Enabling Interoperability Through the Human Dimension: Interoperability with Unified Action Partners, Social Identities and Mission Command

White Paper May - 2017

Concepts and Requirements Division Capability Development Integration Directorate

Mission Command Center of Excellence

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Enabling Interoperability Through the Human Dimension: Interoperability with Unified Action Partners, Social Identities, Mission Command,

May 2017

Concepts and Requirements Division (CRD) Capability Development and Integration Directorate (CDID)

Mission Command Center of Excellence 806 Harrison Drive Building 470

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2302 913-684-4521

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/landingpage/collection/p16040coll2

Produced by Booz Allen Hamilton for the United States Army Contract: W911S0-11-D-0012-0007

© (2016) United States Government, as represented by the Secretary of Army. All rights reserved.

Authors: William Hardy Joseph Rodman Contract Team Lead: Don Kroening

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Mission Command Center of Excellence Mission Statement

The Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCoE) develops, integrates and synchronizes Leader Development, Army Profession, and Mission Command requirements and solutions to prepare leaders and units to successfully exercise Mission Command during the execution of Unified Land Operations. The MCCoE is fully committed to developing and delivering current and relevant Leader Development, Army Profession and Mission Command DOTMLPF (Doctrine-Organization-Training-Materiel-Leadership and education-Personnel-Facilities) solutions for the warfighter based on lessons learned from current operations and analysis of future operations. The MCCoE was established in 2010 as the Army lead for implementing Mission Command across the force. The MCCoE was tasked to: determine MC WfF requirements; identify future MC capabilities; integrate MC across the DOTMLPF domains; and present resource-informed, outcomes-based MC and MC-related recommendations and solutions.

Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Mission Statement

The Mission Command (MC) Capabilities Development Integration Directorate (CDID) conducts analysis and integration to identify future requirements and manage current capabilities that enable the Army, as a part of the Joint Force, to exercise Mission command and operationalize the Human Domain.

The Army’s Human Dimension (HD)

The cognitive, physical, and social components of Soldier, Army Civilians, leader, and organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Army in unified land operations.

Preface to MCCoE Human Dimension White Papers

The Capabilities Requirements Division (CRD) of the MCCoE CDID produces white papers in order to support the

core missions of the MCCoE and CDID and facilitate discussion concerning the human dimension. The papers

review academic and private sector research—including theory and applied practice—and contextualize it with

current Army doctrine, guidance, interests, and the anticipated operational environment of the future. Each paper

provides analysis on topics identified as critical to Mission Command, the Army’s human dimension, and the Army

of the future. This analysis informs recommendations after the conclusion of each paper on how the Army can

better leverage the human dimension in order to gain a decisive edge in operations now and in the future. The

intent of each paper is to provide a foundation of knowledge, expertise, and analysis in order to foster continued

discussion, inform Army efforts, and provide alternative perspectives.

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Executive Summary The volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous future operational environment necessitates that the Army and its personnel prepare for and have the capability to work more regularly and more effectively with an increasingly diverse set of UAPs. This new reality will require the Army to optimize its understanding and implementation of interoperability in a manner that can adapt to the changing realities of its environment. Of course, interoperability has long been a topic of interest for the Army. Its conceptualization, however, largely remains either general or narrowly focused on its technical and/or material components. Notably, current approaches do little to accommodate the “human dimension” aspects of interoperability. The MCCoE believes this is a critical omission that needs to be addressed considering the existing current and anticipated future operational challenges the Army faces. Interoperability, regardless of any existing resource or technology involved, begins and ends with the human operator. Human dimension interoperability includes consideration for the organizational, behavioral, and cultural aspects of interoperability that have, at the very least, an equal impact on effective partnering as the more familiar technical and material components of interoperability. This paper proposes a novel conceptualization of human dimension interoperability for the Army to consider as a starting point for the deliberate development of a more precise and comprehensive appreciation and institutionalization of interoperability. This, in turn, will shape how the Army understands, develops, and invests in appropriate capabilities and solutions for the unique challenges of the future operational environment.

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This conceptualization describes three main components that contribute to effective human dimension interoperability: (1) the ability to identify and understand groups, (2) the ability to successfully engage and interact with partners, and (3) the ability to understand, manage and adapt diverse teams. Essential to successful human dimension interoperability is ability to identify and leverage commonalities between groups and partners in order to emphasize teamwork and strengthen leadership, management, ethical, social, behavioral, communication, and organizational building processes, procedures, and protocols that enable the achievement of objectives and goals. Conversely, and equally important to successful human dimension interoperability, the ability to identify dissimilarities between groups is essential in order to mitigate, minimize, eradicate, or circumvent risk, and/or avoid situations that may adversely affect the performance of diverse teams and groups. While the Army currently addresses each of these components in various ways (cultural awareness, regional expertise, and language training, for instance), the model is unique in two ways: its integration of these components in a broader, unifying, and more comprehensive conceptualization and its emphasis on the third component, understanding, managing, and adapting diverse teams. There is considerable research available in the academic realm to inform the Army’s interest in learning how to better understand, manage, and adapt diverse teams among UAPs. Findings on social/group identities, group entitativity, in-group/out-group distinctions, and strategies for managing group identities can significantly contribute to the Army’s desire to capitalize upon investments into the human dimension, optimize Soldier and leader performance, and become more effectively interoperable with an increasingly varied set of partners—all of which are considered as being critical to mission success in the future operational environment. Current efforts concerning interoperability that do not also consider the human dimension, including the impact of both perceived and acknowledged social identities upon the ability of commanders to manage and adapt diverse teams, risk compromising integral partnerships amidst complex missions. Furthermore, underestimating or disregarding human dimension aspects and consequences of interoperability undermines some of the fundamental principles of mission command, namely building cohesive teams through mutual trust and creating a shared understanding. As such, any efforts to improve interoperability, to include human dimension interoperability, must inherently align with the on-going institutionalization of mission command throughout the Army. Indeed, interoperability in and by the Army should reflect its expeditionary, modular, diverse, and globally integrated operational posture. This is a complex, intensive, and long-term endeavor. One key component of this effort, however, is to understand and plan for the consequences, actual and potential, realized or perceived, of the human dimension components of interoperability, including the impact of social identities on forming effective, adaptive, responsive, and temporary UAP teams. With this in mind, the Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCoE) Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID) makes the following recommendations to the Army concerning improving interoperability and better understanding social identities:

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On Human Dimension Interoperability:

1. Define Human Dimension Interoperability as the social, cognitive, and physical aspects that influence, and are influenced by, the ability of individuals and teams to act together coherently, ethically, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.

2. Conduct an original empirical study (or series of studies) about Army-UAP team

cooperation to identify the specific knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics that are critical to Army-UAP team performance and may be considered to comprise constituent components of a more robust understanding of human dimension interoperability.

3. Adopt the conceptualization of human dimension interoperability presented in this

paper as a starting point for the deliberate development of a more precise and comprehensive institutionalization of interoperability.

4. Assess the potential benefit of creating a Human Dimension Interoperability proponent,

organization, or council capable of coordinating all forms and components of interoperability.

5. Investigate the potential of Hartel and Chamberlain’s recommendation that the US

military place more emphasis on interoperability by reversing funding priorities.

6. Utilize the Army’s CNA process to identify human dimension interoperability requirements.

On Social/Group Identities and Interoperability:

7. Integrate social and group identity concepts into experimentation in order to reflect the complexity and dynamics of the modern operational environment.

8. Consider incorporating elements of Social Psychology and Industrial/Organizational

Psychology into the professional military education of information officers, mil-to-mil liaisons, and digital liaison detachments.

9. Explore through experimentation the potential impact of facilitating an internally

oriented inform and influence cell into the relevant echelons of command during combined Unified Operations.

10. Integrate human dimension interoperability concerns and considerations into the

Army’s Mission Command Network Modernization Strategy.

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Table of Contents

MCCoE and CDID Mission Statements ii

Executive Summary iii

Table of Contents vi

Introduction 1

Scope of Paper 2

Structure of Paper 3

Significance 4

Interoperability 6

Defining Interoperability 7

Interoperability and Unified Action Partners 9

Organizational Structure of Interoperability 12

Types of Interoperability 15

Human Dimension Aspects of Interoperability 16

Conceptualization of Human Dimension Interoperability 19

Social/Group Identities 23

Understanding Social/Group Identities 25

In-Group and Out-Group Perceptions 28

Majority and Minority Groups 29

Holding Multiple Social/Group Identities 30

Group Entitativity 32

Formation Strategies for Managing Group Identities 35

Decategorization 35

Subcategorization 36

Recategorization 37

Optimal Distinctiveness 38

Mission Command, Trust, Interoperability and Future Operations 39

Emphasizing the Human Dimension of Interoperability 41

Operational Risks and Opportunities 42

Conclusion 44

Recommendations 46

References 49

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 53

Appendix B: Previous MCCoE CDID Human Dimension Papers 56

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Introduction

“No degree of technological development or scientific calculation will diminish the human dimension in war. Any doctrine which attempts to reduce warfare to ratios of forces, weapons, and equipment neglects the impact of the human will on the conduct of war, and is therefore inherently flawed.”1

The current and anticipated operational environment of the future requires the Army to work effectively with a diverse range of unified action partners (UAP)—both domestic and foreign. Broadly, the Army’s “ability to operate in synergy” with external entities is referred to as interoperability.2 While such a capacity to cooperate with others has been important to the Army for some time,3 the increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) future environment anticipated by the Army necessitates a corresponding increase in capability within the Total Force. One approach to achieve this capability is through the synergy generated by pooling resources and cooperating directly with UAPs. Most obviously, partnering with UAP teams augments the Army’s material capability. Perhaps less obviously, but at least equally important, by cooperating with UAPs the Army also takes advantage of the unique external human and institutional knowledge and expertise of its partners in order to help the Army succeed amidst the challenging and often novel circumstances of the future operational environment. Despite its emphasis by the Army—both recent4 and historic5—interoperability remains a broad subject that does not lend itself to precise or comprehensive conceptualization. The Department of Defense defines interoperability as “the ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.”6 This is a useful starting point, but leaves much to be deduced for specific circumstances. Broad understanding of interoperability does little to illuminate its nuanced expressions or inform conduct in its many complex permutations critical to the US Army now and in the future. The material and technological components of interoperability (most often addressing communications) have been the focus of the majority of the Army’s efforts on the subject.7 On the other hand, the “human dimension” of interoperability has been less thoroughly considered. All perspectives of interoperability are critical for Army mission success in the future environment. As such, this paper presents a discussion of the human

1 Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1: Warfighting, (June 20, 1997): 13. 2 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (November 8, 2010), 118. 3 For instance, one authors suggests “…partnerships have been a part of virtually every American military operation since World War I”: Thomas Crowson, “Breaking it down Barney style: a framework for cultural interoperability,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 22, no. 2 (2016): 108. 4 M. Wade Markel, Henry A. Leonard, Charlotte Lynch, Christina Panis, Peter Schirmer, and Carra S. Sims, Developing U.S. Army Officers' Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), xiii. 5 Crowson, “Breaking it down Barney style,” 108. 6 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 118. 7 Michael Codner, “Hanging Together: Interoperability Within the Alliance and With Coalition Partners in an Era of Technological Innovation,” NATO Research Fellowship, Final Report, June 1999, 12.

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dimension of interoperability in order to complement the Army’s more mature appreciation of its technical and material components and thereby encourage a more comprehensive understanding of the topic. To buttress the Army’s traditional conceptualization of interoperability (that emphasizes its technical and material components currently discussed in doctrine and mentioned above) it is necessary that the Army develop a more robust understanding of the “human” components of interoperability—that is, human dimension interoperability. In short, the complex, multidimensional nature of interoperability requires a complex, multidimensional perspective. The Army’s interest in its human dimension provides a promising lens through which to elaborate such an approach. The Army’s human dimension, as summarized in The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015 Building Cohesive Teams to Win in a Complex World 8 and the U.S Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040 (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1)9 and explored in the MCCoE’s series of human dimension white papers,10 focuses on preparing for the future by more effectively capitalizing on the unique capabilities of Army personnel. A human dimension approach to interoperability must take into account mission command doctrine and guidance while supplementing it with relevant military and academic social science theory and research. By focusing on how the Army’s human dimension relates to interoperability this paper intends to develop Army understanding of a relatively marginalized component of interoperability that will be critical to mission success in the future operational environment. Furthermore, a detailed discussion of human dimension interoperability will also demonstrate the diversity of the Army’s interest in interoperability, which may encourage similar appreciation or inquiry of specific components of interoperability in the future.

Scope of Paper

Interoperability is multidimensional. It is comprised of different facets, including technical, logistic, doctrinal, network, communication, organizational, behavioral, and cultural interoperability. Furthermore, it extends to a variety of domestic and foreign entities that comprise the Army’s Unified Action Partners (UAP), including joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational teams. This paper will discuss interoperability in the future operational environment as it relates to the Army, the philosophy of mission command, and the Army’s human dimension. The intent is to expand the Army’s understanding of interoperability by revealing its human dimension components and by leveraging military, academic, and private-sector research on interoperability and interdependent social science concepts. Based upon the Army’s recent

8 Department of the Army, The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015: Building Cohesive Teams to Win In A Complex World: Cognitive Dominance, Realistic Training, Institutional Agility, 2015, 1. 9 Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World: 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, October 31, 2014, 2. 10 These are all listed in Appendix B.

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emphasis in the human dimension and its efforts to further institutionalize the mission command philosophy, systems, and warfighting functions (WfF). In aligning these efforts and interests the paper proposes a novel perspective of Army interoperability rooted in rigorous academic research.

Structure of Paper

The paper will examine interoperability through four distinct but complementary prisms of inquiry in order to provide focused depth and rigor to the subject and support human dimension interoperability enabling Army interoperability. These include: (1) the Army’s current and historical appreciation and conceptualization of interoperability, (2) human dimension interoperability, (3) academic research on relevant social and behavioral science topics, and (4) Army doctrine, guidance, and documentation on mission command and the human dimension. First, the paper will provide a review of the Army’s interest in interoperability as a general concept. This discussion will include a brief overview of its historical development as well as a more thorough consideration of current doctrine, documentation, and commentary on the subject. A discussion of Army interoperability a broad level provides foundational documentation on the subject that contextualizes the remainder of the paper. Second, the paper will largely limit its investigation to the human dimension aspects of interoperability, including its organizational, behavioral, and cultural manifestations, based on an integration of academic research and current Army guidance. This paper will refer to these aspects of interoperability collectively as “human dimension interoperability” throughout the paper. An approach focusing on human dimension interoperability provides an explicit context through which to discuss interoperability more generally and from which lessons may be extrapolated to its other variants. This discussion will include a review of how the Army and others have conceptualized interoperability, including various definitions, models, and typologies. This examination will reveal that while the Army has developed a keen interest (matched by investment) for the technological and material dimensions of interoperability, there has been little consideration of the overarching implications and impact of human dimension interoperability.11 Third, the paper will rely on academic research concerning interoperability and relevant social and behavioral science concepts to supplement current Army doctrine, guidance, and documentation. Academic research can serve to broaden the Army’s appreciation for the complexity of interoperability from an existing perspective that primarily considers the individual level to incorporating a focus on the collective level of interoperability. Reviewing the literature concerning potential implications and significance of the human dimension on interoperability will firmly root future Army investment and understanding of the topic in sound theoretical and empirical research. Specifically, social and behavioral science research on the development of group/social identities, in-group/out-group distinctions, and management of

11 Crowson, “Breaking it down Barney style,” 108.

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group-identities within diverse teams and organizations addresses many of the challenges of the human dimension of interoperability the Army faces now and in the future. Finally, the paper will examine human dimension interoperability through the lens of Army mission command doctrine and key documents on the Army’s human dimension. This portion of the paper will discuss mission command and the Army’s human dimension in the context of academic research on group and social identities and the impact they may have on current and future Army operations. By doing so, the paper aligns with the Army’s recent emphasis on its human dimension and its ongoing institutionalization of mission command and advances those efforts by integrating them with concern for appropriate and more effective interoperability.

Significance

Its complexity and breadth make interoperability a unique undertaking for the Army. This is compounded by discussions of interoperability that are dominated by its technical dimension and primarily consist of the technical verbiage that accompanies those discussions.12 Examining human dimension interoperability in this paper provides an opportunity to expand the Army’s focus on interoperability beyond the technical realm and integrate concerns of interoperability with the Army’s ongoing efforts for its human dimension. The Mission Command Network: Vision and Narrative (2015) anticipates a strategic context for 2025 and beyond that will require “Expeditionary maneuver [that] will combine military, inter-organizational, and multinational capabilities delivered from global, theater, and local resources… [and will] fully integrate unified action partners…”13 Such an environment necessitates refined and novel approaches across the spectrum of interoperability for the Army. The mission command philosophy, partnered with an emphasis on the Army’s human dimension, provides a framework with which to discuss interoperability and prepare the Army for success in the future. Army doctrine concerning mission command, TP 525-3-3: The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Mission Command and ADP 6-0: Mission Command, and The Army Human Dimension Strategy remind us that all military functions, across the full spectrum of operations, from waging war to administration, and from command to execution, are intensely human endeavors.14 This is amplified by the increasing regularity with which the Army works with and relies upon UAPs. Conducting operations that are increasingly reliant on integration and cooperation with UAPs requires the formation of provisional organizations containing dissimilar entities from a variety of origins (domestic and foreign). The creation of provisional organizations poses a unique challenge for the implementation of mission command. Each entity, whether organic or from

12 Codner, “Hanging Together, 4. 13 Combine Arms Center and the Army Capabilities Integration Center, The Mission Command Network: Vision and Narrative, October 1, 2015: 3. 14 Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Mission Command: 2020-2040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-3, February 2017, 6; Department of the Army, The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015, 1; Department of the Army, ADP 6-0: Mission Command, May 2012, 1-1.

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UAPs, brings its own distinctive capabilities (and limitations), as well as its own technical, logistic, doctrinal, network, and communication, organizational, behavioral, and cultural frameworks and identities.15 While the unique experience and perspective of each participating organization can provide broader capabilities to the overarching team, they can also frustrate the rapid development of teams (through trust) as well as impede the development of a shared understanding and unity of effort throughout the provisional organization. Such challenges are particularly amplified in multinational teams. Furthermore, the range of capabilities (material) and perspectives (cultural) among potential UAPs can vary drastically. This paper will broaden the discussion on interoperability by examining the academic literature to identify potential consequences in the human dimension that can result from these material limitations and to identify other potential DOTMLPF-P solutions and considerations from a cross-cultural perspective required to address those shortcomings. Though seldom addressing interoperability in explicit terms, the Army’s approach to the subject within the human dimension sphere up until this point has primarily focused on categories that fall into two broad areas of concern: (1) identifying and understanding characteristics of those external entities (individuals, institutions, cultures, and nations, for instance) that the Army works with, and (2) improving how Soldiers engage and interact with those entities.16 For the first category, Army efforts emphasize concepts such as cultural awareness and regional expertise. For the second category, they emphasize language proficiency, cross-cultural competence, and more general concepts such as social intelligence, emotional intelligence, and team building.17 These efforts are designed to provide Army personnel with the knowledge, skills, and abilities that can enable the development of trust-based relationships with partners and, in turn, facilitate interoperability at a personal level. The Army and its partners are organizations comprised of people. As such, relationships between people, inherently based on trust, form a critical component of Army functioning and success—both among Army personnel and with UAPs. While these two approaches to interoperability characterized by individual relationships and interaction are crucial, this paper reveals that a third category based on understanding, managing, and adapting diverse teams (as opposed to individual interaction) is also necessary to supplement the two categories listed above and provide a more comprehensive conceptualization of interoperability.

15 The technical, logistical, doctrinal, and similar dimensions of interoperability are referred as the broad category of “technical-material interoperability” throughout this paper; correspondingly, the organizational, behavioral, cultural, and similar dimensions of interoperability are referred to as “human dimension interoperability” throughout. 16 The following references are a selection of documents that highlight interoperability in terms of understanding and interacting with partners: Department of Defense, Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, January 2005; Department of Defense, Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities, 2010; Department of the Army, Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy, 2009; Jessica A. Gallus, Melissa C. Gouge, Emily Antolic, Kerry Fosher, Victoria Jasparro, Stephanie Coleman, Brian Selmeski, and Jennifer L. Klafehn, “Cross-Cultural Competence in the Department of Defense: An Annotated Bibliography,” Special Report 71, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, April 2014. 17 See Appendix A for further MCCoE research and discussion on these topics.

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Interoperability While it continues to garner increasing attention, interoperability (of various kinds) has been a core concern of the US Department of Defense (DOD) and the US Army for some time.18 One account contends that partnerships with foreign Armies have been a feature of “virtually every American military operation since World War I.”19 Other summaries point to Congressional intervention as historical benchmarks that highlight the rising importance of interoperability for the US military over time. Notably, in 1965, in the midst of the Vietnam War, a special subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee brought attention to joint interoperability among US military forces by citing the “incompatibility of Army and Air Force radios.”20 This resulted in the development of a DOD Directive that established standards for joint interoperability of communications equipment.21 Later, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed interoperability in the wake of problems of inter-service competition and discord during the Vietnam War, the Iranian hostage situation, and the invasion of Grenada.22 Goldwater-Nichols more comprehensively entrenched the joint nature of the DOD by streamlining interaction and cooperation among its military branches and subsuming the authority of the branches under that of the DOD.23 More recent conceptualizations of interoperability have extended beyond joint operations to include its application in interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partnerships.24 Army Regulation (AR) 34-1: Multinational Force Interoperability defines interoperability in the context of multinational operations and establishes policy for achieving it.25 The document highlights the Army’s interest in partnering with foreign militaries and coalitions. It also supports a variety of Army doctrine, including AR 11-31: Army Security Cooperation Policy, Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 11-31: Army Security Cooperation Handbook, the Army Campaign Support Plan, Field Manual (FM) 3-22: Army Support to Security Cooperation, and FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations, that address the increasingly multinational character of Army operations.26 The importance of interoperability to the US Army in future operations is further underscored in a variety of more contemporary documents that aim to

18 John R. Ballard, “Making the Mix Work: Coalition C2 Interoperability During Recent Operations,” Naval War College Report, June 2001, 1. 19 Crowson, "Breaking it down Barney style,” 108. 20 Thomas C. Ford, John M. Colombi, Scott R. Graham, and David R. Jacques, "Survey on Interoperability Measurement" (paper presented at the 12th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Newport, RI, June 19-21, 2007). 21 Ford et al., "Survey on Interoperability Measurement," 3; Department of Defense, Management of DOD Interoperability Efforts for Tactical Command, Control, and Communications, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report, Report Number 93-050 (Arlington, VA, 1993), iii; U.S. General Accounting Office, Interoperability: DOD’s Efforts to Achieve Interoperability Among C3 Systems, GAO/NSIAD-87-124 (Washington, DC, 1987), 20. 22 Thomas T. LoPresti, “The JCS System Before and After Goldwater-Nichols” (Study Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1991), 15; Ronald H. Cole, “Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1998/1999): 57; John R. Ballard, “Making the Mix Work,” 5. 23 Markel et al., Developing U.S. Army Officers' Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments, 1. 24 Ibid., xiii. 25 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 34-1: Multinational Force Interoperability, July 2015, 1. 26 Ibid., 2.

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shape strategy and prepare the US Army for the future. Some of these are noted in Figure 1. By one account the DOD supports over 300 “efforts that focus on codifying equipment, doctrine, procedural, and logistical interoperability” in order to develop trust and relationships with a variety of partner institutions.27 Clearly, each of these efforts and documents anticipates a future environment where interoperability is essential to Army success.

Source Select excerpt emphasizing interoperability

TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-1: The U.S. Army

Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World

“The Army Operating Concept (AOC) describes how future Army forces will prevent conflict, shape security environments, and win wars while operating as part of our Joint Force and working with multiple partners.”28

TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-3: The U.S. Army

Functional Concept for Mission Command: 2020-

2040

“Sustained security cooperation activities” is included in a list of activities that will directly affect the Army’s ability to realize mission command. Army conventional and special operations forces must contribute to a whole-of-government approach to develop and maintain relationships based upon shared interests, respect, and trust. Thoughtful and sustained security cooperation sets conditions for access, improves partner interoperability and resiliency…”29

The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015

“Just as in the conflicts of the past, sustainable political outcomes will often requirethe use of land power with multiple joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners.”30

The Mission Command Network: Vision and

Narrative

“Our Army’s ability to conduct expeditionary maneuver and Joint Combined Arms Operations depends on a Mission Command Network that is assured, interoperable, tailorable, collaborative, identity-based, and accessible at the point of need.”31

2015 National Security Strategy32

“Abroad, we are demonstrating that while we will act unilaterally against threats to our core interests, we are stronger when we mobilize collective action.”33

“American leadership… is based on… A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.”34

Quadrennial Defense Review

“[The DOD] is pursuing a set of creative new presence paradigms to manage and employ our forces to enhance overseas presence and activities… [including] optimizing the use of multilateral, joint training facilities overseas in order to increase readiness and interoperability with our allies and partners.”35

Figure 1. Emphasis on interoperability as highlighted by a number of key US Army and military documents.

Defining Interoperability Reflecting the DOD’s and the Army’s 50-year interest in interoperability, many different definitions of interoperability have been provided by a variety of stakeholders. For instance,

27 Crowson, “Breaking it down Barney style,” 109. 28 Raymond T. Odierno, “Foreword,” The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, i. 29 Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet (TP) 525-3-3: The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Mission Command: 2020-2040, February 2017. 30 Department of the Army, The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015, 4. 31 H.R McMaster, “Foreword: Director Army Capabilities Center,” The Mission Command Network: Vision and Narrative, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center and Fort Eustis, VA: Army Capabilities Integration Center, October 1, 2015: 2. 32 Michelle L. Pryor, Thomas Labouche, Mario Wilke, and Charles C. Pattillo, Jr., “The Multinational Interoperability Council: Enhancing Coalition Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly 82 (3rd Quarter 2016): 113 33 Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (February 2015), foreword. 34 Ibid., 2. 35 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC (March 2014), 24.

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DOD institutions, scholars, and other government organizations (often interested in the standardization of policy and procedures between agencies) have offered their own definitions. Ford and colleagues identified 34 distinct definitions of interoperability in their review of these different sources.36 Many of these definitions describe specific types of interoperability, such as logistical, electronic, technical, and operational interoperability.37 Some of those that focus on interoperability more generally, however, are cited in Figure 2. These generalized definitions provide a flexible and broad interpretation of interoperability that allows them to cover a wide range of sub-types, including those listed above.

Definition Institution Document(s) (Year)

“…the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.”

DOD JP 3-0 (2017)38

“The ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.”

NATO NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2013)39

“The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”

NATO; DOD

NATO Logistics Handbook (1997)40 DOD Directive 2010.6 (1977)41

Figure 2. Definitions of interoperability from US military and alliance documents.

The term “unity of effort” is similar to the Army’s conceptualization of interoperability. “Unity of effort” explicitly expands the notion of “coherent, effective, and efficient” cooperative action by the Army with its partners to include non-military organizations. These include, for instance, interagency, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations.42 The US Army defines “unity of effort” as the “coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action.”43 Though similarities can be implied, it is not clear from doctrine how the Army conceives interoperability and unity of effort to relate to one another. As we discuss in the following section, however, it is necessary to include non-military entities in conceptualizations of interoperability, as they are increasingly involved as partners in US Army operations and missions.

36 Ford et al., “A Survey on Interoperability Measurement,” 4. 37 Ibid., 25. 38 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations (January 17, 2017), GL-10. 39 NATO, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), AAP-06, 2013, 2-I-8. 40 NATO, NATO Logistics Handbook (October 1997), Annex A: Definitions. 41 Department of Defense, DOD Directive 2010.6: Standardization and interoperability of weapon systems and equipment within the north Atlantic treaty organization, 1977. 42 Jon E. Baker, Effective Multinational C2: Five Essential Variables (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009): 4. 43 Department of the Army, ADP 6-0: Mission Command, May 2012, Glossary-2.

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Interoperability and Unified Action Partners The complexity of Army operations, both current and anticipated, requires Army personnel to work closely with a variety of partners. These include traditional partners such as sister services (in joint operations) and foreign national armies and militaries (in combined operations). Due to the nature of contemporary operations, however, effective interoperability must also include consideration for interagency, inter-organizational, and non-governmental entities. Together with joint and combined interaction, these operations have been referred to as JIIM (joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational), UAP, or multi-organizational partnerships. Interoperating with sister services and foreign militaries presents unique challenges, but the Army often shares familiar hierarchical structures and procedures (occasionally codified in shared doctrine or documentation) that can facilitate partnerships. Cooperation with interagency, inter-organizational, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations, however, can often be more challenging due to dissimilar organizational structures, practices, culture, commitment, resource availability, and even terminology. Such differences must be taken into account when developing interoperability expectations and procedures with these partners. In their review of culture and interoperability in peacekeeping missions, Rubinstein and colleagues make an additional distinction among potential partners for the US Army that is relevant to interoperability effectiveness. They argue that the “integrated” and “multifunctional” operations for the 1990s—including those in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia—marked a turning point in modern Army operations. These operations were characterized not only by more intense interaction among an increasing multiplicity of military, government, and civilian organizations but also by increased interaction with local populations.44 The character of the Army’s experience in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 further supports such a claim. Rubinstein and colleagues arranged relationships in these multilateral operations into two broad categories: “horizontal interoperability” and “vertical interoperability”. Horizontal interoperability represents the “interaction that takes place among various kinds of international actors” participating in some capacity in an intervention.45 Vertical interoperability, on the other hand, represents the interaction of those people and institutions (such as the US Army) with local populations.46 The sheer number of participating organizations and their “disparate understandings of the meaning of partnership and cooperation” (i.e., their organizational structure, mission, and culture, for instance) often challenge effective horizontal interoperability.47 On the other hand, dissimilar and unfamiliar cultures and a perceived lack of respect often undermine effective vertical interoperability.48

44 Robert A. Rubinstein, Diana M. Keller, and Michael E. Scherger, “Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (August 2008): 540. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., 543. 48 Ibid., 544.

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Effective interoperability is therefore not as simple as two national armies or two domestic services cooperating with one another. The complex character of contemporary and future Army operations requires a sophisticated approach that enables the Army to take advantage of the full spectrum of organizations and their unique capabilities involved in an intervention and to work effectively with local communities and stakeholders. Multinational Force Interoperability As described throughout this paper the future operational environment will be increasingly VUCA and necessitate that the Army work with a variety of partners.49 Foremost among these will be multinational military forces. The Army has dedicated significant attention to better understanding and preparing for multinational partnerships through more effective interoperability. This includes ample doctrine, documentation, and guidance on the subject, notably including AR 34-1: Multinational Force Interoperability50 and FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations.51 In AR 34-1, the Army defines multinational interoperability as “the ability of the forces of two or more nations to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks”52 and multinational force interoperability activity as “any initiative, forum, agreement, or operation that improves the Army’s ability to operate effectively and efficiently as a member or leader of an alliance or coalition across the full spectrum of military missions.”53 In short, multinational cooperation in military engagements accomplishes two main objectives. First, it leverages the pooled resources from across a variety of multiple militaries. No matter how advanced certain capabilities of the US military may be, that capability is ultimately augmented by partnering with another military and their unique and/or supplementary resources, capabilities, and expertise that can either enhance U.S. capabilities or limit them. Certainly, the collaboration of two militaries is not perfect—there is a cost to partnership, a kind of friction of interoperability, depending on the variables of the forces involved—but if conducted effectively, the collaboration will yield greater collective capabilities than those available to any single military force. FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations articulates this perspective: “interoperability greatly enhances multinational operations. Nations whose forces are interoperable across material and nonmaterial capabilities can operate together effectively in numerous ways.” 54 Part of this includes mitigating risk through “increased military-to-military interoperability.”55 Second, multinational collaboration can establish or enhance the legitimacy of an intervention by actively involving local stakeholders in their

49 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 34-1: Multinational Force Interoperability, 1; Robert Hartel and Sam Chamberlain," Multinational Interoperability Requirements--A Core Competency," paper presented at the 4th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Canberra, ACT, Australia, October 24-26, 2000, 1. 50 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 34-1: Multinational Force Interoperability. 51 Department of the Army, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations (April 2014). 52 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 34-1: Multinational Force Interoperability, 1. 53 Ibid. 54 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-16: Multinational Operations (July 2013), I-9. 55 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 34-1: Multinational Force Interoperability, 1.

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operations, decision making, and consideration. This is a key component in developing a “perception of respect” among horizontal and vertical partners in international missions, which Rubinstein et al cite as an essential element of successful missions.56 Among others, these two benefits underscore the increasing importance of multinational cooperation. Challenges for multinational interoperability Requirements and funding process. Despite the long history of Army interest in multinational interoperability, and in many cases a long history of direct cooperation with specific foreign forces, there remain challenges in effectively and appropriately conceptualizing it and institutionalizing partnerships. For instance, Hartel and Chamberlain argue that the current requirements and funding process for the Army should be reversed in order to reflect its emphasis on multinational operations. They agree with the changing nature of the operational environment, stating “…multinational coalitions are the standard for land force…” operations around the world now and for the foreseeable future.57 Therefore, in order to prepare appropriately for such circumstances, they argue that the US Army (as well as the DOD, and its foreign partner forces) should reverse the current sequential requirements and funding process by working multinational requirements first, followed by joint requirements, and finally service requirements last.58 They discuss this admittedly “unrealistic” proposal in the context of command and control information exchange, but it could easily be extrapolated to any or all dimensions of interoperability, technical or otherwise.59 Interoperability standardization. A second increasingly common challenge of multinational interoperability is standardizing a coherent and comprehensive conceptualization of cultural interoperability. Though not formally defined by the Army, cultural interoperability is one of many types of nontechnical interoperability (further discussed on pages 14-15) that the Army acknowledges as critical to multinational interoperability. For instance, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations states, “cultural, diplomatic, information, military, economic, religious, psychological, technological and political factors all influence the formation and conduct of multinational operations.”60 In his ambitious proposal for a framework of cultural interoperability, Crowson defines it as “the ability of units from different nations, forces, or organizations to understand, respect, and operate with a shared understanding of each other’s values, assumptions, and national caveats in a synergistic attempt to achieve their respective national interests.”61 Crowson contends that while there are interoperability standards for “equipment, doctrine, and procedures… There is no [standard] consideration of cultural interoperability.”62 Much work in the Army has focused on developing individual cross-cultural

56 Rubinstein et al., “Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions,” 544. 57 Hartel and Chamberlain, "Multinational Interoperability Requirements--A Core Competency," 1. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Department of the Army, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations (April 2014), vi. 61 Crowson, “Breaking it down Barney style,” 109. 62 Ibid., 108.

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competence among its personnel,63 but there has been little consideration of collective cultural interoperability for the Army and it partners. Partner capabilities. A third challenge of multinational interoperability to take into account is the relationship between the US Army’s capabilities—technical, nontechnical, or otherwise—and those of its partners. This touches upon the variables that may affect interoperability friction (i.e., the costs of partnerships) noted on page 10. These costs must be weighed against the benefits of the capabilities the partner force provides as well as their potential to legitimize (or de-legitimize) a specific mission. The Army recognizes these differences in AR 34-1 and distinguishes them at four distinct levels, described in Figure 3. Each level is characterized by the following factors: regularity of interaction, professional ability of personnel, and compatibility of technical and material capabilities.

Levels of Interoperability64

I-0 Partner Army has no demonstrated interoperability with (US) Army; Command and Control (C2) interface with the Army is only at the national level; has no regular engagement with the Army.

I-1 Partner Army shares information or situational awareness through liaison teams with US systems (analog to digital conversion required); requires alignment of capabilities and procedures to establish operational norms; has some routine engagement with Army.

I-2 Partner Army has digital C2 capabilities; actively participates in interoperability solutions with the Army; routinely exercises or operates with the Army.

I-3 Partner Army’s interoperability is network enabled through: shared situational awareness; command and control on-the-move; collaborative planning; networked fires; combat identification; and information collection.

Figure 3. Levels of interoperability between the US Army and partner forces based on various factors.

Organizational Structure of Interoperability

Alliances The US Army identifies two primary types of multinational operations: alliances and coalitions.65 JP 1-02 defines an alliance as “the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.”66 NATO is perhaps the most enduring and familiar military alliance the US is a part of. Others include the North American Aerospace Defense Command

63 For a summary of such research please refer to: Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force, Cross-Cultural Competence: Introduction and Overview of Key Concepts (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, April 2015); Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force, Cross-Cultural Competence: Review of Assessment Methodology and Available Assessment Tools (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, June 2015); Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force, Cross-Cultural Competence: Overview of Cross-Cultural Training Theory and Practice for the Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, September 2015). 64 Department of the Army, Army Regulation 34-1: Multinational Force Interoperability, 2. 65 Department of the Army, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations, vi. 66 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 11.

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(NORAD) with Canada, the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines, and ANZUS, a joint military alliance between the US, Australia, and New Zealand. Alliances have the benefit of long-term stability, familiarity, and experience of collaboration, as well as an impetus to develop shared doctrine and systems, which can contribute to more effective interoperability. Coalitions JP 1-02 defines coalition as “an arrangement between two or more nations for common action.”67 Coalitions are generally ad hoc in nature, established to address a discrete conflict or set of circumstances not otherwise addressed by or through existing formal alliances.68 Due to their relatively short-term nature coalitions generally lack uniform or shared doctrine and can often lack the meaningful experience of collaboration that is present in alliances. This can make interoperability within coalitions more challenging than in alliances. Recent examples of coalitions the US military has been a part of include that put together for the first Gulf War (1990-1991) and the “coalition of the willing” for the invasion of Iraq (in the 2000s). Alliances and coalitions can be either bilateral (involving the US and just one other foreign military) or multilateral (involving more than one foreign military). Command Structures Alliances and coalitions are operationalized through four general types of command structures that delineate and specify operational control. FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations identifies these hierarchies as (1) lead nation,69 (2) parallel,70 (3) combination, and (4) integrated71 command structures.72 The lead nation, parallel, and integrated command structures are illustrated in Figure 4.

67 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 35. 68 Baker, Effective Multinational C2, 8. 69 NATO refers to this as a “framework nation” command structure. 70 NATO refers to this as a “bi- or multi-national” command structure. 71 NATO refers to this as a “fully integrated” command structures. 72 Department of the Army, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations, 2-3.

Figure 4. Select command structures for multinational operations.

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Lead nation command structure In the lead nation command structure “one nation has the lead role and its command and control dominates.”73 Though it is led by a single nation, the lead nation command structure often integrates multinational staff in order to draw upon as broad a perspective and pool of expertise as possible.74 The lead nation command structure is generally the US military’s preferred framework for operating in coalitions. Parallel command structure The parallel command structure relies on no individual commander or “lead nation”. 75 Baker points out that parallel command structures are “unique” (often implemented for cultural and political considerations) and can rely on coordination cells in order to develop interoperability and unity of effort.76 FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations bluntly states that parallel command structures are not preferred because they greatly challenge efforts to achieve unity of command and unity of effort in multinational operations.77 Integrated command structure Finally, the integrated command structure features a single commander who has an integrated staff comprised of individuals from a variety of nations. The subordinate commands and staffs will be “integrated to the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission.”78 Combination command structure The combination command structure, while not pictured in Figure 4, consists of the lead nation concept and the parallel command structure blended together. FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations defines the combination command structure as “when two or more nations are the controlling elements for a mix of international forces.”79 Command Structure Preference Coalitions are usually characterized by the lead nation command structure, the parallel command structure, or the combination command structure. Alliances are typically characterized by the integrated command structure (more common) or the lead national

73 Department of the Army, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations, 2-3. 74 Baker, Effective Multinational C2, 7. 75 Department of the Army, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations, 2-3. 76 Baker, Effective Multinational C2, 7. 77 Department of the Army, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations, 2-3. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid.

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command structure (less common). It should be noted, however, that each of the command structures described above could be established in either coalitions or alliances, depending on the needs of the mission and the parties involved. As pointed out in FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations, “no single type of [command] structure universally fits the needs of all partnerships.”80

Types of Interoperability

The definitions of interoperability presented in Figure 2 (on page 8) are particularly useful because they provide a generalized and flexible understanding of interoperability that can account for its many different manifestations. Hand-in-hand with this flexibility, however, is a recognition that these definitions fail to provide enough specificity to “reflect the multidisciplinary nature” of the concept.81 The multidisciplinary and multidimensional nature of interoperability simultaneously makes it a powerfully versatile and wide-ranging but challenging concept. The sheer number of identified and potential types of interoperability is one of the most challenging aspects to coherently appreciating and discussing its importance and applicability. Ford and colleagues identified no fewer than 64 distinct types of interoperability in their review of interoperability literature generated between 1977 and 2006.82 Their research revealed, “most […] types of interoperability can be classified as either technical or non-technical.”83 Technical types of interoperability inherently rely on technological tools or mechanisms and include communications, electronic, and database interoperability. Nontechnical types rely more on process, language, or behavior and include organizational, operational, and cultural interoperability. These and other types of interoperability are presented in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Examples of technical and nontechnical types of interoperability identified by or for the US Army.

In his discussion of interoperability among NATO members, Codner argues that one of the key challenges involved in discussing interoperability is the proliferation of “technical language and jargon” used throughout the field.84 The Army acknowledges as much in its own doctrine, stating in FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations: “Although frequently identified with technology, important areas of interoperability may include doctrine, procedures,

80 Department of the Army, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations, 2-2. 81 Codner, “Hanging Together,” 12. 82 Ford et al., “A Survey of Interoperability Measurement,” 6. 83 Ibid. 84 Codner, “Hanging Together,” 4.

Select Types of Interoperability

Technical

Logistical

Behavioral

Doctrinal

Cultural

Organizational

Electronic

Communications

Database

Process

Operational

Programmatic

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communications, and training.”85 This tendency to focus on the technical elements of interoperability with technical language, combined with the use of specialist metaphors (such as “plug and play” or “information mining”) in those same conversations, can serve to isolate discussions of interoperability and undermine interest in more inclusive dialogue to facilitate broader discussion, understanding, and support from non-specialists.86 Certainly an integrated approach to interoperability is necessary; however, the nature of the future operational environment requires that the Army give equal attention to developing mechanisms that prepare the Total Force to achieve effective nontechnical interoperability in order to succeed. Codner asserts that in order for two forces or entities to consider themselves as interoperable they must achieve interoperability within each of these dimensions.87

Human Dimension Aspects of Interoperability

“In this age, I don’t care how tactically or operationally brilliant you are, if you cannot create harmony—even vicious harmony—on the battlefield based on trust across service lines, across

coalition and national lines, and across civilian/military lines, you need to go home, because your leadership is obsolete. We have got to have officers who can create harmony across all those lines.”

James Mattis, U.S. Secretary of Defense, GEN USMC (Ret.)

Initiatives focused on improving interoperability are often problem-focused, fixated upon a specific type of interoperability concerned with a specific problem. For instance, technical interoperability problems require technical interoperability solutions (such as refined and more sophisticated C2 equipment); likewise, material problems typically have material solutions (i.e. is there a universal ammunition type or do vehicles use the same type of fuel). This is helpful and necessary, but it is also limiting because it often diminishes, circumvents, or disregards the role of the human dimension in the identification and articulation of the problem and the formation of the solution. Regardless of the nature of the problem or the type of solution, interoperability fundamentally consists of the ability of one person to work with another person, and of one team to be able to function with another team. Additionally, all decisions and actions that lead toward implementation of problem resolution start with and involve one person working with at least one or more persons. Mutual trust and shared understanding within a Unified Force are founded upon personal interactions between Soldiers, leaders and their partners. In this regard, all interoperability problems arise from, and culminate within, the human dimension. As such, they require solutions that maintain a human dimension perspective. Indeed, the human dimension is the unifying framework for Army interoperability of every kind. With that in mind, the MCCoE proposes the following suppositions concerning human dimension interoperability for the Army to consider:

1) Human dimension interoperability is concerned with the social, cognitive, and physical aspects that influence, and are influenced by, the ability of individuals and teams to act

85 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-16: Multinational Operations, I-9. 86 Codner, “Hanging Together,” 5. 87 Ibid., 13.

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together coherently, ethically, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.

2) All interoperability problems and solutions begin and end in the human dimension. Actions taken to address any form of interoperability will have consequences that impact human dimension interoperability; correspondingly, any actions taken would more effectively address interoperability were they to integrate and address considerations for the human dimension.

While technical and material interoperability have benefitted from relatively straightforward problems and solutions based on systems compatibility, human dimension interoperability is dependent upon more complex, variable, and often unpredictable human conditions. Human dimension interoperability takes into account the human consequences of actions conducted within each of the other spheres of interoperability. Technical interoperability ultimately facilitates and enables human interoperability (for what good does it do to have two technical systems proficiently interoperable if they serve no purpose for people or their interests?). Despite the human dimension being a common denominator among all forms and components of interoperability, it is often overlooked. As a result, human dimension interoperability remains conceptually and practically ambiguous and complex and has received limited consideration within the Army or elsewhere. The Army Human Dimension Strategy, published in 2015, acknowledges this disparity, stating that the “nature of the strategic environment will require optimizing human performance,” and will also “require teams who improve and thrive” in VUCA environments.88 To satisfy these requirements, The Army Human Dimension Strategy emphasizes areas such as emotional intelligence, social intelligence, cultural awareness, team building, and proficiency in languages. Despite these issues that are critical to the Army’s human dimension efforts, they remain tangential to interoperability, and The Army Human Dimension Strategy stops short of providing even a rough sketch for human dimension interoperability let alone a more comprehensive framework or conceptualization.89 The successful exercise of mission command among UAPs is essentially a massive effort in problem solving.90 It attempts, in part, to answer the question: how can Army leaders better facilitate the creation and maintenance of cohesive teams through mutual trust and a shared understanding from an assortment of dissimilar organizations? One approach to reconciling the diverse nature of UAPs with the Army and mission command is through an emphasis on culture,91 “because it is the basis upon which people generate options for structuring their actions and creating solutions to problems.”92 Human dimension interoperability is concerned

88 Department of the Army, The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015, 5. 89 Ibid., 1. 90 Rubinstein et al., “Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions,” 543. 91 Culture, as a concept, must be discussed not only as a geographically informed phenomenon, but also as an organizational phenomenon. 92 Rubinstein et al., “Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions,” 543.

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with enabling the successful development and achievement of several intangible and interrelated considerations: “rapport, respect, knowledge of partners, team building, patience, and trust.”93 Each of these considerations is examined in FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations (summarized in Figure 6). Furthermore, each of these components is influenced by decisions made concerning each of the technical and non-technical spheres of interoperability. Though it uses different language, the Army Human Dimension Strategy underscores the intent of the considerations in Figure 6 by focusing on such concepts as social intelligence, team building, and more general “social abilities” within its Cognitive Dominance line of effort.94

Consideration Description

Rapport A personal and direct relationship that results in successful teamwork and unity of effort.

Respect Respect of partner’s cultures, languages, religions, customs, and values combined with consideration of their ideas solidifies a partnership.

Knowledge of Partners

Understanding the cultural, national, and organizational identities and interests of partners.

Team Building The ability to manage through rapport, respect, the application of knowledge and understanding of partners in a way that emphasizes unity of effort, patience, and trust.

Patience Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with partners requires time, attention, and untiring even-handed patience.

Trust Trust is the mutual confidence between partners. It consists of both the ability to be trustworthy, as well as the willingness to trust others.

Figure 6. Key considerations for successful multinational operations, as discussed in FM 3-16.

FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations identifies several questions and responsibilities that Army commanders should consider as they prepare for and conduct operations with UAPs (Figure 7). When a Commander fails to take these questions and responsibilities into account, it can compromise their ability to achieve the considerations identified and described in Figure 6. Such a shortcoming ultimately increases the likelihood that an “operation will fail.” 95

93 Department of the Army, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations, 2-3. 94 Department of the Army, The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015, 8. 95 Questions and responsibilities can be found throughout: Department of the Army, FM 3-16: The Army in Multinational Operations.

Questions Responsibilities

What interoperability factors affect the mission? Ensure cross-nation support.

Are there cultural barriers that prevent a harmonious relationship?

Ensure the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting multinational team.

What force structure minimizes friction between partners?

Build a cohesive team, including non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and others.

Figure 7. Selection of key questions and responsibilities for commanders in multinational operations, as identified in FM 3-16.

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In order to meet the challenges pertaining to interoperability in future operations the Army must identify and understand the appropriate capabilities, experiences, and proficiencies that are required of the Total Force to succeed in those circumstances. As The Army Human Dimension Strategy suggests, these must be collective capabilities and proficiencies rather than just individual: “The Army must forge these individuals into cohesive teams who gain and maintain a position of advantage in persistent conflict to prevent shape and win in the future.”96 Any advancement concerning human dimension interoperability within the US Army must focus on developing individuals who are capable of working in multi-faceted teams from diverse and unfamiliar cultures, organizations, and professions. This includes developing leaders capable of managing and adapting those teams to meet the challenges of a VUCA operating environment. Over the last decade and a half of conflict, there has been an organizational emphasis on identifying and understanding knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) in the following areas: culture, regional expertise and language. Additionally, there has also been significant overlap of the Army’s interests and efforts in cross cultural competency and its interests and efforts with interpersonal and leadership proficiencies in areas such as social intelligence and emotional intelligence.97 This approach of identifying and developing appropriate KSAs (such as those associated with social and emotional intelligence, and cross cultural competency98) within individuals in order to make them capable of being interoperable with a variety of individuals and teams is centered on the notion that “culturally diverse teams need the knowledge and the tools necessary to make differences explicit.”99

Conceptualization of Human Dimension Interoperability

The impact of human dimension interoperability on mission success has become increasingly apparent over the course of the last decade and a half of conflict and will likely continue to play a key role in operations into the future. Currently, the Army lacks a coherent and inclusive conceptualization that would allow for an overarching and cohesive approach to human dimension interoperability concerns. Here, however, the MCCoE proposes a simple conceptualization of human dimension interoperability (Figure 8) to address this gap.

96 Department of the Army, The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015, 4. 97 We refer the reader to the papers on cross-cultural competence, social intelligence, and team building produced by the Concepts and Requirements Division (CRD) of the MCCoE CDID and also by the Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force (HDCDTF), all of which are listed in the references section of this paper and again in Appendix B. 98 See Appendix B for a list of Human Dimension White papers addressing these concepts. 99 Helen Altman Klein, Ann Pongonis, and Gary Klein, “Cultural Barriers to Multinational C2 Decision Making,” paper presented at the 8th Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2000, 3.

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Figure 8. Conceptualization of how human dimension interoperability relates to other types of interoperability, and the role it plays regarding the creation of an adaptive and agile force capable of meeting the operational demands of the future.

This conceptualization, highlighted in Figure 8, allows for more deliberate consideration of how the Army might address relevant challenges within the realm of human dimension interoperability. This, in turn, may help shape how the Army understands, develops, and invests in appropriate capabilities and solutions for the unique challenges of the future operational environment. This conceptualization illustrates how various types of interoperability influence human dimension interoperability. Additionally, this conceptualization highlights three separate developmental focal points for producing a modern force capable of successful interoperability across the human domain: 1) the ability to identify and understand groups; 2) the ability to successfully engage and interact with partners; and 3) the ability to manage and adapt diverse teams. This schema is built upon the belief that a fundamental precondition for successful human dimension interoperability is the ability to work with individuals and groups from different national identities, cultural backgrounds, professions, and organizations. This precondition is based upon Gordon Allport’s Intergroup Contact Theory (also known as the Contact Hypothesis) that was first developed in 1954. The Intergroup Contact Theory states that under normal conditions interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members.100 The development of an appreciation for, an understanding of, and, most

100 Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1954), 43.

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importantly, contact with, other groups results in increased sympathy between groups, which in turn leads to less stereotyping.101 The Intergroup Contact Theory was confirmed in military settings by a joint German-Dutch NATO study conducted in 2007. 102 Similarly, a study by RAND on developing Army officers’ capabilities in JIIM (i.e., UAP) environments found that breadth of experience (e.g., exposure to and experience with individuals from different services, agencies, and nations) was more critical to success than depth of experience (e.g., technical expertise in a specific work or task domain).103 Such findings echo the key lessons of Allport’s Intergroup Contact Theory in a military setting with military personnel. While the Intergroup Contact Theory proposes that interaction can lead to improved relations, it is important to note that the resulting relationships will likely reflect the nature of the interactions. Positive interactions are more likely to result in positive perceptions, while negative experiences are likely to result in negative perceptions. Identify and Understand Groups The first part of the conceptualization of human dimension interoperability addresses the ability of individuals to identify and understand group characteristics, with an emphasis on culture (Figure 9). To prepare personnel to work effectively with multicultural and multinational partners, the Army has focused on developing both regional expertise and cultural awareness among individuals within the Total Force. While the degree of individual understanding is job specific and task oriented, the Army has acknowledged the need for all Soldiers to develop a baseline of knowledge prior to deploying or working with UAPs. It is important to note cultural initiatives in the Army typically utilize a nationality or ethnically based conception for cultural groups. This methodology is useful for a national organization that works with other national level organizations, such as in US Army – foreign

101 René Moelker, Joseph Soeters, and Ulrich vom Hagen, “Sympathy, the Cement of Interoperability: Findings on Ten Years of German-Netherlands Military Cooperation,” Armed Forces & Society 33, no. 4 (June 2007): 498-499. 102 Moelker et al., “Sympathy, the Cement of Interoperability,” 500; in addition to confirming the theory in a military context, the study also emphasized the benefits of a climate of cooperation, feelings of interdependency, common goals, and equal status among groups. 103 Markel et al., Developing U.S. Army Officers' Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments, xvii.

Figure 9. A portion of Figure 8 that depicts how various spheres of interoperability influence 2nd and 3rd order effects in the HD sphere of interoperability. This graphic also deconstructs HD interoperability into three distinct, yet mutually supportive parts.

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Army collaborations. Organizational interoperability, however, may further benefit by broadening the conception of culture to include a spectrum of groups ranging from informal groupings, sub-national organizations, national level organizations, and trans-national organizations. For instance, the 2011 RAND study on US Army officers operating in JIIM (i.e., UAP) environments (noted above on page 19) identifies individual capabilities that are common and critical to the relationships the Army and its personnel have with all external entities. 104 In this sense, the RAND study broadens the concern for identifying appropriate officer capabilities beyond those concerned with national culture to include those that are important to all extra-Army partnerships. Engage and Interact with Individuals The second part of the conceptualization is focused on the ability to engage and interact at an individual level (see Figure 9). One of the primary concerns of interoperability at large is communications compatibility with partner forces, sometimes generically referred to as technical interoperability. Technical interoperability suggests digital and physical compatibility between systems (communications, information, logistics, or database systems, for instance). Human dimension interoperability parallels technical compatibility in many ways. Instead of interoperability between systems, however, human dimension interoperability addresses interoperability between people, at the individual and group levels. While technical interoperability ensures systems match, human dimension interoperability ensures that individuals and teams from a variety of backgrounds are able to overcome social, cultural, organizational, and behavioral differences in order to communicate directly and clearly with partner force personnel. Indeed, such effective communication and cooperation with partner forces is fundamental to engagements, interactions, and developing mutually beneficial relationships. The ability to communicate is only half of the equation, however. The other half consists of the ability to perform effectively across and with different groups, organizations, and cultures. This capability in part consists of what some in the Army and elsewhere refer to as cross-cultural competence, of which cross-cultural communication is a sub-component.105 In short, cross-cultural competence is the ability to perform effectively in cross-cultural contexts.106 In addition to having capabilities that are directly applicable for cross cultural contexts, there are a number of KSAs that have been identified as enabling successful leadership that can transfer horizontally and enable greater human dimension interoperability.107 For instance, social

104 Markel et al., Developing U.S. Army Officers' Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments. 105 We refer the reader to the HDCDTF’s series of papers on cross-cultural competence, listed in the reference section below, for a more thorough discussion of the topic in the Army. 106 Allison Abbe, “The Historical Development of Cross-cultural Competence,” in Cross-Cultural Competence for a Twenty-First-Century Military: The Flipside of COIN, eds. Robert R. Greene Sands and Allison Greene Sands (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014): 34. 107 Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force, Understanding Learning Transfer: How Creating a Climate for Learning Transfer can Enable Intellectual Optimization (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, April 2016), 12.;

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intelligence is generally conceived as a multidimensional construct, consisting of cognitive and behavioral components, that enables individuals to understand and act appropriately in social contexts (i.e., any situation involving two or more people).108 For the Army, social intelligence (along with similar concepts such as emotional intelligence) is of particular interest because it has been linked to individual job performance, leadership, team effectiveness, and organizational outcomes.109 Manage and Adapt Diverse Teams Finally, the third part of the conceptualization of human dimension interoperability involves the ability to collectively manage and adapt diverse teams (see Figure 9). The first two components (identifying/understanding and engaging/interacting) are centered on improving interoperability at an individual level. In contrast, the ability of leaders at all levels to manage and adapt diverse teams is focused on improving interoperability at a collective level. The ability to manage and adapt how groups of dissimilar individuals interact, both formally and informally, enables leaders to develop shared understanding and mutual trust to ensure that operations are as effective as possible. While recent efforts have focused on developing an understanding and interacting with partners, there has been less emphasis on the successful formation and adaption of teams consisting of dissimilar parts. The antecedent to being able to manage and adapt diverse teams is the ability to understand how individuals form and maintain self-perceptions and perceptions of themselves and others into larger collectives and group identities. The latter half of this paper will examine this third area of human dimension interoperability, namely how group identities are held, perceived, and potentially influenced. The ability to understand and influence group and social identities is essential for the successful management and adaptation of diverse teams. While it could be argued that all spheres of interoperability are interrelated, human dimension interoperability is unique in that it is the ultimate aim and purpose for the existence of the other spheres. Decisions made, and actions taken, in any given area of interoperability will inevitably have an impact, either positive or negative, concerning the human dimension.

Horizontal Transfer of learning is a concept from the field of education that describes skills that once learned, can be generalized over a larger set of applications at the same level of complexity difficulty. 108 In a previous series of papers on social intelligence, the Capabilities and Requirements Division (CRD) of the Mission Command Center of Excellence’s (MCCoE) Capability and Development Integration Directorate proposed the Army adopt Marlowe’s definition of social intelligence: “The ability to understand the feelings, thoughts, and behaviors of persons, including oneself, in interpersonal situations and to act appropriately upon that understanding.” (Team Building and Social Intelligence: Overview and Integration for the Army’s Human Dimension, 30-31.) 109 For a more thorough discussion of social intelligence and its interest to the US Army, we refer the reader to the series of papers on the topic produced by the Capabilities and Requirements Division (CRD) of the Mission Command Center of Excellence’s (MCCoE) Capability and Development Integration Directorate and listed in the references section of this paper.

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Social/Group Identities

As discussed earlier, interoperability can occur through several different formal command structures. Each of these hierarchies utilizes varying degrees of assimilation, separation, or integration of personal and social identities to promote cooperation, unity of effort, and mission success. Assimilation occurs when one group, often the numeric minority, adapts in such a way that they become like or a part of the other group, often the numeric majority. Assimilation can include the internalization of some of the specific and identifiable characteristics or traits of that other group to develop a single, or similar identity. Assimilation can occur as a result of internal efforts to better identify with a separate group, or through external forces aimed at shaping and altering a group to develop and match a set of desired characteristics. Separation, in contrast, occurs when different groups isolate themselves from each other along unique identity based or formal organizational lines. As the name suggests, separation involves the delineation and organization of groups in a way that highlights and isolates different groups according to their characteristics. Finally, integration is a process that attempts to unify different parties to form a coherent and original organization or group based on a new, integrated identity. Figure 10 describes each process, as well as some of the benefits and challenges that accompany them.

Each of these three generalized concepts has innate benefits and drawbacks. Assimilation unifies groups under a stable identity, but requires the assimilating group (typically the minority) to internalize a new identity (typically of the majority). This involves the assimilating group to be motivated to do so while also sublimating (to a degree, at least) their old identity. Separation promotes existing internal cohesion. However, separation can also produce unhealthy competition, prejudice, bias, and animosity between partner forces that have limited contact or experience with each other. Integration on the other hand requires all parties to accept and internalize a novel organizational identity based upon shared characteristics.

Ultimately, the science and art of command now and in the future must include understanding the social and group identities of all individuals and groups being commanded. An organizational structure that utilizes assimilation, separation, or integration provides leaders with a simplified framework that assists during planning. However, without a better

Figure 10. Descriptions and comparison of the processes of assimilation, separation, and integration.

Process Description Benefits Challenges

Assimilation

When one group, often the numeric minority, adapts in such a way that they become similar to the other group, often the numeric majority.

Unifies groups under an existing, relatively stable identity.

Requires the assimilating group to internalize a new identity, and, at least partially or temporarily, sublimate their old identity.

Separation

When different groups are purposefully isolated along formal or informal lines. (e.g. a Navy or Marine Corps detachment working within an Army Organization).

Promotes pre-existing internal cohesion.

May produce unhealthy competition, prejudice, bias, and animosity between groups that have limited contact or experience with one another.

Integration When different parties are unified to form a coherent and original organization based on a new, integrated identity.

Unifies groups under a novel, yet relevant identity.

Requires all groups to subordinate existing identities in favor of a new, potentially unstable group identity.

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understanding how social identities are formed, held, and adapted, leaders may be unable to optimize the efficiency and efficacy of their command. By developing a better understanding the characteristics of existing group identities, leaders may be able to create and unify diverse teams more effectively. An operational knowledge of social identities may allow leaders to understand and anticipate how group identities inform behavior, including decisions and actions. 110

Understanding Social/Group Identities

Social Identity Theory hypothesizes that an individual’s personal identity is made up of the intrinsic characteristics that are unique to an individual. These characteristics can include relatively stable personality traits, such as the well-tested “Big Five”: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism; additionally, these can include the internalization of external factors (e.g. heritage, language, personal beliefs).111 In contrast, social identities are collective groups formed around these perceived shared characteristics of personal identities (e.g. traits, faith, ethnicity, race, nationality, profession).112 Self-knowledge therefore consists of a combination of an individual’s perception of his own personal identity and his memberships within particular social identity groups (i.e., a form of metacognition). When individuals recognize similar characteristics of their personal identity in others they may align or group themselves with those individuals to form or coalesce a meaningful shared social identity. These groups may be entirely cognitive and inform a sense of pride and self-esteem (e.g. being part of an honor roll), or they can be manifested into actual entities that enable groups to achieve difficult tasks or hold a status perceived as being unattainable for a single individual. Acquiring a social identity requires an individual to sacrifice a perception of personal distinctiveness in exchange for one of conformity, and “entails a shift towards the perception of the self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of the self as a unique person.” 113

The development of a group or social identity “can serve as a rule for defining boundaries of low-risk interpersonal trust that bypasses the need for personal knowledge and the cost of negotiating reciprocity with individual others.” 114 When an individual is perceived as being part of a shared group, the traits of the group are subsequently instilled upon the individual. The

110 Patricia M. Doney, Joseph P. Cannon, and Michael R. Mullen, “Understanding the Influence of National Culture on the Development of Trust,” The Academy Management Review 23, no. 3 (July 1998): 601. 111 Blake Ashforth and Fred Mael, “Social Identity Theory and the Organization,” Academy of Management Review 14, no. 1 (1989): 20; Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” in Psychology of Intergroup Relations ed. by S. Worchel and W. Austin (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1986), 7-24. 112 Ashforth and Mael, “Social Identity Theory and the Organization,” 20; Tajfel and Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior,” 7-24. 113 Marilynn Brewer, Jorge Manzi, and John Shaw, "In-Group Identification as a Function of Depersonalization, Distinctiveness, and Status," Psychological Science 4, no. 2 (1993): 88. 114 Debra Meyerson, Karl Weick, and Roderick Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” in Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, eds. Roderick Kramer and Tom Tyler (Thousand Oaks California: Sage Publications, 1996), 174.

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application of the group’s traits upon the individual allows for the rapid development of trust (if the group is already trusted). The need for personal knowledge of an individual is overridden by the generalized knowledge of the group he is associated with. As a consequence of this shift from a personal level of interaction to the collective level of identity, the individual can adopt a “depersonalized trust towards other group members based on category membership alone.”115 This consequence has both positive and negative implications: in the best case scenario, it could lead to the rapid development of trust, while in the worst case scenario it could lead to misplaced trust. In addition to influencing trust according to the perception of shared characteristics, the “transformation of the self-concept to the collective level of identity is presumed to underlie many important group processes, including conformity to group norms, group polarization, crowd behavior, and in-group favoritism in relation to out-groups.” 116 While many group processes can provide a benefit (i.e. through coordination and shared goals), some group processes can be detrimental in a military context (i.e. group-think informing biases and decision-making). Figure 11 provides a simplified “onion” depiction that highlights how social or group identities are layered. Each layer of social identity is located at a different proximity to an individual’s “core” personal identity depending on the degree of internalization of the characteristic. Allport hypothesizes that as one moves further from the central identity factors (at the core of the onion), the influence of that specific characteristic upon the perception or association of a corresponding in-group may weaken.117 As an illustration, if Figure 11 were to represent an American Soldier working in a multinational organization, the Soldier might first cognitively align with others who share similar internalized characteristics before they might align with individuals who share characteristics on the periphery of the onion. It is in this way, for example, that Soldiers from Texas might form a stronger initial bond with each other than with

115 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 174. 116 Brewer, Manzi, and Shaw. "In-Group Identification as a Function of Depersonalization, Distinctiveness, and Status," 88. 117 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 43.

Figure 11. Adaptation of Marilynn Brewers depiction of how social identities are layered.

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Soldiers from other places. This hypothetical group of Texan Soldiers may form a cognitive group based upon a shared bond. The degree to which such a group is realized and to which it is perceived as an actual entity, however, will be discussed later in the paper (in the section on group entitativity). It is important to note that characteristics that individuals converge around to form group identities or categorizations do not need to be directly related to personally held convictions or internalized characteristics. Extrinsic characteristics that originate either from the environment or from other individuals, and over which the individual lacks control, can also form the basis for the categorization of a group. Social identities can form whenever a salient common denominator is identified between individuals. The common denominator can be incidental (such as shared experience) or even superficial and material in nature; it need only to lead to a perception of oneself as being part of either an in-group or out-group. Figure 12 illustrates how a perfunctory categorization can lead to a perception of categories based upon superficial and material “haves” and “have nots.” In this paragon, social identities may have been formed around perceived access to a digital network system, such as one of those suggested in the Mission Command Network.118 Technicalities like having regular access to a network system, the availability of the material devices (i.e., computers, a consistent electrical supply, and internet access), and proficiency in the lingua franca (common language) utilized by the network can highlight disparities between individuals and groups, creating the perception of “haves” and “have nots.” Such factors that underscore the uneven distribution of access to material resources or skills can cause individuals or groups to begin actively sequestering themselves according to unexpected social characteristics. Using the example highlighted in Figure 12, individuals who lack similarity in what might be perceived as general characteristics (nationality, faith, ethnicity, and language) may categorize themselves based upon a shared absence of a characteristic. This

118 Mission Command Network Strategy Integrated Planning Team, The Mission Command Network: Modernization Strategy. Draft v1.6e, March 21, 2017.

Figure 12. Variation of Figure 11, illustrating how incidental or superficial characteristics may influence the unintentional development of social groupings.

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natural and spontaneous categorization has the potential to hinder the beneficial development of a shared identity (which in turn would lead to potential mutual trust). It can also delay the development of a shared understanding on which a military command’s unity of effort would be established. A shared identity can increase the potential for the rapid development of mutual trust and unity of effort, both of which are cornerstone principles of mission command.119 As an example, the CENTRIXS-ISAF120 data-sharing network was developed out of necessity as a mechanism for sharing classified information with coalition partners in Afghanistan. However, the information that the US and other partners decided to make available on CENTRIXS-ISAF was limited, due to strategic and operational considerations (i.e. pre-existing information sharing agreements and protocols). As a result, CENTRIXS-ISAF, a system that was originally intended as an information-sharing mechanism to develop trust and cooperation between partners, had, at times, the opposite and unintended effect of undermining trust and cooperation by drawing attention to information that was not made available to all coalition partners. In essence, the system highlighted in-groups and out-groups within the coalition and had the potential to erode perceptions of trust, cooperation, and respect between its members. While some partners may recognize the utility and necessity of withholding sensitive information, it can also be perceived as a clear signal of distrust and damage relationships between partners.

In-Group and Out-Group Perceptions

When individuals group themselves around the perception of shared characteristics in a manner that is meaningful, they subsequently create in-groups and out-groups. Being part an in-group or out-group is based upon an observed individual’s shared identity (or absence of such an identity) with the perceiver. If an observed individual shares characteristics or traits, and fits into a group identity with the perceiver, then he is collectively part of an in-group. If an observed individual lacks shared characteristics with the perceiver, then he would be classified as part of an out-group. The creation of in-groups and out-groups can occur naturally without the addition of artificial external influences (i.e. through naturally occurring traits as opposed to the utilization of a network). Ideally, commanders and their staffs should strive to avoid the establishment of any in-groups or out-groups. 121 Realistically though, it may be more pragmatic for command groups to strive to avoid creating unnecessary or superficial in-group or out-group formations that may undermine the effectiveness or cohesion of the group. Regardless of whether a leader is attempting to maintain, balance, or shift the influence of collective social identities, it is important for those leaders to understand the consequences that in-group and out-group formations may result in. One of the predominant outcomes of

119 Department of the Army, ADP 6-0: Mission Command, 2. 120 Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System—International Security Assistance Force 121 Robert A. Rubinstein, Diana M. Keller, and Michael E. Scherger, “Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (August 2008): 551.

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such binary social formations is favoritism for in-group members and bias against out-group members.122 Empirical research has shown that the simple act of placing individuals into social categories can cause in-group favoring evaluations and expectancies. These favorable evaluations can then cause the formation of cognitive biases that have the potential to distort information processing. Individuals tend to approach tasks with a “rudimentary hypothesis” that the in-group is better than or preferential to an out-group.123 The development of a rudimentary hypothesis is a result of “the fundamental categorization of an individual as a member of one’s own group or not,” which in itself, “can give rise to differential affect, regardless of the specific group to which the person belongs. These evaluative inferences occur spontaneously and without conscious awareness.”124 Notably, in-group/out-group biases can be implicitly activated simply by a reference to an in-group or out-group label.125 In this case, labels can be either formal (e.g. membership in an organization) or informal (e.g. based upon performance during an assessment), hold personal or social significance (e.g. the earned title of Ranger or Marine), or be based upon superficial perceptions of individuals (e.g., access to systems, shared experiences, spoken language, and physical characteristics).

Majority and Minority Groups

In-group and out-group perceptions can lead to an increase in the likelihood that select groups are perceived in a specific manner. The numeric representation of a sub-group within a larger group, however, has an impact upon how individuals identify themselves and how they interpret situations. Theorists specializing in social identity have predicted that numerical minorities are not only more aware of their in-group category but also experience more threat and anxiety in the intergroup contact situation. The enhanced perception of threat to an in-group creates a stronger sense of in-group identification, favoritism, and cohesion among minority groups, which in turn mediates intergroup bias.126 When social groups are presented with a real or perceived threat, the perceiver’s group characteristics (such as nationality or ethnicity) will become more salient as a defensive mechanism. For minority groups, reaction to a perceived threat can heighten the perception of characteristic salience, increase existing biases, and potentially complicate any efforts to create a superordinate identity (i.e. an identity that maintains a higher status) that combines the majority and minority populations and economizes the work or task responsibilities of that group. For instance, if Organization A sends a small delegation to work with Organization B, the members of Organization A may make their

122 Sabine Otten and Gordon Moskowitz, “Evidence for Implicit Evaluative In-Group Bias: Affect-Based Spontaneous Trait Inference in a Minimal Group Paradigm,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 36 (2000): 78. 123 Ibid. 124 John F.Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, "Stereotypes and Evaluative Intergroup Bias." in Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception, eds. Diane Mackey and David Hamilton, (San Diego, California, Academic Press Inc., 1993), 179. 125 Rubinstein, Keller, and Scherger, “Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions,” 551. 126 B. Ann Bettencourt, Norman Miller, and Deborah Hume, "Effects of Numerical Representation within cooperative settings: Examining the role of salience in in-group favouritism," British Journal of Social Psychology 38 (1999): 283.

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group identity more salient, as they may perceive themselves as not only working as part of a new team, but also representing the ability and tradition of their organization. The difference between increased group characteristic salience in minority groups and majority groups will be further discussed in the upcoming section on group entitativity. While it might be ideal to make the representation of groups equal on a cooperative team, it is not always realistic in actual group settings. When equal representation is not possible, it is “important to understand how contextual features might enhance [or erode] the benefits of cooperation when groups are unequally represented.”127 The lack of equal status that results from a numerical unbalance in the representation of groups in the contact setting appears to reduce the potential benefits of intergroup cooperation, especially for those in the numerical minority.128 This can lead to increased cognitive biases, favoritism, and animosity between groups. Numeric representation has also been shown to impact the relative salience of group characteristics. Research indicates that within an intergroup setting “the social category of the numeric minority is more salient than that of the majority.” 129 Characteristic salience refers to the degree to which a specific group characteristic stands out relative to similar characteristics of other groups. Theorists predict that perceptual qualities of unequal representation direct the members of both the minority and the majority to focus attention on the minority. 130 When a group member’s in-group category is highly salient, be it the numeric majority or minority, it is more apt to respond to intergroup contact in ways that are category-based. 131 In fact, scholars have observed an inverse relationship between the biases of majority and minority groups. They show that when the minority group is more biased, the majority group is less biased, and when the minority group is less biased the majority group is more biased. 132

Holding Multiple Social/Group Identities

The social identity “onion” used earlier (Figure 11) illustrates how social identities can be held in relation to personal identities given converging, overlapping, or layered characteristics. Like many illustrative representations of psychological processes, however, it represents a

127 B. Ann Bettencourt, Kelly Charlton, and Cyndi Kernahan. "Numerical Representation of Groups in Cooperative Settings: Social Orientation Effects on In-group Bias." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33 (1997): 631. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid., 632. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid., 655.

Figure 13. Graphic depiction of the complexity of simultaneously holding multiple group identities.

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generalization of a complex issue. In situations where an individual holds multiple in-group identities that do not converge, there are alternative forms of identity structure that can reflect the various relationships between an individual’s various group identities (Figure 13). 133 For example, if a U.S. Army Ranger is tasked with joining a combined organization led by a foreign military, he may still maintain his identity as a Ranger; however, in order to expedite and facilitate the creation of a diverse team built upon trust, he will also need to simultaneously adopt a transient identity as a member of the new multinational organization. Simultaneously holding multiple group identities and potentially creating a superordinate identity through group categorization can occur through four separate processes through which group relationships can be represented: intersection, domination, compartmentalization, and merger.134 Intersection As the naming convention implies, the process of intersection allows an individual to achieve simultaneous recognition of more than one social identity while maintaining a single in-group representation. Intersection allows the individual to define the in-group as the overlap of multiple group memberships (Figure 14).135 Intersection allows the perceiver to combine similarities in separate group identities into a single identity, unique from the original categories. 136 Domination Domination, on the other hand, is the process through which an individual adopts a primary group identity under which all other group identities are subordinated (Figure 15). 137 An in-group identity formed through domination is one with individuals who share membership in the primary, or dominant, social group. Since this group is defined by the shared superordinate category all other social identities are subordinated within the group. These subordinate social identities feature as a source

133 Sonia Roccas and Marilynn Brewer. "Social Identity Complexity." Personality and Social Psychology Review 6, no. 2 (2002): 89-90. 134 Roccas and Brewer, "Social Identity Complexity," 89. 135 Ibid., 90. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid.

Figure 14. The process of recognizing the common intersection, or overlap, of two separate social identities.

Figure 15. The process of one social identity dominating, or encompassing another.

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of intra-group variation but do not extend to those individuals outside of that in-group. 138

Compartmentalization The third process, compartmentalization, can occur “if more than one group identity is important to an individual as a source of social identity.” 139 If so, “multiple identities can be activated and expressed through a process of differentiation and isolation.”140 As a result of compartmentalizing multiple, but separate, group identities an individual is able to maintain social categorizations that are context- or situation- specific (Figure 16). 141 In such circumstances, multiple identities are maintained but they are not activated simultaneously. 142 This is akin to the metonymy of someone “wearing multiple hats” to describe their ability to perform different tasks or functions. Merger The final model or process for representation of multiple social group memberships is called merger. Merger occurs when “non-convergent group memberships are simultaneously recognized and embraced in their most inclusive form” (Figure 17).

143 Through the merger process, in-group identification is extended to all others who share any of an individual’s prioritized social category memberships –in this circumstance “social identity is the sum of one’s combined group identifications.”

144

Group Entitativity

Regardless of how an organization is structured, how a social identity is formed, the degree of characteristic homogeneity among group members, or the use of superficial identifiers, a group of individuals is only as fully realized as it is perceived to be. This is known as a group’s

138 Roccas and Brewer, "Social Identity Complexity,"90. 139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid., 91. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid.

Figure 16. The process of compartmentalizing

Figure 17. The process of merging two social identities.

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entitativity, or the “degree to which a collection of persons are perceived as being bonded together in a coherent unit.”145,146 The concept of entitativity was first developed by Donald Campbell in order to explain why some groups are perceived as actual groups while others are merely thought of as an aggregate of individuals.147 The perception of a group as an actual entity as opposed to an aggregate of individuals is not a group characteristic in and of itself, but rather a property among its members that varies along a continuum. 148 There may be a relationship between actual and perceived entitativity, but entitativity likely exists only in the mind of the perceiver.149 As such, entitativity can affect stereotyping, identification process, and intergroup biases.150 It is important to note that group entitativity is neither “a positive or negative group attribute per se; rather, it depends on the context and relationship between the perceiver and the group.” 151 Therefore, while it may be related to how group characteristics are mentally represented as prototypes, the influence of entitativity is dependent upon the specific context and relationship between the perceiver and the individuals or group being perceived. 152 As part of his original hypotheses, Campbell identified and emphasized three separate cues that influence judgments regarding entitativity. The first cue is the perception of a shared common fate. This refers to the degree to which individuals perceive to share interrelated outcomes based upon their membership to the group. The second cue is the perception of similarity in appearance or behavior among individuals that are members of the potential group. Finally, the perception of entitativity is influenced by the physical proximity of the members, reflecting Allport’s Intergroup Contact theory (discussed on pages 18-19).153 Entitativity can have several major influences on how an individual understands a group. The first influence is on the process through which an individual makes a distinction or judgement concerning a particular group.154 While it is believed that perceivers are more likely to make spontaneous dispositional judgments about individuals than for groups, when groups are perceived to have a higher degree of entitativity, the perceiver processes this information in a manner as they would for an individual (i.e., quickly and spontaneously). 155 The second

145 Brian Lickel, David Hamilton, Grazyna Wieczorkowska, Amy Lewis, Steven Sherman, and A. Neville Uhles. "Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78, no. 2 (2000): 224. 146 Donald T. Campbell, "Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities." Systems Research and Behavioral Science 3, no. 1 (1958): 14-25. 147 Campbell, "Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities," 14-25. 148 Simona Sacchi, Emanuele Castano, and Markus Brauer. "Perceiving one's nation: Entitativity, agency and security in the international arena." International Journal of Psychology 44, no. 5 (2009): 322. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid., 321. 151 Ibid. 152 Lickel et al., ”Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity,” 224. 153 Campbell, "Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities," 14-25. 154 Lickel et al., ”Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity,” 224. 155 Ibid.

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influence is through how influential an individual perceives a group to be.156 A group’s perceived “potency to act as a causal agent” can cause an individual to think of the group as an actual entity. 157 Research into group entitativity has demonstrated that “high entitativity groups are viewed by perceivers as possessing more capacity for collective action and as more threatening than lower entitativity groups.”158 In a military context, it may be assumed that increasing a group’s entitativity would increase the capability of the group. However, it has been found that while higher levels of entitativity can enhance in-group benefits it can also negatively impact the expectations concerning the actions and behaviors of out-group members. 159 Higher in-group entitativity can lead to the development of strong biases among the in-group towards out-groups. In-group members also have been found to respond to “existential threats” by enhancing entitativity. Out-groups perceived as having a higher degree of entitativity are viewed as being more threatening to the security of the in-group than out-groups with lower entitativity.160 Simply put, when an out-group is perceived as being more organized or salient it is assessed as a larger threat to the in-group than an out-group that lacks organization or saliency. How an individual perceives entitativity can be influenced by several factors. First, personal differences between individuals can influence their perception. These are known as chronic perceiver differences. Chronic perceiver differences include an individual’s “need for closure, or individualism [versus] collectivism, may influence the degree to which a perceiver tends to generally perceive groups as forming coherent, meaningful units.” 161 Second, situational or contextual factors “such as the presence of competition between groups or membership within a group, may influence how a group is perceived within a particular context.”162 Finally, the “properties of [a] group that is being perceived may serve as antecedent cues to perceptions of entitativity.” 163 In early work concerning entitativity, scholars considered different cues that lead perceivers to see groups as entities. 164 One of the earliest variables identified was degree of perceived similarity between group members.165 Later work has expanded upon these early findings to suggest that entitativity is related to the degree to which groups are mentally represented as

156 Lickel et al., ”Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity,” 224. 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid. 159 Sacchi, Castano, and Brauer. "Perceiving one's nation,” 321. 160 Ibid., 329. 161 Lickel et al.,”Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity,” 224. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Campbell, Donald T. "Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities." Systems Research and Behavioral Science 3, no. 1 (1958): 14-25.

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prototypes.166 One important consideration concerning group entitativity is that there is no consensus on whether individual similarity in a group was an antecedent to perceptions of entitativity, or whether perceptions of similarity were caused by entitativity. 167

Formation Strategies for Managing Group Identities

As discussed earlier, it is important for leaders to understand how sub-groups under their command interact and how these interactions can influence and impact operations. It is conceivable that commanders in the future will likely need to focus an increasing amount of their attention inwardly concerning the organization in order to ensure that their command is operating as efficiently as possible. The ability to harmonize efforts among multiple organizations towards a single, unified objective is challenging in and of itself. In some circumstances, commanders may need to deemphasize entitativity—in essence deconstructing a majority in order to decrease the perceived threat to minority groups. In other instances a leader may need to combine groups into novel categories with varying degrees of uniformity in order gain a decisive edge by exploiting the sum of unique partner capabilities. By understanding how social identities are formed and maintained, as well as how an individual can hold multiple identities at one time, a commander can then utilize different strategies to inform their decisions concerning how they structure their organization.

Decategorization

In situations where a commander may need to deemphasize the entitativity of a majority group, they may turn towards the process of decategorization in an attempt to personalize interactions (Figure 18). Decategorization breaks down the usefulness of category distinctions by focusing on inter-group interactions to re-personalize the in-group’s views of the out-group. One of the unintended consequences of categorization is the de-personalization of the members of an out-group.168 Research has shown that social behavior in “category-based

166 Marilynn Brewer, Joseph Weber, and Barbara Carini, “Person memory in intergroup contexts: Categorization versus individuation.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69, no. 1 (1995): 29-40. 167 Lickel et al.,”Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity,” 225. 168 Brewer, “When Contact is not Enough,” 293.

Figure 18. Illustration of the decategorization process.

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interactions are characterized by a tendency to treat individual members of the out-group as undifferentiated representatives of a unified social category, independent of individual differences that may exist within groups.” 169 Several studies have found that after participants engaged in a cooperative team task with members of an out-group category, those who interacted under more personalized conditions showed significantly less in-group bias at the end of the experience (again, echoing the underlying argument of Allport’s Intergroup Contact theory – discussed on pages 18-19).170 Decategorization may be beneficial in situations where different groups must work together but hold different biases and animosities based upon group stereotypes. By utilizing decategorization leaders are able to promote personal interactions between individuals of separate groups. While this allows individuals to perceive personal similarities between themselves and distinct others, it fails to account for or satisfy an individual’s innate need for inclusion in a larger and clearly defined group. 171

Recategorization

While decategorization breaks down group categories by personalizing interaction, there are instances where a leader may need to reinforce or create a novel collective identity (Figure 19). One such way to reinforce or create a novel group category is through recategorization. Recategorization is the creation of a common in-group identity formed around achieving a shared superordinate goal.172 Proponents of recategorization argue that creating shared goals enables group members to think as one unit, rather than as distinct groups. Collective goal setting may minimize any negative attention garnered by pre-existing categorical differences.173

169 Brewer, “When Contact is not Enough,” 293. 170 Miller, Norman, Marilynn Brewer, and Keith Edwards. “Cooperative Interaction in Desegregated Settings: A Laboratory Analogue.” Journal of Social Issues 41, no. 3 (1985): 63-79.; Bettencourt, B. et al., “Cooperation and reduction of Intergroup Bias: The Role of Reward Structure and Social Orientation,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 28 (1992): 301-319. 171 Brewer, “When Contact is not Enough,” 297. 172 Ibid., 294. 173 Brewer, “When Contact is not Enough,” 294.; Gaertner S. et al., “The Common In-group Identity Model: Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias,” European Review of Social Psychology 4 (1993): 1-26.

Figure 19. Illustration of the recategorization process.

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The goal of recategorization is to “reduce bias by systematically altering the perception of intergroup boundaries, redefining who is conceived of as an in-group member.”174 During recategorization biases towards an individual’s in-group are transferred to the new social group category. 175 However, this new social categorization requires members from both sub-groups to subordinate an identity that they may have held for many years in favor of a new identity. This can be extremely difficult depending on how entrenched previous social identities may be. Broadly, recategorization is the process that occurs during indoctrination at the beginning of military service. Individuals from a wide range of groups are brought together into a new superordinate collective. For the US Army, recategorization focuses on the shared goal of dedicated service and duty to the United States of America. While recategorization can successfully join separate entities under one collective identity, the new collective identity may be unstable if it fails to satisfy a desire for differentiation and exclusiveness. 176 Successful recategorizaiton also requires members of the novel collective identity to subordinate previous memberships. If an individual or group of individuals is unable to subordinate their previous identity categories, recategorization may result in the development of minorities groups that become increasingly salient as they differentiate themselves (or are differentiated) from the majority group. This then leads to the enhancement and entrenchment of biases, prejudices, and potential animosity between groups. For instance, if the leader of a joint command attempts to temporarily recategorize their members under a new collective identity, he may be met with resistance that can increase bias between members of the original groups. When a group identity is threatened, either by a perceived threat or actual threat, “people become motivated to reestablish positive and distinctive group identities and thereby maintain relatively high levels of intergroup bias.”177 If, for instance, the majority group in a Joint Task Force is made up of members of the US Navy and Marine Corps team, the US Soldiers involved may coalesce around their shared identity in order to fortify themselves against the perceived threat of being the minority.

Subcategorization

A variation of recategorization is the process of subcategorization. Subcategorization identifies a shared goal but allows sub-groups to maintain distinct identities and roles (Figure 20). Subcategorization is based upon the Distinct Social Identity Model, which asserts that the need for positive social identity should be capitalized upon in the inter-group contact situation.178

174 John Dovidio, Samuel Gaertner, and Tamar Saguy, “Commonality and the Complexity of ‘We’: Social Attitudes and Social Change,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 13, no. 3 (2009): 5. 175 Brewer, “When Contact is not Enough,” 294. 176 Ibid.,297. 177 Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy, “Commonality and the Complexity of We,” 6. 178 Brewer, “When Contact is not Enough,” 294; Rupert Brown, James Vivian, and Miles Hewstone, “Changing Attitudes through Inter-group Contact: the Effects of Group Membership Salience,” European Journal of Social Psychology 29 (1999): 744.

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This categorization allows pre-existing identities to remain salient, but the environment or situation is structured in a way that enables each group to have distinct but complementary roles within a cooperative framework.179 A key aspect of subcategorization is an emphasis on positive inter-group contact. By focusing on positive inter-group contact, the intent of subcategorization is that positive perceptions will supersede any negative perceptions between the in-group and out-group.180 “By changing the perceived interdependence between groups […] the associated category-based evaluations are also expected to change.”181 If negative perceptions are allowed to persist they can lead to a stronger sense of entitativity among a sub-group. This may promote intragroup trust and loyalty, while simultaneously creating a source of intergroup distrust and competition. 182

Optimal Distinctiveness

Ultimately, whether a multi-organizational command (one that requires effective interoperability) is structured around decategorization, recategorization, or subcategorization, the leadership of the command must strive to balance the members’ contrasting needs to both be part of a larger group and to also differentiate themselves from the group. This balance between assimilation and differentiation is known as finding the optimal distinctiveness. 183 First coined by Marilynn Brewer, optimal distinctiveness is built upon the notion that social identity is “derived from two opposing motivational systems (assimilation and differentiation) that govern the relations between self-concept and membership in social groups.” 184 As discussed with each of the previous processes, as an individual’s need for belonging is satisfied, a need to set themselves apart increases. This negative relationship between assimilation and differentiation is shown in Figure 21.

179 Brewer, “When Contact is not Enough,” 295. 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid., 297. 183 Ibid., 296. 184 Ibid.

Figure 20. Illustration of the subcategorization process.

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The optimal distinctiveness theory posits that there is an ideal balance between the two motivations. It is theorized that this optimum balance can be produced when “social boundaries are clearly defined enough to ensure both inclusion and exclusion” among members. 185 This balance can be realized by creating “an integrated perspective [that] would involve the presence of a salient superordinate level of categorization that simultaneously preserves subordinate differentiation and individualization of the members of subgroups.” 186 This can be accomplished by creating social structures within organizations that are characterized by “cross cutting roles,” rather than hierarchical roles. 187 Cross cutting roles and identities are those where social categories and task roles are functionally independent of each other. Given categories A and B and tasks 1 and 2, dependent categories and tasks would be represented as A1 and B2, with each task being category dependent; in contrast, independent and cross cutting roles would be represented as A1, A2, B1, and B2. 188 Seeking to develop a command identity that allows for optimal distinctiveness may not always be appropriate for a military command operating in a rapidly changing environment. Achieving optimal distinctiveness, more so than the other processes, requires time and a familiar knowledge with the different sub-groups involved. Aspects such as a social group’s collectiveness or individualism can influence where their respective optimal point is. If a leader does not have the time to find the balance or the social awareness to understand particular differences, achieving an optimal distinction may ultimately be an unrealistic ideal given the constraints of the modern battlefield.

Mission Command, Trust, Interoperability, and Future Operations

Regardless of the formal organization of a Joint or Combined Task Force, commanders will require the ability to recognize, understand, and influence social realities in order to generate

185 Brewer, “When Contact is not Enough,” 296-297. 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid., 298.

Figure 21.Illustration of the desired balance between assimilation and differentiation required to achieve optimal distinctiveness.

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optimal operational efficiency among partners and to exert influence within the operational environment. In general, future operations are more likely to be expeditionary in nature and consist of a modular, tailored, and task organized force capable of transitioning quickly and conducting operations of sufficient scale and ample duration in order to achieve strategic aims.189 As such, commanders will be required to inform and influence social cooperation, trust, creativity and unity of effort within a modular, diverse, and globally integrated force. 190 Furthermore, the successful, simultaneous, and continuous execution of Unified Land Operations will require the rapid development of temporary and globally integrated organizations built upon trust between partners. 191 These groups will likely “have a finite life span, form around a shared and relatively clear goal or purpose, and their success depends on a tight and coordinated coupling of activity.” 192 The use of temporary, often ad hoc groups allows the US Army to meet the demands of future operations because they allow for unique specialization for tasks that often involve “a high degree of complexity. 193 Despite the inherent utility of being able to develop temporary groups with specialized knowledge and skills, the formation, deployment and execution of temporary groups can also pose problems as they lack the formal structures that facilitate coordination and control.”194 By definition, temporary systems/groups/organizations do not require the same continuity over time that traditional systems have. Therefore, members of temporary systems may have little experience with each other and may be unlikely to ever work together again. 195 Given the time constraints placed upon the development of temporary organizations, the gradual development of trust is not allowed to occur; rather, individuals must “wade into trust rather than wait.” 196 This results in trust needing to be conferred ex ante, or presumptively, before it can be verified through experience or evidence. 197 The development of “swift trust”198 enables groups to behave as a system rather than as an under-organized crowd of multiple identities. 199 As the future operational environment becomes less predictable and more operationally ambiguous leaders are less likely to be able to specifically tailor their forces for a variety of

189 Department of the Army, Army Operating Concept, 17. 190 Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (September 2012): 4-5. 191 Ibid., 4 192 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 167. 193 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 167. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid., 168. 196 Ibid., 170. 197 Ibid. 198 The importance of swift trust in future Army operations was touched upon in the HDCDTF’s 2015 white paper on trust (Building Mutual Trust Between Soldiers and Leaders), which noted “As the Army implements a more expeditionary stance in accordance with the 2014 Army Operating Concept there will likely be a greater need for swift trust” (page 30). The paper lists key components of teams to develop swift trust, including: (1) a specialized labor pool in order to manage expectations and mitigate poor task performance, (2) unambiguous roles and task specificity for its members, (3) moderate levels of task interdependence, and (4) individual members must be credentialed with relevant, demanding, and enforced standards. 199 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 167; Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force, Building Mutual Trust between Soldiers and Leaders, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence (January 2015), 14-15.

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potential contingencies across the full spectrum of military operations. Task and environmental ambiguity can make it difficult for planners to accurately and effectively allocate resources. 200 Inability to predict and plan for specific contingencies is further compounded by the tyranny of time: “Insufficient time [available] for expectations [of trust] to be built from scratch,” can lead to expectations being “imported from other settings and imposed quickly in categorical forms.”

201 While the problems and solutions concerning human dimension interoperability may be unforeseeable, the processes that might be utilized to resolve problems and find solutions may be integrated in operational planning by efforts that emphasize the role of the human dimension in interoperability and promote the rapid development of a globally integrated force.

Emphasizing the Human Dimension of Interoperability

As discussed previously, interoperability is a wide-ranging and often disjointed concern within and for the US Army. Its application and relevance is simultaneously broad (in its generic conceptualization) and narrow (in its more focused permutations, most notably as appropriated in the technical and communications realms). The Army’s interest in the human dimension, particularly how it relates to mission command in the preparation of the future operational environment, provides an opportunity to unify the disparate and often unconnected dimensions of interoperability into a more coherent conceptualization. This paper has attempted to develop an inclusive conceptualization (first introduced in Figure 8 on page 19, and reconfigured above in Figure 22). Those interested in the

200 Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer, “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups,” 168. 201 Ibid., 170.

Figure 22. Conceptualization of how Human Dimension Interoperability integrates other fields of interoperability, thus enabling the realization of the force of the future.

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human dimension are often reminded that military functions, from waging war to administration, and from command to execution, are intensely human endeavors. 202 Indeed, the Army consists of people and relies on relationships and interaction of all kinds (between people and people, people and machines/systems, and machines/systems with each other). Ultimately, each of these various relationships, however, enables human activity, and remains a fundamental aspect of the Army’s interest in the human dimension. As such, appropriate interoperability needs to be concerned and approached and developed in such a way that ensures these relationships, involving both people and technology, are effective and intuitive. These relationships need to be tailorable, collaborative, identity-based, and accessible in order to allow for the creation of a force capable of achieving the Army’s missions of the future. The forthcoming Mission Command Network Modernization Strategy provides an illustrative example of why the US Army needs to integrate human dimension interoperability into its broader interoperability lexicon. While the Mission Command Network Modernization Strategy problem statement includes language concerning both interoperability and UAPs (Figure 23)203, the subsequent discussion throughout the rest of the strategy is focused primarily on material and technical interoperability and lacks any mention of the 2nd and 3rd order effects upon the human dimension. Materiel availability, technological synchronization, and access to systems can influence whether unified action partners develop a shared identity with US and other coalition forces, or whether they adopt an out-group perspective based upon a perceived inequality in technological capability or access to shared information. The Mission Command Network Modernization Strategy identifies interoperability as one of its primary end-states.204 But the identified objectives for 2020, 2025, and 2040 are primarily technologically driven. If the Army’s conceptualization of interoperability were to include the human dimension, the Mission Command Network Modernization Strategy might also incorporate objectives aimed at limiting potential negative 2nd and 3rd order effects of network

202 Department of the Army, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Mission Command, 6; Department of the Army, The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015, 1; Department of the Army, ADP 6-0: Mission Command, May 2012, 1-1. 203 Mission Command Network Strategy Integrated Planning Team, The Mission Command Network: Modernization Strategy, Draft v1.6e (March 21, 2017): 8. 204 Mission Command Network Strategy Integrated Planning Team, The Mission Command Network: Modernization Strategy,18

Mission Command Network Strategy Problem Statement

How does the Army achieve expeditionary, uninterrupted mission

command; through a network comprised of intuitive, secured,

standards-based capabilities adapted to commander’s

requirements; and integrated into a common operating

environment, with network capabilities that are assured,

interoperable, tailorable, collaborative, identity-based, and

accessible at the point of need in operations that include unified

action partners.

Figure 23. Proposed problem statement taken from the upcoming Mission Command Network's Strategy for modernization.

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capability limitations among partners, and promote the principles of mission command.205 This, in turn, could lead to actions that increase trust between partners, develop a cohesive shared identity, foster a shared understanding of the operational environment, and decrease the likelihood of commander’s intent being misconstrued as a result of network limitations.

Operational Risk and Opportunity

“In war the chief incalculable is the human will.”206 B. H. Liddell Hart

In addition to allowing modern commanders to prepare for and conduct operations with unified action partners, an emphasis on the human dimension would also have operational implications. Modern military operations have consistently provided examples of how complex the human dynamics of conflict can be. Time and again, American forces have aligned themselves with partners who either hold vastly different social identities from our own, or even share social identities with our adversaries. Contemporary examples include operations being conducted against the Islamic State (also known as Daesh) in both Iraq and Syria, and the ongoing conflict between the internationally recognized government of Afghanistan and the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Each of these examples requires American forces to partner with a wide array of international military, non-military partners, and local forces. These partnerships are built upon trust, the ability to create shared goals, and the ability to create a shared understanding of the situation and of the collective identity of the partnership. Without a shared understanding concerning collective identity, partnerships may be more vulnerable to fracturing caused by unpredicted events. Figures 24-26 will illustrate the varying degrees of complexity that social identities can play in modern operations. Utilizing the onion diagram (first introduced in Figure 11), Figure 24 represents the simplest example. This illustration focuses internally and depicts how

205 Department of the Army, ADP 6-0: Mission Command, 2. 206 Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Group, 1991), 323.

Figure 24. Basic representation of how organizations may fit into a transient organization. Of note is the differentiation between host nation forces and international organizations.

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a superordinate transient organization can contain multiple organizations, each with unique identities. Figure 24 shows how a host nation force may work with an international coalition, but not actually be part of the coalition (e.g. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) working with International Security and Assistance Forces (ISAF)). Actions and events can either promote or destabilize relationships between the partners. Figure 25 adds an additional layer of complexity by incorporating both the host nation population and an adversary organization that originates from within or shares characteristics with the host nation population. In this example, while the host nation forces may be opposed to the adversary forces, they may simultaneously share social identifies. The host nation population’s relationship with a unified task force may be dependent upon the host nation security forces relationship with the unified task force. Actions and events that occur can either foster stronger relationships that are insulated against fracturing, or they can isolate different groups, potentially enabling any adversaries who are poised to take advantage of opportunities. The improper disposal of Islamic texts at Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan in 2012, led to rioting across the nation, and allowed adversary organizations (like the Taliban) the opportunity to conduct their own inform and influence campaign. The Taliban fostered a narrative that called into question the personal faith of members of the ANSF. This narrative was aimed at forcing Afghans to decide between partnering with international forces who were perceived as being complicit with the destruction of Islamic texts, or distancing themselves from the international forces and potentially even giving support to the Taliban. Figure 26 introduces further complexity by illustrating the potential for interaction between multiple population groups, adversary groups, and even neutral groups within an operational environment. Each group potentially endorses or advocates for its own perspective or agenda

Figure 25. Intermediate representation building upon Figure 19, with the addition of a host nation population and an adversary organization that potentially shares social identities with both the host nation population and host nation security forces.

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by seeking to enhance their influence or to inhibit cooperation between other groups. In the current conflict against the Islamic State in Iraq, there exist multiple population groups who hold differing identities attempting to seek influence over or disrupt cooperation between other groups. A consequence of modern operations is that they ultimately work to either reinforce or break social bonds between different groups. When military leaders are enabled with a proper understanding of the human dynamic, they should be able to target their information operations to enhance or mitigate the 2nd and 3rd order effects of combat operations, potentially achieving desired results during phase 0 operations.

Conclusion

The volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous future operational environment necessitates that the Army and its personnel work more regularly and more effectively with an increasingly diverse set of UAPs. This requires the Army to optimize its understanding and implementation of interoperability in a manner that can adapt to the changing realities of its environment. Of course, interoperability has long been a topic of interest for the Army. Its conceptualization, however, largely remains either general or focused on its technical and/or material components. Notably, current approaches do not accommodate a “human dimension” of interoperability. The MCCoE believes this is a critical omission that needs to be addressed considering the existing current and anticipated future operational challenges the Army faces. Human dimension interoperability includes consideration for the organizational, behavioral, and cultural aspects of interoperability that have, at the very least, an equal impact on effective partnering as the more familiar technical and material components of interoperability.

Figure 26. Building on Figures 24 and 25. Figure 26 incorporates an increased level of complexity as it adds in more social groups into the Unified Action Task Force, adversary forces, the host nation population and even neutral groups. Every action taken by a group can either draw other groups closer to them or push them away.

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This paper proposes the development of a formal conceptualization of human dimension interoperability (described on page 16 and outlined in Figure 8) for the Army to consider as a starting point for the deliberate development of a more precise and comprehensive appreciation and institutionalization of interoperability. This, in turn, will shape how the Army understands, develops, and invests in appropriate capabilities and solutions for the unique challenges of the future operational environment. Our conceptualization describes three main components that contribute to effective human dimension interoperability: (1) the ability to identify and understand groups, (2) the ability to successfully engage and interact with partners, and (3) the ability to understand, manage and adapt diverse teams. While the Army already addresses each of these components in various ways (cultural awareness, regional expertise, and language training, for instance), the model is unique in two ways: its integration of these components in a broader, unifying, and more comprehensive conceptualization and its emphasis on the third component, understanding, managing, and adapting diverse teams. There is considerable research available in the academic realm to inform the Army’s necessary interest in learning how to better understand, manage, and adapt diverse teams in UAP relationships. Findings on social/group identities, entitativity, in-group/out-group distinctions, and strategies for managing group identifies, some of which was reviewed here, can significantly contribute to the Army’s efforts to capitalize on its human dimension, optimize Soldier and leader performance, and become more effectively interoperable with a wide variety of partners—all of which are critical to mission success in the future operational environment. Current approaches to interoperability that do not consider its human dimensions, including the impact of social identities on the ability of commanders to manage and adapt diverse teams, risk compromising integral partnerships amidst complex missions. Furthermore, underestimating or disregarding human dimension interoperability undermines some of the fundamental principles of mission command, namely building mutual trust through shared understanding. As such, any efforts to improve interoperability, to include human dimension interoperability, needs to align with the on-going institutionalization of mission command throughout the Army. Indeed, interoperability in and by the Army should reflect its expeditionary, modular, diverse, and globally integrated nature. This is a complex, intensive, and long-term endeavor. One key component of this effort, however, is to understand and plan for the consequences, actual and potential, of the human dimension components of interoperability, including the impact of social identities on forming effective temporary UAP teams.

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Recommendations

With this in mind, the Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCOE) Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID) makes the following recommendations concerning human dimension interoperability and social identities: On Human Dimension Interoperability:

1. Define Human Dimension Interoperability as the social, cognitive, and physical aspects that influence, and are influenced by, the ability of individuals and teams to act together coherently, ethically, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.

2. Conduct an original empirical study (or series of studies) about Army-UAP team

cooperation to identify the specific knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics that are critical to Army-UAP team performance and may be considered to comprise constituent components of a more robust understanding of human dimension interoperability. Use these knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics to further refine or support the Army’s definition of human dimension interoperability (recommendation #1).

3. Adopt the conceptualization of human dimension interoperability presented in this

paper (Figure 8) as a starting point for the deliberate development of a more precise and comprehensive institutionalization of interoperability. This, in turn, will shape how the Army understands, develops, and invests in appropriate capabilities and solutions for the unique challenges of the future operational environment.

4. Assess the potential benefit of creating a Human Dimension Interoperability proponent, organization, or council capable of coordinating all forms and components of interoperability. The proposed human dimension interoperability entity should also be capable of identifying, understanding, and mitigating any potential negative effects that might arise from decisions made concerning interoperability.

5. Investigate the potential of Hartel and Chamberlain’s recommendation (page 11) that the US military place more emphasis on interoperability by reversing funding priorities. While their focus was on the technical components (C2) of interoperability, a similar approach for human dimension interoperability may similarly benefit the Army’s emphasis on UAP interoperability. Hartel and Chamberlain argue that:

…the current process of defining multinational C2 requirements is flawed. The service tradition of working service requirements first, then joint requirements, and finally multinational requirements is a long-standing sequential process that mimics the implementation process. Funding also reflects this sequence. [We argue] that this sequence is backwards, and

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although it may be unrealistic to expect to change this order for the implementation process, there are no technical impediments that prevent reversing this order for the requirement definition process.207

6. Utilize the Army’s CNA process to identify human dimension interoperability

requirements. On Social/Group Identities and Interoperability:

7. Integrate social and group identity concepts into experimentation in order to reflect the complexity and dynamics of the modern operational environment. Based upon these findings, identify how the US Army is currently able to address these concerns or how the Army might better address this aspect of the modern fight moving into the future.

8. Consider incorporating elements of Social Psychology and Industrial/Organizational

Psychology into the professional military education of information officers, mil-to-mil liaisons, and digital liaison detachments.

9. Explore through experimentation the potential impact of facilitating an internally

oriented inform and influence cell into the relevant echelons of command during combined Unified Operations. These cells would facilitate the integration of diverse groups into a single unified entity and mitigate potential friction points. Inform and influence activities performed internally have the potential to increase cooperation among partners and the rapid development of a shared unity of effort.

10. Integrate human dimension interoperability concerns and considerations into the

Army’s Mission Command Network Modernization Strategy.

207 Hartel and Chamberlain, “Multinational Interoperability Requirements—A Core Competency,” 1.

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Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force. Cultural Interoperability: Applying Social Categorization to Better Understand and Mitigate Cultural Friction in Multinational Operations. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, January 2016. Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force. Social Intelligence: Introduction and Overview for the Army’s Human Dimension. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, February 2016. Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force. Understanding Learning Transfer: How Creating a Climate for Learning Transfer can Enable Intellectual Optimization. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, April 2016.

Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force. Social Intelligence and Emotional Intelligence: A Literature Review of Their Similarities and Differences. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, May 2016. Human Dimension Capabilities Development Task Force. Social Intelligence: Assessment and Training. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, August 2016. McMaster, H.R. “Foreword: Director Army Capabilities Center.” In The Mission Command Network: Vision and Narrative. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center and Fort Eustis, VA: Army Capabilities Integration Center, October 1, 2015. Mission Command Network Strategy Integrated Planning Team. The Mission Command Network: Modernization Strategy. Draft v1.6e, March 21, 2017. National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds. NIC 2012-001. December 2012. NATO. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. AAP-06, Edition 2013. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), 2013. NATO. NATO Logistics Handbook. October 1997. Odierno, Raymond T. “Foreword.” In The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win In a Complex World: 2020-2040. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1. Department of the Army, October 31, 2014.

University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies. The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook, 7.0. January 2015.

Other Publications

Abbe, Allison. “The Historical Development of Cross-Cultural Competence,” in Cross-Cultural Competence for a Twenty-First Century Military: The Flispide of Counterinsurgency, edited by Robert R. Greene Sands and Allison Greene Sands, 31-42, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014.

Allport, Gordon. The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1954. Ashforth, Blake, and John Turner. “Social Identity Theory and the Organization.” Academy of Management Review 14, no. 1 (1989): 20-39. Baker, Jon. E. Effective Multinational C2: Five Essential Variables. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009. Ballard, John R. "Making the Mix Work: Coalition C2 Interoperability During Recent Operations." Naval War College Report. June 2001.

Berger, Charles and Richard Calabrese. “Some Exploration in Initial Interaction and Beyond: Toward a Developmental Theory of Communication.” Human Communication Research 1, no. 2 (1975): 99-112

Bettencourt, B. Ann, Kelly Charlton, and Cyndi Kernahan. "Numerical Representation of Groups in Cooperative Settings: Social Orientation Effects on Ingroup Bias." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33 (1997): 630-659. Bettencourt, B. Ann, Norman Miller, and Deborah Hume. "Effects of Numerical Representation within cooperative settings: Examining the role of salience in in-group favouritism." British Journal of Social Psychology 38 (1999): 265-287. Bettencourt, B. Ann, Marilyn B. Brewer, Marian Rogers Croak, and Norman Miller. “Cooperation and reduction of Intergroup Bias: The

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Role of Reward Structure and Social Orientation.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 28 (1992): 301-319. Brewer, Marilynn, Jorge Manzi, and John Shaw. "In-Group Identification as a Function of Depersonalization, Distinctiveness, and Status." Psychological Science 4, no. 2 (1993): 88- 92 Brewer, Marilynn, Joseph Weber, and Barbara Carini. “Person memory in intergroup contexts: Categorization versus individuation.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69, no. 1 (1995): 29-40. Brewer, Marilynn. "When Contact is Not Enough: Social Identity and Inter-group Cooperation." Journal of Intercultural Relations 20, no. 3/4 (1996): 291-303. Brown, Rupert, James Vivian, and Miles Hewstone. “Changing Attitudes through Inter-group Contact: the Effects of Group Membership Salience.” European Journal of Social Psychology 29 (1999): 741-764. Campbell, Donald T. "Common fate, similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of persons as social entities." Systems Research and Behavioral Science 3, no. 1 (1958): 14-25. Codner, Michael. “Hanging Together: Interoperability within the Alliance and with Coalition Partners in an Era of Technological Innovation.” NATO Research Fellowship Final Report. Whitehall, London, UK: Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, June 1999. Cole, Ronald H. “Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform.” Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn/Winter 1998/1999): 57-74. Crowson, Thomas A. "Breaking it down Barney style: a framework for cultural interoperability." Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 22, No. 2 (2016): 108-122. Crowson, Thomas A. "Parterning and Army Doctrine: Indicators of Military Cultural Interoperability." Policy Brief. Centre for International and Defence Policy. Spring 2015. Department of State, “National Security Language Initiative,” Briefing by Dina Powell, Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs Barry Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, January 5, 2006, http://web.archive.org/web/20080306151344/http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/58733.htm, accessed June 29, 2015. Doney, Patricia, Joseph Cannon, and Michael Mullen. "Understanding the Influence of National Culture on the Development of Trust." Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (1998): 601-620. Dovidio, John F., and Samuel L. Gaertner. "Stereotypes and evaluative intergroup bias." In Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception, edited by Diane Mackey and David Hamilton, 167-193. San Diego, California: Academic Press Inc., 1993. Dovidio, John, Samuel Gaertner, and Tamar Saguy. “Commonality and the Complexity of ‘We’: Social Attitudes and Social Change.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 13, no. 3 (2009): 3-20.

Ford, Thomas C., John M. Colombi, Scott R. Graham, and David R. Jacques. "Survey on Interoperability Measurement." Paper

presented at the 12th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Newport, RI, June 19-21, 2007. Hartel, Robert, and Sam, Chamberlain. "Multinational Interoperability Requirements--A Core Competency." Paper presented at the 4th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Canberra, ACT, Australia, October 24-26, 2000. Klein, Helen Altman, Anna Pongonis, and Gary Klein. "Cultural Barriers to Multinational C2 Decision Making." Paper presented at the 8th Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2000. Lickel, Brian, David Hamilton, and Steven Sherman. "Elements of a Lay Theory of Groups: Types of Groups, Relational Styles, and the Perception of Group Entitativity." Personality and Social Psychology Review 5, no. 2 (2001): 129-140. Lickel, Brian, David Hamilton, Grazyna Wieczorkowska, Amy Lewis, Steven Sherman, and A. Neville Uhles. "Varieties of Groups and the Perception of Group Entitativity." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78, no. 2 (2000): 223-246. Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry. Strategy, 2nd ed. New York: Penguin Group, 1991. LoPresti, Thomas A. “The JCS System Before and After Goldwater-Nichols.” Study Project. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1991. Markel, M. Wade, Henry A. Leonard, Charlotte Lynch, Christina Panis, Peter Schirmer, and Carra S. Sims. Developing U.S. Army Officers' Capabilties for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011. Meyerson, Debra, Karl Weick, and Roderick Kramer. “Swift Trust and Temporary Groups.” In Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research, edited by Roderick Kramer and Tom Tyler, 166-195 Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1996. Miller, Norman, Marilynn Brewer, and Keith Edwards. “Cooperative Interaction in Desegregated Settings: A Laboratory Analogue.” Journal of Social Issues 41, no. 3 (1985): 63-79. Moelker, René, Joseph Soeters, and Ulrich vom Hagen. "Sympathy, the Cement of Interoperability: Findings on Ten Years of German-Netherlands Military Cooperation." Armed Forces & Society 33, No. 4 (July 2007): 496-517. Obama, Barack. National Security Strategy. February 2015. Otten, Sabine, and Gordon Moskowitz, “Evidence for Implicit Evaluative In-Group Bias: Affect-Biased Spontaneous Trait Inference in a Minimal Group Paradigm.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 36, no. 1 (2000): 77-89. Pryor, Michelle L., Thomas Labouche, Mario Wilke, and Charles C. Pattillo, Jr. "The Multinational Interoperability Council: Enhancing Coalition Operations." Joint Force Quarterly 82, no. 3 (2016): 112-117. Roccas, Sonia, and Marilynn Brewer. "Social Identity Complexity." Personality and Social Psychology Review 6, no. 2 (2002): 88-106.

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Rubinstein, Robert A., Diana M. Keller, and Michael E. Scherger. “Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions.” International Peacekeeping 15, No. 4 (August 2008): 540-555. Sacchi, Simona, Emanuele Castano, and Markus Brauer. "Perceiving one's nation: Entitativity, agency and security in the international arena." International Journal of Psychology 44, no. 5 (2009): 321-332. Taifel, Henri, and John Turner. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior.” In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by Stephen Worchel and William G. Austin, 7-24. Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1986.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Interoperability: DOD’s Efforts to Achieve Interoperability Among C3 Systems. GAO/NSIAD-87-124. Washington, DC: GAO, 1987.

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Appendix A:

Glossary of Terms

Alliance The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 3-0)

Antecedent Preceding a thing or event in time or order; previous or preexisting.

Assimilation When one group, often the numeric minority, adapts in such a way that they become similar to the other group, often the numeric majority. Assimilation can occur naturally or it can be forced upon a minority group by a majority group.

Categorization The act or process of placing objects or people, into classes or groups based upon observed characteristics.

Category Based Expectancy

Category based expectancies refer to the expectations concerning individual people based on the groups (categories) to which they belong.

Characteristic Salience The degree to which a characteristic of an individual or group is particularly noticeable, important, or prominent.

Coalition An arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 5-0)

Combination

(command structure)

The lead nation concept and a parallel command structure exist simultaneously in a coalition. This occurs when two or more nations are the controlling elements for a mix of international forces. This structure is more desirable than the parallel command structure, but an effort to achieve a total lead-nation concept for unity of command is preferred. (FM 3-16).

Compartmentalization The process of differentiation and isolation of social identities, through which different social identities can be activated and expressed in different situations.

Cross-cultural competence

The abilities and skills that enable one to operate effectively with or in different cultures.

Culture An evolving, integrated system of learned behavior patterns that is characteristic of the members of any given society. Culture refers to the total way of life for a particular group of people. It includes what a group of people thinks, says, does and makes—it customs, language, material artifacts and shared systems of attitudes and feelings.

Decategorization The process of breaking down existing social categories in order to personalize interactions with the individual members of a group.

Dominanation The process through which an individual adopts a primary group identity under which all other group identities are subordinated.

Entitativity The extent to which a social group can be perceived as an “entity” – almost a biological organism – having a real and irrefutable existence. In social terms, it is the dimension along which we differentiate between a collection of people being the aggregate of the individuals or a cohesive group.

Forethought The cognitive process that precedes action, shaping potential courses of action and allowing individuals to narrow down the options to only include those that are morally and socially acceptable through regulatory processes characterized by external (fear) control or internal (guilt) control.

Group Identity Refers to an individual’s sense of belonging to a particular group. At its core, the concept describes the potential for social influence within a group.

Human dimension The cognitive, physical, and social components of Soldier, Army Civilians, leader, and organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Army in unified land operations.re, and employ the Army in unified land operations. (TP 525-3-7)

In-Group The perceived entitativity of a group of people with a shared interest or identity.

Integrated

(command structure)

A strategic commander is designated from a (coalition or alliance) member, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup… subordinate commands and staffs [are] integrated into the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-16) Also referred to as the “fully integrated” command structure.

Integration When different parties are unified to form a coherent and original organization based on a new, integrated identity.

Intentionality The state of being deliberate or acting with purpose.

Interoperability “The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.” (JP 1-02)

Intersection The process of intersection allows an individual to achieve simultaneous recognition of more than one social identity while maintaining a single in-group representation.

LandWarNet A critical component of the mission command system. It is the Army’s single network—a system of systems connecting soldiers, platforms, formations, posts, camps, stations, and other facilities. (ADRP 6-0 and The Mission Command Network: Vision and Narrative)

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Lead nation

(command structure)

A command structure in which all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command structure can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity (JP 3-16). Normally, the lead nation is the country that provides the largest number of forces and resources for that operation (FM 3-16). Also referred to as the “framework nation”.

Lead nation: the nation with the will, capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a multinational operation. (JP 3-16)

Majority The greater number. With regard to social identities, the phrase majority refers to the larger/largest group within a given set of groups.

Merger The process concerning holding multiple group identities through which non-convergent group memberships are simultaneously recognized and embraced in their most inclusive form.

Metacognition

Refers to higher order thinking over the cognitive processes engaged in learning, problem-solving, and interaction. Metacognition is a multidimensional set of general, rather than domain-specific, skills. It is comprised of two components: awareness (knowledge) and active control (regulation). Metacognition is empirically distinct from general intelligence and may compensate for deficits in general intelligence and/or prior knowledge on a subject during problem solving. Also referred to as “thinking about thinking” or “cognition about cognitive phenomena.”

Minority The lesser number. With regard to social identities, the phrase minority refers to the smaller/smallest group within a given set of groups.

Mission Command

The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)

Mission Command Network

The mission command network is integrated mission command and LandWarNet capabilities, which enable commanders, leaders, and soldiers to exercise mission command (the philosophy) and integrate all warfighting functions and Unified Action enablers (the warfighting function). It is an inherent component of the Joint Information Environment. The mission command network allows commanders to develop and maintain situational understanding, maneuver across domains and locations, and conduct joint combined arms operations to accomplish the mission. (The Mission Command Network: Vision and Narrative)

Mission Command System

The arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that supports the philosophy of mission command as well as the mission command warfighting function. Commanders organize the five components of their mission command system to support decision-making and facilitate communication. The most important of these components is personnel. (ADP 6-0, ADRP 6-0, and The Mission Command Network: Vision and Narrative)

Multinational force A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1)

Multinational force interoperability

The ability of the forces of two or more nations to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned military tasks. Also called MFI. (AR 34-1)

Multinational force interoperability activity

Any initiative, forum, agreement, or operation that improves the Army’s ability to operate effectively and efficiently as a member or leader of an alliance or coalition across the full spectrum of military missions. (AR 34-1)

Optimal Distinctiveness The balance derived from two opposing motivational systems (assimilation and differentiation) that govern the relations between self-concept and membership in social groups.

Out-Group The group or collection of individuals that does not share characteristics with a perceived in-group.

Parallel

(command structure)

A command structure in which no single force commander is designated. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers (JP 3-16). This is not the preferred structure because of the absence of a single coalition commander and lack of unity of command (FM 3-16). Also referred to as the “bi- or multi- national” command structure.

Perceived Threat A deep sense of vulnerability to an individual or group, that is assumed to be negative, likely to result in a loss, and out of one’s sphere of control.

Perception A way of regarding, understanding, or interpreting something through the senses and from a particular perspective.

Perspective A point of view, a particular attitude toward or way of regarding something. Different perspectives between individuals or groups can lead to different perceptions, and understandings of the same object or event.

Recategorization The process of creating a common in-group identity formed around achieving a shared superordinate goal.

Separation When different groups are purposefully isolated along formal or informal lines. (e.g. a Navy or Marine Corps detachment working within an Army Organization).

Social Identity A person's sense of who they are based on their group membership(s). Tajfel (1979) proposed that the groups (e.g. social class, family, football team etc.) which people belonged to were an important source of pride and self-esteem.

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Social intelligence The ability to understand the feelings, thoughts, and behaviors of persons, including oneself, in interpersonal situations and to act appropriately upon that understanding.

Stereotype A widely held, fixed oversimplification of a particular type thing, individual, or group. While stereotypes are not necessarily negative, the more salient stereotypes tend to be a negative and not necessarily accurate representation of reality.

Subcategorization The development of a group from a variety of smaller groups around a shared goal that still allows sub-groups to maintain distinct identities and roles within the new superordinate group.

Subordinate Identity When multiple group identities exist, the subordinate identity or identities are those that are given a lower status or priority underneath the primary or superordinate identity.

Superordinate Identity A superordinate identity is that identity which is held as the pinnacle, above all others, as the primary identifier of an individual or group.

Temporary System A set of diversely skilled people working together on a specific and complex task over a limited period of time.

Transient Lasting for only a short time, impermanent.

Unified Action

The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). Unified action during multinational operations involves the synergistic application of all instruments of national and multinational power; it includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces (JP 3-16).

Unity of command The operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose. (JP 3-0)

Unity of effort Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

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Appendix B:

Mission Command Center of Excellence Human Dimension White Papers

PRODUCED BY

THE CONCEPTS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION (CRD) CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION DIRECTORATE (CDID)

MISSION COMMAND CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

Fiscal Year 2017

Untitled paper on Character/Leader Development for Mission Command FORTHCOMING (September 2017)

Untitled paper on Metacognition and Mission Command

FORTHCOMING (September 2017)

Untitled paper on Social Influence and Mission Command FORTHCOMING (September 2017)

Enabling Interoperability Through the Human Dimension

Interoperability with Unified Action Partners, Social Identities and Mission Command (in press) May 2017

Human Dimension Considerations for Knowledge Management

(in press) May 2017

Team Building and Social Intelligence: Overview and Integration for the Army's Human Dimension

(Part IV of IV of the series on social intelligence and the US Army) http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/28

Understanding Moral Disengagement:

How Moral Lapses Can Undermine Trust and Decision-Making in Mission Command http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/27

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Fiscal Year 2016

Creativity in the Army: Creative Process, Creative People, and the Creative Climate

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/10

Cultural Interoperability:

Applying Social Categorization to Better Understand and Mitigate Cultural Friction in Multinational Operations

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/14

Holistic Health and the U.S. Army

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/20

Recognition-Primed Decision Making

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/23

Long-Term Memory and Knowledge Retention:

Considerations for Educational Practices http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/21

Social Intelligence:

Introduction and Overview for the Army’s Human Dimension Initiative (Part I of IV of the series on social intelligence and the US Army)

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/8

Social Intelligence and Emotional Intelligence:

A Literature Review of Their Similarities and Differences (Part II of IV of the series on social intelligence and the US Army)

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/6

Social Intelligence:

Assessment and Training (Part III of IV of the series on social intelligence and the US Army)

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/22

Sustainable Individual Cognitive Capabilities Enhancement

Through Socio-Technical Systems http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/24

Understanding Learning Transfer:

How Creating a Climate for Learning Transfer Can Enable Intellectual Optimization http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/17

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Fiscal Year 2015

Building Mutual Trust Between Soldiers and Leaders

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/16

Cognitive Biases and Decision Making:

A Literature Review and Discussion of Implications for the US Army http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/19

Cross-Cultural Competence:

Introduction and Overview of Key Concepts (Part I of III of the series on cross-cultural competence and the US Army)

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/11

Cross-Cultural Competence:

Review of Assessment Methodology and Available Assessment Tools (Part II of III of the series on cross-cultural competence and the US Army)

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/12

Cross-Cultural Competence:

Overview of Cross-Cultural Training Theory and Practice for the US Army (Part III of III of the series on cross-cultural competence and the US Army)

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/13

Enhancing Human Motivation:

How Leveraging Self-Determination Theory Can Set the Conditions for Accelerated and Lifelong Learning

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/15

Grit:

A Look at Individual and Organizational Passion and Perseverance http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/18

Person-Organization Fit and Mission Command:

Why Developing a Mission Command Subset of Leadership Attributes Can Facilitate the Army-wide Implementation of the Mission Command Philosophy

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/5

Talent Management in the Army:

The Principles of Talent Management (Part I of II of the series on Talent Management and the US Army)

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/7

Talent Management in the Army:

Review, Comment, and Recommendation on Talent Management Models (Part II of II of the series on talent management and the US Army)

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16040coll2/id/9