Ethics- Vaji (1)

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VAJIRAM & RAVI

ETHICS, INTEGRITY & APTITUDE

(JUNE 2013)

Ethics, lnte ritv and A titude

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VAJIRA,M & navr, ETHICS, INTEGRIW and APT|TUDE

lntroduction

Ethics' as a discipline, is a branch of the most' fundamental subject, narnely,Philosophy' The word ?hilosophy' comes from two Cr".ttw*;i",';;*'and .sophia,.'Phito' nteans 1tove. of and ;sopi-,iu,

means .*iroo*I]'S",'.,r"Iijl,o,,,(titeraity)'Philosophy' means 'love of wisdom,; ,ror" oit*il; a nut ,r,"ti, piirorophy is abor"rtquestioning, it is a rjtional enquiry, a ciitical examination. philosophy:takes

nothing fqrranted' As an academic subject' Philosophy"rn

u" oivided into four main branch*s"Me.taphvsics, Epistemology, Ethics and Logic. other'rr"";-,r"iilU;i'*'*olil-],Philosophy, Phirosophy of Rerigion, Aesthetii, enitosopny"ia","""" a".o on.

ETHICS AND HUMAN INTERFACE

Definition of Ethics:

To define a thing is never an easy task and in the case of Eth cs it is ali-the n-ioi{-)"difficult' From Plato onwards, philosophers have"n";;;;;H;" an accounr or r{but no phirosopher has as yet provioeo

; r"i'r"""" ";";;; il;;;;;;:;ffi#il,;' briefly defined as "the science of morality, or,a$ .thestudy of right conduct or duty.,.Thus' essentially it is an investigation intoihe nottn.'"f;ll,d il'il, right and wrong;it is the science which examines the facts or r"rriiii" and suggests the course in 1ryftlnFihuman activities should U. Jir*t"0.

'' "-" r" " i ""tEthics is also defined as ad "enquiry into the nature of the ultimate end of humanction : the highe::g"",+61 h;*;; o"ing:;nd ;; #;rc of atrainins itT, rhat is, Ethics ishe study which oeatslth the mprat u"ar or. ,ir;;il ft is concerned wirh judgments ofalue or what'ought to be. lt.is*concemed, not so much with the question:,what thr:ature of

conduct.o,.'q. Gith'ihe qulaiionl*;; ;;r'"ctions ought to be:in order rhiiihey may be conducive to ;r;;d"o g""d.tirhiJ,'tnererore, is a normative scienc,,*.

:f:;*"rlaresurarive science, ,-i it r"Jr,

-J"n*,ilffi:..o;ffi shourd regurate

Ethics and Morality:

'Ethics' and 'Moratity' are terms often used as sTnonyms: an ethical issue ju*t i:,ra moral issue' ln academic discourses,one

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'morality'. However, 'Ethics' and 'Morality'are same when we investigate into Qr,.t{:r:{i,' :;

.like: 'What , :ught to do?" or "How should t live?".

Moreover, the English word 'Ethics' is derived from the Greek worcJ t l t

meaning habit, custom. The English word 'Morality' is created from the 1s1ip1 1r1,1ri.d

maralis, which was credted by Cicero from mos (pl. mores) meaning custom, whichcorrespond to the Greek efhos (custom). This is why in many contexts, 'mora[' r;nd'ethical' or 'moral philosophy' and 'ethics' are used interchangeably. But the two rvr.rrtts

have also been used to rnark various distinctions. Furthermore, despite i I rr ,;

etymological origin, it would be -foolish to equate the customary with the ethii;s ormorality.

llJlona[ and-Non-moral actions: Moral actions are those in which moialquality (riglr{trr:r,s

CI " w "CIngness) is present, such actions are within the moral sphere and are thu.s crlrir t , '

of nrclnal judgment. Non-moral actions, on the other hand, are those that are deriort I , i

rnoral quality and cannot be characterised as right orwrong, and are thus exclucir:ci 'irrrnr

the scope of moraljudgment.

Only voluntary actions and habitual actions of rational persons are objr,t {r Imoral judgment, since voluntary actions are performed knowingly and intelligeriiiy i,1,

self-conscious free agents with choice of ends and means. But, we cannot .6sps6;16;1i,;,;

natural phenomdna such as hurricanes; floods, etc., as eithei moral or.imnrtrai- nanirnate things and events of nature are outside the purview of moral consicjrlu,lior,.

Similariy, actions of animals are neither moral nor immoral. Animals are devoid o{ r(r,,r ,rr

and cannot discrirninate between right and wrong.So, their actiofls are non-rnorir.l"

Again, actio.ns of children and insane persons, who are not capable of reflectiolt i,)i'tai

discrimination. are devoid oJ moral quality. Actions done under'coercion

ar.c irlr cregarded as non-moral,.,i'f they cannot be ibsisted.

,,,/.1,/ .:

Whether Morality is equivalent to Code of Conduct: There[ a widespread bctir.i i,1

there is no such thing as morality per se, that there is only this morality and thdt rnor, i , ;

morality is simply any code of conduct adopted by a group. We do not use it vuill r L

some qualification, such as "Nazi morality", "Christian morality'' or "the moralitv ofGreeks". Nazi morality is the code of conduct adopted by all true Nazis. Christranmorality is the codeof conduct adopted by all true Christians and so on and sr: ir,trit.But, even if such a belief is widespread, it is false. Perhaps, such a misconceptlr:in is

wldespread because morality has not been adequately distinguished from other rrr i ,sto eogrduct

Thus, morality shall not be regarded as equivalent to code of conduct. Tl.rc, l,.r:,.2i

code of conduct was not a moral code; on the contrar it was qrosslv

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there are thinkers who define moiality as thercode of conduct adopted by { social grollr-).others define moratity as the code of conduct inlt-*ortd be

"o"o,.o1, -, *Ji,,,;:,;

persons' Again, there are some who define morality as that code of conduct wfricfr er

person takes to be oveniding or most important.

Morality is a Public System: Morality is not primarily a system of conduct that a rationalperson decides to adopt for oneself; rather morality is a public system that applies to irllrational persons- But such a public system must have moral rules as its core. Alttrougllrthere is not complete agreement concerning what counts as a moral rule, almost no o,edenies that "Don't kill", "Don't steal" and "Don't lie" are moral rules.

lf the moral rules do not form the core of a public system applying to altrationalpersons such that

all impartial rational persons would advocate aOopting it, then moralitlras commonly conceived cannot be justified and ethical relativism, nihilism or scepticisrr"rwonld become inevitable.

Marks of the Moral: A number of thinkers have proposed few criteria of nroraljudgments, principles and ideals. These criteria or 'marks of the moral' are presentecl asmarks which are central to, and characteristic of,_ moral -beliefs. The prominent fourcriteria are as follows:

1' overridingness: A iudgment, principle or ideal is moral only if a person or iisociety accepts it as a supremely authoritative or overridinj guide to actign.This criterion says that morality must have priority over ururytting else in osr

. lives. Thus, self-interegt, pgliti-c_al efftliation; religious heritage and the like are.subservient to moraiity. .

:

/'

.None.lheleTslthis mark or criterion may not be a neressary condition of

., morality. lnis criterion asserts that a principle or goal is rnoral oniv if a

;Pers.on

or a society is totally committed to its pursuit. Yet, at.timu., poiiti*rrl,

legal, religious and other considerations may be given precedence orrermoral consideration when they are in conflict.

However, to answer this criticism one may claim that the ultimate justificatiorrfor giving preference to political, legal, religious and other action guides ovcrmoral principle. wilt necessarily be a moral justification. Therefore, moralprinciples do seem in the end supreme, because the..nnul jr.tin*ii"--i"tallowing a non-moial rule to ovenide a moral one. will ultimately be a moraljustification.

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Prescriptivity: Moral statemenis are distinguished from others by th&ir

prescriptive form, that is, they are action guiding imperatives that Cc not

describe states of affairs. All moral utterances guide behaviour by

prescribing a particular restraint or action. Howevei', this criterion does not

claim that morality. alone is composed of prescriptive statements" For

example, statements of law and etiquette can be prescriptive. lt only clairns

that prescription is a necessary condition of a moral judgment, principle or

ideai.

Problem with this criterion is that there can be moral judgments which may

not be prescriptive because their point would be to blame or censure. At*o,

some morat judgments are evaluative and they do not seem to mandate a

course of action.

rt such utterances are

implicitly or subtly prescriptive and they can be restated in an exp[icit

prescriptive form. l-'lowever, this claim.is doubtful; becai-ise meaning of tirp,.,e

utterances may have to be changed in order to make them prescrir:iive.

Nevqrtheless, many of the moral judgments, principles and ideals do

prescribe.

Criterion of universalizability: According to this criterion, nrai"al

considerations apply universally to all people situated in relevantly sinritar

circumstances. Kant and many others have maintained that what is right iui-one person must be right for all persons similarly situated. A moraljudgri;uiltis not like a judgment of taste or preference, which cari vary according to the'opinions of individuals. Ethicaljudgments transcend ind _y yg.l.jy9.gr*I 9,

il

Pdter Singer states that the justification of an ethical principle cannot be in

terms of any'par.ial or sectional group, ethics requires us. to go beyond "1"

and "you)/a the universal laW, ,the universalizable judgment, the standpoint

of the idpartial spectato ]i{dal observer, or whatever we choose to call it.

Critics point out that moral judgments are tailored to particuiar cultures andsystems of thought beyond which they are often not intended to appty. Sorne

would argue that many moral rules and practices are such that even the

individual or group making the choice.'would not wish to generalize for

others. Again, some ideals and aciions, such as charity, generosity and

heroic actions, are by their very nature not universalizable. Yet these acts

are part of the domain of the moral.

Nonethe{ess, universalizability'need'nol dntail that only one moral system is

correct anduniversalty applicable, regardless of cultural tradition and socialcontext. lt rnakes a purely formal point about the logic of moral judgnrent. A

J-

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moral judgment must, for any perspn who accepts the judgment, apply fn zuft

relevantlysimilarcircumstances. II

4- Some philosophers argue that it is necessary for a moral action-Eurio, iihave some direct. reference to the welfare

ofothers.

This conrtFtr.,'other+egardingness' excludes egoistic principles from the realm of rrttraiaction-guides. lt also excludes certain religious actionguides. Many virtues,such as honesty, courage, temperance, luitice, compalsion and obedience,have something to do with the welfare of others. lt seems aftractive tc hlilithat anyone who makes a moraljudgment must have the welfare of erthers iir

mind.

The criterion may be understood to refer to the welfare of only sc,, ipersons, not to everyone's welfare or even to the welfare of the majority. 1-he

criterion can be misused to give preferential treatment to dominant groups.Thus, the fourth criterion necessitates that we must porr"r.' ; ;;;developed conception of how morality makes reference to human weifare.

Thus, we may conclude that none of the above four conditions is o 1€ceii-\,1fcondition of moralityr, but each may be relevant in mapping the geography of morarlri\..Each may be a mark that identifies some aspect of what is moral,'though not rinessential mark. lt is highly likely that if all four of these marks are present in ;riiyjudgment, principle, or ideal, then we have a moral-judgment, principle, orideal" J'h1:r. ir

some judgment has overriding social importance,'prescribes a course of actir,r:.universalizable, and pertains to the general wetfare of a social g_roup, wB c;rr 1 ,r.

reasonably assured that the judgment is a moral one.

Further, an alternative way of looking at the question "What is rnorality', "

suggests..that..the..term.''morality' cannot be given any single, exhaustive definition uranalysis in terms of criteria,-conditions, or marks of the moral, beicause there are toomany senses of 'moral'Tfulasdair Maclntyre holds that we no longe, nru" . ,n,ri, "concept of morality, bedause it has been fragmented by different tradilions

The obiect of Morality: An important question about morality is, 'What is the phjr.,goal of morality?" One may also ask, 'Why do we need an institution of morality?" Wucan understand the function of certain institutions in terms of their goals, for exanrple.the function of medicine is to improve health and combat disease and the funct *n, ,r

socialresearch is to develop knowledge about social life.

Thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Aristotle suggest that the object of n:qu:r : . ,

the creation and maintenance of conditions that allow inl pursuit of a wllt-5{pg6{,*.-;, r :,happy life-

By contrast, Kant seems to hold that the purpose of mor.alig is moraliry .::r.i:that is, duty is to be o"J_"f,:o,r::^.1:,::l:,r^or*r, shoutd bL rooted in "sercx

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will", which is the condition of moral good. According to some, morality is an institutr*nle;f

fundailnenta soiial importance. G. J- War.nock, like David Hume, holds that rn.,:rn t;r'

fc"Jnetions to ameliorate the tendency foi things to "go badly" in human relatios:s :;i"..

Conrdiiions deterioratein

human affairs asa

result of our limited'resources,ii.'i,i[,:syrng:athy and limited information. For example, we have institutions that hos.ise

prisoners because they are persons who do not have enough of what they want in iife,

fail in their responsibilities to others, and make things "go badly" in social arrangements.

But things may go even worse when prisoners are placed in institutions in which guarri*

hlave "lfu'nited sympathy" for them. Child abuse, battered women, litigation, fu:*i.r,it

contnacts and dissolvinS lartn3rships are everyday examples.

Thus, Warnock argues thal the object of morality is to ccntribute to the

bet'terryrent of this predicament by countering the limited sympathies that persons he,;c

for one another which lead to unfortunate and even tragic situations. Our na'ir"rr;';

syi-npathies for others tend to expand and contract because of the closeness ot. *'*rr,,',r::t:

erf ourr personal associations. Moral judgments function to condemn human plans ar:r1

actrvities, such as ignoring fundamental human needs, invading privacy and inhii:6ti*i;

fneeciorn, that make things "go badly". Morality functions to limit selfish actions that ca*,,:

harm to others. lt is perhaps appropriate to speak of moral judgments as fulfilling a

preventive function, by condemning or demanding the avoidance of certain :ari-r,:-

producing human activities. lt is also claimed that morality actualty contributes tc ir"

actively promotes the betterment of the human condition.

*euenmrinants of ETHICS :

An important challenge of ethics'is to-ascertairi tho'determinants or standards

with reference to which wp can judge the rightness or wrongness of an action" That is,

what is it that enables up'io characterize an act as right or wrong? Now this question has

been answereC difi#ently by different schools or moratists. Some have conceived

custonr as the dptdiminant or standard, for some it is a law/s. Others have suggested

that actiont?t* rightin:the sense of being conducive to plbasure. Again, others ha,.,e

supposed that an act is good if it leads on to perfection and so on and so forth.

Custom: At the level of custom, an action is considered to be right if it has alw-ays been

done, and an action is considered to be wrong if it is not always done. Custorxrary

moraiity is not personal morality. lt does not involve the individual's conscious pursuit of

the good as the personal good. Custom consists in group ways of acting, so customary

rnonaliiy is basically group morality. Customary conduct is largely instinctive and partly

reflective; it is conscioug or unconscious imitation of oth'ers' behaviour. The members ofa group behave according to the custom which is approved by the group. The group as a '

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1,ec{riers and the ancestral Gods are the custodians of cust*nrs" il

::::::: f:'-?::l:jh'_:,* to mainrain ,o"iui o,.;; ;;0,.n'i""r;*;, ,..* ,,"approval, taboo, rituar anir physicar force are the means of enforcing lustoms.

Merits'of customary rnorality: customs furnish the germs of morality. They emboilyvague ccinceptlons of 'right', 'good' and 'virtue'. customary morality fosters sympathyand co-operation, encourages concerted action, and discourages selfishness a*disolation' lt 'promotespeace and harmony, strength and solidarity, fellowship *ndsecurity. "s-'

Defects of customary morality: The morat standards of custom areonty parily ratiorralManv customs are irrationat, slme are inlurio;. d;,;ffiil;il'lnto

"onflicrwi*:one another. Old customs are discarded because thgy U".o*..0r","" and useiess.new customs are formed because. they are supposed to have social utility. Ttru:,customary morarity cannot safisfy the Jemands of human n"trru ,* , ;;;'r,,.n_

'i,

inevitably leads to reflective and personal morality.

Moral progress demands transition from group morality to personal rnoralii,,r :,.demands transition from unreflective morality to reflective morality.'in" ,""*i" rlr'or,,.l

individual both are rooted in truman nature. The individual identifies himself with i;rrigroup' shares commonemotions and ac{s in habitual obedience ," .rr"*. ;;;, ,,;individual has self-assertive impulses and desires, and at times revolts against the gre,r.:i,and asserts one's independence. Thus, couision oetureen t;; ;i"* ;;-;;;; ;L,,*.ndividual's independence, and the

""rlirlr.o;;;; social order and the inclivir*rar ,.progress bring about profound changes in moratity and prepare the way for ,"n"*uu*personal morality.

./' /'

/'conscience: At the level of customary mo[ality the moral authority is outside thrindividual; it is the authority of group. But at the lever of personal morality ti.r* rmur-;r:authority is inside the individual; it is the authorig of conscience within him. lnitiafly, *rr,:inner voice of conscience may be an echo

"rprtrc opinion of the group. But graduati,Twith the growth of the power tf reflection the deliverance of conscience may contradic*tthe commands of rhe group. customary ,"norrtity i, ;r;;t;.;;#;" d;i ;;;u,r';eflective' ln personal morality, tne'iniiviorrr"sr"rt,

the authority of one,s conscierri+against that of the group, and regards one's moral life as on.'j personal matter" f-.li:;political and sociat oenaviou, *rv"; b";;;;:;;1; poriticar and sociar raws s,ii ,;ismoral behaviour is govemed uy the morar principtes o,"r*o'ilr'*, .".r","r.-.

t-

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Fgrther, according t6 some thinkers, conscience is

which it apprehends the rightness or wrongness of an i

moral faculty of the seli'ny

ion. For them, there is ,"u*

cjistinetlon behreen conscience and moral faculty. lntuitionists regard it as an innale

specialfaculty.

lntuitionism:- lntuitionism is the theory that conscience immediately and intuitively

perceives the rightness or wrongness of an action without reference to their. ends ancl

consequences. According to them, the moral quality is unique and sui generis; it is **lreducible to truth, beauty, pleasure or social utility. lt is original and underived, arJ

apprehended intuitively by conscience.

lntuitionism is a kind of ethical objectivism. lt regards moral quatities as objective

characters of actions. Conscience is the universal faculty in ali persons. lt is nrri i.':

conseience of this or that individual. Some lntuitionists regard conscience as the 'ff,'-,i',

seslse", while others regard it as the "aesthetic sense". Thus, lntuitionism takes *.",'o

forms: {a)The Moral Sense Theory and (b) The Aesthetic Sense Theory.

(a) The Moral Sense Theory: According to this theory, conscience is a faculty tfinternal perception, which immediately _recognizes the moral qualities-

rightness and wrongness- of actions; just as we perceive ,nu .*psil:lr:

qualities, colour, sound, etc., of external things immediately through li.i:

external senses. Tlrus, we perceive the moral" qualities of actiar's

immediately through the internal moral sense.

Criticisrn: Critics point out that the moral sense theory cannot adequately

account for the sense of...duty or feeling of moral obligation. The mere faet

tnat an Jction excitei in us a feeling of approval does not explain why we

rh",fl: be unde-moral obligation to perfor:m it.t

{b) The Aestfietic Sense Theory: According to this'theory, beauty is the

ultimatdstandard of morality. lt reduces rightness to beauty, and wrongness

to deformity. Thus, beauty and good are'one and the same.

Criticism: Critics point out that the morat sense cannot be reduced to ttie

aesthetic sense. The obligatoriness of the moral sense is not sufficientiy

brought out when it is reduced to the aesthetic sense.

Law as the determinant or standard: According tc some thinkers, the standard'which

enabies us to determine the moral goodness or badness of conduct is a lawor system r:f

lawS, imposed upon us extgrnally or from without, by the will and command of a superior

power, namely, Godisociety/government. According to this theory, rnoral judgment is

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:ll"o', ln".acl:f discerning whether any particular action is, or is nbt, in conformity with

tl'p prescribed law. There is nothing naturally and essentially right in actions; *nutu.r*rilright, or wrong, must be made so by the'witl and commano oJ some higher power. fii,action is called right, if it agrees with the law; wrong, if it does not agree wittr tir*

prescribed law. This theory assumes three forms:

(1) Divine Law as Standard (Theotogical Standard): According to somethinkers, (like Descartes, Locke, paley), actions are right o, *rlng ,irpi1,because God has commanded or forbidden them. Divine command is thetest of rectitude- The distinctions of right or wrong depend on the will of God"

Criticism:

1" The most obvious objection to this theory is that the motive for virtue oravoidance

of sin, woutd consist simpry in the hope of reward or fear ofpunishment and, thus, virtue would merge in prudence while morality inself-interest. Acts performed out of fear of punishment or expectation ofrew11d ntay"be prudent but not virtuous. such an act cannot have anypositive rnoral merit.

2- This theory denies Goci's perfection; it deprives God of all moralcharacter. For it assumes that the distinction of right and wrong is createrJby an act of arbitrary Divine wiil. ihus, God is anove morar raw, His natur*is morally blank. He is an object of fear rather than of veneration.

3- lnstead oj supposing that acts are right or wrong simply because Gci.fcommands or forbids them, we must suppose that He commands crforbids them bdcause they are right or wrong.

4. That Divine perfection or goodness, and not the arbitrary Divine wiil,ultimately

by the

res what is right, is supported by the admisslons madeof the'arbitrary Theorogicar standard. Thus, Descades

constantly speaks of Divine perfection and veracity. Locke, too, speaks of

livrne

goodness guiding us and directing our actionsto what is best"Th'6se admissions show that they, too, felt at times that God is essentialFy-

good, and that.morality rests on His essential nrtrr*,-und ; on Hisarbitrary will"

(2) Political Law as Standard: According to some, potitical law (the verdict ofthe state) is the determinant of right and wrong. Morarity *rr'rir'*obedience to the laws of the state. Thus, the moral standard is a code oflaws imposed upqn the people by the state. Hobbes has said that the c[vi{law alone is the supreme court of appeal in all cases of right and wrong.

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Iriticism:

1. This theory, again, abolishes the distinction between virtue and prudence,

orality and self-interest.

2. A system of political laws cannot constitute the ultimate moral standard,

since such laws,themselves are open to moi'al scrutiny-

3. Political laws cover only a fraction of our active life and, therefore, cannot

be the standard with reference to vrhich we may jucige every possible

case.

(3) Social Law as Standard: According.to some, the real standard of morality is

constituted'by the opinions, manners and customs of society. What is in

conformity with these is right, what is contrary to these is wrong. The societ5renforces its rules {rnanners and customs) through public sentiments of

appr:oval . and disapproval, honour and 'dishonour. A man' may be

excommunicated for not obeying the rules of society. Thus, society ancl

morality are based on an implicit contract or covenant which everyone is

, tacitly pledged to observe. Nothing is right or.Wrong in itself, but only by

social rule and covenant.

Criticism: -

As a matter of fact we are well aware that social opinion is variable, itchanges from age to age. The social maflners and customs accepted in one

period are often condemned as wrong'in another. ln that case, how can

...social norms be .regarded as unifonn and consistent moral standard?

Moreover, what is customary may not be moral. The conventions and

customs of g society are often questioned and are subjected to'moral

scrutiny. p6'speak'of customs and practices as good dr bad, as moral or

immoraHhus tacitly acknowledging the existence of a higher standard by

refere/ce to which even these are to be judged

Criticigm of Divine, Political or Social Law as the standard: Thus, laW cannot be

iegarded as th'e ultimate standard. According to some, a law without reference to art end

is arbitrary and insignificant; the question of the moral standard is not solv-ed so long as

we do not determine the true end of life, the highest good or the Summum Bonum. ln

other words, acts are to judged good or bad with reference to the supreme end of life.

Some have supposed that pleasure is the supreme end of life or Summum Bonum. This

,theory is called Hedonism..because it makes hedone or pleasure as the ultimate end or

bood

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Psychologi*ai

fact while tht;

Pleasure as standard (Hedonism): Hedonism regards pleasure or gratification of fhesensuous serf as the urtimate morar standard. ril, oi*o;; il';;ilr;;" ;nretaphysical assumption and a psychological assumption. Metaphysical assumptioi.rregards self as purely sensuous in nature; it is a series of sensations, feelings, appetitesand instincts' Though it has reason, 6ut it is not supreme in human nature; it is a mereslave of passions. As David Hume nu, ,rii i*'; reason is the hand-maiden ofassions' Psychological assumption holds that human bJ;; ."rrlru, seeks pleasureand avoids pain- Hedonists rike Bentham, J. s. Min ,no o,n"i, maintain il;#;;;;;;he ultimate end and we desire everything erse as a means to preasure

Hedonism assumes many forms, two important forms areHedonism and Ethicat Hedonis*, ih" former is a statement of an actuarlatter is a statement of an ideal or'end.

Psychological Hedonism: lt is the theory that pleasure is the natural end and motive ofhuman action, we alwavs seek pleasure and avoid o;i; il;;;;H,red not for theiiown sake but only for the sake of pleasure they generate. The cyrenaics, JerernyBentham and J' s' Mill are the prominent ,oro"utl, of this theory. Benthain says,Nattrre has placed mankind unoei the governance of two sovereign masters, pain andleasure' lt is for them alone to point oui *r,ai *""rg,..,,

to do, as well as what we shalido." Thus, according to Bentham, preasure pnd pain- are th"';;y ;orl,o,u motives biction, the only ends at which wecan aim.

I'r Hvoi

Similarly' J"s' Mill says, 'Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to itnd thinking of it as painfur are phenomena entirety inr"p"raf,r", i; d;H;';;.;';;desirable' and to think of it as pleasant, are one ano the same thing., Thus, Mill holdsthat we always desire preasure and preasure is ,h";;r, object of desire.'

""'/ '/Objections to psycHdfogical hedonism:

1' crities argue that to desire and enjoy something is not to desire pleasurewe paint or read a book not for the sake of pleasJre but for its own sake. lt isabsurd to hold that doing something for its own sake is 'doing it for the sakeof pleasure'. we may_ desire to netp a man in-oirtru* uy"rn act of serf_

2' Rashdall observes that psychological hedonism puts the cart before thehorse' The attainment of an'object of desire brings pleasure because ti:r:object was desired. Bufler points out that many kinds of preasure, ;;; ;.;exist if

.they wdre not preceded by certain j"riru. "r"o5]];;J.-inur"ur*some desires which are not desires for preasure. one courd not r*,r *,*

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pleasure of benevolence'unless one first had a desire for,t -re wrelfiirc o{

others. Thus, the desireis directed towards something other tharl tll(riif;ur0,

namely, the welfare of others.

3. According to Sidgwick, psychological hedonism is vitiated by a scriotrsdefect, which he terms as Paradox of Hedonism. He points out that the

impulse towards pleasure defeats its own aim. The more we seek pleasttre,

the less we get it. So, the best way to get pleasure is to forget it ftrr the {inre

being. We require a ceftain degree of disinterestedness in order to oblarirr

pleasure. For example, when we witness a drama, we should fix our rrriirci orr

the drama, and not on the pleasure that we derive. lf we conscio*sly riinr ii[

pleasure, we are sure to miss it.

EthEaaE F{edonism: lt holds that pleBsure is the proper object of desire; that wc cir.i trot

aEways seek pleasure but ought tb seek pleasure. Some hedonists like Bentharn irnci lr4iil

base ethical hedonism on psychological hedonism. However, Sidgwick doe: noi (io r,o,

he rejects psychological hedonism but advocates ethical hedonism" Fc. riher', Illric;al

hedonisrn may assume two forms- Egoistic and Altruistic.

Objections to ethical hedonism:.

1. Ethical hedonism identifies value with pleasure, but pe$aps ttiis ii vlr'onlt.

Health, wealth, knowledge, beauty, virtue etc., are values; when we achicvc

them, we feel pleasure, and if we fail to do so, we feel pain. Pleasurc r:rrr-r l,c

regarded as a sign of value but it is not the value itself. Thus, pleasurr: a;rrti

value are nofident'rcal.nt'

Even rt;l6asure is regarded as a value, it cannot be regardedas thc r:nly

value. Rashdall regards pleasure as one of the values; but he regaros il ils;

inferior to knowledge, beauty and virtue. He regards virtue as thc lrigllrc:;t

value in comparison with pleasureihappiness, knowledge and beauty.

2. Ethical hedonism identifies pleasure with happiness. But pleasure is scrrlit:nt

and'transient

while happiness is ratibnal and abiding. Pleasure me,)/ i;ri:,c:

frsm the gratification of a single desire. But happiness arises fronr the

systematization and regulation of many desires.

EgoistiC'Hedonism: According'to this, ths, pieasure of the individual is tlrc nrLrr;il

standard. lt rnay be of trvo types- gross and refined.

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VAJIRAM & RAVIGross Egoistic Hedonism: According to this doctrine, all pleasures are alike in krrriel,thev difrer only in intensitv or degree; there ir no qr.iiirii* ffi;;Jronn them r lreleasures of the body are preferabte to those of the sout, because the former are n,oreintense than the ratter- To sacrifice the present to the future i"l;;. ii"'or*,; ;ffiorever and witl never return-

The future is uncertrin *o';;ffirunty tne present rscertain' Therefore a careless'surrender to present momentary pleasures of the senses isthe true rule of life.

Aristippus (500 BcE), the founder of the cyrenaic school, was a sensualistsophist before joining socrates. He was an advocate of psychological hedonisrnand regarded the desire for pleasure as the sore motive of our actions- [{eshowed the influence of socrates in advocating inoderation in the enjoymesrt ofpleasure by overcoming the allurement, of ]unre and controlling the grossinstincts of our nature. He recognized the superiority of mental plu".rlru,

;ril;;friendship, paternal and filial love, art and riterature over fleeting sensuousfeelings. He gave preference to a p"r**uni'r,* ;=;ffi content overtransitory pleasures. Thus, he paved the way for Epicurus. some cyrenaicsregarded momentary bodiry preasures as the highest good; others ;;;;; permanent pleasure or happiness as the highest good.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was an advocate of materialism, egoisrn i.rrdhedonism' According to him, soul is governed by appetites, instincts, emctiorrsand passions' lt is subject to the law of necessity and devoid of freedorn of thewitl. Man naturaily seeks onry what preaseshim ano'av;;;; n,u", him pai*Desire for pleasure and aversion to pain are the principal motives. Man pursueshis own pleasuie; he is entirely selfish. rnu.,

"goistichedonism is implied in hrstheory' Benevolence; sympathy and **p"ssioi are not truly altruistic emotions,but self-love in disguise.

However, Hobbes ..was an advocate of modified egoistii hedonism. Heemphasiseo:1..*

ti*:l tne state to ;il';;=-d'*.'l,,or,rus musr hesubjected' Acqaiding to him, men weie at first in a state qfrnature, constan(lyquarrelting with one another for their advanrage ild;.;t'iiJ,sr"te curbeu

their naturar egoistic impurses, regurated them"no *?ou ,r",a, ,n* possrt:te.Thus' he regarded an individual's own pleasure and power curbed by the Law ofthe State as the morat standard.

Refined Egoistic Hedonism:

Epicurus (341-27a BCE) is an advocate of refined egoistic hedonisnr, h*recognizes the importance of reason in our morar iir". rpi.r;;#;;lfr,rm *r,*

cyrenaics. For Epicurus, momentary bodiry pr;;;;; are not the highesi ,"_r-

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But a happy life as a whole is_the greatest good; Pleasures differ in intrrrsil\r ariri

dui'ation, they should be rneasured in ter:ms of both. Sensibility gives L,r; ilr(' t r r, i

of life, but reason gives us the means to realize it. lt guides us howier clinrirrrir:

pain as much as possible and attain the maximum amount of pleasur'e{,; ilr (rn(:'i;

life.

By pleasure, the Epicureans mean the absence of pain. The important rna.>rirn r:f

Epicuiean life is to cultivate a temper of indifference to pleasure antl 1.riiin, r.r

tranquillity of the soul which cannot be disturbed by the assaults of the foriurrr:t;.

The end of the life is a state of indifference, of neutral feelings, of irrscrr,itriliirr,

than a positive state of feeling or enjoyment.

Epicurus gives pre-eminence to the inteltectual pleasures over the lrhvr^ir, I

pleasures because of their comparative freedom from pain and greater: dLrralriliii,,

tlrough he does not tistinctly recognize the qualitative superiority cil ilro forrri,r'

over the latter, as Mill has maintained. Epicurus regards prudence, tenrlrr:riil(;i.'

and fortitude as great virtues.

CnitEc6srn of Egoistic Hedonism:

1. .Egoistic hedonism is based on psychological hedonism, and, ttrr-rs, rritii;ic:.i

by its defects.

2. Hobbes holds that man is naturally egoistic, and that all the higher c{nt.riiorr:,

andspringsof actionsaremdesof self{ove. But,criticspointoutilriit ii ir,;

also a fact that people live for the sake of others.than for their.otrvrr i;rilir,

Self-sacrifice is no less primordial than self-preservation. EEoisru i,i i

altruism both.are rooted in human nature.

73. Moreovgr'iegoistic hedonism can never supply us with a unifornr stancjr:r..; r '

morali(. What is pleasurable to one may be painful to another. tiLr.r:.,

rnorality which is regarded as uniform would be abolished.

4. Egoistic hedonism requires us to calculate the comparative \rilrrr ', t ,

pleasures. But this is extremely difficult. Subjective feelings carrru"ri lrr,:

qualitatively measured.

5. Further, critics argue that gross or sensualistic egoism is, strictl],spcal<irr1t,

not a moral theory at all. The gratification of hunger, thirst and cther hor111',

appetites cannot constitute the highest good. Human beinq is al ri;li(;rr,

.., beilg and so happine.ss myst depend upon rational self+esirai,-''1 i[1;:11i ,,r,

gratification

of appetites. Even Aristippus advocated moderaiioriist

indulgence and intelligent control of vulgar instincts.

I

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6' The refined egoism of Epicurus is more reffective than the sensualistiuegoism of Aristippus, since it recognizes the function

"i;"rr;; i-n"morat rir.and it does not regard momentary preasure but happy rife-;;'g,*

nigr.,,u,igood' However, it reggrds pleasure as negative feeling or absence of pairr [f

. does not seem to encourage active life but rather rriinr.,iu" in., i** ***.npain' Moraiity consists in activity rather than in painless inactive life. lt laysmore stresb on the calmness of mind due to the reduction of desires andindifference to preasures and pains, than on tne actiw;; ffi" go*rrMoreover, egoistic happiness cannot be the highest good, it cannot satishthe altruistic instinct.

Altruistic hedonism/Gross or Quantitative utilitarianism of Bentham: According to

Altruistic Hedonism, "the greatest happiness of the gr"rt;ri ;;#, is the ultimair,,morat siandard. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and lo"nn i,rln ,ri (r;b;:r;ffi;ffi;such a view; however, they differ in that Bentham recognizes only quantitative distinctronof pleasure, whereas J- s- Mill admits their qualitative distinction as well. This theory isrcalled Utilitarianism, because it judges all actions accoroing t" tnJ,. ,1;],,, as means fr;rthe promotion of generar happiness or prevention of generar pain.

Bentham is an advocate of psychorogicar Hedonism, he says, ,,Natureh;l:;placed man-under the empire of pleasure and pain. wu o*u i; il ;ll our ideas, w*refer to them all our judgments'and all our judgments

and all the determination of ourlife' His object is to seek pleasure and shun pain. The principle of utility sub.feds:everything to these tvv.o motives." "Nature has placed mankind under tn" gou";#l';ltwo sovereign masters, pain and pleasure." "lt is for them uron" to po,n, *n* we oughtto do, as well as to determine what we shall do.,, Bentham argqgq i.h.at..b*rruru...vye...d.crdesire pleasure' therefore we ought to desire p[easure. He bases ethicat hedonism onpsychologicalhedonism.,n,

/Bentham believfin hedonistic calculug. He says, "weigh pleasuies and weig rpains, and as the balancestands, will sjqnd;f,"'qresion of right and wrong.,, An actior-lis rightif it gives pleasure or excess of -easur:e ovei pain. An action is wrong if it givespain or excess of pain over preasure. Benth"* o,"ii"r", il;;;urJ,

"",be varueoonly in terms of quantity, but quantity takes dir"r;;i;;rms. rt has seven dimensions: .tr

lntensity, 2. Duration, 3- certainty, 4. propinquity, 5. Fecundity; 6. purity and 7. Extgnt.Thus' of pleasures othenruise eeual, the more int"n* pleasure is preferable to a lessintense pleasure. of preasu;es otherwise equar, tn" ,.noru lrrrtl'r,Lrrr" i, preferabreto a less durable pleasure. A certain pteasure is preferabl;-i;;; I.*n"'. pteasure Aproximate pleasure is preferabte to a remote preasure. A fecund pr"r.rr"i. ;;;"#;; barren pleasure which does not give rise to other pr"asu.. ; il;;; ,; ;;;;il; ;,is free from pain; it is impure

when it is mixed with pain. A pure pleasure is preferable to

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an impure pleasure. Again, a pleasure of greater extent is preferable to one of, ie*s

extent.

Bentham's Utilitarianism may be called gross or sensualistic, because hq

';*esnot acimit qualitative differences among pleasures. For him, any pleasure is as go':i.i as

another provided they are equal in quantity. He says, "Quantity of pleasure being equal,

pushpin is as good as poetry." Further, Bentham's hedonism is altruistic, by introducing

'extent' as a dimension of pleasure his doctrine becomes altruistic. The great*st

happiness of the greatest number is the moral standard.

Though Bentham is an advocate of altruistic hedonism, he clearly recogrtizei i,,o

natural egoism of man. He says, "Dream not that men will move their little finger to serve

you, unless their own advantage in so doing be obvious to ihem. They will desir* to

serve you, when by so doing they can serve themselves." Thus, Bentham clearly aiin-;iisthat rnan is egoistic by nature, but still Bentham is an advocate of altruistic hedonism" i{;,;

says,'"Each is to count for one, and no one for than one." This is the democratic prinelpte

of justice, according to him.

Moral Sanctions: Bentham accounts for the transition from egoism to altruisrn by

means of four external sanctions-

Physical or Natural sanction,

Political sanction, ."

Social sanction, and

4. Religious sanction.

/These sanctprls operate tlrrough the princple of .pleasure and -pain. The

Fhysical sanctionzirS constituted by the physical pains, which result from $3 disr:egand

of natural laws, such as the laws of health. lt is a law of nature that wethoirld satisfy ttre

appetites moderately; if we violate this by over-indulgence, the violation is followec :iydiseases and pains.-The Political sanction consists of those pains which follow utr:on

thSl penalties inflicted by the authority of the- State. Thus, these pains prevent the

individualfrom violating political laws and the hope of reward from the State prompts one

to perform actions that are beneficial tothe State. The Social sanction consists of thcse

pains which follow upon the penalties inflicted by tle society upon the individual, for

example, excommunication. The idea of such pain dissuadesrthe individual frorn aciing

selfishly.-The'ileligiouS sanction inctudes the fear of punishment in heli and the iuope

of neward in heaven. Thus, the extemal sanctions are external fressures whie,rl conap,el

ttre inOiviOual to pass from egoism to altruism,

1.

2.

3.

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Criticism: Bentham's Grosd Utilitarianism is open to the following objections:

$

Bentham is an advocate of psychological hedonism, so his doctrine suffersfrom all the defects of psychological hedonism. our desire is primari:,

directed towards some object, the attainment of which is followed bypleasure- lf we desire pleasant 6bject, then it does not mean that we desirepleasure. lt is also subjected to the Paradox of Hedonism, the more we seekpleasure, the less we get it. Moreover, even if we naiurally seek pleasure, itdoes not follow that we ought to seek pleasure. Thus, psychologicaihedonism does not necessarily lead to ethical hedonism, trere ls nCI

necessary connection between the two.

The Hedonistic Calculus proposed by Bentham is impracticable. Accordilgto him, the surplus of pleasure over pain determines the rightness of an

action, and the surplus of pain over pleasure determines the wrongness oi.an action. He seems to regard pleasure and pain as concrete things whichcan be added and subtracted and, thus, can be measured quantitatively. Butfeelings of pleasure and pain are purely subjective states of the minrj anrjcannot be measured quantitatively like coins. Th'ey are highly variable 1character.

Bentham introduces altruism into his doctrine by taking into account tf,.r,:

extent of pleasures, i.e,.the number of persons affected by them. But h*:gives no reason

why the pleasures of greater extent are preferable to those,of smaller extent.

The external sanctions can never explain the transition from egoisni tualtruism. we choose lo obey the law_s of Nalure, state, society and God nottor their sake but for prudential consideiations. Ti,ese external sanctions cancreate 'a

mupt' or physical compulsion, but never an il*ir-o, *orutobligation. z/.,/

t,/

_ e$ham'saltruism is gross or sensualistic, because he does not recognize

-thequalitative difference of pleasures- For him all pleasures are alike ip

terms of quality. But, intellectual pleasures, artistic enjoyment and spipt, ,,:bliss are believed to be superior in quarity than the preaiures or eating ;;adrinking.

Refined or Qualitative Altruistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism of,J. S. Mill: Mill givbs ahedonistic criterion of right and wrong. An action is right if it resultrh" oi.r";;; il"-;action is wronQ if it gives pain. According to him, pleasure and freedom f;;;; rr" *t.,,

only things desirable as ends; anO alt desirable things ,r. Ourirrble either for thepleasure inherent in thennselves, or as means tc the

-pfomotionof pteasure and th+'

1.

2.

3.

4"

5.

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prevention of pain. fulill uses 'pleasure' and 'happiness' as synonymous, he does not

distinguish between the two.

Mill bases his hedonism on psychological hedonism; he maintains that to think of

an object as desirable,. and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing: Thus,we aiways desire what'is pleasant, and therefore, we desire pleasur,e..Mill is an

advocate of ethical hedonism and it is based on psychological hedonism. He says, "The

on$y proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it.

The only proof that a sound is auCible, is that people hear it, the sole evidence that

amythlng is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.'Thus, according to him, since

aB[ persons desire pleasure, so, pleasure is desirable.

Mill recognizes the qualitative distinctions among pleasures. Earlier, Epicurus

has emphasise.d on the distinction between the pleasur-es of the body and those of ttie

ry13rucl, and has given superiority to the latter on account of their greater durability an,I

ttreir eomparative freedom frorn painful consequence's. But he did not recognize the

qtLralitative superiority of the mental pleasures. Mill, for the first time, holds that the

elistinction of quality is independent of quantity, and that the qualitative distinction is as

;'eai as the quantitative. Hence, Mill's doctrine is called Refined Utilitarianism as

contrasted with Bentham's Gross Utilitarianism. Sometimes, Mill's doctrine is called

Qualitative Utilitarianism as distinguished from Bentham's Quantitative Utilitarianism.

T*g ' of Quality: ln order to test the quality of pleasures, Mill appeals to the verOict cf

eornp:etent iudges. According to him, of two pleasures, competent judges always prefer

intellectual pleasures to bodily and sensual pteasures. However, if there is d conflict of

cpinlon arnong the competent judgi-'s, we should abide by the verdict of'the majority of

ihem. He rnaintains that from this verdict of competenfjudges, there can be no appeal.

/''Wherl Mi{l isy'sked to give the ultimate reason of preference fo1 intellectual

pleasures by comBeient judges, he refers to "sens'erof dignity", which, according to him,

is natural to man. He points out that no man wsuld conse-nt to be changed into any of the

trower animals capable of sensual pleasures alone. Mill:says, "lt is better to be a humanbelng dissatisfed than a pig ,satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool

satisfied".

A.ftruEstic Hedonism: Mill offers the following argument for altruism. He says, "No

reason can be given why the general hgppiness is desirable except that each person

desires his own happiness. Each.person's happiness is a good to that person, and the

generat happiness, therefore, a go6d to the aggregate of all perSonSP.'A'S"happinesS'is-a"

good to A. B's happiness is a good to B. C's happiness is a good to C. Therefore,

general happiness is an aggregate of all persons' happiness and is a good to all.

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s Mill maintains that there are two kinds of sanction{ ror attruistic conduct, externaland internal' To the external sanctions: physical, political,f social and reJigiour,'nn,ri

"oolhe internal sanction of conscience; it is sympathy, fellow-feeling, social feeling ofmankind, a'feeling for the happiness of mankind, a Jesire to be in unity with our fellc,,vcreatures.

criticism: Mill'i Refined Utiritarianism is open to the fortowing objections

1' Mill's doctrine is hedonistic so it is 'open to all the objections againsthedonism. Moreover, Bentham and nlliit rait to recognize the distinctionbetween pleasure and happiness. Happiness is not the same thing aspleasure' Dewey rightly remarks that happiness is a feeling of tire wholeieif,as opposed to pleasure, which is a feeling of the

sore aspect of self.Happiness is permanent while pleasure is iemporary, an-d is related to a" particular activity. Happiness lies in the harmony of pleasures while pi""rrr.arises from the gratification of a.singre isorated desire.

2: Mill bases his Utilitarianism on Psychological Hedonism, so his doctrinesuffers from all the defects of Psychological Hedonism. Moreover, even if wedo desire pleasure, it does not prove that pleasure is desirable.Psyctrological Hedonism does not necessarily lead io Ethical Hedonism.

3' Mill commits the fallacy of figureof speech in ni, proof for the EthicalHedonism' He argues that an object is visible if people ,"trrtty

="" ;1, ;;,object is audible if people actually hear it. Likewise, an object is iesiraote, irpeople actually desire it- He confounds the word 'desirabll,with ,capable

of

:it,Vo"-:if9-i.,9g:if3b g1 means 'what ought to be desired, o, ;0"r"r"" *

be desired', it does not mean.'abte to be desired'as'visibte,mear,s,rbl; i;be seen" The /'esirable' is not the normal object ,io"rir", nri ,nu.proper orreasonabteyiigct

9fdesire. Thtis, what is ;;;il ;;",il,"en is visrbre.

what is odpable of being heard is audible. But, what is capable of beingdesir,ed is not desirabre. what ought to be desireo is oesiraoreivvtr qutv.

4' critics point out that Mill introduces an element of rationalism into hisdoctrine by recognizing the qualitative oistinclion"'oiir"u"rur"r. Thosepleasures are quaritativery superior which are approved by,";;;;;; ;;;an admission amounts to an abandonment of the hedonistb position. lf somepleasures are preferabre to others on account of tn"i, q*riiv ,h;;=;;;hedonistic theory is abandoned because somethirg ;rh"r d. ,""*;. ,r'ri

quality in pleasure, we do not desire pleasure.

'ri

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Miil appeals to the verdict of competent judges to explain the test of quality,

but in that case it becomes an arb-itrary affair. Mill may respond by saying

that the outer verdict of competent judges is an echo of the inner voice of

conscience; but in that case it would be tantamount to saying that m*ral

reason determines the moral quality of pleasures. .

Again, when pressed hard to give a real test of quality, Mill refers to the

sense of dignity. T. H. Green remarks that the sense of dignity is not a desire

for pleasure. The sense of dignity natural to man is the dignity of reason, not

of sensibility. Thus, here again, Mill introduces an element of rationalisrn into

his doctrine.

'Mill'sargument that each person's happiness is a good to him, therefore, the

general happiness is good to the aggregate of all persons, cemmits iwo

fallacies- (1). The fallacy of composition and (2). The fallacy of division.

{1)Mill argues that each person's happiness is good to him; therefore, the

general happiness is 'a good to the aggregate of all persons. ,t's

happiness is a good to A, B's happiness is a good to B, C's happiness :s a

good to C. Therefore, A's happiness, B's happiness and C's happiness

are a good to A+B+C. This argument involves the fallacy of

composition. Here we pass from the distributive to the collective use cl a

term.. The aggregate of pleasurep is not pleasure. The aggregat* i-:f

persons is nc person. Pleasures cannot he added to one another."il",e

minds of persons also cannot be rolled into one and made int* :*n

aggr:egate.

(2)The general happiness is a good to the',aggregate of all persons.

Therefore, th'e general happiness is a good to each persn. Thts,/

argumept'involves the fallacy of division. lt is not explicitly stated by Mill./

Here/e paqs from the collective to the distributive use of a term. :

/ ..:

Psychotogicdl hedonism is inconsistent with altruistic hedonism. Mill is an

advocate of psychotogical hedonism. According to him, we always deslr,*pleasure. lf so, we always desire our own pleasure. We cannot desire

anybody else's pleasure, becatise we do not feel,it as our owil pleasune.

Martineau says, lThere is no road from each for hirnself to each fo,r alf . ,'

Mill cannot offer a reasonable explanation of moral obligation or sense of

duty. The external sanctions cannot account for the sense of duty or

ougnfness; they can create a must but never an ought:They can account for

ptry.sical compylg.icn, but not for mo.ralobligatioh. Mill adds to these bxternal

sanctions, the iriternai'sanctiofl of conscience. But when he bppeals [o-the

internal sanction of conscience, he undennines his own hedonistic position

5.

ll

7.

B.

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f 'sympathy' or'feltow-feeling,, h,ulsubjective feeling cannot be the sourcelof morat'obligation. sometimes, f\,{itispeaks of the internal sanction as "the feeling of pain attendant on thn

violiition of duty", This feeling of pain or remorse is the consequence of ther' violation of duty. The violation of duty is the infringement of the moral law ofreason' Therefore, Mill covertly appeats to reascn as the moral authority and

9' Mill's recognition of qualities of pleasure makes hed6nistic calculusextremely impracticable- Pleasures and pains are viewed by Mill as a kind *f3mltlonat

currency, which can be added, subtracted and multiplied. But thists wrong.

significance of utilitarianism: Bentham and Mill extended invaluable services to legaland political reforms by stressing on the doctrine of great.rt h;;;;"., of the greateslnumber' Also, the slogan of 'each is to count for one and no one for more than one,played vital role in'social reforms and justice: Howeve.r, utiliiarians identified socialprogress.with material and bodily comforts; they identified happiness with rnateriahappiness' They put insufficient emphasis on the intellectuar, #tnutic and religiousvalues; they did not recognize the in[rinsic worth of character, love and friendship. "" Human good does comprise economic goods, that

is, wealth and material comfort; but riincludes knowledge and virtue as well.

31intloouce.s an

{gr"1t of rationarism inro his doctr:in", o*"-**1,,,,u,internal sanction is fne subjective feeling of ,sympathv,

or.fellow_feelinn, h,,:

.F-v-q-t.utip-nary Hedonism: The Hedonism of Bbntham and MillHedonism- The Hedonism of Herbert spun."r, r"rru stepnen ano

,/

Herbert spencer (1820-1903) propounded his doctrine in his Data of Ethics. spenr.erapplies the idea of evolution to morals. He traces tne germs"ir"rr',r, to the conduct *fanimals' According to him, life consists in the continuous adjustment of the vital fo:.ces tr,the environment. conduct is an adjustment of the orgrnism ,; il" ;;;;;;ili

conduct is good which promotes effective adjustment;f"th";rgr.,*,"'rhe environmeniand produces preasure. That conduct is bad which ninoJrs ;"i"oi**"r; ;;,roduces pain" Pleasure is an index of increase or rir"; il,

"to"r*"se of life" Thatconduct is absotufely good which yields pl;;r;;" unmixeo with pain. That conduct ir:relatively good which gives surplus of pleasure over pain,.

is called Empirical

Samuel Alexander ls

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VAJIRAM & RAVI8

The ultimate end of life is happiness. The proximate eno [f life is lengfii i;rxibreadth of lifu. Length is duration of life; breadth i-s volume or complexity of life" iri prri.rto ensure happiness we should keep it in the background and direcgy airn :.t ittcproximate end, that is, length and breadth of life. tr/oral consciousness is dq.le i* ilrcpolitical, the social, the religious and the moral control. Moral obligation is transitory" tt rs

due to incomplete adaptation of the individual to the society. When the adaptation vvilf tre

compiete, there will be no sense of duty or moral obligation, and virtues will becomrispontaneous. Spencer distinguishes between Relative Ethics and Absolute [Urirr.;Reiative ethics deals with relative morality in an imperfect society, Absolute Et[rics di,r;lr;

v,,ith absolute morality in a perfect society. Spencer believes in the advent of e t-tto1rir,,

where there will be no clash between egoism and altruism.

GritEeism:

By applying the idea of evolution to morality, Spencer seeks to evc;lve 1lri.:

ideal from the actual, the Oughf from the /s, butthis is impossible. Mo,il liic:

is governed by the ideal and therefcre cannot be explained by the acf r;rl.

Critics point out that the adjustment of the organism to the environi,r"icrr{

presupposes the idea of an end or ideal. Thus, the process of adjustlreptcan be explained by the ideal and not the ideal by the process of adj*stnren1..

ln rnoral life the physical and social environment ismoulded in

c*n{crnrii\rwith the moral ideal.

Darurrin's principle of biological eVolution, namely, natural selection or ilicsurvival qr- tne.l t g,it,.-c?.Q.lp-t be..applied to morality: ln morality, might is rror

right, but right is might. ln the kingdom of animals 'survival of the flttcst'means the victory of the strongest; but in morality it rneans the ascendarrcyof the 'mfially best', which includes the protection of the weakest. itimorality:" ruthless self-assertion is replaced by rational self-restraint, cur

throat competition by loving co-bperation. This is adrnitted by Sarnui I

Alexander, another advooate of evolutionary hedonism.

Moral evolution cannot be a part of biological evolution. Biological eriolutlc,rr

implies, physical necessity. The organism is moulded by heredity andenvironment. But moral evolution implies freedom of the will. Moral progresspartly depends upon the social environment, but mainly upon the rrrorrrl

insight and free actions of persons. Hence, moral evolution cannct beregarded as a,part of biologicalevolution.

1.

2.

{

4.

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:::]f-::"1^T::t:rlie stephen (1832-1e03) conceived the socieg as an orsanism *{

I::T"|:^:.Y:11 ::r:.interdependent'members. rhe individuats

"unno,j,r-_o*from society' The connection between the individual and the society ir"ioi',o[;ffi;

external and mechanical, but intetnal and organic. Bentham and Mill regarded th*sociefyas a mere aggregate of independent individuals, though they spoke of thegreatest happineSs of the greatest number, but they we.re inaiviiuaiirir. ,pun"er wasalso an individualist; he regarded the individual as the unit of ,h; ;;;;;ir. ;';;;;;

individuals were independ.ent units, and thus ,n" .rpr"*" ;ri"t

,,* ir", oirurly se[f*preservation, and only indirecfly race-preservation.-'.

According to Leslie stephen, the supreme end of life is not the greatesthappiness of the greatest number, as Bentham and Miil suppor", nor,rh; ;rr--;;;breadth of rife, as spencer hords, but. hearth o,

"rfi.i*ncyof the sqciar organism. Thataction is good which is conducive to social health. However,

health.rd;:;;;;r';;not really divergent, they tend to coincide. conscien; lr;; ;; .i'in. voice of rhepublic in the individuar. Sympathy is an innate sociar instinct.

stephen repudiates the Absolute Ethics of spencer. stephen does not recogniz*an ultimate end of a society, but health or equilibrium is the moral end.

Criticism:

critics argue that 'sociar organism' is onry a metaphor and it shourd not L;cpushed too far' lt is not the social organism, but the individual that lives an*feels pteasure and pain. The individuars are centres ;.;;;rrr.rr, ,n-society does not have its own centre of consciousness, it rives in tireindividuais as social or rationai self.

'-: ""

Likewise, 'hearth"of the sociar organism' is arso a metaphoricar expression.

1111i,:ith/sociai

irs*ir* 1;.r the conditions of society, which areconouclve'to the happiness of its individual merhbers. The'greaier is the co-opurrtion among them, tn" gr"uiu,.

ffi;

';;;;';,

;; ffi;'ffir*Thus;'society is not an organism but an aggregate of individuars. Themetaphor of rsocial organism'can be misleaOini."

v -

. ..,samuel Alexander's Evolutionary Hedonism: social equilibrium is the moral ideal,according to Atexander; it is the perfect adjustment of the conduct or tn" lnoil;;imembers of the society to one another and the elimination of conflict among lrem.conflicts among individuars and groups are inimicara,;;;or,i,"*r.

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2.

.i

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--:-:.ll@

J

RAVII

Arexandei- exprains the origin of mbra idears by a process of natural selecti'r'r. ltt

vAnRtM &

rriqin of mbral ide

ttre anlmj *orto, natural selection means survival of the fittest or the strongest' I'lrrt'irr

moratiry, it means the extermination of the weaker ideals by the more?:1::lj--:::'l;.,1)lll

;il; ;;ri" for." but by inoral persuasion. lnhuman.affairs, the war of natural st:lc:tdioti

tu^2-. i,t^-,lr r-z

is carried out'not ugainst weaker or incompatibte individuars, but against their ide-a-ls or

modes of life. tnuJ, in morat evolution, lower fdeats are supplanted by higher iclcals

through persuasion and education' I

f Natural Selection tr: ntotals isCritieisrn: Alexander's application of the principle o

arbitrary. He himserf admiis that in morarity it does not mean survr.var of the fittest.r tlrc

strongest or extermination of the weakest, but thatt 1ea1s

the triumph of higher. iciJlals

over rower idears through persuasion. But this can hardrybe cailed nq{ural sr;krcdi.tt'

This is a clear admittance of the failure of biotogical concepts to explain moral tr.iltl(:s'

$Edgwick,s Rational utilitarianism: Henry sidgwick (1830-1900) is an e:qrottt:ttt of

lntuitional or Rational utilitarianism. He maintains that pleasure is the only intrinsic valuc'

Knowledge, beauty, virtue, etc:, are means. to pleasure- They have evjtinsic ot"

instrumental value. sidgwick does not distinguish between pleasure and happincss'

Bentham and.Millare advocates of psychological'hedonism."Sidgwicl< tt:jt:i:ls

psychological hedonism; he argues that it involves paradbx of fre.Oo,1i1: H::says'."].":

irnpulse towards pleasure, if too predominant, defeats its own a.im"' He points ottt tltrd

even when we do desire pteasure, the best way to get it is often to forget it' Hov"c'c:t '

sidwick .advocates ethical hedonism. He does not argue, like Mill, that pleasutc is

desirable because it is desired by men. He argues that reason tells us that pleasurc: is

the highest good whiclris desirable in itself. lt is an intuition'of conscience oJ practic;al

reason. Thus, sidgwipfddvocates Rational utilitarianisrn as distinguished from l-tctttltr;trr

and Mill's empirical/utilitarianism.

Like Bentham, Si.dgwick recognizes only degrees or intensities of pt*astlt'c:atrci

unlike Mill, rejects the-qualities

o-1 pleasures. According to Sidwick, firucicnc;i:'

Benevolence and Justice are the three rational principles of the distribution of lrappinr:ss

in our individual and social life; Sidgwick borrowed these priniiples from Butler, rvho r"'as

an intuitionist.

Cniticism:

L Critics point out that Sidgwick wrongly identifiespleasure with happitless' I icr

'iS, also, mistaken in maintaining lDatpleasure alone has intrin*lir: rra;luc zritttr

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VAJIRAM & RAVI

everything else is subsidiary to it we ought not to 5im at happiness for itsown sake. we ought to pursue knowredgl, curture, o""rty, ,iii;;o,. moraiexcellence, which have intrinsic value and satisfy the spiritual cravings of theself.

2' sidgwick himself admits that he could not reconcile egoism with altruism. Hethinks that there is a contradiction between the relommenoafions ; i;;principles of prudence and benevotence. prudence oictates il;;;;;;it of ourown greatest happiness; white benevorence dictates til il;rii of thegreatest happiness of mankind, He calls it "the dualism of practical reason,,"

The dualism of practical reason can be reconciled by the psychological lawthat'by making others happy; we ourseru", o*ome happy. But this iscontrary to our experience. The dualism

can be reconciled by a metaphysicaltheory that God arranges events in such a way that those *ho purrre othershappiness are rewarded with happiness in this life or next life. But sidgwickneither believes in the psychological law nor in the controlling power of God.Thus, the duatism of practicar reason courd not be reconcired.

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VAJIRAM & RAVI

Moral Thinkers and Philosophers

SoCRATES (469-399 BCE)

Socrates was a great thinker. He influenced the entire development of western

philosophy. He wrote nothing. Our .knowledge of Socrates comes primarily frcrn

Dialogues written by Plato. Plato was deeply influenced by him. lt is impossible to se=e

cBearly where Socrates'thought ends and Plato's begins.

Socrates lived in Athens. Socrates' chief concern was to challenge trre

sceptlcisnn of Sophists; Since Sophists threatened the foundations of morality and the

State ny undermining knowledge. For Sophists, knowledge is unattainable and there is

no tnuth. Socrates borrowed his view of life from the inscription at Delphi "Know Tly.*:r-il '.

He ,boasted that his superiority tay in his awareness of his own ignorance. Unlrkc ti.re

$egrhrsis, he made no claim to the possbssion of any speclalknowledge.

Socrates'aim was not to construct a system of philosophy but to arouse the larie

cf trnrth and virtue in men. He did not offer a theory but practiced a method of acquir"ing

knowledge, lived it and taugjht it to others. His plrilosophical method was that of elenel-rlrs

(dialectical): questioning of beliefs in order to establish truths and reveai inconsistenc:u:,.

He exposed those who, without knowledge, claimed to have found the truth; in his eyt:s,

ignorance disguised as knowledge is mer.e arrogance and the epitome of falsehocej. [-i.,spent much of his time in discussion & debate with rich young men. He compareci li;rri t'l

a c"drid-wife. He said, like a mid-wife, he drew out the thoughts with which his youmg

pupils were pregnant.

According to Socrates, knowledge is concerned with the general and not with thre

particular. For him, concgptual knowledge is the only genulne knowledge. Socrates was

not interested in metgp6ysical speculution. Nis miin concern was ethics and practical

aspects of,life. Socffies said, "Knowledge is virtue", that is, moral knowledge and virtue

were one and the same thing. lf someone did wrong, then it was because he did not

ks'iovu what was right.

His ideas and personality won him a devoted following among the young, but he

was far from unive.rsally adrnired, He was accused of not worshipping the Gods of the

Slate (as he used to say that he foltow an inner divine voice), of introducing new divinity

(atlteism & impiety) and o[ cor.rupting the young. He was given death sentence and his

death was brought about by drinking hemlock.

During his trial, even when it became evident that [e would be sentcr"leed to

death, Socrates did not surrender to his accusers. Socrates told the judges that he could

have easily n T*.qdefence and would have secured'aoquittal, but the kind of taetics

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VAJIRAM&RAVI re ,",Jrequired would have been beneath him. As Socrates said, such an act, although it miglih1v3 savei his life, would have destroyed his soul, for it would hur" *Lunt surrenelrririirwisdom to ignorance' For Socrates the real difficulty is not so much to escape clcalr r.rr,rto escape from doing wrong. "To be afraid of death is just another form of thinking o*e iswise when one'is not"- Socrates' equanimous ,"""pi"n"e

of the ,"rolt increa"seo nisfame as a wise man; and he has come to be regarded as the perfect"*.rpi" "iln""trriuhilosophical life- Plato was present at Socrates' trial and later wrote a dramatizcj

version of his speech in Apotogy.

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