Explaining US Strategy

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The State of the World: Explaining U.S. Strategy By George Friedman | February 28, 2012

The fall of the Soviet Union ended the European epoch, the period in which

European power dominated the world. It left the United States as the only global

power , something for which it was culturally and institutionally unprepared. Since

the end of World War II, the United States had defined its foreign policy in terms of

its confrontation with the Soviet Union. Virtually everything it did around the world in

some fashion related to this confrontation. The fall of the Soviet Union

simultaneously freed the United States from a dangerous confrontation and

eliminated the focus of its foreign policy.

In the course of a century, the United States had gone from marginal to world

power. It had waged war or Cold War from 1917 until 1991, with roughly 20 years of

peace between the two wars dominated by the Great Depression and numerous

interventions in Latin America. Accordingly, the 20th century was a time of conflict

and crisis for the United States. It entered the century without well-developed

governmental institutions for managing its foreign policy. It built its foreign policy

apparatus to deal with war and the threat of war; the sudden absence of an

adversary inevitably left the United States off balance.

After the Cold War

The post-Cold War period can be divided into three parts. A simultaneous optimism

and uncertainty marked the first, which lasted from 1992 until 2001. On one hand,

the fall of the Soviet Union promised a period in which economic development

supplanted war. On the other, American institutions were born in battle, so to



speak, so transforming them for a time of apparently extended peace was not easy.

Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton both pursued a policy built around

economic growth, with periodic and not fully predictable military interventions in

places such as Panama, Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo.

These interventions were not seen as critical to U.S. national security. In some

cases, they were seen as solving a marginal problem, such as Panamanian dictator

Manuel Noriega's drug trafficking. Alternatively, they were explained as primarily

humanitarian missions. Some have sought a pattern or logic to these varied

interventions; in fact, they were as random as they appeared, driven more by

domestic politics and alliance pressures than any clear national purpose. U.S.

power was so overwhelming that these interventions cost relatively little and risked

even less.

The period where indulgences could be tolerated ended on Sept. 11, 2001. At thatpoint, the United States faced a situation congruent with its strategic culture. It had

a real, if unconventional, enemy that posed a genuine threat to the homeland. The

institutions built up during and after World War II could function again effectively. In

an odd and tragic way, the United States was back in its comfort zone, fighting a

war it saw as imposed on it.

The period from 2001 until about 2007 consisted of a series of wars in the Islamic

world. Like all wars, they involved brilliant successes and abject failures. They can

be judged one of two ways. First, if the wars were intended to prevent al Qaeda

from ever attacking the United States again in the fashion of 9/11, they succeeded.Even if it is difficult to see how the war in Iraq meshes with this goal, all wars

involve dubious operations; the measure of war is success. If, however, the

purpose of these wars was to create a sphere of pro-U.S. regimes, stable and

emulating American values, they clearly failed.

By 2007 and the surge in Iraq, U.S. foreign policy moved into its present phase. No

longer was the primary goal to dominate the region. Rather, it was to withdraw from

the region while attempting to sustain regimes able to defend themselves and not

hostile to the United States. The withdrawal from Iraq did not achieve this goal; the

withdrawal from Afghanistan probably will not either. Having withdrawn from Iraq,the United States will withdraw from Afghanistan regardless of the aftermath. The

United States will not end its involvement in the region, and the primary goal of

defeating al Qaeda will no longer be the centerpiece.

President Barack Obama continued the strategy his predecessor, George W. Bush,

set in Iraq after 2007. While Obama increased forces beyond what Bush did in



Afghanistan, he nevertheless accepted the concept of a surge -- the increase of

forces designed to facilitate withdrawal. For Obama, the core strategic problem was

not the wars but rather the problem of the 1990s -- namely, how to accommodate

the United States and its institutions to a world without major enemies.

The Failure of Reset

The reset button Hillary Clinton gave to the Russians symbolized Obama's strategy.

Obama wanted to reset U.S. foreign policy to the period before 9/11, a period when

U.S. interventions, although frequent, were minor and could be justified as

humanitarian. Economic issues dominated the period, and the primary issue was

managing prosperity. It also was a period in which U.S.-European and U.S.-

Chinese relations fell into alignment, and when U.S.-Russian relations were stable.

Obama thus sought a return to a period when the international system was stable,

pro-American and prosperous. While understandable from an American point ofview, Russia, for example, considers the 1990s an unmitigated disaster to which it

must never return.

The problem in this strategy was that it was impossible to reset the international

system. The prosperity of the 1990s had turned into the difficulties of the post-2008

financial crisis. This obviously created preoccupations with managing the domestic

economy, but as we saw in our first installment , the financial crisis redefined the

way the rest of the world operated. The Europe, China and Russia of the 1990s no

longer existed, and the Middle East had been transformed as well.

During the 1990s, it was possible to speak of Europe as a single entity with the

expectation that European unity would intensify. That was no longer the case by

2010. The European financial crisis had torn apart the unity that had existed in the

1990s, putting European institutions under intense pressure along with trans-

Atlantic institutions such as NATO. In many ways, the United States was irrelevant

to the issues the European Union faced. The Europeans might have wanted money

from the Americans, but they did not want 1990s-style leadership.

China had also changed. Unease about the state of its economy had replaced the

self-confidence of the elite that had dominated during the 1990s in China. Itsexports were under heavy pressure, and concerns about social stability had

increased. China also had become increasingly repressive and hostile, at least

rhetorically, in its foreign policy.

In the Middle East, there was little receptivity to Obama's public diplomacy. In

practical terms, the expansion of Iranian power was substantial. Given Israeli fears



over Iranian nuclear weapons, Obama found himself walking a fine line between

possible conflict with Iran and allowing events to take their own course.

Limiting Intervention

This emerged as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy. Where previously the United

States saw itself as having an imperative to try to manage events, Obama clearly

saw that as a problem. As seen in this strategy, the United States has limited

resources that have been overly strained during the wars. Rather than attempting to

manage foreign events, Obama is shifting U.S. strategy toward limiting intervention

and allowing events to proceed on their own.

Strategy in Europe clearly reflects this. Washington has avoided any attempt to lead

the Europeans to a solution even though the United States has provided massive

assistance via the Federal Reserve. This strategy is designed to stabilize ratherthan to manage. With the Russians, who clearly have reached a point of self-

confidence, the failure of an attempt to reset relations resulted in a withdrawal of

U.S. focus and attention in the Russian periphery and a willingness by Washington

to stand by and allow the Russians to evolve as they will. Similarly, whatever the

rhetoric of China and U.S. discussions of redeployment to deal with the Chinese

threat, U.S. policy remains passive and accepting.

It is in Iran that we see this most clearly. Apart from nuclear weapons, Iran is

becoming a major regional power with a substantial sphere of influence. Rather

than attempt to block the Iranians directly, the United States has chosen to stand byand allow the game to play out, making it clear to the Israelis that it prefers

diplomacy over military action, which in practical terms means allowing events to

take their own course.

This is not necessarily a foolish policy. The entire notion of the balance of power is

built on the assumption that regional challengers confront regional opponents who

will counterbalance them. Balance-of-power theory assumes the leading power

intervenes only when an imbalance occurs. Since no intervention is practical in

China, Europe or Russia, a degree of passivity makes sense. In the case of Iran,

where military action against its conventional forces is difficult and against itsnuclear facilities risky, the same logic applies.

In this strategy, Obama has not returned to the 1990s. Rather, he is attempting to

stake out new ground. It is not isolationism in its classic sense, as the United States

is now the only global power. He appears to be engineering a new strategy,

acknowledging that many outcomes in most of the world are acceptable to the



United States and that no one outcome is inherently superior or possible to achieve.

The U.S. interest lies in resuming its own prosperity; the arrangements the rest of

the world makes are, within very broad limits, acceptable.

Put differently, unable to return U.S. foreign policy to the 1990s and unwilling and

unable to continue the post-9/11 strategy, Obama is pursuing a policy of

acquiescence. He is decreasing the use of military force and, having limited

economic leverage, allowing the system to evolve on its own. Implicit in this

strategy is the existence of overwhelming military force, particularly naval power.

Europe is not manageable through military force, and it poses the most serious

long-term threat. As Europe frays, Germany's interests may be better served in a

relationship with Russia. Germany needs Russian energy, and Russia needs

German technology. Neither is happy with American power, and together they may

limit it. Indeed, an entente between Germany and Russia was a founding fear ofU.S. foreign policy from World War I until the Cold War. This is the only combination

that could conceivably threaten the United States. The American counter here is to

support Poland, which physically divides the two, along with other key allies in

Europe, and the United States is doing this with a high degree of caution.

China is highly vulnerable to naval force because of the configuration of its coastal

waters, which provides choke points for access to its shores. The ultimate Chinese

fear is an American blockade, which the weak Chinese navy would be unable to

counter, but this is a distant fear. Still, it is the ultimate American advantage.

Russia's vulnerability lies in the ability of its former fellow members of the Soviet

Union, which it is trying to organize into a Eurasian Union, to undermine its post-

Soviet agenda. The United States has not interfered in this process significantly, but

it has economic incentives and covert influence it could use to undermine or at least

challenge Russia. Russia is aware of these capabilities and that the United States

has not yet used them.

The same strategy is in place with Iran. Sanctions on Iran are unlikely to work, as

they are too porous and China and Russia will not honor them. Still, the United

States pursues them not for what they will achieve but for what they will avoid --namely, direct action. The assumption underlying U.S. quiescence, rhetoric aside,

is that regional forces, the Turks in particular, will be forced to deal with the Iranians

themselves, and that patience will allow a balance of power to emerge.

The Risks of Inaction



U.S. strategy under Obama is classic in the sense that it allows the system to

evolve as it will, thereby allowing the United States to reduce its efforts. On the

other hand, U.S. military power is sufficient that should the situation evolve

unsatisfactorily, intervention and reversal is still possible. Obama has to fight the

foreign policy establishment, particularly the U.S. Defense Department and

intelligence community, to resist older temptations. He is trying to rebuild the foreign

policy architecture away from the World War II-Cold War model, and that takes

time.

The weakness in Obama's strategy is that the situation in many regions could

suddenly and unexpectedly move in undesirable directions. Unlike the Cold War

system, which tended to react too soon to problems, it is not clear that the current

system won't take too long to react. Strategies create psychological frameworks

that in turn shape decisions, and Obama has created a situation wherein the United

States may not react quickly enough if the passive approach were to collapsesuddenly.

It is difficult to see the current strategy as a permanent model. Before balances of

power are created, great powers must ensure that a balance is possible. In Europe,

within China, against Russia and in the Persian Gulf, it is not clear what the balance

consists of. It is not obvious that the regional balance will contain emerging powers.

Therefore, this is not a classic balance-of-power strategy. Rather it is an ad hoc

strategy imposed by the financial crisis and its impact on psychology and by war-

weariness. These issues cannot be ignored, but they do not provide a stable

foundation for a long-term policy, which will likely replace the one Obama ispursuing now.

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Explaining US Strategy