense, and non-interference principle. The conventional structure of Chinese military thinking has always been dominated by the precedent of protection of the core and heartland, which includes

central China as well as the outlying regions such as Tibet, Xinxiang, Mongolia, Manchuria, Taiwan (Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 99). Moreover, a cornerstone Chinese principle was the military to be inclusive of only an infantry army with limited mobility, logistics, ordnance and communications (Chansoria, 2009, p. 100). Also, as mentioned in China’s military doctrine, China’s primary operational policy guideline is ‘active defense,’ which means “China does not initiate wars or fights wars of aggression” (Chansoria, 2009, p. 105). Moreover, during the Imperial period, the period after the People’s Republic of China was formed and during Mao Zedong’s rule, China did not illustrate much interest in maintaining a naval fleet or launching sea journeys, and China generally ’turned its back to the sea’ (Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 10). However, with increased military modernization and organization, China has sought to prepare its forces, the army, navy, air force and the rocket force battle-ready in order to gain decisive victories for the people’s liberation forces in any geographic theatre of battle. The IO can be seen as one such major theater of battle, conflict and competition where China seeks to play an assertive role.

The setting up of the Chinese base in Djibouti reflects a change to China’s long practiced commitment to the non-interference concept. Conventionally, China has considered that the Middle East is the ‘graveyard of great powers’ so it has avoided getting involved in the affairs of the Middle East. However, irrespective of Djibouti being a base shared by other great powers and irrespective of it being situated in the turbulent Middle East and North African region, China has decided to set up its first naval base in Djibouti despite its non-interference stance. It can be analyzed that Djibouti’s strategic location and geopolitical significance has urged China to choose it departing from the traditional non-interference in the MENA region.

DROM Model and China in the IO

China’s recent strategically responsive goals in the IO can be assessed with the model of Deployment, Reception and Onward Movement (DROM) of foreign military powers. There are two approaches to DROM of foreign military powers; soft military approach and hard military approach.

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The soft military approach includes temporary deployment of military patrols, peacekeeping forces, military trainers, and consultants, as well as building overseas munitions warehouses, joint intelligence facilities, aerospace tracking facilities, earthquake monitoring stations, technical service and military replenishment stops, maintenance bases, and military teaching institutions (Sun, 2015). The hard military approach includes establishing semi-permanent military bases which would serve military purposes as opposed to civilian purposes. Those military purposes would include command, surveillance, combat, intelligence collecting operations (Sun, 2015).

China has been exercising a soft military approach in the Middle East until it established its permanent military base in Djibouti. Its soft military approach in the region includes convoy fleets in Gulf of Aden and Somali waters launching evacuation and disaster relief and emergency aid, peacekeeping forces and Chinese navy technical service stops in Middle East which are based on short-term and long term agreements but not as permanent bases (Sun, 2015). Through operations such as naval diplomacy, the combating of piracy, disaster relief, and ocean rescue, China has aimed only to launch temporary naval deployments and not have permanent military bases which can be termed as a “state within a state” or special military zones.

China at present, has withdrawn from its long practiced soft military approach in the Deployment, Reception and Onward Movement (DROM) as a foreign nation in some parts of the IOR. Traditional Chinese diplomatic principle has been to reject overseas military deployments (Sun, 2015). With the establishment of the permanent military base in Djibouti, China’s soft military approach has shifted to a hard military approach and thereby the traditional military role has been transformed. So far, in order to protect its geo-economic interest in the region, China has been following temporary military exchanges, but the base in Djibouti falls under the category of hard military approach as it is a permanent military base within the borders of another country with the right to conduct specific military activities. It can be thus seen that the planned Jiwani port too will accommodate China with more

specific military activities to be launched within the borders of Pakistan, an activity that the Port Gwadar would not do. Therefore, these initiatives have transformed the soft military approach of the DROM to meet the strategically responsive goals of the PLA Navy in the IO.

However, China is continuously denying that it has any intention for hegemony. So the question is what are China’s real motives and how far will China go and how realistic are the goals that China is attempting to achieve by going beyond their traditional principles and commitments. This research study intended to address this issue by analyzing China’s sea power potential in the IO.

Assessing China’s pre-dominant sea power

potential in the IO

China’s recent policy in the IO is underpinned by the tenants of classical geopolitical theories of sea power. The PLAN’s recent strategies in the IO illustrate that they have been inspired by Alfred Mahan’s theory of Sea power. Naval strategist thinker, Alfred Thayer Mahan brought out some requirements which determine a nation’s sea power potential. Therefore, Mahan’s theory of sea power can be applied to assess China’s predominant sea power potential in the IO.

The main assumption in Mahan’s theory of sea power is that sea borne trade is the most profitable way to gain access to international markets as it accommodates low-cost, long distance transportation. Therefore, a merchant navy is needed to carry products across “great highways” of the high seas. A battle ship navy is also needed in order to protect the merchant navy from potential rival navies. Thirdly, a network of bases are needed to supply fuel and other supplies to the merchant navy and a battle ship navy in operation as well as to maintain and keep the sea lanes of communications open between the nation in concern and the new markets. Therefore, a battle fleet and overseas bases are essential to maintain safe and smooth seaborne trade for a nation. In turn, the profit gained from seaborne trade is utilized to maintain the battle-fleet and the bases. Due to the zero-sum outcome nature of the seas, conflicts are an essential feature in the seaborne trade between great powers.

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China’s role in the IO also corresponds to Mahan’s ideology. Maintaining a large merchant navy and PLAN’s expansive role as a battle-ready fleet, rigorous foreign policy with the grand vision of Belt and Road Initiative to ensure unrestricted energy supplies, nations’ adventurous spirit with a large coastal population engaged in sea-faring activities, shipyards, ports, commercial and military bases established overseas, growing economy and well-developed sea trade are the factors which connote the idea that China has been inspired by Mahan’s model in guaranteeing the protection of its seaborne trade as well as expanding sea power.

Moreover, according to Mahan, weaknesses in countries such as poor soil and less cultivable land urge nations to find resources in the sea depths, which gradually result in naval expansion. Similarly, it can be argued that China’s relatively low agricultural land has become an accelerating factor in its naval expansion. China’s large population and relatively low agricultural land within the country too has resulted in limited ability to produce food. According to the World Factbook 2018, China’s agricultural land is approximately 10-11% of the total area of the country. In contrast, the agricultural land accounts for 7.17% of Russia’s area, 11.64% of Japan’s area and 18.01% of the USA area. The population of those nations are nearly four times smaller than that of China (Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 9). Therefore, China’s relatively low agricultural land, limited ability to produce food as well as hard and insufficient access to natural resources such as oil, which are situated in remote provinces with a harsh climate have caused China to process its development of sea power (Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 9).

So it is clear that China has the potential for sea power according to Mahan’s model. In fact, it can be analyzed that China’s moves in the IO can be likened to a game of ‘Go,’ a fiendishly difficult board game in which each player tries to acquire the largest area in the board using black or white pebbles. One’s position in the endgame is determined by where one places one’s chips at the beginning (Brewster, 2016). However, pre-dominant sea control is what is required if China is to alter multipolar balance of power in the IO and gain maritime hegemony over the ocean, replace the US Fifth Fleet as the predominant navy and to turn the IO in to a Chinese

lake. Yet, the predominant sea control over the IO remains an unrealistic goal for China due to several factors, inclusive of both challenges faced by China’s strategy as well as the pragmatic limitations of China’s role. It can be perceived that even though China has adapted into its IO strategy, the sea power requirements in Mahan’s model, China has not been able to meet with some determinant factors in Mahan’s model which are required if it is to be a hegemonic sea power.

China’s limited geographical access to the IO as opposed to residential IO powers is a major disadvantage for China on its development of sea expansion in the IO. Easy access to an open sea is a main determinant factor to attain hegemonic sea power. Mahan claimed that being located on islands and having easy access to open sea are two determinant factors for a nation to become a hegemonic sea power. For example, the British, due to its easy access to open seas, could develop a coherent sustained policy of sea expansion, had relative advantage in concentrating its fleet to monitor the rival navies and dominate key sea routes that run across rival nations (as quoted in Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 5). French admiral Théophile Aube who is a major opponent of Alfred Mahan, also agreed with the geographical advantages that the British enjoyed over its rival navies, due to its geographical location as an island nation and its easy access to open seas (Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 5).

Even though China has a long coastline which enables sea-faring activities and ensures a sea-faring population which are also determinant of a sea power spirit of a nation, the continental nation’s access to open sea through its coastline has been barred by several factors. PLAN has to cross the “lines of islands” to access the Pacific Ocean, and the lines of islands comprise of the Aleutian Islands, the Korean Peninsula, the Kuril Islands, the Japanese Archipelago and the Archipelago of the Philippines, Borneo and Australia. These territories in the lines of islands are under the allies of USA (Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 8). Another factor that bars China’s direct access to the Indo-Pacific Ocean is the presence of American fleet operating from the second and third lines of islands (Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 8). Irrespective of the dominant

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presence of the American fleet in the lines of islands, America has direct access to open-seas unlike China. Due to the aforementioned geographical disadvantages of China and the relatively higher geographical advantages of the USA, it is more likely that the American predominant sea control in the IO will continue in the foreseeable future.

Another major geographical disadvantage that China has is, its long land-border. China’s territory is nearly 9.6 million km2 and is the fourth largest territory after Russia, Canada and the US. Its land-border is amounted to 22,000km and it is longer than that of the US which is approximately 12,000km (Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 9). China’s land border is relatively peaceful, irrespective of the land dispute with India. There is no real threat of land invasion against China, and Chinese borders are well protected by natural geographical barriers. Yet, according to Mahan’s model, an invasion through the high mountains and vast deserts is no mean challenge even in the 21st Century (Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 9). Therefore, China’s longer land-border requests it to have a strong focus on developing a battle-ready sizeable land army. It requires substantial expense for development of defense strategies in the land-border, which could otherwise have been invested in sea expansion (Adamczyk & Rutkowska, 2018, p. 12).

India in the IO is another major challenge for China’s hegemonic aspirations in the IO. India’s Act East Policy is the cornerstone of India’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. Furthermore, to counter China’s BRI, India is investing in the Cotton Route. India aims to balance China’s maritime ambitions by building strategic and economic relations, people to people relations and exploring trade potentials with other IO states. India also revisits the ancient Mausam strategy to counter China’s BRI by expanding its maritime presence in the region culturally, psychologically and strategically. Moreover, SAGAR and SAGARMALA projects aim to promote India’s engagement with the region. Swaran Singh, a professor at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, has stated that neither Gwadar nor Jiwani would be a wise choice for a naval base because of its proximity to the port of Chabahar in Iran, in which India has a big stake (Chan, 2018).

The Quadrilateral alliance to balance China is another major challenge for China’s predominance in the IO. Warming quadrilateral relations among the US, India, Japan and Australia have become a new geopolitical reality which has the potential to transform the Indo-Pacific. Japan and India’s ties mark the uniting of Asia’s two most important democracies and the joining of the US, mark the entry of a global super power to determine the parameters of security in the IO. Regular port visits, international military education and training programmes granted to the IO littoral states, military technology transfers among the four nations and Malabar exercises are among the main initiatives undertaken by the Quadrilateral alliance to maintain balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s assertive role in the IOR and the initiatives by the Quadrilateral alliance among the US, India, Japan and Australia connote that a security dilemma prevails in the IOR. Security Dilemma in International Relations is a situation in which states feel insecure in relation to another state or states and therefore each state act militarily and diplomatically to make itself more secure, and in turn the other states interpret those actions as threatening. (IR Paradigms, Approaches and Theories, 2014). Such security dilemma in the IOR is followed by a soft balancing strategy. States engage in power-balancing for the purpose of deterring rising powers and to prevent competing nations from becoming militarily stronger (Stafford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2013). The Quadrilateral alliance as a group of major powers therefore pose a challenge to the assertive actions of China while trying to maintain balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region.

Conclusion

According to Mahan’s model of sea power, China has the potential to be a sea power. Moreover, according to the DROM model, China has shown signs of withdrawal from its long practiced traditional military principles in the IO. However, there are challenges and practical limitations to China’s potential for predominant sea control in the IO. Therefore, it could be concluded that China’s role in the Indian Ocean is limited. Even though predominant sea control is not a realistic goal, there are other realistic missions for China due to the presence of multidimensional non-traditional security threats in the region. Thus, China will

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not replace the American predominance in the Indian Ocean due to limitations and challenges the PLAN has encountered. Therefore, it can be argued that Western criticisms that China has the potential to gain predominant sea control in the IO are groundless. In fact, there are vulnerabilities for China in the Indian Ocean during wartime or in the event of a major conflict. So, China will play an influential, assertive but a limited role in the Indian Ocean in the foreseeable future.

References

Adamczyk, M., Rutkowska, P. (2018), China on the Road to Becoming a Sea Power — Is This the Renaissance of A.T. Mahan’s and J.S. Corbett’s Theory?, kultura — historia — globalizacja nr, Retrieved from https://depot.ceon.pl/bitstream/handle/123456789/15489/China_on_the_road_to_becoming_a_sea_power_%E2%80%94_is_this_the_renaissance_of_A.T._Mahan%E2%80%99s_and_J.S._Corbett%E2%80%99s_theory.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Brewster, D. (2016), India and China: playing “go” in the Indian Ocean, LOWLY Institute. Retrieved from: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/india-and-China-playing-go-indian-ocean

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Chan, M. (2018), First Djibouti, Now Pakistan port earmarked for a Chinese overseas naval base, Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/China/diplomacy-defence/article/2127040/first-djibouti-now-pakistan-port-earmarked-chinese

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The Militarization of Outer Space: A New Frontier for National Security

Inoka Perera*

ABSTRACT

Increase of technological developments over the past few decades have led to an excessive proliferation in the destructive capacity of outer space warfare, in a context where space technology and research is viewed as a measuring stick of a state’s power capabilities on the global stage. The present research argued that in a multipolar, anarchic system, major players such as US, China, Russia and India constitute proactive space power capabilities as an element of national power maximization and a deterrent strategy, prompting a new non-traditional security threat to the world and therefore demands the necessity of proper international governance mechanisms. Reluctance of states to abide by an international rule-based order in utilizing the outer space for military purposes further induces a new cold war environment potentially leading to a security dilemma and risks confrontation. Most importantly, a phenomenon of an eventual space race can be explained in terms of both as a tool of hard power and soft power, wherein the former depicts the building of one’s military capacities to counter its threats while these military capacities are also a vehicle of great power status on the global stage. Taking into consideration this perspective, the notion of ‘independence’ and sovereignty appears to be strongly at risk and outer space therefore is perceived as ‘a new frontier that is exploited as part of an inevitable and enduring struggle for power.’ Therefore, the paper concludes the possible exacerbation of celestial conflictual relations that an anarchical state system would experience as a result of an arms race through continued militarization and the eventual weaponisation of the outer space that often tend to go under the radar in national defence policy strategies. The importance of a rules-based order while prioritizing on peace initiatives such as space diplomacy to safeguard the peaceful nature of the outer space is conclusively found imperative.

Keywords: Militarization of Outer Space, National Security, Space Diplomacy

Introduction

Gen. Joseph W. Ashy, former Commander in Chief of the United States Space Command once stated that

It’s politically sensitive, but it’s going to happen. Some people don’t want to hear this, and it sure isn’t in vogue … but – absolutely – we’re going to fight in space, we’re going to fight from space and we’re going to fight into space (Spacey, 1999).

Since the dawn of the space age, the outer space has become a theater for military operations, taking into consideration the exceeding geopolitical significance of space in its ability to control the ground from above. The term militarisation of space for the purpose of this study is defined as the use of assets based in space to enhance the military effectiveness of conventional forces or the use of space assets for military purposes (Matthew, 2002). Space capabilities have become central to many military operations, including

missile warning, geolocation and navigation, target identification and tracking of adversary activities (Chin, 2011). Most importantly, space technology and research is viewed as a measuring stick for a state’s power capabilities on the global stage. A number of states are conducting space capabilities seeking to elevate their status in the international arena since historical times. As a result, increased technological developments over the past few decades have led to an excessive proliferation in the destructive capacity of outer space warfare. In a multipolar, anarchic system, the outer space continues to be perceived as a medium of global, political, technological and military competition and with it the continued blurring of military, civil science, and commercial space. The militarization of space was initially a product of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and the desire of the United States to examine what the Soviet Union was doing by developing a satellite reconnaissance programme. The

Research Article 08

* Inoka Perera, Student, University of Colombo. Email: inocperera@gmail.com

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military use of outer space began to evolve since the Sputnik 1 went into orbit in 1957 followed by The Star Wars Initiative of USA in 1983. In the 21st Century, major players such as the US, China, Russia, India and other states and non-state actors constituted proactive space power capabilities as an element of national power maximization and deterrence strategies, prompting a new non-traditional security threat to the world and therefore demanding the necessity for comprehensive international governance mechanisms.

In addition, the countries’ reluctance to abide by an international rules-based order in utilizing the outer space for military purposes further induced a cold war environment potentially leading to a security dilemma that risks confrontation. It can be argued that if this process should continue, distinct dangers of deterioration in peaceful cooperation, a possible nuclear confrontation in addition to an increase of orbital debris are certain ramifications. Therefore the paper attempted to understand outer space initiatives, policies and programs conducted by states in a realist anarchic context, with reference to US weaponisation programmes in the outer space and the consequent counter initiatives by Russia, China and India and the national security threats they may trigger. The paper aimed to assess the potential risks for global security and for the sovereign independence of states due to the growing threat of an outer space warfare.

Methodology

This research was based on the qualitative research mechanism, conducted using both primary and secondary resources. Primary data included treaties and conventions related to outer space in addition to international space agencies and satellite information, interviews and speech of state leaders. Secondary sources included book publications on outer space power theories, journal articles on outer space militarization and budgetary expenditures to compare the states’ space power capabilities so as to analyze the national security threats posed thereof. The paper focused on the concept of geopolitics in order to stress the significance of outer space as an area of power projection. It utilized the theories of realism and stressed on the concepts of power maximization in the competition for hegemonic status leading to situations of security dilemmas risking confrontation.

Discussion and Findings

Geopolitics of Outer Space

The utilisation of the outer space for military purposes has evolved since the Sputnik 1 went into orbit in 1957. During the Cold War era, where space militarisation only affected the two super powers, in which given the accelerated nuclear profile on both sides, the two super powers were able to avert the imminent danger of a space attack. With the present context of emerging powers and the advancement of military weapon technologies, in a system where countries are increasingly accelerating their space programs in order to safeguard their national security by enhancing military dimensions, the probability of a space confrontation remains highly possible. Thus, James A. Lewis (2007) from the Centre of Strategic and International studies (CSTS) stresses the manner in which the use of new and advanced technology in the new millennium has marked a new direction of future warfare. He distinguishes three main reasons as to why state actors use outer space for national security purposes: (1) the political prestige and international influence brought by space activities; (2) the technological capabilities that space programmes create or reinforce and (3) the informational advantages space assets and services can bring to military and security operations, and to strategic planning for security.

Therefore at present, with the rapid advancement of possibilities for greater international access to and interest in space, the geopolitical context in which space policies are carried out is profoundly changing. Today, more than 60 countries have at least some presence in space in addition to private and commercial actors realizing the great potential of space flight and technologies, and gaining more and more access to space, which are all influential factors for the constantly altering outer space geopolitical power configurations (Al-Rodhan, 2002). The complexity of this constantly evolving situation, the multiplicity of actors and the speed of technological change pose serious challenges to the security and the governance of the international system. Borrowing heavily from the literary tradition of 19th Century geopolitics, Dolman (1999) argues that space, much like the air and maritime environments, offers considerable advantages to the state that is best able to capitalize on its geography. Dolman considers

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outer space as the home to ‘chokepoints,’ ‘strategic narrows’ and commerce lanes of particular strategic importance, and the primary purpose of US space policy should thus be to control these.

Realist Influence on Outer Space Politics and US’s

Space Programs

Theoretically, explanations on the geopolitics of space, since the earliest times, rely heavily on classical realist assumptions. This is not surprising since realism was the predominant approach in the International Relations discipline from the 1950s, when the Soviet Union launched the world’s first satellite into space when the Cold War was at its height. Classical realism, as brought forward by Hans J. Morgenthau (1948), theorizes states as unitary and rational actors. Thus in the absence of a world-recognized authority, territorial states continue to compete for power in an anarchic global system given the extreme fear and uncertainty in the state system. Power maximization through the enhancement of one’s capabilities became the only means of survival for all states and to fulfill a state’s unilateral interests leading to a power competition within the international system.

Therefore, the efforts of the US and the Soviet Union in their utilization of the outer space for military purposes during the 1960s can be considered a consequence of the rivalry among super powers striving for power in their interest towards becoming the space hegemon. In fact, military capacities in the outer space are a demonstration of power and prestige of a state and an elevation of their status in the international arena. As Michael Sheehan (2007) points out, “the ‘power’ in question is a multifaceted amalgam of different forces ranging from tangible military capability to unquantifiable degrees of prestige. A space programme could contribute to overall power by confirming or suggesting capabilities in a range of other areas, such as long-range missiles and technological expertise.” Therefore, an eventual space race can be explained in terms of a tool of hard power and soft power, wherein the former depicts the building of one’s military capacities to counter its threats while these military capacities are also a vehicle of great power status in the global stage. Developing countries such as China and India have further invested in extensively costly space programmes despite the domestic poverty and

underdevelopment constraints that have challenged these countries. Therefore, the realists emphasise on the significance of reputation and prestige in the countries’ efforts to conduct expensive commitment of a manned spaceflight programmes.

Apart from the soft power approach, realism postulates that the unilateral efforts for power maximization to ensure the national security of its people can in turn lead to a security dilemma, a spiral of insecurity and the pursuit of security caused by the perception of the other power’s efforts to accumulate power. Taking in to consideration this perspective, the notion of ‘independence’ and sovereignty appears to be strongly at risk and outer space therefore is perceived as ‘a new frontier that is exploited as part of an inevitable and enduring struggle for power’ (Pfaltzgraff Jr, 2001). Under such terms, the utilisation of a militarized outer space during the 1960s by the US and USSR, in a realist lens was part of a global competition for international leadership in an era when direct military confrontation was increasingly unthinkable. As a theatre of political interaction, the space environment continued to evolve and was responsive to changes in the world system. In the present technological era, especially given a multipolar international system, realism finds no difficulty in maintaining that countries’ pursuit for power and hegemonic dominance is increasingly escalating causing an even greater risk at securing the peace and order in the global system and the national security of states.

Consequently, major players such as the US, China, Russia and India constitute proactive space power capabilities as an element of national power maximization and deterrence strategies, prompting a new non-traditional security threat to the world and therefore demanding the necessity for comprehensive international governance mechanisms. Deudney (1985), agreeing with this, sees outer space as a double-edged sword in superpower relations. On the one side, increased militarization of outer space poses a risk where the superpowers could extend their conflict extra-terrestrially and devise new, deadlier technologies that would enhance the risk of exterminating all of humanity; on the other, the space age creates productive opportunities for the superpowers to deal with their rivalries in stabilising collaboration. For instance, US President Donald

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Trump, during a meeting of the National Space Council at the White House (2018), states that, “My administration is reclaiming America’s heritage as the world’s greatest space-faring nation. The essence of the American character is to explore new horizons and to tame new frontiers. But our destiny, beyond the Earth, is not only a matter of national identity, but a matter of national security,” he announced. “[I]t is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space.” Therefore, the US’s competition for hegemony as postulated by Dolman is further evidenced with the Trump administration’s plan to spend approximately $14.1 billion on national security space programs in 2020 (Erwin, 2019) as a critical and essential move towards safeguarding the US military dominance in outer space in retaliation to other major actors such as China and Russia. Furthermore, the US aspires in the establishment of a new Space Development Agency, a U.S. Space Command and now pleads its case to Congress for establishing a new Space Force within the Department of the Air Force (Erwin, 2019). These are all strategic initiatives undertaken by the US in its attempt to pursue an outer space hegemon.

These policies may be considered as a result of the realization of the geopolitical significance of the outer space in which, once the US materializes its interests in space militarisation, it becomes indispensable in its capability of maintaining its dominance in the entire international system. Military analyst Lt. Col. Rick Francona noted (CNN 2018) that military leaders definitely have an eye on the sky, “space doesn’t dominate one small geographic area, it dominates continents, oceans… . Most military thinkers know this is the battle space of the future.” Moreover, Lt. Col. Thomas Bell (1999) describes the inevitability of space weaponisation through subsequent militarisation by stating, “just as the role of US military operations in space has gradually shifted from scientific interest, through intelligence collection, to robust combat support, so it will continue to shift inevitably towards the weaponisation of space.”

Logically, this is a justifiable conclusion. Why would space be different from all four other military domains? Lt Col Bell (1999) argues that “it is inevitable that mankind will weaponise space, and

equally likely that this weaponisation will occur with maturing of specific technologies over the next thirty years.” Thus, the potential of the United States to incorporate and engage in the militarization of outer space will essentially create the required asymmetrical environment for future conflicts. Bell further postulates that space weapons, which include the ability to conduct warfare in, from, or through space, will be required in the next major conflict of the United States due to the mandate to ensure freedom of access. Bell (1999) identifies three major requirements for space: “enhanced space surveillance; develop the capability to deny a potential enemy the use of space; and develop capability to protect United States space assets from the enemy.” Bell’s analysis demonstrates a unique perspective where technology is treated as a powerful drive for space weaponisation.

China and Russia’s Retaliatory Space Programs

The picture becomes even more complicated given the prominence to the anarchic multipolar world order, where there is no one power but a complicated mix of a multitude of emerging powers such as Russia, China, India and North Korea and even states such as Israel and Iran that are presently pursuing their power capabilities in outer space. For instance, China and Russia pose aggressive space approaches that seek to challenge U.S. superiority in space with ambitious military space programs of their own (Billings, 2015). The power struggle thus risks sparking a conflict that could cripple the entire planet’s space-based infrastructure, and though it might begin in space, such a conflict could easily ignite full-blown war on Earth.

China’s space expenditure in 2017 is estimated at US $11 billion, second to only the US which has an expenditure of US $48 billion in 2017 (Harrison, Johnson et al 2018). At the same time, China has partnered with Russia for joint ventures and is welcoming private investors in a “non-U.S. space start-up.” The US Defense Intelligence Agency in its first unclassified report made public about China’s military power which further approves of China’s proliferating presence in outer space by revealing China’s “sophisticated satellite operations and its probable tests in on-orbit dual-use technologies

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that could be applied to counter-space missions (Harrison, Johnson et al 2019).” The report further maintains that China’s increased space capabilities are utilized as a mechanism to deter the US or others from intervening in military conflicts specifically in the Asia-Pacific region. While it is no secret that the Chinese are already engaged in spying on US national security technology to counter US as a threat with China’s submarines under waters to project nuclear power against the US as national security expert Jim Sciutto further outlines in his book, “The Shadow War: Inside Russia’s and China’s Secret Operations to Defeat America” (CBSNews, 2019), that the weapons in space: Lasers, kamikaze satellites, kidnapper satellites that are stationed in outer space by both Russia and China not only create a significant threat to the US hegemonic position in the world order but to the national security and territorial integrity of all states in the international system remain at stake due to the growing probability of a space warfare.

Over the past two decades, China has advanced both its civil space programs and its military space capabilities, but what is most concerning is its advances in its counterspace programs. Counterspace systems are designed to disrupt, degrade, or destroy the space systems we have come to rely upon. Thus China seems to have an advantage in developing counterspace systems relative to the United States’ progress in deploying protections against these threats. Co-orbital systems such as Aolong-1, capable of physically manipulating other satellites, together with its non-kinetic counterspace capabilities can threaten the U.S. economic and security interests in space (China in Space: A Strategic Competition, 2019).

India’s Space Programs

In the new millennium, countries are also ameliorating their anti-satellite (ASAT) or missile defence capacities in an emerging arms race between nations. Being the fourth country to test ASATs, India’s launch of a Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) largely serves its defence interests in the Indian Ocean. In fact, unlike GPS, GLONASS or BeiDou, INRSS is a regional navigation system with a footprint that extends about 1500 km from India’s

landmass, which not only addresses the navigational requirements for operations across mainland, islands and the Indian Ocean, but also covers the main sphere of India’s regional security interests’ including China and Pakistan (Nagendra, 2016).

Thus, the increasingly contested nature of space has become an impetus to India’s changing approach to outer space; it has transformed its outer space engagement extending from a purely civilian and peaceful approach to one where certain military characteristics are evident, conditioned by changing security realities (Rajagopalan, 2019). The “IndSpaceEx” is a proposed wargame that would help India in its rationale calculation of the capabilities India must develop in order to protect its assets and secure its national interests (Rajagopalan, 2019). In addition to these developments, others include India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capability and the establishment of the new tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA) all of which are enhanced to facilitate India’s regional and global strategic interests which are worth close scrutiny.

Findings

The developments of space capabilities and counter-space capabilities of major actors such as the US, Russia, China and India are evident that terrestrial politics have presently changed the perspective of outer space and is casting a long and heavy shadow on outer space politics. Figure 1 is a summary of the space launches that are conducted by the US, China, Russia and other actors such as India from 1957 to 2018. It depicts the increased proliferation of space launches until the 1990s which gradually reaches a decline as it comes down to 2018. However, what is also interesting is that despite the low number of space launches, there is a considerable increase of actors, both state and non-state that are engaging in space militarization and thus complicating the peaceful nature of the global order and making it even more difficult to curb a potential space warfare.

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Figure 1: Total Launches from the US, China,

Russia and all other states from 1957 to 2018

Source: CSIS Aerospace Security

With the growing advancement in technology and research in the 21st Century, reduced cost, increased access and proliferation of space systems will drive more countries to integrate these systems into military capabilities (NASIC, 2018) in addition to the already capable China and Russia creating an even more insecure world order. Furthermore, non-state actors will also proliferate in their presence complicating the peace and security of the outer space. The emergence of more actors in outer space leading to the increase of counterspace capabilities, particularly in the low Earth orbit, have created significant risks of collision. This is the risk that a new Cold War in a multipolar world poses.

Moreover, one of the main challenges that space objects create is their dual capabilities which will challenge the ability to provide advanced warning of nefarious intentions or the ability to discern between peaceful and potential hostile activity. For example, future satellite servicing and recycling capabilities incorporate a variety of technologies, such as robotic arms, to inspect, repair, or dispose of damaged satellites (NASIC, 2018). However, the same technologies have inherent counter-space capabilities that could be used to inspect non-consenting satellites or to cause physical damage, steal parts, or grapple with a satellite.

Therefore, it is more than evident that the nature of the outer space has become more contested and competitive in the global world order posing greater and stronger threats than nation states have ever perceived before. This paper raised the importance of attention towards a possible near-future space confrontation that all states in the international system must focus, which often go under the radar of International Relations. It remains equally important to provide a permeable solution to combat and control the escalation of outer space militarization.

Although a comprehensive legal framework seems a long-lasting solution, Dolman (2002) argues that all attempts conducted to reduce and control weaponisation and the arms proliferation outer space are “a slick diplomatic manoeuver.” Therefore, space-related treaties and international agreements are unlikely to be sustainably effective given the manner in which states can easily withdraw from them when conditions seem contradictory to their national interests. In fact, in a realist perspective of the international system, the governance of the world order tends to be outstandingly dominated by the emerging super powers resulting in regulatory frameworks being institutionalized based on their interests and to fulfill their own political advantages and aspirations. However, what remains interesting is that despite the anarchy and the uncertainty in the global system, states have been able to create a command and control mechanism in the international seas through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which similarly can be applied in the outer space to control who can launch space satellites and utilize space for military purposes and to what extent these military operations can be conducted.

In addition, it is imperative that states formulate discussions and ensure a national space legislation to control the extent of space objects that can be stationed in outer space by each actor in the international system. Furthermore, there also seems to lack a proper definition for space militarization and a proper political framework to elucidate the nature of outer space politics given its vast extend.

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This creates the need for an “innovative and comprehensive political framework for outer space that traditional geopolitical approaches have not addressed,” according to Dr. Al-Rodhan (2012). Most importantly, states and non-state actors must realize the overwhelming effects of a possible outer space warfare and prioritise more on space diplomatic efforts in which international actors may arrive at a consensus on the military utility of outer space.

Conclusion

The paper highlighted the possibility of a potential confrontation in the outer space given the increased arms proliferation and the competition of states in space. It argued that in a realist-led anarchical and multipolar international order, major actors such as the United States and Russia including China and India have increased their presence in the outer space, utilising it both as a soft and a hard power tool. Space capabilities while qualifying to be a yardstick of status and prestige of a state in the global stage is also a strong geopolitical arena to manifest one’s hegemonic aspirations in the superpower rivalry of the world order. The paper argued that what remains today is a new Cold War, for unlike in a bipolar world during the 1960s, the multipolar world is threatened with a growing number of emerging actors in the outer space ready to attack and counterattack whenever necessary. The problem arises wherein not only do these space capabilities create even more complexities in the outer space, but these proliferations have the potential to lead on to a security dilemma and create stronger implications on the national security and the territorial integrity of other states in the international system and threaten the peace and security of the international system. Therefore, the paper called upon for a greater dialogue on restraining outer space militarization and the eventual weaponisation through efforts such as comprehensive regulatory mechanisms, national space legislations and peace initiatives such as space diplomacy which remain essential for global peace and security.

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