European Expression - Issue 52

EVROPAIKI EKFRASSI ñ Ù. 52 ñ 1st QUARTER 2004

C O N T E N T S 3

Editorial: After the 11th March: The time has come to move fasttowards a European Federal Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

SPECIAL ISSUE

Comparative presentation of Greece, France and Hungary- Prof. STERGIOS BABANASSIS, From a different past to a common future . . . . .4

THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN

-Prof. NIKIFOROS DIAMANTOUROS, The European Ombudsman in theEuropean Union of tomorrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

- DIALOGUES “IN ABSTRACTION”: What is next for Europe? . . . . . . . . . . . .13

- KATALIN ALFOLDI, Is it a knowledge-based Europe that we wantfor ourselves? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

YOUTH FORUM

-JEREMIE PELERIN, L’Union européenne: Un projet citoyen à l’échelle d’uncontinent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

-ARIS TRANTIDIS, Inviting Civil Society : Participatory democracy and thequestions of the Union’s democratic performance and legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

-MOURAT CHALAL, La Turquie, européenne ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

-STAVROS KOURTALIS-THEODOROS KOUKOULIS, Enlarged EU: Still aUnion of deep diversity? Prospects and challenges for the new member states . . . . .26

- GEORGES DE RIVAS, Pour une fête des cultures et de la jeunesse européennes . . .29

- PANOS LAMBRIDES, The Schuman Plan: Was it inspired more by a fear ofnationalism or a desiere for economic prosperity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

BOOK REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

-EKFRASSI : A BRIEF PRESENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

EVROPAIKI EKFRASSIQUARTERLY EDITION ON EUROPEAN ISSUES

FIRST PUBLISHED: 1989 ñ ISSN: 1105-8137 ñ EURO 5 ñ YEAR 13 ñ VOL. 52 JANUARY - FEBRUARY - MARCH 2004PROPRIETOR - EDITION:"European Society, Politics, Expression,

Institutions", non Profit Making Company54 Omirou St., Athens 106 72Tel.: +30 210 3643223-4 Fax: +30 2103646953E-mail: [email protected]://www.ekfrasi.gr

EDITOR - PUBLISHER BY LAW:

Nikos Yannis

EDITOR IN CHIEF:

Stathis Kampouridis

PROJECT MANAGERS:

∫onstantinos DiamantikosMarie BardinMiklos Barabas

PROJECT ADMINISTRATOR:

Athamadia Baboula

REGULAR CONTRIBUTORS:

Vassiliki Georgiadou ñ Stavros Kourtalis ñDimosthenis Mammonas ñ Kostas Lavdas ñGeorge Pagoulatos ñ Ch. Papassotiriou ñThodoros Psalidopoulos ñ NancyVasilopoulou ñ Dimitris Chryssochou

ADVISORY COMMITTEE:

Stergios Babanasis ñ ThanasisDiamandopoulos ñ Nikos Frangakis ñPanayotis Ioakimidis ñ Ilias Katsoulis ñPanos Kazakos ñ Antonis Makrydemetres ñYiorgos Papadimitriou ñ Argiris Passas ñKonstantinos Stefanou ªichalis Tsinisizelis ñPavlos Tzermias

ADVISOR - PUBLIC RELATIONS:

Alexandros Lakerdas–Ypsiladis

FRONT COVER DESIGN:

Maria Teresa Conesa Alcazar

FRONT COVER PHOTO:

European Parliamen - Architecte:Association des architects du CIC: VandenBossche sprl, C.R.V. s.a., CDG sprl,Studiegroep D. Bontinck.

TRANSLATIONS:

ñ A. Baboula ñ P. Balopoulou ñ V. Geka ñ St.Karathanou ñ V. Polyzoidi

TECHNICAL ADVISOR:

Politika Themata Inc.

CORRESPONDENTS:

Eszter Almassy (Budapest) ñ G.Chatzimarkakis (Bonn) ñ D. Christopoulos(Bristol) ñ Irina Pavlova (Skopja) ñ RonaldMeinardus (Manila) ñ Savas Papassavas(Nikosia) ñ Camil Parvu (Bucarest) ñ BeataPlonka (Washington) ñ D. Triantafyllou(Brussels) ñ Ch. Zoumboulis (Berlin),


Madrid’s terrorist attackmakes Europeansrealise that they areonce more powerlessand unable to act. The

European states become increasinglyweaker and continuously loose theirinternal and international legitimacy.There is a feeling that if the EU cannotagree on an internal issue like theadoption of the Constitution, it willhardly be able to put up an effectiveunited front against the threat ofterrorism. Whenever there was a needin previous occasions, Europeans-especially the Spanish, the British andthe Germans, had been able to containthe destabilising impact of terrorismdue to the fact that the integration ofEurope was progressing towardseconomic development and itsinfluence on international affairs wasincreasing. But this is no more the case.Today, the European Union of 25, soon27 or even 30 member states, hasentered a phase, where its institutions,its policies, its economic perspectivesand even its very democraticaccountability are very much inquestion. Thus, the need to understandthe roots of the problem is renderedmore urgent than ever.The European Union, with or without aEuropean Constitution, will not be ableto face the several internationalchallenges ahead and will be left in thetide of international affairs. One of theoptions left for Europe in order toavoid such a negative course for its

history and to arch over theparalysing void, is a group ofstates (possibly the foundingmembers of EU) to form thecore of a European federaldemocracy, which would later oninvite other states to join.

The French, the German and theBritish governments realised that thecurrent EU institutions can neitherguarantee an active European presencein the world nor some crediblegovernance for the Union. So, theyhave tried to lay down the foundationsfor the formation of a pioneer group ofstates that would adopt a commonstance in the most important fields ofEuropean policy. An alliance of theUnion’s ‘big three’ has emerged, whichis meant to be a stable one. However, itwill be proved incapable to takedecisions for two reasons: Firstly,because it is just another workingversion of the well knownintergovernmental method and,secondly, because its members’ views onall major political issues of Europe arenot compatible. What is more, no smallor medium size state that has been leftout from this alliance will accept itsexistence. So, sooner or later, it willfinally be absorbed by the very presentUnion from which it has originallyattempted to spring.

In addition, United Kingdom’sgovernment, elite groups and theoverwhelming majority of its public

After 11th March:The time has come to move fasttowards a European Federal Democracy

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opinion oppose firmly the evolution ofEU towards the supranationaldirection. It should not sound strange,therefore, if we said that the UK has noneed for European political unity, incontrast to Continental member statesthat demonstrate apart from a desirefor stronger integration, also a vastdecline, which is rendering them almostimpossible to govern.

In essence, what we are facing is onebig issue: The creation of a singleEuropean power. Should this be donethrough alliances and complexinstitutions that leave member states’sovereignty intact? Should it be donemore effectively through the formationof a nucleus of a European federaldemocracy, with its own army thatwould replace the member states’armed forces? With the samedemocratic rights for all its citizensregardless the size of their state oforigin?

It cannot be denied that governmentsof the member states have not maturedenough to be so willing to relinquishtheir sovereignty. It is also true,however, that there is a positiveattitude towards this perspective atleast among the six founding states –perhaps in a couple of other states too.This is so, because these states dependheavily on each other, share alongstanding European tradition andtheir public opinion is open to the ideaof political unification. In order for thisidea to become reality, it takes anopportunity as well as far reachingleaders to seize this opportunity.Perhaps in the aftermath of the Madridterrorist attack, this idea pops into ourminds once again.

Therefore, the forthcoming agreement

over the European Constitution,although undoubtedly a majorachievement for the current state ofaffairs, is just a step forward; it is notthe final destination of the Europeanpolitical unity venture. It is widely heldthat many European citizens considerEU and its institutions distant, aperception that increases thedemocratic deficit syndrome. However,it is also true that the emergingEuropean civil society is nowadaysmore willing than ever to promote suchan ambitious project and to make it ourreality.

It is now time to create and improvevarious fora for debate on Europeanaffairs among NGOs and civil societyorganizations, with the aim todisseminate information and providedialogue schemes on key issues such asIntegration, Citizenship, Constitutionand Enlargement. In this wayEuropean citizens will be able to form amore positive, more imaginative andsuggestive vision of the new –albeitpost Constitution- future of Europealong with a sense of “belonging andowning”. The need to provideinformation on the practical benefitsthe EU membership brings is still here.It is also useful to explain thedistribution of responsibilities betweenthe EU and member states, as well as,its impact on the EU decision-makingprocess. With the support of theEuropean Commission, this issue ofEvropaiki Ekfrassi (EuropeanExpression) and the next one (issue 53)has gladly undertaken the task toexplore the European concerns and theEuropean vision of Greek, French,Hungarian and Belgian active citizens:in other words, to promote Europeanunity through national diversity.

Nicos YANNIS

Differences in historical heritage

Greece has always had a dominating role in theshaping of the European identity. It is quite distinctivethat the word Europe derives from the Greek mythol-ogy. Ancient Greece is known to be the cradle of Eu-ropean civilization. Democracy, as well as several oth-er values, was born in Ancient Greece. The importantrole of Greece is also depicted in the preface of theEuropean Constitution, which begins with a passagetaken from Pericles’ Epitaph:

«ÃÚÒÌÂı· Á¿Ú ÔÏÈÙÂ›·… Î·› fiÓÔÌ· Ì¤Ó ‰È¿ Ùfi Ì‹ Â˜

ÔÏ›ÁÔ˘˜ ·ÏÏ’ Â˜ ÏÂ›ÔÓ·˜ ÔÈÎÂÈÓ ‰ËÌÔÎÚ·Ù›· Î¤ÎÏËÙ·È»

£Ô˘Î˘‰›‰Ë˜ µ, 371

We maintain a regime…and it (which) is called

democracy, due to the fact that the ruling of the state re-

sides not in the hands of those who are few but of those

who are numerous.

The very idea of the European Union was born inthe Greek-Roman Antiquity, which created institu-tions and values that spread all over Europe. Chris-tianity became the link that has unified the peoples ofEurope since the times of Byzantine Empire. Christ-ian religion dominated Greece under the form of Or-thodoxy, whereas in France and Hungary it took theforms of Catholicism and Protestantism. In the begin-ning of the 19th century, the first Governor of theNeo-Hellenic State, Ioannis Kapodistrias, presentedthe idea of the creation of European institutions.

France has decisively contributed to the develop-ment of the modern European identity by havingplayed a leading role during the Renaissance and En-lightenment periods, and mainly by having created the

French Revolution. The contribution of Renaissancewas extremely important for the formation of modernEuropean civilization, as it has glorified man. TheFrench supporters of the Enlightenment Period en-couraged knowledge, faith in the supremacy of man,human intelligence and the idea of development. TheFrench Revolution gave a new impetus to the valuesof modernization and European unification. Unifyingtendencies determined the present political structureby supporting the creation of new democratic institu-tions, parliamentary democracies, as well as, the pre-dominance of pluralistic and multi-party systems.

Hungary belongs to the newly founded Europeancountries. Throughout the centuries, it has managed toacquire a vital European identity. The adoption ofCatholicism along with the strong relations that it hasforged with western European countries contributedto this end. Hungary gained a valuable experiencewithin the frame of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy(1867-1918) and, later on, as part of the foundation ofCOMECON (1949-1989). As a central Europeancountry, it has a rich intellectual and artistic heritage,and worth-mentioned achievements in science, musicand sports. It is quite characteristic that 13 Hungarianshave been nominated with the Nobel Prize.

Past experience proves that Greece, France andHungary were more dynamically and efficiently devel-oped while belonging to a benevolent internationalenvironment. The example of Hungary during the eraof the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and that ofGreece after the II World War as an integral and fullyaccepted part of the European Union are quite char-acteristic.

From a different pastto a common future

By Stergios BABANASSISProfessor at Emeritus University, Greece∂vropaiki Ekfrassi advisory committee

6 P R E S E N T A T I O N O F G R E E C E , F R A N C E A N D H U N G A R Y


Participation in the European integration

France has had a leading role in the birth, expan-sion and realization of the idea of the European U-nion. In 1929 the French Foreign Affairs Minister,Aristide Briand, during his famous speech in theCommunity of Nations in Geneva, suggested that Eu-ropean governments should found a European Unionwithin the context of the Community of Nations.Well-known personalities of modern France such asRobert Schuman, Jean Monet andDe Gaulle decisively contributed tothe conception and realization of theEuropean Union.

France is one of the foundingmembers of the European EconomicCommunity (1957). It has had a lead-ing role in the creation of the Cus-toms Union, the Common InternalMarket and the Economic and Mon-etary Union. France is also a mem-ber of the euro zone and an enthusi-astic recipient of the common Euro-pean currency. Moreover, it is a pio-neer in the creation of the PoliticalUnion having as political model thatof the Federation.

Greece has had a 43 year-old firm co-operationwith the European Union: from 1961 to 1980 as an as-sociated member of the European Economic Commu-nity; from 1981 up until today as a full member of theEuropean Union; from 2002 and on as a member ofthe euro zone. Compared to the rest of the Europeanstates it was amongst the first to smoothly adapt to thenew euro-currency. On the political level, Greece sup-ports the creation of a federation-type European U-nion.

Hungary established diplomatic relations with theEuropean Economic Community on the 8th of August1988 and signed the treaty for economic and tradingco-operation on the 26th of September 1988. In 1989it had started applying the Phare Program and on the16th of December 1991 signed the Association Treaty.The negotiations for Hungary’s full accession into theEU were initiated in 1998 and ended up successfullyin February 2003. On the 20th of February 2003, theEuropean Commission has ascertained that Hungary

meets the requirements for its admission in the Euro-pean Union and on the 16th of April 2003 Hungarysigned its accession Treaty in Athens (with the partici-pation of 9 other countries). Upon the ratification ofthe Treaty, Hungary will become a full member of theEU from the 1st of May 2004. Its integration in the eu-ro zone is scheduled for 1.1.2008, after having met thenecessary conditions.

The participation of the three countries in the Euro-pean integration procedures has led to a tighter eco-

nomic co-operation amongst them, tothe creation of new trade possibilitiesand to the diversion of commercefrom third countries towards the EU.Here there are some numerical illus-trations:

During the last decade, tradingexchanges between France andHungary have been increased with afastest rate compared to those be-tween Hungary, the EU and othercountries worldwide all together. In2002, there was a slowing down inrates. The volume of Hungarian ex-ports towards France was 2.069 mil-lion Euros, 2,1% higher if comparedto 2003. Two thirds of its exports are

in machinery and mechanical equipment. The volumeof its imports from France was 1922 million Euros,that is 9,2% higher than last year. About 50% of thesewere also in machinery and equipment. The share ofFrance in the total amount of Hungarian exports to-wards the EU was 7,7% for 2003, while total exportsare estimated to have been 8,7%. Among the 15member states of the EU, France occupies the 4thplace in the Hungarian external commerce (followingGermany, Italy and Austria). The total EU share is75% for Hungarian exports and 56% for imports.Trade balance for Hungary presents a surplus.French companies have invested capitals of approxi-mately 2,5 billion Euros.2

The Hungarian exports to Greece have reachedthe amount of 140,2 million Euros in 2002, and 129,3millions in the first 11 months of 2003, whereas its im-ports amounted to 70,6 and 57,6 millions respectively.Hungary’s trading exchanges with Greece present asurplus. The share of Greece in Hungary’s total ex-ports is estimated to 0,5%, while the correspondingshare for its total imports to 0,3%. According to these

The partic-ipation ofFrance, Greeceand Hungary inthe EU, hascontributed totheimprovementof theirdevelopmentrates ❞

❝

P R E S E N T A T I O N O F G R E E C E , F R A N C E A N D H U N G A R Y 7


percentages, Greece occupies- among the 15 memberstates of the EU, the 14th place in the external trade ofHungary3. It is estimated that the capital invested byGreek companies in Hungary is about 130 million dol-lars.4

In 2003, Greek imports from France represented2.438 million Euros, 1,9% higher than in 2002, whileGreek exports towards France reached the amountof 430 million, that is 11,5% less compared to 2002.The foreign direct investment of France to Greecewas 202 million Euros in 2003, whereas that of Greeceto France 17 millions.5

The participation of France, Greece and Hungaryin the EU, has contributed to the improvement of theirdevelopment rates, as it is shown in the data of Table 1.

Comparison of basic economiccharacteristics

France is the largest country of Western Europewith a total surface of 543.965 km2 and 59,6 millionresidents. Greece follows with 131.957 km2 and 10,9million residents and Hungary with 93.030 km2 and10,5 million residents. The number of the economi-cally active population in France and Hungary is rela-tively high, whereas in Greece quite lower. Thelargest part of the inhabitants work in public and pri-vate services; industry and agriculture follow.6 Francebelongs to the most developed countries worldwideand occupies the 17th position among 175 countriesaccording to the UN indicator of human develop-ment, which amounts to the GDP per capita, the edu-cation level of population and the life expectancyrate. Greece occupies the 24th position and Hungarythe 38th.7

Tables 2,3 and 4 show the macroeconomic indica-tors of the three countries along with their evolution.Comparison shows that there are many differences, aswell as many, similarities.

All three countries have open economies, how-ever, to a different degree. Hungary leads the way

1999 2000 2001 2002

- GDP LEVEL AT CURRENT MARKET 1.34 1.40 1.46. 1.50PRICES (bn euro) 4,3 4,8 1,0 7,3- GDP GROWTH AT CONSTANT 2,9 3,1 2,0 1,2PRICES, % 21.4 21.9 22.0 22.1- PER CAPITA GDP AT CURREN 48 84 50 64PRICES, Euro/capita 0,4 0,9 1,7 2,0- INFLATION, % 10,8 9,2 9,0 9,0- UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, % 283,9 324,4 325,5 326,0- MERCHANDISE EXPORT (bn euro)- MERCHANDISE IMPORT (bn euro) 269,5 327,8 322,2 316,0- CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (bn euro) 33,7 22,7 29,4 30,9- FISCAL DEFICIT, PER CENT GDP, % -1,6 -1,4 -1,4 -3,0- FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 113,2 187,2 92,5,2 67,8FROM FRANCE (bn euro)

Source: Hungarian Embassy in Athens.

Table 2Macroeconomic indicators of France

Countries 1995 2000 2001 2002∂∂-15 100 100 100 100France 104 104 105 105Greece 65 66 67 71Hungary 45 49 51 53

Table 1The evolution of GDP per capita in the EU (PP, %)

Source: Estimation Eurostat. To Vima, 19.12.2003.

8 P R E S E N T A T I O N O F G R E E C E , F R A N C E A N D H U N G A R Y


with an average rate of 61,5% of exports and im-ports in goods and services, Greece follows with29% and France with 27%. 8 In 2001, the net stockof direct foreign investments was 4,7% GDP in Hun-gary and 1,4% in Greece. The inflows of direct for-eign investments as fixed capital reached 20,1% inHungary (2001), 18,4% in France (2002) and 0,2%in Greece (2002), while the outflows reached re-spectively 2,1%, 22,4% and 2,8%. The transnation-

ality index of the economy is very high in Hungary(almost 70%) and modest in France (27%) andGreece (23%).9

All three countries mainly export manufacturedproducts: In 2001, manufactured products represent-ed 85% of all Hungarian exports, 82% of the Frenchand 52% of the Greek, while the same percentage forhigh-tech products was 23% for France and Hungary,and only 8% for Greece.10

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006GDP GROWTH AT CONSTANT PRICES 4.0% 3.8% 4.0% 4.2% 4.0% 3.8%GDP LEVEL AT CURRENT MARKET PRICES (bn euro) 131.0 141.3 152.2 163.9 175.9 188.1GDP DEFLATOR CHANGE 3.5% 4.0% 3.5% 3.4% 3.2% 3.0%PRIVATE CONSUMPTION DEFLATOR CHANGE 3.3% 3.6% 3.5% 3.0% 2.8% 2.6%UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, % 10,4% 10,0% 9,3% .. .. ..LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 4.4% 3.7% 2.5% 2.5% 2.7% 2.7%UNIT LABOUR COSTS 1.1% 4.6% 3.5% 3.9% 2.3% 2.0%GENERAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE, % OF GDP -1.5% -1.2% -1.4% -1.2% -0.5% 0.0%GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT, % OF GDP 106.9% 104.7% 101.7% 98.5% 94.6% 90.5%

Table 3Macroeconomic indicators of Greece

Source: EUROSTAT, ∆Ô µ‹Ì·, 11.1.2004. -Hellenic Republic Ministry of Economy and Finance: The 2003update of the Hellenic Stability and Growth Programme 2003-2006, Athens, December 2003, p.5.

Table 4Macroeconomic indicators of Hungary

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20040 1 2 3

Nomimal GDP USD billion .. 46,6 51,9 65,0 82,0 93,4(f)

GDP per capita USD .. 4,704 5,241 6,567 8,372 9,532(f)

GDP growth (real) % 4,2 5,2 3,8 3,5 2,7 3,1(f)

Unemployment Rate % 7,0 6,4 5,7 5,9 5,7 5,8(f)

Inflation Rate, % 10,0 9,8 9,2 5,3 4,7 6,2(f)

Exports, % 12,4 21,0 8,8 3,8 4,5 7,9(f)

Imports, % 13,3 19,4 6,1 6,1 9,1 9,1(f)

Trade Balance, euro billion -2,8 -4,3 -3,6 -3,4 -4,3 -4,5(f)

Current Account Balance, euro billion -2,3 -3,2 -2,0 -2,8 -4,8 -5,1(f)

Current Account Balance, percent GDP -5,1 -6,2 -3,4 -4,8 -4,7 -6,2(f)

Foreign Direct Investment USD billion .. 0,8 0,6 0,9 1,1 1,5(f)

Fiscal deficit, per cent GDP .. -3,0 -4,7 -9,8 -5,6 -4,6(f)

f: forecast of National Bank of Greece and Ecostat.Source: - FIG ELÖnet, www.fn.hu, February 2, 2004- ECOSTAT- National Bank of Greece: Southestern Europe and Mediterranean Emerging Market Economics Bulletin, Volume 4, Issue 4 – March2003, p.48

P R E S E N T A T I O N O F G R E E C E , F R A N C E A N D H U N G A R Y 9


The expenditure for research and developmentfor the period 1996-2000 was 2,2% of the GDP inFrance, 0,8% in Hungary and 0,7% in Greece. In2001, 573 standard telephone connections corre-sponded to 1000 inhabitants in France, 529 in Greeceand 267 in Hungary. The GSM subscribers in Greecewere 751 per 1000 inhabitants, 605 in France and 460in Hungary. As far as Internet users are concerned,France has the lead with 263,8 users per 1000 inhabi-tants, Hungary follows with 148,4 and Greece with132,1 users. France is first in energy consumption with6.457 kwh per capita (in 2000). Greece and Hungaryfollow with 4.086 and 2.909 kwh per capita respective-ly. Greece occupies the first place in carbon dioxide e-missions with 8,2 metrical tones per capita followed byFrance with 6,1. Finally, Hungary emits 5,6 metricaltones per capita (1999).11

Common Future

Greece, France and Hungary adopt the commonvalues consolidated by the Draft European Constitu-tion: “The European Union leans upon the values ofhuman dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, justice,along with the respect of human rights. These valuesare common to all member states, in a society of plu-ralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and prohibition ofdiscriminations”. 12 All three nations have contributedwith their struggles in the shaping and strengtheningof these values.

France has a presidential form of regime and a leg-

islative body composed by two organs. Legislativepower is executed by the parliament, which is consti-tuted by the Senate and the National Assembly.Greece constitutes a democracy with one legislativebody, the Parliament of Greeks. In the HungarianDemocracy there is only one legislative body: The Na-tional Assembly.

All three countries state as common goals theones defined in the Draft of the European Constitu-tion. They seek “the advancement of peace, of Euro-pean values and of social prosperity.” They providetheir citizens with “a space of freedom, security andjustice without internal boundaries and with a com-mon market where competition is free and pure”.They all work “for a Europe of viable developmentbased on balanced economic growth, on an extremelycompetitive social market economy with the objectiveof full employment and social progress as a guide,within a high level of protection and improvement ofthe quality of environment, accompanied by the pro-motion of scientific and technological progress”. Theypromote “the economic, social and territory coher-ence and solidarity among member states”. They re-spect “the wealth of their cultural and linguistic diver-sity” and care for “the protection and development ofthe European cultural heritage”. 13 Finally, they pro-mote the above-mentioned values through their rela-tions with the rest of the world.

All three countries have common interests. In anenlarged common market of 450 million of citizensnew business opportunities are combined with possi-


A view of Budapest


bilities of mutual prosperous partnerships. All threecan have certain benefits to the extent that their e-conomies are supplementary to each other. Neverthe-less, several issues may arise with regard to competi-tive areas.

France, Greece and Hungary have supplementaryand competitive areas in their economies. The mostsignificant French products are cement, iron, steeland aluminium. Its main industrial goods are cars,trains, aircrafts, machinery, tyres, modern electrical e-quipment and different kinds of defence equipment.Crops such as wheat, sugar beets, corn, barley, pota-toes, olives, fruits and vegetables are very frequent inFrance. Finally, wine and cheese of excellent qualityare some of the most famous French products. Greeceextracts major stocks of lignite, bauxite and other met-als. Its industrial activity also expands to various otherareas such as textile, woven products, leather, clothesand shoes, several kinds of food, metallic products,furniture, electric equipment, machinery, means oftransport, printings and cement, as well as, to the new

areas of telecommunications and IT materials. Themost important of its agricultural products are cotton,wheat, olive oil, tobacco, wine, citrus fruits, vegetablesand corn. As far as the tertiary sector is concerned,mercantile marine, tourism, trade, banking servicesand telecommunications have a leading role. In Hun-gary the basic industrial products are iron, steel, alu-minium, cement, cars, railway rolling stock, engines,precision tools, medical equipment, medicaments, t-elecommunications and IT material, shoes, textilesand food products. Corn, wheat, sugar beets and fruitsare the main Hungarian crops. Moreover, Hungaryhas a well-developed stockbreeding and producesgreat quantities of row and cooked meat. Transport, t-elecommunications, trade and banking services occu-py a prominent position in the tertiary sector.14

The re-establishment of the European unity withthe forthcoming enlargement of the EU creates long-term prospects for peace and co-operation and, thus,it is to the common interest of France, Greece andHungary.

PARIS - FRANCE. The role of France is becoming increasingly important for the future direction of the Union


1. COMV 820/03. See ∂∫∂ª, page1.2. Hungarian Embassy in Athens.3. Statistic Service and Hungarian For-

eign Ministry.4. Hungarian Embassy in Athens.5. Bank of Greece 6. Grand Larousse, vol. 5. - Human De-

velopment Report 2003, UNDP, NewYork, Oxford, Oxford University Press,2003, p.250.

7. Human Development Report, p.237,322.

8. ibid p.300.9. UNCTAD, World Investment Report

2003, U.N. New York and Genova,2003, pp.257-276.

10. Human Development Report, p.286.11. ibid, pp.274, 30012. CONV 820/03. See ∂∫∂ª, 2003, page 3.13. CONV 820/03. ibid, page 414. For more details Grand Larousse, vol. 5.

Notes

The three countries contribute to the re-enforce-ment of Europe’s geostrategic position. Greece, be-ing situated at the meeting point of three continentsand being the only Balkan member state of the EU,contributes to the co-operation between West andEast, North and South. France contributes to thestrengthening of the EU relations with North Africaand other areas of the world. Hungary, being a Cen-tral European country, could become the unifying linkbetween the EU and Eastern Europe.

Greece, France and Hungary can co-operate con-

structively in finding the appropriate answers to im-

portant questions for the future of the Union that

arise from issues such as the enlargement, the Draft

Constitution, the structural funds, and the Common

Foreign and Defence Policy. As they share common

values, they can contribute to the creation of a Euro-

pean Political Union, which in turn will assure a better

future for all their peoples.

T H E E U R O P E A N O M B U D S M A N 13


On 1 May 2004, the Eu-ropean Union willwelcome 10 newMember States and 9

new official languages in its biggestenlargement ever. Three years lat-er, in 2007, Bulgaria and Romaniashould equally join the EU andmove the Union’s borders furthereastwards. Concretely, the enlarge-ment means that more than 70 mil-lion (and 100 million in 2007) citi-zens from the Eastern Europeancountries, the Baltic States, Maltaand Cyprus will, in addition to theirnational citizenship, acquire the “cit-

izenship of the Union” and be enti-tled to a whole series of new rightsestablished under the current Treaty(and the future Constitution).

One of those rights is the rightof every citizen to complain to theEuropean Ombudsman (Article 21of the EC Treaty). The enlarge-ment is therefore the perfect occa-sion to reflect on the role and utili-ty of the European Ombudsman inthe enlarged Union, as part of thebroader question “The EuropeanUnion, What for?” subject of thepresent edition of this publication.

The institution of the EuropeanOmbudsman was established bythe Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.His task is to conduct inquiries, on

the basis of complaints or on hisown initiative, into alleged in-stances of mal-administration bythe Community institutions andbodies. The institution has beenoperative for more than eight anda half years. The first EuropeanOmbudsman, Mr Jacob Söderman,was elected in July 1995 and tookoffice in September 1995. At thetime of publication of the presentissue, I will have occupied the postfor one year, further to my electionby the European Parliament on 15January 2003 and the assumptionof my duties on 1 April 2003.

Despite a relatively short exis-tence, the Ombudsman -throughhis work and inquiries, has left hisimprint on the way the Communityinstitutions and bodies deal with c-itizens and contributed to provid-ing the European Union with amore human face. For example,the Ombudsman drafted the mod-el Code of Good AdministrativeBehaviour that has been adoptedby several Community institutionsand bodies and which was finallyapproved in a resolution of the Eu-ropean Parliament in September2001. The Ombudsman has been

The European OmbudsmanEuropean Unionof tomorrow

By Professor P. Nikiforos DIAMANTOUROSEuropean Ombudsman

in the

«...The Ombudsman -through his work and inquiries, has left his imprint on the way theCommunity institutions and bodies deal with citizens and contributed to providing the Euro-pean Union with a more human face».

T H E E U R O P E A N


successful in helping citizens ob-tain public access to documentsand is still today, along with theCourt of First Instance of the EC,the institution to which citizensnormally turn when they have beenrefused access. He has introducedmore transparency and requestedmore rights for the complainants inthe administrative phase of the so-called infringement procedure(Article 226 EC Treaty), a proce-dure that the Commission followswhen presented with citizens’ com-plaints concerning alleged infringe-ments of Community law in theMember States. Thanks to his ef-forts, age discrimination in recruit-ment competitions has been abol-ished and the competitions them-selves are nowadays run in a moretransparent way. Companies haveobtained the final payment ofgrants for projects after complain-ing to the Ombudsman. These arejust some examples of areas inwhich the Ombudsman has, on thebasis of complaints or on his owninitiative and by using his powers,positively influenced the adminis-trative functioning of the Union’sinstitutions and bodies. Importantto note in this context is that theOmbudsman’s service to the citi-zens is free of charge contrary to the

s o m e t i m e shuge sums in-volved in try-ing to obtainjustice via co-urts, a realitywhich leavesthe economi-cally disadvan-taged more orless excluded.It should alsobe recalledthat the Om-

budsman’s decisions are not legallybinding and his authority is basedon the persuasiveness of his legalarguments.

I intend to further use the pow-ers that have been given to me bythe Treaty and the future Consti-tution to reach out to the citizensof the current and future MemberStates in order to assist them inshaping an ever more citizen-friendly European Union, where-by the institutions will be operat-ing in a transparent and efficientway, mindful of the rule of law andthe respect for fundamental rights.

Respect for the rule of law andfundamental rights are essential el-ements of every democratic soci-ety. On the level of the EuropeanUnion, the Ombudsman has con-tributed in various ways into ensur-ing that these principles are re-flected in two major recent texts,namely the Charter of Fundamen-tal Rights and the Draft Treaty es-tablishing a Constitution for Eu-rope. It is due to the efforts of theOmbudsman, who was an observerto the Convention charged withdrafting the Charter, that theCharter of Fundamental Rightsproclaimed in Nice in December2000 contains the “right to goodadministration” (Article 41). The

Ombudsman, along with others,has equally supported the idea thatthe Charter itself should be legallybinding upon member states whenapplying Union law. The Charterhas been incorporated as “Part II”of the Draft Treaty establishing aConstitution for Europe.

Both my predecessor and I pro-posed to the European Conventionthat the future Constitution con-tain a clear reference to both judi-cial and extra-judicial remedies.The Draft Constitutional Treaty al-most exclusively refers to the courtsand only on four occasions to theEuropean Ombudsman. I will con-tinue to argue that the Intergovern-mental Conference should adopt aprovision in the Constitution ex-plicitly recognising the right of citi-zens to have recourse to extra-judi-cial remedies (such as ombudsmenand similar bodies) when theirrights- including their Communitylaw rights, are violated.

In the enlarged Europe, theservice that ombudsmen deliver tocitizens can only be efficient if theywork closely together. It is thus myaim to further develop andstrengthen the liaison network thathas been established between myoffice and the offices of all nationalOmbudsmen- a network that cur-rently serves 30 countries. I am al-so currently visiting all the acces-sion states in order to make the in-stitution better known to all thosewho will benefit from “Europeancitizenship” as of May 2004. It ismy conviction that in a democraticsociety, it is not enough for citizensto know their rights. More impor-tant is the knowledge of the avail-able remedies in case these rightsare infringed. I will continue tostrike for the realisation of thesegoals.

ªr Diamantouros with the president of the European ParliamentPat Cox.

T H E F U T U R E O F E U R O P E 15


A. A large majority in the 25countries (77%) agree that

the EU must adopt a Constitu-tion. This support is higher than inthe previous survey conducted inSeptember-October 2003, whensupport stood at 67%. Very largesupport for a Constitution (morethan 80%) can be found in Bel-gium, Germany, Greece, Spain,France, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-bourg, Portugal, Cyprus, Hungary,Lithuania and Slovenia. OnlySwedish and UK public opinion s-core lower than 60%, with respec-tively 58 and 51% supporting a Eu-ropean Constitution. In 16 coun-tries, less than 15% of the popula-tion oppose a Constitution. Oppo-sition is somewhat higher in Aus-tria, Sweden, Denmark and UK,ranging from 23 to 30%. Survey re-sults also confirm large support foran EU Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Eurobarometer February 2004, Eu-

ropean Commission press release).

B. “…On both sides of the At-lantic, we share two aims:

to build a peaceful and orderedsociety for our citizens, and to laythe foundations for stability anddevelopment in other regions ofthe world. We are driven by thesame ideals and a shared aware-ness that a world, which is more

stable and more just, is a conditionfor our societies’ well-being and se-curity. In that endeavour, though,we must not forget the opennessand tolerance that have been thedistinctive mark of our societies. Itwould be a huge mistake if the onlyprospect we held out to our citi-zens were one of fear and uncer-tainty for the future. Our societieswould end up by drawing in onthemselves and losing their driveand vitality, like a plant deprived ofoxygen. What we want is to see lib-erty flourishing and peace and e-quality thriving. Both Europeansand Americans must put all theirefforts and all their energy intothat. And the Commission willcontinue to work for that with allthe enthusiasm and determinationit can muster.” (Romano Prondi,President of the European Commis-

sion, The European Union’s role af-

ter Enlargement, High-Level Con-

ference on the future of transatlantic

relations-ELDR group, Brussels 3

March 2004).

C. “Three theses for the newCommission president”

1. “The President of the incom-ing Commission needs to have astrong profile as a ‘technocratpolitician’.

2. The new Commission needs

to base its work on a multi-annualmission, agreed with the EuropeanCouncil, and that gives priority tothe development of EU strategiesin the fields of economic gover-nance and of justice and home af-fairs.

3. The internal organisation ofthe College of Commissionersneeds to be firmly based on theprinciple of collegiality, with theCommission President assigningportfolios on the basis of substan-tive tasks rather than administra-tive entities.”

“… The theses are motivatedby the notion that a well-function-ing Commission is a preconditionfor the successful continuation ofthe project of European integra-tion. While a strong Commissionmay not be able to propel the U-nion forward, a weak Commissioncan certainly halt it. Eventually, itis the Commission that has tomake the cooperation work. In re-cent times we have had reasons tobecome concerned about the Com-mission’s ability to do so. The ex-pansion of the College of Commis-sioners to 25 adds further causesfor concern. That is why the timeto make some clear choices isnow.” “With a new team of Com-missioners entering office in anew, enlarged European Union,

DIALOGUES «IN ABSTRACTION»:is nextfor Europe?What

Body of a turtle, feet of a lion andhead of a dragon. For thepresident of the Convention V.Giscard d’ Estaing this creaturebest symbolises the Union.

16 T H E F U T U R E O F E U R O P E


the incoming European Commis-sion can make a fresh start, savingthe best of what the Commissionhas become up till now but alsolooking afresh at what it is andwhere it stands within the overallEU architecture. Moreover, if theCommission is to seize this mo-ment, it is crucial that it acts rightfrom the start, as it will only be-come more difficult to put thingsright with the passage of time.”(Ben Crum in consultation with E-

tienne Davignon, Philippe De

Schoutheete and Stefano Micossi,

Center for European Policy Studies,

PF 47, Feb. 2004).

D. “The Convention’s pro-posals on the role of na-

tional parliaments in the EU’s le-gal system represent an unhappyand unsatisfactory compromise.They seem to reflect an underlying,but questionable belief that the U-nion’s political and legal structurewill be improved by an increasedformal role for national parliamen-tarians in European lawmaking.Even so, the formal role allocatedto national parliaments by theConvention is extremely limited inscope and purely consultative in ef-fect. If the Convention genuinelybelieved that it was important toinvolve national legislators morefully in European legislation, theycould surely have found a morecredible way of doing so. A partic-ularly strange aspect of the Con-vention’s recommendations in thisarea is the proposed continuationof the present arrangement where-by national parliaments cannotbring a case before the EuropeanCourt of Justice except with thehelp (which may be refused) of anational government. It seemshighly illogical to claim that na-

tional parliaments have a particu-larly valuable contribution to makeon questions of subsidiarity andproportionality, and then denythem the right to seek to have theirviews tested on these legal issuesbefore the European Court of Jus-tice. A more coherent systemwould have been to give a certainnumber of national parliaments,such as two thirds of the total, aright to go in their own name to theEuropean Court of Justice to havelegislation struck down where theybelieved that the principles of sub-sidiarity or proportionality hadbeen infringed. (Brendan Donnelly and Lars Hoff-mann, The Role of National Parlia-

ments in the European Union, Eu-

ropean Policy Briefs no. 3, Federal

Trust)

E. “…At the inaugural sessionof the IGC in Rome on 4

October 2003 the Heads of Stateand Government reaffirmed “thatthe process of European integra-tion is our continent’s essentialcalling as the instrument for amore efficacious international rolefor the Union in supporting peace,democracy, prosperity and solidar-ity in all Member States” and wenton to highlight the fact “that theimminent enlargement constitutesan historical moment which ren-ders the Union richer in terms of i-dentity and culture and extends thepossibility of promoting shared val-ues and of conferring weight andauthority to Europe’s role in theworld.” These are high soundingand visionary statements. Theymust be given concrete reality in adifficult world setting in whichMember States, their governmentsand peoples, are subject to seriouschallenges and pressures. Above

all, if problems of the kind thatare summed up in the‘big/small’confrontations, which have beenso evident, are to be confrontedthere is a clear and pressing needfor the restoration of trust be-tween all Member States and be-tween the EU institutions. For ex-ample, it has been argued that thenecessary development of closerco-operation in civil and criminallaw matters, dependent on ele-ments such as mutual recognitionof court judgments have been de-layed and even called into questionbecause of a serious lack of trust.We should never forget that JeanMonnet wrote many years ago that“without trust I have never ob-tained anything – indeed, I have n-ever tried.” (Tony Brown, Achiev-

ing Balance: Institutions and mem-

ber states, Jan. 2004, Federal Trust)

F. “… Europe lacks, as I wouldsay in French, both lisibilité

and visibilité in political terms.Why is a fascinating issue, and a-gain I don’t have time to considerthis fully. But a key factor is the ab-sence of political debate on whatEurope should be and should do.It’s some time now since policymakers both talked policy and poli-tics. The first problem is that nei-ther of the two main groupings ofthe European Parliament the PPEand PSE are much more than dis-tant relatives of national parties,which has not helped. Here, theremay be change in the air. Secondproblem, politics does not yet trav-el easily across national frontiers.It is still quite difficult to find con-sensus between a Swedish socialdemocrat and an Italian socialist.Or between a British Tory and aBelgian Christian Democrat. And,thirdly, and ironically, as the Econ-

T H E F U T U R E O F E U R O P E


omist has pointed out, Europeanpolitics has been the victim of Eu-ropean consensus itself: a consen-sus between European social de-mocrats and European Christiandemocrats, particularly amongstpolitical elites. Ironic, because itmight be a result of the fact that somany “sort of” agreed for so long /on so much. So Europe’s citizensnever got the chance to discuss thebenefits up close, or decide whatthey really wanted from Europe, a-part from a few sporadic referen-dums here and there. Too easy, alltoo easy, as a result, to decide thatthe problem is simply in Brussels.“…Europe needs a double dose ofpolitical legitimacy, a double doseof political entertainment, to reallyengage its citizens because we aremore distant from them than na-tional governments are”.“…Iwould suggest that as a start, thenew European Council, indeedperhaps the first European Coun-cil properly meeting with 25 mem-bers undertake a novel exercise.They should devote an entire day,or an entire Council meeting, as agood executive board should do,from time to time, to debating howto communicate a clearer, morepolitical, more vibrant vision ofEurope to its citizens. And thiscould be useful to commit the w-hole corporation, and notably thebosses, to deliver this message.And what is the message? ThatEurope adds real value above andbeyond what Member States cando on their own. European “iden-tity” and “values” are essential,but they don’t put food on thetable. So as the Centre for Euro-pean Reform has suggested, per-haps we should look for a fairly u-tilitarian mission statement forthe EU: that the EU exists to en-

sure greater stability, secu-rity and prosperity than anyone Member State canachieve alone. And thismessage I would like to putclearly and simply to ourclients, our voters, ourshareholders.” (PascalLamy, Trade Commissioner,

EU 25 Make it work, speech

to CEPS-19 Feb. 2004)

G. ”…Despite its im-perfections, the sin-

gle market is well advanced;EMU is a reality, and ESDPis slowly emerging alongsideCFSP. More problematical-ly, the Union has nowreached a stage in its devel-opment that makes any fur-ther grand integration project ex-tremely difficult to engineer politi-cally. Progress from the originalTreaty of Paris through theTreaties of Rome and on to themore recent treaty revisions of the1980s and 1990s has been enabledby the fundamental ambiguity ofwhat the ultimate goal might be.For years, both ardent federalistsand those more sceptical about`ever closer union’ could comfortthemselves with the notion thatthere was still everything to playfor. With the incredible success ofthe integration project, harderquestions can no longer be avoid-ed. However, it is for precisely thisreason that the lack of a strongsense of common project doesmatter. Given the undercurrent ofthreats from some member statesto press forward with integrationmore quickly, the risk of confusionand intra-European political ten-sion grows considerably. It is farfrom clear what a two-speed Eu-rope’ means in practice (or even

if it is politically viable), while the`multi-speed’ approach is fraughtwith practical challenges, notleast as to how overlapping coali-tions of states could find a way toput in place coherent and effec-tive administrative and enforce-ment mechanisms.”“…Of equalimportance is the danger of furtherundermining the confidence andsupport of the citizens of EU mem-ber states, particularly given thefragility of pro-EU opinion inmany of the accession states. Al-though this is not a uniquely `Eu-ropean’ as opposed to nationalproblem, concern about a disaf-fected or disengaged populationshould not be confined to the af-termath — or anticipation — ofdamaging referenda setback.” “…The Convention has established atreaty blueprint. Now is the timefor a new process to be undertak-en, perhaps using a familiar butuseful EU approach: a group ofwise men (and women)’, whichwould think through the most diffi-

18


cult and controversial of questions:how far can integration go at 25?Of course, opinions will differ andthere will be no single answer.However, the debate needs to be s-tarted in a coherent and transpar-ent manner. 2020 vision might be alot to ask for, but 2010 visionwould be helpful.” (Jonathan Lip-kin, The ‘vision thing’: defining the

long term agenda, Eurobserver, 29-

1-2004)

H. “Competition between ri-val European-level parties

for control of the EU policy agen-da is the only way to ensure thatEU policies reflect citizens’ wish-es and to hold EU level politiciansaccountable for their actions – inother words, to make the EU trulydemocratic. Party competition atthe European level, connected tovoters’ choices, is also the only wayto legitimise tough policy decisionsby Europe’s leaders. In the shortterm, party competition at the Eu-ropean level can be promoted with-in the current Treaty structure by avariety of means:

ñ European parties can pre-sent rival candidates for the Com-mission President in the 2004 Eu-ropean elections;

ñ National party leaders mayback one or other of these candi-dates in the subsequent investiturebattle between the Council andParliament;

ñ The rules of procedure in theEuropean Parliament can bechanged to enable the winningelectoral coalition to dominate thepolicy agenda inside the parlia-ment (via controlling committeechairs and rapporteurships);

ñ European elections can bechanged, to allow candidates to bechosen regionally rather than na-tionally, and to allow citizens tovote for individual politiciansrather than national party blocs.

In the medium term, partycompetition at the European levelcan be promoted through the fol-lowing developments:

ñ Further Treaty reforms couldbe made, such as allowing the ma-jority in the European Parliamentto elect the Commission President

(a full-blown parliamentary mod-el) or the direct election of theCommission President by the citi-zens (a full-blown presidentialmodel).

ñ The second reading of theCodecision Procedure (and theBudgetary Procedure) could bechanged to allow the EuropeanParliament to adopt amendmentsby a simple-majority rather than anabsolute-majority.

ñ Finally, a uniform electoralsystem for European electionscould be introduced, based on acandidate-centred rather than par-ty-controlled electoral system, andwith European-wide top-up listscontrolled by European level par-ties.” (Simon Hix, Possibilities for

European Parties: 2004 and beyond,

European Policy Centre)

This paper will appear in The Demo-cratic Papers (forthcoming, April 2004),a collection of essays on Europe, democ-racy and the world emerging from col-laboration between the think tanksDemos and Vision, openDemocracy.netand the British Council Brussels. To findout more, email paul.hilder @ pobox.com.

Voting at the European Parliament. For many analysts, it is time for European - level party competition

T H E F U T U R E O F E U R O P E 19


Once there was a radio-play on the Hungari-an Radio about a couple of kids who weretrying to figure out how to steal the lastminute of the day of 31st August in order

to avoid to go to school the following day (the 1st ofSeptember). Later on they realised that the best thingto do was to let this day come as usual. So they startedschool and they found it interesting, challenging and a-musing.

There are only a few days left until the 1st of May2004. Shall we steal the last minute of the 30th of Aprilor be open to our “new-old” lives?

If we look around Europe we can be faced with dif-ferent aspects of the very similar debates about thelong-awaited Momentum of the European history,when (almost) all of its nations will belong to the sameeconomic-political entity.

This historical momentum takes place in an epochwhen Europe has to answer the most critical questionsshe has ever been confronted with throughout its mod-ern existence. She has to prove to herself, to her citi-zens and to her competitors, that she has not grownold, that she is still attractive, capable and willing toconquer the global stage.

The most recent developments show that the Euro-pean Union has started to redirect its mainstreamthinking towards being more knowledge-focused in or-der to be more competitive on the long-term and in asustainable manner. The early years of our decadebrought two major strategies to be implemented by2010. One is to bring Europe to the point of becomingthe most competitive economy of the world1, and theother to complement the economic objectives with theapproach of sustainability and environmental-sensibil-ity2. The struggle for success of the above strategiescan be illustrated if we have a look at the official docu-ments issued by Brussels.

The “Report issued by the European Commissionto the Spring Council: Delivery Lisbon: Reforms forthe Enlarged Union” urges to catch up with the objec-tives set out for Europe. The document “FinancialPerspectives 2007-20133 ” calls “sustainable develop-ment – cohesion (for growth and employment)” as oneof the four key political priorities of the Union and al-locates an approximately double budget for research.The objectives of the 3rd Cohesion Report4 empha-

size the role research and innovation can play in thecontext of achieving the “Lisbon” and “Gothenburg”goals.

Why all this list of heavy documents is being pub-lished during this final phase when it is history, whichshould claim our full attention? The answer may soundfar too simple:

Studying the most recent official papers, articles,public discussions and debates one can easily recog-nise that our “Old Lady”, with the scope to reach thepolitical and economic objectives she has set, uses themost common and obvious of her strengths: protectionand full exploitation of added value and knowledgecreated within Europe. Knowledge has become themost valuable resource of ours, the means with which –if we know how to use it well - it is possible to stay com-petitive in a more and more accelerating knowledge-based economy. The greater of all challenges Euro-pean Union is facing nowadays is probably the degreeof efficiency she will show in shifting decision-makers’attention of all levels towards the establishment of ef-fective investment schemes; that is, schemes which, de-spite the less tangible results that may achieve in theshort-term, aim at greater beneficial effects in the longterm as they support more human intelligence de-manding activities (i.e.: research, education, innova-tion).

The European Union can and -in my view, shouldassist and facilitate those initiatives and endeavoursthat not only allow for integration and sharing of theexisting wisdom but also contribute to the emergenceof new knowledge. These initiatives should be utilisedfor the mutual benefit of all involved, as well as, ofthose who wish to be involved.

Notes:1. Presidency Conclusion – Lisbon: http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/euro-

council/index.htm 2. Presidency Conclusion – GÖTEBORG: http://ue.eu.int/en/In-

fo/eurocouncil/index.htm3. COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE

COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Buildingour common Future Policy challenges and Budgetary means ofthe Enlarged Union 2007-2013; COM(2004) 101 final

4. A new partnership for cohesion - convergence competitivenesscooperation, Third report on economic and social cohesion

http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/offi-cial/reports/cohesion3/cohesion3_en.htm

Is it a knowledge - based Europethat we want for ourselves?

By Katalin ALFOLDIHungarian National expert at DG Research, European Commission, Regional Aspects Sector

20 Y O U T H F O R U M


Informer

Pour y parvenir, la pre-mière tâche à laquelledoivent s’attacher l’U-nion et ses Etats mem-

bres est l’information des c-itoyens. En effet, l’euroscepti-cisme ambiant dans certains E-tats membres ou l’indifférencedes citoyens à l’égard de l’Eu-rope sont principalement dus àune méconnaissance des poli-tiques européennes ou à unemauvaise information sur ce su-jet.

Certains clichés perdurent cheznombre de citoyens. Ainsi, les ter-mes « Bruxelles », « Commissioneuropéenne », « Union eu-ropéenne » évoquent indifférem-ment une bureaucratie anonyme,

procédurière et tentaculaire. Or,l’administration européenne esttout sauf cela. La Commission eu-ropéenne compte moins de fonc-tionnaires (environ 24.000) que lamairie de Paris (environ 40.000) !Administration légère, elle est aus-si l’une des plus efficaces, comptetenu de l’étendue de ses compé-tences et du budget qu’elle gère, etl’une des plus transparentes.Cependant, les politiques con-tribuent à entretenir ces préjugéspar une attitude ambiguë vis-à-visde l’Europe. On accuse fréquem-ment l’Union pour faire passer auniveau national une mesure néces-saire, mais impopulaire. En re-vanche, quand une mesure estjugée positive ou populaire, cesont les gouvernements qui en ré-clament la paternité. Il semble

nécessaire de responsabiliser lespolitiques nationaux par rapport àl’Europe. Mais comment ?

Le meilleur moyen d’y parvenirest sans doute de proposer aux c-itoyens une information objectivesur l’Europe. Les media ont ungrand rôle à jouer en cette matière,en donnant la priorité à la préci-sion et à l’exactitude de l’informa-tion. Il faut bannir par exemple l’-expression « Bruxelles a décidéque » et lui substituer le nom del’institution responsable de cechoix pour mettre les membres decelle-ci face à leurs responsabilités.Il faut mettre en avant le travail dela Commission, du Parlement eu-ropéen et du Conseil, mais aussidésigner l’institution responsable,lorsqu’une décision nécessaire n’apas été prise ou a été prise troptard…

Une autre urgence est celle dela création d’un grand medium eu-ropéen d’information. Il y a dansce domaine une carence consid-érable des media nationaux àcombler. L’information sur l’Eu-rope est en effet trop souvent par-cellaire, voire inexacte. La télévi-sion semble être le medium le plusapproprié puisqu’elle constitue lapremière source d’information descitoyens européens. Une grandechaîne de télévision européenned’information semble seule être àmême de corriger ces lacunes, carelle constituerait à la fois unesource d’information pour les me-

L’Union européenne,un projet citoyenà l’échelle d’un continentJérémie PELERINEtudiant de Sciences-PolitiquesVice-président de “Jeunes Europeans” Lille

Depuis les origines de la construction européenne, les

efforts de coopération entre Etats et d’unification du

continent ont eu pour objectif de servir les citoyens

européens, d’abord en leur permettant de vivre dans un

espace de paix, puis en améliorant leurs conditions de vie.

Cependant, tout le projet politique de l’Europe s’est

construit par le haut, bien souvent en l’absence du citoyen.

La réussite de l’Union européenne suppose a contrario de

redonner au citoyen sa place entière dans la construction

européenne, car il est la raison d’être de tout projet

politique.

Lots of pro- European activists con-tend that European leaders do notlisten to their citizens.

Y O U T H F O R U M 21


dia nationaux et un moyen d’infor-mation direct pour les citoyens eu-ropéens. Le travail réalisé par Eu-ronews est en cela exemplaire.Cependant, il est évident que cesefforts sont insuffisants face aupoids des grandes chaînes d’infor-mation américaines, à commencerpar CNN, et même des chaînesd’informations nationales.

Ecouter

Parallèlement à ce travail d’in-formation, le meilleur moyen

de remettre le citoyen au cœur de laconstruction européenne est de l’é-couter. Il existe à cet égard déjà cer-tains instruments, comme le systèmed’analyse de l’opinion publique« Eurobaromètre ». Encorefaudrait-il en tirer des conséquencesen termes d’action et de décisionpolitique… A titre d’exemple, alorsque sept citoyens européens sur dixsoutiennent une politique de sécu-rité et de défense commune de l’U-nion européenne, les Etats mem-bres peinent à s’accorder surquelques positions communes dansce domaine, qui relève de la méth-ode intergouvernementale.

C’est uniquement en écoutantles citoyens européens qu’on peutrépondre à la question: « pourquoiconstruire l’Europe ? ». Et c’est àpartir de ce diagnostic que les ac-teurs politiques peuvent construireun projet susceptible de rassemblerles citoyens.

Se donner les moyensd’agir ensemble

Au service de ce projet citoyen,les Etats membres doivent

repenser de façon dépassionnée lesinstitutions communautaires. Letravail considérable de la Conven-tion constitue une base solide pourla révision des traités, mais peut-être faut-il oser aller plus loin,alors qu’il est possible aujourd’huide faire le choix de l’Europe des c-itoyens. Cela pourrait passer par

des moyens tels que le référendumd’initiative populaire ou la trans-formation de la Commission en unvéritable gouvernement européen,intégralement nommé par le Par-lement et responsable devant lui.Cependant, ce sont les Etats quidécident de l’avenir des traités ; etil apparaît que ce sont eux qui sontles plus réticents à l’idée de démoc-ratisation de l’Europe, comme ledémontre l’échec récent du som-met de Bruxelles.

Pourtant, faire l’Europe des c-itoyens ne signifie pas pour autantdéfaire les nations. Depuis lesdébuts de la construction eu-ropéenne, ce sont les Etats qui ontlibrement choisi d’exercer en com-mun leur souveraineté au niveaueuropéen dans les domaines qu’ilsont eux-même déterminé. Aujour-d’hui, le Conseil des Ministres, in-stitution qui représente les Etatsmembres, reste prépondérant pourun grand nombre de sujets, malgré

l’augmentation du poids du Par-lement européen dans le processusdécisionnel. Il est vital de sauveg-arder cette légitimation par les E-tats de l’Union européenne. Néan-moins, il n’est pas souhaitable queles Etats membres constituent dé-sormais des freins à l’avancée del’Europe. A vingt-cinq Etats mem-bres, chacun sait qu’il sera impossi-ble de fonctionner sans repenser lesystème de décision au Conseil, enparticulier dans le sens d’une ma-jorité qualifiée plus souple et plusfacile à atteindre.

***

Aujourd’hui, à l’aube de l’élar-gissement et dans l’attente d’uneréforme institutionnelle, l’Europeest à la croisée des chemins. Il esturgent que l’Europe retrouve savraie vocation : un projet pour sescitoyens, si elle veut éviter qu’ilss’écartent un peu plus des urnes enjuin.

The European Union: a citizens’ projectof a continental scale

The citizen is the raison d’être of the European Project. However, a top-down approach in constructing Europe does not enable citizens to assumetheir place and role.The bringing together of the European citizens passes through an effort tobetter inform them about the decisions and actions of the Union, so as toavoid euroscepticism and indifference. The best means of reaching this pointis to offer to the citizens objective information and to confront the politicianswith their responsibilities.

The construction of a project in favour of Europe also presupposes to lis-ten to its citizens. The practice of consulting public opinion must be used asthe foundation for the construction of the political project, as only the citi-zens can answer the question “why build Europe?”.

At the service of this project, Europe must obtain the means of acting to-gether. That involves recasting the common institutions on the basis of theConvention works. Nevertheless, it is perhaps necessary at this point to becautious about proceeding with the building of a European government. Infact, it is the States that have to make these decisions, although one can fearthat there will be a slow down in the evolution of the Union. However, theconstruction of a citizens’ Europe does not mean the deconstruction of itsnations.

Taking the stakes of 2004 into account, the time has come and it is nowmore imperative than ever that the European Union reforms itself in orderto become a truly citizens’ project.

Summary



It appears difficult for a po-litical system to strike a bal-ance between having a highlevel of democratic qualities

and achieving effective policy out-comes. Efficiency and democracyhave been largely perceived as anti-thetical to each other. While theremay be arguments and empiricalevidence to question this state-ment, it is true that any politicalsystem struggles to fashion a gover-nance structure, which accommo-dates and simultaneously satisfiesthe demands for both democraticperformance and effectiveness.

The Union also needs to fulfilthat dual task, particularly nowthat it faces strong public dissatis-faction with both its decision-mak-ing processes and its policy out-comes. The Union’s functioninghas been said to produce a ‘democ-ratic deficit’ meaning that the con-trol of decision-making by democ-ratically elected governments hasnot been capable of compensatingfor the loss of national parliamen-tary control. Although there havebeen significant changes, such asthe co-decision procedure, theCharter of fundamental rights, andlegal texts improving transparencyand openness, the Union is still un-

favourably compared with statedemocracies. It is actually present-ed as an underdeveloped democ-ratic system.

Why the Union still remainsso? It is because, unlike states, ithas to overcome two major hur-dles: a limited range of options forconstitutional reform and theheavy burden of establishing andstrengthening its overall legitimacyas an innovative polity.

The limited scope of constitu-tional choices emanates from thefact that the Union’s constitutionalorder is largely determined by s-tates in intergovernmental negoti-ations. While states seem to bar-gain for a functional institutionalorder, their preferences are signifi-cantly shaped with considerationsof their national interests. Theirprime concern is to achieve a bal-ance in the attribution of powers,which is both vertical (between theUnion and the member states) andhorizontal (among the variousCommunity institutions), thusleading to a ‘limited capacity forconstitutional reform’. Its impacton the Community’s democraticperformance is obvious.

A great bulk of criticism target-ing the Union’s democratic perfor-

mance observes an underdevel-oped presence of majoritariandemocracy in decision-making.The ensuing proposals stress theneed to enhance the role of theEuropean Parliament, since it isthe only institution that directlyrepresents the citizens of the U-nion. But a series of institutional a-mendments only partially strength-ened the Parliament. The EP hasyet to become a true co-legislatortogether with the Council, and itappears as a second order chamberin some policy areas, while it is ex-cluded from deciding in others.The member-states, which havesurrendered significant powers tothe Union, seem not willing toloose the almost absolute controlof decision-making.

The second hurdle is that of theoverall legitimacy of the Union.Whereas nation states have well-es-tablished constitutional orderswidely accepted by their citizens,and enjoy an unquestionable legiti-macy as the natural geographic do-main of a nation’s governancelinked with a common history and ashared cultural background, the U-nion does not enjoy such a pre-givenbasis of legitimacy. It has no myth tobind its citizens and create a strong

Inviting Civil Society

µy Aris TRANTIDISMA European Politics, Business and Law, LLBMA Candidate, European Political Economy, University of Athens.

Participatory democracy and the questionsof the Union’s democratic performanceand legitimacy



sense of affiliation. The fashion thatits policies are shaped and imple-mented, as well as, the outcomesthat these policies have, may legiti-mate or delegitimate the Union. Itslegitimacy solely relies on good per-formance delivered in an open,transparent and democratic way.

Good governance implies ef-fective policies. But the very com-plicated decision-making system,which was designed to accommo-date states’ interests and achieve avertical and horizontal balance,has failed, in many occasions, todeliver efficient policy outcomes.On the contrary, the governancesystem of the Communities hasbeen ferociously criticised as over-sophisticated, counter-productive,and bureaucratic. Biased as thiscritique may sound, it reflects thewide perceptions of the public.

Therefore, we come with thecentral question of how the Unioncan design such decision-makingprocedures, which will be both de-mocratic and able to produce effi-cient policy outputs. It seems thereis no single answer. Better democra-cy and good governance seem to re-quire an innovative mix of institu-tional instruments, borrowed fromthe experience of national democra-cies and adapted to the special na-ture of the Union. At this point, par-ticipatory governance emerges as apromising mode of governance.

Participatory governance is not anew concept. It has been a centralaspect of pluralistic democraciesthat incorporate the organisationsof civil society, such as public inter-est groups, pressure or private inter-est groups, non-governmental or-ganisations and sectional associa-tions, into decision-making. Partici-patory modes of governance do alsoexist in the Community practice.

There is already widespread infor-mal consultation with interestgroups that have gradually shiftedtheir attention and expectations tothe Union level of governance.There are also important instancesof co-regulation, such as a series ofdirectives on employment collectiveagreements and some designed self-regulation patterns in environmen-tal and consumer protection issues.

Participatory modes of gover-nance have flourished becausethey are considered as a necessarycomponent of representative gov-ernance, a complement to the ma-joritarian parliamentary institu-tions. While the latter relies on pe-riodic elections, participation ofcivil society allows an everyday in-teraction between citizens and alllevels of government, most ofwhich comprise groups of unelect-ed technocrats.

Participatory governance, there-fore, ‘adds’ democracy to decision-making, especially in areas thathave been regulated by technocrat-ic bodies in processes that are thusheavily criticised as undemocratic.

Consultation processes are open tothe considerations of those likely tobe affected by the outcome. Thisguarantees fairness and improvesmutual understanding among thoseinvolved. The regulating authoritieseventually increase their respon-siveness to citizens’ claims and be-come more successful in definingpolicy priorities. Decision-makinggains credibility and its outcomesmay enjoy easier implementationand larger compliance as those con-cerned were previously engaged inthe process.

Participatory governance alsomakes decisions more likely to beefficient, because participants bringinformation and feedback into deci-sion-making. It may ensure the co-herence and consistency of the out-comes, because, unlike a possiblefragmented top-down process, itsets a broader dialogue with inputsfrom groups of expertise.

These qualities of participationpoint out that, while representativedemocracy constitutes the corner-stone of democracy, participatorymodes of governance come as a

∆Ô ¿ÚıÚÔ ÂÈÛ¿ÁÂÈ ÙËÓ ¤ÓÓÔÈ· ÙË˜ Û˘ÌÌÂÙÔ¯ÈÎ‹˜ ‰ËÌÔÎÚ·Ù›·˜ ÛÙË Û˘˙‹ÙËÛË ÁÈ·ÙË ‰ËÌÔÎÚ·ÙÈÎ‹ ÏÂÈÙÔ˘ÚÁ›· ÙË˜ ŒÓˆÛË˜. ∏ ŒÓˆÛË ¯·Ú·ÎÙËÚ›˙ÂÙ·È ·fi ¤Ó·¤ÏÏÂÈÌÌ· ‰ËÌÔÎÚ·Ù›·˜ ÛÙË ‰È·‰ÈÎ·Û›· Ï‹„Ë˜ ·ÔÊ¿ÛÂˆÓ Î˘Ú›ˆ˜ ÏfiÁˆ ÙË˜˘ÛÙ¤ÚËÛË˜ ÙË˜ ÛÂ ıÂÛÌÔ‡˜ ·ÓÙÈÚÔÛˆÂ˘ÙÈÎ‹˜ ‰ËÌÔÎÚ·Ù›·˜ ÛÙÔÓ ÌË¯·ÓÈÛÌfiÏ‹„Ë˜ ÙˆÓ ·ÔÊ¿ÛÂˆÓ, ·Ú¿ ÙËÓ ·ÍÈÔÛËÌÂ›ˆÙË ÚfiÔ‰Ô ÙË˜ ÙÂÏÂ˘Ù·›·˜‰ÂÎ·ÂÙ›·˜. ∏ ŒÓˆÛË Â›ÛË˜, ·ÓÙÈÌÂÙˆ›˙ÂÈ Î·È ÙËÓ ÚfiÎÏËÛË ÙË˜ ‰È·ÚÎÔ‡˜ıÂÌÂÏ›ˆÛË˜ ÙË˜ ÓÔÌÈÌÔÔ›ËÛË˜ ÙË˜. °È·Ù›, ·ÓÙ›ıÂÙ· ÌÂ ÙÔ ÎÚ¿ÙÔ˜-¤ıÓÔ˜ ÙÔ˘ÔÔ›Ô˘ Ë ÓÔÌÈÌÔÔ›ËÛË Â›Ó·È Û¯Â‰fiÓ ‰Â‰ÔÌ¤ÓË, ·ÊÔ‡ ÚÔ‚¿ÏÏÂÈ ˆ˜ ÔÊ˘ÛÈÎfi˜ ¯ÒÚÔ˜ ‰È·Î˘‚¤ÚÓËÛË˜ ÙÔ˘ ¤ıÓÔ˘˜, Ë ›‰È· Ú¤ÂÈ Ó· ıÂÌÂÏÈÒÓÂÈ‰È·ÚÎÒ˜ ÙË ÓÔÌÈÌÔÔ›ËÛË ÙË˜ Ô˘ ÂÍ·ÚÙ¿Ù·È ÙfiÛÔ ·fi ÙÔ fiÛÔ ·ÓÔÈÎÙ¤˜ Î·È‰ËÌÔÎÚ·ÙÈÎ¤˜ Â›Ó·È ÔÈ ‰È·‰ÈÎ·Û›Â˜ Ï‹„Ë˜ ·ÔÊ¿ÛÂˆÓ, fiÛÔ Î·È ·fi ÙËÓ·ÔÙÂÏÂÛÌ·ÙÈÎfiÙËÙ· ÙˆÓ ÔÏÈÙÈÎÒÓ ÙË˜ ÚÔ˚fiÓÙˆÓ. √È Û˘ÌÌÂÙÔ¯ÈÎ¤˜ ÌÔÚÊ¤˜ ‰È·Î˘‚¤ÚÓËÛË˜ ¤¯Ô˘Ó ‹‰Ë ·Ó·‰ÂÈ¯ıÂ› ÛÂ Â›Â‰ÔÎÚ¿ÙÔ˘˜ ˆ˜ ¤Ó· ¯Ú‹ÛÈÌÔ Û˘ÌÏ‹ÚˆÌ· Î·È ÌÈ· ÂÓ›Û¯˘ÛË ÙË˜·ÓÙÈÚÔÛˆÂ˘ÙÈÎ‹˜ ‰ËÌÔÎÚ·Ù›·˜, Î·È ¤¯Ô˘Ó ÂÈÏ¤ÔÓ ÙËÓ ·ÚÂÙ‹ Ó· ·˘Í¿ÓÔ˘ÓÙÈ˜ Èı·ÓfiÙËÙÂ˜ ÁÈ· ÈÔ ·ÔÙÂÏÂÛÌ·ÙÈÎ¤˜ ·ÔÊ¿ÛÂÈ˜. ∆Ô ¿ÚıÚÔ Î·Ù·Ï‹ÁÂÈ fiÙÈ ËÂ¤ÎÙ·ÛË ÙË˜ ¯Ú‹ÛË˜ ÙÔ˘˜ ÛÙËÓ ŒÓˆÛË ÌÂÙ¿ Î·È ·fi ÙÈ˜ ·Ú·¿Óˆ‰È·ÈÛÙÒÛÂÈ˜ ı· Â›Ó·È ÂÍ·ÈÚÂÙÈÎ¿ ÂˆÊÂÏ‹˜ ÁÈ· ÙËÓ ÂÓ›Û¯˘ÛË ÙË˜ ‰ËÌÔÎÚ·Ù›·˜Î·È ÂÓ Á¤ÓÂÈ ÙË˜ ÓÔÌÈÌÔÔ›ËÛË˜ ÙË˜.

¶ÂÚ›ÏË„Ë



complementary input into deci-sion-making. Due to the above-mentioned ‘limited capacity for

constitutional reform’ at EU leveland given that the Union needs tofabricate innovative sources of le-

gitimacy, they seem vital ‘shots ofdemocracy and efficiency’ into itssystem of governance.

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La Turquie présenta officiellement sa de-mande d’adhésion à la Communauté le 14avril 1987. L’adhésion à la Communautéeuropéenne exige que le pays soit eu-

ropéen, démocratique et que le niveau de son é-conomie lui permette d’assumer les obligations dé-coulant du Traité de Rome. Le gouvernement turquede l’époque a estimé que la Turquie était revenue à unrégime démocratique avec les élections de 1983 et quecelles de 1987 furent entièrement libre. La Turquieveut s’intégrer à l’Europe parce qu’elle est unmorceau de l’espace de défense et de sécurité de l’Eu-rope. Concernant les relations économiques, plus de50% des échanges commerciaux de la Turquie se fai-saient avec les pays de la Communauté. Ces dernierssont les premiers investisseurs en Turquie. Seulement,la Turquie, qui serait à terme le pays le plus peuplé detous les Etats membres, et dont le niveau dedéveloppement était supérieur à la moyenne eu-ropéenne, n’aurait pas (selon la Communauté) sup-porté les contraintes économiques imposées par uneadhésion à l’Union. En outre, avec la mise en œuvredu traité sur l’Union européenne, les pays membres seconcentrent sur la modification du fonctionnementdes institutions et affichent l’ambition de doter l’U-nion d’une dimension politique, ce qui suppose uneintégration politique plus poussée. Toutefois,

quelques années après ce premier refus, alors quepersistaient les difficultés économiques et sociales dela Turquie, un événement majeur allait provoquer unnouveau rapprochement du pays avec l’Union eu-ropéenne. En effet, l’effondrement de l’URSS a pro-fondément modifié les données géopolitiques et lesrapports de force dans la région de la Méditerranéeorientale et dans les Balkans. On assiste à une vérita-ble montée en puissance de la Turquie. Elle est le seulpays appartenant aussi bien aux Balkans qu’auMoyen-Orient tout en étant le pays méditerranéen leplus peuplé. La Turquie se découvre une dimensiongéopolitique nouvelle dans le cadre du nouvel ordremondial et espère devenir un pole économique ré-gional en développant ses liens avec l’Asie centrale, leMoyen Orient, les Balkans et l’Europe occidentale.Sur le plan politique, le conflit en Bosnie Herzégovinea réintroduit la Turquie dans le jeu régional. Dans cecontexte, un renforcement actif des liens va s’opérer.Cette démarche aboutit à la conclusion de l’Accordd’Union douanière de décembre 1995, entré envigueur le 1er janvier 1996. Le but est d’établir pro-gressivement une zone de libre-échange, la libertéd’établissement, la libéralisation des services ainsi quela libre circulation des capitaux. Seulement, cet accordne s’inscrit pas dans une problématique d’adhésion.En effet, lors des discussions sur la ratification de

Mourad CHALALEtudiant en Maîtrise d’Etudes européennes - Paris III Sorbonne-Nou-

velle Enseignant de guitare

européenne?La Turquie,

Grâce à sa situation géographique, tant en termes

stratégiques qu’économiques, la Turquie a depuis le

XVème siècle été associé à l’histoire de l’Europe. Les

échanges commerciaux et culturels ainsi que les alliances

politico-militaires sont la preuve de la place importante

occupée par la Turquie dans la politique européenne.

26


l’Accord au sein du Parlement européen, la Commis-sion a expressément fait comprendre aux députés que«la décision sur l’Union douanière sur laquelle le Par-lement Européen est appelé a se prononcer ne com-porte en elle-même aucune disposition de nature poli-tique» ( Commission Européenne, dossier «Uniondouanière Turquie», document 4, «les enjeux poli-tiques et stratégiques de l’Union douanière», Brux-elles, 11 décembre1995). Etablir un «partenariat s-tratégique avec la Turquie» apparaît indispensable etdevient l’un des aspects de la mise en place de la Poli-tique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune. La Turquiese voit attribuer, de part sa situation géographique, unrôle de stabilisateur économique et politique. L’Ac-cord d’Union douanière n’est donc pas l’aboutisse-ment de l’Accord d’Ankara de 1963. Selon les termesde ce dernier, l’ Union douanière est la phase finaledevant conduire à une intégration allant jusqu’à l’ad-hésion. En 1995, aucun engagement de nature poli-tique n’a été pris sur la question de l’adhésion de laTurquie.

Par ailleurs, la volonté affichée des Européens derenforcer ses liens avec la Turquie a conduit ceux-ci àfaire l’impasse sur les questions du respect des droitsde l’homme, de l’Etat de droit ainsi que sur la ques-

tion de la protection des minorités. Engagée depuis 1963 dans ce processus, la

Turquie doit se plier aux règles fixées par le Conseileuropéen de Copenhague de juin 1993 et appliquéespar celui de Luxembourg de juin 1997. Les turcsdoivent ainsi satisfaire aux critères politiques (dé-mocratie, Etat de droit, respect des droits del’homme et protection des minorités) et é-conomiques (économie de marché viable, capacité àfaire face à la pression concurrentielle dans l’Union).Ce fut lors du sommet d’Helsinki des 10 et 11 décem-bre 1999 que les Quinze donnèrent leurs feu vert à lacandidature de la Turquie. Les députés turcs ontaboli la peine de mort. Ils ont autorisé l’enseigne-ment du kurde. Ils ont également élargi les droits del’homme, d’association et de manifestation. Ils ontfavorisé la liberté d’expression et promis de lutterplus efficacement contre l’immigration clandestine.En dépit de toutes ces réformes démocratiquesadoptées par Ankara dans le but de négocier l’adhé-sion du pays à l’Union, la Turquie n’a pas été retenueparmi les dix pays finalistes et s’est vu fixer rendez-vous avec l’Union en décembre 2004. Alors, laTurquie est-elle européenne ? Il est souvent soulignéque seulement 3% du territoire turc (la Thrace) sont

Would Turkey's accession bring some «spice» in the EU?



situés sur le continent Européen. Le reste constituel’Anatolie et s’étend sur l’Asie. Le pays a des fron-tières communes avec: la Géorgie(250 km), l’Arménie (300 km), l’I-ran (400 km), l’Irak (250 km) et laSyrie (750km). Elargir les frontièresde l’Europe aux frontières d’une ré-gion instables impliquerait l’Uniondans des conflits qui affectent cettepartie du monde. De même, l’ab-sence de règlement du problème deChypre constitue un obstacle ma-jeur pour l’entrée de la Turquie enEurope. Toutefois, le plan KofiAnan représente un espoir vers uneissue pacifique d’autant que les événements récentsmontrent des signes positifs.

Rappelons également que ce fut par des moyensautoritaires et antireligieux que la Turquie rompitavec l’héritage Ottoman. Ainsi, les réformes entrepris-es par Atatürk aboutirent à l’abolition du sultanat en1922 ainsi qu’à celle du khalifat en 1924. En 1928, futsupprimée toute référence à l’Islam comme religiond’Etat, les tribunaux coraniquesfurent remplacés par des codes ju-ridiques empruntés à l’occident.L’enseignement, lui, fut entière-ment laïcisé et l’alphabet latinadopté. Toutes ces réformes met-taient fin à un Etat théocratiquequi durait depuis le XVème siècletout en engageant le pays sur lavoie de l’occidentalisation. La ré-surgence et la montée de l’is-lamisme auxquelles nous assistonsaujourd’hui ont greffé l’élémentculturel dans les relations entrel’occident et le monde musulman.Pourtant, l’Europe n’a-t-elle pascontribué à la montée de l’is-lamisme en s’abstenant d’inter-venir dans les événements sur-venus en Bosnie ? Encore perçuscomme un peuple de barbares, lesturcs, aux yeux de nombreux Eu-ropéens, représentent une menacepour la civilisation occidentale etles valeurs judéo-chrétiennes.Alors la Turquie a-t-elle vocation

à faire partie de l’Europe? Une telle interrogation re-vient à poser la délicate question de l’identité Eu-

ropéenne de la Turquie, car qui, ausein de l’Union, n’envisage pas sansinquiétude la perspective de voir unjour quelque 68 millions de turcs, à95% musulmans, entrer dans le club?Vers 2010, la Turquie deviendrait lepays le plus peuplé de l’Union. Lapeur de l’intégrisme islamique peutexpliquer les réticences de certains,mais les conséquences sur le plan in-stitutionnel n’échappent à personne.Il serait tout de même injuste deranger un pays qui a choisi la laïcité

depuis presque quatre-vingts ans dans la même caté-gorie que les mollahs de Téhéran. Enfin, s’il est injustede sanctionner la Turquie pour son appartenance re-ligieuse à l’islam, il est aussi injuste de reprendre cequ’affirment certains turcs à propos de l’Europe: «unclub chrétien fermé». Car les siècles de lutte des peu-ples Européens contre l’emprise de l’église sur la viepolitique ont façonné l’identité Européenne.

Is Turkey European?

In view of its geographical and economic situation, as well as, of its com-mon history with Europe, Turkey’s adhesion to the European Union remainsa very delicate question.Turkey submitted its application for adhesion intothe European Union on the 14th of April 1987. A decision on its adhesion isstill pending today.

In order to become part of the European Union, Turkey must meet a cer-tain number of important criteria such as freedom of speech, democraticgovernance (segregation of powers), respect of human rights and fundamen-tal freedoms. However, these are criteria that Turkey has not entirely met, asseveral questions have been raised regarding human rights violation in thecountry (child work, death penalty...).

Strongly willing to become part of the Union, Turkey has made efforts totackle these problems and also to improve its economic situation. Freedomof expression and human rights issues have been given more attention andthe death penalty has been recently abolished. Therefore, if it was solely forthese criteria to be met, Turkey’s adhesion should not be facing serious con-strains any more.

However, this is without taking into account the new challenge that theworld must face nowadays: terrorism. Turkey is a country where 95% of itspopulation are Muslims. Yet, it is important to note that Islam is no longerconsidered as the official religion of the State and all religious communitieslive in perfect harmony.

The European council of Helsinki has declared Turkey along with othercountries, an official candidate for adhesion. The decision on whether thiscountry will be a full member of the European Union will be announced atthe end of December 2004...

Summary

Freedom ofexpression andhuman rightsissues have beengiven moreattention inTurkey

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1. It pinpoints to the end of theartificial division between Westernand Eastern Europe1.

2. Emphasises the underlyingideals, values and objectives of theEU. European Union with the ac-cession of the new member statesbecomes a unifying crossroad of d-ifferent cultures and civilizations2.

3. It is an important step to po-litical and economic integration.

The new member states will inte-grate with an economic area, whichenjoys higher living standards, amore efficient allocation of re-sources, higher levels of productiv-ity and higher levels of human andphysical capital. It also means thatthe economies of the new mem-bers will face competition fromcompanies, which, in general, op-erate under a more productive, ef-

ficient and stable business environ-ment and are supported by a liber-alized framework and economicpolicies that guarantee a certaindegree of low inflation, low publicand external deficits and stable ex-change rates3.

4. For the new member statesof Central and Eastern Europe itsymbolises the return to Europeand the chance to anchor theirdemocracies firmly within theEU4.

Undoubtedly, enlargement willwork to the benefit of all Europeancountries in many ways. It willstrengthen the zone of stability andsecurity in Europe. A larger inter-nal market and a strong Europeaneconomy are to the common bene-fit of all European countries. Buteconomy, like security, is not a ze-ro-sum game. And that is becauseenlargement will:

1. Increase economic hetero-geneity5. Heterogeneity in politicalterms means diversity, which is afundamental element of the rich-

ENLARGED EU:Still a Unionof deep diversity? Prospects and Challenges for the new member states

By Stavros KOURTALIS and Theodoros KOUKOULISS.KOURTALIS: MA in European & International Studies, PhD CanditateDepartment of Political Science & Public Administration, University of AthensT.KOUKOULIS: MA in European & International Studies, TheologistDepartment of Political Science & Public Administration, University of Athens

The EU has a history of successful enlargements. In 1973

Britain, Denmark and Ireland joined; then, after the col-

lapse of their dictatorships, it welcomed Greece in 1981 and

Spain and Portugal in 1986, thus underpinning their demo-

cratic development; in 1995 it took in Austria, Finland and

Sweden. In the past 30 years the EU has grown from 6 mem-

bers with a population of 185 million into an international

entity of 15 members with 375 million people. It is now on

the eve of expanding to 25 members with 450 million citi-

zens. Widening has not prevented deepening.

The forthcoming enlargement is another step towards Euro-

pean integration, as:



ness of the common historical i-dentity of the EU. But heterogene-ity in economic terms means theneed for more investments, moresocial policy, more common poli-cies and a bigger EU budget.

2. Boost the regional dispa-rities6. The income per capita(GDP has calculated in PPS) of thepopulation of the 23 poorest re-gions (which represent approxi-mately the 10% of the total popu-lation of the Union of 15) was 2.6times lower than that of the inhabi-tants of the 15 richest areas (whichalso represent approximatelythe10% of the population of theUnion)7. This gap will widen to 4.4in the Union of 25.

3. Reduce by 13% the averageincome of the Union of 25 in com-parison to that of the Union of 158.This reduction will have the effectof “statistically ousting” a numberof regions in the Union of the15,which until now were eligible forObjective I of the cohesion policyand were receiving nearly 70% ofthe total allocated funds. Only 30areas (instead of 45 at present) ofthe 15 member states with a popu-lation of 47 million people (insteadof 68 million at present) will be eli-gible to receive these funds afterenlargement. In a parallel direc-tion, the total number of eligibleareas and inhabitants will increasemore than proportionally in the U-nion of the 25. 67 areas, compris-ing 26% of the total population(116 million inhabitants), will beeligible in the enlarged Europe 9.

4. Deteriorate the average em-ployment statistics in the Union ofthe 25. In 2001, the average em-ployment rate in the Union ofthe15 was 64% and only 57.8% inthe 10 applicant countries10. Therate of unemployment in the new

accession countries was 13% onaverage, compared to 7.4% in theUnion of the15. Unemployment a-mong young people is particularlyhigh in these countries (28.6%).

However, the applicant coun-tries have a higher growth ratethan the average in the current U-nion and their population’s level ofeducation is on average higherthan that of a number of the cur-rent regions, especially in SouthernEurope.

The economic opportunitiesand risks of enlargement, as wellas, its success will depend on howwell both present and future mem-ber states will manage to adapt tothe new realities. The extent towhich countries, firms and peoplegain or lose will depend on theirown decisions, not the fact of EUenlargement as such. Despite theimportance of EU policies, themember countries’ economic suc-cess has been and will still continueto be very much in their ownhands.

Nevertheless, this enlargementis very different from previousones in terms of the economic dif-ferences involved: The averageGDP per capita of the future mem-bers is approximately 60% lessthan the respective average of thepresent members (at purchasingpower parity)11. The most compa-rable case is that of the accessionof Spain and Portugal in 1986,which increased the EU’s popula-tion by 16%: The average per capi-

ta GDP of these countries wasabout 30% less than the one of theEU of that time (at purchasingpower parity)12.

Another difference betweenthis enlargement and previousones is that most of the new mem-bers are also pursuing their transi-tion from planned economies to amarket-based system and havebeen undergoing difficult econom-ic reforms independently of theirefforts to join the EU13.

Moreover, the development ofthe candidate countries’ financial

On the 1st of May 2004, 10 more flags will be waving outside European Institutions.

Y O U T H F O R U M


markets as a result of enlargementdynamics is an additional asset forEuropean business. Expanding cap-ital markets under EU regulationsand supervision rules are expectedto attract more foreign inflows14.This will lead to higher diversifica-tion of financial products and im-proved liquidity conditions, whichwill foster financing opportunitiesfor business. This means more eco-nomic growth and stability15.

With the integration of 10 newmember states on the 1st of May2004, Europe is obliged to changeits institutional, economic, socialand political form. It is also worthadding that a pretty successfuland worldwide known business-man of today, Mr. George Soros,came to the conclusion that“ the

traditional laissez-faire put at risk

the values of an open society”. Inother words, too much competi-tion and less co-operation can in-duce exactly the same results ascan the opposite. Therefore, it isproposed that:

1. Growth and convergencemust be the keywords for the en-

larged EU. European and nationalpolicies should give priority to eco-nomic growth and convergence.

2. The EU needs an economicand social model, which will com-bine the best elements of the exist-ing and new members. Its aimshould be to facilitate adjustmentinto new employment opportuni-ties, rather than to protect existingjobs.

3. The new members should im-mediately and fully be involved inthe Lisbon strategy.

4. The EU needs to reform itssolidarity and cohesion policies.The main priority of the new poli-cies should be not just saving mon-ey but also delivering better policyoutcomes.

5. The common agriculturalpolicy (C.A.P.) must focus on thequality of the products and not onthe quantity.

6. The EU budget needs to ex-pand. Only through a budget “bigbang” the Union could be morestable, equitable and transparentfor its citizens and its member s-tates.

Notes:

1. Look at Olivier Louis, “Pre-accession E-conomic Programmes”, paper fromMINEFI - DREE elargissement,31/10/2003

2. op.cit3. Wojciech Paczynski, “ECB decision –

making and the Status of Eurogroup inan Enlarged EMU”, Center for Socialand Economic Research (CASE),Poland, 08/12/2003 & paper from Bur-son-Marsteller, “Enlargement 2004 –Preparing for a “Rough Ride””,02/10/2003

4. See Heather Grabbe, “Political up-heaval and shifting coalitions likely tomark early years”, paper presented fromCentre for European Reform,30/09/2003

5. For more information, look at the paperof Katinka Barysch, “Is Europe Work-ing”, Centre for European Reform,10/12/2003

6. See the paper of Michael Landesmann -Sandor Richter, “Consequences of EUAccession: Economic Effects onCEECs”, The Vienna Institute for In-ternational Economic Studies,02/09/2003

7. See at Richard Nahuis and AshokParikh, “Factor Mobility and RegionalDisparities: East, West, Home’sBest?”, ENEPRI Working Paper No.26, January 2004 & Ville Kaitila, “Con-vergence of Real GDP per Capita inthe EU15: How do the accession coun-tries fit in?”, ENEPRI Working PaperNo. 25, January 2004

8 .op.cit.9. According to eurostat10. See “The Kok report: Making a success

of Enlargement”, downloaded fromhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/enlarge-ment/communication/, 12/02/2004

11. See “The Kok report: Making a successof Enlargement”, downloaded fromhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/enlarge-ment/communication/, 12/02/2004

12. See the paper of Theodoros Papaspy-rou, “EMU Strategy: Lessons fromGreece”, presented at the Hellenic Ob-servatory, European Institute, LondonSchool of Economics, on 20th January2004.

13. See the paper of B.Yilmaz, S.J.Ergun,“The Foreign Trade Pattern and For-eign Trade Specialization of Candidatesof the European Union”, Ezone plusWorking paper 19, September 2003,downloaded from www.ezoneplus.org

14. See the Report of Burson-Marsteller,“Enlargement 2004 - Influencing the en-larged EU: Conclusions for Business”,02/10/2003.

15. Op.cit footnote 12

The accession agreement for the 10 new member states was signed during the Greekpresidency of the EU.



Ces trois considérationsmorales, stratégiqueset politiques apparais-sent d’autant plus per-

tinentes qu’elles présupposentqu’au fondement même de l’idéeeuropéenne – de la constructioncomme de la réunification del’Europe – se trouvent les sourceséthiques et spirituelles d’unecommunauté de valeurs parta-gées: le projet d’un espace decivilisation fondé sur la coexis-tence d’une pluralité de langueset de cultures et qui vise à

l’avènement d’une société eu-ropéenne interculturelle har-monieuse.

Nous pouvons bien sûr ici faireécho à la parole de Milan Kunderapour qui l’Europe se caractérisepar « un maximum de diversité dans

un minimum d’espace ». Notre de-voir n’est-il pas de préserver cetteimage de l’unité dans la diversitécomme patrimoine commun his-torique de tous les Européens…l’image d’une Europe au fond tou-jours fidèle au grand dessein ini-tialement conçu par les Pères fon-

Pour une fête des cultureset de la jeunesse européennes

Georges DE RIVASPrésident du « Printemps de l’Europe »

La chute du mur de Berlin le9 novembre 1989 a signé

pour les nouvellesdémocraties d’Europe

centrale et orientale ce queleurs peuples ont considéré

comme leur retour àl’Europe. Et puis, bien au-delà des frontières des pays

concernés par le futur etcinquième élargissement del’Europe qui entérinera leur

entrée officielle dans l’Unionen mai 2004, s’est fait jour le

sentiment amplement partagéque nous passions du retourà l’Europe à la réunification

de l’Europe. Aussi cette réunification

trouve-t-elle pleinement sonsens parce qu’elle porteprécisément la marque

distinctive de « laréconciliation de l’histoire et

de la géographie » selon labelle expression de Bronislaw

Geremek. Et c’est bien avecla même appréciation de cetournant historique majeur

que le Parlement Européen apu qualifier cette

réunification du continent de« moralement souhaitable,

stratégiquement nécessaire etpolitiquement réalisable ».

Y O U T H F O R U M


dateurs ainsi qu’au sein de la plusvieille institution européenne, leConseil de l’Europe, qui en ap-pelait dans ses statuts à « sa contri-

bution à la préservation du patri-

moine naturel historique, culturel et

spirituel de la civilisation eu-

ropéenne » ?Comment ignorer en l’occur-

rence les menaces qui pèsent àl’échelle planétaire et partant surle territoire européen, en particuli-er sur notre écosphère comme surnotre logosphère ? Face à la han-tise d’une disparition de ce qui a puconstituer jusqu’à nos jours unepart essentielle du Génie de l’Eu-rope – à l’heure même de l’élar-gissement de l’Union - que s’estimposée la nécessité de promou-voir un nouvel espace de rencon-tres interculturelles entre les c-itoyens de l’Europe réunifiée : unefête des cultures et de la créationappelée à se dérouler simultané-ment sur une thématique com-mune dans les diverses capitales,localités et régions du continenteuropéen.

C’est dans cet esprit qu’a étéconçue l’initiative de l’événementculturel européen « Le Printempsde l’Europe », comme fête des cul-tures et de la jeunesse eu-ropéennes, lieu de reconnaissancedes racines communes mais aussi

d’expression des forces vives de lacréation. « Le Printemps de l’Eu-rope » vise dans cette perspective àfavoriser une meilleure connais-sance des mythes et identités cul-turelles qui font partie de notrepatrimoine commun et l’expressionde leurs prolongements contempo-rains dans les différents domainesde la création artistique.

Cette fête des cultures du conti-nent européen placée sous le signede la mémoire et de la novation nes’impose-t-elle pas comme la gestevivante de notre vouloir-vivre en-

semble à l’heure où s’exprime lafascination pour on ne sait quel ob-scur et fatal « choc des cultures »ou « guerre des civilisations » ?

Et si « être Européen, c’est se

souvenir de l’Europe », selon le motde Milan Kundera, c’est aussiimaginer ensemble l’avenir, c’est-à-dire répondre à cette question :Que voulons-nous faire ensemble ?Or ce qui peut nous unir et nousdonner le goût d’un avenir com-mun, c’est d’abord et avant tout laculture, les œuvres qui en émanentsous le signe de la Beauté et quisont, comme l’avait bien vuSchiller, ce qui donne un vrai senti-ment de communion et d’apparte-nance citoyenne à la communautéde destin. C’est dans ce sensqu’Elie Wiesel a pu dire que « laculture est un lien ».

D’où cette nécessité toujoursplus actuelle pour les européensd’approfondir leur (re)connais-sance mutuelle des liens his-toriques, affectifs et culturels quiles unissent, de promouvoir en-core et toujours des lieux d’écha-nges et de partage de leur héritagecommun, en vue de construirecette identité interculturelle quisera seule en mesure de con-tribuer au rayonnement de notrecontinent.

A l’heure de la mondialisationsans régulation où pèsent les men-aces d’une marchandisation desœuvres de l’esprit, le Temps quivient sera-il vraiment le « Temps de

l’Europe », du renouveau de sonrayonnement dans le monde ? Oui,si l’Europe demeure capable de sesouvenir de l’argile et du limondont sont faits les rêves et lesmythes, les grandes créations quilaissent une trace dans la mémoiredes peuples. Oui, si elle sait êtreaussi « celle qui voit (au) loin »,selon l’une de ses acceptions éty-mologiques, c’est-à-dire celle quiporte la promesse de l’Histoire.

Cette Union n’est-elle pas dev-

There isa definite

need to promotea new spacethat allowsfor interculturalmeetingsof the citizensof a reunited Europe.

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Y O U T H F O R U M


enue au demeurant l’horizon indé-passable des nations qui le con-stituent ? Dans ce sens, la réunifi-cation de notre continent est unechance historique pour chacunedes nations de l’Union d’êtreélevée à une puissance dans tousles sens du mot, mathématiquecomme métaphysique, moral etspirituel.

N’est-ce pas cette élévation detoute la communauté des nations àune telle puissance morale qui serala condition d’un véritable rayon-nement de l’Europe-Puissance,ainsi porteuse d’une voix quicomptera pour le monde ? C’estpourquoi, à l’heure où la grandefamille européenne va se trouverquasiment réunie et tournée versde nouveaux et plus vastes hori-zons, l’Europe élargie qui advientpleinement à l’Histoire doit êtreaussi celle qui se souvient… car a-vant même d’être une entité poli-tique, l’Europe demeure toujoursune puissance culturelle porteused’une part d’espérance essentiellepour le monde.

Dans ce sens, pourquoi ne pastourner notre regard, nous mettreà l’écoute de cet imaginaire eu-ropéen d’où sont issues les plus no-bles impulsions morales qui onttraversé notre histoire et en partic-ulier les grandes œuvres et créa-tions artistiques, notre patrimoinemythologique et plus générale-ment symbolique et culturel com-mun.

Ce sera précisément sur lethème « Patrimoine commun,

mythes et nouveaux horizons de

l’Europe » que le « Printemps del’Europe 2004 » sera lancé à Parisdu 28 mai au 6 juin 2004.

A l’heure de la réunification denotre continent, la reconnaissance,voire la revisitation de cette sphère

symbolique commune n’est-ellepas devenue un ciment essentiel àla construction de cette commu-nauté de nations, à la consolidationdu sentiment d’appartenance c-itoyenne à une communauté dedestin ?

N’est-ce pas au demeurantl’imaginaire des peuples européensqui a inventé cette immense œuvred’art, cette création poétique qui atraversé les siècles sous le nom demythologie ?

Que le Printemps de l’Europe2004 soit donc l’occasion d’une re-visitation des mythes européens !Afin que l’Europe, au génie para-

doxal, par une alchimie propre aumystère de la création, finisse parpasser du statut de mythe où ellefut si longtemps confinée, à son ac-complissement comme nécessité etpromesse de l’Histoire !

Dans l’arc-en-ciel des culturesdes pays de notre continent vit lalumière d’Europe. Puisse le tempsvenu de la réunification – avec cecinquième élargissement - êtrecelui dont parle le poète OctavioPaz, pour qui « le temps est lumière

qui se pense », lumière qui se penseaussi ensemble et qui rayonnecomme le pain de l’avenir partagéà la table de notre Grande Europe!

For a one-week festival of European Culturesand Youth

At the very moment of the fifth enlargement that is questionning our i-dentity and the specificity of the genius of Europe, Europe is more than evercalling for a deepening of the historical, cultural and emotional bonds linkingthe European people together.

In this perspective, there is a definite need to promote a new space thatallows for intercultural meetings of the citizens of a reunited Europe. This ishow the idea of “Le Printemps de l’Europe” (The Spring of Europe) wasforged : a one-week festival of European cultures, artistic creation and youthdesigned to take place simultaneously and on a common theme in all the c-ities and regions of Europe.

The first festival will be launched in Paris on May 28th 2004 on the theme“Common heritage, Myths and New Horizons for Europe”. It will be an op-portunity for europeans to re-explore the common symbolic sphere as a nec-essary step in the building process of a community of nations and the rein-forcement of the feeling of a common citizenship.

Summary



Introduction

On 9 May 1950, the French for-eign minister Robert Schuman in-terrupted a regularly scheduledbroadcast on the French radio, inorder to make what would be-come a historical announcement:

“ The French government proposes

that Franco-German production of

coal and steel be placed under a com-

mon ‘high authority’, within an or-

ganisation open to the participation

of the other European nations. (…)

By pooling basic production and by

creating a new high authority whose

decisions will be binding on France,

Germany and the other countries

that may subsequently join, these

proposals will lay the first and con-

crete foundation for a European

Federation which is indispensable

to the preservation of peace.”

The Schuman plan broke awayfrom any ordinary coal steel deal.It proposed to end the age-old op-position between France and Ger-many by pooling their heavy in-dustry interests under the supervi-sion of a supranational body, andto pave the way for a Europeanfederation. France was, therefore,ready to relinquish a part of its

sovereignty to facilitate peacewith what was not less than a yearbefore its utmost enemy.

What accounts for such a radi-cal change of attitude? WasFrance really convinced that thebest way to achieve world peacewas to establish economic co-op-eration with Germany on a sec-toral basis? Or, more pragmatical-ly, did France realise that only aclose co-operation with Germanywould ensure the delivery of Ger-man Ruhr coal, on which Frencheconomy was so dependent? Inother words: Was the Schumanplan inspired more by a fear of na-tionalism1 or a desire for econom-ic prosperity?

Argument

In this article, we will arguethat it is impossible to appreciatethe Schuman plan without placingit in its historical context (interna-tional, European and national).At the first part, we will, conse-quently, illustrate that in the af-termath of the Second World Warall Western European nationswere both concerned with recon-structing their economies and withpreventing another German hege-

mony. The fear of nationalism andthe desire for economic prosperitywere the twin impetus of a Europetraumatised by Nazi Germany anddevastated by the war. However,these motives taken together onlygive a partial explanation of theSchuman plan. Therefore, at thesecond part, we will argue that theSchuman plan was also partly de-fined by the interaction betweenAmerican and West European in-terests within the broader contextof the Cold War. Eventually, at thethird part, we will demonstratehow -constrained by American in-tentions and supported by thegrowth of intra-western Europeantrade, Robert Schuman and Mon-net, the architects behind the plan,managed to find a way of guaran-teeing French national securityand of securing French economyaround the coal-steel pool.

1. From the Monnet plan forModernisation to the Schu-man plan.The Second World War was ex-

tremely violent and left the gov-ernments at the end of the warwith the task of rebuilding their e-conomies, as well as, of providingfundamental services such as sup-plying food, housing and relocat-

The Schuman PlanWas it inspired more by a fear of nationalism

or a desire for economic prosperity?Panos LAMBRIDES

PhD canditate, Department of Political Science & Public AdministrationUniversity of Athens



ing displaced people (Wallace,1990, p37). Despite some nationaldifferences, all European e-conomies heavily suffered fromthe war: their markets were uncer-tain, their export industries hadbeen destroyed and had lost theirforeign investments (Wallace,1990, p38). Confronted with thisdisastrous prospect and on theroad of reconstruction, Europeangovernments engaged around thesame two pillars which had shapedtheir economies in the 1930s: agri-culture and heavy industry. Agri-culture was still a major sector ofemployment and heavy industry–coal, steel, iron and heavy engi-neering- was crucial for the recon-struction of railways, mines, facto-ries and housing. It also formed astrategic sector because of therole it had played in the arms racepreceding the First World War, aswell as, owing to the capacity itfurnished Germany to rearm inthe 1930ties, not to mention itspotential for the future develop-ment of aero-engines and aircrafts(Wallace, 1990, p37).

Economic reconstruction wasnot the only imperative after 1945.The other central issue was that ofnational security. The first andsecond world war had been foughtagainst Germany and the Alliesfeared a renewed German hege-mony. The Treaty of Dunkirk,signed in 1947 between Britainand France, guaranteed mutualaid in face of a future German ag-gression. This demonstrates thatthe fear of German resurgent na-tionalism was anchored in West-ern Europe (Urwin, 1997, p75).As a consequence and despite thedifferent national approaches tothese two issues2, the phobia ofGerman nationalism and the de-

sire for economic prosperity wereon every state’s agenda. These t-wo issues instigated the Frenchpolicies and, therefore, also theSchuman plan. Yet, they do notexplain in full for the form theSchuman plan finally took.

After all, until 1948, Frenchaims at European reconstructionwere focused on a punitive parti-tion of Germany to keep it weakand on the desire to acquire aguaranteed access to the Ruhrarea. These aims had been clearlyexpressed in the 1947 Monnet planfor French economic modernisa-tion. The plan had been designedin view of preventing the economicrecovery of the coal-rich Ruhr areaand had been based squarely onthe assumption that coal and steelwould be obtained at the expenseof the restricted German industry(Dinan, 1999, p19). It was also in-tended that, in the partition ofGermany, an autonomous and in-ternationally administered zonecovering the Ruhr area would pro-tect French national security, aswell as, guarantee access to theGerman Ruhr coal on which mostEuropean economies were depen-dent (Milward, 1984, p467).

Three years later, the Schumanplan no longer advocated punitivepolicies towards Germany butsupported the end of Franco-Ger-man opposition and the pooling oftheir coal and steel productionsunder the umbrella of a suprana-tional High Authority. What ac-counts for such an apparentchange of attitude?

2. Interaction between Americaninterests and those of the mostimportant West European na-tions.It is impossible to understand

the Schuman plan without replac-ing it in the context within which itdeveloped. After 1945, the devas-tation of Europe and the fear ofthe Soviet Union drew the USAdeeper into European affairs.Gradually, through the creation ofthe Atlantic Alliance3, the Euro-pean Recovery Plan (E.R.P), alsoknown as the Marshall plan, andthe various other internationaland regional organisations (suchas the International MonetaryFund, the World Bank and theGeneral Agreement on Tariff andTrade), the United States laiddown the institutional frameworkwithin which post-war Europeanformal and informal integrationwould operate. However, thesestructures were not merely institu-tional; they also defined certainpolitical objectives. The Marshallfinancial assistance, for instance,intended to promote economicstability in order to prevent acommunist alternative and in or-der to push European govern-ments into closer co-operation.Similarly, the NATO summits n-ever ceased to reaffirm their de-termination to “overcome…theunnatural division of Europe, andparticularly Germany” and to seea united Europe taking a greatershare of the “risks, roles and re-sponsibilities of the Atlantic part-nership” (Wallace, 1990, p2).Overall, the United States wereaiming at establishing a western-oriented European federation,which would act as a protectionshield against the Soviet threatand which would constitute a free-trade customs union in WesternEurope.

As a result, the United Statesset up the Organisation for Euro-pean Economic Cooperation



(O.E.E.C), a body whose primaryaim was to administer the ERPand to remove trade barriers. Yet,instead of contributing to furthereconomic integration as the USAhad hoped, it revealed the differ-ent points of view of the Euro-pean nation-states and the diver-gence with the US (Milward,1984, p467). The fundamentalquarrel was upon the “GermanQuestion” and the question of“Co-operation versus Integra-tion”.

As soon as 1948, the US startedpressing for a more integratedEurope realising that the controlsand limitations imposed uponWest Germany underminedWestern European economic re-covery and jeopardised security(making Germany more vulnera-ble to the external and internalcommunist threat). Yet, Ameri-can pressures for a more integrat-ed Western Europe was a directmenace to French national secu-rity and to French access to Ger-man resources, on which Frenchnational economy was based. The1948 London Conference on Ger-many, which decided to set up aunitary West German state, was aturning point in French attitudeto the German question (Mil-ward, 1984, p468). From 1948 on-wards, the French Foreign min-istry started to press for closer co-operation with Germany, in so asto provide an alternative econom-ic framework to the one the UStried to impose.

The second sensitive issue wasthat of Co-operation versus Inte-gration. The United Kingdom wasopposed to the political goals setup by the ERP (Milward, 1984,p469). Britain did not see theAmerican ideal policy of a maxi-

mum degree of economic unity inWestern Europe as adequate toits own future (Urwin, 1997, p82).Under such circumstances,Britain could no longer be the ini-tiator and the creator of Euro-pean integration, as the Ameri-cans had wished. By 1949, the U-nited States had to give up ontheir ideal policy plans for otheralternatives. The 1950 KoreanWar, which intensified the ColdWar, pressed even further for arapid solution with a view tostrengthening a united WesternEurope against the Soviet threat.

3. The Conditions that made theSchuman plan acceptable.It took another year for West-

ern Europe to provide an accept-able alternative. The idea of amore restricted customs unionbased on regulated and controlledmarkets advocated by France in1948, was unacceptable to Britain,which favoured a free-trade mod-el based on the development ofthe sterling area, and was equallyunacceptable to the Netherlands,which did not conceive of a cus-toms union without any of its pre-war trading partners, i.e. Britainand Germany (Milward, 1984,p470). Only Italy was ready to em-bark upon the road of a Europeancustoms union but the latter didnot meet the economic needs ofFrance (Milwards, 1984, p470). Itwas not until 1950 that the cus-toms union conceived by theFrench civil servant Monnet andput forward by the French For-eign Minister Robert Schuman,became acceptable to the UnitedStates and the Benelux. The fac-tors, which brought about theirsudden acceptance, are threefold.

Firstly, the separate national e-

conomic booms enjoyed by West-ern Europe in the 1950s and1960s created a stable institution-al basis, which protected WesternEurope from the American reces-sion of 1948-9 (Britain apart) andon which reconstruction couldtake place (Milward, 1984, p471).In addition to this, the growth ofintra-Western European tradepromoted by Germany’s econom-ic recovery and imports in 1948-50, created a pattern of interde-pendence, which made a customsunion more acceptable to West-ern Europe in 1950 than it was in1948 (Milward, 1984, p472).Thus, for instance, the Nether-lands, whose national policiesheavily relied on foreign tradeand which benefited a great dealfrom the growth of West Germanexport, saw the French idea of acommon market including Ger-many as an opportunity to expandits economy. And so did Belgium,whose national income also camefrom abroad.

The second factor, which con-tributed to the acceptance of aFrench-led integrated “little Eu-rope” was the recognition by theUnited States that Britain wouldnot lead European integration.Despite Churchill’s memorablespeech on a “United States ofEurope” at Zurich University inSeptember 1946, the United K-ingdom was very reluctant to theidea of integration (Dinan, 1999,p23). This, in turn, gave Francethe opportunity to be the initiatorand the creator of European inte-gration at the expense of the U-nited Kingdom, which was givenonly a few hours notice beforeSchuman’s announcement of afuture coal and steel community(Dinan, 1999, p24).



The last paragon that led tothe institutionalisation of thecoal and steel pool, was the de-termination of Monnet and Schu-man to ensure French security, tobolster its economy and to re-as-sert the French nation at the in-ternational level. Constrained bythe American intentions of set-ting up a unitary Germany, theybecame convinced that the onlyway to re-establish (according totheir own ideas and plans)French economic security was topool French and German heavyindustry interests under a supra-national body. Nevertheless, theultimate task was to convince theUnited States4, the rest West Eu-ropean countries, as well as theFrench national assembly andpublic opinion. A series of talksbegan which, as a result of suc-cessful co-operative diplomacy,were concluded by the establish-ment of the European Coal andsteel Community (Gillingham,1991).

Conclusion

“People only accept change when

they are faced with necessity, and

only recognise necessity when a

crisis is upon them”

(Monnet in Dinan, 1999, p14).

Both the Monnet Plan forModernisation and the Schumanplan were driven by the fear ofGerman nationalism and a desirefor economic prosperity5.Nonetheless, the Schuman plantook a different form from thatof Monnet’s, for it responded todifferent international impera-tives. By 1950, when the plan wasendorsed, the United States hadalready established a political

and institutional framework thatshaped Western European poli-cy-making. It is within this struc-ture and constrained by theAmerican decision to establishthe Federal Republic of Ger-many (1949), that Monnet andSchuman found an alternativeway of securing access to Germanresources and of guaranteeingnational security. The context ofthe Cold War and the British op-position to the idea of an inte-grated Western Europe providedthe opportunity for France to putits plan forward. Germany re-sponded positively and endorsedthe plan, for it saw the opportuni-ty to re-gain its sovereignty.

END NOTES

1. By which I mean German national-ism.

2. At the economic level, national poli-cy choices oscillated between tacklingfirst the issue of employment and do-mestic output or expanding foreigntrade, in order to recover from wardamages (Milward, 1984, pp464). Asfor the fate of Germany, Europeanpolicies were also diverse with Francesupporting the most rigid course (de-militarisation, decentralisation anddesindustrialisation).

3. The refusal of the Soviet Union toparticipate into the administration ofpost-war Germany after the break-down of the Moscow meeting of for-eign ministers in March 1947, the im-

position of Stalinist regimes in East-ern Europe and the looming presenceof the Red Army, not to mention theinternal threat of communism, con-tributed to the institutionalisation ofthe Atlantic Alliance in 1949 whichwas aimed at protecting the suppos-edly “vulnerable” Western Europe a-gainst the Soviet threat

4. The US which at that stage support-ed the French leadership in the Euro-pean path to integration feared, how-ever, that the Schuman plan was acover for a “gigantic European cartel”(Dinan, 1999, p22).

5. The implication of this article is thatfederalism was not the driving forcebehind the Schuman plan, though weacknowledge that European federal-ism had considerable strength afterthe war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

DePorte, Antony W., 1986, “ E u r o p ebetween the Super-Powers: The Endur-ing Balance”,Yale: Yale University Press Dinan, D. 1999, “Ever Closer Union”,USA: MacMillan.Gillingham, John., 1991, “Coal, steeland the rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955”,Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.Milward, Alan S., 1992, “The Europeanrescue of the Nation State”, London:Routledge.Milward, Alan S., 1984, “The Recon-struction of Western Europe, 1945-51”,London: Methuen & Co, Ltd.Urwin, Derek W., 1997, “A PoliticalHistory of Western Europe since 1945”,New York: Longman.Wallace, William., 1994, “Regional Inte-gration: the West EuropeanExperience”, Washington DC: Brook-lings Institution.

™Â ÌÈ· ÂÔ¯‹ Ô˘ Á›ÓÂÙ·È ÌÂÁ¿ÏË Û˘˙‹ÙËÛË ÁÈ· ÙÔ «™‡ÓÙ·ÁÌ· ÙË˜ ∂˘ÚÒ‹˜»,¤¯ÂÈ ÂÓ‰È·Ê¤ÚÔÓ Ó· ‰ÈÂÚÂ˘Ó‹ÛÔ˘ÌÂ ÙÈ˜ ··Ú¯¤˜ ÙË˜ ŒÓˆÛË˜. ∆ÔÓ ª¿ÈÔ ÙÔ˘1950, Ë °·ÏÏ›· ·ÔÊ¿ÛÈÛÂ Ó· ·Ê‹ÛÂÈ Î·Ù¿ Ì¤ÚÔ˘˜ ÙÈ˜ ÌÂÙ·ÔÏÂÌÈÎ¤˜ ÊÔ‚›Â˜ÙË˜ ·¤Ó·ÓÙÈ ÛÙËÓ °ÂÚÌ·Ó›·. ™Â ÙÈ ÔÊÂ›ÏÂÙ·È ÌÈ· ÙfiÛÔ ÚÈ˙ÈÎ‹ ·ÏÏ·Á‹;¶Â›ÛıËÎÂ, ÙÂÏÈÎ¿, Ë °·ÏÏ›· fiÙÈ Ô Î·Ï‡ÙÂÚÔ˜ ÙÚfiÔ˜ ÁÈ· Ó· ÂÈÙÂ˘¯ıÂ› Ë·ÁÎfiÛÌÈ· ÂÈÚ‹ÓË, ‹Ù·Ó Ó· Â‰Ú·ÈÒÛÂÈ ÔÈÎÔÓÔÌÈÎ‹ Û˘ÓÂÚÁ·Û›· ÌÂ ÙËÓ°ÂÚÌ·Ó›· ÛÂ ¤Ó·Ó Û˘ÁÎÂÎÚÈÌ¤ÓÔ ‚ÈÔÌË¯·ÓÈÎfi ÙÔÌ¤·; ◊, Ì‹ˆ˜, Ë °·ÏÏ›·ÚÔ¤‚Ë ÛÙËÓ Ú·ÁÌ·ÙÈÛÙÈÎ‹ ‰È·›ÛÙˆÛË ˆ˜ ÌfiÓÔ Ë ÛÙÂÓ‹ Û˘ÓÂÚÁ·Û›· ÌÂ ÙËÓ°ÂÚÌ·Ó›· ı· ÂÁÁ˘Ô‡Ù·Ó ÙËÓ ·ÚfiÛÎÔÙË ·Ú¿‰ÔÛË ÙÔ˘ ÁÂÚÌ·ÓÈÎÔ‡ ¿ÓıÚ·Î··fi ÙÔ ƒÔ˘Ú, ·fi ÙÔÓ ÔÔ›Ô ÙfiÛÔ ÔÏ‡ ÂÍ·ÚÙ¿ÙÔ Ë Á·ÏÏÈÎ‹ ÔÈÎÔÓÔÌ›·; ªÂ ¿ÏÏ·ÏfiÁÈ·: ∂ÌÓÂfiÙ·Ó ÙÔ «™¯¤‰ÈÔ ™Ô˘Ì¿Ó» ÂÚÈÛÛfiÙÂÚÔ ·fi ÙÔÓ Êfi‚Ô ÙÔ˘ÂıÓÈÎÈÛÌÔ‡ ‹ ÙËÓ ÂÈı˘Ì›· ÁÈ· ÔÈÎÔÓÔÌÈÎ‹ ·Ó¿Ù˘ÍË;

¶ÂÚ›ÏË„Ë

38 B O O K R E V I E W

EYPø¶A´KH EKºPA™H ñ Ù. 52 ñ 1O TPIMHNO 2004

Une constitutionpour l’europe - réflexionssur les transformationsdu droit de l’unioneuropéenne

(European Bookshop Publications,

2004 )

by De Schutter, Olivier / Nihoul,Paul

En 1992, leTraité surl’Union eu-

ropéenne a pourvud’une structure in-stitutionnelle u-

nique les Communautés eu-ropéennes et la coopération inter-gouvernementale conduite enmatière de politique étrangère etde sécurité commune et en matièrede justice et affaires intérieures. LeTraité d’Amsterdam en 1997, puisle Traité de Nice en 2001, ont en-core apporté des modificationsconstitutionnelles de première im-portance au cadre dans lequel l’U-nion européenne conduit ses activ-ités. En juillet 2003, la Conventionsur l’avenir de l’Europe a soumis àla Conférence intergouvernemen-tale un projet de traité établissantune Constitution pour l’Europe.La voie vers une Constitution eu-ropéenne est ouverte. A ce mo-

ment pivot de la construction eu-ropéenne, cet ouvrage tente d’in-terpréter le sens de cette Constitu-tion au regard des développementsantérieurs. Les contributions querassemble cet ouvrage abordentdonc cette entreprise de constitu-tionnalisation en essayant de la re-situer dans son contexte d’ensem-ble, comme l’aboutissement d’évo-lutions analysées dans leur pro-fondeur historique. L’ouvrage estdivisé en trois parties. La premièrepartie examine la structure institu-tionnelle de la future Constitution(fonction constituante, répartitiondes compétences, séparation despouvoirs, droits fondamentaux, etfonction juridictionnelle). La deux-ième partie est consacrée à l’Eu-rope des personnes (libre circula-tion, Europe sociale, coopérationpolicière et judiciaire pénale,coopération judiciaire civile etconflits de lois). La troisième par-tie est consacrée à la Constitution“économique” de l’Union (concur-rence et marché intérieur, protec-tion des consommateurs et de l’en-vironnement). La mise sur piedprogressive de l’architecture con-stitutionnelle européenne estanalysée par P. Magnette, K.Lenaerts, M. Desomer, O. DeSchutter et J.-V. Louis. L’évolu-tion de la condition des personnes

dans l’Union est étudiée par J.-Y.Carlier, S. Sciarra, G. de Kerchove,M. Fallon et S. Francq. Enfin, lespolitiques de l’Union européenneet notamment l’établissement dumarché intérieur sont analysés parJ. Stuyck, J.-P. Keppenne, L. De-falque et N. de Sadeleer. Dans sapréface à l’ouvrage, W. van Gervendémontre l’influence que le droiteuropéen exerce sur les transfor-mations du droit privé, comme surles autres branches du droitanalysées dans l’ouvrage

“The Greek Serpentine”,namely Athens and Euro-pean integration process

(“A görög szerpentin”, avagy Athén

és az europai integracio,)

Eszter Almassy ed.: Szazadvég, Budapest 2003

pages 263 (in Hungarian)

This book fo-cuses on theexperiences

of Greece in theprocess of European

Integration. The most importantoutcome of this study, however,deals with Hungary, and how thelatter may use Greek experiencesin its own integration process. It

BOOKS

B O O K R E V I E W 39


analyses the Greek political, eco-nomic and social developmentfrom the second half of 1950s ,thatis since the “Athenian Agreement”until today. Moreover, the study islooking for answers to the follow-ing questions: How internationalcircumstances and globalisationcan influence the utilisation of theadvantages of the integrationprocess? What is the reason be-hind the fact that Greece aftertwenty years of its accession couldonly come closer to the othermember-states in a relatively slowprocess? At the same time, this re-search illustates what does mem-bership mean to this country: Howdo the changes steming from mem-pership have influenced the Greekmacro- and micro economic andsocial environment. More specifi-cally, the book is comparing the e-conomic, political and social situa-tion of Greece to the Hungarianone. Cases of all current member-states and, in particular, remark-able aspirations of those countrieswith similar background and possi-bilities could be instructive to Hun-gary in its own integration process .There is no doubt that, duringthese more than fifty years sincethe foundation of the EuropeanCommunities, there have been ex-traordinary changes in Europe.From the first association agree-ments to European Agreementswe have witnesed considerablechanges in the conditions and thegeneral enviroments of the inte-gration process . Ambitions of theCentral-Eastern-European coun-tries have to be separated in timeand space from the previous en-largement waves. In order to planour future it is necessary to studyhistory. So far, there has been nocomplex study in Hungary to fo-

cus on the Geek intergrationprocess throughout the last fourtyyears since the Greek AssociationAgreement, at least not from aHungarian point of view; that is,how Hungary can utilise theGreek experience.

The path to europeandefence

(European Bookshop Publications,

2004)

by Von Wogau, Karl

After the In-ternal Mar-ket and the

Introduction of theEuro, the EuropeanUnion is making the

decisive steps towards the nextlarge project on the way to Euro-pean unification, which is Euro-pean Defence. The recent Iraqicrisis has shown that a commonEuropean foreign policy is morenecessary than ever. In spite of thisshortfall, there has been importantprogress: The European crisis in-tervention force, such as it was de-fined in Helsinki in 1999, has al-ready been deployed successfullyin two operations. Still, creating aEuropean Defence is an ongoingprocess, where Europe has to con-tinue to improve its capabilities.The direction that the EuropeanUnion will have to take in the com-ing years is indicated by the Euro-pean Convention, which has pro-posed to create a European Minis-ter of Foreign Affairs and a Euro-pean Armaments, Research andMilitary Capabilities Agency.Within the European Parliament,there is a large majority for the ne-cessity of a European Defence.This is demonstrated by the contri-

butions of representatives of thefour major political groups in thisbook. It also corresponds with thepreferences of public opinion. Thedraft of a European Security Strat-egy presented by Javier Solana inJune 2003 is a good step towards aEuropean Foreign and SecurityPolicy, which will be able to guar-antee the security of the Europeancitizens and to defend the interestsof the European Union in theworld. High-ranking Europeanpersonalities, such as JavierSolana, Guy Verhofstadt, Erkii Li-ikanen and Philippe Busquin havemade valuable contributions to thisbook. The authors set out to iden-tify where we stand on defence andwhat remains to be done to helpEurope evolve in the changingglobal context of the 21st century.

Theseus andthe Minotaur: The threadof CFSP and externalrelations of the EU

Kyriakos D. KentrotisGeolab Library Series, Papazissis

Publishers, Athens 2003, pages 338,

(in Greek).

This bookrecords andanalyses the

data that give shapeto EU foreign rela-tions as a whole in

view of their interrelation with theissues of traditional foreign policyof the member states and the Eu-ropean integration sought for inthe fields of foreign policy, defenseand security. Within the EU, re-spective discussion refers to theformulation of the institutionalframework of CFSP and ESDP.

Ascertaining that Europe, as a

40 µ π µ § π √ ∫ ƒ π ∆ π ∫ ∏


political power, is called upon tocombine the democratic peace ithas achieved with a far from peace-ful world, Kentrotis ponders on thecourse Europe will take in the fu-ture, making use of the ancientGreek myth of Theseus and theMinotaur. A maze, Labyrinth, isthe intricate building, and Theseusand the Minotaur, the main he-roes, with the help of the otherpersons in the story, work as amapping of different approachesto the ancient conundrum. Theparallel focuses on the aspirationsand concerns with which the futureof Europe has been faced sincemany years now; the contradictoryforces of wish and will in a givenreality surface again. Following thePicasso example, the reader canmark the landmarks and phases ofEuropean integration so far byputting spots on a piece of paperand then draw a line from spot tospot. What is the hidden picturebehind the spots? Theseus, theMinotaur or the Labyrinth?

In the Appendix, the authorprovides us with the necessary ter-minology in English, French andGerman. Research for this bookhas been carried out under the aus-pices of the Laboratory for Geo-cultural Analyses (Geolab) of theDepartment of Foreign Lan-guages, Translation and Interpret-

ing, Ionian University.

MORE BOOKS

Sovereignty in Transition, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003

Neil Walker (editedby), Professor of Euro-pean Law, EuropeanUniversity Institute,Florence.

Long expected and now appeared,in the last month of 2003. Some ofthe essays included in this volume:

-Van Roermund “Sovereignty: Pop-

ular and Unpopular”.- R. Bellamy “Sovereignty, Post-

Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty:

The Three Models of the State,

Democracy and Rights within the

EU”

- Kenneth Armstrong, “United King-

dom – Divided on Sovereignty?”

- Jeffrey Goldsworthy “The Ameri-

can Debate About Sovereignty: a

Comparative and Historical Per-

spective”

La Nouvelle ConstitutionEuropéenne,

La Découverte, 2003,

Paris

Jacques Ziller,

Professor of Comparative PublicLaw, European University Insti-tute, Florence.

L’européanisa-tiondes droitsconstitution-nels à la

lumièrede laConstitution pourl’EuropeL’Harmattan, 2003, Paris, Collec-

tion Logiques juridiques

Jacques Ziller (sous la directionde), European University Institute.

European Gov-ernance, Delib-eration and theQuest for De-mocratisation,

Arena, 2003, Report No. 2/2003,

ISSN 0807-3139

Erik O Eriksen, Christian Jo-erges et Jürgen Neyer (eds).ARENA (Advanced Researchon the Europeanisation of theNation State), Oslo and Euro-pean University Institute, RobertSchuman Centre for AdvancedStudies.

EVROPAIKI EKFRASSI EUROPEAN EXPRESSION


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In the 48 pages of our edition, scholars, well-informedcitizens and young people who believe in the ideals ofEurope express their views on economic, political,cultural and social issues.Our readership consists of young men and women 20-45 years of age, highly qualified (University gra-duates), highly interested in socio-economic deve-lopments, active in collective activities on economic,social and political issues and public life. Although the

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PLANED PROGRAMMES-ACTIVITIES

– Ekfrassi - Euroletter

This will be the Hellenic portal for addressingEuropean issues of significant importance in twolanguages: Greek and English. The primaryobjective is to create an electronic means ofcommunication through the Internet (portal), whichwill allow for the establishment of a regular contact(with the form of an electronic Newsletter) amongstcitizens directly and professionally involved in EUissues, but also amongst citizens, who just want tolearn about the latest developments with regard to

EU institutions, policies, member states andcandidate countries.

– Latin Afro Youth ExchangeWithin the context of the YOUTH programme

(Directorate General of Education and Culture)there will be a follow up of activities in Englandfollowing last year’s successful organization of therespective action in Greece .

– ∂uropean Voluntary Service programmes (EVS)Continuation of youth exchanges for environmentalprotection and general voluntary work (EvropaikiEkfrassi East Attica)

«Youth links to unlock barriers». Youth exchanges, Mati - Attica

48 ∂ V R O P A I K I E K F R A S S I - B R I E F P R E S E N T A T I O N


REGIONAL STRUCTURE

The headquarters of Evropaiki Ekfrassi are locatedin Kolonaki (the centre of Athens),54, Omirou street, 106 72, near Skoufa street,tel.: 210-36.43.223-4, fax: 210-36.46.953, e-mail:[email protected]

There are regional branch-organisations of EvropaikiEkfrassi in other areas of Greece - Thessaloniki, EastAttica, Larisa and Chania, as well as, an independentorganisation in Cyprus. It is also represented inKavala, Kilkis, Heraclion, Ioannina, Serres andHalkida and it is active abroad, in Spain (Zaragoza),France and Belgium.

The aims and activities of Evropaiki Ekfrassi aresupported by active citizens (more than 800 membersand 2.000 subscribers), as well as, the Hellenic state,the European Union and the private sector.

Executive Board of the CompanyEvropaiki Ekfrassi

Panagiotis Gennimatas, PresidentKonstantinos Stefanou, Vice-PresidentPanos Kazakos, Vice-PresidentNicos Koulouris, General Secretary

Nicos Giannis, Vice General SecretaryVasilis Kostopoulos, TreasurerMembers: Gerasimos Aggelopoulos, VasilikiGeorgiadou, Christos Gortsos, KonstantinosIthakisios, Paulina Lampsa, Konstantina Botsiou,Antouanetta Oikonomopoulou, Georgios Pagoulatos,Giannis Papageorgiou, Triantafyllia (Lina)Papadopoulou, Charis Papasotiriou, Panos Polizoidis.

YOUTH EVROPAIKI EKFRASSI (54, Omiroustreet, 106 72, Athens)Secretary General: Vasiliki KoutsoukouOffice Director, Athamadia Baboula

EUROPEAN SOCIETY POLITICALEXPRESSION INSTITUTIONS (E.K.P.E.TH.E.), (54, Omirou street, 106 72, Athens)Head Manager: Tasos FountisDirector of EKPETHE: Maria MilaDepute Director of EKPETHE: Georgia AstrakaOffice Director: Athamadia Baboula

EVROPAIKI EKFRASSI QUARTERLYEDITION (54. Omirou street, 106 72, Athens)Head Editor: Stathis KampouridisEditor Advisors: Konstantinos Diamantikos, EleniDemiri

Seminars. Ekfrassi Youth Thessaloniki

∂ V R O P A I K I E K F R A S S I - B R I E F P R E S E N T A T I O N 49

EVROPAIKI EKFRASSI – EAST ATTICA(38, Poseidonos Boulevard, 19 009, NeaMakri)Director: Maria MilaReforestation Coordinator: Costas StrabiNatural Disasters Coordinator: PeterEvenhuisEVS Coordinator – Office Collaborator:Dimitris Kolotouros

EVROPAIKI EKFRASSI –THESSALONIKIEvropaiki Ekfrassi: Lina PapadopoulouYouth Evropaiki Ekfrassi: AntigoniMelidonioti

EVROPAIKI EKFRASSI – CHANIA (16Michelidaki, Chania)Adamantios (Adamis) Aretakis

EVROPAIKI EKFRASSI – LARISSAPresident: Grigoris PapacharalambousSecretary General: Elizabeth (Betty) Limnidou

EVROPAIKI EKFRASSI – BRUSSELSNicos Giannis

Stathis Kampouridis

Kimon Zorbas

Kiveli Ringou

Dimosthenis Mammonas

Nasos Sofos

EVROPAIKI EKFRASSI – CYPRUS

President: Savvas Papasavvas


«Dialogue for Europe» conference


50

GUIDELINES AND SELECTION CRITERIA FOR NEXT ISSUE

The aim of this publication is to present awide spectrum of well-grounded opinionsand to create in this way a forum fordiscussing and debating all issues regarding

the European integration process. The views expressedby the contributors are their own and do not bind byany sense the owner, publisher and editor of the journal.

The articles are selected on the basis of thefollowing criteria: Quality - The theme ofeach edition – Originality - Scientificvalidity - Scholarly documentation and

Timeliness. Articles should not be more that 900 wordsin length.

Together with the article, to be submitted inEnglish or French, all contributors shouldnecessarily include a summary (100-200words), preferably in a language other than

the one used for the main article (English, French,

Hungarian, Greek). The articles and summaries shouldbe submitted in electronic form in Word format, viaemail and/or floppy disc sent by post (manuscripts andfloppies are not returned). Photos of the authors orrelated to the article are welcome but will not bereturned either.

All rights reserved. No part of thispublication may be reprinted orreproduced or utilized in any form or byany means, without prior written

permission of the editor. Once this permission isgranted, it is necessary for all publications to give fullreference of the original publication. Authors will benotified on the selection of their article. Following theconfirmation of the articles’ publication, authors shouldnot publish the material anywhere else. EvropaikiEkfrassi holds the exclusive right to distribute throughthe Internet articles, summaries or the entire journalwithout any restriction.

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ú Subscribers from Greece..............................15 Â˘ÚÒ 28 Â˘ÚÒ

ú Subscribers from Greece(subscriptions for the Public Sector, Banks,Libraries, Universities and Companies)..............21 Â˘ÚÒ 42 Â˘ÚÒ ú Subscribers from Greece.............................12 Â˘ÚÒ 21 Â˘ÚÒ (subscriptions for students)

ú Subscribers from Europe..............................21 Â˘ÚÒ 38 Â˘ÚÒ

ú Subscribers from other continents................24 Â˘ÚÒ 48 Â˘ÚÒ

ú Special support subscription ........................40 Â˘ÚÒ 80 Â˘ÚÒ

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Founded in 1989

Omirou 54, 106 72, Athens, tel.: 2103643223-4, fax: 21036.46.953,e-mail: [email protected].

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EVROPAIKIEKFRASSI

Documents

European Expression - Issue 52