32
About the authors Dima Mahdi is a researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies whose work focuses on sociopolitical issues concerning Lebanese as well as refugees residing in Lebanon. She has contributed to projects covering the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi was an International Parliamentary Stipend Fellow at the German Parliament conducting research on social, political, and economic issues. Mahdi earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science and International Affairs from the Lebanese American University. Daniel Garrote Sanchez is a senior researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. His areas of work include refugees’ access to job opportunities and social services, development of lagging regions in Lebanon, and citizens’ preferences on government spending. Prior to joining LCPS, he served as a labor market and migration consultant for the World Bank and the Ministry of Labor of Saudi Arabia. He also worked for six years as an economic researcher at the Central Bank of Spain covering a range of macroeconomic topics such as fiscal policy, labor markets, and deleveraging. There, he published several papers and represented the institution in international fora. Garrote Sanchez holds a master's degree in Public Administration and International Development from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. LCPS Policy Brief February 2019 Number 38 How do People in Lebanon Perceive Corruption? Dima Mahdi and Daniel Garrote Sanchez E xecutive Summary Lebanon has a consistently poor corruption track record, a fact not lost on the Lebanese public, among whom perceptions of corruption are high. This brief examines these perceptions using a countrywide opinion survey of 1,200 Lebanese respondents conducted in the fall of 2018. It aims to better flesh out perceptions of corruption and their demographic, socio- economic, political, and regional characteristics, factors which are integral to forming an understanding of how the Lebanese public regards corrupt practices. Additionally, the brief examines the prevalence, implications, and drivers of corruption and identifies actors who are perceived to be participating in corrupt practices and their reasons for doing so. Citizens from poor regions, those in high income brackets, and Shia and Druze perceive higher levels of corruption. Individuals with high levels of education, political connections, and strong sectarian identities have lower perceptions of corruption. Citizens also perceive widespread corruption across local, regional, and national institutions. More than half of Lebanese believe that ethical values, greed, financial needs, and familial pressure act as impetuses for participating in corruption. A similar portion of Lebanese believe that citizens’ motivations for engaging in corruption include regular interactions with an inefficient public bureaucracy, the desire for special treatment from public officials, and, more generally, achieving desired outcomes. In light of Lebanon's weak advancements in addressing corruption at the legislative and administrative levels, this brief recommends resorting to alternative methods targeting perceptions of corruption specifically through a bottom-up approach using information campaigns that have the potential to influence citizens’ behavior and decisions. The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies ا ل م ر ك ز ا ل ل ب ن ا ن ي ل ل د ر ا س ا ت

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Page 1: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

About the authorsDima Mahdi is a researcher at the Lebanese Center for PolicyStudies whose work focuses on sociopolitical issues concerningLebanese as well as refugees residing in Lebanon. She has contributed to projects coveringthe 2018 parliamentary elections,development of lagging regions,and sectarianism in Lebanon.Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi wasan International ParliamentaryStipend Fellow at the GermanParliament conducting researchon social, political, and economicissues. Mahdi earned a bachelor'sdegree in Political Science andInternational Affairs from theLebanese American University.

Daniel Garrote Sanchez is a seniorresearcher at the Lebanese Centerfor Policy Studies. His areas ofwork include refugees’ access tojob opportunities and social services, development of laggingregions in Lebanon, and citizens’preferences on governmentspending. Prior to joining LCPS,he served as a labor market andmigration consultant for theWorld Bank and the Ministry ofLabor of Saudi Arabia. He alsoworked for six years as an economic researcher at the Central Bank of Spain covering arange of macroeconomic topicssuch as fiscal policy, labor markets, and deleveraging. There,he published several papers andrepresented the institution in international fora. GarroteSanchez holds a master's degreein Public Administration and International Development fromthe Harvard Kennedy School ofGovernment.

LCPS Policy Brief

February 2019 Number 38

How do People inLebanon Perceive Corruption?Dima Mahdi and Daniel Garrote Sanchez

Executive SummaryLebanon has a consistently poor corruption track record, a fact not loston the Lebanese public, among whom perceptions of corruption are high.This brief examines these perceptions using a countrywide opinion surveyof 1,200 Lebanese respondents conducted in the fall of 2018. It aims tobetter flesh out perceptions of corruption and their demographic, socio-economic, political, and regional characteristics, factors which are integralto forming an understanding of how the Lebanese public regards corruptpractices. Additionally, the brief examines the prevalence, implications,and drivers of corruption and identifies actors who are perceived to beparticipating in corrupt practices and their reasons for doing so.

Citizens from poor regions, those in high income brackets, and Shiaand Druze perceive higher levels of corruption. Individuals with high levels of education, political connections, and strong sectarian identitieshave lower perceptions of corruption. Citizens also perceive widespreadcorruption across local, regional, and national institutions. More than halfof Lebanese believe that ethical values, greed, financial needs, and familialpressure act as impetuses for participating in corruption. A similar portionof Lebanese believe that citizens’ motivations for engaging in corruptioninclude regular interactions with an inefficient public bureaucracy, the desire for special treatment from public officials, and, more generally,achieving desired outcomes.

In light of Lebanon's weak advancements in addressing corruption atthe legislative and administrative levels, this brief recommends resortingto alternative methods targeting perceptions of corruption specificallythrough a bottom-up approach using information campaigns that havethe potential to influence citizens’ behavior and decisions.

The Lebanese Centerfor Policy Studies

تاساردلل ينانبللا زكرملا

Page 2: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

LCPS Policy Brief2

IntroductionCorruption is prevalent across the Lebanese public sector, due in no small partto Lebanon’s confessional power-sharing system, which has institutionalizedelite capture of private and public sector interests, weakened the state’s centralauthority and public institutions, and exacerbated clientelism and sectariancleavages.1 Moreover, the country’s oversight institutions—such as the CentralInspection Board and Court of Accounts—are often ineffective and lack thepower to take decisive action to prevent the misuse of public office for privategain. As such, confessional interests, patronage networks, and clientelismundermine service provision and good governance practices.2

In order to better understand individuals’ perceptions of corruption in theLebanese public sector, Statistics Lebanon—in consultation with the LebaneseCenter for Policy Studies—conducted the Lebanon Public Opinion Surveyin October 2018 (LPOS 2018). The survey targeted 1,200 respondents, wasdistributed equally between genders, and is representative of the confessionaland regional distribution of Lebanese citizens.3 The conclusions of this policybrief are based on descriptive statistics and regression analysis derived fromthe LPOS 2018.

An Overview of Corruption in LebanonAccording to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index—which ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly clean)—Lebanon’s scorehas remained at 28 for four consecutive years since 2015. Lebanon was ranked138 out of 180 countries in 2018, making it the fifth-worst country in termsof corruption across the MENA region after Syria (178), Yemen (176), Libya(170), and Iraq (168).4 Moreover, the World Bank’s Control of Corruptionindicator—which ranges from -2.5 (weak governance performance) to +2.5(strong governance performance)—shows that Lebanon’s control of corruptionhas worsened since 2002 (figure 1). This capacity has deteriorated since theearly 2000s, dropping from -0.5 to -1. In comparison to other countries withsimilar levels of GDP per capita and other upper-middle income countries inthe region, Lebanon has significantly less control of corruption.

1Le Borgne, E., T. Jacobs, and P.Barbour. 2015. ‘SystematicCountry Diagnostic: Lebanon,Promoting Poverty Reductionand Shared Prosperity.’ TheWorld Bank Group.http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/698161468179049613/pdf/97498-CAS-P151430-SecM2015-0202-IFC-SecM2015-0073-MIGA-SecM2015-0047-Box391476B-OUO-9.pdf

2Ibid.

4Transparency International.2018. ‘Corruption PerceptionsIndex 2018.’https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018#results

3The sample was distributedequally among genders with600 males and 600 femalessurveyed; is representative ofconfessional distribution with320 Sunnis, 310 Shia, 470Christians, and 100 Druzesurveyed; and is representativeof geographical distributionwith 80 respondents fromAkkar, 70 from Baalbek-Hermel,120 from Beirut, 80 from Bekaa,480 from Mount Lebanon, 70from Nabatiyeh, 170 from theNorth, and 130 from the South.

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How do People in Lebanon Perceive Corruption? 3

Figure 1

Control of Corruption 2002 – 2017

The prevalence of corruption is often associated with a lack of or weaktransparency and accountability. Anti-corruption literature focuses on goodgovernance, transparency, and accountability,5 through which trust in politiciansand public institutions is built.6 According to the World Economic Forum’sGlobal Competitiveness Index’sInstitutions Pillar 2017—whichmeasures a country’s institutionalenvironment and assesses theefficiency and behavior of publicand private stakeholders—Lebanon ranked 124 out of 137countries.7 As shown in table 1,Lebanon’s inefficient institutionsare tainted by low public trustin politicians, favoritism in government officials’ decision-making, weaktransparency in government policy-making, and the prevalence of irregularpayments and bribes.

... Lebanon’s inefficient institutionsare tainted by low public trust in politicians, favoritism in governmentofficials’ decision-making, weak transparency in government policy-making, and the prevalence of irregular payments and bribes

Source World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 2017.

Note Control of Corruption is measured on a scale of -2.5 (weak governance performance) and +2.5(strong governance performance). The average of comparative countries includes those with similarlevels of GDP per capita: Argentina, Belarus, Botswana, Bulgaria, Iran, Mexico, and Thailand.

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

-0.50

-1.00

-1.502002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Lebanon Jordan Turkey Comparative Countries

5Lebanese TransparencyAssociation. 2009. ‘Towards aNational Anti-Corruption Strategy.’https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resources/Final_book_en.pdf

6Organisation for EconomicCo-operation and Development.2017. ‘Trust and Public Policy:How Better Governance CanHelp Rebuild Public Trust.’https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264268920-en

7World Economic Forum. 2017.‘The Global CompetitivenessIndex Report 2017-2018.’http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2017-2018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2017%E2%80%932018.pdf

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LCPS Policy Brief

Table 1

Lebanon’s ranking in the Global Competitiveness Index’s InstitutionsPillar

Although Lebanon has been a signatory to the International Conventionagainst Corruption since 2009,8 the country is ‘among the worst 20% of countriesworldwide in corruption, transparency, and lack of accountability.’9 Despitethe implementation of measures ostensibly aimed at combating corruptionin Lebanon, there has been a lack of substantial effort in prioritizing anti-corruption initiatives. For instance, although Prime Minister Saad Haririappointed a minister of state for combating corruption in December 2016, theministry was not given a clearly defined role, was not allocated adequatebudgetary or human resources, and the ministry's file is absent in thegovernment formed in February 2019.10 Recent anti-corruption legislationpassed by the parliament, such as the access to information law (10 February2017) and a law protecting whistleblowers (24 September 2018),11 have yetto be fully implemented.12 Additional noteworthy developments include theannouncement of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and its implementation

plan in April 2018, which wasprepared by the Office of theMinister of State for Adminis-trative Reform with the sup-port of the United NationsDevelopment Program.13 More-

over, the Finance and Budget Parliamentary Committee recently endorsed a draftlaw (19 December 2018) enabling the establishment of a National Commissionfor Combating Corruption, which is tasked with investigating public sectorcorruption allegations and overseeing the implementation of relevant laws. Asof publishing, the draft law remains inactive pending parliament ratification.14

Citizens Believe Corruption is a Widespread ProblemIn some instances, perceptions of corruption are affected by citizens’ sensi-tivity to corruption and the extent to which corrupt practices are perceivedas the norm.15 Findings derived from the LPOS 2018 show that an overwhelmingmajority (98%) of Lebanese believe that corruption is a very large or somewhatlarge problem in Lebanon. Furthermore, citizens observe a worsening trend in

4

8United Nations. 2003. ‘UnitedNationals Convention AgainstCorruption.’https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2003/12/20031209%2002-50%20PM/Ch_XVIII_14p.pdf

9Garrote Sanchez, D. 2018. ‘Comba-ting Corruption, a Necessary StepToward Improving Infrastructure.’Lebanese Center for Policy Studies.http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/publication.php?id=319

10Timour Azhari. 2018. ‘I Did WhatI Could’: Tueni defends anti-corruption efforts.’ The Daily Star.http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Oct-24/467320-i-did-what-i-could-tueni-defends-anti-corruption-efforts.ashx

11The Daily Star. 2018. ‘ParliamentPasses Series of Laws in EveningSession.’ http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Sep-24/464295-parliament-passes-e-transactions-law-in-evening-session.ashx

Public Trust in Politicians

Favoritism in Decisions of Government Officials

Transparency of Government Policy-making

Irregular Payments and Bribes

128

126

124

121

Rank Out of 137 Countries

Source World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2017.

… an overwhelming majority (98%) of Lebanese believe that corruption is a very large or somewhat large

problem in Lebanon

13Lebanese Office of the Ministerof State for Administrative Reform. 2018.

http://www.omsar.gov.lb/Cultures/en-US/Publications/Strategies/Documents/Anti-Corruption_Strategy.pdf

14The Daily Star. 2018. ‘CommitteeApproves Law to Establish NationalAnti-Corruption Commission.’http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Dec-19/472191-committee-ap-proves-law-to-establish-national-anti-corruption-commission.ashx

ةحفاكمل ةينطولا ةيجيتارتسالا‘’.3202 -8102 داسفلا

15Kaffenberger, M. 2012. ‘TheEffect of Educational Attainmenton Corruption Participation InSub-Saharan Africa.’ GraduateSchool of Vanderbilt University.

12According to Gherbal Initiative,a non-profit civil company thatsent out 133 applications orrequests for information toLebanese Administrations andreceived 34 responses, 19 ofwhich within the legal deadline.http://elgherbal.org/wp-content/uploads/rail/files/elgherbal_rail_report_en.pdf

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How do People in Lebanon Perceive Corruption? 5

corruption, with more than three-quarters of respondents concurring thatcorruption has strongly or somewhat increased in the past two years, comparedto only 19% reporting stable levels of corruption.

The literature on corruption shows mixed results on the relationship betweensocioeconomic status and perceptions of corruption. There is an inverserelationship between socioeconomic status—namely education and incomelevels—and perceptions of corruption, as people of low socioeconomic statusare those most harmed by corrupt practices, though this finding appliesprimarily to developed countries and is not as robust in developing countries.16

Education theoretically has two opposite effects regarding how people perceiveand engage in corruption.17 On the one hand, as education levels increase,perceptions of corruption decrease, due to the observation that educatedindividuals may exhibit a higher level of social responsibility and refrain fromengaging in corruption. On the other hand, research suggests that educationhas a positive effect on engaging in corruption, as more educated individualsare more likely to interact withpublic officials and more likely tobe exposed to corrupt practices,such as bribery.18 Similarly,wealthier individuals are morelikely to accept some degree of corruption.19 Taking socioeconomic differencesinto consideration in the analysis of the LPOS 2018 results reveals that moreeducated citizens report lower levels of corruption, and controlling for levelof education, citizens in higher income brackets perceive higher levels ofcorruption and worsening corruption in the last two years compared to citizensin lower income brackets. This leads to the conclusion that those with higherincomes whose wealth was obtained not through education but through otherchannels such as inheritance or political connections, may be more likely toengage in corrupt practices and thus report higher corruption levels.

From a regional lens, there are significant variations in perceptions ofcorruption, even after controlling for individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics.Given the limited availability of development data at the governorate level,night-time light activity is used as a proxy for economic development.20

Perceptions of corruption appear to be lowest in economically developedgovernorates. Figure 2 shows that citizens in Akkar, Baalbek-Hermel, andBekaa perceive a higher level of corruption21 compared to citizens in other,more developed regions. This may be because the poorest regions are dispro-portionately affected by corruption, which in turn further impacts povertylevels and economic growth.22

16Marda, K. and A. Ziegfeld. 2015.‘Socioeconomic status andcorruption perceptions aroundthe world’. SAGE. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168015580838

17Ibid.

19Gatti, R., S. Paternostro, andJ. Rigolini. 2003. ‘IndividualAttitudes Towards Corruption:Do Social Effects Matter?’ TheWorld Bank. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/33da/189cfb18fae422406ab6d847d6f6472a3fce.pdf

20The economic index is obtainedfrom night-time light datathat proxy economic activity,normalized and re-scaled sothat the scores range between0 (low) and 100 (high).

21The relative corruption levelsper region are obtained basedon multivariate regressionsthat control for individualdemographic, socioeconomic,and network characteristics.The coefficients of corruptionin each region are thennormalized and re-scaled sothat the scores range between0 (low) and 100 (high).

... those with higher incomes ... may bemore likely to engage in corrupt practicesand thus report higher corruption levels

18Kaffenberger, M. 2012. ‘TheEffect of Educational Attainmenton Corruption Participation InSub-Saharan Africa.’ GraduateSchool of Vanderbilt University.

22Chetwynd, E., F. Chetwyndand B. Spector. 2003.‘Corruption and Poverty: AReview of Recent Literature.’Management Systems Inter-national. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACW645.pdf

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LCPS Policy Brief

Across confessions, Shia and Druze report the highest corruption levels,followed by Maronites, while Sunnis, by comparison, report lower levels ofcorruption. Variations among respondents of different confessions seem tobe neither due to more awareness of corrupt practices nor linked to higher

engagement in corruption, asregression analysis shows nosignificant variations basedon socioeconomic charac-teristics, political networks,understandings of corruption,

or citizens’ engagement in corrupt practices. Moreover, differences in perceptionsof corruption may be related to political leaders’ positions on corruption.According to an LCPS study assessing the policy positions of members ofparliament (MPs) in 2016, MPs are more concerned about fighting corruptionthan citizens. For instance, Shia MPs are 29% more concerned than Shiaconstituents, while 17% of Sunni MPs and only 1% Maronite MPs are moreconcerned than their constituents.24 Fighting corruption is a top priority of Shiaand Sunni MPs, as it was prioritized by 40% of Shia MPs and 30% of Sunni MPs.Although higher concern for combating corruption among political leaders mayexplain the levels of corruption reported by Shia and Maronites, Sunnis’ lowerperceptions of corruption may be influenced by Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s

6

… Shia and Druze report the highest corruption levels, followed by

Maronites, while Sunnis, by comparison,report lower levels of corruption

Figure 2

Corruption levels by governorate and level of economic development

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

00

Relative Corruption Levels (0 lowest -100

highe

st)

Economic Index (0 lowest -100 highest)

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Source LPOS 2018 and National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration23 (2017).

Baalbek-Hermel

Akkar

Bekaa

Beirut

South

NorthNabatiyeh

Mount Lebanon

23National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration.2017. ‘Nighttime Lights TimeSeries data.’ NationalGeophysical Data Center.http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html

42alyaN dna hallatA imaS

.8102 .aegaeGينانبللا يباينلا سلجملا

غيرفتلاو ديدمتلا نيب :9002-7102سلجملا ةداعتسال قيرط ةطراخ

.يباقرلاو يعيرشتلا هيرودلyciloP rof retneC esenabeL

.seidutS

Page 7: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

How do People in Lebanon Perceive Corruption? 7

former governments’ vow to restore people’s confidence in the government. The prevalence of political networks and prominence of one’s sectarian

identity25 are crucial factors that affect perceptions of corruption, as theseincrease the probability of benefiting from clientelistic networks. Forinstance, figure 3 shows that politically connected individuals and those witha stronger sectarian identityperceive less corruption. Thesesame respondents believe corru-ption has not increased at thesame pace compared to those whodo not have strong sectarianidentities and are not politicallyconnected. The less frequentreporting of corruption among citizens with stronger sectarian identities isdue to the fact that they consider fewer activities and actions to be corrupt.Therefore, the stronger citizens’ sectarian identity, the more diluted theirperceptions of corruption.26

The prevalence of political networksand prominence of one’s sectarianidentity are crucial factors that affectperceptions of corruption, as these increase the probability of benefitingfrom clientelistic networks

25The prominence of respondents’sectarian identity wasmeasured by the degree towhich they identify withtheir confessional group.

26This finding is based on thesecond model in annex 1whereby the inclusion of thevariable ‘number of actionsconsidered corrupt’ in theregression analysis madesectarian identity insignificant.

Figure 3

Percentage of citizens perceiving corruption as a large problem

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%Strong Sectarian Identity

77%

60%

Politically Connected

76%

57%

Source LPOS 2018.

Note 95% confidence intervals are included in order to assess whether differences are statisticallysignificant.

No Yes

I

I

I

I

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LCPS Policy Brief8

Citizens Perceive Corruption at All Levels of GovernmentLebanese citizens believe corruption is a widespread practice at different levelsof government. Specifically, 45% of respondents report a higher prevalenceof corruption in institutions at the national level, 30% at the governoratelevel, and 25% at the local level. Figure 4 presents perceptions of corruption at

different levels of government,across governorates. WhileLebanese in Akkar, Bekaa,and Beirut report corruptionas a practice found predomi-

nantly at the national level, the majority of Lebanese in the South andNabatiyeh believe corruption occurs primarily at the local level. Controllingfor variations in individual socioeconomic characteristics, regression analysisshows that residents in lagging regions observe the highest levels of corruptionat the local level, in particular in Akkar, South Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, Bekaa,and Baalbek-Hermel.

… residents in lagging regions observethe highest levels of corruption at the

local level …

Source LPOS 2018.

Figure 4

Perceptions of corruption by governorate and level of government

Akkar

Beirut

Bekaa

North

Mount Lebanon

Baalbek-Hermel

Nabatiyeh

South

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Local Regional National

9% 6% 85%

13% 23% 64%

27% 9% 64%

11% 41% 48%

20% 38% 42%

33% 27% 40%

43% 33% 24%

71% 16% 13%

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How do People in Lebanon Perceive Corruption? 9

Less educated citizens not only observe higher levels of corruption butalso observe a larger share of corruption occurring at the local level, comparedto those with higher levels of education. Thus, while both low- and high-educated citizens observe similar levels of corruption at the national level,differences arise from the broader exposure to corrupt practices of less-educated Lebanese in their local area of residence.

Regarding corruption at the national level, there is a near consensusamong Lebanese citizens regarding corruption practiced by the nationalgovernment (99%) and political parties (96%). Higher levels of perceivedcorruption are associated with lower levels of trust in the Lebanese Government(32%), followed by the Lebanese Parliament (36%) and political parties (38%).Sunnis have more trust in the government compared to other confessions,while Shia have more trust inthe parliament and politicalparties. Confessional differencesin trust of institutions are notonly shaped by perceptionsof corruption but also by theconfessional divide of power derived from the National Pact, according towhich the prime minister is to be Sunni, the parliament speaker Shia, andthe president Maronite. Furthermore, compared to other governorates,Lebanese citizens in the North and South express the highest levels of trust inthe government and parliament while more than half of Lebanese in Baalbek-Hermel and the South express the highest levels of trust in political parties.

Citizens Believe Corruption Negatively Impacts their LivesAlthough nine-in-ten respondents agree that corruption has a negative impacton citizens’ lives, there are variations in perceptions of its impact, with 28%reporting a large negative impact, 31% a moderate negative impact, 29% asmall negative impact, and 12% no negative impact (figure 5).

… there is a near consensus amongLebanese citizens regarding corruptionpracticed by the national government(99%) and political parties (96%)

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LCPS Policy Brief

Citizens who report higher levels of corruption tend to observe a largernegative impact of corruption on their households. Across confessions, Shiaand Druze—who overall report high perceptions of corruption—tend to reporta greater number of negative implications on citizens’ lives than Sunnis andChristians. Per region, citizens in Akkar and Baalbek-Hermel also perceivehigher corruption levels than citizens in other governorates. As such, residents

of poorer regions perceivehigher levels of corruptionand a greater negative impactof corruption on their lives,confirming the perception ofdisproportionate effects of

corruption on those who are less wealthy. Furthermore, middle-aged Lebanese,compared to youth, believe that corruption has a greater negative impacton their personal lives. This finding is in line with existing literature,which argues that older individuals tend to be more averse to corruption.27

Politically connected Lebanese tend to suffer less from corruption. Inparticular, 33% of citizens who are not politically connected believe thatcorruption has a large negative impact on their lives, compared to only 17% ofthose who are politically connected. Generally, politically connected citizensand citizens with less cross-sectarian networks28 also have more trust in publicinstitutions. In turn, Lebanese with stronger cross-sectarian networks reportthat corruption has a greater impact on their lives than those without cross-sectarian networks, which may be because they are more critical of corruptionand clientelistic systems.

10

… Lebanese with stronger cross-sectarian networks report

that corruption has a greater impact on their lives...

27Gatti, R., S. Paternostro, and J. Rigolini. 2003. ‘IndividualAttitudes Towards Corruption:Do Social Effects Matter?’ TheWorld Bank.https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/33da/189cfb18fae422406ab6d847d6f6472a3fce.pdf

28The prevalence of cross-sectariannetworks were measured by thedegree to which respondentsinteract with individuals fromdifferent confessions.

Figure 5

Impact of corruption on citizens’ lives

Source LPOS 2018.

Moderate Negative

31%

Small Negative

29%No Negative

12%

Large Negative

28%

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How do People in Lebanon Perceive Corruption? 11

Lebanese Readily Identify Corrupt Behaviors and Why'Ordinary Citizens' Participate in ThemCorrupt practices within Lebanese society and the political establishment aredescribed as ‘the norm’ by the Lebanese Transparency Association.29 Accordingly,it is important to better understand the Lebanese public’s threshold in termsof their perceptions of, drivers of, and reasons to engage in corruption.

Some 65% of Lebanese believe that ‘ordinary citizens’ engage in corruption.The general public acknowledges the use of wasta and bribery as corrupt practices.Political and social connections and influence, referred to as wasta, are oftenused in order to process normalprocedures or request favors.Wasta is one of the practices inwhich clientelistic relations aresignificant and exacerbate the patron-client relationship between the politicalelite and citizens.30 The majority of respondents consider the use of connectionsfor personal gain an act of corruption: 95% believe that the abuse of an officialposition for personal gain is an act of corruption, 93% report that using aconnection to avoid prosecution for a crime is an act of corruption, and 87%agree that resorting to the assistance of a public official to ensure a relative’sadmission into a university is an act of corruption.

Furthermore, when examining public perceptions of bribery, the majority ofrespondents identify acts of bribery as corrupt although 80% of respondentsagree that bribes are effective in achieving desired outcomes. Over 90% ofrespondents concur that the following are acts of corruption: Public officialsaccepting gifts for performing official functions, businesses paying publicofficials for favorable treatment, public officials accepting payments in orderto assume public positions, those seeking a public position paying a publicofficial in order to assume aposition in public office, studentspaying professors for favorabletreatment, judges accepting pay-ments for a favorable ruling,police officers accepting payments to overlook a violation, and public officialsaccepting payments for the delivery of a pension. Views on whether payinga doctor additional sums for normal (71%) or special care (80%) are lessprominent, and are considered corrupt by the majority.

The more behaviors people consider corrupt, the more they report highcorruption levels in the country. Assessing the drivers of and reasons behindLebanese citizens’ engagement in corrupt practices is essential to understandingthe rationale behind such acts. Respondents report that the impetuses forengaging in corrupt practices include a lack of social responsibility or ethics(97%), greed or ambition to obtain wealth (96%), a low salary (94%), andfamilial pressure (85%).

… 80% of respondents agree thatbribes are effective in achieving desired outcomes

Some 65% of Lebanese believe that ‘ordinary citizens’ engage in corruption

29Lebanese TransparencyAssociation. 2009. ‘Towards aNational Anti-CorruptionStrategy.’https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resources/Final_book_en.pdf

30Ibid.

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LCPS Policy Brief

Understanding why individuals engage in corrupt practices may be linked tothe theory of individual utility maximization, according to which such actionsare understood in the context of benefits gained—as an outcome of corruptengagement can outweigh the costs.31 Benefits gained include monetarygains, political connections, job opportunities, acquiring a post, or any otherfavor requested in return for a bribe or clientelistic networks. Costs includethe monetary value of a bribe, the feeling of embarrassment that comes withrequesting a favor, the potential expectation of reciprocity, and the presenceof or lack of severe penalties.

As shown in figure 6, an overwhelming majority of Lebanese citizens believethat engaging in such practices is necessary in order to speed up processes(with public institutions), secure an additional source of income, avoid higherpayments, earn ‘proper treatment’, and receive preferential treatment. More-over, 86% of Lebanese believe that corrupt practices are resorted to in orderto avoid delays involving public sector procedures, while 77% believe thatthere is no other way to get things done.

12

31Søreide, T. 2014. ‘Drivers ofCorruption: A Brief Review.’World Bank Group.https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20457

Figure 6

Why Lebanese citizens engage in corruption

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%Speed

Up ProcessesSecure AnotherSource ofIncome

AvoidHigher

Payments

EnsureProper

Treatment

EnsurePreferentialTreatment

Avoid Penalties

Only Way toGet Things

Done

Source LPOS 2018.

93% 92% 92% 91% 91%

86%

77%

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How do People in Lebanon Perceive Corruption? 13

Conclusion and Recommendations This brief demonstrates how there is widespread consensus that corruptionis a significant problem, which has negative implications for citizens acrossLebanon. Corruption is perceived to be more prevalent in lagging regions, andhas a redistribution effect that increases inequality as it particularly affectspoorer citizens and poorer regions. Socioeconomic factors and politicalconnections also affect perceptions of corruption. Moreover, althoughLebanese citizens acknowledge the use of connections and bribery as corruptpractices, they also regard these practices as necessary to carry out processeswith public offices in an efficient manner.

To address corrupt practices in Lebanon, institutional and legal reformsare necessary. Those include strengthening accountability mechanisms bybuilding the capacity of and empowering oversight and control institutions,restructuring the administrative structure to make it more efficient,32 facili-tating public procedures by adopting electronic services,33 strengthening serviceprovision, promoting transparency in decision-making, and passing andefficiently implementing anti-corruption legislation. Laws that have yet tobe adopted include those that establish a National Commission for CombatingCorruption, authorize the investigation and prosecution of a political figure,and clearly define tender processes in the public sector.34 Additionally, therecently passed access to information and whistleblower protection lawsshould be fully implemented.

In addition to top-down reform recommendations—such as decentralization,the unification of budgetary processes, and judicial independence from politicalinfluence35—efforts should bedirected toward incorporatingpolicies that tackle public per-ceptions of corruption from anethical perspective and raiseintegrity standards. Results fromthe LPOS 2018 show that corrup-tion is widespread and citizens largely engage in corrupt activities. We alsofind that perceptions of corruption levels are strongly correlated with theextent of actions that people consider corrupt. As such, in order to tacklecorruption more effectively there is a need to include other measures thatdirectly shape citizens’ perceptions of corruption, which can be addressedthrough information or shaming campaigns that have the potential tochange perceptions of corruption and influence decision-making. For instance,workshops and campaigns fostering awareness of the unethical nature ofcorrupt practices may potentially reduce engagement in such practices.36

Additionally, creating a reward system for whistleblowers and honest publicsector employees may also incentivize honest behavior and raise integritystandards.

32Lebanese TransparencyAssociation. 2009. ‘Towards aNational Anti-CorruptionStrategy.’https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resources/Final_book_en.pdf

33The World Bank Group. 2015.‘Lebanon: Promoting PovertyReduction and SharedProsperity.’http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/698161468179049613/pdf/97498-CAS-P151430-SecM2015-0202-IFC-SecM2015-0073-MIGA-SecM2015-0047-Box391476B-OUO-9.pdf

34Azhari, T. 2018. ‘I Did What ICould’: Tueni DefendsAnti-Corruption Efforts’. TheDaily Star.http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Oct-24/467320-i-did-what-i-could-tueni-defends-anti-corruption-efforts.ashx

35Lebanese TransparencyAssociation. 2009. ‘Towards aNational Anti-CorruptionStrategy.’ https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resources/Final_book_en.pdf

36Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.2018. ‘A Nudge in the RightDirection: Applying BehavioralInsights to Public Integrity.’https://oecdonthelevel.com/2018/03/12/a-nudge-in-the-right-direction-applying-behavioural-insights-to-public-integrity/

… efforts should be directed towardincorporating policies that tackle public perceptions of corruption froman ethical perspective and raise integrity standards

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LCPS Policy Brief14

Annex 1Corruption regressions

Age

Age Squared

Female

Years of

Education

Years of Edu-

cation Squared

Economic

Situation

Sectarian

Identity

Cross-Sectarian

Networks

Political

Networks

Unemployed

Self-

Employed

Wage-

Employed

Homemaker

Shia

Maronite

Greek

Orthodox

Greek

Catholic

Armenian

Orthodox

Armenian

Catholic

Minority

Christian

Variables

-0.00782

(0.0193)

0.000118

(0.000210)

0.0509

(0.102)

-0.207***

(0.0638)

0.00972***

(0.00281)

0.169***

(0.0639)

-0.139***

(0.0509)

-0.0429

(0.0460)

-0.487***

(0.0556)

-0.00710

(0.254)

0.152

(0.202)

-0.0223

(0.197)

0.0179

(0.226)

0.975***

(0.165)

0.693***

(0.156)

1.087***

(0.229)

1.287***

(0.334)

1.238***

(0.414)

0.0715

(0.599)

-1.218**

(0.533)

Model 1(Order Probit)CorruptionLevel

Model 2(Order Probit)CorruptionLevel

Model 3(Logit)CorruptionMostly atLocal Level

Model 4(Order Probit)NegativeImpact ofCorruption

Model 5(Order Probit)Increase inCorruptionLast Two Years

-0.00960

(0.0205)

0.000130

(0.000222)

0.0799

(0.111)

-0.190***

(0.0669)

0.00920***

(0.00296)

0.143**

(0.0707)

-0.0665

(0.0549)

-0.0236

(0.0502)

-0.476***

(0.0615)

-0.0707

(0.275)

0.194

(0.215)

-0.0401

(0.209)

-0.0359

(0.241)

0.962***

(0.192)

0.688***

(0.175)

1.022***

(0.245)

1.199***

(0.353)

1.187***

(0.424)

-0.379

(0.689)

-1.431***

(0.547)

0.0308

(0.0358)

-0.000444

(0.000390)

-0.0819

(0.190)

-0.304***

(0.0936)

0.0127***

(0.00419)

0.136

(0.120)

-0.0571

(0.0894)

0.293***

(0.0840)

-0.0448

(0.0974)

0.551

(0.522)

0.417

(0.469)

0.487

(0.457)

1.011**

(0.497)

0.773***

(0.276)

0.393

(0.303)

0.203

(0.445)

1.544***

(0.405)

1.536**

(0.606)

2.797***

(1.035)

2.522***

(0.958)

0.0703***

(0.0146)

-

0.000765**

*

(0.000158)

0.0415

(0.0793)

-0.0620

(0.0416)

0.00312*

(0.00188)

-0.0439

(0.0495)

0.145***

(0.0380)

0.150***

(0.0355)

-0.197***

(0.0410)

-0.120

(0.194)

-0.00887

(0.159)

-0.202

(0.155)

-0.351**

(0.176)

0.671***

(0.121)

0.451***

(0.117)

0.812***

(0.165)

-0.0943

(0.189)

0.920***

(0.296)

0.385

(0.497)

0.0154

(0.0158)

-6.05e-05

(0.000170)

0.00360

(0.0859)

-0.0634

(0.0458)

0.00404**

(0.00206)

0.238***

(0.0530)

-0.0841**

(0.0411)

-0.0691*

(0.0385)

-0.400***

(0.0451)

0.180

(0.213)

-0.0541

(0.166)

0.138

(0.163)

-0.152

(0.185)

1.171***

(0.136)

0.303**

(0.123)

0.497***

(0.170)

0.853***

(0.228)

1.081***

(0.360)

-0.607

(0.482)

0.281

(0.521)

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How do People in Lebanon Perceive Corruption? 15

Druze

What Is

Corruption

Baalbek-

Hermel

Beirut

Bekaa

Mount

Lebanon

Nabatiyeh

North

South

Constant

Cut 1

Constant

Cut 2

Constant

Cut 3

Constant

Constant

Cut 4

Observations

Variables

1.191***

(0.210)

0.0398

(0.462)

-0.569**

(0.270)

4.024

(79.34)

-1.711***

(0.249)

-1.355***

(0.289)

-1.208***

(0.221)

-0.941***

(0.265)

-3.805***

(0.593)

-2.780***

(0.544)

-0.901*

(0.537)

1,163

Model 1(Order Probit)CorruptionLevel

Model 2(Order Probit)CorruptionLevel

Model 3(Logit)CorruptionMostly atLocal Level

Model 4(Order Probit)NegativeImpact ofCorruption

Model 5(Order Probit)Increase inCorruptionLast Two Years

1.238***

(0.235)

0.0751***

(0.0179)

-0.0303

(0.469)

-0.138

(0.296)

3.927

(83.34)

-1.729***

(0.269)

-1.348***

(0.310)

-1.239***

(0.228)

-0.770***

(0.294)

-5.327***

(0.739)

-4.090***

(0.644)

-2.105***

(0.632)

1,080

-0.0577

(0.420)

1.229**

(0.581)

-0.0334

(0.579)

1.260**

(0.561)

0.885*

(0.531)

2.013***

(0.579)

0.632

(0.527)

3.045***

(0.530)

-3.118***

(1.011)

1,141

0.592

(0.489)

0.575***

(0.160)

0.507**

(0.228)

-0.522***

(0.184)

-0.610***

(0.198)

-0.785***

(0.172)

-1.124***

(0.215)

-1.028***

(0.162)

-0.744***

(0.185)

0.738*

(0.398)

1.820***

(0.398)

2.781***

(0.402)

1,156

0.844***

(0.171)

-0.598**

(0.234)

-0.500***

(0.192)

0.283

(0.220)

-0.590***

(0.180)

-0.310

(0.234)

-0.541***

(0.165)

0.422**

(0.214)

-3.216***

(0.442)

-2.254***

(0.425)

-1.210***

(0.421)

-0.430

(0.421)

1,163

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Page 16: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

LCPS Policy Brief16

LCPSAbout the Policy BriefA Policy Brief is a short piece regularly published by LCPS that analyzes keypolitical, economic, and social issues and providespolicy recommendations to a wide audience of decision makers and thepublic at large.

About LCPSFounded in 1989, theLebanese Center for PolicyStudies is a Beirut-based independent, non-partisanthink-tank whose missionis to produce and advocatepolicies that improve goodgovernance in fields suchas oil and gas, economic development, public finance,and decentralization.

Contact InformationLebanese Center for Policy StudiesSadat Tower, Tenth floorP.O.B 55-215, Leon Street,Ras Beirut, LebanonT: + 961 1 799301F: + 961 1 [email protected]

Page 17: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

يذيفنت صخلمروهمجلا اهكردي ةقيقح هذهو ،ائيس داسفلا ىوتسم ىلع نانبل لجس دعي،يلاتلاب .نيينانبللا مومع فوفص يف ةيلاع داسفلا تاروصت نأ ثيح ينانبللاعالطتسا ىلع زكتريو داسفلا تاروصت ةسارد ىلإ اذه ةسايسلا صخلم فدهياضيأ فدهيو امك .بيجتسم٠٠٢١ لمش ،٨١٠٢ ماعلا فيرخ يف يرجأ ماع يأرةيسايسلاو ةيعامتجالاو ةيفارغميدلا اهصئاصخو داسفلا تاروصت مهف ىلإمهف ىلإ لصوتلا ةيلمع نم أزجتي ال اءزج لكشت يتلا ةيقطانملاو ةيداصتقالاوفدهي كلذ ىلإ ةفاضإلاب .ةدسافلا تاسرامملا هاجت نيينانبللا ةرظنل لضفأ

،هتازفحمو ،هتايعادتو ،داسفلا راشتنا ىدم ةسارد ىلإ اذه ةسايسلا صخلميتلا بابسألاو ،ةدساف تاسرامم يف كراشت يتلا ةلعافلا تاهجلا ديدحتو .كلذب مايقلل اهوعدت

فوفص يف اهتيبلاغب رهظت داسفلل ىلعأ تاروصت نأ تانايبلا رهظتولخد شماوه مهيدل نيذلا نينطاوملاو ،ارقف رثكألا قطانملا نم نينطاوملابارعإلا متي .ةيزردلاو ةيعيشلا نيتفئاطلا ىلإ نومتني نيذلا نينطاوملاو ،ةيلاع،لاع يميلعت ىوتسمب نوعتمتي دارفأ لبق نم داسفلل ىندأ تاروصت نعىلع داسفلا راشتنا نع نونطاوملا ديفي امك .ةيوق ةيفئاطو ةيسايس تالصبونإ .تايدلبلاو تاظفاحملا ىوتسم ىلعو ينطولا ىوتسملا ىلع عساو قاطنميقلا نمضتت داسفلا تازفحم نأ اضيأ نودقتعي نيينانبللا فصن نم رثكأنم لثامم ددع ربتعيو .يلئاعلا طغضلاو ،ةيلاملا تاجايتحالاو ،عشجلاو ،ةيقالخألانمضتت داسفلا يف طارخنالا ىلإ نينطاوملا عفدت يتلا بابسألا نأ نيينانبللالبق نم ةصاخ ةلماعم ىلع لوصحلا يف ةبغرلاو ،ةلاعف ريغ ةماع ةيطارقوريب.ةاجترملا جئاتنلا قيقحت ،معأ لكشبو ،نييمومعلا نيفظوملا

نييوتسملا ىلع داسفلا ةجلاعم يف نانبل هزرحي يذلا فيعضلا مدقتلا لظ يففدهتست ةليدب تابراقم ىلإ ءوجللاب صخلملا اذه يصوي ،يرادإلاو يعيرشتلاةردقلا اهل ةيمالعإ تالمح مادختساب ،ةمقلا ىلإ ةدعاقلا نم داسفلا تاروصت.مهتارارقو نينطاوملا كولس يف ريثأتلا ىلع

باتكلا نعزكرملا ىدل ةثحاب يه يدهم اميد ىلع اهثاحبأ زكرت تاساردلل ينانبللا

لوح ةيعامتجإ ةيداصتقإ نوؤشيف نيميقملا نيحزانلاو نيينانبللاديدعلا يثحبلا اهلمع لمشي .نانبل

تاباختنإلا لثم تالاجملا نمةيفئاطلاو ،ةيلحملا ةيمنتلاو،ةيباينلا

زكرملاب قاحتلالا لبقو .نانبل يفةليمز اميد تناك ،تاساردلل ينانبللاناملربلا ىدل ةيلود ةيناملرب ةثحابثاحبألا يرجت تناك ثيح يناملألاةيسايسو ةيعامتجا اياضق ىلعةداهش ىلع اميد تلصح .ةيداصتقاوةيسايسلا مولعلا يف سويرولاكبلاةعماجلا نم ةيلودلا نوؤشلاو .ةينانبللا ةيكيرمألا

ثحاب وه زيشناس يتوراغ لاينادينانبللا زكرملا ىدل يسيئرهلمع لاجم لمشيو .تاساردلل

صرف ىلع نيئجاللا لوصح ةلأسم،ةيعامتجالا تامدخلاو لمعلايتلا قطانملا ةيمنت ىلإ ةفاضإلاب،نانبل يف يئامنإ فلخت نم يناعتةلصتملا نينطاوملا تايلضفأوهمامضنا لبق .يموكحلا قافنإلابتامدخ زيشناش مدق ،زكرملا ىلإلصتت لئاسم يف ةيراشتسإيلودلا كنبلل ةرجهلاو لمعلا قوسب.ةيدوعسلا يف لمعلا ةرازووتاونس تس ةدمل اضيأ لمعويزكرملا كنبلا ىدل يداصتقا ثحابكاياضق نم ةفئاط ىطغف ،ينابسإلاةسايسلا لثم ،يلكلا داصتقالاصيلقتو ،لمعلا قاوسأو ،ةيلاملاىتش تالاقم رشن دقو ،ةينويدملالفاحملا يف ةسسؤملا لثموزيشناس يتوراغ لمحيو .ةيلودلا

ةماعلا ةرادإلا يف رتسيجام ةداهشيدنك ةيلك نم ةيلودلا ةيمنتلاو.درفراه ةعماجل ةعباتلا مكحلا نوؤشل

تاساردلل ينانبللا زكرملاThe Lebanese Centerfor Policy StudiesLCPSةماع ةسايس صخلم

٨٣ مقر ددعلا٩١٠٢ طابش

سانلا تاروصت يه ام؟نانبل يف داسفلا نع

زيشناس يتوراغ لاينادو يدهم اميد

Page 18: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

ةماع ةسايس صخلم2

ةمدقمماظنلا ىلإ ريبك لكشب اذه دوعيو نانبل يف ماعلا عاطقلا يف اعئاش داسفلا دعيحلاصم ىلع بخنلا دي عضو ةيلمع سسأم يذلاو دلبلا يف دئاسلا يفئاطلا،ةماعلا تاسسؤملاو ةلودلل ةيزكرملا ةطلسلا فعضأو .ماعلاو صاخلا نيعاطقلايف ةباقرلاب ةينعملاتاسسؤملا نأ امك١.ةيفئاطلا تاماسقنالاو ةينئابزلا مقافوةردقلا دقتفتو ةلاعف ريغ ابلاغ يه ةبساحملا ناويدو يزكرملا شيتفتلا لثم دالبلا.ةصاخ بساكم قيقحتل ةماعلا فئاظولا مادختسا عنمل ةمساح تاءارجا ذاختا ىلعتامدخلا ريفوت ةينئابزلاو،ةيبوسحملا تاكبشو ،ةيفئاطلا حلاصملا ضوقت ،هيلعو٢.ةديشرلا ةمكوحلا تاسراممو

ترجأ نانبل يف ماعلا عاطقلا يف داسفلا تاروصتل لضفأ مهف لجأ نمينانبـلـلا زـكرـمـلا عـم نواـعـتـلاـب ءاصحإلل ةدودـحـمـلا نوـناـبـيـل سكـتسيـتاـتس ةـكرش

،بيجتسم٠٠٢١فدهتسا٨١٠٢ لوألا نيرشت يف ماعلا يأرلل اعالطتسا تاساردلليفئاطلا عيزوتلا سكعي لكشبو ،يعامتجالا عونلا بسحب واستم لكشب اوعزوتتاءاصحا ىلع اذه ةسايسلا صخلم جئاتن زكترتو٣.نيينانبللا نينطاوملل يقطانملاو.رادحنالا ليلحتو ةيفصو

نانبل يف داسفلا نع ةماع ةحمليذلا—داسفلا دوجو كارداب صاخلا ةيلودلا ةيفافشلا ةسسؤم رشؤمل اقفو٨٢ نانبل ةجيتن تلظ—(ةفاظنلا يلاع)٠٠١و (ةيلاع ةجردب دساف)٠ نيب حوارتي

٨٣١ ةبترملا يف نانبل فينصت متو .5١٠٢ ماعلا ذنم ،يلاوتلا ىلع تاونس عبرألنم دلب أوسأ سماخ ةبترم يف هعضو ام ،٨١٠٢ ماعلا يف ادلب٠٨١ لصأ نمدعب نانبل كلذب ءاجف ،ايقيرفا لامشو طسوألا قرشلا ةقطنم يف داسفلا ثيح

نأ ،كلذ ىلإ فضأ4.(٨6١) قارعلاو ،(٠7١) ايبيلو ،(67١) نميلاو ،(٨7١) ايروسةمكوح ءادأ)5.٢- نيب حوارتي يذلا ،يلودلا كنبلاب صاخلا داسفلا طبض رشؤم

تعجارت نانبل يف داسفلا طباوض نأ رهظي (يوق ةمكوح ءادأ)5.٢ +و (فيعضيداحلا نرقلا لئاوأ ذنم تعجارت دق ةردقلا هذه نإ .(١ مسرلا)٢٠٠٢ ماعلا ذنمنم لثامم درف بيصن اهيدل ىرخأ نادلب عم ةنراقمو.١- ىلإ5،٠- نم ،نيرشعلاوةطسوتملا نادلبلل ايلعلا ةحيرشلا نم ىرخأنادلبو ،يلامجإلا يلحملا جتانلا.ظوحلم لكشب ىندأ داسفلل نانبل طبض نأ دجن ،لخدلا

3روكذلا نيب يواستلاب ةعزوم ةنيعلا٠٠6 كانه ثيح ثانالاوةبيجتسم٠٠6و ركذ بيجتسمعيزوتلل ةلثمم يه امك .ىثنأ٠٢٣ كانه ثيح يفئاطلا

ةينسلا ةفئاطلا نم بيجتسمةيعيشلا ةفئاطلا نم٠١٣وةيحيسملا ةفئاطلا نم٠74وامك .ةيزردلا ةفئاطلا نم٠٠١ويفارغجلا عيزوتلل ةلثمم يهنم بيجتسم٠٨ كانه ثيحلمرهلا-كبلعب نم٠7و راكععاقبلا نم٠٨و توريب نم٠٢١ونم٠7و نانبل لبج نم٠٨4ولامشلا نم٠7١و ةيطبنلا .بونجلا نم٠٣١و

1Le Borgne, E., T. Jacobs, and P.

Barbour. 2015. ‘SystematicCountry Diagnostic: Lebanon,Promoting Poverty Reductionand Shared Prosperity.’ The

World Bank Group.http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/698161468179049613/pdf/97498-CAS-P151430-SecM2015-0202-IFC-SecM2015-0073-MIGA-SecM2015-0047-Box3

91476B-OUO-9.pdf

2Ibid.

4Transparency International.

2018. ‘Corruption PerceptionsIndex 2018.’

https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018#results

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هنإف .امهفعض وأ ةلءاسملاو ةيفافشلا بايغب داسفلا راشتنا طبر متي ام ابلاغوةمكوحلا راطإ نمض داسفلا ةحفاكمب ةطبترملا لئاسملا ةشقانم متي ام ابلاغنييسايسلاب ةقثلا ءانب اهلالخ نم متي يتلا ،5ةلءاسملاو ،ةيفافشلاو ،ةديشرلاةيملاعلا ةيسفانتلا ةردقلا رشؤم يف تاسسؤملا مئاقل اقفو6.ةماعلا تاسسؤملاويداصتقالا ىدتنمـلاـب صاـخـلاسيقييذلا—7١٠٢ يملاعلادـلـبـلـل ةـيـتاسسؤمــلا ةــئيــبــلاباحصأ كولسو ةءافك ميقيو،ةصاـخـلاو ةـماــعــلا حــلاصمــلانم4٢١ ةبترمـلا ناـنـبـل لـتـحاوحنلا ىلعو7.ةلود7٣١ لصأبوشي ،١ لودجلا يف رهاظلا

،نييسايسلاب بعشلا ةـقـث ىوـتسم ىـلـع اـفـعض ةـلاـعـفـلا رـيـغ ناـنـبـل تاسسؤميف ةيفافشلا يف افعضو ،تارارقلل نييموكحلا نيلوؤسملا ذاختا يف ةاباحمو

.ىواشرلاو ةيماظنلا ريغ تاعوفدملا راشتناو ،ةموكحلا تاسايس عنص

٣ ؟نانبل يف داسفلا نع سانلا تاروصت يه ام

افعض ةلاعفلا ريغ نانبل تاسسؤم بوشي،نييسايسلاب بعشلا ةقث ىوتسم ىلعنييموكحلا نيلوؤسملا ذاختا يف ةاباحموعنص يف ةيفافشلا يف افعضو ،تارارقلل

ريغ تاعوفدملا راشتناو ،ةموكحلا تاسايسىواشرلاو ةيماظنلا

١ مسرلا

(7102-2002) داسفلا طبض

.يلودلا كنبلا نع ةرداصلا7102 ملاعلا يف ةمكوحلا تارشؤمردصملا

نمضتيو .(يوق ةمكوح ءادأ)5.2+و (فيعض ةمكوح ءادأ)5.2- ثيح ملس ساسأ ىلع داسفلا طبض سايق متيةظحالم،نيتنجرألا :يهو ،يلامجإلا يلحملا جتانلا نم درفلا بيصن نم ةلثامم تايوتسم اهيدل نادلب ةنراقملا نادلب طسوتم.ادنالياتو ،كيسكملاو ،ناريإو ،اناوستوبو ،ايسوراليبو

1.50

1.00

0.50

0.00

-0.50

-1.00

-1.502002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017

ةنراقملا نادلبايكرتندرالا نانبل

5Lebanese Transparency

Association. 2009. ‘Towards aNational Anti-Corruption Strategy.’https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resources/Fi

nal_book_en.pdf

6Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development.2017. ‘Trust and Public Policy:How Better Governance CanHelp Rebuild Public Trust.’

https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264268920-en

7World Economic Forum. 2017.‘The Global CompetitivenessIndex Report 2017-2018.’

http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2017-2018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2017%E2%80%932018.pdf

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ةماع ةسايس صخلم44

ةحفاكمل ةيلودلا ةيقافتالا ىلع ةعقوملا لودلا نيب نم نانبل نوك نم مغرلابوىلع ملاعلا يف أوسألا لودلا نم %٠٢ ـلا نيب نم‘ هنإف٨ ،٩٠٠٢ ماعلا ذنم داسفلا

تاءارجإ ذيفنت نم مغرلا ىلعو٩’.ةلءاسملا بايغو ،ةيفافشلاو ،داسفلا ىوتسمةظوحلم دوهج يأ لجست مل ،نانبل يف داسفلا ةحفاكم ىلإ رهاظلا يف فدهت

سلجم سيئر نوك نم مغرلاب ،الثم .داسفلا ةحفاكم تاردابمل ةيولوألا ءاطعإللوألا نوناك يف داسفلا ةحفاكم نوؤشل ةلود ريزو نيع دق يريرحلا دعس ءارزولا

اهديوزت متي ملو ،حوضوب اددحم ارود هذه ةلودلا ةرازو ءاطعإ متي مل ،6١٠٢نع ةبئاغ ةرازولا هذهو ،ةيرشبلا دراوملاو ةينازيملاب صتخي ام يف ةمئالم دراومبماق يتلا داسفلا ةحفاكمب ةصاخلا تاعيرشتلا نإ٩١٠٢.٠١ طابش ةموكح ةليكشت٠١) تامولعملا ىلإ لوصولا قح نوناق لثم ،ارخؤم اهيلع ةقداصملاب ناملربلا

بجاولا نم لازي ال١١،(٨١٠٢ لوليأ4٢) داسفلا يفشاك ةيامح نوناقو (7١٠٢ طابشنع نالعإلا ركذلاب ةريدجلا ةيفاضإلا تاروطتلا نمضتتو٢١.مئالم لكشب اهقيبطت

ةحفاكمل ةينطولا ةيجيتارتسالاةيذيفنتلا اـهـتـطـخو داسفـلا

ماق يتلا ،٨١٠٢ ناسين يفةلودلا ةريزو بتكم اهدادعإبمعدب ،ةيرادإلا ةيمنتلا نوؤشل

ةنزاوملاو لاملا ةنجل نأ ،كلذ ىلإ فضأ٣١.يئامنالا ةدحتملا ممألا جمانرب نمةينطو ةنجل ءاشنإ نكمي نوناق عورشم ىلع ةقداصملاب ارخؤم تماق ةيناملربلامعازم يف قيقحتلا اهماهم نم نوكت ،(٨١٠٢ لوألا نوناك٩١) داسفلا ةحفاكمل

خيرات ذنمو .ةلصلا تاذ نيناوقلا قيبطت ىلع فارشالاو ،ماعلا عاطقلا يف داسف4١.هيلع باونلا سلجم ةقداصم راظتناب لعفم ريغ نوناقلا عورشم لازي ال ،رشنلا

راشتنالا ةعساو ةلكشم داسفلا نوينانبللا ربتعيتاسرامملا رابتعا ىدمو ،داسفلا ءازإ نينطاوملا ةيساسحب داسفلا تاروصت رثأتت دقنيينانبللا نم ةقحاسلا ةيبلاغلا نأ ماعلا يأرلا عالطتسا جئاتن ريشت5١.ةدعاقك ةدسافلاىلإ فضأ .نانبل يف ام اعون ةريبك وأ ادج ةريبك ةلكشم داسفلا نأ ربتعت (%٨٩)رثكأ دييأت عم ،داسفلا ىوتسم ىلع امقافتم اهاجتا نوظحالي نينطاوملا نأ كلذ

نيينانبللا نم ةقحاسلا ةيبلاغلا ةلكشم داسفلا نأ ربتعت (89%)

نانبل يف ام اعون ةريبك وأ ادج ةريبك

8United Nations. 2003. ‘UnitedNationals Convention Against

Corruption.’https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2003/12/20031209%2002-50%20PM/Ch_XVIII_14p.pdf

9Garrote Sanchez, D. 2018. ‘Comba-ting Corruption, a Necessary StepToward Improving Infrastructure.’Lebanese Center for Policy Studies.http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/

publication.php?id=319

10Timour Azhari. 2018. ‘I Did WhatI Could’: Tueni defends anti-

corruption efforts.’ The Daily Star.http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Oct-24/467320-i-did-what-i-could-tueni-defends-anti-corruption-efforts.ashx

11The Daily Star. 2018. ‘ParliamentPasses Series of Laws in EveningSession.’ http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/

2018/Sep-24/464295-parliament-passes-e-transactions-law-in-

evening-session.ashx

13Lebanese Office of the Minister

of State for Administrative Reform. 2018.

http://www.omsar.gov.lb/Cultures/en-US/Publications/Strategies/Documents/Anti-

Corruption_Strategy.pdf

14The Daily Star. 2018. ‘CommitteeApproves Law to Establish NationalAnti-Corruption Commission.’

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Dec-19/472191-committee-ap-

proves-law-to-establish-national-anti-corruption-commission.ashx

ةحفاكمل ةينطولا ةيجيتارتسالا‘’.٣٢٠٢ -٨١٠٢ داسفلا

15Kaffenberger, M. 2012. ‘The

Effect of Educational Attainmenton Corruption Participation InSub-Saharan Africa.’ Graduate

School of Vanderbilt University.

نييسايسلاب روهمجلا ةقثنييموكحلا نيلوؤسملا تارارق يف ةاباحملاةموكحلا تارارق عنص يف ةيفافشلاىواشرلاو ةيماظنلا ريغ تاعوفدملا

128

126

124

121

ةلود7٣١ لصأ نم ةبترملا

١ لودجلا

ةيملاعلا ةيسفانتلا ةردقلا رشؤمب صاخلا تاسسؤملا مئاق يف نانبل فينصت

.7102 ماعلل ةيملاعلا ةيسفانتلا ةردقلا ريرقت ،يملاعلا يداصتقالا ىدتنملاردصملا

21ةكرش يهو ،لابرغ ةردابمل اقفوتماق ،حبرلا ىخوتت ال ةيندمبلط وأ ةرامتسا٣٣١ لاسرإبىلإ تامولعم ىلع لوصحلل،اباوج4٣ تقلتو ،ةينانبل تارادإنمض اهلصأ نم٩١ لصو.ةينوناقلا ةلهملا

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5 ؟نانبل يف داسفلا نع سانلا تاروصت يه ام

لالخ ام دح ىلإ دادزا وأ ةوقب دادزا دق داسفلا نوك نيبيجتسملا نم عابرأ ةثالث نمنم ةرقتسم تايوتسم نع اودافأ طقف %٩١ عم ةنراقم ،نيتمرصنملانيتنسلا .داسفلا

يداصتقالا عضولا صخ ام يف ةنيابتم جئاتن داسفلا لوح ثاحبألا رهظتيداصتقالا عضولا نيب ةيسكع ةقالع ىلع ليلد ةمث .داسفلا تاروصتو يعامتجالاوذإ ،داسفلا تاروصتو ،لخدلا ىوتسمو يميلعتلا ىوتسملا اميس ال ،يعامتجالاواضرعت رثكألا مه يندتم يداصتقاو يعامتجا ىوتسم مهيدل نيذلا صاخشألا نأنادلبلا ىلع قبطنت ةجيتنلا هذه نأ ركذلا عم ةدسافلا تاسرامملا لعفب ىذألليميلعتلا ىوتسملا نأب ودبيو6١.ةيمانلا لودلا صخ ام يف ةنيتم تسيلو ةمدقتملايف طارخنالاو داسفلا تاروصت ىلع ناسكاعتم ناريثأت ،ةيرظنلا ةيحانلا نم ،هلتاروصت ىندتت ،يميلعتلا ىوتسملا دايدزا عم ،ةهج نمف7١.ةدسافلا تاسرامملاىلعأ ىوتسم نع نورهظي دق نيملعملا صاخشألا نأ ةظحالم ىلإ ادانتسا داسفلا

ةـيـعاـمـتـجالا ةـيـلوؤسمـلا نـميف طارخنالا نـع نوـعـنـتـمـيونـمو .ةدساـفـلا تاسراـمـمـلانأب ثاحبألا ريشت ،ىرخأ ةهجىلع يباجيإ رـيـثأت هـل مـيـلـعـتـلامهل رثكأ حجري ىلعألا يميلعتلا ىوتسملا يوذ دارفألا نأ ذإ داسفلا يف طارخنالالثم ،ةدساف تاسراممل مهضرعت رثكأ حجريو ،نييمومع نيفظوم عم اولعافتي نأنم نيعم ىوتسم ىنغ رثكألا دارفألا لبقي نأ رثكأ حجري ،لثملاب٨١.ةوشرلايف رابتعالا نيعب ةيداصتقالاو ةيعامتجالا تافالتخالا ذخأ رهظأ دقو٩١.داسفلانوديفي نيملعملا نينطاوملا نم ربكأ اددع نأ ةيئاصقتسالا ةساردلا جئاتن ليلحتدجن ،رابتعالا نيعب يميلعتلا ىوتسملا ذخأ دنعو ،داسفلا نم ىندأ تايوتسم نعداسفلا نم ىلعأ تايوتسم ةمث هنأ نوربتعيعفترملا لخدلا يوذ نينطاوملا نألخدلا يوذ نينطاوملا عم ةنراقم ،نيتيضاملا نيتنسلا لالخ داسفلا يف مقافتوىلع اولصحتسي مل نيذلا ءاينغألا دارفألا نأ ةصالخ ىلإ اذه يضفي .ضفخنملاطباورلا وأ ثاريملا لثم ،ىرخأ تاونق لالخ نم لب ميلعتلا لالخ نم مهتاورثنع نوديفي ،يلاتلابو ،ةدساف تاسرامم يف مهطارخنا رثكأ حجري ،ةيسايسلا

.داسفلا نم ىلعأ تايوتسمذخألا دعب ىتح ،داسفلا تاروصت يف ةريبك تاتوافت ةمث ،يقطانم راظنم نم

دودحملا رفوتلل ارظنو .دارفألل ةيداصتقالاو ةيعامتجالا صئاصخلا رابتعالا نيعبءاوضألا تانايب مادختسا مت ،ةظفاحملا ىوتسم ىلع ةيمنتلاب ةصاخلا تانايبللىندأ داسفلا تاروصت نأب رهظيو٠٢.ةيداصتقالا ةيمنتلل ليدب سايقمك ةيليللا

نينطاوملا نأ٢ مسرلا رهظي .يداصتقالا ىوتسملا ىلع ةروطتملا تاظفاحملا يف،١٢داسفلا نم ىلعأ ىوتسم ةمث هنأ نوربتعي عاقبلاو ،لمرهلا-كبلعبو ،راكع يفقطانملا نوك ىلإ كلذ دوعي دقو .اروطت رثكأ ىرخأ قطانم يف نينطاوم عم ةنراقمتايوتسم ىلع رثكأ هرودب رثؤي ام ،ةبسانتم ريغ ةروصب داسفلاب ةرثأتم ارقف دشألا٢٢.يداصتقالا ومنلاو رقفلا

يف رثكأ ءاينغألا دارفألا طارخنا حجرينع نوديفي ،يلاتلابو ،ةدساف تاسراممداسفلا نم ىلعأ تايوتسم

02رشؤملا ىلع لوصحلا متيءاوضألا تانايب لالخ نم يداصتقالااسايقم لكشت يتلا ةيليللامتي ،يداصتقالا طاشنلل اليدبسيياقم ملس عضوو اهعيبطت٠ نيب جئاتنلا حوارتت يكل ديدج.(عفترم)٠٠١ و (ضفخنم)12تايوتسملا ىلع لوصحلا متيءانب ةقطنم لكل داسفلل ةيبسنلاتاريغتملا ةددعتم تارادحنا ىلعصئاصخلا رابتعالا نيعب ذخأتةيعامتجالاو ،ةيفارغميدلا ةيدرفلا.تاكبشلا صئاصخو ،ةيداصتقالاوداسفلا تالماعم عيبطت متي اهدعبوملس عضوو ةقطنم لك يفجئاتنلا حوارتت يكل ديدج سيياقم.(عفترم)٠٠١ و (ضفخنم)٠ نيب

16Marda, K. and A. Ziegfeld. 2015.

‘Socioeconomic status andcorruption perceptions aroundthe world’. SAGE. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/

2053168015580838

17Ibid.

19Gatti, R., S. Paternostro, andJ. Rigolini. 2003. ‘IndividualAttitudes Towards Corruption:Do Social Effects Matter?’ The

World Bank. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/33da/189cfb18fae422406ab6d847d6f6

472a3fce.pdf

18Kaffenberger, M. 2012. ‘The

Effect of Educational Attainmenton Corruption Participation InSub-Saharan Africa.’ Graduate

School of Vanderbilt University.

22Chetwynd, E., F. Chetwynd

and B. Spector. 2003.‘Corruption and Poverty: A

Review of Recent Literature.’Management Systems Inter-national. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACW645.pdf

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ةماع ةسايس صخلم6

٢ مسرلا

ةيداصتقالا ةيمنتلا ىوتسمو ةظفاحملا بسحب داسفلا تايوتسم

زوردلاو ةعيشلا ديفي ،داسفلا تاروصتو ةيفئاطلا تافالتخالا يف رظنلا دنعتايوتسم نع ةنسلا ديفي نيح يف ،ةنراوملا مهيلي ،ىلعألا داسفلا تايوتسم نعفئاوطلا نم نيعلطتسملا نيب تافالتخالا يف ببسلا دوعي الو .داسفلا نم ىندأربكأ طارخناب ةطبترم يه الو ةدسافلا تاسرامملاب يعولا نم ديزم ىلإ ةفلتخملا

صئاصخلا ىلع ءانب ةريبك تانيابت رهظي ال رادحنالا ليلحت نأ ذإ ،داسفلا يف،ةـيداصتـقالاو ةـيـعاـمـتـجالا،ةـــيساـــيسلا تاــــكــــبشلاوطارـخــنا وأ داسفــلا مــهــفوتاسرامم يف نيـنـطاوـمـلاىلإ فضأ .داسفلاب مستت

ءامعزلا فقاومب ةطبترم نوكت دق داسفلا تاروصت يف تافالتخالا نأ كلذميقت تاساردلل ينانبللا زكرملا اهارجأ ةسارد قفوو .داسفلا نم نييسايسلاباونلا نأ دجن ،6١٠٢ ماعلا يف باونلاب ةصاخلا تاسايسلاب ةقلعتملا فقاوملا

رثكأ نومتهم الثم ةعيشلا باونلاف .داسفلا ةحفاكمب نينطاوملا نم رثكأ نومتهمنم %١ طقفو ةنسلا باونلا نم %7١ نيح يف ،ةعيشلا نيبخانلا نم %٩٢ـبتايولوألا نم داسفلا ةحفاكم دعت4٢.مهيبخان نم رثكأ اضيأ نومتهم ةنراوملا باونلانم %٠٣و ةعيشلا باونلا نم %٠4 ماق ذإ ،ةنسلاو ةعيشلا باونلا ىدل ىوصقلاةحفاكمب ربكألا مامتهالا نوك نيح يفو .ةيولوأك كلذ ديدحتب ةنسلا باونلا

.(7102)32يوجلا فالغلاو تاطيحملا ةساردل ةينطولا ةرادإلاو (8102) ينانبللا ماعلا يأرلا عالطتساردصملا

داسفلا تايوتسم نع زوردلاو ةعيشلا ديفيديفي نيح يف ،ةنراوملا مهيلي ،ىلعألاداسفلا نم ىندأ تايوتسم نع ةنسلا

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

00102030405060708090100

توريب

مايوتس

فلا تنلا داس

ندألا٠) ةيبسلعألا٠٠١ - ى

(ى(ىلعألا٠٠١ - ىندألا٠) يداصتقالا رشؤملا

عاقبلاراكع

لمرهلا-كبلعب

بونجلالامشلا

هيطبنلا

نانبل لبج

23National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration.2017. ‘Nighttime Lights Time

Series data.’ NationalGeophysical Data Center.

http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html

٤2سلجملا .عجعج .نو .س ،هللاطع:7102-9002 ينانبللا يباينلاةطراخ غيرفتلاو ديدمتلا نيب

هيرودل سلجملا ةداعتسال قيرطزكرملا .يباقرلاو يعيرشتلا.تاساردلل ينانبللا

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7 ؟نانبل يف داسفلا نع سانلا تاروصت يه ام

ةعيشلا اهنع دافأ يتلا داسفلا تايوتسم رسفت دق نييسايسلا ةداقلا ىدل داسفلاةموكـحـلا دـهـعـتـب ةرـثأتـم داسفـلـل ىـندألا ةـنسلا تاروصت نوـكـت دـق ،ةـنراوـمـلاو .ةموكحلاب بعشلا ةقث ءانب ةداعإب يريرحلا ءارزولا سلجم سيئرل ةقباسلا

نييساسأ نيلماع5٢ةيفئاطلا درفلا ةيوه زوربو ةيسايسلا تاكبشلا راشتنا دعيتاكبشلا نم ةدافتسالا ةيلامتحا نم ناديزي امهنأ ذإ ،داسفلا تاروصتب نارثؤينييسايسب تاقالع مهعمجت نيذلا سانلا نأ٣ مسرلا رهظي ،الثم.ةينئابزلاةيوهب نوعتمتي نيذلا ءالؤهونأ نورـبـتـعـي ىوـقأ ةـيــفــئاــطاـمـك ،ىــندأ داسفــلا ىوــتسممل داسفلا نأ ءالؤه دقتعيوعم ةنراقم ةريتولا سفنب دادزيتايوهب نوعتمتي ال نيذلا كئلوأ

يف داسفلاب ىندألا ةدافإلا .نييسايسلاب تاقالع مهطبرت ال نيذلاو ةيوق ةيفئاطنوربتعي مهنوك ىلإ دوعي ىوقأ ةيفئاط تايوهب نوعتمتي نيذلا نينطاوملا فوفصةيوه نينطاوملا ىدل ناك املك ،يلاتلاب .ادساف لاعفألاو ةطشنألا نم لقأ اددع6٢.رثكأ داسفلاب مهروصت فعض ،ىوقأ ةيفئاط

٣ مسرلا

ةريبك ةلكشم لكشي داسفلا نأ نوربتعي نيذلا نينطاوملا ةبسن

52ةيفئاطلا ةيوهلا زورب سايق متىدم ساسأ ىلع نيبيجتسمللىلإ ادانتسا مهسفنأب مهفيرعت

.مهتفئاط

ةيوه زوربو ةيسايسلا تاكبشلا راشتنا دعينارثؤي نييساسأ نيلماع ةيفئاطلا درفلانم ناديزي امهنأ ذإ ،داسفلا تاروصتبةينئابزلا تاكبشلا نم ةدافتسالا ةيلامتحا

٦2جذومنلا ىلإ ةجيتنلا هذه زكترت١ قحلملا يف دراولا يناثلاددع‘ ةريغتملا لاخدإىدأثيحيف’ةدساف ربتعت يتلا لامعألاةيوهلالعجىلإ رادحنالا ليلحت.ةيمهأ نودب ةيفئاطلا

%90

%80

%70

%60

%50

%40

%30

%20

%10

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I

I

I

I

.(8102) ينانبللا ماعلا يأرلا عالطتساردصملا

.ةيئاصحإ ةلالد تاذ تافالتخالا تناك اذإ ام مييقت لجأ نم ةقث لصاوف %59 نيمضت متيةظحالم

معن الك

ةيسايس تالصةيوق ةيفئاط ةيوه

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ةماع ةسايس صخلم8

تايوتسم ةفاك ىلع رشتنم داسفلا نأ نونطاوملا ربتعيةموكحلانم ةفلتخم تايوتسم لاطتو راشتنالا ةعساو ةسرامم داسفلا نأ نوينانبللا ربتعيتاسسؤملا يف داسفلل ربكأ راشتنا نع نيبيجتسملا نم %54 دافأ ،ديدحتلاب .مكحلاىوتسملا ىلع %5٢و ،ةظفاحملا ىوتسم ىلع %٠٣و ،ينطولا ىوتسملا ىلع،مكحلا نم ةفلتخم تايوتسم ىلع داسفلل تاروصت4 مسرلا ضرعي .يلحملا

.تاظفاـحـمـلا فـلـتـخـم يفيف نوينانبللا ديفـي اـمـنـيـبنع توريبو ،عاـقـبـلاو ،راـكـعدـجاوـتـت ةسراـمـمـك داسفــلاىوتسملا ىلع غاط لكشب

لصحي داسفلا نأ ةيطبنلاو بونجلا يف نيينانبللا نم ةيرثكأ ربتعت ،ينطولاصئاصخلا يف تاتوافتلا ذخأ دنعو .يلحملا ىوتسملا ىلع يساسأ لكشبنيميقملا نأ رادحنالا ليلحت رهظي ،رابتعالا نيعب دارفألل ةيداصتقالاو ةيعامتجالا

،يلحملا ىوتسملا ىلع داسفلل ىلعألا تايوتسملا نوظحالي ةرخأتم قطانم يف.لمرهلا-كبلعبو ،عاقبلاو ،ةيطبنلاو ،نانبل بونجو ،راكع يف اميس ال

نوظحالي ةرخأتم قطانم يف نيميقملا ىلع داسفلل ىلعألا تايوتسملا

يلحملا ىوتسملا

%100 %90 %80 %70 %60 %50 %40 %30 %20 %10 %0

%85

%64

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%71%16%13

4 مسرلا

مكحلا ىوتسم بسحب داسفلل ةيقطانملا تاروصتلا

.(8102) ينانبللا ماعلا يأرلا عالطتساردصملا

راكع

توريب

عاقبلا

لامشلا

نانبل لبج

لمرهلا-كبلعب

ةيطبنلا

بونجلا

%9%6

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%64

ينطويلحميميلقإ

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9 ؟نانبل يف داسفلا نع سانلا تاروصت يه ام

ىلعأ تايوتسم ىندأ يميلعت ىوتسمب نوعتمتي نيذلا نونطاوملا ظحالي الىلع لصاحلا داسفلا نم ربكأ ةبسن اضيأ نوظحالي لب ،بسحف داسفلا نم.ىلعأ يميلعت ىوتسمب نوعتمتي نيذلا ءالؤه عم ةنراقم ،يلحملا ىوتسملاىندأ يميلعت ىوتسمب نوعتمتي نيذلا نينطاوملا نم لك ظحالي نيح يف ،يلاتلابنم تافالتخالا أشنت ،ينطولا ىوتسملا ىلع داسفلا نم ةلثامم تايوتسم ىلعأوتاسراممل ىندأ يميلعت ىوتسمب نوعتمتي نيذلا نيينانبلل ربكألا ضرعتلا ءارج.يلحملا مهنكس ناكم يف ةدساف

ءارآلا يف يلك هبش قفاوت ةمث ،ينطولا ىوتسملا ىلع داسفلا ىلإ ةبسنلاببازحألاو (%٩٩) ةموكحلا هسرامت يذلا داسفلا لوح نيينانبللا فوفص يفىندأ تايوتسمب روصتملا داسفلا نم ىلعأ تايوتسم طبترتو .(%6٩) ةيسايسلا

بازحألاو ،(%6٣) ينانبللا باونلا سلجم اهيلي ،(%٢٣) ةينانبللا ةموكحلاب ةقثلا نمرثكأ ةموكحلاب ةينسلا ةفئاطلا ىلإ نومتني نيذلا نوينانبللا قثي .(%٨٣) ةيسايسلا

،ىرخألا فئاوطلا اهب قثت اممنيذلا نويناـنـبـلـلا قـثـي اـمـنـيـبةيعيشلا ةفئاطلا ىلا نومتنيبازــحألاو باوــنــلا سلــجــمــبلـكشتـت الو .رـثـكأ ةــيساــيسلالب ،بسحف داسفلا تاروصت لالخ نم تاسسؤملاب ةقثلا يف ةيفئاطلا تافالتخالايذلا ،ينطولا قاثيملا نم دمتسملا ةطلسلل يفئاطلا ميسقتلا لالخ نم اضيأ،ايعيش باونلا سلجم سيئرو ،اينس ءارزولا سلجم سيئر نوكي نأ بجي هبجومبنوينانبللا نونطاوملا برعأ ،ىرخأ تاظفاحم عم ةنراقم .اينورام ةيروهمجلا سيئرورثكأ قثي امنيب ناملربلاو ةموكحلاب ةقثلا تايوتسم ىلعأ نع بونجلاو لامشلا يف .ةيسايسلا بازحألاب بونجلاو لمرهلا-كبلعب يف نيينانبللا فصن نم

مهتايح ىلع يبلس ريثأت داسفلل نأ نوربتعي نونطاوملايبلس ريثأت هل داسفلا نأب نوقفتي نيبيجتسم٠١ لصأ نم٩ نوك نم مغرلاب

%٨٢ ةدافإ عم ،داسفلا ريثأت تاروصت يف تاتوافت ةمث ،نينطاوملا ةايح ىلع،ضفخنم ريثأت نع %٩٢و ،لدتعم ريثأت نع %١٣و ،ريبك يبلس ريثأت نع مهنم .(5 مسرلا) يبلس ريغ ريثأت نع %٢١و

فوفص يف ءارآلا يف يلك هبش قفاوت ةمثةموكحلا هسرامت يذلا داسفلا لوح نيينانبللا(%٦9) ةيسايسلا بازحألاو (99%)

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ةماع ةسايس صخلم10

ةظحالم ىلإ داسفلا نم ةيلاع تايوتسم نع نوديفي نيذلا نونطاوملا ليمينيذلا—زوردلاو ةعيشلا ،ةفئاطلا بسحب .مهرسأ ىلع داسفلل ربكأ يبلس ريثأتتايعادت نع ةدافإلا ىلإ نوليمي—داسفلل ىلعأ تاروصت نع لامجالاب اودافأ

بسحبو .نييحيسملاو ةنسلا عم ةنراقم نينطاوملا ةايح ىلع داسفلل ربكأ ةيبلستايوتسم لوح لمرهلا-كبلعبو راكع يف نينطاوملا تاروصت تناك ،قطانملاىري ،وحنلا اذه ىلع .ىرخأ تاظفاحم يف نينطاوملا تاروصت نم ىلعأ داسفلا

داسفلل ربكأ ايبلس اريثأتو داسفلا نم ىلعأ تايوتسم رقفألا قطانملا ونطاومروصت دكؤي ام ،مهتايح ىلعةبسانتم ريغ تاريثأت دوجولقأ مه نم ىلع داسفللنأ كلذ ىـــــلإ فضأ .ءارـــــث

ريثأت داسفلل نأ نودقتعي ،بابشلا عم ةنراقم ،نسلا يطسوتملا نيينانبللاديفت يتلا تايبدألا يف ءاج ام عم ةجيتنلا هذه قباطتتو .مهتايح ىلع رثكأ يبلس

7٢.داسفلا هاجت اروفن رثكأ اونوكي نأ ىلإ نوليمي انس ربكألا دارفألا نأب

.داسفلا نم لقأ اوناعي نأ ىلإ ةيسايس تالص مهيدل نيذلا نوينانبللا ليمينأب نييسايسب تاقالع مهعمجت ال نيذلا نينطاوملا نم %٣٣ ركذي ،ةصاخ ةروصبنيذلا نيينانبللا نم %7١ عم ةنراقم ،مهتايح ىلع ريبك يبلس ريثأت داسفلا ىدلطباور مهعمجت نيذلا نينطاوملا ىدل ،ماع لكشب .نييسايسلاب تاقالع مهعمجتربكأ ةقث اضيأ ،٨٢فئاوطلل اروبع لقأ تاكبش مهيدل نيذلا نينطاوملاو نييسايسبنوديفي فئاوطلل اروبع رثكأ تاكبش مهيدل نيذلا نوينانبللا .ةماعلا تاسسؤملابادقن رثكأ مهنوك ىلإ دوعي دق يذلا رمألا ،مهتايح ىلع داسفلل ربكأ يبلس ريثأت نع.ينئابزلا ماظنلاو داسفلل

5 مسرلا

نينطاوملا ةايح ىلع داسفلا ريثأت

.(8102) ينانبللا ماعلا يأرلا عالطتسا ردصملا

اروبع رثكأ تاكبش مهيدل نيذلا نوينانبللاربكأ يبلس ريثأت نع نوديفي فئاوطلل

مهتايح ىلع داسفلل

يبلس ريغ21%

ريبك لكشب يبلس82%

ءيشلا ضعب يبلس13%

اليلق يبلس92%

27Gatti, R., S. Paternostro, and J. Rigolini. 2003. ‘IndividualAttitudes Towards Corruption:Do Social Effects Matter?’ The

World Bank.https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/33da/189cfb18fae422406ab6

d847d6f6472a3fce.pdf

82تاكبشلا راشتنا ىدم سايق متلعافت ىدمب فئاوطلل ةرباعلانم دارفأ عم نيبيجتسملا

.ىرخأ فئاوط

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11 ؟نانبل يف داسفلا نع سانلا تاروصت يه ام

كراشي اذاملو ةدسافلا تاسرامملا ةلوهسب نوزيمي نوينانبللااهب’نويداعلا نونطاوملا‘عمتجملا يف ةدسافلا تاسرامملا ةيفافشلا زيزعتل ةينانبللا ةيعمجلا تفصومهملا نم هنإ ،هبجومبو٩٢.’ةدعاقلا‘ اهنأ ىلع ةيسايسلا ةسسؤملاو ينانبللامهتاروصت ةهجل ينانبللا روهمجلا ىدل ىندألا دحلا ةبتعل لضفأ مهف ىلإ لصوتلا.ةدسافلا تاسرامملا ىف طارخنالا بابسأو ،هتازفحم ،داسفلل

.داسفلا يف نوطرخني’نييداعلا نينطاوملا‘ نأب نوربتعي نيينانبللا نم 56%يه ىواشرلاو ةطساولا مادختسا نأب رقت بعشلا ةماع نأ كلذ ىلإ فضأ

ام اـبـلاـغو .ةدساـف تاسراـمـمذوـفـنـلاو طــباورــلا مدــخــتســتيتلا ،يعامتجالاو يسايسلالجأ نم ،ةطساولاب اهيلإ راشييتلا تاسرامملا ىدحإ ةطساولا دعتو .تامدخ بلط وأ ةيداعلا تاءارجالا صيلختنوبزلا‘ ةقالع مقافت ىلإ يدؤت يتلاو ،ةمهم ةينئابزلا تاقالعلا اهيف نوكتنأ نيبيجتسملا ةيبلاغ تربتعا دقو٠٣.نينطاوملاو ةيسايسلا بخنلا نيب’ليمعلاونوربتعي %5٩ :دساف لمع ةيصخش بساكم قيقحت لجأ نم تاقالعلا مادختسااودافأ %٣٩و ،دساف لعف يصخش بسكم لجأ نم يمسر بصنم لالغتسا نأ%7٨و ،دساف لعف وه مرجل ةقحالملا يدافت لجأ نم تاقالعلا مادختسا نأبدحأ لوخد نامضل ةلودلا يف لوؤسم ةدعاسم ىلإ ءوجللا نأ ىلع نوقفاوي .داسفلاب مستي لعف ةعماج ىلإ براقألا

ةيبلاغ تددح ،ةوشرلل ةماعلا تاروصتلا يف رظنلا ىدل هنأ ،كلذ ىلإ فضأنأ ىلع اوقفاوت %٠٨ نأ نم مغرلاب ،اداسف دعت ىواشرلا لاعفأ نأ نيبيجتسملاجئاتنلا قيقحت يف ةلاعف ىواشرلا%٠٩ نم رثكأ قفاويو .ةاخوتملا

دعي يلي ام نأ نيبيجتسملا نم،ةيمسرلا ماهملل مهئادأ لباقم ايادهلل نييمومعلا نيفظوملا لوبق :داسف لاعفأعفدلاو ،ةيليضفت ةلماعم لباقم نييمومعلا نيفظوملل ةيراجتلا تاسسؤملا عفدوةذتاسألل ذيمالتلا عفدو ،ماع بصنم يف نييعتلا لباقم ةلودلا يف لوؤسمل

لبقت ةطرشلاو ،تاؤم مكح لباقم عفدلا نولبقي ةاضقو ،ةيليضفت ةلماعم لباقمميلست لباقم عفدلا نولبقي نويمومع نوفظومو ،ةفلاخم نع يضاغتلل عفدلا

لجأ نم ةيفاضإ غلابم بيبطل عفدلا ناك اذإ ام لوح ءارآلا تناكو .يدعاقت شاعم.ةدساف ةيبلاغلا اهتربتعا نكل ،ازورب لقأ (%٠٨) ةصاخ ةياعر وأ (%١7) ةيداع ةياعر

نع مهتدافا تدادزا ،ةدساف سانلا اهربتعي يتلا تايكولسلا ددع دادزا املكطارخنا ىلإ يدؤت يتلا بابسألا مييقت دعيو .دالبلا يف ةعفترم داسف تايوتسملاعفأ فلخ قطنملا مهفل ايساسأ ةدساف تاسرامم يف نيينانبللا نينطاوملا

نمضتت ةدساف تاسرامم يف طارخنالا تازفحم نأب نوبيجتسملا ديفي .ةلثامملوصحلا حومط وأ عشجلاو ،(%7٩) تايقالخألا وأ ةيعامتجالا ةيلوؤسملا مادعنا.(%5٨) ةيلئاعلا تاطوغضلاو ،(%4٩) ضفخنملا بتارلاو ،(%6٩) ةورثلاىلع

نينطاوملا‘ نأب نوربتعي نيينانبللا نم %5٦داسفلا يف نوطرخني’نييداعلا

يف ةلاعف ىواشرلا نأ ىلع اوقفاوت 08%ةاخوتملا جئاتنلا قيقحت

29Lebanese Transparency

Association. 2009. ‘Towards aNational Anti-Corruption

Strategy.’https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resource

s/Final_book_en.pdf

30Lebanese Transparency

Association. 2009. ‘Towards aNational Anti-Corruption

Strategy.’https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resource

s/Final_book_en.pdf

Page 28: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

6 مسرلا

داسفلا يف نوينانبللا طرخني مل

ةماع ةسايس صخلم12

ةدساف تاسرامم يف طارخنالا ىلإ دارفألا عفدي يذلا ببسلا مهف طبتري دقوقايس نمض ةلثامم الاعفأ رربت يتلا ،ةيدرفلا ةعفنملا ةميق ميظعت ةيرظنبنمضتت١٣.فيلاكتلا قوفت لثامم طارخنا جئاتن نوكل ارظن—ةبستكملا عفانملالوصحلاو ،لمع صرفو ،ةيسايس تالصو ،ةيدقن بساكم ةبستكملا عفانملانمضتت .ةينئابز تاكبش وأ ،ةوشر لباقم ةبولطم ىرخأ ةمدخ يأ وأ ،بصنم ىلع،ةمدخ بلط عم قفارتي يذلا جرحلاب روعشلاو ،ةوشرلل ةيدقنلا ةميقلا فيلاكتلا.ديدشلا باقعلا بايغ وأ دوجوو ،لثملاب ةلماعملا بلطب لمتحملا عقوتلاو

يف طارخنالا نأ نيينانبللا نينطاوملا نم ةقحاس ةيبلاغ ربتعت ،6 مسرلل اقفولوصحلاو ،(ةماعلا تاسسؤملا عم) تالماعملا عيرستل يرورض ةلثامم تاسرامم،’ةمئالم ةلماعم‘ بسكو ،ىلعأ تاعوفدم يدافتو ،لخدلل يفاضإ ردصم ىلعمتي هنأ نوربتعي نيينانبللا نم %6٨ نأ كلذ ىلإ فضأ .ةيليضفت ةلماعم يقلتوتاءارجإ لمشي يذلاريخأتلا لثم ءازجلا يدافت لجأ نم ةدساف تاسرامم ىلإ ءوجللا.رومألا زاجنإل ىرخأ ةقيرط نم ام هنأ نوري مهنم %77 نيح يف ،ماعلا عاطقلا

31Søreide, T. 2014. ‘Drivers ofCorruption: A Brief Review.’

World Bank Group.https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20457

%100

%90

%80

%70

%60

%50

%40

%30

%20

%10

%0

%93%92%92%91%91

%86

%77

.(8102) ينانبللا ماعلا يأرلا عالطتسا ردصملا

عيرستتالماعملا

ردصم نيمأتيفاضإ

لخدلل

يدافتتاعوفدم

ىلعأ

لوصحلاةلماعم ىلع

ةمئالم

ىلع لوصحلاةلماعم

ةيليضفت

يدافت ءازجلا

ةقيرطلازاجنإل ةديحولا

رومألا

Page 29: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

13 ؟نانبل يف داسفلا نع سانلا تاروصت يه ام

تايصوتو ةمتاخلكشي داسفلا نأب عساو قاطن ىلع ءارآلا يف قفاوت ةمث نأ صخلملا اذه رهظيربتعيو .نانبل ءاحنأ عيمج يف نينطاوملا ىلع ةيبلس تايعادت اهل ةريبك ةلكشمعيزوت ةداعإ ةيلمع ىلع يوطني رثأ هلو ،ةرخأتملا قطانملا يف اراشتنا رثكأ داسفلا

قطانملاو نينطاوملا صاخ لكشب لاطت اهنوكل ارظن ،تانيابتلا ديزت نأ اهنأش نمىلع ةيسايسلا تالصلاو ةيداصتقالاو ةيعامتجالا لماوعلا رثؤت امك .ارقف رثكألانأب نيينانبللا نينطاوملا رارقإ نم مغرلاب هنأ كلذ ىلإ فضأ .داسفلا تاروصتهذه ىلإنورظني اضيأ مهنإف ،ةدساف تاسرامم يه ةوشرلاو طباورلا مادختسا.لاعف لكشب ةلودلا رئاود يف تالماعم زاجنإل ةيرورض اهنأ ىلع تاسرامملا

ةيتاسسؤملا تاحالصالا دعت ،نانبل يف داسفلا تاسرامم ةجلاعم ةيغبوتاردق ءانب ربع ةلءاسملا تايلآ زيزعت تاحالصالا هذه نمضتت .ةيرورض ةينوناقلاونم ةدايزلل ةرادإلا ةلكيه ةداعإو ،اهنيكمتو ةباقرلاو فارشإلاب ةينعملا تاسسؤملا

نيسحتو٣٣،ةننكملا دامتعا لالخ نم ةيمسرلا تالماعملا ليهستو٢٣،اهتيلاعفةحفاكمل تاعيرشت رادصإو ،رارقلا عنص يف ةيفافشلا زيزعتو ،تامدخلا ريفوتةينطو ةنجل ءاشنإ نمضتتاهينبت بجي يتلا تاعيرشتلا.ةيلاعفب اهقيبطتو داسفلا،اينوناق اهتقحالمو ةيسايس ةيصخش عم قيقحتلاب حامسلاو،داسفلاةحفاكملذافنإ ةرورض ىلإةفاضإلاب4٣.ماعلا عاطقلا يف تاصقانملل ةحضاو تايلآ دامتعاومت نيذللا داسفلا يفشاك ةيامح نوناقو تامولعملا ىلإلوصولا قح نوناق.ارخؤم امهرارقإ

،ةيزكرماللا لثم ،مرهلا ىلعأ نم أدبت تاحالصإب تايصوت ىلإ ةفاضإلاببجي5٣،ةيسايسلا تاريثأتلا نع ءاضقلا ةيلالقتساو ،ةنزاوملا تاءارجإ ديحوتورظن ةهجو نم داسفلاب ةماعلا تاروصتلا جلاعت تاسايس دامتعا وحن دوهجلا هيجوتداسفلا نأ ةيئاصقتسالا انتسارد جئاتن رهظتو .ةهازنلا ريياعم عفرتو ،ةيقالخأنينطاوملا نأو ،راشتنالا عساوعساو قاـطـن ىـلـع نوـطرـخـنـي.داسفلاب مستت ةطشنأ يفةصاخلا تاروصتلا نأ اضيأ دجنةطـبـترـم داسفـلا تاـيوـتسمـبةحفاكم لجأ نم ،يلاتلابو .اداسف سانلا اهربتعي يتلا لاعفألا قاطنب يوق لكشبرشابم لكشب عبطت ىرخأ ريبادت ذاختال ةجاح ةمث ،ةيلاعفلا نم ديزمب داسفلاتالمح وأ ةيمالعإ تالمح لكش ىلع يتأت نأ نكمي ،داسفلل سانلا تاروصت،الثم .تارارقلا عنص يف ريثأتلاو داسفلا تاروصت رييغت ىلع ةردقلاب عتمتت ريهشتتاسرامملل ةيقالخأاللا ةعيبطلاب يعولا ززعت يتلا تالمحلاو لمعلا شرول نكميءاشنإ نأ ،كلذ ىلإ فضأ6٣.ةلثامم تاسرامم يف طارخنالا صلقت نأ ةدسافلازفحي نأ نكمي نيقداصلا ماعلا عاطقلا يفظومو داسفلا يفشاكل تآفاكم ماظن.ةهازنلا ريياعم نم عفريو قداصلا كولسلا اضيأ

تاسايس دامتعا وحن دوهجلا هيجوت بجيةهجو نم داسفلاب ةماعلا تاروصتلا جلاعت ةهازنلا ريياعم عفرتو ،ةيقالخأ رظن

32Lebanese Transparency

Association. 2009. ‘Towards aNational Anti-Corruption

Strategy.’https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resources/Final_book_en.pdf

33The World Bank Group. 2015.‘Lebanon: Promoting Poverty

Reduction and SharedProsperity.’

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/698161468179049613/pdf/97498-CAS-P151430-SecM2015-0202-IFC-SecM2015-0073-MIGA-SecM2015-0047-Box391476B-OUO-9.pdf

34Azhari, T. 2018. ‘I Did What I

Could’: Tueni DefendsAnti-Corruption Efforts’. The

Daily Star.http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Oct-24/467320-i-did-what-i-could-tueni-defends-anti-corrupti

on-efforts.ashx

35Lebanese Transparency

Association. 2009. ‘Towards aNational Anti-Corruption

Strategy.’ https://civilsociety-centre.org/sites/default/files/resources/Final_book_en.pdf

36Organisation for Economic

Cooperation and Development.2018. ‘A Nudge in the Right

Direction: Applying BehavioralInsights to Public Integrity.’

https://oecdonthelevel.com/2018/03/12/a-nudge-in-the-right-direction-applying-behavioural-insights-to-public-integrity/

Page 30: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

ةماع ةسايس صخلم14

5 جذومنلا(ةيلامتحا ةدحو)داسفلا يف عافترانيماعلا لالخنيمرصنملا

4 جذومنلا(ةيلامتحا ةدحو)يبلسلا ريثأتلاداسفلل

٣ جذومنلا(ةيحجرألا متيراغول)يف داسفىلع همظعميلحملا ىوتسملا

٢ جذومنلا(ةيلامتحا ةدحو)داسفلا ىوتسم

١ جذومنلا(ةيلامتحا ةدحو)داسفلا ىوتسم تاريغتملا

نسلا

عيبرتلانسلل يردنجلاىثنأ

تاونس ددعةساردلايردنجلا عيبرتلاتاونس ددعلةساردلاعضولايداصتقالاةيوهلاةيفئاطلاتاكبشلافئاوطلل ةرباعلاتاكبشلاةيسايسلاةلاطبلا

باسحلل لمعصاخلاعوفدم لمعرجألالزنم ةبر

ةعيش

ةنراوم

مورسكوذوثرأكيلوثاك مور

نمرأسكوذوثرأكيلوثاك نمرأ

1 قحلملاداسفلا تارادحنا

-0.00782

(0.0193)

0.000118

(0.000210)

0.0509

(0.102)

-0.207***

(0.0638)

0.00972***

(0.00281)

0.169***

(0.0639)

-0.139***

(0.0509)

-0.0429

(0.0460)

-0.487***

(0.0556)

-0.00710

(0.254)

0.152

(0.202)

-0.0223

(0.197)

0.0179

(0.226)

0.975***

(0.165)

0.693***

(0.156)

1.087***

(0.229)

1.287***

(0.334)

1.238***

(0.414)

0.0715

(0.599)

-0.00960

(0.0205)

0.000130

(0.000222)

0.0799

(0.111)

-0.190***

(0.0669)

0.00920***

(0.00296)

0.143**

(0.0707)

-0.0665

(0.0549)

-0.0236

(0.0502)

-0.476***

(0.0615)

-0.0707

(0.275)

0.194

(0.215)

-0.0401

(0.209)

-0.0359

(0.241)

0.962***

(0.192)

0.688***

(0.175)

1.022***

(0.245)

1.199***

(0.353)

1.187***

(0.424)

-0.379

(0.689)

0.0308

(0.0358)

-0.000444

(0.000390)

-0.0819

(0.190)

-0.304***

(0.0936)

0.0127***

(0.00419)

0.136

(0.120)

-0.0571

(0.0894)

0.293***

(0.0840)

-0.0448

(0.0974)

0.551

(0.522)

0.417

(0.469)

0.487

(0.457)

1.011**

(0.497)

0.773***

(0.276)

0.393

(0.303)

0.203

(0.445)

1.544***

(0.405)

1.536**

(0.606)

2.797***

(1.035)

0.0703***

(0.0146)

-

0.000765**

*

(0.000158)

0.0415

(0.0793)

-0.0620

(0.0416)

0.00312*

(0.00188)

-0.0439

(0.0495)

0.145***

(0.0380)

0.150***

(0.0355)

-0.197***

(0.0410)

-0.120

(0.194)

-0.00887

(0.159)

-0.202

(0.155)

-0.351**

(0.176)

0.671***

(0.121)

0.451***

(0.117)

0.812***

(0.165)

-0.0943

(0.189)

0.920***

(0.296)

0.0154

(0.0158)

-6.05e-05

(0.000170)

0.00360

(0.0859)

-0.0634

(0.0458)

0.00404**

(0.00206)

0.238***

(0.0530)

-0.0841**

(0.0411)

-0.0691*

(0.0385)

-0.400***

(0.0451)

0.180

(0.213)

-0.0541

(0.166)

0.138

(0.163)

-0.152

(0.185)

1.171***

(0.136)

0.303**

(0.123)

0.497***

(0.170)

0.853***

(0.228)

1.081***

(0.360)

-0.607

(0.482)

Page 31: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

15 ؟نانبل يف داسفلا نع سانلا تاروصت يه ام

5 جذومنلا(ةيلامتحا ةدحو)داسفلا يف عافترانيماعلا لالخنيمرصنملا

4 جذومنلا(ةيلامتحا ةدحو)يبلسلا ريثأتلاداسفلل

٣ جذومنلا(ةيحجرألا متيراغول)يف داسفىلع همظعميلحملا ىوتسملا

٢ جذومنلا(ةيلامتحا ةدحو)داسفلا ىوتسم

١ جذومنلا(ةيلامتحا ةدحو)داسفلا ىوتسم تاريغتملا

تايلقأةيحيسمزورد

داسفلا وه ام

لمرهلا-كبلعب

توريب

عاقبلا

نانبل لبج

ةيطبنلا

لامشلا

بونجلا

١ ةتباث

٢ ةتباث

٣ ةتباث

تباثلا

4 ةتباث

تاظحالم

-1.218**

(0.533)

1.191***

(0.210)

0.0398

(0.462)

-0.569**

(0.270)

4.024

(79.34)

-1.711***

(0.249)

-1.355***

(0.289)

-1.208***

(0.221)

-0.941***

(0.265)

-3.805***

(0.593)

-2.780***

(0.544)

-0.901*

(0.537)

1,163

-1.431***

(0.547)

1.238***

(0.235)

0.0751***

(0.0179)

-0.0303

(0.469)

-0.138

(0.296)

3.927

(83.34)

-1.729***

(0.269)

-1.348***

(0.310)

-1.239***

(0.228)

-0.770***

(0.294)

-5.327***

(0.739)

-4.090***

(0.644)

-2.105***

(0.632)

1,080

2.522***

(0.958)

-0.0577

(0.420)

1.229**

(0.581)

-0.0334

(0.579)

1.260**

(0.561)

0.885*

(0.531)

2.013***

(0.579)

0.632

(0.527)

3.045***

(0.530)

-3.118***

(1.011)

1,141

0.385

(0.497)

0.592

(0.489)

0.575***

(0.160)

0.507**

(0.228)

-0.522***

(0.184)

-0.610***

(0.198)

-0.785***

(0.172)

-1.124***

(0.215)

-1.028***

(0.162)

-0.744***

(0.185)

0.738*

(0.398)

1.820***

(0.398)

2.781***

(0.402)

1,156

0.281

(0.521)

0.844***

(0.171)

-0.598**

(0.234)

-0.500***

(0.192)

0.283

(0.220)

-0.590***

(0.180)

-0.310

(0.234)

-0.541***

(0.165)

0.422**

(0.214)

-3.216***

(0.442)

-2.254***

(0.425)

-1.210***

(0.421)

-0.430

(0.421)

1,163

نيسوق نيب ةيرايعملا ءاطخأ

١.٠<p * ،5٠.٠<p ** ،١٠.٠<p ***

Page 32: February 2019 Number 38 LCPS Policy Brief · 2019-03-15 · the 2018 parliamentary elections, development of lagging regions, and sectarianism in Lebanon. Prior to joining LCPS, Mahdi

ةماع ةسايس صخلم16

ةماعلا ةسايسلا صخلم لوحوه ةماعلا ةسايسلا صخلملكشب ردصت ةريصق ةروشنمينانبللا زكرملا نع مظتنمعيضاوم للحت تاساردلل

ةيعامتجاو ةيداصتقاو ةيسايسيف تايصوت مدقتو ةيساسأةحيرشل ةماعلا تاسايسلارارقلا عانص نم ةعساو.ماع هجوب روهمجلاو

تاساردلل ينانبللا زكرملا لوحينانبللا زكرملا سسأتوه .٩٨٩١ ماع يف تاساردلل

،توريب يف هرقم ثاحبألل زكرمةدياحمو ةلقتسم هترادإ

ةرصانمو جاتنإ هتمهم ،ايسايسىلإ ىعست يتلا تاسايسلايف ديشرلا مكحلا نيسحت،ةيزكرماللا لثم تالاجمةيلاملاو ،ةيداصتقالا ةيمنتلاو.زاغلاو طفنلاو ةماعلا

انب لاصتإللتاساردلل ينانبللا زكرملارشاعلا قباطلا ،تاداسلا جرب

نويل عراش ،55-5١٢ .ب.صنانبل ،توريب سأر

+ ١٠٣٩٩7١١6٩ :ت+ ٢٠٣٩٩7١١6٩ :ف

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LCPS