Essays by a History Major

7/31/2019 Essays by a History Major

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Essays By AHistory

Major


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2012 Max Mersinger

1st Edition Miramar, FL 33029

! Thanks to Everyone who helped along the way.

Essays By A History Major


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1What is Afghanistan, and

Who is an Afghan?

On The Question of

Afghan Nationalism


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Pull out your sword and slay anyone, that says Pashtun and Afghan are not one! Arabs

know this and so do Romans: Afghans are Pashtuns, Pashtuns are Afghans!

- Khushal Khan Khattak 17th Century Pashto Poet1

3

! The question of why a Nationalistic movement has appeared has been askedover and over again the both the general public and the scholars that study the sub-

ject. But what is almost never asked is what a movement has never appeared. Forthe country of Afghanistan that happens to be the case. There is almost no national

unity to show of beyond the capital of Kabul and even less of a tie to the nation out-side of members of the Pastun tribe in southern Afghanistan. This is a puzzling ques-tion as most of the tribes in the area have been there for almost 2000 years andhave never once formed what is the modern day definition of a Nation-State. Thesepeople have been grouped together for almost as long as they have been there buthave never truly come under one banner for very long. What I propose is that thereis no Afghanistan, it is just a construct of a roll of the dice as to where various groupsstopped expanding their borders and what laid in between became the country weknow today. To look at it from the western perspective there is almost everythingthere to form a full actor on the international stage, but to the people of the areathere is no nation, just the tribe that has been there over the past 2000 year. Before

even Islam the people of Afghanistan will go to their tribal roots in a quest for resolu-tion of their problems. For these reasons and more that are below I dare to say thatAfghanistan is not a Nation, nor a country but the space left over in the rush. Peoplegrouped together by no logical means going into the modern era and pushed to livetogether in a state that dose not exist.

! Most of the talk regarding Afghanistan these days turn to how the UnitedStates has either won or lost its military action in the country. What gets over lookedin most of the conversations is the lack of a National identity. Even more of a press-ing question beyond National Identity is if there really is a nation there to be made?The creation of the Afghan nation has been on the minds of American and world pol-

icy makers for the past decade since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2002. For themost part the focus in nation building has been very western in nature, the idea of acentral government in Kabul controlling the nation as a whole. But for the better partof the last 2500 years the nation has been controlled from the outside by everyoneother than the Afghans themselves.

! Most of the writing and study of the issue turn on the fact that there is an Af-ghan nation. The idea of a nation in the western sense of the term belie the fact thatfor the most part Afghanistan is a lose group of tribes. The Minister of Defense for

On the Question of Afghan Nationalism

On The Question of

Afghan Nationalism


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Great Britain Liam Fox in May of 2010 called the nation a broken 13 th centurycountry.1 Most of the writings on the subject come in along those lines with the ideathat a nation of western form must emerge.

! The nations on the southern part of the Asian continent all point to the idea

that this can be done, Iran, Pakistan, India, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all havethe hallmarks of the modern nation state. But the nation in the middle, Afghanistan,has never formed in such a way to emulate its neighbors. The Russian ambassadorto the nation notes that like the Russians in the 1980s the American have controlover all the major centers in the provinces and look to govern form there. This con-trol has had no effect on the course of the efforts by the insurgents towards continu-ing to fight to drive out the American forces.2

! In The Atlantic Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason make the point thatfor almost all of the history of Afghanistan there has never been much in the way of atrue central government. They note that most of the people identify with the most

basic unit of the Afghan governmental system, the woleswali. Going on in their writ-ing they note that the southern part of the nation has its own form of government andlaw based on the tribal level. This rural area of the nation looks both on westernnorms of government and those of the Taliban with equal ire and disgust.3

! They are among the minority in terms of how they look at the lack of a strongnational government. Barnett R Rubin writing for the Council on Foreign Relationsmakes no note of the structure of government in the nation but calls for a focus onPakistan in the fight to bring about a peaceful nation.4 Pakistan shows up largely inthe movement towards an Afghan nation. In American Interest Ronald Neumannmakes the case that all the problems with Afghanistan are rooted with the Pakistanisto the west.5 He, like others, work under the assumption that for all the problems inAfghanistan they could be solved almost overnight with the solution of those in Paki-stan.

! Michael OHanlon and Bruce Riedel writing in The Washington Quarterly, andThomas H. Johnson for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute both play upon the ideaof central government as the major player in securing the country. Johnson toucheson the idea that the tribal element is there but moves towards a nation built by Kabul.He calls for action towards making the central government more palatable for the ma-

jor tribes in the region but recommends action only at the national level.6 OHanlon

and Riedel make the same call in how they see events in the region focusing on thenational level leaving out that of the tribal influences in the nation. They note that forthem it all comes down to a strong Kabul and a push towards centralizing itsgovernment.7

! Most of the studies of modern nation building in Afghanistan focus on securityand building this idea strong central government in the western model. Left out areany solutions that would lead to a government not in the model of a textbook nation.Each of these articles note that anything less than this would constitute a loss on thescale of nothing ever seen in history. None of them ask who are the Afghans, what istheir connection to each other and how do you build them into a responsible player inthe world today with these facts.

Pull out your sword and slay anyone, that says Pashtun and Afghan are not one! Arabs know

this and so do Romans: Afghans are Pashtuns, Pashtuns are Afghans!

- Khushal Khan Khattak 17th Century Pashto Poet8

Who are the Afghan people? When we mention the word there is a need to under-stand who is being referenced. The word itself, Afghanistan is in reference to justone of the tribes contained within the modern borders. The loose translation, or justthe one that makes sense in English, from Arabic is Land of the Afghans. Its firstknow appearance in Arabic is found in the 10th century CE Hudu al-Alam. They get

this name from the Prakritic Avgana from the 6 th century CE Brhat Samhita by Vara-hamihira. And the name dates back even farther from there, the Sassanids from Iranin the 3ed century CE make a reference to a tribe in the region they called Abgan.9But in the end, or beginning, the name can be traced to the Sanskritic name for thetribe, the Asvaka.

! For most of the nations history the term Afghan meant only the people of thePashtun tribes. Inside and outside of the nation since about the middle ages theterms have been interchangeable with each other.10 They are in the area at least be-fore 440BCE when Herodotus wrote his History and makes reference to them.11


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Their oral orgin myth is one that tries to put them on top of every other tribe in theregion, Ibn Battuta notes in 1333;

! We travelled on to Kabul, formerly a vast town, the site of which is now occupied by a

village inhabited by a tribe of Persians called Afghans. They hold mountains and defiles and

possess considerable strength, and are mostly highwaymen. Their principle mountain is called

Kuh Sulayman. It is told that the prophet Sulayman [Solomon] ascended this mountain and

having looked out over India, which was then covered with darkness, returned without enter-

ing it.

Ibn Battuta,133312 This origin myth was also put down by Maghzan-e-Afghani for Khan-e-JehanLodhi in the 17th century.13 The myth in full holds that in the 7th century BC the BaniIsrael settled in the Ghor Region of the country and later moved down to their currentlocation. The commonly held view among modern Pashtuns is that they are the de-

cendents of the Tribe of Joseph after the Twelve Tribes of Israel were disbursed.14

! Currently the Pasthuns make up about 42% of the current 29 million peoplewithin the current boundaries.15 They can be found, like they have since they firstsettled in the region, in the mountainous region of the Hindu Kush in the southwest-ern part of the country.16 When it comes to the race of these people they are placedwith Mediterranean Caucasians and the Pashto language is born from the Iranianside of the Indo-European Family of Languages.17

The countless graces of Paradise come through Pashtu to the Pashtuns.

Ghani Khan,197718 The one thing that binds the Pashtun together is their code of ethics. Pashtun-wall, or way of the Pasthuns or the code of life is a set of non-written traditionsthat pre date the Muslim invasion in 7th century.19 Its force is so great that even mem-bers of different tribes or non-tribal members living in close proximity to the Pashtunswill use it in their everyday lives. Even with its origins before the islamazation of theAfghans it does not contravene the basic principles of Islamic law.20 This code of lifewould find its way almost untouched after existing under Persian, Greek, Hindu, Se-leucid, Mauryan, Hellenistic, Parthian, Kushan, Buddist, and Islamic rule.21 The ba-

sic tenants of the code fall into nine general rules, Melmastia (Hospitality), Nana-watai (Asylum), Badal (Justice), Tureh (Bravery), Sabat (Loyalty), Imandari (Right-eousness), Isteqamat (Trust in God), Ghayrat (Self Honor or Dignity), and Namus(Honor of Women). These nine virtues make up the basis for most if not all of Af-ghanistans governance. But over the course of the past two thousand or so years

who exactly has controlled the area now known as Afghanistan?

! The history of modern government in the region starts around the 313 BCEwith the Founding of the Seleucid Empire out of the possessions of the eastern partof Alexander the Greats conquest of the Persian Empire.22 After the conquest of thePersian Empire in 330 BCE Alexander died with all the lands from Greece to the In-dus Valley under his control. With no male hair to the throne of the Macedonian Em-pire in 323 BCE the empire was divided up in the Partition of Babylon. But aftersome infighting among the generals of Alexander the Empire was once again dividedin 320 at Triparadisus when Seleucus gained the area of Babylon. But its not until312 BCE that he makes it there to set himself up. By the turn of the century in 305BCE all of the eastern parts of the old Macedonian Empire up to the Indus Riverwould be under one common government again.23

! But this would not last all to long. IN 305 BCE Seleucus made the attempt togo over the Indus river and invade the Maurya Empire on the Indian subcontinent.There are no accounts of how the war went but it was over within a year with Seleu-cus giving up much of his territory from the Hindu Kush Mountains to the Indus Riverin exchange for 500 War Elephants.24 It is under the Maurya Empire that the religionof Buddhism is brought into the region. All across the kingdom are placed the Edictsof Ashoka that extol the values of the religion and the kings of the empire. Madefrom 269 BCE to 231 BCE during the reign of the Emperor Ashoka the Edicts arealso the first tangible evidence of Buddhism.25 The effect on the Afghan region hadnot been lost to Ashoka, on his 13th edcit is found an inscription in both Greek andAramaic, using the Hebrew alphabet. This and one other Edict were found in thearea around Kandahar, Afghanistan during the 20 th century.26 The Greeks in Afghani-stan would continue to have a major impact in the region up until the turn of the mil-lennium.

! Northern Afghanistan come 250 BCE was still under the Seleucid Empire untilthe satrap of Bactria, Diodotus I, declared independence from the empire.27 The
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khan_Abdul_Ghani_Khanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Battutahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulaiman_Mountainshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_view_of_Solomonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ajamhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khan_Abdul_Ghani_Khanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khan_Abdul_Ghani_Khanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Battutahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_Battutahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_view_of_Solomonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_view_of_Solomonhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulaiman_Mountainshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulaiman_Mountainshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ajamhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ajam


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Greeks who overthrew the Seleucid Empire would grow into one of the most power-ful forces in the region. The Empire known as the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom wouldcome to have the first contact with from the western world with the Chinese andother people of the steps.28! The Kingdom would roll along till 180 BCE andexpansion was on the horizon.

! Before their expansion the Maurya Empire collapsed in 185 BCE with a coupby its Generals. The successor empire, the Sunga Empire, would for the most partmaintain the boundaries of its former state. But what they did to their own people isstill up for debate. Most of the records of the time say that the Sunga began a cam-paign of terror against the Buddhists in the area. In 180 BCE the Greco-BactrianKingdom invaded the Sunga Empire, for what most see, as a way to protect the Bud-dhists. By 170 BCE the Kingdom would expand to include all of the territories up tothe Indus River. In so far as they took back all the land that was once under Alexan-der the Great they moved almost to the Himalayas in north central India. 29 To thesouth the Kingdom would move all the way down the Indian coast to Simylla by the

time it was all done.30

! This new conquest by the Greeks would be split off after the conquest to fromthe Bactrian Kingdom to form the Indo-Greek Kingdom. It is this Kingdom that wouldrule the area from the Hindu Kush to the Eastern edges of the Kingdom until around10 CE, But forces from within would contribute to its own downfall.

! The Saka people from the eastern part of china were a nomadic people whosettled in the area just south of the Hindu Kush during the 1 st century BCE.31 By 10CE they had forced the Indo-Greeks out of the territory along the southern base ofthe Hindu Kush and started their move towards India by 20 CE. Formed out of these

lands was the Kushan Empire, which ruled unmolested for almost 200 years. Duringthis time there was vast contact with the Roman Empire to the west and the ChineseHan Dynasty to the East.32 It wasnt until 225 CE with the death of Vasudeva I thatthere was a split of the Empire into eastern and western portions. The western por-tion in Afghanistan was very quickly after separating taken in by the Sassanid Em-pire. The Sassanids would rule Afghanistan for well into the 5th century CE when theKidarite Kingdom comes to power in Northern Afghanistan and proceeds to conquermost of Peshawar and Northwestern India.33 The Kidarite would, in the 5th and 6thcenturies CE, fall into the Nomadic confederation of the Hephthalites. 34 But unlike all

who came before the next group to control the region would for the first time have itscapital in Afghanistan.

! The Kingdom of Kabul Shahi moved into the area with the fall of the Hephthal-ites around 565 CE. For the first time the people ruling the land were not Greeks Indi-

ans or Persians but Turks.35 Also of note here is the note of how the region wasnamed, Kabulistan, referring to the area around the city of Kabul but not including theareas to the south refered to as Afghanistan. For the most part Hindu and Buddhisttraditions were the major religions in Kabul Shahi until the start of the Muslim inva-sions in 664 CE.36 With the Muslim invasion one of Afghanistans major players inmyth would come on to the scean and for the first time control all of the modern daycountry.

! Yaqud bin Laith as-Saffar was born in 840 CE somewhere in southwesternAfghanistan.37 As-Saffar would go on from very humble beginnings to control areasof Pakistan, Iran, and all of Afghanistan from his capital in Zaranj, the city near to his

birth site.38 The dynasty of As-Saffar would go on to rule for almost 150 year until1002 CE at which point Mahmud of Ghazni invaded and de throned Khalaf I. 39 Afterthis time for almost 700 years almost no one maintains control for more than 100year until what Steven Otfinoski calls the Afghan George Washington comes along. 40

! Mirwais Kan Hotak came to power after killing Gurgin Khan in 1709 in the cityof Kandahar.41 Thou he only lived a few more years until 1715 his Hotaki Empirewould come to embody the future for an Pashtun tribe that ruled itself. After hisdeath his sons were defeated in 1736 by the Persans for what would be the last timethat Afghanistan would be under the rule of a foreign power. The Durrani Empirecame to power in 1747 under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durrani. The Empire

would become only the second Pastun rulers of the Kandahar region after onlyHotakis.42 At the time of his death Durrani would become know as the father of mod-ern Afghanistan for bringing all of the tribes together and moving them towards acommon goal of forming a nation. During his time the empire was the largest Muslimpolitical grouping next to only the Ottoman Empire.43 The empire would go on till1826 with its undoing at the hands of the Sikhs. In all the rulers of the empire triedsix times to take over subdue the Sikhs but never could. As more and more of theHindu peoples converted to being Sikhs they pushed out the Durrani from all of Paki-stan to where the modern border sits today.44


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! In the late 19th century Afghanistan was for all intent and purpose an independ-ent nation, there are three wars with the British along its eastern border. But in 1919with the Treaty of Rawalpindi the British gave up and claim to Afghanistan and it wasdeclared an sovereign and fully independent state. Amanulla Khan was the king andthe time started the process of opening up the nation to standard international

relations.45 But as Khan was to find out Afghanistan would never grow in to a modernnation, as up to the 1979 Marxist rebellion almost 12 different kings or warlords con-trolled the country with differing values and different visions for what Afghanistancould be. This left the nation in shambles being left behind in the push to modernize.For even at the end of the 20th century it went from Marxists to extreme Islamist inthe span of 20 years, each with the hope of holding together a nation. But wherethey have failed might be the insight in to producing a positive actor on the interna-tional stage.

The use of western nationalism to look at Afghanistan is somewhat misguided in howit approaches the nation. The nation is not bound together in the ways that there are

truly definable in the western sense. The idea of a strong central government in thenation is almost nonexistent. The seat of legitimist government is seated in the vil-lage elders in the eyes of the people. Most of the functions of government are car-ried out at this level with little input from Kabul. As seen above the majority of timesthat the people of Afghanistan have come together have been to push out a foreignpower from the nation, after which they go back to the status quo of government atthe local level. Unlike other nation building efforts in the late 20th and early 21st centu-ries that have some form of central governing power in their movement that the peo-ple have unified under. The push to move in Afghanistan has been placed on a cen-tral government that has almost no power at the regional level on down.

! The use of exiles also comes into question when it comes to the unifying ofthe nation. Most of the members of the current government were up until 2001-2002out of the county. Pushed out after the Taliban came to power in the 1990s theywent abroad, and to local eyes, bided their time until they could swoop in and takepower. They werent around to suffer or fight in the eyes of the normal Afghan vil-lager. After the ouster of the Taliban in 2001 at the hands of the Americans theycame back to power hand picked by the members of NATO. Upon returning to theNation as their new leaders Hamid Karzai took power by reenacting the coronation ofAhmad Shah Durrani. But as he took power many called him The Mayor of Kabul.

Most saw him as the puppet of both the Americans and the Pakistani ISI who heworked with during the 2001 invasion.

! This lack of faith in the central government of the country most glaringlyshows itself in studies done on the level of corruption in the central government. In

the last year in which data is available, 2010, Afghanistan ranks alongside Myanmar,home of a military junta, and just above Somalia (which is only really a country forseveral blocks of its capital Mogadishu).46 These levels of corruption in the nationput it almost dead last in the world. One of the hallmarks of western nationalism isthe legitimacy of governing institutions. For the ability to move a group of trucksacross the nation will cost $6,000 USD for the police to not tip off the Taliban to theirlocation. Ashraf Gani described the government as completely controlled by corrup-tion, The narco-mafia stat is now completely consolidated. The people see mem-bers of government living in houses that got for $11,000 USD a month, but the presi-dent, who is the highest paid member of government, only gets about $600 USD a

month in salary.47 The British government estimates that almost!70 Million will belost to corruption in the next four years starting in 2012.48 For the Americans it is al-most $360 million in funds given to reconstruct the nation that will be lost to the sys-tem of corruption in the nation.49

! The transmission of ideas and media across the nation also finds itself in aposition that makes moving the people together almost impossible. For the 29 mil-lion people in 4.8 million households in 2010 only 497,000 of them had access toelectricity. Only 140,000 telephones (main lines) are in use across the country. Forthe 13 million cell phones in the country there is, as the state department puts it, ir-regular cell phone signals50 Compared to the US state of Texas (25 million peo-ple, 696,241 km2) Afghanistan, at 652,230 sq km, has only 12,350 km of pavedroads, mostly between major cities, Texas has 121,561 km of public highwaysalone.51 There is almost no movement of people or goods inside the country, thusalmost no movement of news, events and ideas. This lack of communication alsoeffects the centralization of government. Without reliable lines of communication toKabul most matters must be settled at the local level with no guidance or help fromthe central government. The functions of national government can not exists if thereis no way to get information from decision makers to those putting them to action.


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! In the end for that information to even matter there needs to be a populousready and wanting of that message. For its entire history Afghanistan has been botha nation and a random place on the map. A unified people and a disorganized smat-tering of tribes, that can not be brought together within the western model of the na-tion state. What is needed in the end is to flip then conventions on its head and not

have federal system in the American model but a confederacy upon the model of theEuropean Union. The idea of a strong central government just does not fit into themold that Afghanistan presents and the option of a decentralized government that isstrongest at the local level only moving to work at the national level only to outsiders.For at the end of the day Afghanistan is just an illusion, a country on paper but in real-ity nothing more than the negative space on the map between Iran and Pakistan.

Footnotes1 13th Century Fox

2, 3 Johnson, Mason

4 Rubin

5 Neumann

6 Johnson

7 OHanlon/Riedel

8 Khushal Khan Khattak

9 Encyclopaedia Iranica

10 Abdul Hai Habibi

11 Heredotus Chapter 7

12 Battuta pg. 180

13 Houtsma pg. 150

14 Muhammad Introduction

15 Central Intelligence Agency Afghanistan

16 National Geographic

17 The Cultural Orientation Project The Pashtuns

18 Olesen p. 33.

19 Library of Congress

20 Nadjma pg. 49.21 Encyclopaedia Iranica

22 Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies p.211.

23 Appian Chapters 52-55

24 Plinty Book 6 Ch. 21

25 Avari p.113

26 Afghanistan dot Net

27 Justinus

28, 29,30 Strabo 11.11.1

31 Isidore of Charax

32 Victor XV 4

33 GRENET p.203224.

34 Procopius Book 1 Part 1

35 Tarikh-al-Hind pp 10-14

36 Oldham p 126

37 Noldeke p 178

38 Encyclopdia Britannica

39 Bosworth p 8940 Otfinoski p.8.

41 packhum.org Chapter IV

42 Malleson Chapter 7

43 Library of Congress

44 Tannerp.126.

45 Encyclopaedia Iranica, Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921

46 Transparency International
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Author:Procopiushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aurelius_Victorhttp://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Author:Procopiushttp://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Author:Procopiushttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aurelius_Victorhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aurelius_Victorhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khushal_Khan_Khattakhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Khushal_Khan_Khattak


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47 Filkins

48 Walker

49 Riechmann/ Lardner

50 U.S. Department of State

51 Central Intelligence Agency


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2Or how to have Cold War

America pay for everything

Algers


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! ! ...the Soviets might be involved.

11

As the curtain rose on the 1960s France would find itself at the position that

many old war powers would find themselves, at the end of an era, the world

was changing weather they liked it or not. Finding themselves in the position

of giving up all her colonies around the world France would need to find a way

to pay and maintain local governments in her old colonies. But with politicaltrouble at home, as well as abroad it found itself in a position where the goal of

decolonization not was truly attainable from both the side of political and

monetary capital. The push to leave the colonies forced France to move to

find a force to fund this movement and give back up to the faltering French po-

litical system. Into the arms they flew to find the United States of America wait-

ing to give them the capital they desperately sought and needed. By the end

of the 1960s they would achieve this goal and more with the United States

funding not just decolonization but also drawing it in to help preserve the last

remaining vestiges of France as a global player.

! In the quest for these goals the French would find that the United Stateswould only give so much, but beyond that there lied a recipe for almost unlim-ited funds and support that they could tap into. Through the use of State De-

partment documents I intend to show that the 4 th and 5th French Republics hit

upon the threat of Soviet interference in their affairs to get the Americans to

move and give support towards putting down rebellions and other colonial ef-

forts in the late 50s and early 1960s. Once the French see that this strategy

would not be questioned by the Americans they moved to use it as a threat

hanging over the Americans, that only they, no one else could keep commu-

nism ay bay and lead a Free France into the rest of the century.

! There is no greater example of this political blackmail than that of theAlgerian War of Independence. The war would in the end lead to the fall of the

4th Republic, splintering of the French public and the rise of the 5 th Republic.

The war was taken upon by not just French and Algerian forces but also the

French Algerian colonists themselves. This combustible mix would fuel the

need for outside intervention to keep France from falling to either Communist

or Fascist forces. It would take the return of a hero in Charles De Gaulle to

bring peace to what has been called the French Vietnam. 1

! In the scholarship on the issue of French Decolonization the UnitedStates is rarely if ever mentioned. Danielle Costa, in an essay, makes this over

look of the United States that characterizes most of the scholarship on the is-

Algers

Oh, and By The

Way...


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12

sue. She points to both political pressure and feelings of the French people at

home towards her colonies, leaving out any way that they got funding or

supplies.2 Like Costa most of the works on the subject look at the subject from

the perspective French internal politics, but some look at as outside actors

working against the French.

! There are two seminal works on the Algerian War, both twenty yearsapart and almost as far apart in terms of how they take a look at the implica-

tions and American involvement. Writing in 1980 John E. Tallbotts book, The

War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962 takes a stance of looking at

the implications of the war for the French people. In it he looks at the Frances

moral dichotomy of trying to keep a hold of this crown jewel of its old empire

and the French tradition from its revolution of human rights and freedom for all

people. His work is the seminal study into the French republic and how oppos-

ing forces almost tore it apart.3

! In 2001 Irwin M. Wall moved to rewrite the history of the Algerian Warwith his book France, the United States, and the Algerian War. Wall takes the

opposite approach from Tallbott in looking not so much at internal forces work-

ing in France but at the outsized influence of the United States in the post

World War Two era. From this he goes on to make a case that the U.S. forced

the downfall of the 4th French Republic and the long and bitter battle for the Al-

gerian colony. He does this in a way that makes Du Gaulle seam almost as a

puppet of the United States, which I find in my research to be utterly wrong.

He picks and chooses the information that he uses to make his point of trying

to make De Gaulle appear to have no free will or choice in the manner, laying at

the feet of history the idea that there is almost internal reason for the fall of the

4th Republic, but the United States wanted it so, and it was done.4

!Where this paper tries to fit into the research is the idea that, yes DeGaulle did get some of his marching orders from the American government,

but at the same time he was calculating in his approach to the matter and

learned how to pull the strings of Washington. That it is more a question of

how De Gaulle and other French leaders framed the advancement of U.S. pol-

icy and not the other way around. There are internal forces and external forces

at play and he learned how to play them to his advantage. The end game at the

time of his second rise to power brought about stability to France that is still

here today in the form of the 5th Republic. From documents from the U.S. gov-

ernment this paper will try to show how over time the change and movement of

U.S. African policy, Algeria in particular, was moved by the French to their own

motives and not by independent reports.

! I plan on telling how this happened through the official Department ofState records contained in the collection known as the Foreign Relations of

the United States 1860-1960 I start my study in 1952 with the start of the upris-

ing through the end of records in 1960. The reason for the use of just officialrecords is that the majority of the memoirs and other books on the issue all

have some slant or score to settle in terms of who was right or wrong on the

issue. For this study that does not matter as much as the how, for success

has a thousand fathers, but failure has none. The other reason will be seen

clearly in the later stages of the study as the use of telegrams, cables, letters

and memos allow for members of the Diplomatic corps to converse uncen-

sored and with tone that would not be there had these documents been public

record at the time. All this leads to insights that could not be had any other

way. This study looks to find how people on the inside of the process at the mo-

ment, not 30 to 40 years later take on the subject, and handle different lines of

thought.

! In February 1952 long before the November 1954 uprising in Algeria theUnited States was already looking for factors and movement towards an upris-

ing or nationalistic movement in the nation. In a memo dated 27 February,

1952 the Consul General in Algiers makes note of there being two major

groups from where rebellion might come from, the Nationalist parties and the

Moslem population. The memo takes care to note that the communist part in

Algeria is apart of the nationalistic movement but at the same time that Nation-

alists would move if they could get support from the United States and the

United Nations to put pressure on the French.5 Noted in the memo is the idea

that there isnt great Nationalistic fervor among the general population but it ismostly held in outlying groups with in the colony. In fact the idea of such feel-

ings is dismissed as surprising.6 In the end it makes the conclusion that,

we foresee no likelihood for the near future of any outbreak in Algeria other

than isolated incidents that could be rapidly under control.7

! A year before the action in 1954 a dispatch is sent from the Consul Gen-eral after a vote in the United Nations on the question of Morocco and how it

was viewed from the perspective of Algerian nationalists. Among the opinions

reported to the Washington at the time are some very critical editorials in the

Algerian Nationalist paper La Republique Algerienn, in the 4 September issue,


14/36

13

the memo goes to point out, blame for the events in Morocco of Frances vio-

lent repression lie at what UDMN leader Ferhat Abbas saw as, French bour-

geoisie which has lost faith in itself and seeks t compensate for its own inferi-

ority complex by a series of criminally brutal acts against the unarmed colonial

people.8 From the same issue it called for the French to start their own revo-

lution again and to escape the Fascist forces which threaten them.9 Fromtheir perspective it sees the United states as betraying the promises of Roo-

sevelt in the relief of French forces in the form of supplies and money. The

MTLD journal LAlgerie Libre itself goes even further to indite the United States

for their support of France in North African matters, even making note that

they have almost no choice in the matter, The United States are caught in a

trap. They must tolerate everything. Their security in the event of the independ-

ence of a colonial country would be endangered. The United States, a former

colony, thus go in the name of strategy, against their history and the freedom

which they pretend to defend throughout the world.10 In the end in his com-

ments section of the memo the Consul General sees no significant change in

how Algerian nationalist will operate. But without even mentioning them for

the entire memo bright up the Communist Party in the colony, noting that their

cooperation with the nationalist movement is just nothing more than a Com-

munist hope.11

! As troubles start to mount in early 1954 there is a telling memo sentfrom Algeria to Washington. On 18 May the Consul General at the time had a

conversation with the French Governor General about the rising tensions in

the colony. In the conversation the Governor General made note of how they

French believed that there was no trouble to be had with Algerian nationalists

but it was from terrorists sent into Algeria from abroad.12 When describing

these outside forces there is a glaring mention of Spanish Communist activityin the nation. Wile the governor General makes some note of how they sup-

pressed further activity there are very much the dog whistles given to the

American diplomats of the idea that they were prepared to seize on any

incident.13

! There is no reason for alarm.14 This is how a telegram dated 2 Novem-ber 1954 from the Consul General to the State Department ended. On the night

before of 1 November a series of bombs and attacks took place in the southern

part of the colony, but with the note that most of the attack did not succeed. In

the end of the memo the Counsel General leaves no douth as to the forces be-

hind the attacks, No question in anyones mind that terrorists are MTLD-PCA

members and attacks made under pressure from Arab League.15 This no rea-

son for alarm is taken very seriously by the French press in Paris, as the U.S.

Ambassador in France notes that even on 4 November there is Surprisingly

little specific information.16 But in talks with French officials it is seen that

blame is laid square at the feet of the Arab League and other forces from theMiddle East, Egypt in particular.17 At the end of this telegraph from Paris to

Washington is a small note of how French official had indicated that, there is

growing evidence of Communist and nationalist cooperation at lower levels.18

! In the ongoing conversation of what had actually happened in Algeria on1 November 1954 there is a telegram from the Consul General at Tunis to his

fellow diplomats in the region that makes some interesting points to how the

French were pushing the quiet agenda of dropping the threat of communism

into every conversation. While he reports that his French equal in the country

all but pins the Arab League for the attack the French official adds, Moscow

turns to North Africa as the soft under belly West Europe alliances and most

vulnerable for attack. Not that he expects successful revolt soon or immediate

Communist gains but is concerned lest basis be established for future suc-

cess. Said he hoped US would perceive Communist pattern and help France

combat it.19! At this point in the documents looked at there is no mentionof independent conformation of any communist threat by the U.S. but always

mentioned at the end of conversations by the French when speaking to Ameri-

can Diplomats.

! This threat blows up in a memo dated 9 November. On the Night of 6 No-vember the French Government raids and bans the Nationalist group MLTD de-

claring it a terrorist organization. The French also took the opportunity to shut

down the Communist Organ Alger Republic.20

Near the end of the memothere is a report of note of how the Governor General of Algeria was appalled

at how sudden along with the scope of the attacks. He even goes on grasp-

ing at any explanation for the failure intelligence services to provide adequate

prior knowledge.21 But even with this lack of knowledge the Consul General

in making a request for leave states that he, would not consider leaving Al-

giers if there were likelihood major Nationalist uprisings. Am not of course in-

fallible but am confident that taking leave at this time would not be detrimental

US interests.22


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14

! On 22 December the French government under Mendes moved to pushfor an end to the uprising by making wholesale arrests of leaders of several

different Algerian organizations. The Consul General makes note that there

was no clear evidence of any new plots but many of the persons arrested were

charged with endangering the security of the State.23 There is note of a

Christmas plot that had been aborted by the MTLD, it is also noted that therewas, no serious indications that a plot had in fact been discovered by the

police.24 The conclusion that the Consul General comes to is one of the

idea that this plot was cooked up by the French government in order to clean

out members of the Nationalists movement from the colonial government.

Most persons arrested that night were in fact released not long after the raids.

Making their first appearance in the documents are people called colons, peo-

ple of French decent in Algeria. The Consul General remarks that the raid

might have been a change in policy that was called upon and meet with in-

tense satisfaction by the colons.25

! The memos and cables written in the latter parts of 1954 speak to an as-tonishing lack of insight on the part of the French government on how the inter-

nal politics of the colony were playing out. Causes and bogie men seam to ap-

pear almost out of nowhere to the utter surprise of Paris. This holds the same

for the Americans, from the consular asking for leave to the lack of knowledge

on the part of any person writing these paper it could be said that there was

very little attention paid to current events in Algeria. The events of the end of

the year are a general shock to them. Apart from one or two interviews most of

their information is coming from their counterparts in the French diplomat

corps. The U.S. State Department looks, from these documents, to have noth-

ing on the group in terms of Human Intelligence other than what is sitting be-

hind the gates of its embassy. As the year turns to 1955 it will be the Ameri-cans pining all the blame on the French and making sure they know it.

! For the first time making an appearance in the collection is a memo date-lined Washington. ! Secretary of State Dulles writes to the embassy inFrance in regards to a request by Pinay to use helicopters meant for the upris-

ing in Indochina (Vietnam) to be diverted to North Africa. Right from the top he

takes no time in chiding the French in pointing out that the request alone dem-

onstrates French failure aooreciate problem created for us by rapid deteriora-

tion situation North Africa and apparent inability French formulate and apply

specific and imaginative programs.26 The push to move the French to settle

the matter comes at the end of the memo asking the Ambassador to comclude

by assuring the French that we desire continue support France and that

there is no time for France to lose.27 Throughout the memo is the push for

the Ambassador to assure support of native populations of French North Af-

rica, and that they have increasingly grave political problems from both at

home and abroad that is fostered by US weapons and support in the North Afri-can region.28

! These problems are fleshed out not much later in a telegram dates 17June, 1955 which makes the following observations as representing Depart-

ment thinking.29 In the official published record this is the first time that there

are concrete concurs given by Washington to Paris, before only had there

been generalities about these concerns but here they are laid out for all to see.

Though reassured in the French coming out and saying that they would not

contemplate retaliatory measures against civil populations, that in their own

words would shock world opinion. They take note that the major case

against the French is one of the underling fact that it concerns the franchise

of indigenous populations. But for all these reassurances is something of

gave note, an FYI section at the end of paragraph in which this all appears,

FYI. Certain intelligence reports are to effect French probably contemplate

just such measures. Certain items on list requested are not reassuring. End

FYI.30 These two sentences take the entire paragraph and put it into a new

light, without it this is just a general warning not to do anything that might turn

public opinion against the French. But with it, it now reads like a moment of

the United States telling France that we know what your up to.

! Through out the documents starting in 1955 is the overwhelming sensethat the United States is having a hard time at home trying to sell support for

the French mission. For in the last instructions given to the Ambassador isthat he may wish to observe that statements made by the French make it

more difficult for US Govt to be forthcoming in giving support to French. 31

But for the French to keep up appearances of US support there is a note made

in a final FYI on the availability of helicopters that were being given to the

French, We hope assistance on helicopters will provide evidence to French

Govt and public opinion that US willing respond to French appeals for assis-

tance to extent possible.32

! There is an interesting gap in the document records at this point, fromthe Hoover telegram dated 17 June of 1955 there is a jump of a little over four


16/36

15

months to 4 October of that year. For the most part in the records at the start

of a jump like this there are editors notes or footnotes providing for the lost

time, major events or other ways to connect the timeline of events. Even in

this case it leaves out anything before 30 September and a UN vote to place

The question of Algeria on its agenda.33 But this jump lands at a very inter-

esting conversation between Pinay of France and Dillon from the UnitedStates. Written and sent right after this conversation, the telegram was time

stamped at 3pm and he was received This Morning, the mood described by

the Ambassador was one of heightened dignity and restraint stemming from

badly hurt feelings.34 Prefacing his remarks Pinay stated that he had always

been extremely frank in his remarks to the Ambassador but that the support

which he had received from the US had not been what he would have expected

or hoped for.35 The support he was looking for was on the UN vote, for it

passed 28 to 27 with 5 abstentions even with the General Committee reporting

that they were against inscription.36 Even with a speech by Ambassador to the

UN Lodge against the inscription Pinay still felt that he did not consider

Lodges speech had been as forceful as it could have been and that the Ameri-

can Delegation had not made any visible attempt to work on other delegations

on Frances behalf.37 The French are made to look in the conversation that

they were under the impression that the US could control the Latin American

bloc, but quick to point of that such was not actually the case, the Ambassa-

dor attempts to all at once make it look like they can control the votes and that

there had always been a great deal of independent action among the Latin

American nations.38 Even with the discussion of the vote itself at the fore-

front on the backburner is the general feeling of the French government that it

had been let out to dry after the vote. As for after the vote Pinay notes that he

wasnt contacted by any form by any member of the American government.

Pinay notes that with Britain along with practically all the smaller countries of

Europe, offering some form of expression of support towards them that he

had been neglected by the US in his moment of trouble. 39

! After the airing of grievances by the French there is a very interestingmoment in the room. Pinay takes his time to work on the thesis that the Alge-

ria vote is not really about France, but whether or not the UN was competent

to meddle in the internal affairs of any and all countries. He makes the case

that this entire vote and issue itself was put before the General Assembly by a

alliance of the Bandung and Soviet blocs, calling into question who might

be next, the situation of Negroes in the southern part of the US, the situation

in Northern Ireland, the division of Belgium between Wallons and Flemish,

ect.40 Not only at this point had the French Foreign Minister brought forward

the threat of communism running the UN but had hit on the major third rail of

American politics at the time, the Civil Rights movement of which was just

starting to form around that time. In one final parting shot by the Foreign Min-ister is the chiding of the Americans that they had not fully recognized the

threat that could be posed by the voting block of Bandung and the Soviet bloc

nations. For he called them the gravest threat to the stability of the world.41

! Come the very next day in Washington 5 October Ambassador Lodgesends what to this point is the most outwardly pointed telegram so far in-

cluded in the public record. We must first set record straight in Paris and in-

sist French immediately desist baseless charges.42 Having read the tele-

gram dated 4 October from Paris to Washington Lodge sets about picking

apart the French for what he sees as lies. He starts by making the case that by

spreading these lies which if picked up by press could create situation in

which we could not render assistance French badly need.43 This case had al-

ready been made before in various memos and telegrams on the issue, as Dil-

lon was told to tell the French in June of that year that the political situation

was already near breaking point and nothing was needed to inflame it. But it is

the next paragraph that stands out the most, We cannot let French dictate

terms on which we should assist them because this will only lead to further un-

justified recriminations if we are unable carry them out.44 From there he goes

point by point dismantling the French case from the day before.

! Lodge sends his Telegram at 11am from New York, by 7:02 pm a tele-gram is sent from State in Washington to the Embassy in France for the Ambas-

sador to deliver a message direct from the Secretary of State. From the Lodge

telegram in the morning that can only be described as a diplomatic bleep you

the 7:02 telegram maintains the very nature and points given by Lodge but

placed into language that is suitable for the world stage. Contained with in it

are such turns of phrase from Lodges, We must first set record straight in

Paris and insist French immediately desist baseless charges,45 to the more

diplomatic I believe that your Governments reaction was dignified and

understandable.46 And in response to the French worries about the Soviet

blocs power the quote, May I add that I believe that this type of action di-


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16

rected against France is intensified by Communist scheming, with him going

on to later state that they will look into it at a later date. 47

! Out for blood Lodge sends a letter to Ambassador Dillon in Paris on apersonal letter starting with Dear Doug:.48 Sent on 6 October to Paris he be-

lieves you should have in mind the following facts concerning United States

support of the French on the Algerian issue.49 The letter goes on to confronteach and every charge levied against the United States by the French in the 4

October meeting. From his point of view with the information he has it turns

into a case of the French in his eyes apparently unprepared for the unfavor-

able vote.50 His most biting criticism for the French comes in point ten of the

eleven point letter where he says this of the US effort to help the French, God

helps those who help themselves.51 On 1 November Lodge sends a telegram

from the UN to Washington that is most mundane in nature but contains some

very candid moments in the form of FYIs laced throughout. When the French

Ambassador to the UN Alphand outlines the plan for taking on the issue in the

future Lodge sums up his plan as such, FYI: I feel that sooner or later- and

preferably sooner, we must make it clear to Alphand as we must to everyone,

that while the US is powerful, it is not all-powerful and we cannot work mira-

cles. End FYI.52 For the French had come up with a plan that boiled down to

let the Americans push their weight around and it will get done. And here for

once was someone with the willingness to say no to the French. For the offi-

cial report is only 2-3 paragraphs long there is a lengthy FYI at the end with a

very sobering assessment of the US position in terms of France and the ques-

tion of Algeria.

FYI: This whole conversation inspires no confidence whatever. It is perfectlyclear that the French are maintaining an impossible attitude of wanting to get a

result achieved without lifting a finger to do it, which never works in any depart-

ment of life. It is perfectly clear that he has not done his homework, that the

texts of motions have not been drafted, that speakers have not been lined up,

and that none of the essential practical steps have been taken. Nor is there

sound basis for hope that they ever will be.

! In all this there is one thing which the US should avoid, by every meanswithin its power, and that is to become the so-called muscle man who is re-

quired to lead a strong fight in defense of French colonialism. I have now

agreed to speak to Iceland, Liberia, Ethiopia, Guatemala and Bolivia. I will also

make a brief statement in the Plenary. I feel that I have agreed to enough and

that I should not be required to agree to anything more. I very much fear that

Pinay will ask Secretary Dulles to direct me to organize a big fight in defense

of French colonialism. I cannot find words to express how strongly I feel that

this would be most harmful to the American position throughout the wholenon-white world.53

This quote finds itself in the position of summing up to this point everything

that has gone wrong with Algeria and the position the French had put them in.

For America at the time stood as the force for Freedom and Democracy in the

world vs. the evil oppression of the Soviet Union. Algeria had pined them into

the position of having to defend that which they had tried so had to foster, self-

determination of a people to chose their leaders. On the other hand they had

to defend France for if questions were raised there would the Soviet bloc use

this president to call upon the sins of America and place them in front of the

whole world. For Americas image in the world it was a catch-22 of epic propor-

tions. What Lodge saw as a total mismanagement of the vote by the French

and the passing of the buck to the Americans when put in context with other

documents make it seam that the French know the Americans cannot let this

measure pass. For them there is no work to be done, America in their eyes has

to do it or face untold consequences on the world stage.

Writing on 7 February in Washington Secretary of State Dulles passes along

words through the embassy in Paris to show support for planes by Mollet in

Algeria to help quell the violence through liberal reform. But for the members

of the Cairo and Tripoli offices Dulles makes note of the political instability inFrance and resistance to any plan that was peaceful noting that the plan might

bring about violent opposition by local French elements, and subsequent

opposition rightist groups French Parliament, and that the look of having the

US behind the plan would cause most of the citizens to buy into the plan. 54

Paris a month later, on 7 March a telegram is sent from the Embassy to State

marked eyes only with a very sobering perspective of the situation at hand. It

lays out several points of fact; that the in trying to not offend both colonial

power and colonies themselves it has been left in the position of gathering fa-

vor for neither, rumors are spreading that as soon as the French pull out Ameri-


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17

can businesses are set to move in, which is noted to be encouraged by the

Communists and Arab bloc, that the demand for scapegoats will grow over

time as France at best is going to have a very rough time over Algeria, a call

for a series of statements that can be used to defend the United States from

blame by any side in the conflict, and that the position of the United Kingdom

is moving to paint the Americans in an unfavorable light. 55Responding to this assessment the Department of State passes along their

concerns with the anti-American situation in France and Algeria. At the same

time there are concerns about how to go about not giving France a blank

check to maintain control in what might take form of long and sanguinary mili-

tary campaign involving operations against civilian Moslem population. 56

There is advisory to only support the French up to the point that it starts to

damage relations with the Arab world. But down telegram is the sentiment that

for all its problem the French be told that the United States does not wish to

see them evicted from North Africa.

It is this power vacuum that the Americans fear most, the idea of a newly inde-

pendent state with little time for a hand over to prep the population and govern-

ment for self rule. But this moment in time where at one end was the question

of military force being used against civilians or the threat that a communist or

Islamism government could form makes the choice for how to react and how

to move a difficult one for American policy makers. For the French Algeria is

France and giving it up is tantamount to giving up Paris itself. To keep it they

would do most anything, including throwing out the threat of communism for

the United States to keep them interested in Frances cause.

Washington, February 20, 1958. Subject: United States Initiative on North Af-

rica. Pursuant to your instructions conveyed orally to me by the Under Secre-

tary, I submit the following suggestions.57

Come 1958 a major statement on what should be done about Algeria is sent

from Under Secretary Holmes to the Secretary of State. . In it Holmes calls for

the United States to persuade France to make a fresh start in North Africa and

reach a negotiated settlement of the Algerian problem.58 Pointing out down

paragraph from that that more and more the United States is seen as under-

writing colonialism and that this perception supports the Egyptian-Soviet

axis against the West.59 This is in fact the first time in all of the documents

that any such axis is seen or heard from. Before they had been separate parts

of the same problem. The French always made note of how the Islamists and

nationalists had no to little contact with the communist forces in the colony. It

seams very much of note that this comes from NATO and Washington and not

Paris. It hints to either State reading into the developments in the region or of

France being blind to the connections.

! In Holmes memo there is a plan to push the French to the table, to solveall their problems in the region at the same time in the name of westernsecurity.60 The plan outlined called for a detachment to be sent to Paris to

start the talks on getting the French to modify their thesis. The thesis he

writes of is one of Algeria being a major piece of their metropole. But there is

warning sown into the hope laid out for the solution, there is a warning of the

Gillard Governments need for the support of the right wing of French politics

to hold up their rule. Due to this reading of the situation in Paris there is cau-

tion that there might be a backlash in the government and with public knowl-

edge of the push to settle strains would be put on the already thin relationship

between Paris and Washington. The suggestion is even given that NATO and

the North Atlantic Council should not be made aware of this effort. But in clos-

ing Holems notes, Faced with the increasing danger of disaster in North Af-

rica, however, I feel that these risks should be taken. 61 What ever was done at

the time it did not get through to Gaillard, for on 7 March he went before the

French National Assembly and proposed an Western Mediterranean Common-

wealth comprising France, Algeria, Tunisis, Moroco, Libya, and possibly Italy

and Spain.62

! But before that group could take form the French started to grow tired ofthe bloodshed and losses incurred in Algeria. By May 1958 the government

that had been in place as the 4th French Republic was toppled in a civil upris-

ing. Come November 1958 Charles De Gaulle would win election to his second

term as leading France, First as Prime Minister but now as President.

3 September, 1959, the newly installed Charles De Gaulle meets in Paris with

President Eisenhower to discuss the situation concerning Algeria. The Ameri-

cans started a presentation on the region trying to get the French to support

goals that were felt to be mutually beneficial. But at the end of it there was

only one thing on the mind of President De Gaulle, certain independent na-

tions were in direct contact with the Communist world.63 This forced the

Americans into the position of telling the French, we should send in that

amount of equipment that was necessary to keep Iron Curtain out.64


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18

In a report dated 4 November, 1959 by the National Security Council some

400,000 French troop had been deployed to stamp out the rebellion. The re-

port estimates that only 15-20,000 rebels exist getting support from Arab na-

tions and most notably Communist China.65 In an effort to maintain the

peace De Gaulle called for a referendum on how Algeria would be governed af-

ter peace. This effort is praised well over by the Americans seeing it as thebest way out.66 The report notes that the Soviet Union has come to champion

the oppressed Algerian colonial people, wile trying to gain a seat at the table

with the nationalist movements. But unlike China they did not move to recog-

nize the government for lest they upset their large following in France itself by

way of the Communist party.67 In their conclusion on the matter the call the Al-

gerian conflict a handicap to the Free World in terms of dealing with the Sovi-

ets elsewhere. In fact they see U.S. involvement in the nation as risking driv-

ing the Algerian rebels toward closer ties with Moscow and Peiping, should

they interpret out position as giving a blank check to the French. 68 Their main

objective put to paper, Prevention of the spread of Communist influence in

the North African area.69

The official record ends in 1960 as it is the last published volume of the For-

eign Policy of the United States, but even up to that point much can be gained

to see how France took what should have just been a colonial matter and

formed it into a story spanning the globe. For all the dysfunction the French

had shown, from missing the start of the uprising to begin with, to trying to

down play its importance to the Americans they always knew where and how

to turn for help. The United States at the time was riding high on the ending of

the Second World War with the message of self-determination and freedom for

all people. But here the French masterfully moved to force them into a posi-

tion that ran counter to their public persona. They forced the Americans to

open themselves to attacks and ridicule that might have forced the United

States to drop support for any other nation. For the United States there is a

moral conflict as to what to do, the threat of communism always around the

corner in the 1950s forced them to keep governments in place that might not

have conformed to the American model of what a post war world should look

like.

But they couldnt take chances, for at every turn they could have gone to the

French and told them that they were on their own. The cost of fronting a mili-

tary crackdown on a people only doing what they had called for at the end of

the war, trying to determine who rules them on their own. Then there is the

ally who thinks of the land not as a colony but as part of the motherland itself.

As can be seen in the documents above every time that there is a question

about Frances policy or declining support for the effort there is always a drop

at the end of how there might be communist forces at work trying to ally them-

selves with the nationalist movement. The Americans couldnt afford to alien-ate either side, the Arabs supporting the Algerians or the French who they had

fought along side in the War.

This small case study in the effect America has on the world would play itself

out all over the world time and time again through out the Cold War. Groups

realized that no matter what you were along as there were no communists

around you could get support from the Americans. Various juntas, dictators,

and other surly characters would find this as their meal ticket for decades to

come.

This push to stop communism and its school of thought in Domino theory

would find safe haven policy circles till the fall of the Soviet Union. The crisis

in Algeria started during the Red Scare in the United States and extended intothe start of the Vietnam War. This over powering though of the spread of com-

munism would lead to the sacrificing of American ideals and money. Did it

really stop the spread we may never know for sure, but it is clear from the

document evidence that the French knew when and where to use its specter to

gain what they wanted out from the Americans.

But what to make of the documents themselves? When putting together these

collections they present the documents that had the most effect in terms of the

issue at hand. But it is also telling in how most of the documents found are

cables, the transition from the early 1950s of cables between the North African

Counsel Generals growing to include the French Embassy to at the close of

the decade there are eyes only documents moving to the upper levels of the

government. Over time these cables start with very regular diplomatic docu-

ments to very personal at the end. These movements are telling of how a cri-

sis develops from inside the government. It is not until the later part of the dec-

ade that the secretary of state shows up as more than just a mentioned per-

son. The cables back to Washington show the most change, they get more

and more specific as the crisis moves on to the world state. The more directed

movement of information is very important and the French would have known

this.


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19

The best example of this comes straight from the UN vote in 1955. The French

would have known that they could get high level people to move their position

through the Ambassador and talks with him. The moment where trust is

played in the comment about being very frank then passing on information on

how they felt about a lack of support towards their goals from the United

States. Nowhere in the documents is this kind of personal attack made on any-one person. Their inclusion is both interesting from the standpoint of seeing

the French trying to discredit an American diplomat and how fiercely he went

about defending himself. The Level of gamesmanship shown in those few

days in October 1955 almost tells the whole story. The French know they have

the Americans cornered, but they need someone who will be loyal to their

cause and going about what could look like a set up to discredit an obstacle in

their way. The cable alone from New York to Washington just after seeing the

one sent from Paris with the French charges show just how well they knew

how to push the Americans buttons.

As a study in statecraft it has been shown that over the long haul even actors

in positions where they should have no leverage over a larger power can findand exploit it in vast and interesting ways. The French placed the Americans

in a no win situation of trying not to upset to many people. When the time pre-

sented itself they presented the one thing that could override the moral and

logical compass of American Foreign policy of the time in the threat of Commu-

nism. It is with this force that they moved the United States into a position of

trying to play all sides. For as much as America enjoys the idea that it could

shape its own foreign policy France played very much a active part in quietly

shaping the face of American foreign policy for decades to come.

Footnotes

1 Stern2 Costa

3 Tallbott

4 Wall

5 Lockett 382-383

6 Lockett 382

7 Lockett 386

8 Lockett 389

9 Lockett 389

10 Lockett 390

11 Lockett 391

12 Clark 392

13 Clark 391-392

14 Clark 393

15 Clark 393

16 Dillon 394

17 Dillon 395

18

Dillon 39519 Hughes 396

20 Clark 396

21 Clark 396

22 Clark 399

23 Dorros 403

24 Dorros 403

25 Dorros 404


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26 Dulles 219

27 Dulles 220

28 Dulles 220

29 Hoover 221

30 Hoover 22131 Hoover 221

32 Hoover 222

33 Footnote 2 on page 222

34 Dillon 222

35 Dillon 222

36 Footnote 2 on page 222

37 Dillon 222

38 Dillon 223

39 Dillon 223

40 Dillon 223

41 Dillon 224

42 Lodge 225

43 Lodge 225

44 Lodge 225

45 Lodge 225

46 Dulles 227

47

Dulles 22748 Lodge 227

49 Lodge 227

50 Lodge 228

51 Lodge 228

52 Lodge 230

53 Lodge 230-231

54 Dulles 233

55 Dillon 234

56 Hoover 236

57,58,59 Holmes 626

60 Holmes 627

61 Holmes 62862 Editorial Note 628

63 State 613

64 State 614

65 National Security Council 619

66 National Security Council 619-620

67 National Security Council 621-622




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3The Movement Toward a

United Europe 1945-1992

Soft over Hard


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!

22

! ! Since the turn of the 19th century many men and groups have triedto bring the European continent under one flag. But at the end of the 20th cen-

tury the economics of the changing world did what no man ever could. Start-

ing after World War 2 the changing economic climate of a growing world

forced the continent closer together. Over the past half-century many organiza-

tions have come and gone over the course of 60 years, but they all leaded to

the unification of the European continent.

! Before the modern era power in Europe was very decentralized. TheFirst attempt to bring the City-States in to modern nations started in 1806. Un-

der the Holy Roman Empire in Germany there were more than 300 States at

one time, some not being more than the size of a small town. During what the

Germans call Kleinstaaterei economics and trade were hampered with each

town having tariffs and weights for goods. The power of the German economy

could not be harnessed with all these impediments in the way. The number of

states was consolidated in 1806 when Napoleon Bonaparte had Francis II dis-

solve the Holy Roman Empire. Under the French run Confederation of the Rinethe number of over 300 was whittled down to a little over two dozen member

states. But upon the defeat of Napoleon in 1814 the Austrian and Prussians

during the Congress of Vienna restored many older lines of nobility, increasing

the number to around 40 states.1 A few years later the Zollverein, a customs

union, was created to make trade among the German city-states more open. In

doing this they standardized the weights and measures for goods, and with in

the borders encouraged free trade among the German people.2 At about the

start of the Customs Union the GDP for the region of Germany was $26.819 Bil-

lion, but by the time of German Unification in 1871 it had grown to $85.914

Billion.3

! Always on the prowl for more land and power Kings and Emperors sentout army to march across the land every now and then to gain more for their

King. The powers at the time took and tried to keep territories and people un-

der control through the projection of hard power. But slowly soft power was

bringing the Continent under one flag. As the century moved on more and

more smaller stated were being swallowed up into the ever-larger Empires of

the era. Surrounding the Germans in 1850 were all the major land powers of

the ear: The French Republic, Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Ottoman Empire,

and the Russian Empire. All of whom were trying becoming the biggest player

Soft over Hard

Swords into Euros


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23

on the stage and at the same time keeping the status quo. But the dream of a

unified Europe would still need more than a century and two world wars two

start to unify behind one common goal.

! After World War II at the University of Zurich in 1946 Winston Churchillgave a speech on The Tragedy of Europe. In it he called for the Creation of a

United States of Europe as a sort of third part to the United States of Americaand the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This speech, even with its re-

hashed arguments was given new impact with the events of the past few years

and where Europe found itself going into the future.4 These ideas for the first

time in history gained mainstream traction. After the speech the Congress of

Europe convened under Churchills chairmanship to look into the idea of bring-

ing all of Europe together. Meeting at The Hague between the 7 th and 10th of

May 1948 the Congress went about fleshing out the ideas of what was to be

done. To get to this point all the groups that were apart of the movement were

brought together in 1947 under the International Committee of the Movements

for European Unity. Consisting of the main groups they set about their work.

With 800 members from among different groups and 30 different governmentaldelegations they set about to try and prove three goals: To one demonstrate

the existence, in all free countries of Europe, of a body of public opinion in sup-

port of European unity, two, discus the challenges posed by European unity

and propose practical solutions to governments, and three give impetus to the

international publicity campaign. To get their goals covered they set about

their work in three committees: Political, Economic and Social, and a Cultural

Committee.

! With members from all the major unity groups under one roof there wasan obvious place of departure from their shared goals. The Unionists in the

congress advocated confederate from of government where the central govern-

ment would not have a large amount of control over the member states. Wile

the Federalists made their case for a strong central government over all the

states. In the end the congress sided with the Unionists, who also wanted

movement toward unification to be slow and steady, when they drafted their

recommendations for the body to consider, Among the major recommenda-

tions out of the congress were calls for the prompt establishment of a Euro-

pean deliberative assembly, the drafting of a Charter of Human Rights along

with a Court of Justice to enforce it, The Creation of an economic union, and a

Cultural Center.

! With the rousing success of the congress, thats to the almost 250 jour-nalists in attendance, the International Committer went about making the union

of Europe a reality. On the 25th of October 1948 in Brussels the committee

changed its name to the European Movement. This change came about after it

became plainly clear that the individual groups needed to be finally under one

central group and no longer spread out among the committee as it was. Thefirst of the goals to be meet was the creation covenanting of a European As-

sembly, and in 1949 the Council of Europe was founded. As the dream looked

more and more like reality the Movement held over the course of the next sev-

eral year conferences looking to address the problems that would lie ahead.5

! On the 9th of May in Paris the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, calling

for Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a

common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the

participation of the other countries of Europe. His reasoning for this he

states in later in the speech as being The solidarity in production thus estab-

lished will make it plain that any was between France and Germany becomesnot merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.6 In the rest of the speech

he makes the statement that it is only through economic unification that the

continent will truly know peace.

! From this declaration on France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxem-bourg, and the Netherlands began to work out a treaty to make this vision a re-

ality. When they were done with the talks a treaty was forged to form what at

first was a simple vision but became a complex 100-article monster. Signed on

15 April 1951 the treaty established the European Coal and Steel Community

(ECSC). Its goal, laid out in its second article as stating, To Contribute,

through the common market for coal and steel, to economic expansion, growth

of employment and a rising standard of living.7 The treaty joined the six na-

tions national resource into a bigger economic unit. The ECSC held the power

to regulate the production and pricing of products, making sure that there was

a constant supply and just the right amount for the market to keep prices regu-

lar for the makers. The treaty also allowed for the research and development

of all six nations to be combined and work towards one common goal not six.8

! Though not all was rosy on the march to a super national Europe. In1954 in response to calls form the United States to rearm Western Germany the

French Prime Minister Rene Pleven called for the forming of a European De-


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fense Community (EDC). The plan was to form a pan-European defense force

as an alternative to the rearmament of the West Germans and their joining of

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Signed by the same six countries

in the ECSC on 27 May 1952 it never went into effect, as members of the

French Parliament feared that having the EDC would threaten the national sov-

ereignty of the French among other fears.9

Once again hard power was not tobring Europe together.

! At the Messina Conference of June 1955 was called to reinvigorate thecause of unity after the failure of the EDC. Even with the experiment of the

ECSC still underway a set of meetings was held among ministers and experts.

From there in 1956 a committee was charged with creating a report on the idea

of creating a common European market. Under the Presidency of the Belgian

Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time P.H. Spaak the committee meet in Brus-

sels to study the subject. In April of that year the committee presented to the

six nations of the ECSC two draft resolutions for treaties to be considered.

The First of which is the Treaty establishing the European Economic Commu-

nity (EEC Treaty). They EEC Treaty had two major goals, the first of which wasto transform the conditions of trade and manufacture on the territory of the

Community. And its second was the more political of the two, taking a major

step forward toward the larger goal of a joined Europe. These are laid out in

the preamble to the treaty;

-Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples

of Europe, resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of their coun-

tries by common action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, affirm-

ing as the essential objective of their efforts the constant improvements of the

living and working conditions of their peoples,

-recognizing that the removal of existing obstacles calls for the concerted ac-

tion in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competi-

tion;

-anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmo-

nious development by reducing the differences existing between the carious

regions and the backwardness of the less-favored regions;

-desiring to contribute, by means of a common commercial policy, to the pro-

gressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;

-intending to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas coun-

tries and desiring to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance

with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

-resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace

and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal

to join in their efforts10

! The EEC Treaty establishes three main points toward the unification ofEuropean continent. In the second article of the treaty is created a common

market for goods from member nations, founded on the Four Freedoms, the

free movement of persons, services, goods and capital among member na-

tions. As laid out in Article 8 the market was phased in over a period of 12

years for ember nations to set laws to comply with the treat. The second major

establishment come is the form of a Customs Union among member nations.

The treaty abolishes any form of quotas, and customs duties between member

nations, but does establish a common external tariff for the members, replac-

ing the six different ones at the time. To make all this work are several articles

mandating common economic policies on the state level. These included agri-cultural, trade and transport policies. Also included in the treaty are the man-

dates for creating institutions to help manage the community.11

Also coming out of the 1956 exploratory committee was the draft of the Treaty

establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Just as the

EEC Treaty was to bring together the economies of the sex nations involved

the addition of Euratom was to take the study of atomic research that no one

nation could afford and share the work among the six. At the end of World War

2 much of the conventional energy infrastructure had been destroyed in the

course of war. The Community had also found in the post war years along

with its missing infrastructure was a general shortage of conventional en-

ergy. Looking for energy independence they looked to what was thought to, at

the time, be the future of energy. But with the costs involved in making this

independence a reality were more than one nation alone could afford. Euratom

laid out the ways in which the six nations of the community would participate

and gain from their shared interaction within Euratom.12

! Within Euratom where also enshrined protections for the people that thetreaty was to serve. Like the EEC and ECSC treaties before it Euratom looked

to make the people within the communities lives better. But in a different turn


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25

from the others the Euratom treaty describes not what the treaty sets out to do

but what they, the signatories, describe themselves and the world they live in.

recognizing that nuclear energy represents an essential resource for the de-

velopment and invigoration of industry and will permit the advancement of the

cause of peace,

- resolved to create the conditions necessary for the development of a power-ful nuclear industry, which will provide extensive energy resources, lead to the

modernization of technical processes and contribute, through its many other

applications, to the prosperity of their peoples,

- anxious to create the conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to

the life and health of the public,

- desiring to associate other countries with their work and to cooperate with

international organizations concerned with the peaceful development of

atomic energy13

! The agency set up with the treaty was also called Euratom and was setabout to do its work with several different tasks. Euratom was to promote re-

search and ensure the dissemination of technical information, establish uni-form safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general pub-

lic and ensure that they are applied, facilitate investment and ensure the estab-

lishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of nuclear

energy in the community, ensure that all user in the community receive a regu-

lar and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels, make sure certain that civil

nuclear materials are not diverted to other (particularly mili

Documents

Essays by a History Major