Evaluating U.S. Foreign Policy and Effectiveness in the Horn of Africa

8/6/2019 Evaluating U.S. Foreign Policy and Effectiveness in the Horn of Africa

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Evaluating U.S Foreign Policy and

Aid Effectiveness in the Horn of Africa

Nick Eberhart, University of GeorgiaDefense and Diplomacy Center, Spring 2011


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The role o oreign aid as a oreign policy ool has long been a con en ious deba e. Developmen is dis incrom he o her wo big Ds o De ense and Diplomacy ye o wha ex en is i subjec o he s ra egic objec-ives o hese bigger policy and poli ical impera ives? In his Presiden ial Policy Direc ive on Global Develop-men , Presiden Obama laid ou a vision or Americas developmen efor s o be one o hree equal pillars

o Americas oreign policy por olio wi h he o her wo. However, he ex en o which his can be realizedin prac ice is s ill unclear. Promising s eps, mos no ewor hy o which is he inclusion o he USAID Admin-is ra or a Na ional Securi y Council, have been aken bu appropria ely placing developmen s voice in hecon ex o American oreign policy remains challenging.

One hing ha is clear, however, is ha oreign aid and developmen efor s are ex remely impor an . None-heless, oreign aid has come under requen atack or being inefec ive, misdirec ed, or even or crea ingperverse incen ives and uelling corrup ion and, ironically, underdevelopmen . There ore, a rank, open, andinnova ive deba e on aid efec iveness is much needed. Such a deba e wi hin he developmen es ablish-men is already ongoing and many ini ia ives have been launched o achieve and manage resul s or improveddevelopmen ou comes.

Wha his Whi e Paper seeks o do is no o replica e his ongoing process bu ra her o provide resh per-spec ives on several o he many curren developmen challenges. This research is by no way mean o becomprehensive or o provide a single ormula or improved aid efec iveness. Indeed, a he core, his Whi ePaper desires o underscore he essen ial need or con ex -driven aid policies and ac ivi ies. I is he sincerehope o he wri ers ha his work becomes a con ribu ion o he wider efor s o re rame aid and improvedevelopmen efec iveness hrough improving he mechanisms o aid planning, delivery, and managemen .

Mathew Eldridge and Ahmad SolimanSenior Policy Fellows

De ense and Diplomacy Cen er | Roosevel Ins i u e Campus Ne work

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The Horn o A rica contains pro ound humanitarian crises on a massive intrastate level. Con ict has de ned the Horn o A ricasince most o its countries became independent over a hal -century ago. Civil wars or wars between competing actions in Sudan,Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Eritrea are su cient to show that the countries within this region su er rom deep instability. Alongwith the internal instability o the countries, wars between countries in this region such as the Eritrea-Ethiopia War o 1998 to 2000,support o proxy groups such as Ethiopias support o the SPLA in Sudan and Eritreas support o Al Shabaab in Somalia, and other

ethnic con icts make this region extremely volatile.

Aid to the region has not been lacking, but the region still su ers rom more humanitarian and political di culties than most. USoreign aid to the region has not been enough to lif this regions population out o poverty, not necessarily because it has beendelivered poorly, but because the United States and the international community at large have been unable to help create an envi-ronment that is conducive to development or e cient use o oreign aid. The region has too many di culties and too rich a historyo interconnectivity and con ict to warrant a quick x by the US or any other actor. The region, though, is not helpless. The UnitedStates can choose to align its oreign policy with its oreign aid so that the two are not at odds.

It would be un air to say that the United States has not attempted to assist this region, but these attempts have been too inconsis-tent to achieve lasting stability in the region. An over-arching aid program that addresses every di culty in the Horn o A rica isunrealistic, but by ocusing on speci c issues, such as border demarcation and security, the United States could help to stabilize thisregion and provide a sounder plat orm or development. The United States can only be success ul in this region i it can increase

the capacity o civil society, local government, and other key institutions by providing a sa e environment or these institutions togrow. Security o individual countries depends on security o the whole region; security in the Horn o A rica is de ned by interde-pendence and must be achieved through regional cohesion and cooperation. Lastly, United States policymakers must begin to linkthe short-term e ects o oreign aid with the long-term goals o national security and oreign policy to ensure that short-term reliedoes not come at the expense o long-term stability.

Con ict in the region has a myriad o causes. One o the most signi cant is the high prevalence o border disputes between coun-tries i, ethnic groups, semi-autonomous regions and other groups. Border disputes are not the only cause o con ict, but they arean important one and can be used as an example or the region as a whole. ii The Horn o A rica is marked by an interconnectivitythat makes it di cult or con ict and humanitarian issues to be con ned to just one or two countries. The border dispute betweenEthiopia and Eritrea is a prime example o this as cited by Terrence Lyons in his book, Avoiding Con ict in the Horn o A rica (2006).Lyons discusses the use o proxy militant groups in Somalia by Eritrea to hinder the Ethiopian military intervention orce that wassent to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. Lyons describes this common strategy in the Horn o A ricaas the belie that the enemy o my enemy is my riend and can also be seen in examples such as the support o the Sudan PeoplesLiberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA) by Ethiopia in decades past. This pattern o destabilization exacerbates poverty in al-ready deeply impoverished countries.

To understand the oreign aid issues in this region it is imperative to be aware o the history o con ict. Somalia has been without apower ul central government or over 20 years. 2 As Peter Woodward points out in his book, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o A rica(2006), 3 afer Siad Barres regime ell in 1991 the country ell into the control o warlords and other actors. There now exists in Somaliaa Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is backed by the United States and the A rican Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).The TFG has had mixed success but has recently made an AMISOM-backed push to reclaim parts o Mogadishu, southern Somalia,and other ormer Al Shabaab-held areas. 4 Despite these recent pushes, groups such as the International Crisis Group eel that theTFG is not the best option or Somalia due to i ts poor per ormance in power-sharing, decentralization, ability to maintain peace andalso or its history o corruption. 5

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i. Border disputes in the Horn o A rica, as in much o A rica, are a legacy o the colonial system and have been particularly problematic in the Horn o A rica due tothe history o French, Italian, and British colonialism that urther separated groups in individual countries.ii. Border disputes are also incredibly di cult to manage in the region because o the high prevalence o pastoralists and nomads in the region. South Sudan especiallyis important because o its large pastoral population.


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Con ict has also been near constant in Sudans history. The regime in Khartoum and the rebels in South Sudan have been ghtingor years, and their ghting has created many re ugees and has led to a great human cost. The ghting o cially ended, however,with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and South Sudan has this year voted or secession rom the northern part othe country, set to take e ect this summer. This transition will no doubt take much US and oreign aid because Southern Sudan as acountry will be one o the poorest on earth. iii

Statistics rom the region are telling o the dire situation. The average Somali makes $600 per year, Ethiopias literacy rate is around42%, and at least 40% o the population in the region lives below the poverty line(less than one US dollar per day). 7 These issues war-rant global attention, but one o the humanitarian actors in the region not only presents a huge task or the international communitybut also compounds the other problems in the region.

According to the CIA World Fact Book, there are around 9.5 million re ugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Horno A rica. Near-constant con ict in the Horn produced these re ugees and these re ugees in turn have strained the economy o theregion. Around 80% o the labor orce in the Horn o A rica is involved in agriculture, reaching as high as 85% in Ethiopia. As much othis agriculture is subsistence any disruption to agriculture in the region could be potentially catastrophic. This is especially evidentin the prevalence o drought in the region.

Drought is one o the primary humanitarian concerns in the Horn. In a region where about 80% o the labor orce is involved in agri-cultures, especially pastoral activities, droughts can hit the population extremely hard. Drought in 1984 in Ethiopia was estimated to

have killed around one million people. 8 As can be seen with most droughts and amines in the region, the causes o the 1984 aminewere two- old. First, this region o the world is prone to drought because o arid conditions. The second, and increasingly common,cause o drought is human activity and con ict. As Milner notes, the 1984 amine and drought were caused by grain yields one milliontons less than was needed to eed the population. The 1984 amine was made worse as both Ethiopia and its then territory Eritrearedirected ood aid to eed their combatants in the border con ict. This pattern o con ict exacerbating and con ounding aid e ortscontinues even up to this year with a drought in Somalia threatening to destabilize Somalia even more. In a region that is 60% aridthat contains two countries, Djibouti and Somalia that are classi ed as 100% arid it should be understood that drought will inevitablystrike.9 The goal o the United States and o the leaders in the Horn o A rica should be to ensure that a drought does not translateinto extreme starvation in the region.

United States policy on the Horn o A rica must also tie in diplomatic, economic, and strategic concepts as well. The countries o theHorn o A rica are some o the largest and most important in East A rica. The Horn has coastline on the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean,and the Gul o Aden. This coastline and its proximity to the Middle East and the rest o A rica make it an important area strategicallyin the current War on Terror. In act, the United States currently operates its only military base on the A rican continent in Djibouti, 1and the Department o De ense recently created A rica Command, which has been tasked with de eating Al Qaeda and other ter-rorist groups while stabilizing A rica.

For over a decade now, the Horn o A rica has been seen as a breeding ground or terrorism. Sudan has supported Libyan terror-ists, harbored terrorists such as Carlos the Jackal and Osama Bin Laden, and was o cially designated as a State Sponsor o Terrorin 1993.11 Somalia is also home to a number o terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab, which is an extremist Islamic group that usesviolence to jockey or power in Somalia. Whats more, Al Shabaab has grown into a more power ul insurgency with the all o theIslamic Courts Union afer the US-backed invasion o Somalia by Ethiopia. More relevant to the US is the recent prevalence o Somalipirates in the region. In act, Somalia pirates recently captured a tanker that was carrying $200 million worth o oil on February 9th,2011.12 According to a Reuters report Over 40 percent o the worlds seaborne oil passes through the Gul o Aden and the ArabianSea, suggesting that increased inter erence in this region by Somali pirates would lead to higher oil prices, adversely a ecting theUS economy.

In addition to the humanitarian, political, strategic, and economic gains rom stabilizing the Horn o A rica, the United States has ac-cepted the role o the supporter and riend o democracy. Indeed the US State Department website notes that The United Statesstands with all those who champion human dignity and liberty. The advancement o human rights and democracy is not just the policyo the United States; it is the epitome o who we are as a nation. 13 I one believes that the promotion o democracy is a central teneto not only American belie , but also American oreign policy, then the United States should have an interest in the Horn o A rica.

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iii. According to an ABC report South Sudan has a population that is 80% illiterate with over hal o the population living under the poverty line.


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United States interest in the Horn o A rica has waxed and waned over the years. During the Cold War the region was part o thetug-o -war that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Many countries in this region were rst be riended by theUnited States or the Soviet Union and then switched back and orth according to the ideologies o the people in power. The hugein ux o arms and the use o the region as pieces on the geopolitical chess board o the Cold War, rather than as new countries withlegitimate development needs made or countries that would be much more prepared to settle disputes violently than diplomati-

cally. The region drew attention in 1993 during the Battle o Mogadishu, an event which caused the American populace to develop anaversion to the region and American policy makers to shy away rom the region or the remainder o the decade. In the past decade,however, the United States has been party to important negotiations in the region.

The United States has been instrumental in several negotiations afer con icts in the region, and has also tried to prevent con icts inthe region rom occurring as well. The 1998 US-Rwanda Peace Proposal was a cooperative attempt between the United States andRwanda to bring a diplomatic end to the Eritrea-Ethiopia con ict be ore it ever started. The peace proposal attempted to bring thetwo parties to the diplomatic table, to demarcate the boundary between the countries, and to demilitarize the boundary betweenthem. In a 1998 release by the US State Department, the plan was drafed with excellent relations with the Governments o bothEritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea rejected this agreement and the war continued until the Algiers Agreement in 2000 ended the warand created the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC).

The American partiality to certain countries in the region over others, especially Ethiopia, makes sense when viewed in a security

context, but has led to increased tensions in the region overall. The United States has over the years, been partial to Ethiopia espe-cially during its illegal annexation o Eritrea as described by Reid in Eritreas External Relations. Reid describes the support by sayingDespite the illegality o the annexation, the United States actively supported Ethiopia in its attempts to paci y Eritrea by providingit with military aid worth about $147 million, which was around hal i ts total military aid to A rica between 1952 and 1976. This patterno supporting Ethiopia has continued and has seen Ethiopia receive over $20 million in military aid between 2002 and 2007. 14 Thiscontinued support o Ethiopia has led to a distrust ul Eritrea that eels wary o the global community in such situations as the AlgiersAgreement, where Ethiopia de ed the agreement and the US did not en orce the agreement.

Peace in Sudan has also been one o the goals o the United States in the region. To e ectively provide humanitarian aid, con ictin Sudan would have to end. It was not until 2005 with the signing o the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that the SecondSudanese Civil War, which started in 1983 iv nally ended. The process by which the CPA came to ruition represents one o the keyarguments that will be presented later. The principle that the actors in the Horn o A rica, such as the Intergovernmental Authorityon Development (IGAD), must be given a leadership role in negotiations is important in a region where every state in the regioncan either gain rom the collective stability or lose rom the continued regional instability. Another important aspect o policy in thisregion is that the United States can have signi cant in uence when it chooses. Woodward states that the US brought considerablein uence and that the peace process in Sudan would probably not have happened at all without the weight that the US brought tothe process.

An alternative to resolution o regional issues by the United States would be another credible third-party country handling the diplo-matic dilemmas between states in the region. The border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti was mediated last year by Qatar withoversight by the UN Security Council, 15 The government o Qatar was on good terms with the governments o both countries andwas able to mediate their dispute over the shared border. Although this action was not per ormed by the United States it serves theUnited States interests. I such a third-party mediation o other disputes could lead to credible and lasting solution, then the UnitedStates as a member o the Security Council, should endorse it.

Another current key element o oreign policy in the Horn is combatting Somalias Al Shabaab and supporting the TransitionalFederal Government (TFG). Counterterrorism attempts have been success ul in some areas, but have been unsuccess ul and evenharm ul in others. As Ted Dagne pointed out last year in a U.S. House o Representatives hearing on the Horn o A rica, the UnitedStates created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn o A rica to ght terrorism in the region. 16 The establishment o a permanentbase in the region shows an understanding o the importance o the region in the War on Terror. Such a presence in the Horn oA rica gives the United States a way to help contain terrorism on a small scale by eliminating certain key terrorists, but the dangerlies in the US intervening too directly in the a airs o the Horn o A rica. Many analysts believe that Al Shabaab has grown due to theEthiopian occupation and has now turned into a ull-blown insurgency in much o the country. The US-backed Ethiopian invasion oSomalia undoubtedly had good intentions, but, as will be addressed later, many in Somalia while not supporting Al Shabaab resentan Ethiopian invasion o their territory.

V. ecent oreign Policy tance of the nited tates

iv. The Second Sudanese Civil War came around a decade afer the destructive First Sudanese Civil War o 1955 to 1972.


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Given the humanitarian, political, and economic issues discussed above in the Horn o A rica there exists a great need in the regionor humanitarian aid. This humanitarian aid is supplied in great quantities by the United States, but humanitarian aid must be a meansto an end and not merely the end itsel . The United States and the global community can clearly bene t rom a stable Horn o A rica.United States pours humanitarian and development aid into the region in attempt to stabilize it. The goal o humanitarian aid mustnot be only to stabilize regions, but it should put them in a position to e ectively handle developmental aid and become sel -su -

cient. The only way to achieve such sel -su ciency is to clear away any boundaries to sel -su ciency created by con ict, geopoliticaldisputes, or ine cient governments. While clearing away these boundaries to growth, aid in the Horn o A rica must also build uplocal communities and civil society leaders. This aim to stabilize and improve the region is where the United States aid e ectivenessover the years can be questioned. In the past ew decades US has sent billions o dollars in aid to the Horn o A rica yet or yearsSudan continued to ght a civil war, Somalia became a collapsed state, and the majority o the region remains in abject poverty. USaid to the region has had the best o intentions, but the best intentions do not always translate into the best results.

In September 2010 President Obama signed a Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development which calls or the elevation odevelopment as a core pillar o American power and charts a course or development, diplomacy, and de ense to mutually rein orceand complement one another in an integrated comprehensive approach to national security. 17Such a statement would en orce thestance that the United States should use aid to advance the wel are o the Horn o A rica to thereby urther enhance its interests inthe region and the greater global community.

To create a more sel -sustaining Horn o A rica, the United States is currently unding a program called Feed the Future, 18 which hasas its primary aims both the increased nutrition o the population o the countries it supports as well as the growth o private sectoragriculture that will translate into much more long-term sustainable growth in the supported nations. The initiative is global, but itwill be especially bene cial to the Horn because the three countries receiving the most unding are Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenyareceiving around $29 million each. v This policy addresses one o the key recurring concerns in the Horn o A rica and illustrates oneo the policy recommendations o this paper, which is the centrality o shielding the population rom the e ects o drought andamine by adequately developing the agricultural sector in the region. Another key component o the Feed the Future program isits investment in building more integrated regional cooperation. This will allow ood to be traded and more e ectively be allocatedto the segments o the population that need it most.

Although Feed the Future is one o the newest programs that the United States Government is introducing, it is certainly not theonly source o aid going to the Horn o A rica. The United States aid community currently operates and partners with dozens oprograms in the region such as programs to ensure peace ul border-crossing corridors between Kenya and Somalia and dialogueson how to mitigate violence by peace ully discussing clan di erences. The US has poured millions o dollars into the region and isrequesting an additional billion dollars or activities this year. 19 This amount is a substantial number, but when one considers the ex-treme condition o the region and then compares this aid request to the request or Israel which is three billion dollars, it seems thatthe United States aid priorities are misaligned. This policy papers recommendation, however, does not push or pouring money intoregions that cannot adequately handle excess unds.

Another recent aspect o US oreign aid or the region is the deteriorating relationship with Eritrea. Eritrea has been extremelylimiting in the access it will give to oreigners. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea was terminated in 2008 becausethe restrictions imposed on the mission were too severe to continue carrying on operations. USAID also no longer operates in thecountry, which has an extremely repressive government, and currently there is no money requested or the country in the UnitedStates oreign aid budget or Fiscal Year 2011. Eritrea, as mentioned earlier, has responded to diplomacy through the recent Qatarimediation o the border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti. Eritrea is no less impoverished than the rest o the region, yet is oneo the more destabilizing entities in the region.

A common concern with oreign aid is whether the aid will reach the people it is intended to help. This concern is especially prevalentin war-torn areas such as Somalia where aid can ofen end up as the possession o the same warlords and leaders who are causingthe stri e in the region. A stinging example o the danger o these warlords is the 1993 Battle o Mogadishu where US orces weresent in to apprehend the aides o a leading warlord, Mohamed Aidid, 20 but were ambushed and orced into a brutal ght. vi Becauseood is such a highly valued commodity in these situations, whoever controls the ood will also control the power in the region. TheUnited States and other donors cannot e ectively de end ood and ensure that it is apportioned to those who need it.

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v. Ethiopia and Kenya will both receive $29 million and Uganda will receive $29.5 million.iv. As a result o a well-planned ambush by insurgents and militia in Mogadishu, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and 18 US soldiers were killed.


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The Horn o A rica, as mentioned earlier, is an extremely interconnected region. The extreme diaspora o re ugees rom the con ictsin the region are testament to that act. The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development vii (IGADD) was ormed in1986 in response to the Ethiopian drought and amine o 1984. 21IGADD was then revitalized by its member countries in 1996 and witha broader mandate it was also given a new name, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD, now a branch othe A rican Union, as it exists today was ormed in the mid 1990s and has a much more broad set o objectives including macroeco-

nomic growth and harmonization, regional peace, and common security through increased dialogue.

IGAD, afer its revitalization, was set on ending the violence in Sudan. The IGAD talks began in 1994 and or years were unsuccess ul.However, these e orts included some key ideas that would eventually be incorporated into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement(CPA) which marked the end o the violence in Sudan on paper and set timelines or the independence re erendum that recentlypassed in Southern Sudan. This idea - that a peace deal in Sudan could eventually lead to Southern Sudan secession - came romIGAD.

As illustrated, the Horn o A rica presents many humanitarian, political, and economic di culties to the United States aid community.Given the dire situations in the individual countries in the Horn, the United States should be speci c and decisive in its policies and

actions. The main policy recommendation o this paper is to ocus on solving regional issues. This recommendation has two maincomponents. The rst is to bring decisive ends to con ict between countries in the Horn. viii The second is to build regional responsi-bility, pre erably through the existing model o IGAD. This paper certainly does not recommend the cessation o humanitarian aid tothe region, but it does emphasize that through more involved oreign policy aid could be much more e cient.

The end goal o these recommendations is to create an environment that is more conducive to international aid. Currently aid tothe Horn can only be e ective in sustaining the population or in developing at the regional level. The goal o the United States andthe international community should be a Horn o A rica that can manage its own con ict so that oreign aid can truly take root andbegin to develop the region.

Humanitarian aid to the Horn will undoubtedly remain an essential part o US oreign aid. Just this year the Famine Early WarningSystems Network (Fewsnet) warned o ood shortages in the region. The UN World Food Program is requesting ood to eed 2.5million Somalis who are currently in areas dangerous or aid workers. 22 Providing emergency ood and humanitarian aid will remainas part o the US commitment in the region, but providing development aid to stable regions should be stressed heavily as well. TheFeed the Future Initiative will help to build the capacity o some states in the region to eed their own populations, which will allowthe region to move to sel -su ciency. Such aid projects are essential in that they will empower the local population to work moree ciently, and enable the region to survive the requent droughts without large outpouring rom the international community.

This sel -su ciency through developmental aid can only be e cient in the proper environment. The Eritrea-Ethiopia border disputeremains a great destabilizing orce in the region. There ore the rst policy recommendation is that the US work to improve the re-gions transnational issues. The United States has had trouble in the region be ore, but as Terrence Lyons stated The case or tryingis a good one, as the report [Avoiding Con ict in the Horn o A rica] makes clear that ailure to resolve the Ethiopian-Eritrean disputecould exacerbate governance, health, and humanitarian problems, and set back U.S. e orts to ght terrorists, who are increasinglydrawn to the area. The United States should make the resolution o the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea its rst diplo-matic objective in the region in order to create an environment more conducive to aid. I Eritrea and Ethiopia settled their borderdispute border then Eritrea would have less incentive to destabilize Ethiopia by supporting Al Shabaab, and i not then the US canocus diplomatically on this situation. 23 Settling not only this, but also the other border disputes in the region are important to creat-ing environments or aid. ix Given the extreme interconnectedness o the region, it would best serve the United States to solve thoseproblems that are both diplomatically easible and causing the most transnational issues.

The second recommendation is to allow other mediators to assist the region. Recently, the Qatari mediation o the Djibouti-Eritreadispute was success ully enacted. The United States and European states can give generous oreign aid to the Horn, but many situ-ations in the region may be more e ciently solved through mediation by other actors. Most importantly the building o regional

V . Policy ecommendations

V . ntergovernmental Authority on evelopment ( GA )

vii. IGADD was ormed with the idea that the national governments in the region needed a supplement to their individual drought recovery e orts given the magni-tude o the drought.viii. For example, The United States and IGAD had e ective involvement in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement o 2005 in Sudan.ix. The United States has brought considerable diplomatic clout to the region be ore in the 2005 Peace Agreement and the Algiers Agreement o 2000, which wasintended to originally end the con ict.


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capacity through IGAD, which clearly has a vested interest in the region, would give sustainability to the interactions between thestates in the region. There ore, the last speci c policy recommendation o this paper is to build the regional institutions, namelyIGAD, in order to create an environment more conducive to aid.

As the current IGAD Executive Secretary stated in a recent interview when asked about what the international community shoulddo with regards to Somalia, he said listen to IGAD [because] member states are neighbors o Somalia. It is in the interest o IGADmembers that there is a permanent settlement in Somalia. 24 IGAD has not been entirely success ul in orchestrating aid e orts, butthe member states o IGAD do have the most to gain or lose through the betterment o their region as a whole. I IGAD were to bekept accountable and actively partnered with the United States then the orchestration o aid activities throughout the region would

run more smoothly and possibly lead to regional sel -su ciency, even in con ict resolution attempts.

The Horn o A rica remains one o the most unstable regions o the world. Un ortunately, it will most likely stay that way or yearsto come given the complex way interactions and connectivity that exist between its countries. Foreign aid to the region is greatlyconstrained by the political and civil situations in the region that are currently mired in con ict. The goal o the United States shouldbe to eliminate some o these political and civil situations that are constraining oreign aid. Despite these di culties that are im-mediately presented, the United States clearly possesses incentives to assist this di cult region. The United States must recognizeits unique ability to bring diplomatic clout and development to this desperate region and then act to bring stability to a region that

since independence has never truly known peace.

1. Lyons, Terrence. 2006. Avoiding Con ict in the Horn o A rica. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.2. Patman, Robert. 2010. Strategic Short all. Santa Barbara: Praeger.3. Woodward, Peter. 2006. US Foreign Policy and the Horn o A rica. Hampshire, England: Ashgate.4. UPI Emerging Threats. Somali Government Push Makes Headway. International Security and Counter Terrorism Re erence Center. (2011). EBSCOhost.com5. International Crisis Group. Somalia: The Transitional Government on Li e Support. 21 February 2011. Retrieved rom http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/a rica/horn-o -a rica/somalia/170%20Somalia%20The%20Transitional%20Government%20on%20Li e%20Support.ashx6. Peter Cave. South Sudan to Become One o the Newest and Poorest Countries. ABC News. January 10 2011. Accessed March 6, 2011. http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2011/s3109928.htm7. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook. Last modi ed February 28, 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- actbook/region/region_a r.html

8. Milner, Kate. Flashback 1984: Portrait o a Famine. BBC Online. April 6 2000. Accessed February 2, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/a rica/703958.stm9. Knips, Vivien. Review o the Livestock Sector in the Horn o A rica (IGAD Countries). Food and Agriculture Organization o the United Nations. 2004. FAOOnline.10. Reid, Richard. 2009. Eritreas External Relations. London: Chatham House.11. Department o State. US-Sudan Relations. Last modi ed 2011, http://sudan.usembassy.gov/ussudan_relations.html12. Saul, Jonathan. How Will Somalia Piracy A ect Shipping. Reuters. February 10 2011. Accessed February 13, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/10/piracy-tankers-idUSLDE7191BY2011021013. Department o State. Advancing Freedom and Democracy. Last modi ed May 2010, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/a dr/14.Slavin, Barbara. U.S. Support Key to Ethiopias Invasion. USA Today Online. January 1 2007. Accessed February 12, 2011. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-01-07-ethiopia_x.htm15. UN News Centre. Security Council Welcomes Agreement Between Eritrea and Djibouti to End Border Dispute. UN News Centre Online. June 11 2010. AccessedFebruary 15, 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=35005&Cr=djibouti&Cr1=16. Congressional Research Service. House o Representatives. Hearing on the Horn o A rica: Current Conditions and US Policy. 111th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2010.17. The White House. Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy. Last modi ed September 22 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-o ce/2010/09/22/ act-sheet-us-global-development-policy18. United States Agency or International Development. Feed the Future: East A rica FY 2010 Implementation Plan. Last modi ed 2010, http://www. eedthe uture.gov/implementation.html19. Department o State. Foreign Assistance by Organizational Unit. Last modi ed 2011, http://www. oreignassistance.gov/OULanding.aspx20. Shay, Shaul. 2006. Somalia Between Jihad and Restoration. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.21. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development. About Us. Last modi ed January 9 2010, http://igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=12422. Latham, Brian. East A rica Should Begin Planning or Food Crisis, Fewsnet Says. Bloomberg. February 24 2011. Accessed March 5, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-24/east-a rica-should-begin-planning- or- ood-crisis- ewsnet-says.html23. The Australian. Eritrea Warned on Al-Shabaab Links . The Australian. August 10 2009. Accessed March 2, 2011. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/eritrea-warned-on-al-shabaab-links/story-e6 rg6so-122575958619024. IRIN News. Horn o A rica: IGAD Chie Interviewed on Humanitarian, Political Challenges. IRIN News Online. February 1 2011. Accessed February 12, 2011, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=91800

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Evaluating U.S. Foreign Policy and Effectiveness in the Horn of Africa