FINAL NARRATIVE REPORT The Effective Seed Storage in Timor-Leste Program OCTOBER 2017

Country Contact Headquarter Contact Project Summary

Tate Munro

Country Director

Address: Rua Travessa de Lecidere,

Dili, Timor Leste.

Ph. +670 3312726

Mob. +670 739 9045

tmunro@mercycorps.org

Denise Ledgerwood

Senior Program Officer

Address: 45 SW Ankeny,

Portland, Oregon, USA

Ph. +1(503) 896-5000

Fax. +1(503) 896-5011

dledgerwood@mercycorps.org

Award No:

Start Date:

End Date:

Report Date:

Budget

AID-OFDA-G-11-

00174

11 August 2011

31 July 2017

31 October 2017

US$4,772,499

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 2

Table of Contents 1. Program Overview __________________________________________________________________ 3

1.1. Summary of Activities ____________________________________________________________ 3

1.2. Summary of Achievements ________________________________________________________ 5

2. Implementation of Activities __________________________________________________________ 6

2.1. Improved Seed Storage (ISS) ______________________________________________________ 7

2.1.1. The Design Thinking Process _________________________________________________ 7

2.1.2. The Initial Market Facilitation __________________________________________________ 9

2.1.3. Behavior Change Communication Activities _____________________________________ 11

2.1.4. The Nation-Wide Expansion _________________________________________________ 12

2.2. Savings and Internal Lending Community (SILC) ______________________________________ 15

2.2.1. Field Agent (FA) & Private Service Provider (PSP) Outreach ________________________ 16

2.2.2. Influencing Government and Peers through Saving Groups Technical Working Group ____ 18

2.3. Keyhole Gardening (KHG) ________________________________________________________ 18

2.3.1. KHG Training of Trainers ___________________________________________________ 19

2.3.2. Support Farmers with KHG Establishment ______________________________________ 19

2.4. El Niño Seed Interventions _______________________________________________________ 21

2.4.1. Assessments _____________________________________________________________ 21

2.4.2. Seeds Interventions _______________________________________________________ 22

3. Assessment to Program Performances _______________________________________________ 23

3.1. Outputs and Outcomes __________________________________________________________ 23

3.2. Probable Effects/Impacts on Society ________________________________________________ 24

4. Lessons Learned & Moving Forward __________________________________________________ 26

4.1. Lessons Learned _______________________________________________________________ 26

4.2. Moving Forward ________________________________________________________________ 28

List of Annexes: ____________________________________________________________________ 29

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 3

1. Program Overview 1.1. Summary of Activities

“ESS program displays the potential of an MSD approach

to yield significant resilience benefits, particularly where

it builds wide-reaching market access for risk-reducing

technologies.”

— Can Market Systems Development Build Resilience in Fragile Contexts? A Case Study of Effective Seed Storage in Timor-Leste

Since August 2011, Mercy Corps and partners through the USAID/OFDA funded Effective Seed Storage (ESS) in

Timor-Leste program successfully developed a market system for a locally manufactured seed storage system.

Because of the ESS program, more than half of rural

households nationwide across Timor-Leste benefited from

the individual-household-sized seed storage silos. This

program was in line with priority action four of the Hyogo

Framework for Action. Through its interventions, the

program addressed seed system insecurity, and ultimately

food insecurity, in Timor-Leste. The program provided a

local solution for farmers to mitigate post-harvest storage

losses of farm-saved seeds and to help maintain better

quality seeds to reduce the underlying risk factors of

availability, accessibility and utilization of productive seeds.

Since the program’s first inception phase in 2011, the ESS model was successfully replicated in 12 out of 13 districts

in the country through an initial expansion in February 2013. Starting from February 2014, the program incorporated

a member-based financial institution model called Savings and Internal Lending Communities (SILC). The SILC

activity under the ESS program further reduced risks through expanded access to credit and promoted a culture of

savings among poor farming households in target vulnerable communities. While the seed storage system

effectively improved food self-sufficiency, SILC interventions provided savings-led financial services to communities

that had little or no access to formal financial services and contributed to strengthening resilience among vulnerable

families.

In April 2015, Mercy Corps, its partner, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and five local NGOs leveraged the success

of the program by expanding the improved storage system and SILC activities to further ‘off-grid’ communities1 and

promoted keyhole gardening as a climate-smart, drought resistant diversified vegetable production system. The

inclusion of the keyhole garden systems not only further increased food self-sufficiency, but it also increased the

availability and accessibility of much-needed nutritious vegetables.

In Timor-Leste, the impact of the most recent El Niño (August 2015-July 2016) was reported to be on par with the

1997-98 El Niño, one of the worst on record. Since it started in May 2015, rainfall was erratic with an intense dry

season that began in August 2015 and lasted until the end of March 2016. As a result, agriculture, the main food

1 The program utilized 2013 Asian Development Bank’s Least Developed Suco Timor-Leste report. Copy of the report can be

access through the following https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/30343/least-developed-sucos-timor-leste.pdf

ESS was a finalist of Mercy Corps’ 2016 Impact, Influence, and Innovation Award.

ESS took second place in the Impact Category

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 4

and income source for rural communities, was seriously impacted and food insecurity was exacerbated. Through a

cost modification granted in 2016, the ESS program assisted 6,638 most drought impacted households with in-kind

seed provision through voucher distribution, providing purchasing power to households to replenish their staple

crop seeds. This additional activity allowed the El Niño affected farming households to more quickly recover by re-

establishing their farming system, their main livelihood source.

The ESS program, designed initially as a seed storage program, over a six-year period has evolved into a more

comprehensive program that strengthened the resilience of rural farming households in Timor-Leste to a wide range

of shocks and stresses through a critical set of capacities. The following table summarizes ESS program’s

‘evolution’.

Table 1: ESS program phases and activities

Phase Modification Title Main Activities

I Original Award Start Date: August 12, 2011 End Date: February 11, 2013

Effective Seed Storage in Timor-Leste

Seed storage development in two districts of Ainaro and Manufahi focused on the development of effective solutions with two local manufacturers

II Modification 1 Start Date: February 12, 2013 End Date: February 11, 2015

Nation-wide Expansion of Effective Seed Storage in Timor-Leste

Expansion of successful seed storage activities to 10 districts

Modification 2 Additional obligated funds

Modification 3 Start Date: May 14, 2014 End Date: February 11, 2015

Effective Seed Storage in Timor-Leste: Inclusion of Savings and Internal Lending Communities (SILC)

Continued the nation-wide expansion of seed storage activities while introducing SILC to selected target communities

III Modification 4 Start Date: February 12, 2015 End Date: February 11, 2017

Effective Seed Storage in Timor-Leste: Inclusion of Keyhole Garden System and Expansion of Improved Seed Storage and Savings and Internal Lending Communities (SILC) to ‘Off-Grid’ Communities

Building on the initial success of the SILC activities into the seed storage intervention, the program added keyhole gardening while continuing to strengthen the outcomes of the seed storage and SILC interventions

Modification 5 Additional obligated funds

Modification 6 Start Date: November, 2016 End Date: February 11, 2017

Effective Seed Storage (ESS) – El Niño and La Niña Emergency Seed Supports

An emergency response activity through seed vouchers and fairs across ESS communities impacted by El Niño

Modification 7 End Date: July 31, 2017

NCE up to July 31, 2017 Strengthened the outcomes to ensure sustainability

Based on robust evidence and experience acquired under the ESS program, Mercy Corps and CRS, with continued funding from OFDA/USAID, launched a new investment aimed at addressing root causes of chronic food insecurity, poverty and vulnerability across Timor-Leste. that. This program, called Climate-Smart Resilience Opportunities through Post-Harvest Storage (CROPS), aims to better sequence, layer and integrate interventions as it tackles the challenges facing subsistence farmers’ access to and effective use of appropriate, consumer-designed (1) grain and (2) rainwater storage technologies, (3) climate-smart, intensive vegetable production systems, and (4) savings and internal lending communities (SILC).

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 5

1.2. Summary of Achievements

“ESS is largely a very successful program and it is well

appreciated by nearly all involved.”

— ESS Final Evaluation Report

Thanks to its systematic and more sustainable facilitative approach, by the end of the program, ESS reached 72,611

direct beneficiary households. This represents 413,883 individuals and achieving 138% of the total beneficiary

target. The program also reached or exceeded all other OFDA indicators. The following tables present the ESS

program’s achievements per indicator, segregated by OFDA sectors and sub-sectors.

Table 2: Summary of program achievements for Sector 1

Sector 1: Agriculture and

Food Security

Objective: Increased food self-sufficiency through access to post-harvest storage system

and promoting keyhole garden production system

Beneficiaries Targeted 300,000 (IDPs: 0) Overall budget (for all sectors): US$4,772,499

Beneficiaries Reached 413,883 (IDPs: 0) Amount Spent (for all sectors): US$4,764,195.66

Geographic Area (s) At least 10 out of 13 districts of Timor-Leste

Sub-Sector 1: Seed System Security Sub-Sector 2: Improving Agricultural Production/Food Security

OFDA Indicator Baseline Target Progress Last update

Projected increase in number of months of food self-sufficiency due to seed systems activities/ agricultural input for beneficiary households

2.5 month2 >0 5 months (this is 2.5 month increase from the baseline)

July 2017

Number of people benefiting from seed systems/agricultural input activities, by sex

0 300,000 413,8833 (46% female)

July 2017

Additional Indicators

% of farmers reported increase of knowledge and practice in seed selection, drying and storage

60% 80% 95% July 2017

Number of farmers with access to improved seed storage system

0 52,200 72,6114 July 2017

Increase of Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS)

75 96 8.87 July 2017

Number of households with properly used keyhole garden

0 690 1,158 July 2017

Number of households replicating keyhole garden

0 690 240 July 2017

2 Recalculated from the baseline data during the Phase II Final Evaluation, especially to make adjustments from number of

food security months into food self-sufficiency months 3 Calculated from total household that accessed the storage system and/or accessed promoted good practices (BCC) multiplied

by the average number of household members, during previous phases (5.7) 4 ‘Access’ is determined to be ‘buying’. Due to difficulty in tracking the number of farmers who bought promoted storage

solutions at full price, it was assumed that all storage unit sold (72,611) equals with total number of farmers with access to

improved seed storage system. To track numbers of farmers who bought the promoted solutions, the program relied on the

monthly sales data collected from the manufacturers. The actual numbers were projected to be much higher than numbers

reported here. 5 Baseline HDDS is average of all survey respondents 6 Target based on upper percentage of all respondents’ HDDS 7 Target is considered to be achieved

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 6

Number of households receiving El Niño and La Niña Emergency Seed Supports El Niño and La Niña Emergency Seed Supports

0 7,000 7,000 households received vouchers; 6,638 redeemed

July 2017

Table 3: Summary of program achievements for Sector 2

Sector 2: Economic

Recovery and Market Systems

Objective: Increased resilience through access to credit and promoting culture of savings

Beneficiaries Targeted 4,8408 (no IDPs)

Beneficiaries Reached 4,877

Geographic Area (s) Ainaro, Manufahi, and Baucau

Sub- Sector: Microfinance

OFDA Indicator Baseline Target Progress (to date) Last update

Number of people, by sex, or MSEs newly receiving financial services due to USAID/OFDA support

0 4,840 4,877 members – 57% women

July 2017

Percentage of financial service accounts/groups supported by USAID/OFDA that are functioning properly

0 100% 100% of reported SILC groups

July 2017

Total USD amount channeled into the program area through sub-sector activities

0 0 0 July 2017

Additional Indicators

% of participating households that have sold assets in the last 6 months to purchase foods or other basic needs

31% Reduced by 50% from the baseline

28% July 2017

% of participating household saving every month 2% 100% 100% of reported 4,877 SILC members

July 2017

Average amount of household income $114.61 Increased by 30% from the baseline

$155 July 2017

Findings from the external Final Evaluation (for full report see Annex 4) confirmed that the program was resource

efficient in human, material, and financial terms. Stakeholder involvement was good, especially with the Ministry of

Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) and its extension workers. Areas for improvement in this regards would be to

strengthen the shared planning process. There were also a few design and implementation weaknesses that can

be improved in the CROPS program. While the detailed implementation of activities and its lower level outputs are

presented in Section 2, the discussion of the results, outcomes and probable impacts of the program are presented

in Section 3. Section of 4 of this report presents key lessons learned gathered from the ESS program and how

these lessons will be carried out moving forward.

2. Implementation of Activities During the course of the six-year program, ESS comprised of three main activities which were: (i) improved seed

storage (ISS); (ii) savings and internal lending community (SILC); and (iii) keyhole gardens (KHG). For that reason,

the overview of program implementation is presented in these three categories.

8 The majority of these will likely overlap Sector 1 beneficiaries

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 7

2.1. Improved Seed Storage (ISS)

The majority of farmers in Timor-Leste rely on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods and are effectively caught

in a poverty trap, with poor seed quality and poor storage fundamental to this problem. The continuous use of farm-

saved seed leads to reduced yields, and the lack of appropriate on-farm storage results in a high percentage of

post-harvest seed loss. These problems, combined with a lack of market access, results in falling incomes for

farmers over time. Prior to ESS, effective storage solutions for seeds were not available for the majority of farmers

in rural Timor-Leste. Based on the results of an in-depth preliminary assessment, Mercy Corps introduced

appropriate and effective post-harvest storage systems primarily focusing on seed storage solutions for maize – but

also used for rice and legume beans, the main staple crops in Timor-Leste. Through the Effective Seed Storage

(ESS) program, Mercy Corps moved away from the distribution/handout model and implemented a market-led

approach to storage that continues to perform in Timor-Leste to-date.

The ESS program involved local manufacturers in efforts to increase access to improved storage systems, and

combined this with capacity building for farmers and extension workers to sustainably link farmers with viable input

and output markets. Initially (Phase I) the program complemented an existing 3.5 year, $1.7 million European

Commission (EC) funded program called Sustainable Crop Production, Utilisation, and Resource management

through Capacity Enhancement in two districts of Timor-Leste (SECURE) which was implemented by Mercy Corps

and partners in the two target districts. ESS filled a critical gap in the SECURE program while benefiting from cost

efficiencies and established relationships with farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF). The

success from this first phase was leveraged to implement the nation-wide expansion to 10 out of 13 districts in

Timor-Leste.

2.1.1. The Design Thinking Process

In February 2012, a study on effective seed storage solutions for Timor-Leste was conducted by Dr. Bruce Litchfield

from the University of Illinois. Dr. Litchfield recommended exploring the use of polymer drums; plastic water bottles

or bags inside of metal or wooden containers; and plastic totes. In addition, custom manufactured silos; using glass

bottle/jar and metal biscuit containers were identified as potential solutions. The study also identified the ‘desired

attributes’ of an effective seed storage solution. These attributes included: oxygen free – hermetic (airtight)

environment, rat and fire resistant, and durable in a humid tropical climate condition. In addition, the study identified

the importance of the ‘drum culture’ of farmers in Timor-Leste, where used oil drums are commonly used and

embraced. However, used oil drums have limited availability and limited size options. It was thought that the use

of oil drum (either new or used), to some extent, discouraged farmers from separating their seed from food grain.

In the local language, Tetum, the word for seed is fini and there is no specific term for grain; in most cases, farmers

treat both as one commodity. The study also confirmed that the fundamental barrier to effective storage solutions

in Timor-Leste was a lack of its availability and accessibility.

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 8

The challenge for the ESS program was, therefore, to find

a storage unit that: (i) conveyed desired attributes, (ii)

encouraged farmers to distinguish that the stored fini was

of high quality and high value to be used as seed rather

than food, (iii) embraced the ‘drum culture’, and (iv)

ensured that the program was able to develop the market

system for identified solution(s), to ensure its availability

and accessibility for broader target farmers.

Each of the recommended seed storage options had pros

and cons; the ESS team decided to run an in-depth

exploration process to further assess the feasibility

(technically), viability (economically), and desirability

(desired by customers) of the proposed solutions. Polymer

drums and plastic totes were imported products and only

available in Dili, the capital city. Custom manufactured

silos could be produced locally (at district level), but the

business model of the manufacturers (blacksmiths) at that time was very donor-dependent –the manufacturers

only produced silos based on orders from a donor agency, which imported the materials and provided them to the

manufacturer. The silo manufacturing model was therefore unsustainable. Furthermore, the available silo designs

were not airtight. Wooden containers were unavailable in the local markets, but local carpenters were not able to

produce it.

In short, the markets –at community level, for the polymer drums, used oil drums, plastic totes, silos and wooden

container products– were non-existent. Thus, the program was required to introduce, develop the supply chain, and

promote the demand for the silos. Utilizing the design thinking process, ESS decided to develop prototypes of

improved quality silos (i.e. airtight and smaller for seed storage) and wooden containers, for viability and feasibility

testing. The program found that high quality wooden containers would be prohibitively expensive, and thus dropped

it as an option for further exploration.

In light of the poor economic and physical infrastructure conditions in the target areas, developing supply chains for

multiple products would be very challenging, and for that reason, the program strategically selected and focused its

efforts on the most preferred storage solutions by farmers. To ascertain which would be best, in April 2012, ESS

conducted a series of consultation meetings with four communities to select the storage unit to bring to scale. From

a total number of 149 participant farmers, 87% participants selected the metal silo with an airtight lid, 9% selected

the metal silo with a large opening, while the remaining selected other storage units.

Picture 1: Consultation Meetings with farmers

“Design thinking incorporates constituent or

consumer insights in depth and rapid

prototyping, all aimed at getting beyond the

assumptions that block effective solutions.

Design thinking—inherently optimistic,

constructive, and experiential—addresses

the needs of the people who will consume a

product or service and the infrastructure

that enables it.”

Tim Brown & Jocelyn Wyatt, Design Thinking for Social Innovation, Stanford Social Innovation Review Winter 2010

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 9

Farmers prioritized the custom and locally manufactured silos because they conveyed the desired attributes and it

embraced the ‘drum culture.’ The ESS team anticipated that the polymer drum would be one of the most desired

options, but it was not selected.

Although, in the preliminary stage, the cost of the metal

silo was relatively high when compared with the other

options, especially as the required metal sheet was not

available at that time, making them costly to import. The

program team, however, believed that there must be an

alternative metal sheet to use in order to reduce the cost.

For that reason, the ESS team, with two local

blacksmiths interested in partnering with the program,

conducted rapid consultations with suppliers of metal

sheets and identified cheaper materials that have similar

or, if not, only slightly lower quality than the initial metal

sheets used, but still able to retain the desired attributes

of effective seed storage.

The second prototyping process used the cheaper metal sheets and different PVC caps. An increased involvement

of the two-blacksmiths, over time, during the discussions with suppliers/importers of key material initiated the

linkages between these manufacturers and the material suppliers. From this design process, the program was able

to develop solutions that would cost farmers around $25 to $35, depending on the size. This price range was much

better than the initial designs that cost between $40 to $50. Over time, the silo prices decreased as markets got

more competitive.

2.1.2. The Initial Market Facilitation

To ensure that the identified solution was broadly available for farmers, the ESS team assisted the two local

blacksmiths to develop a sustainable business model by linking

them with material suppliers. In addition, the program also facilitated

business development trainings by linking them with the

government-funded Institute for Business Support (IADE).

The program opted to use a voucher system to facilitate demand

creation. The voucher acted as a subsidy to support early adopters

(who were vulnerable/poor farmers) to access the storage. It also

allowed for a direct ‘transactional interaction’ between the producers

and the buyers. Rather than directly distributing the units or

providing full-value vouchers, this method gave farmers exposure to

the unit’s actual cost and enhanced their ‘sense of ownership’ of the

product (this supported the idea that requiring individual investment

caused farmers to value the silo more highly and further increased

their awareness of the importance of high quality seeds).

By the end of the first phase of the program in four sub-districts in Ainaro and Manufahi, ESS successfully introduced

the effective post-harvest seed storage system to 3,378 rural farmers (30% non-subsidized) by February 2013.

Based on the success of the program and the continued need for seed system security throughout rural Timor-

Leste, Mercy Corps, in partnership with Catholic Relief Services (CRS), expanded the program nation-wide.

Picture 2: Initial designs of ESS solutions

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Ora

na

Ho

laru

a

Foh

o-A

ilico

Suro

-Cra

ic

56 33 40 20

Custom Silo withlarge opening (9%)

Custom Silo withairtight lid (87%)

Plastic Tote (1%)

Plastic Water Jar(1%)

Polimer Drum (1%)

Graph 1: Results from the customers’ prioritization

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 10

KEY PRINCIPLES USED BY ESS

The following principles were identified from the first phase of the program as key successful

principles for the next phase of the program, in order to scale the solution nation-wide:

1) Participatory identification of solutions. Extensive research with the full participation of

farmers combined with iterative prototyping process to identify culturally acceptable, affordable,

appropriate storage solutions that can be manufactured or sold locally.

2) Incorporate market-based approach. Designed to create a financially sustainable business

model ensuring that key goods/services necessary to sell products are demand-driven, and

sustainable post-program. Demand creation is done through smart subsidies allowing direct

interaction between buyer and supplier.

3) Sustainable local solutions. It was locally driven, both in terms of the initial design and also the

solution. Farmers need to be able to access and maintain storage solutions within their reach.

This has the added advantage of stimulating local economic development.

4) Community mobilization. This process allowed for a participatory planning process to ensure

that solutions are catered to community needs, priorities, and geographical conditions.

5) Coordination/partnerships. Village level extension workers were an integral part of this

program and were involved in all activities in addition to working closely with other actors

working in the agriculture sector.

6) Individual storage as opposed to community models. Promoted household level storage owned

and managed by each farmer. Evidences showed community storage model is complicated to

manage with little incentive for farmers to participate.

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 11

2.1.3. Behavior Change Communication Activities

Along with increasing access to the seed storage solution, the program worked with government extension workers

to provide training to farmers on good post-harvest management practices. This included providing training on seed

production techniques, seed selection, drying, measuring moisture content, and storage. The program also worked

to embed selected post-harvest techniques (especially for seed selection, drying and storing) into the silo

manufacturers’ services.

In addition, a training module (in the form of a flipbook) was developed in consultation with extension workers in the

target districts and in partnership with the local artist group, Arte Moris. The contextually, appropriate illustrated

flipbook was used by the extension workers, as well as the project officers, to promote the existing good practices.

The flipbook also used simple messaging to demonstrate how to improve the less effective techniques. For

example, the program encouraged farmers to continue to

use big maize cobs (something they already practiced), but

it also taught them that the best seeds are from big cobs

growing in the middle of the farm plot9 and the absolute best

seeds are located in the middle of a big, healthy corn cob.

For those who received vouchers, in partnership with

government extension workers and the local NGO partners,

the program staff facilitated post-harvest training for all

voucher recipients. Overtime, Mercy Corps improved the

BCC materials. During Phase II, for example, the program

carried out a Designing for Behavior Change (DBC)

exercise. The following table summarizes the findings and

actions taken by the program.

Table 4: DBC Exercise Results

The promoted

behaviors Key determinants Actions taken

9 If located in the middle of the plot, the likelihood of cross-pollination with other varieties from the surrounding plots is

minimized

Picture 4: Sample of BCC material

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 12

Seed storage:

Targeted men and women

in maize producer

households keep the dried

grain and seeds

separately in clean and

airtight storage units, in

dry conditions and off the

ground of the storage

space

Perceived self-efficacy

Proper seed storage is not a difficult practice

Perceived access

Improved seed storage system is not widely

available

Perceived positive consequence

Proper storage reduces the likelihood of

weevil attack

Reminder

It is difficult to remember that seeds should

be separated from grains

Updated the training guide: to simplify the key

steps in storage practice and to include a

message that good airtight storage minimizes

weevil attacks

Continued to work with local manufacturers to

increase availability of silos and if needed to

provide discounted voucher for poor farmers

Used SMS reminders during the harvest period

on the need to store seeds and grain properly

Seed Selection:

Targeted men & women in

maize production

households carry out seed

selection of a similar

variety of maize - to be

dried and stored

separately from

grain/food, by selecting

only seeds from the

middle part of big, clean

cobs with no obvious

physical damage and/or

indication of pest activity

Perceived positive consequences

Good seeds are key for good planting

Perceived negative consequences

Without proper seeds selection the likelihood

of not having good seeds during next planting

season is very high

Perceived access

Not always having big cobs. No access to

tarpaulin or other layer to dry seeds

Perceived severity

Food insecurity is a serious problem

Perceived action efficacy

Seed selection contributes to ensuring

access to seeds for next planting season

therefore needed for food security

Updated the training guide with the following:

Select the biggest available cobs

Include economic benefits of investing in

doing proper drying (i.e. cost/benefit analysis

of the use of tarpaulin)

During the HH visits, field officers discuss with

beneficiaries the positive and negative

consequences of doing or not doing seed

selection

Included in the BCC material the following

statement: ‘food security started with seed

security and seed security started with seed

selection’

Seed Drying:

Targeted men and women

in maize producer

households sun-dry their

harvested maize

grains/seeds immediately

after being harvested;

under bright sunlight and

on a clean surface; with

the maximum depth of the

maize not more than ankle

bone; for at least 3 days

Perceived positive consequence

Properly dried seeds will ensure availability of

seeds during next planting season. Properly

dried seed ensure good production

Perceived access

No tarpaulin or other drying bases

Reminder

It is difficult to remember that seeds should

be dried properly

Perceived risk

Family members may have food security

problem if no seeds available for next

planting season

Perceived action efficacy

Drying seeds properly will help them to

mitigate from hunger

Revisited the training guide: to reinforce the

following:

Drying seeds will ensure availability of

quality seeds for next planting season

Good production of maize will only possible

if high quality seeds which is dried are used

To include simple cost/benefit analysis of the

use of tarpaulin and other alternatives

Worked with local stores to increase availability

of tarpaulin

Used SMS reminders during the harvest period

to remind them on drying practices

Included in the BCC material a statement:

‘food security started with seed security and

seed security started with seed drying.’

As part of the Final Evaluation, the household survey confirmed that 100% of respondents reported that they

received training prior to receiving voucher.

2.1.4. The Nation-Wide Expansion

The nation-wide expansion of the program began by identifying and selecting new blacksmiths. Fifteen additional

blacksmiths joined the program during Phase II of the program. During this second phase, CRS also joined the

program to implement ESS in the three most eastern districts of Timor-Leste. During the second phase, the program

also tried to promote the use of GrainPro bags and to develop its supply chain – working with an importer in Dili

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 13

who procured the products from the Philippines. However, the limited economy of scale resulted in an expensive

retail price, and the GrainPro bags were not promoted during the third phase of ESS.

The program continued to use the voucher system to support vulnerable farmers to access the seed silos. This

method proved to be an effective way to initiate direct ‘transactional interaction’ between farmers (as consumers)

and blacksmiths (as suppliers). The program distributed

vouchers valued at $20 to targeted farmers to redeem for storage

units. The farmers were then responsible to cover the difference

between the actual price and the value of the voucher. The prices

of the silos were from $23 to $35. Rather than directly distributing

the units or providing full-value vouchers, this method helped the

farmers understand the unit’s actual cost, enhancing their overall

‘sense of ownership’ of the product.

However, the voucher only targeted selected vulnerable farmers;

other farmers who wanted the silos were required to pay full

price. The project team formed selection teams within each suco

consisting of suco or aldea chiefs, government extension

workers, and project and partner staff. The selection criteria for

targeting these farmers included: (i) high level of vulnerability and/or food insecurity; (ii) willingness to participate in

post-harvest training and other project activities; (iii) willingness to share learning and data with the project and

other farmers; (iv) not currently served by other organizations or government on similar activities; and other criteria

as deemed appropriate by each selection committee.

THE USE OF E-VOUCHER Entering Phase III, the program transitioned to using the electronic

voucher system. Mercy Corps contracted Transversal, a Mercy

Corps’ pre-selected e-voucher app developer, for this work (Mercy

Corps worked with Transversal on e-vouchers in several countries,

including Nepal and Haiti). After testing and feedback from the

blacksmiths and Mercy Corps and CRS’ key program, finance and

operations staff, the app was finalized in November 2015. The

program trained and provided one-on-one assistance to the

blacksmiths from November 2015 until they mastered the system by

early 2016. Financially, vouchers equal cash, and therefore voucher

handling should be done as rigorously as cash handling. The use of

the e-voucher system proved to ease the voucher handling (i.e. from

request process, distribution, and reporting process); improved the

financial and operational compliance, and increased overall

transparency to beneficiaries.

The use of vouchers were deemed to be effective as it created demand for the promoted solution. Other better-off

farmers started to buy it at full price after they saw other farmers benefit from the promoted seed storage solution.

The Final Evaluation of Phase II, however, highlighted that the number of distributed vouchers was too high. It was

argued that the high number of distributed vouchers had to some extent (i) discouraged staff to carry out behavior

change interventions as their focus and time was spent on achieving the quantitative target (in addition to time spent

by the program team to meet rigorous procedures of voucher handling - especially with the paper-based/manual

Picture 5: A training session facilitated by trained

government extension workers

Picture 6: The e-voucher app in

Tetum

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 14

system that was utilized before Phase III); and (ii) encouraged ‘wait and see’ attitude among potential buyers as

they waited for the next round of vouchers, instead of purchasing with own resources.

Therefore, during phase III (i) electronic voucher

system was used –see above ‘The Use of e-

Voucher’; and (ii) number of distributed vouchers in

new target locations was significantly reduced,

despite the area covered by the program was

expanded. Overall, the voucher distributions

covered 111 out of total 442 villages (sucos) in

Timor-Leste (25%). The sales data of the promoted

solutions, disaggregated by type of solutions and

voucher versus full price, is presented in Table 4.

With ESS focused on the communities identified as

the least developed sucos (as per the Asian

Development Bank Least Developed Suco in

Timor-Leste Report), the non-subsidized seed

storage silo reached the communities outside these target sucos with better access to markets. By 2016, the ESS

program covered 12 out of 13 districts in Timor-Leste, reached 52% of rural households in the country.10

HELPING LOCAL MANUFACTURERS HELP FARMERS

The key to the sustainability and scale of ESS was the private sector engagement in the project

activities. ESS supported the local silo manufacturers to perform their market roles, sustainably

through:

1) Product diversification. The ESS Program facilitated new product designs and shared different

product samples between the blacksmiths to assist blacksmiths to diversify their products. Nine

blacksmiths diversified their products, including water containers, different storage units for

different commodities (i.e. for rice or legumes/beans), simple cool boxes with Styrofoam inside,

watering cans, etc. Product diversification combined with linkages to sales merchants and

materials helped to sustain blacksmiths’ businesses and, therefore, resulted in farmers’

sustained access to customized and locally produced storage systems.

2) Supported business management and marketing activities. In order to assist manufacturers

and retailers in marketing the new storage system, the ESS Program developed a brand, “SILO”

[pronounced locally see-lo’] with a tagline of “Fatin Fini Foun!” which means “New Seed

Storage” and used them in different marketing/promotional activities. The brand was developed

in consultation with all partners, manufacturers and retailers. The decision to name the product

as “SILO” was simply because it is catchy and because there is no specific term for silo in

Tetum, the local language. Mercy Corps and CRS also provided all blacksmiths and kiosks with

a branded signboard to promote the products. In addition, the ESS program provided simple

business training to each blacksmith so that they could record expenditures, revenue and income

10 Assumptions: (i) the total number of rural households in Timor-Leste is projected to be 103,279 households (data extracted

from 2015 Census data), and (ii) average number seed storage silo per household is 1.11 (calculated from the Households

Survey at the end-line)

Table 4: Outreach of the promoted solutions, July 2017

Number of silos sold Number of

GrainPro

bags sold

(full price) Voucher Full price

Phase 1 2,337 1,052 -

Phase 2 24,239 7,607 9,936

Phase 3 11,200 16,240 -

TOTAL 62,675 9,936

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 15

on a monthly basis as well as calculate income. Mercy Corps also commissioned the production

of a video clip to air on national television (TVTL). The video clip (which can be viewed on

YouTube: http://youtu.be/I9rftD7xjnA) showcased and promoted good seed storage practices and

promoted the improved seed storage solutions produced by the blacksmiths and sold in

participating kiosks. The TV promotion also provided general visibility for the ESS program to

broader audiences throughout Timor-Leste.

3) The formation of the nation-wide blacksmiths cooperative. With technical assistance provided

by Mercy Corps and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Environment (MCIE), the

cooperative of storage manufacturers was established in March 2017. The following month, the

cooperative conducted a launching event in Dili. Representatives from MCIE and the Ministry

of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), other development agencies (UN/NGOs) as well as

representatives from the Chambers of Commerce and Industry participated in the events. During

the launch, the head of the cooperative presented the objectives of the cooperative which are:

(i) to help members to grow their business locally, through sharing ideas and know-how or by

tapping into support provided by the government or other market actors (e.g. financial

institutions for access to credit, etc.); (ii) to increase their advocacy power, especially to

influence policy makers to create an enabling environment for local business development (i.e.

to stop handouts that kill local businesses); and (iii) to improve the economy of scale among

members (i.e. to better prepare for market opportunities through joint applications for tender

and/or joint procurement). During this event, different products (including the seed storage

units) were displayed. Representative from MAF expressed their willingness to support the

cooperative by promoting the use of the locally produced storage system. In addition, MAF, with

support from FAO and the World Bank, plan to place a large procurement request (bid) for

metal-based grain storage containers for distribution to the most vulnerable households in their

projects’ target municipalities, therefore, encouraging the cooperative to compete in the biding

process. The head of the cooperative believed that they have a very competitive advantage, not

just because they can produce custom designed storage as needed by farmers in each

municipality, but also because the members can produce them locally. By producing the storage

locally, they can offer significant reduction in cost for transportation (one of the highest costs

with bulky storage containers) as transport cost can be much cheaper than products transported

from outside Timor-Leste.

2.2. Savings and Internal Lending Community (SILC)

In February 2014, the program incorporated a member-based financial institution model called Savings and Internal

Lending Communities (SILC) to expand access to credit and promote a culture of savings among poor farming

households. Savings and Internal Communities (SILC) organize community members into self-selecting groups of

15 to 25 members. Each group elects leaders and drafts a constitution that specifies mandatory savings deposits

and loan terms. Group members meet weekly for savings collection and lending distribution. Loans are repaid with

interest, allowing the fund to grow and provides a dividend at the end of each 8 to 12 month cycle (the quasi-totality

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 16

of groups continues with a new cycle, typically increasing the savings amounts). Groups also create a social fund

for emergency assistance, such as health and funeral expenses.

SILC successfully increased its member’s financial numeracy and literacy, essential for engaging them in a cash

economy, while providing affordable and accessible savings, micro-insurance, and loan services. The savings,

insurance and loan facilities of the SILCs allowed members to meet their small, short-term financial needs for

household cash flow, income-generating activities, social obligations and emergencies, thus increasing members’

financial security and resilience. In addition, women were typically the majority of SILC participants (SILC members

are 57% female). SILC provided an important opportunity for strengthening women’s leadership and decision-

making at the household and community level.

2.2.1. Field Agent (FA) & Private Service Provider (PSP) Outreach

Mercy Corps and partners used Field Agents to

form and provide training to the SILC groups.

Field Agents, who were selected from within the

communities and trained by the program,

conducted program outreach and provided

capacity building and services to SILC groups. In

the beginning, Field Agents were paid

(performance-based) by the program with the

longer-term strategy to transition them into

Private Service Providers (PSPs).

Comprehensive group formation and training

were identified as the key to the success of SILC

initiatives. The role of FA was, therefore, very

crucial during program implementation. In

addition to the benefit of increasing financial

assets through loans, savings, and profit generation from SILCs, the FA also provided training to group members

in new skills such as bookkeeping, savings and lending policies, accountability, and good governance through the

drafting of the SILC’s constitution and by-laws.

By end of the second phase, the program trained and supported 25 FAs (15 female). Almost half of the FAs dropped

out of the program after several months, in particular female FAs. The work of a FA required them to travel from

one place to another, which was challenging for most of women – especially when public or personal transport is

inexistent. In many cases, program staff had to intervene by replacing the FAs and providing direct assistance to

the SILC groups. During Phase II of ESS, these FAs worked with 31 SILC groups benefiting 570 members in three

districts of Baucau, Ainaro and Manufahi. Expanding the success of SILC to other communities both in the existing

target as well as other districts was identified to ultimately fill the gaps of financial service needs for rural households

to further strengthen vulnerable households’ resilience against shocks. This intervention was then continued into

Phase III, especially to promote SILC to the neighboring districts/communities.

During Phase III, the program focused on strengthening the capacity of the Field Agents (FA) to continue to offer

services and become independent service providers (PSPs). Learning from Phase II, the program identified a

technical area for improvement which was around the ‘breaking SILC cycle’ facilitation. In SILC, built-in ‘breaking

Picture 7: A PSP training a SILC group

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 17

the cycle’ approach11 (also called as share-out) is used – where regular contributions to the SILC are deposited

with an end date in mind for distribution of all or part of the total funds, including interest earnings to the individual

members, usually on the basis of a formula that links payout to the amount saved. However, there were always

strong tendencies amongst groups to accumulate capital and, therefore, they were reluctant to share-out on a

recommended 6-12 month basis. Provision of capacity building and coaching around share-out facilitation to FAs

was then carried out by the program team.

In order to help FAs become independent PSPs, the ESS program established a ‘graduation’ process. To graduate,

a FA had to master SILC methodology and demonstrate that most of groups under his or her facilitation were

conducting share-out and continued the SILC activity. The FA also had to pass a written test carried out by the ESS

program, particularly on bookkeeping. The ESS program provided follow-up capacity building and marketing for

those who passed the test and met the criteria. The capacity building covered mostly entrepreneurial and inter-

personal skill building and business management, like pricing and conducting promotional activities. Once

graduated, the program ‘launched’ event for the PSP at the local level to promote his or her services to stakeholders.

By end of program, a total of 64 FAs were recruited and trained with a total of 29 who graduated into PSPs. Through

these FAs/PSPs, the ESS program facilitated 4,877 individuals to participate in the SILC groups. This number

exceeded the program’s target of 4,840 member households.

FINDING THE APPROPIATE INCENTIVES The Final Evaluation of Mercy Corps’ Effective Seed Storage (ESS) Program, completed in June

and July 2017, found that the Private Service Providers (PSPs) operated in a difficult work

environment due to the distances between groups, poor quality of the roads and bad weather.

Mobility, therefore, is a key characteristic that Mercy Corps needs to take into account when

selecting individuals to become FA. The Final Evaluation report also highlighted PSPs without

entrepreneurial capacity who were unable to perform the expected fee-based services for

community members. Some reported that they had not received compensation for their services

rendered to SILC groups and some even stated that they believed that groups should not pay them.

Therefore, entrepreneurial capacity should be another key characteristic for FA. This does not

mean that ‘commercializing’ SILC capacity building services is impossible. For example, some

PSPs were able to receive payment of their services at share-out time and received a small

compensation during visits for food and drink. In another example, PSPs provided capacity-

building services for free, but they used the groups to source agriculture products and livestock

for market and sold vegetable seeds and household needs (i.e. rice) to their members. Exploring

these different ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ financial incentives for FA will be much more suitable for

Timor-Leste.

11 The SILC model is one of a few savings approaches that require groups to ‘break the cycle’. Breaking the cycle provides

the following economic ‘incentives’: (i) it is an intrinsic risk management strategy where the group is discouraged to

accumulate their assets – that carries bigger risks over time, beyond recommended timeframe; and (ii) it gives every member

pre-planned access to their savings and interest income from loans, at least once annually that accelerates the circulation of

cash in the village; (iii) it provides time for the group to clarify the status of the club’s money; and (iv) it increases pressure

on delinquent borrowers to repay.

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 18

2.2.2. Influencing Government and Peers through Saving Groups Technical Working Group

Mercy Corps and CRS are both active members of the Saving Groups Technical Working Group (SGTWG) together

with other NGOs and UN agencies working in this sector. This working group was formed in 2013 by the Inclusive

Finance for Underserved Economy Program (INFUSE)12 to distil best practices suited to the Timor-Leste context

for more sustainable and robust savings groups.

The working group coordinates activities and shares lessons from field implementation among member

organizations. The group identified key principles and best practices on appropriate registration and reporting

systems for saving groups in Timor-Leste. It was common that many of the savings groups neither ‘break’ nor

‘balance’ their accounts and this reflects a shortage of good practice in cash handling. SILC was identified as an

approach that was proven to be successful and sustainable, especially due to its strength in ensuring a governance

system and transparency are in place with appropriate record keeping as well as a built-in mechanism of share-out.

The other organizations have recognized the simplicity in educating savings groups to do regular share-outs. The

working group members have visited the ESS program implementation areas several times to learn about how to

do it. Nowadays, share-out mechanism has been adopted by many organizations promoting savings group.

In addition, the working group coordinates with the government, especially the Cooperative Department of the

Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Environment (MCIE) and the Central Bank of Timor-Leste. Through this

coordination, the government has learned to appreciate the roles of informal saving groups to improve financial

inclusion in the country and, as a result, the current Timor-Leste Financial Inclusion Strategy strongly recognizes

the role of informal savings groups to ensure that the rural population has access to financial services.

2.3. Keyhole Gardening (KHG)

Mercy Corps learned from its other food security programming in the country that improving grain production and

cash income at the household level does not necessarily translate into improvements in nutrition.13 Food shortages

and household food insecurity are particularly severe during the periods from October to March. A more diversified

diet and, thus production system, are necessary for ensuring food and nutrition security among vulnerable

communities in Timor-Leste. An essential element of this is stable access to and intake of diverse nutritious foods

at the household level. Sustainable management of the environment and building resilience in the face of climate

change are also fundamental for achieving lasting food and nutrition security. As a primarily natural resource-based

economy heavily reliant on subsistence agriculture, climate change poses important risks to sustainable economic

development and food and nutrition security. The National Adaptation Plan of Action for Climate Change (NAPA)

identified the agriculture and water sectors as the most vulnerable to climate change. This poses significant risks

with the potential to undermine progress made on key development indicators particularly related to agricultural

production and food security.14 Timor-Leste’s Seed System Security Assessment (SSSA) recommended promoting

nutrient-dense foods at the household level through climate friendly techniques and technologies.

12 A joint initiative of UNCDF, UNDP, GOTL and Australian Aid, is aimed at increasing access by low income people to

sustainable financial services in TL while taking a sector approach in addressing these issues 13 Mercy Corps, SECURE Midterm Review (2011) and Final Evaluation Report (2013) 14 While there are pronounced wet and dry seasons each year influenced by the West Pacific Monsoon, rainfall patterns are

subject to wide variability due to the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO). The ENSO cycle is considered to have a major

impact on agricultural productivity and food security, as was seen in the El Niño related drought in 2007.

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 19

Recognized as one of the more effective sustainable homestead production systems, keyhole15 garden production

increased households’ access to nutritious foods –

in particular vegetables. A key success factor of the

keyhole garden is its ability to hold moisture and

nutrients due to an active compost pile placed in the

center of a round bed. Although most helpful in hot

and dry locations, a keyhole garden proved to be

effective in just about any climate. Keyhole

gardening was introduced during Phase III of the

ESS program to further contribute to achieving the

program’s goal of increasing food self-sufficiency

and resilience of poor and vulnerable farming

households in rural Timor-Leste.

2.3.1. KHG Training of Trainers

In June 2015, ESS kicked off the third phase of the

program through a Training of Trainers (ToT) using

a KHG farmer field school. During this training, the

program established four different KHG models at a

public school in order to provide hands on

experiences for staff on the promoted gardens. Two

staff from the United Nations Organization for

Migration (IOM)16 were involved as resource

persons for the training. The training for CRS and

their local partners was conducted during the

following week in Baucau.

2.3.2. Support Farmers with KHG Establishment

Working with selected early adopters, the program

utilized and modified the Farmer Field School (FFS)

approach. This approach is based on the principle

of group-based adaptive research and participatory

adult learning practices to introduce keyhole garden

systems to the target communities. The approach

served the purpose of adapting, validating,

demonstrating and extending new and improved technologies and practices, introducing appropriate equipment

and inputs, providing an outlet for production surplus, and facilitating farmers’ learning and training activities. The

FFS comprised of groups of like-minded and forward-thinking small-scale producers involved in an experimental

learning-based approach to KHG farming practices. The capacity building sessions included core techniques and

technology on KHG (constructing, planting, maintaining and harvesting), but also included vegetable farm-saved-

15 From a bird's eye view the garden is shaped as a keyhole; a notch is cut into a round garden bed where the notch makes it

easier access to the center compost well. 16 IOM was also an OFDA grantee in Timor-Leste and introduced keyhole gardens in 2014-2016 as part of their Disaster

Risk Reduction (DRR) program.

HALMARK OF THE KEYHOLE GARDEN 1. It is cost-effective and adaptable to nearly

any context because it makes use of locally

available materials.

2. Water is used efficiently, even making use of

water from household washing (called grey

water) that will otherwise be thrown out.

3. Its design saves labor. People can garden

while standing, making it particularly

effective technology for those who have

physical limitations, those who live with

chronic illness, and the elderly, all of whom

make up a disproportionate share of the food

insecure.

4. It produces enough crops year round to feed

a family of five. Farmers often are able grow

surplus, making it an income-generating

option for many.

5. It can produce nutritious food even during

times of shock caused by drought, conflicts

and other natural and man-made disasters.

(from “Keyhole Garden A Practitioner Guide,

USAID and CRS)

Picture 8: A keyhole garden established in a school in

Dili

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 20

seeds production and handling (as per AVRDC/the World Vegetable Center guidelines) and ensuring more

sustainable access to seeds.

In addition, the team also facilitated farmer field day (FFD) events to showcase the KHGs to other households.

These events showcased to local community members and

local leaders the performance of KHGs and how they benefit

families.

Linkages with ‘Loja Agricultura’ (a network of rural kiosks selling

agriculture inputs supported by Mercy Corps) was also

developed to support beneficiaries’ access to inputs. The

program supported 32 kiosks at the community level in order to

fill the gaps where ‘Loja Agricultura’ was neither available nor

accessible.

Learning from IOM’s experiences in piloting keyhole gardens in

Timor-Leste, ESS understood that women’s participation was critical to its success and, therefore, the program

strategically targeted this group. In addition, the program used an appreciative approach and utilized participatory

tools for planning (such as transect walks and resources mapping) to identify and appreciate locally available

materials and other resources that could be used for establishing keyhole gardens. Required in-kind supports from

the project were determined according to the needs identified during the exercise. Exchange visits between farmers

were facilitated to promote cross farmer-to-farmer learning. The program also developed a video clip for mobile

phones, which showcased good practices on keyhole garden systems for further adoption by other farmers.

By end of program, 1,158 households own and use keyhole gardens (168% of target households). A total of 240

households (only 35% of target) replicated the KHG on their own.

2.3.3. Promotion of KHG at Public Places & Collaboration with Others To promote keyhole gardens to broader audiences, the program worked with interested schools to establish keyhole

gardens at schoolyards together with school pupils, teachers and staff. Mercy Corps and partners collaborated

closely with both the national and district level Ministry of Education (MOE) so that learning was shared with other

schools. This activity also contributed to the improvement of the school feeding program in the participating schools.

In addition to schools, the program also established keyhole gardens at suco offices or other public places to

showcase keyhole gardens to others.

In 2015 and 2016, Mercy Corps was invited to showcase the keyhole gardens technique to participants of the 2015

and 2016 Perma-Youth Camp in Baucau (2015) and Aileu (2016). The Perma-Youth Camp was an effort to promote

sustainable agriculture practices to youth by holding a five-day camp located in a rural farm setting. During this

event, a keyhole garden was established in one school nearby where the camp was located.

Picture 7: A small kiosk selling vegetable seeds

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 21

In order to collect evidence supporting the effectiveness of KHG in terms of soil nutrients, Mercy Corps, in

partnership with the Soil Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF), conducted soil testing in

four municipalities (Bobonaro, Manufahi, Baucau and Lautem). The activity started in June and was finalized in

August 2016. Testing was completed on the following: (i) Soil physical compositions; (ii) % of Nitrogen, Phosphor

and Potassium (NPK) contents; (iii) % Porosity; (iv) pH;

and (v) Moisture content. The soil testing included

comparisons between KHGs and control areas (soil

from farming land nearby the sample keyhole gardens).

The results of the analysis confirmed that KHG resulted

in better soil, both in terms of physical as well as

chemical conditions. These findings validated that

keyhole gardens were a proven approach to improve

and maintain soil quality. The observation results also

showed that biological activities at keyhole gardens

were more obvious than the control plots, meaning that

the soil was rich in nutrients. The Soil Department

shared these findings to MAF extension workers. As a

result, MAF requested the ESS program to provide

training to extension workers, so that keyhole garden

system can be further promoted by the extension

workers to farmers. The training was completed for all MAF extension workers across ESS target districts in 2016

and 2017. This is another example of how the program has influenced the government ensuring the sustainability

of promoted practices by the ESS program.

2.4. El Niño Seed Interventions

The impact of the most current El Niño (August 2015-July 2016) in Timor-Leste was reported to be on par with the

1997-98 El Niño, one of the worst on record. Since it started in May 2015, rainfall was erratic with an intense dry

season that began in August 2015 and lasted until the end of March 2016. As a result, agriculture, was seriously

impacted and food insecurity was exacerbated. Through a cost modification granted in 2016, the Mercy Corps’ led

consortium carried out response interventions focused on in-kind seed provision for vulnerable households through

the distribution of vouchers; seed fairs and selected retail outlets to supply seeds. Leveraging our extensive

experience using voucher systems in the country, the ESS program utilized best practices drawn from Mercy Corps’

Cash Transfers Programming (CTP) toolkit.

2.4.1. Assessments

The majority of Timorese farmers were impacted by the 2015/16 El Niño, especially during the main cropping

season of September 2015 – April/May 2016. The Humanitarian Partnership Agreement (HPA) assessment

reported that 67% of farmer households had to replant, while the MAF assessment revealed that 9% (an estimated

11,000 drought-affected households) intended to replant more maize and rice in the April/May 2016 season, but

could not due to a lack of seeds. With the reported crop failures, farmers continued to experience further difficulty

during the main August/September 2016 planting season of staple crops, especially due to the potential reduction

of available seeds at the household level. A combination of crop failures and food insecurity jeopardized the

country’s seed system security. To understand the impact of the drought on seed system security, in May and June

2016, CRS, Mercy Corps and CARE conducted a follow-on study on seed system security and a market assessment

to determine whether cash/voucher food assistance and/or seed assistance would be an appropriate response.

PEACE CORPS Partnership: In October 2015,

Mercy Corps’ ESS Program Manager was invited

by Peace Corps to provide on-the-job training to

their new volunteers. Peace Corps identified

keyhole gardens as one of several technical skills

that can be further introduced by the volunteers to

Timorese communities. The training also included

practical sessions at a community in Dili. Seven

keyhole gardens at seven different households

were established at the end of the training. At

least three volunteers have actively promoted

keyhole gardens to the communities where they

live.

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 22

The assessment was conducted in Baucau, Lautem, Viqueque, Manufahi, Covalima and

Bobonaro municipalities – areas indicated by the MAF assessment as badly impacted

municipalities. The assessment found that the markets during the drought were functioning

normally and beneficiaries continued to have access to markets where food was available

and the quality of the available food was equivalent to what would be distributed through a

food distribution program. Therefore, this type of programing was not recommended.

However, with multiple plantings and subsequent crop failure reported, households had

depleted all available farm-saved seed and were unable to replenish their stock. Fortunately,

in all communities surveyed, farmers were still able obtain seed either from their neighbors

or the market if they had the resources to buy/trade for this seed. With adequate seed

available locally, purchasing power diminished due to households’ need to purchase both

food and seed, therefore the program determined that a seed voucher distribution initiative

was necessary. The assessment found that the main limitation to purchasing seeds on the

market was cash.

2.4.2. Seeds Interventions

The ESS program, through a cost modification granted by OFDA, increased the program’s

scope to include seed fairs and vouchers to assist 7,000 households badly impacted by the

drought. The intervention began in October 2016 with a market assessment to identify

vendors and their capacity to supply and determine acceptable prices for seeds. The program

then conducted a tender process to recruit vendors participating in the activity. As part of the

selection process, the team carried out quality tests on the sample seeds collected from

interested vendors.

The quality check included a germination test and a physical assessment according to the

following predetermined criteria: (i) maximum 12% of moisture content, (ii) germination rate

at a minimum 80%; (iii) maximum physical damage of 3%; and (iv) purity (i.e. no

contamination and seeds are from similar variety). The physical test was done not only to the

samples, but also during the voucher distribution and fairs in order for the teams to continually

monitor the quality of seeds. Mercy Corps and CRS also adopted the Seed Fairs and

Vouchers standard operating procedure (SOP) based on Mercy Corps’ guide. The

beneficiary selection criteria and process included the close participation of local leaders and

MAF extension workers in each suco. The value for each voucher was $10 where farmers

were expected to get around 7-10kg of seeds, enough for them to farm and re-establish their

subsistence farming system. Farmers were also recommended to add additional money if

they required more seeds.

The program also established a Community Accountability Reporting Mechanism (CARM) to

ensure transparency and accountability during the interventions. SMS and phone call

mechanisms were used as a complaint/reporting mechanisms by farmers. By the end of the

reporting period, out of the 7,000 vouchers distributed, 6,528 vouchers were redeemed.

Seeds traded at the fairs were maize, rice, peanut, soybean, redbean, and mungbean. Maize

seed dominated as the most popular (77%) seed purchased, followed by rice (10%). The

Final Evaluation confirmed that among the respondents who received a voucher and

participated in the fair, they expressed satisfaction on the quality of seeds accessed. The

seeds were mostly sown during the March 2016 planting season and have helped targeted

beneficiaries to ‘re-establish’ their farming system.

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 23

3. Assessment to Program Performances The ESS program carried out both regular monitoring and lower-frequency M&E activities. The regular quarterly

monitoring was a mechanism to assess data collected by program field staff, and the baselines and endlines were

done to measure higher-level indicators. The summary of M&E activities carried out by the ESS program are found

in Annex 3.

3.1. Outputs and Outcomes

The ESS program met almost all output and outcome indicators. Thanks to the use of the voucher system and the

incorporation of market systems development into the program implementation, the ESS program was one amongst

a few in Timor-Leste’s agriculture development programs that was able to reach scale.

Food Self-Sufficiencies: With more than half of rural households in the country owning the promoted effective

storage solutions, the ESS program has significantly helped poor subsistence farmers increase their capacity to

prevent losses of their farm-saved seeds. The farm-saved seeds are crucial assets for rural farming households in

the country –where in most cases, its existence determines the ability of a household to produce significant amounts

of foods for consumption during the months after the harvest. Overall, the metal seed storage silo developed and

promoted by the ESS program has increased the number of months of food self-sufficiency by 100% (from 2.5 to 5

months).

Knowledge and Practices: Another key factor that contributed to the increase in number of food self-sufficiency

months was the BCC activities. With storage as just a part of the overall post-harvest handling systems, the success

of the seed storage interventions relied on the ability and willingness of farmers to carry out good practices around

seed selection, drying, proper harvesting, etc. in addition to the use of the effective storage solution. The BCC

activities –that was strengthened through the use of the Designing for Behavior Change approach with Barrier

Analysis tool– play an important role in educating farmers, not just on the promoted seed storage solutions, but also

on other good post-harvest practices. The percentage of farmers reported an increase of knowledge and practice

in seed selection, drying and storage was 95%, thanks to the use of key messaging through various mediums (SMS,

TV, video clips, stickers, flipbook, etc.) and different channels (MAF extension officers, the silo manufacturers,

program staff, etc.) reinforced key messages to farmers.

Dietary Diversity: The ESS program also contributed to the increase of Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS).

HDDS is a qualitative measure of food consumption that reflects household’s access to a variety of foods. The

reported increase was from 7.0 during baseline into 8.8 (out of 12 food groups) during endline. This indicator

measured dietary diversity amongst respondent households (24-hour recall, baseline versus endline) who

participated in the keyhole garden activity. The almost two point increase, however, could not be attributed only to

the keyhole garden interventions. The ESS promoted keyhole garden system promotes different vegetables, but

they all fall under one food group category. For that reason, contribution of keyhole garden to the increase of HDDS

would be only a maximum of one point. It is important to note, however, that the household survey was part of the

Final Evaluation that found that 45% of keyhole gardeners were making additional net income on average of $36

during past six months. Despite small, women mostly managed the income from keyhole gardens. Anecdotally,

women spend money better than men do. The likelihood that this money will be used for the benefit of the family

(i.e. to buy food) is high when women manage money –that may or may not contributed to the increase of HDDS.

The total number of keyhole garden interventions, however, are still relatively limited in terms of the number of direct

beneficiaries (only 1,158 households). A more systematic outreaching/scaling-up strategy would help the program

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 24

to reach a larger number of beneficiaries (i.e. using Field Agents to sell much-needed vegetable seeds while

promoting keyhole gardens).

Household Income: A significant increase was observed in the average amount of monthly household income,

which increased from $115 to $155. The average amount of household income was an additional indicator

measured under the SILC component of the ESS program. Similar to the correlation between keyhole garden and

HDDS as discussed above, this income increase should not be only attributed to SILC interventions. Other activities

like keyhole garden and improved seed storage would also likely contribute to the reported increased income. As

aforementioned, keyhole gardens provided an alternative income source for a significant percentage of farmers.

Meanwhile, with the improved seeds storage system, a household can have an additional two and a-half months of

food self-sufficiency. This means that a farming household can use the money saved to pay food.

However, several targets of the output or outcome indicators were not met, they are:

The program distributed 7,000 vouchers with an expectation that 100% of farmers would utilize them. However,

only 6,638 (95%) farmers used them. The program should distribute more to reach the target, as it would be

normal that not everyone would claim the vouchers that they received. This might also reflect the number of

farmers who would actually need seeds, which suggests a better beneficiary selection process. This additional

activity, however, were deemed by endline survey respondent as important for farmers impacted by drought.

This seeds are mostly used to re-sow seeds in their farmland during the off-season to produce both food grains

and seeds.

The program targeted 690 farmers to replicate the keyhole gardens. However, by end of program, only 240

were doing it. This target may have been ambitious given the relatively limited timeframe. In addition, the

program team focused much of their efforts on assisting new households to establish and use the keyhole

gardens, which resulted in 1,158 households (168% of the target) with functioning keyhole gardens. Feedback

from the beneficiaries gathered during monitoring visits suggested that the main challenge with keyhole garden

is the difficulty in acquiring key materials and in constructing the wall (especially if stones are used for wall).

This advised that Behavior change around keyhole gardening will also need to highlight possibility of using

alternative and lighter materials (i.e. use of bamboos, woods, etc. instead of stones).

3.2. Probable Effects/Impacts on Society

Food security: In addition to measuring the ‘number of months of food self-sufficiency, the endline household

survey also measured household food security (in the form of number of food insecure months). The measurement

of the number of food insecure months was done to suggest to what extent the improvement of food self-sufficient

months would create impact in term of food security17. There was certainly a strong connection between food self-

sufficiency and food security and it was confirmed that food self-sufficiency contributes to food security. However,

improvement in number of food self-sufficient months due to seed interventions does not necessarily mean that

households are fully food secure. This justified a more integrated approach to food security in Timor-Leste.

From the analysis, it is clear that there was an improvement in term of food security among beneficiaries. The

average number food insecure months was reduced from three months18 at the baseline to 0.68 month at the

endline. It is important to note, however, that a quite significant number of beneficiaries (39%) were still reporting

to experience at least one month or more of food insecurity –either not being able to access foods (i.e. buying from

17 While self-sufficiency is defined as being able to meet consumption needs (particularly for staple food crops) from own

production rather than buying or importing, food security is defined as “the access for all people at all times to enough food

for a healthy, active life 18 Baseline Report of Phase II

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 25

market) or not enough stored and own-produced foods. However, this figure showcased a significant food security

improvement. The baseline figure was that 80% households were not able to meet their food needs.19

Sale of Assets: The SILC activity used “sale of assets among participating households within the past six months”

as a proxy indicator to see if there would be any long-term impact in terms of resiliency among SILC participants.20

The final evaluator, however, argued that this indicator is ambiguous, especially as it did not restrict types of sold

assets. This indicator was also perceived to be too remote from the expected outcome of SILC interventions. Finally,

the evaluator argued that, as used, this indicator (‘% of participating households that have sold assets in the last 6

months’) does not inform well enough to either draw any lesson or make recommendations on the intervention. It

was targeted that the ‘% of participating households that have sold assets in the last 6 months’ were reduced by

50% from the baseline. However only 28% reduction was achieved. Despite that this target was not achieved, the

achievement for this indicator was showing a significant improvement and, therefore, shows an improvement.

Putting It All Together: The ESS program achievements were made possible due to the ability of the program

team to leverage different actors existing in the systems where we operate. This strategy was meant to ensure that

sustainability of results were built into program implementation. However, the ESS program was not designed from

the beginning as an integrated program with layers of needed interventions for the target communities. The

additional activities were identified and built into program as the program progressed. This may not be an ideal

design process, but it provided Mercy Corps with an opportunity to look at how different combinations of

interventions contribute to the expected outcomes and helped indicate whether the impacts are sustainable or not.

Thus the below section of ‘Why Layering and Integration of Activity Matters’ justified for a more integrated approach

to development in Timor-Leste.

WHY LAYERING AND INTEGRATION OF ACTIVITIES MATTERS? The analysis of the endline household survey data confirmed that layering interventions matters

in helping communities maximize the benefits gained from the program’s interventions.

Household engaged in: # food self-

sufficient months HDDS

Monthly

income (US$)

% of hhs sold

asset during past

6 months

‘Silo’ only 4 8.5 154.3 30

‘Silo’ + SILC activities 5 8.9 156.4 23

‘Silo’ + KHG activities 5 8.8 155.1 17

‘Silo’ + SILC + KHG

activities

6 8.9 162.1 9

19 Baseline Report of Phase I 20 As per SILC measurement guide

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 26

4. Lessons Learned & Moving Forward 4.1. Lessons Learned

In order to capture critical learnings from the ESS program, Mercy Corps conducted an assessment at the end of

the program documenting lessons around the synergies between Market Systems Development (MSD) Resilience

approaches. The full report is found in Annex 2. Overall, these findings underline the potential of a MSD approach

to build resilience, especially where it widely expands market access for risk-reducing technology. The analysis also

suggests that MSD approaches must consider household and community-level social norms, particularly those

related to gender, to enhance the performance of market systems in meeting resilience outcomes. The following is

a summary of the lessons learned:

Assessing local preferences and risks can improve market intervention design for resilience. As

detailed in Section 2, to address food self-sufficiency constraints and avoid the often unsustainable practice of

directly distributing new technology without a longer-term supply network, the ESS team conducted market

assessments and a community engagement process aimed at developing a more robust, customer-driven seed

storage product and supply chain. Importantly, as part of this process, the program sourced vulnerable farmers’

perceptions and experience with risk to help strengthen the design of the

solution and increase its uptake. This included identifying both technical

and non-technical aspects of seed storage and - in collaboration with local

blacksmiths, prototypes were developed for trial and feedback within target

communities. As a result, the design was a best fit for the preferences and

needs of farmers.

Carefully crafted subsidies can foster long-term access to

resilience-building technologies. The ESS program used

USAID/OFDA’s financial support to provide a strategic, direct assistance to

the most vulnerable farmers located at the remote communities. In addition

to reducing their vulnerability, this strategy was integral in achieving early

adoption of the promoted solution. The tactic employed was a voucher-

based ‘smart’ subsidy. This smart subsidy ‘bought’ down beneficiaries’

perceived risk with adopting a need seed storage solution by decreasing

its retail cost for these most vulnerable families. Because vulnerable

farmers could now afford the initial investment at its reduced price, they

were much more likely to purchase and test the product. After initial testing

and sales, the program linked new blacksmiths with the original manufacturers to build their capacity and increase

production, expanding the network of silo manufacturers and suppliers from two to 17 over the course of the

program. In fact, ESS successfully resulted in farmers purchasing additional silos, at full cost, using their own

income and savings which resulted from increased farming productivity from the first purchase. The ESS program’s

success in using smart subsidies to build a market for the seed storage system underscores MSD’s ability to

stimulate demand for and scale new resilience-building technologies in the context of weak markets. Subsidies

were necessary in this context, but were crafted carefully to plan for and ensure a transition to a self-sustaining

market that met farmer demand and willingness to pay.

Cultivating social capital and networks across farmers and market actors stimulates resilience.

Tradeoffs often exist when selecting market actors as program partners. Well-established, larger businesses are

often favored to help MSD programs gain traction and market penetration due to their better business acumen and

financial capabilities. However, this analysis found that smaller but well-connected market actors may be better

trusted by local farmers. This trust position tends to allow them deeper access within rural communities, ultimately

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 27

strengthening rural markets’ ability to contribute to improved resilience. The ESS program’s decision to engage

local blacksmiths for sourcing, constructing and selling the silos—instead of a larger high-skilled business—helped

build strong relationships throughout the market, from input suppliers and transporters to farmers. Choosing

fledgling and smaller-scale service providers in a weak market context meant the program had to invest substantially

in business development training and entrepreneurship skill development, while supporting market linkages with

input suppliers, transporters and retailers. This decision however likely resulted in a more resilience market system

(see ‘Transforming Market Systems’). With a product lifecycle of over 10 years, the market for silos may not grow

indefinitely, but the seed silo’s market expansion catalyzed growth in other products and sectors that have had

important contributions to protecting farmers against risk.

TRANSFORMING MARKET SYSTEMS The scale of voucher distribution and the corresponding manufacturing requirements stimulated

increased imports of the core metal material that went into silo production. This increased

demand drove additional metal importers to crowd the market: the number of specific sheet metal

importers in Dili grew from one to 20 wholesalers over the life of the program, reducing

production costs. The combination of increased sheet metal supply and improved efficiencies in

transportation networks (i.e. economies of scale) decreased silo prices by 40%, while allowing

blacksmiths to increase their profit by $5-7 per unit. Most recently, blacksmiths have begun

offering alternative payment methods, such as installment plans and barter systems, based on

their understanding of customer need and purchasing power. Market actors also capitalized on

their relationships to create a more efficient distribution chain, and some blacksmiths earned

enough income to invest in their own trucks. Increased capacity and connections among

blacksmiths and other market actors ultimately allowed them to adapt and respond to market

needs, expanding their business models in unanticipated ways that contributed not only to

farmers’ market opportunities, but also to resilience. Another critical example of market

expansion and social capital contributing to resilience is the role of blacksmiths in creating

livestock off-take channels during the onset of the 2015-16 EL Niño-induced drought. This

unanticipated ripple effect from the program showed how building local market linkages, and the

capacity of trusted local actors, can create both economic and resilience benefits in unexpected

areas, enabling market actors to pivot in the face of shocks and stresses to meet local needs.

Failure to target gender-based norms and vulnerabilities in markets programs can undermine

resilience. One critical area where ESS had limited success is in transforming gender norms and increasing

women’s participation in the market and productive activities. During its start-up phase, targeting male beneficiaries

enabled swift decision-making around paying the $15-20 cost share for the silo. This attribute was critical in helping

to stimulate initial market demand. However, because women in Timor-Leste are primarily responsible for seed

storage and handling, and since they did not have access to this new knowledge, early on the program missed

critical opportunities to benefit household resilience through women’s empowerment in critical agriculture decision-

making. In its second year, the program began to address this gap by targeting women for trainings and voucher

distribution, increasing the initially minimal percentage of female recipients of voucher subsidies to 43% by the fifth

year. The program also developed activities designed to empower women and help households manage lean

seasons and challenging points in food production cycles, especially through complementing SILC and KHG

interventions. ESS promoted KHG to help stabilize household food production and allow women to earn income

selling excess yield, and SILCs to help them accumulate small money useful for a variety of purposes, including

absorbing or adapting to shocks and/ or stresses. While somewhat successful, these initiatives reinforced women’s

role in managing only small money, while increasing the expectation that more of their limited household budget be

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 28

allocated to risk management. Without promoting joint decision-making and shared responsibility for risk

management, the program not only lost opportunities to transform gender norms, it decreased households’ ability

to invest in long-term risk reduction, often limiting the interventions’ resilience benefits.

4.2. Moving Forward

The aforementioned case study underscores the

potential of an MSD approach to yield significant

resilience benefits as demonstrated by the ESS

program. This was possible in particular as it

improved wide-reaching market access for risk-

reducing technologies (seed storage in this

sense). Investing in the right sectors, actors and

partnerships can enhance the resilience of the

market as a whole, catalyzing the provision of

other resilience building products and services

and improving the long-term sustainability of

interventions. At the same time, we learned about

the importance of focusing on household and

community-level social norms, particularly related

to gender, to enhance the performance of market

systems in meeting resilience outcomes.

These learning have placed Mercy Corps and

partners in a position to better design and

implement a community-based and market-led

programming in country like Timor-Leste. With the

goal of greater food, nutrition and economic

security and resilience of poor and vulnerable

farming households in the face of shocks and

stresses, Mercy Corps and Catholic Relief Service

(CRS) are now implementing the USAID/OFDA

funded Climate-smart Resilience Opportunities

through Post-Harvest Storage (CROPS) program. The CROPS program is built on robust evidence and experience

acquired under the ESS program. The CROPS program, aimed at addressing chronic food insecurity, poverty and

vulnerability across Timor-Leste, will be better sequenced, layered and integrated. The CROPS program tackles

the challenges facing subsistence farmers’ access to and effective use of appropriate, consumer-designed (1) grain

and (2) rainwater storage technologies, (3) climate-smart, intensive vegetable production systems, and (4) savings

and internal lending communities (SILC). By better understanding the barriers to uptake of certain promoted

behaviors or practices (e.g. post-harvest techniques or behaviors related to house-hold dietary practices), the

CROPS program utilizes the Designing for Behavior Change (DBC) framework and information communication and

technology (ICT) where it adds value to program implementation and quality (i.e. e-vouchers and paperless

monitoring and evaluation).

Leveraging the opportunity of the ESS program Final Evaluation, Mercy Corps and partners determined to use that

opportunity to also provide baseline points and feedbacks for the CROPS program. By doing so, the CROPS

program has gained direct inputs as well as an opportunity to incorporate these inputs into action plans. The full

report of the ESS Program Final Evaluation is attached as Annex 3.

HARNESSING THE LESSONS The aforementioned case study (Can Market

Systems Development Build Resilience in Fragile

Context?) provides the following

recommendations for ensuring program design

and implementation maximize both resilience and

economic outcomes.

1. Assess stakeholder risks and needs holistically

to inform MSD intervention design and partner

selection

2. Harness market systems change to catalyze

risk reduction and build resilience at scale

3. Build and leverage social networks to enhance

markets’ risk-reducing potential

4. Design smart subsidies to target immediate

risks while building long-term resilience

through market system change

5. Understand and address gender-based

vulnerabilities to build individual and

household resilience more effectively.

MERCY CORPS ESS Program: Final Narrative Report 29

The report indicated that there are a few design and implementation weaknesses of the ESS program that need to

be improved in the CROPS program. For example, there was not much integration with other Mercy Corps, CRS,

or other projects in the same areas, especially for nutrition and for using SILC groups for information sharing. The

report also lays out several key recommendations for the CROPS program as follows:

Consider extending the CROPS program timeframe to at least three

years from the start, to provide appropriate time for the ‘sequencing’

process21 of new techniques or technologies promoted.

For layering and sequencing, first fill the gaps for the existing ESS

program beneficiaries, and then start immediately with the new SILC

groups. This will enable easier mobilization when it is time to promote

the new products, which will take some time to research and develop

before reaching marketability.

Better beneficiary targeting within the targeted least developed

communities so that any random sample of beneficiaries reflects the

national proportions of vulnerability categories.

Offer as little direct subsidies as possible and, if used, make them

smarter and possibly offer financing options instead of, or in support

of, direct subsidies. For example, offer financing through SILC groups

and through microfinance institutions (MFIs).

List of Annexes:

Annex 1: Stories from the Field

Annex 2: Case Study

Annex 3: Summary of Key M&E Activities

Annex 4: Final Evaluation Report

21 Sequencing is process to demonstrate the feasibility of a promoted technique/technology, moving to scale, and then

exiting. This sequencing process involves: (i) demonstrating proof of concept; (ii) demonstrating feasibility; (iii)

demonstrating scalability; (iv) demonstrating sustainability (via the private sector, local NGO and/or Government providers);

and finally (v) exiting. Adaptive management and cross-learning between different target communities will be important for

improving the quality of promoted interventions, while establishment/strengthening of service providers (private and

government) will help scale-up of promoted NSA activities to a broader clientele of beneficiaries.