Field Artillery Journal - Dec 1941

8/6/2019 Field Artillery Journal - Dec 1941

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MAJOR W. S. NYE,Editor

LIEUT. HARVEY S. FORD,Assistant Editor

LENNA PEDIGO,Business Manager

THIS ISSUE features lessons from themaneuvers, and the JOURNAL has joined the hecklersin heaving a few rocks at the participants. But wewant to make it perfectly clear that we are aware thatmuch fine work was done, that great improvementhas been shown, and that all in all the praise

bestowed by high commanders and by the press has been well merited. Recent notes from the Chief'sOffice (published in the JOURNAL) giving a fewcriticisms on the maneuvers have brought favorableresponse and have shown that units and individualscan take it and like it. Hence we have beenemboldened to go into the subject more fully.

HOWEVER, there is no need to get too long aface over it. A distinguished foreign officer who wasat the maneuvers told the editor that the criticismswe direct at ourselves are too severe if we compareourselves to foreign armies. Many of the so-calledmistakes would not occur in combat. In maneuversthe average American has an understandableaversion to hiding under the leaves, like a covey ofyoung quail, everytime a plane flies over. But if he

actually were being shot at he would not be so brash.The American's sense of humor does not permit himto perform in rehearsal with the same deadlyseriousness as some of his Europeancontemporaries. But he learns quickly.

IN ACCORDANCE with our prior promise weare presenting with this issue a bonus consisting of atinted photograph suitable for framing. There will bea series of these inserted in forthcoming issues.

AGAIN WE URGE that readers save their backnumbers of the JOURNAL. In years to come, acomplete set of the magazine covering the period ofthe present war will be a rich source of historical and

professional data. The photos which we are nowproducing will in themselves be worth the price ofthe periodical. Many of them are flown across the

south Atlantic, thence up the coast of SouthAmerica, and reach this country in a remarkablyshort time after the events illustrated. To those whoare not subscribers, we can only repeat, "If you wantthe JOURNAL, you had better enroll; we don't knowwhere you will get back numbersthey are

collectors' items already."

The United States FieldArtillery Association

ORGANIZED JUNE 7, 1910

President

Major General Robert M. Danford

Vice-President

Brig. Gen. George R. Allin

Executive Council

Major General Robert M. DanfordBrigadier General William H. SandsBrigadier General C. C. Haffner, Jr. Brigadier General John A. CraneBrigadier General Fred C. WallaceLieutenant Colonel Ralph C. BishopLieutenant Colonel Edward S. OttMajor Thomas NorthCaptain George L. Hart

Secretary-Treasurer

Major W. S. Nye

The Field Artillery JournalA Publication for the Field Artillery of the Army of the United States

DECEMBER, 1941Vol. 31, No. 12

PAGE

THE COVERILLUSTRATION: THENEW 8-INCH HOWITZER

MESSAGE FROM CHIEF OF FIELD ARTILLERY............................................................. 906

LOUISIANA HAYRIDE ................................................................................................ 907By Garrett Underhill

LESSONS FROM THE MANEUVERS .............................................................................. 914

BAREHEADED WE SALUTE THEM.............................................................................. 918

MAY, 1940............................................................................................................... 919

A SURVEY OF MILITARY TRUCKS ............................................................................. 930By Major C. C. Duell, FA .

FATHERNEPTUNE..................................................................................................... 939By Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Ennis, GSC.

WAR IN THE BALKANS .............................................................................................. 944By Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, FA.

THE AIRCENTER-OF-IMPACT.................................................................................... 954By Captain R. H. Adams and Lieutenant Robert Fullerton, III, FA.

HOW THE POLES FOUGHT IN FRANCE ........................................................................ 956By Colonel Wlodzimierz Onacewicz

THE MAN WHO KEEPS THEM SHOOTING................................................................... 966By Lieutenant Colonel John P. Eckert, FA .

WITH THE OTHERARMS AND SERVICES: VITHE ARMY AIRFORCES ..................... 969

By Lieutenant Colonel Ivan L. Foster, GSC.

CAMPAIGN OF FLANDERS, 1940PART IV .............................................................. 978By Captain Leo Framery

THISNEW FIRE-DIRECTION TECHNIQUE ................................................................... 985By Captain Walter D. Atkins, FA.

IS IT TOO LATE? ...................................................................................................... 986By Major Irwin A. Lex, FA .

REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARTILLERY ............................... 989

FROM THE CHIEF'S OFFICE........................................................................................ 992

NOT IN THE BOOK..................................................................................................... 996

BOOKREVIEWS ........................................................................................................ 997

Published monthly by the United States Field Artillery Association. Publication office 3110 Elm Avenue,Baltimore, Md. Business and editorial office, United States Field Artillery Association, 1624 H Street, N. W.,Washington, D. C. Address all communications for publication to the Washington office. Entered as second classmatter August 20, 1929, at the post office at Baltimore, Md. Copyright, 1941, by The United States FieldArtillery Association. Subscription price $3.00; Canada $4.00; foreign $3.50; single copies to subscribers, 25cents; nonsubscribers, 35 cents. THE FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL pays for original articles accepted. It ispublished without expense to the government. Authors alone are responsible for statements made. Addresses,and changes of rank, will be changed as frequently as desired, upon notification; not otherwise. Changes

should reach the editor three weeks before date of next issue. Immediate notice should be given of any delay

in the receipt of the magazine. Unsolicited manuscripts should be accompanied by return postage.


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A MESSAGEFROM THE CHIEF OF FIELD ARTILLERY

As the holiday season again approaches, we look back upon a yearof activity such as has not been seen in our Army since 1918. Theparticularly difficult period of reorganization and expansion liesbehind us; perfection of our individual abilities and skills, and theperfection of our units as teams, lies ahead. We would not be humanif we failed to take the keenest interest in what the New Year holds instore for us.

As field artillerymen, and as soldiers in the United States Army, it is ourbusiness to face the uncertainties of the coming year as though war for us at anearly date was an absolute certainty. It is only by such a view of the situation thatwe are made to realize how precious is the time available to us for essentialinstruction and training.

Sergeant, as Chief of Section, are all of your men skilled in setting the sights andlaying the gun? Are all of your men proficient in all of the duties of all of the

cannoneers? Do they all know the mechanism of the gun and how to keep it clean,free of rust, and lubricated, and do you see that they keep it that way? Do all of themen of your section know how to drive the truck that pulls your gun, and do you seethat they all know how to "groom," and water and gas, and lubricate that truck, andkeep it in such condition as to make it, in depreciation and maintenance, the leastpossible expense to the American taxpayer? Do you keep your men smart, and clean,and proud of themselves in their punctilious observance of their military courtesies?

Lieutenant, do you assemble your sergeants and corporals and teach them, andcoach them, in their many and varied duties, and in the knowledge that they musthave?

Captain, are you by any chance permitting your men to idle away their time whenit is your business to see that they are kept busy on progressive instruction? If so,you have not yet mastered your job, and time is very short. Remember that you willhave no morale troubles if you follow the tried and reliable Army rule "feed them well,treat them squarely, and work them hard." Do you or your officers by any chancehobnob with your men, as, for instance, mix with them for cards or dice, or for anoccasional beer? If so, you have a rotten outfit and it will get worse, not better, untilyou learn that trying to be a "good fellow" in any such way does not win the respect,confidence, or affection of your men.

Colonel, do you sit up nights, if necessary, planning comprehensive, wellbalanced, and thorough schedules of training, and do you meet with the officersfrequently and regularly to doctrinate them with your standards, and to help themand coach them in getting interesting and instructive training down to their men? Ifso, and if you carefully supervise their work; if you are fair and kind and just andexacting in your relations with all of your officers and men, you have assuredyourself the privilege and the honor of commanding a superb organization ofAmerican soldiers.

May the holiday season be a most happy one, and may the New Year bring

frequent and repeated satisfaction over duties loyally, enthusiastically, and efficientlyperformed, is the wish extended at this time to all personnel of the Field Artillery ofthe Army of the United States.

ROBERT M. DANFORD,Major General, U. S. Army,

Chief of Field Artillery.


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Editor's foreword: This issue of the Journal features reportsboth official and

unofficialon the Louisiana maneuvers. The general tone is critical; although

praise was due in numerous instances, this magazine can fill no useful function

in lauding units or individuals. That can be (and doubtless has been) done more

authoritatively by commanders concerned. However, we do not toss brickbats for

the pleasure of it. Our army is undergoing a phase of searching self-analysis

which is both wholesome and timely. Far better that we expose our own faults

now than have the enemy do it for us later.

A "battle." Troopsare waiting forumpires to decidewho won.

LOUISIANA HAYRIDEBy Garrett Underhill

Photographs from "Life," by Ralph Morse

A journalist casts a sharply critical eye at the maneuvers, and tells us many things which may be helpful.

The joint Louisiana maneuvers of the Second and ThirdArmies this year were thoroughly covered by the FourthEstate. Uniformed and assigned to either Red or Bluearmies in a combatant status, reporters attached themselvesto military units, and were thus for the first time broughtinto interested and intimate contact with combatintelligence, reconnaissance, patrolling, and local security.

The conduct of units engaged in such work did not bear

out the reputation Americans have as frontiersmen, huntersand scouts. In view of this outdoor tradition and the pastmonths of small unit training, their execution of localsecurity was particularly disappointing.

Along improved roads where heavy traffic moved therewas no organization to prevent vehicles and personnel fromrunning right through friendly outposts and into the handsof the enemy. Such ridiculous sights as a -ton weaponscarrier with a caliber .50 machine gun attacking (at 30

mph) two parked scout cars and a light tank has no place inmodern war. Neither has the spectacle of two Blue wiretrucks traveling at such a clip that they were unable to stop before passing through a Blue rifle company and a Redreconnaissance platoon. However, there were innumerableinstances where the situation had so changed as to absolvethe lost vehicles and personnel of much blame for runninginto enemy lines.

A striking case in point concerns a problem whereinBlue cavalry had penetrated behind the Red right flankto a town called Zwolle, thus getting astride a north-south concrete road and separating Red Army HQ andsome railheads from the main Red effort in the south.Red cavalry and armored formations south of Zwolleabout-faced and went north to push the Blues out of thetown. They parked half-tracks 1 miles south of Zwolleon the concrete highway and swung to the right

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After getting hopelessly intermixed with Red Cavalry at Zwolle, and after turning around toattack the center of town, Red tanks here meet a colored brigade moving up to reinforce the

cavalry attack.

to attack along a parallel road. Meanwhile a Blue cavalrypatrol worked in among the half-tracks and forced them back.

Mired tanks surprised by Blue infantrymen, the first of whom is seenapproaching in the foreground. Note the utter lack of local security on the

part of the Reds.

Subsequently, in the course of an hour, the Red half-tracks were passed by a northbound Red 66, various Redmotorcyclists, a division artillery commander and party, aforward artilleryobserver, jeeps andmiscellaneous other personnel. Somevehicles were evenunaware that Zwolle'soccupation had blockedthe main road to Army

HQ and Shreveport. Allwent through Redoutposts without theslightest warning fromthe half-tracks, and weretaken captive almost toa man.

Such indifference asthese half-tracksdisplayed was common. No small number ofofficers and men outsideof corps and division

CP's had a shocking lackof knowledge about thelocation of the enemy intheir immediate front,and were equally and blandly ignorant as wellas careless as to whatfriendly units in theimmediate vicinity weredoing.

A Red tank company

commander in a certain village was questioned. No, hedidn't know where the Blues were. His mission was todefend the village against attacks from the south and east,and he supposed the enemy to be directly to the south.(There was at least a battalion of his own division some

seven miles to thesouth.) He had noinformation concerningthe antitank units in thevillageneither as totheir unit or as to their purpose. (They weremechanized cavalry

whose mission was todefend the town againstattack from the southand easta little matteron which they and thetanks might well havegotten together.) Hedidn't know where theremainder of hisregiment was, but whentold that X Companywas on the defensive tothe east, he surmised

that they might be protecting regimental train. But hecouldn't be sure.

MP's knew nothing.While men were posted to guide personnel of their ownunits when occupyinga position, they were oflittle additional


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1941 LOUISIANA HAYRIDE 909

and. A typical conversation between an artilleryman andsuch a guide ran as follows:

Blue infantry has out-bluffed this half-track platoon, scared them to they are making thisterrible mistake of running directly across the road to mount their car in background. The

Blues have a light machine gun with their forward platoon, and will get them all. Presently thehalf-track itself will come out to flee, and be nicked by the .50 caliber also with the advance

oint. With jeeps, 66's, etc., this Red force has about twelve times the fire power of the BluePlatoon, and has greater strength in rifles alonefor they have armored infantry with them.

"Third Cavalry Brigade thisway." "Did any artillery gowith it?" "I can't say, sir." "Did

any guns at all go down thisroad?" "I really don't know,sir." "Did any artillery of anydescription go through thisroad junction at any timeduring the past two hours?""I'm sure I couldn't say, sir."

In the Zwolle engagementalready mentioned, a Redmedium tank battalioncommander was ordered todeliver an attack to clear outthe town. His attack began to

roll, and found Red cavalry infull possession of the quarterhe first entered. It wastherefore decided to supportthe cavalry in storming a finalcenter of resistance in acemetery. In so doing, thetanks became so hopelesslyintermixed with cavalryreserves that forward progress became impossible. The tanksturned, in hopes of getting in a blow on the center of town,got mixed up in other armored columns already there, and

before the battalion could be reorganized the war was over.At least a partial excuse for the commander of the tank battalion seemed to lie in the absence of good generalinformation, to no small extent due to the lack of adequateradio equipment.

There is no excuse for the type of mentality displayed bythe tank company commander. Later this captain lost threetanks to the Blues. With no guards out, no guns manned ordismounted, these mired tanks were caught flat-footed byless than a squad of crack Blue infantrymen.

The actions of these BluesWesterners and cageyIndians of a Guard divisionwere in striking contrast tothe sloppy work of many other soldiers. After taking theCaptain's tanksalong with a wrecker, a reporter and tworadio announcersthey scored again on the regiment towhich he belonged. Light tanks were sent down to clearthe Blues out. They worked around a bend in the roadwith only a gesture at reconnaissance. Here they ransmack into a cleverly emplaced Blue .50 caliber antitankgun. A Blue lieutenant concealed in the grass on the high bank would observe each tank as it worked around thebend. By hand signals he would indicate to his gun squadthe time to commence dragging their piece out of hidingin the woods, the path to take through the long grass, and

the location of the forward tank. They would let thesurprised tank have it, and crawl back into cover to await

the next. In this manner two tanks were called out. Allumpires agreed that in war a minimum of four wouldhave been lost by blundering into this single gun and itshandful of protecting riflemen.

In the course of the same afternoon, these Westernersaccounted for a total of 3 half-tracks, 6 tanks and a hordeof other vehicles and personnel. This feat wasaccomplished with a Blue loss of two .50 caliber antitankguns and a scattering of assessed casualties. The evidentreason for success: headwork on the part of the officers,NCO's and men of the rifle companies which successivelyled the advance. Their skill (and ability to bluff) was suchthat it was never necessary for the leading platoon to callon the support platoons of their company.

By no means uncommon, this kind of work was oftenduplicated by units whose scouting and patrolling abilityenabled them to maneuver or frighten out of position morepowerful organizations whose ignorance, indifference andlack of skill left them open to such action.

While training alone is the remedy for most faults ofinability, one wonders about devising some schemes tocure at least the outpost and information problem. Theduties of MP's might be expanded to include the posting ofguards along important roads rendered dangerous by


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Typical machine gun emplacement for maneuversright out inthe open. Incidentally, the position on the gun of the ammunitionchest is not favored by the Infantry School. It is fixed to tripodonly for AA use.

enemy action. In accordance with the natural limitationsimposed by military activity and terrain (and not merely bymilitary organization by corps and divisions) anintelligence network might be arranged so that, at keypoints, it would be possible to find out what was going onand where other units were.

Under present conditions, the vertical routing ofintelligence puts such a lag on distribution that

organizations operating on the same road and contiguous toa reporting unit will normally get those reports asforwarded by rear echelons far too late. Brigade anddivision S-2's were usually aware of the general situation,but were poor on knowledge of road conditions and on theimmediate battle intelligence required by reinforcing and

maneuvering elements. As we have seen, this especiallypertains when units are utilizing roads and fronts crowdedwith cooperating divisions and detachments. It evenapplies when division commanders themselves are visitingforward echelons.* If there were more effort at constantlateral communication useful to regimental and battalioncommanders, the actions of striking forces could be mademore rapid and effective. A well-organized service,composed of messengers, MP's, radio, telephone, airobservation and other facilities, would lighten thecommunications burden of combat forces, and workingwith them might considerably enhance the all-round entireefficiency of forces in their area.

The objection might well be posed that a special areaground and radio network would provide the enemy withmuch useful information. In reply, many disastrousincidents from our own military history and repeatedmaneuver experience, and finally the Allied fiascoesagainst the Germans may be cited. In contrast is the openuse of radio, flares, rockets and air panels by the GermanArmy. There is a strong argument in that the policy ofsecrecy and security is per se a conservative trendabnegating the spirit of the offensive which underlies ourmilitary doctrine and animates our Army. Indeed, if it ismaintained that, given information, we shall not be able toact upon it and render it obsolete before the enemy can

react, in so ruling we are undoubtedly assuming an attitudeof defeatism.Quite as surprising to newsgatherers as the handling of

combat intelligence was the lack of thoroughness exhibitedby the majority of troops. One would have thought that thenews despatches and gory pictures of the European Warwould have instilled an anxiety to work hard and well attheir new profession. But no. No care whatever was takenin emplacing machine guns to select real fields of fire,cover or proper concealment. Though generallymaintaining safe intervals, truck convoys seldom halted todismount and scatter when strafed by aircraft. Here andthere antiaircraft machine guns of convoys would be laidon the offending planes, but normally not. There was a pleasing and distinct improvement in camouflagediscipline, but it is a far cry from the requirements laiddown by engineers who coach reporters on camouflagestories.

Over the entire Army phase there was an atmosphere ofunreal and indecent haste which seemed to compoundordinary errors and force many into doing, that they mightnot be left behind, what they might ordinarily avoid.A Blue Douglas attack bomber strafes assembled Red tanks and

other vehicles without getting more than passing attention. This isthe tank battalion assembling to "attack" Zwolle.

*The reader is reminded that three ranking British generals were socaptured by the Germans in Libya recently.


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This held even for air. At flying fields, seldom was evenlip-service paid to reality as squadron commanders persisted in parking planes wing tip to wing tip, seekingservicing convenience and military precision rather thanpractice at dispersion. In view of the fact that this habit oflining 'em up has lost the Poles, the Dutch, the Belgians,

the French, the Yugoslavs their air forcesand theRussians a good part of theirs if pictures tell the talepractice of this sort was extremely alarming to the press.Crowded though the fields were, the need for rapidservicing ought not to have precluded the cultivation ofgood habits.

Overworked umpire received protests for allowing Blue advance.Even though he did his best to keep the Blues back, while he wasordering them to retire in one area they would come forward inanother. Undoubtedly Blue infantry here had fine spirit, but their

actions would in war have been productive of nothing butcasualties.

Not so noticeable as haste, but in many ways moresignificant, was the unreality of maneuvers where firepower was concerned. Troops in contact with hostileforces will discover in a trice, come war, that they cannotadvance across open fields against machine-gun fire,because in war there are no weak-willed umpires. Troopswill learn to take cover and dig in, when now they make

little pretense of so doing. But without Gen. McNair'sidea of using live artillery ammunition as an object lessonin connection with training, it is difficult to see how thefull realization of the tremendous destructiveness ofartillery fire is to be brought home. In spite of thesuperhuman job done by artillery umpires, right now thelack of appreciation is appalling. Anyone who has seendemonstrations of time shell at Sill and glanced atcasualty statistics of past wars must shudder at thecareless exposure of movements and positions to artilleryfire prevalent in the maneuvers. One is alarmed to seethat commanders even went so far as to forget their ownartillery and its tremendous value. In some casesas in

maneuvers pastit was left in march order on the roadwhen it should have been supporting the effort of itsdivision. Too often, except in more or less elite outfitslike regular infantry, cavalry and armored divisions, theusefulness of forward artillery went unappreciated.Infantry was put to costly use where artillery would havewon for nothing.

Almost worse than this ignoring of artillery was awidespread failure to react to air firepower. Since all thedifference between security on one hand and practicalannihilation and transport paralysis on the other lies in afew simple precautions, this is amazing. The appearanceof a major general of cavalry should not be required,

before engineer vehicles concentrated at a bridgeheaddisperse into neighboring woods. Neither should the wisesecurity measures taken in a CP like Gen. Patton's socontrast with lackadaisical performances by some lowerechelons as to make headquarters personnel appearalmost freakish. As a practical lesson to officers, ademonstration of air bombardment and machine gunningwas staged at Barksdale Field in the middle of the armyphase. Ninety generals and selected juniors totaling 4,000were invited. Because high winds retarded the schedule,many generals left before the conclusion of the show.

All these points were of interest. But they were neitheras fascinating nor as unexpected as a thought which thesefirst large-scale maneuvers of our new Army havegenerated. The thought is this:

Following recognition of the high promise of theArmy, critics have soughtas aboveto enumerate themistakes observed so that correction through futuretraining may be accomplished. There has been muchbloodthirsty talk, too. Dark hints are passed that heads

Artillery umpire's assistant indicating fire on bridge south ofZwolle. The Red half-tracks in the background are about to driveright through this fire to escape Blue cavalry which has worked

in among them. It is laid down by 105-mm. howitzers in Zwolle.


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shall fall right and left in the most approved Alice inWonderland manner. Guard officers must go. Reserveofficers are to get the sack. A thorough purge of theRegular list will occur immediately.

It is to be hoped that, having been rushed into anemergency which it has long warned against, the Army

will not be hustled into anything that it has not ponderedlong and well. And thus comes the question: would suchthought reach the conclusion that the majority of maneuvermistakes were not in themselves evils, but merely surfacemanifestations which would disappear when the root andsource was located and removed?

The author is convinced that most maneuver errors areattributable to a few basic psychological factors, and thatthese should be made the target of intensive correctiveeffort. The great majority of these factors stem from thefact that the United States Army today is a civilian army.

The Regularthe soldier well-grounded inthe profession of armsis a rare phenomenon. Rarer still is the reserve orguard officer whose peacetime pur suitshave permitted him to convert himself intothe practical equivalent of a professional.

Both types are submerged in a tremendousflood of civilian personnel. Inevitablythese civilian soldiers must carry all beforethem, and, for a time at least, impose onthe Army the behavior patterns of civilianlife.

Civilian life in the United States is peculiar. Our prize idiosyncrasy is ourfamed aptitude for bustle and haste.Stranger still for an army where all shouldwork together is that unfortunatedemocratic development: ruggedindividualism. This trait has made "mind

your own business" a national rule, anddaily causes citizens to neglect their civicduties and to tolerate unfair business practices not directly affecting them.Probably rugged individualism, like haste,is an outgrowth of that pushing businessenterprise which has sought to place a premium on individualistic success of amaterialistic nature. Truly our God isMammon, and woe betide him who wasteshis time or falls behind through assistancerendered to his fellow men.

The most recent American

psychological development also seems tostem from this neglect of the concept ofgroup service and solidarity. In seekingmaterial advancement, Americanenterprise has discovered and developedadvertising and sales techniques to thepoint where it is a simple matter to makean inferior product outsell a superior one.

The cumulative effect has been a lack of thoroughness inour people. The cagey man will try to push ahead withoutward show; the dull will see no point in hard labor ifcomparative results are negative. In short, it is regrettable but true that neither business enterprise nor unionization

has yet made positive contributions towards the democraticideal of servicetowards group action and consciousness;towards thoroughness in thought and deed; and towardsrapid and methodicalbut not hastyaction.

A demonstration of camouflage was staged during the maneuvers at Esler Field, CampBeauregard. Here men of the 21st Engineers (Avn) take their simulated cabbage patchacross the runway. They constructed revetments which they had intended the Blue

ursuit planes stationed at the field to use. Only after the greatest persuasion could theAir Corps be induced to utilize the camouflaged facilities.

It must be acknowledged, of course, that the oppositeshould hold for the regular. He has sworn himself to theservice of his fellow countrymen. Unlike the civiliansoldier, much is to be expected of him. If he has so farforgotten his ideals and the standards of thought andworkmanship inculcated by every military precept, he hasbetrayed his trust, and he should go.


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Actually, the regular must absorb his own psychologicalpatternsthose peculiar to the military profession and tothe conditions under which the Army has labored duringthe past 20 years.

Under the former heading come some pretty commonattitudes of mind. Like any tight organization of men, a

regular force is as susceptible to clannishness as to espritde corps. Clannishness has a tendency to develop into prejudice against those who do not belong: against theGuard and against the reserve and selectees. Worse, amongofficers it progresses into a secretiveness more congenial toa high school fraternity than to an organization built tocreate an army from military ignoramuses, and bred to theoffensive spirit. We must face the facts: some of these evilsdo exist.

Unfortunately they have been compounded where they do pertain because of two decades of military neglect by apacifistic public. Officers have been compelled to substitutetheory and desk work for troop duty. Dearth of funds has

caused them to waste time in accounting for every picayunelittle item. It is not surprising, then, that an officer who hadto salvage for training purposes the wood and nails fromfurniture crates might suffer from habitual inability to thinkin the broad terms of modern war's vast wastage.

On comparing these attitudes of civilian and militaryminds with maneuver faults, it should be possible to seehow they motivate almostif not absolutelyall theerrors previously listed. The tank company commanderwas a reserve officerthe crews of the Red half-tracksnear Zwolle were selectees and new recruits. They wereminding their own business, and not speaking until spokento. So slack were their security precautions that the Bluescould and did work in to defeat them. Haste and want ofthoroughness is seen throughout. The good old militarymind is to be found permeating intelligence, and in theline-up of planes on fields. Finally, the small-mindedcommander is betrayed in the officer who forgets about hisartillery. And so it goes.

The solution might well be the institution ofpsychological drills which would instill the characteristicsdesiredat least in the junior officers and enlisted men.Once these drills had made the individual's mind and habitsreceptive to military training, the purely military programshould be completed rapidly. There cannot be the slightestdoubt but that the raw manpower the Army has today is thebest an army ever had. It is not to be compared with regular

enlisted personnel of the past 20 years, nor even with thatof 1917-18. Having the advantage of rising educationalstandards, it is highly intelligent. With prejudices removed,it will easily absorb combat training because militaryaction is simply logical action in any given situation.

To facilitate this planor even to facilitate the presentprogramthe essential must be constant, clear answers tothe implied question "Why?" during all phases of trainingand operations. The increasing trend to wards visual andpictorial instead of written instruction should be continued because it is quicker, less boring, and more self-

explanatory. The dryness should be removed from militaryinstruction and especially from manuals, so that pupils mayreplace the longing for the end of instruction and studywith the interest to ask the question "Why?"

In this the Germans have set us a strong precedent. It isill-fitting that we should fall behind, and continue to treat

junior officers and especially enlisted men as children.Conservative regulars and strutting reserve and guardofficers must avoid maintaining their authority by pullingrank and social distinctions, and by trying to make amystery out of their professional knowledge. Conduct ofthis nature is mortally resented by any intelligent person.Today it is foolish, for many enlisted men possess ageneralif not a militaryintellect and social positionwell above that of their superiors. A real leader is he whocommands through character and professional excellencealone; an officer who develops and guides, but does notdrive, his men.

To get the most out of Americans, it must be

remembered that our form of government has developed apeople who respect their leaders only when that respect isreturned. To explain things to them is to gain their respect,their interest and their regard. In so doing one also providesthat information which develops to a maximum ournational characteristic of individual initiative. Since the fogof war imposes on armies a demand for isolated andindependent action on every side, it is imperative that thesoldier be developed to the fullest who, through asking"Why?" has become capable of acting individually yet inharmony with his neighbors seen or unseen, joined to themby a common mind and a common purpose.

The maneuvers have indicated that this type of personis rare. Yet he is the sort vitally needed not only assoldiers by the Army, but as a citizen by present day andpost-war democracy. If the Army can convert the mass ofcivilians to conform to such a pattern, it will perform ahigh service to the country, and win for an intelligentmilitary policy a respect that may well save us fromfuture unpreparedness.

Signal Corps sound trucks supplied battle sounds for realism. (Photoby Dmitri Kessel.)


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Lake Charles airport: note the concentration of trailers, the line-up of Navy Grumman fighters

faced beyond with another line of Douglas dive-bombers. In the background is still another line-up of planes. Life photo.

Lessons from the ManeuversExtracts from the reports of Field Artillery official observers at the Second Army-First Army exercises

GENERAL

All operations in the maneuvers were decidedly affectedby two factors: First, the preoccupation of all participantswith tank and antitank features; and second, the terrain,which has few roads, little observation, and is heavilywooded.

AIROBSERVATION

One observer reported that no battalion was located

which had not requested air observation but only onebattalion was found which actually received action on suchrequest. The Air Corps performed an enormous number ofmissions, but it is not believed that they were useful tofield artillery except in lengthening the effective range ofharassing, interdiction and demolition fires. Any effect thusobtained, however, was not given as the result of fieldartillery commanders making requests for deepening oftheir fires. From the fact that air observation was requested,it is deduced that it was needed. From the fact that it was

not supplied, it is deduced that (1) there were moreimportant missions; (2) Air Corps training would notpermit air observation of field artillery fire; or (3) that theAir Corps is not extremely interested in putting their planesand pilots to such a use.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY

Artillery battalion commanders and umpires were wellaware of the haulage problem involved in ammunitionresupply; apparently they made every effort to have the

actual haulage meet the theoretical expenditures. Allbattalion S-4's and at least one division ammunition officerfelt that the Division Ammunition Office is unnecessary,serves no useful purpose for artillery, and is a definitebottleneck in resupply.

ANTITANKDEFENSE

Weapons were generally located in pairs and in depth.The field of fire was toward the enemy and was generallywell chosen. Many instances were noted where field

914


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1941 LESSONS FROM THE MANEUVERS 915

pieces were used for antitank defense on order of combatteam commanders.

It is believed that the individual soldier has beenthoroughly indoctrinated with the necessity and desire toseek and destroy the tank. He seems to have lost his fear oftanks now that he has seen them, and in some ways appears

to show a hatred of them,engendered in part by the factthat the tank umpires haveallowed the tank most unusualliberties when opposing antitankguns.

As a whole the tank attackswere stopped wheneverlaunched. That the terrain isunfavorable for tanks mayaccount in part for this. Nevertheless the fact remainsthat the attacks were stopped bythe use of organic artillery andantitank weapons.

Armored forces attackedhabitually in the following order: Afew motorcycles, a few scout cars,more motorcycles, tanks. Our

troops do not meet this method ofattack in the best fashion, accordingto one report. The present method isto fire at each vehicle as it comesup. This is objectionable on thefollowing grounds:

a. The position of theantitank gun is disclosedprematurely.

b. The fire is directed at thetank at the time and place wherethe tank is the strongest. This isbecause the armament of the tank

is designed to fire forward mostefficiently; and the front armorof the tank is thickest.

c. The successful attack onone vehicle leaves a road block between the gun and the nexttarget.

More effective fire could bedelivered on tanks if the guncrews waited until after thevehicles had passed. The probable objection is thatumpires will not assess tanklosses if this procedure isfollowed.

Two things were especiallynoted concerning tank attacksduring the maneuvers: (1) Theuse of artillery to support tanks

was extremely limited. (2) Tanks, no matter how mucheffort is exerted, always work back toward roads whenthey encounter obstacles.

75-mm. antitank gun commanding road and a part of the 37th Division Provisional ATBattalion. This is the gun shown from the front.

The same gun photographed from the rear. Life photos.

ORDERS

Warning orders were used extensively but in many


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cases their improper use defeated their purpose, as thetroops were alerted only to have the orders changed later.Many warning orders caused men to be mounted andmaterial ready to be moved hours before they could be puton the road. Numerous statements were made that poorplanning was the rule rather than the exception.

Operations maps and overlays were being used.Fragmentary oral orders were in full use by the lower units.But in some cases the orders issued were indefinite and toofragmentary. As an example, the order issued by anantitank battalion commander to one of his companiesconsisted of the following statement, "Get on the road andget going." When the company commander asked as to thedestination and mission, he received as an answer arepetition of the foregoing command.

COMMUNICATION

Poor results in telephone communication were chieflydue to poor technique in wire laying. It was the old story of

lines crossing roads with no attempt made to protect them,leaving wires on road shoulders, laying them too tight,rough handling during recovery of wire, and so on.

Although many radios were successfully used, thetroops claim that the sets, especially the 194's, were notgood enough to perform the missions.

FIRE DIRECTION

In general, units were employing the technique taught atthe Field Artillery School. However, more training of theFD teams is needed. The fire-direction center appeared to be the only operating installation at the battalion CP.Installations were concentrated, and were not dug in. No

systematic arrangement ofequipment appeared to be in use.Firing charts were in every caseseparate from the situation map.This may account for the fact thatin one division 18 per cent of thefires marked on its leadingelements were fired by its ownartillery. The function of the S-2and S-3 sections, except withregard to fire direction, appear tohave been neglected. Suitablesituation maps frequently were

lacking.

FORWARD OBSERVATION

Because of the nature of theterrain, forward observation wasthe most successful means ofdelivering observed fires. Animprovement has been made inthe use of more experiencedofficers for this important duty.

Many battery commandersand in one case even a battalion commanderacted as forward observer. The battery forward observers were ahead of the infantry battalion commander, and usually right in the front.Communication by radio was common; however, many batteries made arrangements to lay wires to the forward

observers. Forward observers were active in making thelocal situation clear to their own troops, but there is still aneed for teaching these details that they have auxiliaryintelligence functions. Fires requested by forwardobservers were more reliable than those called for byliaison officers.

GUNNERY

In general, survey was by battalion. Data furnished bythe division artillery headquarters or by the observationbattalion seldom arrived in time to be of use initially. Thetype of survey performed was influenced by the heavilywooded terrain.

None of the photos, maps, or mosaics distributed weremade during the maneuvers.

A great amount of confusion existed at times as to thecapabilities of the various weapons. In one case 75-mm.guns "fired" on targets eight miles distant.

LIAISON

Command and combat liaison were employed, but not tothe extent considered desirable. More and better artillerysupport would have resulted from closer commandliaison. Artillery and combat teams sometimes marchedwithout sending a liaison officer of any kind to the combatteam commander. This may account in part for the

Life

A message center about as well-concealed as an airplane beacon.


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1941 LESSONS FROM THE MANEUVERS 917

fact that many supported commanders were not really"artillery conscious."

MOTORMOVEMENTS

Many movements observed showed evidence of faultyprior planning and reconnaissance. Evidently the use of the

roads was not coordinated by higher staffs; as an example,on one occasion where two divisions had been ordered tomove by the same road, one element of one division wasdelayed ten hours at the IP. On another occasion during anight move one division crossed its own columns andoccasioned a delay of eight hours in the launching of itsattack ordered by a higher commander.

The road discipline of the individual soldier and officeris noticeably poor, particularly at halts. No halted columnwas observed in which some individuals were not on theleft of the column and in many cases well out toward thecenter of the road. Halted columns seem to rely more on asentry at the head and tail of columns to slow down

approaching vehicles than on proper discipline to protectthemselves and passing vehicles.

It is believed that the artilleryman may as well resignhimself to the use of all of his vehicles for the shuttling ofinfantry. All type vehicles within the artillery were used forthat purpose.

Many instances were observed of vehicles beingoverloaded, driven at excessive speeds and generally beingabused, but some faults must be charged to highercommanders who required prolonged and excessive use ofvehicles with insufficient opportunity for caretaking.

It is to be noted that the operation of motor vehicles hasimproved materially. There is still much to be desired

along the lines of caretaking, cleaning, driver maintenance,tightening, drivers' inspections and servicing. In short, thedrivers now know how to drive, but do not know how totake care of the transportation. The small number ofaccidents was a great surprise. Most that did occur could belaid directly to (1) driver fatigue, (2) blackout drivingunder the most difficult conditions, and (3) carelessness.

There is a tendency on the part of the troops to overloadlight vehicles and underload medium or heavy vehicleswhen shuttling.

The use of traction devices was not prevalent. Thepractice of winching to hard roads and staying on them wasthe means usually employed to the exclusion of other

forms of field expedients.Maintenance was poor. Although most motor officers

knew the general requirements for motor maintenancethere was not enough effort and technical knowledge toinsure proper maintenance. From personal observationthis failure started with the driver and continuedthroughout the echelons of maintenance up to the 4th.There was one exception to this statement found in a thirdechelon set-up. The reasons for this failing are believed tobe:

(1) Training of maintenance personnel was inadequate.(2) Maintenance was subordinated to such an extent

that it was forgotten, due to more obvious needs such as:

(a) Shuttling.(b) Supply.(c) Cleanliness.(d) Training of details and firing batteries.

(3) The time necessary to perform maintenance is notmade available by commanders.

(4) There is a dearth of technically qualified motorofficers, motor sergeants and mechanics.

(5) The army is not motor conscious.(6) Abuses and faulty maintenance of motor vehicles

are condoned. (This is one of the greatest sources of poormaintenance.)

In general, the 1940-41 vehicles now in use are superior

vehicles. There are many who question particular vehiclecharacteristics but the fact is that in spite of maintenancedifficulties mentioned above, the vehicles functioned.Foreign officers (British) present at the maneuvers wereunanimous in their praise of all vehicles observed. Theyfrankly admitted that our transport is the best they haveseen bar none.

Notice of Annual Meeting, U. S. Field Artillery Association

In compliance with Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution, notice is herebygiven that the Executive Council has fixed 5:30 PM, Monday, December 15, 1941, as

the time of the annual meeting of the Association to be held at the Army and NavyClub, Washington, D. C.

The business to be disposed of will be the selection of six members of theExecutive Council; voting on proposed amendments to the Constitution (as printed ineach issue of the JOURNAL beginning with June, 1941); and the transaction of such otherbusiness as may properly come before the meeting.

Proxy cards are being sent out to all active members of the Association within thecontinental limits of the United States, as required by the Constitution, and it is desiredthat they be returned promptly. Nominations may be made on the proxy cards or fromthe floor of the meeting.


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Bareheaded

We Salute ThemDuring the year just ending there has been recorded the "final

ride" of three of our immortals.

April 15, 1941. COLONEL DAN T. MOORE, who as a Captainwas the first Commandant of the Field Artillery School, and who

has been suitably regarded as the founder and father of modern

gunnery in the U. S. Field Artillery.

May 30, 1941. BRIGADIER GENERAL EDMUND L. GRUBER,

who as 1st Lieutenant, 5th Field Artillery, at Camp Stotensburg, P.

I., in March, 1908 composed the Field Artillery Song, which will be

sung as long as the United States has a Field Artillery.

June 17, 1941. MAJOR GENERAL ERNEST HINDS, who as a

Captain of Field Artillery in 1904-06 was a member of the Boardthat wrote the first Drill Regulations for our then new, rapid fire

field gun, and who in 1918 was Chief of Field Artillery of the A.E.F.

Men such as these are the creators of the traditions of our Arm.

R. M. D.

918


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May, 1940Some Experiences of a Field Regiment R. A.

By D/101*

[Editorial note: This superb account, by courtesy ofThe Journal of the Royal Artillery, July, 1941, needs no additional comments. It is "allthere"packed with artillery lessons on every conceivable topic.]

Loading a 25-pounder

Like the test of the B.E.F., we had had a long coldwinter during which we lived in scattered farms, lofts and barns and almost entirely on a troop basis. Thus we allrealized that if the threatened "Blitzkrieg" was ever todevelop, we should have to take a good pull at ourselves to

be ready for it. What we perhaps did not see so clearly washow valuable had been this decentralization to troops, particularly in the matter of messing and the training oflarge numbers of cooks.

It was a joke in the regiment that whenever we went back to trainusually to Bapaume or thereaboutstherewas a "flap" which brought us back at short notice. Thishad happened twice and when the early part of May found

us there once more we were pretty sure we should bewhisked back again; the real arguments centred roundwhether it would be for another "flap" or for the realthing!

A word here as to our preparations to fit ourselves for

the blitz if it materialized: We felt that although theexact form which modern war would take was a matterof some doubt, it was essential that we should all have aplan in our minds of how we were going to set about our job. We therefore decided upon a new system ofbroadcasting our regimental policy, and one that shouldbe quite unlike any other. The result was the productionof "Mrs. Beeton," a fat notebook written entirely inmanuscript and containing perhaps 30 written pages anda few diagrams. This volume went "on tour" round

*Apparently a commander of a divisional (25-pdr.) regiment.

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batteries (staying 3 or 4 days in each andoften being copied out by subalterns fortheir own use) and then returning to R.H.Q.for a "refresher" and rest. It was a goodidea. We decided that the war would be oneof movement, of wireless, and of air

activity. We therefore trained very hardindeed and concentrated on these points. Itsoon became apparent that to bring aregiment to a starting point at the correctdensity and speed was a great art, particularly as troops and batteries oftencame by entirely different routes. We wereshockingly bad at this to begin with and outof it emerged the golden rule that howeverlow the density at which a unit is moving,someone must be in charge of every sub-unit in it; how he exercises his command ishis funeral, but it can be done. As for

wireless, not only have perhaps seven setsto operate on one frequency but, far moreimportant, the B.C. has to be able to get his personality over the ether as surely andeffectively as if he were standing in front ofhis officers giving out orders direct. Weconcentrated, therefore, on complete silenceon all sets except when traffic was passing,rigid control from the control set, and onmaking all officers into wireless operators(not with the idea that they would oftenreally have to do it but to give them theinterest in it which can only come ofpractical experience).

One other thing we practiced hard wasdigging by night. Fully equipped O.P.parties, with the necessary additional labour,used to sweat all night digging O.Ps oppositeeach other, and when daylight came sittrying to spot the "enemy" till it was time togo home to breakfast. We dug in a completeR.H.Q. only a couple of days before the"balloon" went up and when we got up nearBrussels all we had to say was "same again"and it was done in a few hours. Finally, we paid great attention to the detailed packingand loading of our precious armoured O.Ps.

and particularly to such vital details as thesmooth running out of remote controls. Ourmagnificent American officer, L, wasmore responsible than anyone else for theresults we got with these.

So much for some of our preparations.May 10th dawned fine and stillbut therewas an air raid warning, an almost unheardof thing, about 0400 hours. We had a"date" with the French D.L.M. to whomwe were returning hospitality for a very


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1941 MAY, 1940EXPERIENCES OF A FIELD REGIMENT 921

pleasant day we spent with them nearCambrai a few days before. I strolled downthe High Street to breakfast and was theregreeted with the astounding news thatBelgium and Holland were being invaded.Hasty orders were issued to pack up and be

prepared to move at 1300 hours. (We had a bad start in the race to the R. Dyle!) It ishard to recapture the atmosphere of thatday; there was little excitement, we all feltwe were jolly well "teed up" for anythingand we expected we were in for some fairlyexciting times. We were quite prepared tostart the war in the good old British method,i.e., by a retreat; but luckily we didn't seefurther than that! It was a great relief tohave a real chance of getting at the Bocheand everyone was in great heart.

We arrived in the area of our winter

quarters that evening and bivouaced. Ourlong "scroll" map of the country up toLouvain was produced (it was mounted ontwo broomsticks and fitted on a simpleframe) and orders for plan D were given outto the accompaniment of "noises off" fromthe bombing of the little town whereDivisional H.Q. had been. Reconnaissance parties, limited to 15 vehicles, per fieldregiment, were to cross the frontier at about0900 hours next morningthe guns movingabout twelve hours later.

The move is of interest. The advance to

the R. Dyle (just E. of Brussels) was basedon "continuous movement" at a low density.Advance study of such maps as wereavailable had indicated likely deploymentareas and provisional plans for this, with aC.R.As.1 co-ordinating conference thatevening, had been made. We decided oncertain principles connected with the move,the most unusual, perhaps, being that underno circumstances would we strip our maincolumn of senior officers, in view of whatmight happen to this rather dashing forwardmove. Thus we left both B.Cs. and one

officer per troop (or equivalent sub-unit) behind with the guns, taking forward theC.O., C.O.2, a/Adjt. and liaison agent fromR.H.Q., and from each battery a seniortroop commander (for O.Ps.), a C.P.O., aG.P.O. per troop and a W.L.O.2 Every vehicle

1Divisional artillery commander.2C.P.O. = command post officer; G.P.O. = gun

position officer; W.L.O. = wagon line (motor park)officer.


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throughout the regiment had its own supplies of food andwater, with special cooking arrangements in the case ofreconnaissance parties.

The morning of 11th May was brilliantly fine and inspite of some late running ahead of us, I noted that mycar crossed the Franco-Belgian frontier at 10.34 a.m. A

big date! The move forward went like clockwork andwith no opposition from the enemy air and by 5 p.m. wewere having our first look at our new gun area. Thisconsisted of rolling arable land, covered with springcorn perhaps a foot high, some very narrow sunkenroads and very few houses. There were terraces betweensome of the fields, but there was very little air cover.The regiment was the rear one in action,3 being behindthe divisional reserve line and therefore some seven oreight thousand yards from the foremost defendedlocalities. Communications were thus of vast length andso we instituted a forward exchange, dug in, where alarge maintenance party (well equipped with rations)

remained throughout the operations in this areathisworked well. The wagon lines were in a lovely great beech forest near Brussels, but a great distance away.We had no forward wagon lines, except for staff vehicleand for the forward troops.

As yet there were no enemy nearindeed it was ourhope that the R. Dyle was to be only an intermediate stagein our advance to the northern frontier of Belgium, but wecould hear ominous rumblings to the N.E. which indicatedthat things were not so quiet out that way.

The guns arrived early on the morning of the 12th Mayinto the wagon line area. They were tired after their longdrive without lights but everything had arrived safely

barring a petrol lorry hit by a train! B.Cs. and all whocould get forward came up to look at the position and thatnight the guns moved up. At the same time ourammunition lorries (under orders from the C.R.A.) ran allthe way back to France to raid the dumps in our backareas, doing the same the following night. This was atremendous strain on the drivers but a brilliant move as itturned out.

Owing to the lack of air cover we adopted exceptionallywide and irregular gun intervals and though Boche planeswere often over very low down we had no trouble. Thedigging was easy, being in sandbut it was hard to revet,as one C.P.O. found to his cost in a sunken road!

On Whit Monday, 13th May, one of our two forwardtroops which were pushed up close behind the foremostdefended localities on the R. Dyle, about two miles N. ofWavre, was put right ahead of the river to support ourcavalry if need be. L, in an armoured O.P., went out tothem but had some trouble with the very longcommunications. However, there was nothing to shoot atand the troop withdrew S.W. of the Dyle that evening.

Next day streams of refugees, amongst them Belgianand French soldiers, started coming back; Wavre, with its

narrow streets, was packed with them. We heard that theBoche were through on the frontier. The noises ofapproaching war got louder. There were more Boche planes about, including the Henschel reconnaissance planes which we had not seen before. The parachutist problem began to loom uphow much of it was real is

hard to say but undoubtedly they were used. Early thatmorning a Do. 17 swooped fairly low over our gun areaand out tumbled a little object which later turned into a parachutist. Every bren gun for miles around blazed athim as he swung slowly earthwards, to disappear behind arow of houses about a mile away. We heard he had beencaught (with a slight scratch on a finger!). They werestout fellows and, if dropped into a built up or woodedarea, very hard to catch. I doubt, however, whether theywould have been so willing to be dropped onto a reallyhostile country into which their friends were notadvancing at such a phenomenal rate. One result of thiswas, however, that all D.Rs.4 had to go in pairs, which

made an already difficult problem still more so. (Thisapplied chiefly to signal D.Rs. and those going back tothe wagon lines through the forest and suburbs.)

I motor cycled up to the front that eveningthe first wewere properly in action. An extraordinary party was goingon, reminding one more of Rushmoor Arena than real war.The Dyle ran through a lovely valley, with water meadowsand lines of trees fringing them, and our foremost defendedlocalities ran just our side of these meadows. Behind themthe sides of the valley rose steeply, with dense woods, andwhere our forward troop was (the other had gone back)was a park and a large chateau. When I got there, there wasan incessant roar of rifle and machine gun fire. I found the

troop G.P.O. laying a gun over open sights through a gapin the trees at a vehicle and some men on the far side of thewater meadows. What nationality the target was I don'tknow. I told him to hold on a bit as it seemed pointless toadvertise the position of the guns, trapped as they were just behind the foremost defended localities, with a long plateau to cross behind them, if it was unnecessary. Ienquired from all the infantry I could find as to what theywere shooting at. They were all very excited and kept pointing across the meadows to groups of people on thefar side. These were certainly soldiers but I believe theywere mainly Belgians! Undoubtedly Bochereconnaissance parties were mixed up with them and,indeed, the enemy did close up properly that night but itall was much more like the Aldershot Tattoo (with theguns put close up so as to be sure of getting them into thearena!) than anything else.

The other forward troop had been put into action in alittle hollow just behind the top edge of the woodswhich rose up from the valley and dawn found theregiment with this troop forward and all the others backin battle positions. The only way to fit in this forwardtroop was to put three of its guns one behind the other (there

3Meaning "in position."4Despatch ridermtcl. msgr.


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was no room for the fourth gun anywhere). The onlygrouse was that, with the wide zone, no one knew whichwas No. 1! On the night 14th/15th we had put one sectionright forward to fire harassing fire tasks. This was carefullysurveyed in and fired a lot, being withdrawn beforedaylight, across the plateau, which was in full view. On

15th May the forward troop, and the forward regiment, dida lot of shooting. I was in the O.P. area with H,commanding one of the batteries about 1700 hours thatevening when we met an infantry major who said theenemy were through on our right and that his battalion was being hurriedly moved S. of Wavre to try and dosomething about it. Ihurried back toR.H.Q. and foundthe story true. Whathad happened wasthat theunexpectedly swift

enemy advance hadcaught thenonmechanizedFrench division,which should havecome up on the rightof our division, before it was properly deployed.As a result of thisour right flank wasin the air and roundand past it weresweeping theenemy's columns.Not so good, and somuch for our hopesof a further advance.I ordered forward,under a good officer,all the vehiclesrequired to extricateour forward troop(knowing hownarrow and awkwardwere the lanes) and got them up as close to the guns ascould be done in daylight. This was a lucky move, as quite

a number of guns were lost here by other people solelythrough inability to get tractors forward from the far distantwagon lines.

It was this evening that we brought off a "coup." Iwas rung up from the right O.P., overlooking Wavre, byM, who said his look-out man (actually hissignaller) had spotted Boche tanks camouflagingthemselves on our side of a wood! The inference wasthat if some were there, there were probably lots moreinside, so I ordered a regimental concentration, allexactly as per miniature range, and at zero hour, some

ten minutes later, we put 500 rounds at rate intense intothe wood without any preliminary ranging. It was agrand crash and excited chuckles down the O.P. wireconfirmed that we had struck a winner. That wood blazed for several hours with big black columns ofsmoke indicating petrol fires. A good effort on the part

of an alert O.P.In the absence of orders I withdrew the forward troop

after dark and was much relieved to hear it was safely in.The telephone was almost red hot that evening and wefired masses of ammunition. I turned in, fairly tired, at0100 hours and two minutes later a liaison officer arrived

with orders for us to pull out at once and get back to a position on the suburbs of Brussels! Reconnaissance

parties had already spent the evening on an entirelydifferent piece of ground and so of course it was a nightwithdrawal onto unreconnoitred ground! We were to getused to this later.

Gun position officer, 25-pounder battery

Owing to the great distances and to traffic hold-ups and partially to the slowness out of action of our rather overequipped troops we never got the last troop away till wellafter dawnhowever, we were behind the new foremostdefended localities and the Boche did nothing about it aswe had slipped away without his being able to maintaintouch. We had an incredibly intricate withdrawal


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through miles of greenhouses, small suburban housesand steep narrow roads and were pretty tired when wehad our midday meal in our new positions. However, Iwas delighted at the way everyone always dug slittrenches, however tired they werethey had not yet had practical proof of how necessary these were; but they

soon had it.We got an hour or two of sleep that afternoon but not

very much for me as I had a rather exhaustingreconnaissance of a new line facing S. (instead of E. aspreviously). This involved wandering about in the suburbsand entering endless houses in the hopes of getting a view, but always without success. The great exodus fromBrussels had begun and the few remaining inhabitants andsuch of our troops as we encountered were usuallyextremley suspicious, so great was the impression made bythe tales of parachutists in British uniform. A large town,or a farm, suddenly bereft of its inhabitants is a mostunpleasant and eerie place and it was perfectly horrible to

see the animals left tied up without water or food, and thecows unmilked. There was a ceaseless lowing of cattle andbarking of dogs throughout the country-side.

That night we fired hard on "map shoots"I doubt if wehit much!and towards 0200 hours the last troop slippedaway. It was a very dark night and our way ran throughinky black woods. The maps, though good in themselves,showed none of the recent building developments and sowere very hard to read, and of course no lights wereallowed. Further we had had no time to get reconnaissanceparties back by daylight and so it came about that we wereagain trekking through the dark to a mere "name" on themap with orders to get into action by first light to see our

infantry away from Foret de Soignies when we quittedBrussels.Dawn found our Z car5 and a signals' wireless truck

apparently alone in a world of small villas; of the regimentthere was no sign. However, by the usual series of luckyflukes we picked up some of the threads and made contactwith the infantry brigadier (Brig. G), just outside theforest. The situation was obscure. All we knew was, wewere to be back behind the line of the canalized river of theBrussels - Charleroi canal that morning. And here twogreat lessons were brought out. First, the value of wirelessin such a situation; for it was only the wireless signal,travelling on its mysterious way, that could find itsdestination, and without it none of the component parts ofthe regiment would have known where the others were inthat complicated country. It was quite miraculous how thesituation sorted itself out entirely by wireless, so that I wasshortly installed with the infantry brigadier and my twoB.Cs. alongside me and the whole show under my controlonce more.

The next great lesson was the need for quickness inand out of action. It had never dawned on me what was

going on at the guns and when the brigadier startedthinning out, and the time came to make that criticalestimate of just how long it was safe to leave the guns inaction, I quite happily "thought of a number and doubledit" and ordered the various moves accordingly. To myhorror and amazement I found our last infantry emerging

from the forest and tumbling back towards the guns andas yet no reports of "closing down" from the guns. Idashed back to the nearest troop and found every kind of junk being slowly loaded onto the waiting tractors (stuffwhich might have been of use in a "thirty years' war" butcertainly not in this) and no conception at all of what wasrequired in a rear guard show. Mercifully the Boche weremiles away and so we "got away with it" and, after ratheran agitating morning, got the last vehicle over the bridgejust before it went up.

That day was chiefly remarkable for some vast trafficjams and for the dive bombing of one of our troops, whenon the move. There were some huge craters almost

touching the road and the whole outfit was smothered inmud but not a soul was hurt. (Throughout the campaignonly one man in the regiment was hit by enemy "air," aremarkable commentary on the relative harmlessness of airaction against vehicles spread out in the open.) We movedback slowly, rather uncertain of what to do, till we later gotorders to get back behind the next canal at Grammont,another twenty miles or so on. We pulled into someorchards about tea time and had a meal. Strongrepresentations were made that the drivers were too tired togo on. They had had four consecutive nights' driving withno sleep at all and under the most trying conditions.However, we decided that we must go on and that we must

sleep so, posting double sentries everywhere, we slepttill 23,30, had some tea and pulled out just after midnight,moving slowly through the ruins of Enghein, which was being ineffectively shelled at long range, and onto thearterial road to Grammont. Here I saw my first driver go tosleep. It was dawn and down the road came sailing atractor and gun, going beautifully. It slowly left the road,hit a concrete pillar and stopped with a sickening jar, lyingon its tummy astride a low bank. No one woke up and theengine continued to whirr for several seconds beforeanyone was awake enough to switch it off! Towards theend of that march we got officers onto motor cycles topatrol the column and keep men awake, for the moment avehicle stopped "flop" went the driver over the steeringwheel and that was that! It was an incessant source oftrouble for the rest of the show. About breakfast time wewere safely over the Dendre Canal and distributed undercover awaiting orders. I was just getting into my valise,under an apple tree, when orders came to reconnoitre for anoccupation that evening. So off we went, a very sleepy lotof reconnaissance parties, and did the job and I got backonly to find all was wrong and that we should have gonefour miles further and not where we were told. That putthe lid on it because we had lost our reconnaissance

5Command car.


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parties and were now to do it all again without them and infailing light. It was as bad a day as I remember.

The upshot of it all was that by about 2100 hours I mademy first contact with the Brigadier I was supporting and couldonly promise one battery in action, and that I was doubtful of.I was not very popular and I don't wonder. The Boche had

come on incredibly fast and was tapping at our position on thecanal at Lescelles. Luckily another field regiment wasthoroughly in action and also, when an S.O.S. came through,we didget it off after a fashion. It was a sticky night. Thecavalry who should have taken over the canal to enable theinfantry to slip away never got up for some reason (an orderwent wrong. I believe) and the acting divisional commander,the C.R.A. and the brigadier commanding the infantry brigadewere anxious as to what to do about it. Even the tenseness ofthe atmosphere failed to keep me awake and seeing I wasquite useless the C.R.A. mercifully sent me to bed andproduced a better and brighter substitute!

We left an hour or two later and I next saw the regiment

(after an interlude to help clear the biggest and best traffic block ever known, at Renaix) about 1000 hours thatmorning (Sun. 19th May) at Ere, south of the Escaut,which was to be our next stand. We really were tired bythen but luckily were left to sleep it off, which we did mostsuccessfully that day and the following night.

Here let me say a word about the vital necessity for theconservation of energy by every legitimate means. Onemust have an absolutely "cast iron" system of reliefs,particularly of officers, and one must stick to it.

That night was the only really decent one we got inthe whole twenty days and it completely set us on ourfeet. By 1100 hours next day we had our maintenancefully up to scratch and all ready. This was as well, as wehad hurried orders to side step to our right and get intoaction covering Antoing, where there was trouble. Here

we had our first casualty, Captain Tim Mead beingkilled, to the great sorrow of everyone. We spent threehectic days here, dug into the terraced banks of fieldsand shot a great deal of ammunition. The difficulty wasobservation. We could not see down into the Escaut andnever really knew what was happening in it, the Bocheseemed to have achieved complete air superiority andO.Ps. were few and far between and mostly veryunhealthy into the bargain. The cheering thing here wasthe extraordinary rapidity with which the regiment dugitself in. We saw to it, also, that our wagon lines were agood deal closer than at Brussels!

It was in this position that we were much

inconvenienced by the necessity of running two R.H.Qs.,one with the infantry brigade in a beastly place which wasalways in trouble and our own, back in the gun area andbeautifully dug in and very safe. The lines between theseH.Qs. were continually being cut and it doubled the workfor everyone. It was that "hardy annual"should theinfantryman come to the gunner, or vice versain its mostaggressive form.

We of course reckoned we would stay behind ourexcellent water obstacle and fight it outbut not a bit of

The battlefield of 1940men of a British front line infantry regiment in Belgium find time for a little relaxation. One of the features of thewar in the west was that it was fought mostly along the roads, with the result that the fields showed little signs of the struggle as they did

in 1914-18.


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it. Having had all our L. of C. cut by the Boche thrust tothe Boulogne area, we got orders late on the evening of22nd May that we were to slip away that nightand thatwe were to do rear guard again, with a group of one of our batteries and one from another field regiment supportingthe cavalry. So that was that, and once again we were

turned out, not as a result of enemy action against us, butelsewhere.

We had a successful get-away without any firing, and bykeeping a set from each battery with me at cavalry H.Q.,were able to be in a position throughout to providecontinuous support, had it been needed.

Midday on 23rd May saw us back in France and almostin that bit of the defences which we had dug during thewinter. That afternoon we were put in support of aninfantry brigade and had hopes of a stand here. But againwe got orders for a movethis time to strange country,Neuve Chapelle.

We started off in the dark and marched all night,occasionally having to pull off into fields and reverse thewhole outfit to avoid traffic jams, and arrived rather wearyat our destination to find no guides awaiting us. This hadhappened before and we were furious. The explanationwasand it is a point of interestthat one of two thingsare apt to happen, either the guides go to sleep at theirrendezvous or else they go off in triumph with the firstarrivals and leave no one to tell the remainder where to go.The remedy is duplicated guides and written instructions asto where to make for, which can be shown to everyonewho casts up.

The refugee problem was bad in this area. The wretchedpeople having fled to the S. were now finding themselves

again involved in the German thrust and, bewildered andscared, were aimlessly wandering about short of food,accommodation and hope. It was an awful warning againsttaking to the roads unless absolutely forced to by enemyaction.

Owing to the change of front and to the overrunning ofall the rear H.Qs. and depots, an acute map shortageoccurred on this day. When orders were received to hastilydeploy towards Merville I remember giving out orders offthe one and only map in the regiment and that a small scaleone. However, the two batteries dashed off and did greatwork. Major S in particular, getting some magnificentshooting, observing from the top of a Dutch barn in the

front line and earning great praise from the infantry, whowere being greatly worried by the inevitable trenchmortars.

(Here let me note that the enemy's support for his fastmoving columns seemed to consist almost entirely oftrench mortarsoften of very long rangeand a few wellhandled 4.2 gun-howitzer batteries.)

This little battle did not last long and while it was on Iwas busily engaged in finding fresh positions for our mainjob, which was to support the infantry brigade on the line

of the canal from Festubert-La Bassee. These positionswere hard to find, being overlooked by slag heaps S. of thecanal; however, we got into them that night and dug slittrenches to the very limited depth allowed by the waterlevel. We had an O.P. in the church tower at Festubert,from which a grand general view was obtainable, two (one

from each battery) in Givenchy, and the left O.P. at the W.corner of La Bassee. Elsewhere it was very hard to get aview and there were masses of dead ground near and S. ofthe canal. May 24th was a busy day, with a fair amount ofshelling on both sides. Whenever we fired we wereimmediately shelled, and very effectively, and we had agood few casualties. It soon became clear that the slagheaps were the cause of the troubleindeed we could seethe reliefs going up to the Boche O.Ps. on themOh, forsome 60-pdr. shrapnel.

The enemy army co-operation Henschels sat about overour guns from dawn till dusk on this and the ensuing day.We were short of tracer ammunition and made poor

shooting at them. However, someone brought one downand its pilot assured us that he thanked heaven he was notan Englishman in view of the terrible fate awaiting us inthe next few days! That night we moved both D and Etroops, which had been badly shot up; and also R.H.Q.,which moved with H.Q. infantry brigade (who had beenalso located and shelled), into some less pretentious housesin Richebourg L'Avou, where we were right in the gunarea and very convenient. Next day things got a good deallivelier, and there was a very great deal of trench mortaractivity, especially onto Givenchy. The battle was awonderful sight from the tower of Festubert church, quitelike one of those "dioramas" one sees at exhibitions, as for

a full 180 one could see it in progress.It became impossible to maintain O.Ps. actually in

Givenchy. M, shelled out of his and sheltering behindthe church, counted 25 direct hits on it in 45 minutes!

The O.P. at La Bassee also got into trouble and greatdifficulty was experienced with all of them except the oneat Festubert church, which bore a charmed life.

That afternoon one battery was sent off to the Mervillearea to be grouped with another field regiment. Here therewas a very sticky situation on the front of the infantry brigade and on the morning of 27th May, D troop (withthree guns remaining) were ordered to take up a positionon the Merville - Estaires road to engage, with direct fire,tanks reported advancing towards the canal from the S.This involved occupying a very isolated position far fromthe nearest infantry, and no sooner were they in action thannews was received that the enemy tanks were across in theMerville area. One gun was sent post haste to Merville totry and deal with these but though it did not, in fact, shootat any it knocked out a trench mortar and two machine gunswith the loss of some men wounded. The remaining twoguns, after a quiet morning, were suddenly machine gunnedat short range from across the canal and later, the look-out


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on a roof saw a German anti-tank gun there. This was promptly knocked out at a range of 400 yards. Directlyafterwards another look-out man reported an enemymachine-gun getting into action in the same area; this wassimilarly destroyed. More enemy, including machine-gunson motor cycle outfits, were seen and engaged both by the

guns and by the troop's bren gun firing from an upstairswindow and another machine-gun was knocked out. Theenemy then brought up trench mortars and started shellingwith them and about 1500 hours some enemy sidecaroutfits, having crossed the canal further up, engaged theguns at close range from the flanks and rear, making theposition almost untenable. The B.C., Major H, arrivedand went off to try and get some infantry to help, returning

shortly with a machine-gun platoon which, however,immediately suffered heavy casualties. They got one guninto action and attempts were made to get the 25-pdrs.

away. The first one to move received a direct hit in itstractor, which went up in flames, so blocking the road forthe other gun and so the B.C. decided to destroy theremaining gun and get out with the surviving men. Thisinvolved crossing a belt of open ground with practically nocover, but by wading down ditches, often up to the neck inwater, the bulk of the men, with most of the wounded,were got away. The B.C. himself was wounded severaltimes and also had a lorry accident before reachinghospital, in which he was later shot up from the air beforefinally reaching England. In this action of D troop B.S.M.

T was lost. This W.O. had most gallantly extricatedtwo men from a blazing gun-pit on the previous day atRichebourg, an extremely brave action.

Meanwhile, on the night 26th/27th May, R.H.Q. and theremaining battery had been joined by another fieldregiment to form a group supporting the infantry brigade.

This regiment had many delays in getting into action andhad to occupy extremely exposed positions on account ofbeing armed only with short range 4.5's and 18-pdrs. Theywere heavily shelled next morning, only to be ordered backbefore midday to the next position in rear. All this time thesituation ahead had become more threatening. The centrebattalion had failed to maintain its hold astride Givenchy,the left battalion was being hard pressed and only the right

remained reasonably secure (except that in their rear the battle around Merville was not exactly prospering!). Thefailure in the centre meant that there was a section of

canal between Givenchy and La Bassee onto which noone could observe and it was here that the enemy got towork in earnest. At about 1500 hours on this day (27th)Brig. G, sitting in the roof of his H.Q. lookingthrough a skylight, called me up. We looked at the ridgerunning from Givenchy to Violaines (in which hamletwas the H.Q. company of the left battalion) and theresaw, at a range of about 4000 yards, some 50 enemy tankslined up facing Violaines, and behind them, as if on parade, a quantity of German infantry! It was a mostspectacular apparition. This mass almost immediately

German tank attack on Violaines


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moved off from right to left, on to Violaines, halted some200 yards short of that village, and, with orange flashesstabbing from the turrets of the tanks, sent the whole placeup in flames in a few seconds, so it seemed. This done theymoved on into the village and out of sight. It was beastly towatch, but impressive to a degree.

We had thinned out one of our troops, on orders justreceived, and so had only two left and of these one ortwo guns were knocked out. But Major S happenedto be at H.Q. with his X car and, hastily shouting fireorders down to the street below, we started in on thisenormous target. Observation was difficult because ofthe drifting smoke from Givenchy, which was on fire, but we did succeed in making the enemy infantry clearover to the far side of the crest. We fired as hard as wecould and later, when the tanks appeared to the E. ofViolaines, after passing through it, we shot at themagain as they rallied before passing round the rear of theFrench on our leftbut without our apparently doing

them any harm.Capt. R, on the way out in an armoured O.P. to try

and clear up the situation by a visit to Violaines, met thishorrid mass as it was emerging from his destination. Hevery stoutly hung on to the fringes of the "fleet" andreported its progress round behind La Bassee, returninglate that night wounded in the arm.

Shortly before this tank attack the infantry brigade hadhad orders to make a daylight "get-away" and to retire behind the canal at Estaires, and now, with the left battalion apparently wiped out and the centre battaliondisorganized, there was little else to do except go. Westayed on about an hour longer, as there was no enemy

pressure towards our guns, and had an uneventful trip backthe five or six miles to the Estaires canal.The actual crossing was not easy, owing to bombing and

congestion generally and I was relieved to discover that allof one battery and R.H.Q. were back. Of the other batterywe had no word.

It rained hard that night, road conditions were appallingand we spent a wet and miserable night huddled in ourtrucks waiting for the roads to clear. By about 0730 hourswe had so far discovered our whereabouts and sortedourselves out as to be in action near a place called LeDoulieu. We had also heard of the loss of the troop atMerville.

As will have been gathered, it had now becomeobvious that we were in a fast narrowing bottleneck, withsome portpossibly Dunkirkat the end of it. I do notthink anyone was worried about all this to any greatextent, we were all far too busy and too short of sleep totake a "long term" view ahead as far as the next day ortwo! But at about 1000 hours the G.I. (de F.) came to meand said we were to clear out, by day

Documents

Field Artillery Journal - Dec 1941