Examples of Employment of Tanks in Night Fighting on the European Land Mass During World War II

8/6/2019 Examples of Employment of Tanks in Night Fighting on the European Land Mass During World War II

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EXAMPLES OF EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS INNIGHT FIGHTING ON THE EUROPEAN LAND

MASS DURING WORLD WAR II

[Note: This manuscript was prepared on 2 June 1966 by MartinBlumenson, a historian assigned to the Office of the Chief of MilitaryHistory (now US Army Center of Military History) for reference use bymembers of the Office of the Chief of Staff, Army. It is typical of thekinds of "staff support" projects routinely carried out by the Center.

The original is on file in the Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC)under file number 2-3.7 AC.Y, which should be cited in footnotes, alongwith the title. It is reproduced here with only those limitedmodifications required to adapt to the World Wide Web; spelling,punctuation, and slang usage have not been altered from the original.Where modern explanatory notes were required, they have beeninserted as italicized text in square brackets.]

EXAMPLES OF EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN NIGHT FIGHTING ONTHE EUROPEAN LAND MASS DURING WORLD WAR II

1. In order to assure agreement on the definition and the parametersof the problem, certain types of action have been eliminated. They are:

a. Tanks in an artillery role.

b. Tanks in tactical marches.

c. Tanks in meeting engagements.


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d. Attack movements starting during the night butdesigned to get armor to the LD or to the enemy MLR bydawn, the actual battle to be fought during the day.

e. Daylight attacks turning into exploitation or pursuit and

pressed beyond dusk and into the hours of darkness tocomplete the successful action.

2. Bona fide and documented tank attacks made during the hours ofdarkness in World War II are few in number. Some examples arepresented here in brief form.

a. Full-scale attack:

(1) Operation TOTALIZE, a night attacklaunched by the First Canadian Army formpositions south of Caen toward Falaise. Theattack started at 2300, 7 August 1944, whenmore than 1,000 RAF planes, including heavybombers, dropped more than 5,000 tons ofbombs in front of the ground troops. As 720artillery pieces shelled the enemy and lightedthe battlefield with flares, as Bofors guns firedtracer bullets to mark the direction of theattack, and as searchlights provided artificial

sunlight, two divisions moved out aroundmidnight. Preceded by

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tanks with flailing mechanisms to detonateenemy mines and by engineers who cleared

routes through German mine fields, eightcolumns of armor, each with four vehiclesabreast, advanced. Infantrymen followed inarmored personnel carriers with the mission ofdetrucking at appropriate places to mop upbypassed strongpoints. Despite dense clouds ofdust mixed with ground mist, despite vehicularcollisions, despite inevitable losses in direction,


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the Canadians broke through substantialGerman defenses for a distance of three milesby dawn. Source: Martin Blumenson, Breakoutand Pursuit, pp. 479-80.

b. Surprise raid.

(1) German 3d Panzer Division. 25 October1941. Attacking out of a bridgehead on theSusha River to gain access to the Mzensk-Tularoad, a brigade commander decided to make anight raid with the 18th Panzer Regiment. Hestarted moving with one battalion at 1800,advanced slowly in pitch-black darkness, and,just before reaching the road objective, raninto enemy trucks, which turned out to belong

to a Russian tank-repair depot. In a sharpexchange of fire, several Russian trucks weredestroyed; the others escaped in the darkness.The German tank battalion moved to the road,established blocking positions, and enabled theentire XXIV Panzer Corps to advance along theroad in the morning. Source: Oskar Munzel,Panzer-Taktik (Neckargemuend, Germany,1959) p. 108.

(2) 83d Division and part of the attached 736th

Tank Battalion. 1 March 1945. A regimentaltask force attempted to seize by stealth abridge over the Rhine at Oberkassel, movingduring the night, trying to deceive theGermans on the identity of the column.

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The task force reached the outskirts ofOberkassel, but was discovered at dawn. Thealarm was given, and the Germans destroyedthe bridge as the task force was rushingforward to seize it. Source: Charles B.MacDonald, The Last Offensive, (unpublishedmanuscript) Chapter IX, p. 22.


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(3) Task Force Baum: CCB, 4th ArmoredDivision. 26-27 March 1945. A tank company,joined with an infantry company andsupporting elements, struck out from friendlylines to go approximately 50 miles into enemy-

held territory and liberate a German campconfining American officer prisoners of war.Streaking through the enemy rear during thehours of darkness, the task force was detectedshortly after daylight by the enemy. The taskforce reached its objective but was destroyedas it was trying to return to friendly lines.Source: John Toland, The Last 100 Days, pp.287-99.

(4) Task Force Hollingsworth: CCB, 2d Armored

Division. 11 April 1945. A column of tanksstruck out from Magdeburg after darkness tocapture a bridge across the Elbe atSchoenebeck. The tanks came within a few feetof the bridge but were unable to take it in theface of determined German fire. By the time anew attack with infantry could be mounted, theGermans had demolished the structure.Source: Charles B. MacDonald, The LastOffensive, (unpublished manuscript) ChapterXVII, pp. 22-23; Cornelius Ryan, The Last

Battle, pp. 305-10.

c. Counterattack:

(1) German 5th Parachute Regiment. 29November 1944. Two companies of the 26thInfantry attacked at noon and took the villageof Merode by darkness. The Germanscounterattacked during the night, using

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at least one tank, probably more. They retookthe village before the Americans, beset withconfusion, could get supporting tanks into the


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village to bolster the infantry. Charles B.MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp.490-91.

d. Breakout from encirclement.

(1) Parts of the 2d SS Panzer Division, the 17thSS Engineer Battalion, the 6th ParachuteRegiment, and the 17th SS Panzer GrenadierDivision were trapped near the village ofRoncey in the Cotentin of Normandy late in July1944. They tried to break through a series ofroadblocks established by the 2d ArmoredDivision to ring the encircled Germans. Shortlybefore dawn, 29 July, about thirty enemy tanksand other vehicles, led by an 88-mm. Self-

propelled gun, approached a cross-roadsdefended by a company of American armoredinfantry and a company of tanks. Germaninfantrymen crawled along the ditches besidethe road and half a dozen German tanks andarmored vehicles assaulted frontally to forceopen an escape route. The self-propelled gunin the lead overran the American defensive lineand was about to make a breakthrough wenrifle shots killed the driver and gunner. As thegun carriage blocked the road, Germans and

Americans battled for the crossroads untildaybreak, when the Germans withdrew,leaving 17 dead and 150 wounded. Americanlosses were less than 50 casualties, one tank,and one halftrack.

About the same time, several miles away,about 15 German tanks and several hundredtroops overran an outpost manned by aninfantry company. The company commanderwas killed at once, and the troops fell back half

a mile into the positions of an armored fieldartillery battalion,

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which fired for thirty minutes and held offfurther German attack until nearby armoredinfantrymen arrived and re-established theoutpost. They found 7 destroyed Mark IV tanksand counted 125 German dead. Some Germans

had escaped.

German groups struck the armored defensiveline again during the following night of 29 July.One of the largest was a group of about 1,000troops and nearly 100 armored vehicles, whichstruck at the cross-roads of St. Denis le Gast intwo columns. A shot by a Mark V, which pokedits gun through a hedgerow, destroyed thecommand halftrack of the American tankbattalion, and the tank continued to fire and

set vehicles at the command post ablaze. TheAmericans became disorganized and fell back,relinquishing the crossroads. As the Germanspoured through the opening, the Americansrallied and returned to fight an intense close-range battle. By morning, American troopsagain held firm hold on St. Denis le Gast;against losses of 100 men and 12 vehicles,they had killed 130 enemy, wounded 124,captured 500, and destroyed at least 25vehicles, of which 7 were tanks.

At Cambry, shortly after midnight of 29 July,about 2,500 Germans made an organizedbreak. The point of the attack overran a tankroadblock and threatened to crush thedefenses held by a company each of tanks andinfantry. American tankfire at very short rangedestroyed the momentum of the Germanattack, which fell apart as panic-stricken troopstried to flee. At the end of a six-hourengagement, 450 Germans were killed, 1,000

were prisoners, and about 100 vehicles of alltypes were destroyed; the American losseswere about 50 killed and 60 wounded. Source:Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp.277-81.

(2) The German breakout from the Argentan-Falaise pocket was so large in scope, so


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disjointed in sequence, and so poor indocumentation that only a fragmentary recordsurvives. The overall operation consisted of twoparts, first, a withdrawal, which started on thenight of 16 August 1944 after the failure of the

Mortain counterattack, and second, a breakout,which started on the night of 19 August 1944after Allied troops closed the pocket. Duringthe first phase, the withdrawals made duringthe hours of darkness on three successivenights were accomplished for the most partwithout intense combat. During the secondphase, the breakout operations conductedduring the hours of darkness on two successivenights were the result for the most part ofindividual, fragmented efforts. Commanders

tried to employ their armor, when tanks wereavailable to them, at the point of each column,in the rear guard, and to a certain extent ascovering forces on the flanks. Success inescaping the closing Allied ring depended onindividual initiative of small unit commanders,on unit morale and will to fight, and on purechancethe good fortune, for example, offinding an intact bridge or shallow ford. Anaccount of the second phase of the breakout,which is more relevant to the problem, may be

found in Martin Blumenson, Breakout andPursuit, pp. 542 ff.

3. There was much night fighting by tanks of both sides during thebattle of the Bulge, not all of it documented. The following examples,taken from Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: The Battle of the Bulge (pagenumbers are cited after each example) have been divided intosuccessful and unsuccessful actions from the point of view of theattacking armor. An

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example fitting neither category is added. A summary statement isappended on the night-fighting experience of the 4th Armored Divisionduring its drive to Bastogne.

a. Successful actions.

(1) During the exceptionally dark night of 16December 1944, a regimental armored taskforce from the 1st SS Panzer Division overranand engulfed two platoons of American infantryat Bucholz. Moving into Honsfeld whileAmerican troops were pulling out, the leadingGerman tanks simply joined the Americantraffic and, led by a man signaling with aflashlight, rolled down the village streets.American troops scrambled out of town as

Germans poured in from all sides. Pp. 90-91.

(2) Mark IV and Panther tanks of the 3d PanzerRegiment reached a roadblock protectingBastogne and defended by an understrengthtank battalion of CCR, 9th Armored Divisionafter darkness on 17 December 1944.Sweeping the area with machine gun fire toclear any infantry who might be protecting theAmerican tanks, the panzers overran anddestroyed two tank platoons, set other vehicles

ablaze with tracer bullets, and knocked out theroadblock. Pp. 295-296.

(3) An hour before midnight, 20 December, the1st Battalion, 119th Infantry (30th Division)_and a tank company holding a sanatoriumbuilding on a hill on the edge of Stoumontcame under attack. German tanks inchedforward to positions from which they fireddirectly into the sanatorium. American tanksbrought up were unable to negotiate the steep

banks of the hill, and one was set afire by aGerman bazooka, two others were knocked outby German tank fire. These burning tanks andsome outbuildings set afire lighted theapproaches to the main building


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and prevented further American tank

maneuver. German tanks then ran in closeenough to fire through the windows of thesanatorium. After furious close-in fighting, theGermans took possession of the large buildingand drove the Americans off the hill. Pp. 349-51.

(4) The 18th Volks Grenadier Division attackingalong the Schoenberg road toward St. Vithmounted what turned out to be the finalassault at 2000, 21 December, against a 106th

Division roadblock incorporating threeSherman tanks into the defenses. A Germaninfantry regiment, supported by one or twoplatoons of Tiger tanks, quickly knocked outthe Shermans and broke through the line offoxholes held by exhausted men who hadbattled for several days against overwhelmingodds. Pp. 404-05.

(5) The 1st Battalion, 319th Infantry (80thDivision) waited until after dark on 23

Decemberwhen ten tanks formerly attachedto the 28th Division arrivedto attack Kehman.The task force destroyed three German tanksand freed the village. Pp. 518-19.

(6) The 2d Battalion, 104th Infantry (26thDivision) and a few tanks attacked at 0045, 25December to take Eschdorf. When German fireturned back the infantry, three tanks churnedto the fore through the snow until checked by asmall creek, extended by an antitank ditch. A

second effort launched at 0400 succeeded onlyin getting as far as the first effort. But becausethe tanks in the center pinned down theGerman defenders, the American companieson the flanks broke through and moved intothe town. Pp. 542-43.


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(7) At 2100, 24 December, the 2d SS PanzerDivision attacked toward Manhay, whereelements of the 3d, 7th, and 9th Armored

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Divisions were located, some withdrawing fromdefensive positions previously held in thegeneral area. On that beautifully clear andmoonlit night, the glistening and hard-packedsnow gave goo surface for tank movement. Acaptured Sherman tank led the German tank

column and deceived the American defendersat a roadblock in front of Manhay. FourAmerican Shermans fell to enemy bazookasand two were crippled. A thousand yards or sobeyond, where another roadblock wasdefended by an understrength rifle companyand ten medium tanks dug into hull defilade,the German column, still led by the capturedSherman, got close to the defenders, let looseflares that blinded the dug-in Shermans andknocked them out. Around 2230, the Germans

were entering Manhay, where they knockedout five more American tanks. Pp. 587-89.

b. Unsuccessful actions.

(1) About 1930, 16 December, three Germantanks and a platoon or so of infantry simplyrolled through the line of the 1st Battalion, 9thInfantry (2d Division) and proceeded towardRocherath. Half an hour later, when moreGerman tanks came along the same road, they

struck mines and were stopped. American firesthen turned them back. After an hour ofreorganization, the Germans attacked again.Five or six German tanks rolled to within a fewhundred yards of the foxhole line. Joined byinfantry, the German tanks broke through. Butthe Americans refused to panic and checkedthe attack by midnight. Pp. 109-10.


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(5) At 1845, 23 December, a regiment ofPanzer Lehr, employing at least two tankcompanies, began a co-ordinated attackagainst Marvile, held by the 2d Battalion, 327thGlider Infantry (101st Airborne Division) and a

tank battalion of CCB, 10th Armored Division.The German tankers overran defenses on theedge of Marvie but were unable to enter thevillage. They launched a second attack atmidnight, but were stopped

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again by American tank and tank destroyerfires against the panzers silhouetted by theglare of burning buildings. The battle endedjust before dawn with both opponents holdingpart of Marvie. Pp. 471-72.

(6) A tank battalion of CCA, 4th ArmoredDivision was driving to reach Bastogne on 22December. Approaching Warnach as night wasfalling, a tank company at the head of the

column entered the village and ran intoGerman fire. While tank destroyers shelled thehouses, a light tank platoon and a rifle platoonadvanced into the village to clear it. Theseelements were ambushed, and one tank andmost of the foot troops, got out. Antitank fireswere effective. Not until after daylight did theAmericans take the village. Pp. 529-30.

c. Tanks defending a village.

The 1st SS Panzer Division sent a columncomposed of infantry and assault guns towardRecht. About 0200, the advance guard hit thevillage defended by a tank battalion operatingunder the headquarters of CCR, 7th ArmoredDivision. Unwilling to risk his tanks withoutinfantry protection in a night fight throughnarrow streets and uncertain of the German


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strength, the American commander ordered awithdrawal after a sharp 450-minuteengagement. P. 280.

d. The following summary statement is appended to

indicate the impracticability of continuous armored action:"Attack around the Clock, enjoined by General Patton, hadnot been notably successful so far as the tank arm wasconcerned. From commander down, the 4th Armored[Division] was opposed to further use of the weakened tankbattalions in hours of darkness." P. 531.

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4. The following is a paraphrased excerpt of a German observation ofthe use of tanks in night operations on the Russian front.

Combat at Night. "Battles which extend into darkness or suddenencounters during the night generally lead quickly to a static firefightor to an immediate breaking off of the engagement." "The scope of anight attack must generally be restricted and the objective limited."These quotations from the German manual on troop leadership wereregarded in peacetime training as accepted doctrine. The campaign in

the East produced a decisive change. The increased number andeffectiveness of modern weapons forced a shift to purely nightoperations of ever increasing scope. The growing importance of airpower also contributed to the practice of assembling, deploying, andreadying forces in darkness. Not only the scope and importance ofnight operations, but the manner of their execution changedsignificantly. Before the war and at the outset, night operations werenormally carried out in stealth. During the course of the war, inaddition to surreptitious attacks by limited numbers of infantry,powerful attacks were made with concentrated forces employingsuperior mobility and heavy firepower. In these, tanks and/or armored

personnel carriers played a decisive role, particularly when enemyfirepower was limited. Tanks in combination with 1) halftracks, 2)closely following infantry, or 3) self-propelled assault guns carryinginfantry, and firing as they moved almost always had success if theyattained surprise. The approach of tanks at night gave the defender afeeling of helplessness.


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Combat in darkness or fog requires an especially high state of training,hardened and determined troops, special equipment, including devicesfor night vision, whether infra-red or radar, and maximum mental,

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physical, and moral exertion. Night operations, particularly largeattacks, must be thoroughly prepared. More time than normal isnecessary not only for reconnaissance on foot during the day but alsofor executing the operation on the battlefield. A failure in a nightoperation generally has a greater moral effect on the executing troopsthan a similar failure in the daytime.

In summary, night operations give certain advantages: reduce theeffectiveness of enemy ground weapons and air power; heighten themoral factors on the side of the attacker' conceal movements behindthe front and on the battlefield; as well as certain disadvantages:provoke greater difficulty in command, ground orientation,reconnaissance, security, and maintenance of contact among friendlyforces; reduce weapons support; reduce co-ordination with artillery.

The German practice of depending on the initiative of the small-unitleaders suffers in night operations because of the difficulty of co-ordinating the combat arms. Further, breaking enemy resistance bymeans of concentrated fires at certain times and places is oftenimpossible at night.

Finally, in night combat, the stronger will and the better nerves are

decisive. These are generally the decisive factors in day operations.

Night Attack and Night Pursuit. The Russians constantly improved andrefined their night attack methods during the war. In 1941-42, localsuccesses were insufficiently exploited. In 1942-43, large-scale attackswere pressed well after dark, though toward relatively shallow


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objectives, often simply to take the forward line of the Germanpositions.

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Usually, these attacks failed despite heavy expenditures of men andmateriel, because of poorly organized artillery support and the inabilityof Russian small-unit leaders to deal with German counterattackslaunched even by relatively small forces. From the end of 1943, theRussians normally executed night attacks toward deep objectives andused numerous tanks; they were frequently successful. Particularlygood examples are: the big Russian tank breakthrough on the night of

the second day of battle in the Baranov bridgehead in January, 1945;and the night attack on Berlin against a fluid German front in April,1945. In the Baranov bridgehead, Russian infantry followed a heavyartillery preparation and, with tank support, broke big gaps which wereexploited during the hours of darkness by tanks heading for deepobjectives.

The main characteristics of Russian night attacks were: deception as toplace of attack and method of execution; heavy concentration at the

point of breakthrough; and mass infiltration. In pursuit the Russiansoften used night attacks or night marches. Particularly impressive inthis respect was the advance of Russian tank forces at the end ofJanuary 1945 out of the Posen area via Landsberg an dem Warthetoward Stettin, which was carried out in a single night through thelarge and difficult forested area of the Landsberger Heide (heath)despite a heavy snowstorm. Source: Eike Middleldorf, Taktik imRusslandfeldzug (Darmstadt, Germany, 1956), pp. 196 ff.

5. A research report entitled "Armor in Night Attack," prepared at TheArmored School, Fort Knox, in 1949-1950:

a. recognized the very few references dealing with theemployment of armor in night attacks;


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b. stated that night operations give the benefit of secrecy

and surprise to the attacker;

c. reminded of the psychological advantage accruing tot heattacker because of his knowledge of when, where, andhow the attack is to be conducted;

d. repeated the necessity for thorough planning anddetailed reconnaissance;

e. warned of the extreme difficulty of maintaining control;

f. concluded that "Any unit with proper training andequipment is capable of conducting night operations as aroutine form of combat."

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Documents

Examples of Employment of Tanks in Night Fighting on the European Land Mass During World War II