FIRE & AVIATION SAFETY

Fast Delegation of Authority Daily FAST Log Southwest Oregon Geo-Multi-Agency Coordinating Group White Paper After Action Report
Team Lead: Tracy Beck Contracting: Neil Austin US Forest Service, Willamette NF Forest Supervisor US Forest Service, Fire Contract Operations Operations: Dave LaFave Health & Safety: Neil Agren Fire Chief, Cowlitz 2 Fire & Rescue Health/Safety Officer, Cowlitz 2 Fire & Rescue Safety: Tom Johnston Aviation: Doug Alexander SOF1/Risk Management Specialist US Fish and Wildlife Service, Regional Fire
Management Coordinator, Alaska Writer/Editor: Arley Paulus David Grim US Forest Service, Regional Safety Specialist Oregon Dept. of Forestry, Safety Manager The Northwest Coordinating Group stood up a Fire Aviation Safety Team (FAST) to review incidents in Oregon and Washington. The Region is operating at planning level 5 with several fires continuing to burn in the Pacific Northwest including Canada. A cold front with lightning moved through the Pacific Northwest in mid-July causing numerous long duration complex fires. The Region moved to Preparedness level 5 and Pacific Northwest Multi-Agency Coordination Group (PNWCG NW MAC). Remote locations, weather conditions (hot-dry-wind), difficult terrain coupled with a lack of resources drastically reduced containment efforts.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary/ Introduction
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The purpose of the FAST is to engage individual firefighters, Incident Management Teams (IMTs), Agency Administrators (AAs), Agency Representatives (ARs) and Fire Management staff in understanding the current and potential safety/risk management issues. Two-way conversation(s) have been proven the best way to gather data and information during fire management activities. Primary objectives Included: 1. The FAST will serve as the “eyes and ears” in the field for the PNWCG NW MAC, and assist
firefighters, fire managers, AAs, and IMTs. We want your team to be service and communications orientated, interagency in focus, and to provide early warnings where accident prone circumstances exist.
2. The FAST is to conduct independent assessment and evaluation of operations and managerial activities on individual large and small fires throughout Oregon and Washington.
3. Develop tangible findings with associated recommendations. Recognize commendable actions/efforts.
The FAST comprised an AA, safety/risk management, operations, contracting, aviation specialists and a writer/editor. • Contact and coordinate with the AAs, ARs and IMT prior to your arrival. • Conduct an in-brief with the Incident Commander (IC) and AAs (as available) with FAST members,
introducing intent and beginning dialogue. • Clarify and promote the FAST process. • Conversations with AAs; operations, plans, safety, medical, aviation, and as applicable finance. • Visit Helibases and airfields. • Conduct a close out with the IC and AAs when possible. Prior to visiting different incidents, the FAST reviewed the 2017 report and attempted to manage visits better, communicate more effectively with IC/administrator’s. An Aviation Safety Assistance Team (ASAT) was also traveling in the region. Teams coordinated visits to reduce overburdening IMTs. Sites Visited:
Forest/BLM Area Fires Incident Number Okanogan/Wenatchee NF Cougar Creek Fire WA-OWF-000419 Okanogan/Wenatchee NF Miriam Fire WA-OWF-000443 Rogue River-Siskiyou NF Taylor Creek Fire OR-MED-000395 Umpqua National Forest Miles Fire OR-UPF-000246
Purpose and Objectives
Methods and Procedures
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The Cougar Creek Fire is located 20 miles northwest of Entiat Washington. The fire started by lightning/natural event. There have been several fires over the last decade near this location. The area also involves several agencies and local emergency services. The Cougar Creek fire also included the Lost Creek Fire which was more remote and northwest of the Cougar Creek Fire. With many past fires in the area it has afforded the area the opportunity to build relationships between emergency response agencies. Vegetation includes a large amount of material, closed timber litter, dead/down and shrub. There is also significant standing dead from beetle kill southeast of the Lost Creek Fire. The FAST Team was able to sit down and discuss operational objectives, challenges, opportunities for improvement with the Incident Commander and Deputy Incident Commander. Commendations: • During discussions with Forest Supervisor and Deputy Resources
they felt the surge Task Force (T.F.) are a good way to share critical resources to accomplish critical, time-sensitive missions. Stress a 6 days on 1 day off schedule for forest resources when not on an incident helps resource recovery (fatigue).
• Interagency cooperation between local, state and federal resources was good. They had common and consistent objectives. There were no conflicts for ground operations. There was great coordination with local fire chiefs, Washington Department of National Resources (DNR) and did substantial resource sharing.
• Use of surge resources was effective to complete critical ground operations.
• Use of the Primary Alternate Contingency Emergency (PACE) model was effective for planning and the development of strategies and tactics.
• The Forest has a good plan for covering the 3 three IMT’s with AA’s and AR’s. • The IMT is less than 10% administratively determined (AD) hires. Way lower than most. • Relationship with the Okanogan National Forest AA and AR’s is going great.
Review Element 1: Fire Operations
Cougar Creek Fire, WA-OWF-000419
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• Cooperators met daily and they expressed they were getting what they needed in cooperation. • Prioritizing resources based on values at risk (VAR) was going well. They frequently adapted tactics
based on available resources. •
Finding: Numerous middle management positions were not filled on the incident. Lack of supervision causes span of control issues. Recommendation: Due to staffing restrictions, the operational objectives needed to match the available resources. Finding: During discussions with line personnel, leader’s intent was not clear. i.e. Contingency Group was directed to “go direct”. When the Contingency Group requested clarification on tactics the response was to again “go direct”. Recommendation: Utilize the leader’s intent format; task, purpose and end state. The “Why” is important. Finding: There are 40-50 vacancies at the lower levels in the fire organization across the Forest. Fire and temporary hire problems exist. Hiring is the most important thing we do. Continuing with the Fire Hire process, how will it be set for next year? Will it be worse? “We have detailers on top of detailers and only one shot to hire!” Fire Hire was mentioned as a barrier to filling positions from the Forest
Supervisor down to the Acting Fire Management Officer (AFMO). Key fire management positions vacancies exist in the temporary and permanent fire work force. o All four of the Type 2 Initial Attack (T2IA) Crews on Okanogan/Wenatchee are understaffed by 3-4 folks. o Multiple layers of detailers o Key permanent leadership positions vacant o One district can staff one fire engine when historically there were more staffed. o Temporary Fire Hire announcement date was set by Albuquerque Service Center (ASC) for mid-September through mid-October. This occurs during our fire season. Furthermore, it prevents recruitment to be completed prior to the operational season and will not provide time for current firefighters to apply. o Fleet, specifically the shortage/lack of availability of summer fleet affects our capacity for local firefighters to fill key single resource positions. I.E. Heavy Equipment Boss (HEQB), Task force
Team Leader (TFLD) etc. (where a vehicle is required). Recommendation: Permanent Fire Hire and temporary Fire Hire needs to be fixed. We must be able to make job offers closer to reporting dates. The new process is even worse. Human Resources and the ASC need to meet hiring manager needs, not the other way around. We think the Interim Chief needs to intervene to correct the situation. Finding: Certain fire prone areas on the forest have had control lines built on key ridges and control features that have proved successful in the past. One local fire manager quoted “4 out of the last 9 seasons they have used some of the same lines” Every time they are rehabilitated, then re-opened this practice costs valuable time, increased exposure to firefighters and expense. Recommendation: Why can’t they be left open, and mapped for future teams? Maybe even maintained for future use in higher risk locations.
Finding(s)/Recommendation(s)
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Finding: Lack of coordination/timing for FAST, (ASAT), Risk Management Assistance Team (RMAT), etc. causes added stress for local AAs, ARs, Incident Management Team (IMTs) when they all visit the incident around the same time. The time spent with teams takes away from other business and adds stress/anxiety to folks. Recommendation: Better management of Regional review teams by the coordinating group. Finding: Difficulty in some cases with span of control and the number trainers assigned/operating with trainees on the line (more than one trainee assigned to a Trainer/Evaluator). This observation may have been very isolated however it is a result of a higher need than availability of resource. The current succession process is not producing an adequate number of qualified mid-level overhead. Recommendation: The current system for training and qualifications is not effective. The program needs to be evaluated and redesigned or agencies need to look at other opportunities to get task book work completed such as utilizing planned events, incidents other than wildfires and partnering with local fire agencies to complete tasks which are not required to occur on a wildfire incident. This would allow a more focused effort for those tasks that are required to be on wildland fires as well as year around opportunities. Attended the 0530 Operations Meeting, and then the 0600 Incident Briefing. Attended 0900 briefing with Entiat District Ranger and (AFMO). Completed site visits at the Fish Lake Helibase, and the Moses Lake Airtanker base. Visited with the pilots of T-911 and T- 101. Conditions were hot, and the air was filled with smoke and no aviation activities were taking place. Toured both airtankers with the pilots. Commendations: • Have enough helicopters to keep hour
per day use to reasonable usage (4-6 hours).
• Increased dust abatement appliances in short periods of time to keep dust to a minimum.
• Considering the shortage of overhead and outstanding, unfilled orders, the base operations were in good order.
• Lead plane was good to work with the helicopters in place of air attack when needed.
Review Element 2: Aviation
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Finding: Not having the required Type 1 Helibase Manager at Fish Lake, using a trainee from the Malheur rappel helicopter. Recommendation: Have the required position filled with the qualified personnel. Finding: Ongoing loss of “corporate knowledge” of qualified personnel to staff helicopters and therefor a shortage of qualified personnel. Recommendation: Encourage organizations to develop career ladders for helicopter crews to maintain “corporate knowledge” and the staffing needed.
Finding: Attended morning Incident Briefing and the term “Sectors” was used in one Division. Recommendation: Define the use of Sectors within a Division. The “word” was Improperly used, and segment is the correct term. Finding: Briefing by the Operations Section Chief Trainee verbally described the actions on the Divisions- making it very hard to understand the briefing without the use of a pointer. Recommendation: Utilize a laser pointer and or pointer of some sort. Finding: Morning Operations Briefing had too many changes made from the Incident Action Plan (IAP). Recommendation: More concerted effort in making the briefing match the IAP. Finding: The Moses Lake Airtanker Base has been very busy averaging 30,000 to 50,000 gallons of retardant per day with a high of over 100,000 gallons on 8/9. Recommendation: Reviewing daily usage logs and locations of the retardant drops by the host agency to ensure the host agency is aware of the amount and associated costs. Commendations • Use of trainees (mentor, assist in experience, etc.) • Aware of hazard (hornets, wasps, etc.) and having mitigations in place.
o Medical Unit staffed with Paramedics (on line and Incident Command Post (ICP)). o Insect traps (ICP and sleeping area- Facilities unit leader (FACL) and eating area-Food Unit
Leader (FDUL)). • Attaching the 215A risk assessment in the IAP.
o Consider an additional column indicating residual risk to personnel after the warnings, mitigations and remedies have been identified. That will give a clearer picture and will generate risk conversations.
• Mitigating potential medical issues by inserting the right resources, medical personnel and extraction equipment for the Lost Fire.
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Finding: Command (IC and Liaison)
• We had to alter our tactics and strategy due to lack of resources and resource type (Contract hand crews’ verses Interagency Hotshot Crew (IHC’s)).
• Use of Detailers works well to augment forest fire personnel. • Need a new Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) - we already exceeded cost
element objective. • Some discussion on the prioritization of critical resources and incidents.
o Creative writing on the 209 can move you up in priority setting by the GMAC. o A phone call to the GACC/MAC explaining the situation more clearly than can be described
in the 209 will in some cases move critical resource more easily to the fire. • Want the relationship with partners and cooperators to be better when we leave than before.
o Allow us to use “local” resources that are not in the system, DNR.
Recommendation: Continue fire management activities in accordance with policy, guidelines, available resources and continue to build strong partner/Cooperator relationships. Finding: Safety and Medical
• Put a paramedic into the Lost Fire as soon as possible (day 2) to mitigate possible injuries. o Extraction of illness/injured is by helicopter only. o Day 4- an IHC and a T2IA hand crew were airlifted as well as an additional paramedic. o A modified UTV with patient basket was sent up as close to the Lost Fire as possible.
• Two REM’s (Remote Extraction modules) were ordered for illness/injury in the back country (Invaluable if an extraction life flight or Cougar helicopter cannot fly because of smoke.
• Operations exceeded the span of control at times because of the lack of resources. • Medical 206/8-line is the last page of IAP. • Safety/Operations have a Tactics meeting to develop the 215 and 215A risk modified.
o Put the residual risk into the IAP and have the 215A displayed near the briefing area- it would generate that risk discussion with the IMT members and assigned resources.
Recommendation: Continue to insert equipment/personnel into remote operations as risk mitigations.
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Finding: Operations • Use as Trainees as Heavy Equipment Bosses without Trainer/evaluators; this stretched the span
of control. • Local personnel showed the locations of past suppression lines, direct and indirect (local
expertise is important for our planning and suppression activities). • Used 50,000, 104,000 and
134,000 gallons of retardant over a three-day period. o Some on the Lost Fire and
most on the west unoccupied flank.
• Forest • IMT will give our resources
back as soon as available (Lost Fire); 16 smoke jumpers and 8 heli-rapellers that were air lifted into the Lost Fire- north northeast of the Cougar. This was a 25+ acre that started by lightning at the same time as the Cougar.
• Fire Hire- It’s the wrong time of year and is cumbersome. o The most important thing we do is hiring (filling our ranks with permeants and seasonal
personnel- it’s difficult with the current system to get them here in an efficient manner. o It’s challenging and a piecemeal approach.
• Letting fire management know the “why” of tactics, strategy is important. • Forrest has a mid-day fire coordination conference call each day (situational awareness and
updates. • AA- I worry about communication failures (at all levels). • It’s common to have one AA per incident (not distracted by having two, etc.). • Modifying behavior to reduce cumulative fatigue over time.
o Six days of work; one day off and monitor 2-1 work rest guidelines. • We’re always looking for things to change for the better.
Recommendation: Continue the good practices (Conference calls, AA designation per fire, fire specialists on remote fires, mitigations for fatigue, etc.) and conduct risk analyses on potential span of control issues.
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• Briefings (morning and operations). o Utilize a laser pointer describing locations and tactics. o Utilize a hung map verses a flat map when describing tactical assignments and strategy.
Recommendation: Post the 215A (modified or 215R) near the Briefing area for conversation and discussion; also add the risk level on the 215A that is in the IAP. The Miriam Fire is located 2 miles southeast of White Pass Ski Area, Washington. The fire was started by lighting. The lead agency is USDA Forest Service. The fuel includes mixed conifers, brush and snags. Smokey conditions at times has limited air operations. The FAST sat down and discussed operational objectives, challenges, opportunities for improvement with the Incident Commander and Deputy Incident Commander. Commendations: Relationships and communication seem to be good between the IMT and both forests, at least one
Agency Representative is always at ICP, “We are communicating often and in a timely fashion.”
Miriam Fire, WA-OWF-000443
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IMT had pre-approval to use retardant in Wilderness. They have set up a batch plant. Retardant is working well in checking fire growth. IMT is tracking retardant use for the Forest and retardant avoidance maps are being used.
The ICP location was a challenge, it is situated on both sides of Highway 12 at the White Pass Ski facilities. Numerous safety mitigations are in place and there are three designated crossings for foot traffic. Washington Department of Transportation (WADOT) has helped with traffic warning signs.
Finding: The Incident Meteorologist (IMET) was from Washington DNR not a National Weather Service employee, to get dispatched they (non-weather service) must be specific name requested and still must contact the National Weather Service to get approval. This must be done for all non-weather service IMETs- Qualified/certified personnel shouldn’t have to request approval from outside agencies to be assigned. Recommendation: Consider uniformity and standardization when ordering IMETs. Finding: The IMT has a need for 4x4 ambulances due to the fire access roads. They either cannot be ordered in that configuration, or they were not available. They did get one “fill” on a 4x4, but it showed up as a 4x2 after all. They put the ambulances out there on the line anyway, as they had no other options, creating more risk for vehicle damage and accidents etc. Recommendation: Conduct risk analysis on utilizing the right equipment for the mission; mitigate when possible, but continue to provide medical support for fire suppression and support personnel. Finding: The contracted security company that the IMT had for road guards etc. came off the line on 8/7, as the company owner did not want them to work longer than 12 hours, and the IMT required them to work 15 hours for coverage. The signed contract stated 12-16 hours. The contractors came off the line and were demobed. Finding: One privately owned fire engine was found to be driven by an employee who had their driver’s license suspended. This was discovered by the Forest Service Law Enforcement Officer (LEO). The driver was cited, and the engine was demobed.
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Visited the ICP and met with IC and Air Operations Branch Director (AOBD) Sidebottom. Discussed the current aviation activities on the fire. The helibase is full to capacity, 2T2, 2 T1 DNR, 1T2- Rappel Ship and 1T3. They are currently setting up a mobile batch retardant base east of the fire to apply retardant to the northeast corner of the fire. This application will be a retardant line up the ridge tying into an old burn scare to keep the fire from advancing through sparse fuels and terrain that is hazardous with snags and will not have firefighters working in the area. Helicopters are reported to have maximum hours to included use to provide with at least 2 hours of initial attack if needed. The helibase was not reviewed. AOBD stated that a Retardant Effectiveness Team was onsite and was evaluating the effectiveness of the retardant on the northeast corner of the fire. Stated no reports had been submitted at this date. Commendations: The “Lend Lease” use of 2 Type 1 helicopters from the Washington DNR. When the IMT assumed command, they were provided air ambulance landing sites for extraction.
They continued providing the coordinates in their medical plans. There was an incident that called for an air ambulance flight, and on arrival to one of the sites the air ambulance refused to land in the identified site. The extraction happened shortly after with an exclusive use helicopter, that landed and flew the patient direct to the hospital. The outcome was positive, and the IMT learned an important lesson regarding landing sites and
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back-up plans. Ground-truth or ensure approval of all medi-vac helispots before listing and assuming they are solid. Always attempt to have a back-up plan in motion or prepared to be operational in the event the primary plan doesn’t work out.
Finding: In need of a Type 1 helibase manager. Recommendation: Manager has been on order and had arrived during our visit. Finding: Helibase is maxed out for space of any additional helicopters Recommendation: Future planning for additional space if needed. Finding: Retardant Effectiveness Team was on site. Recommendation: Follow up on the effectiveness and evaluation.
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Commendations The highway was an obvious hazard that became a risk
as soon as firefighters had to cross the highway to move around the camp facilities. The IMT identified a crosswalk with additional lighting at night. After the caterer was in place, the IMT recognized that firefighters were taking a more direct line to the caterer which caused them to cross outside the designated lighted area, so they created two crosswalks similarly lighted and identified. The crosswalks and light systems will help the firefighters to be safer if they use them, and they won’t use them if they aren’t convenient, so the IMT provided convenient crosswalks.
Utilization of Australians in other needed and qualified positions.
IMT evaluation form in IAP for fire suppression and support personnel (internal report on how the IMT is doing).
Incident Action Plan (IAP) o RM Objective is the first objective o 215A (Modified risk assessment- is in the IAP with the residual risk. o There is a questionnaire within the IAP that asks for comments on the IMT (Health, Safety,
Operations, etc. Findings: Incident Commander
• The Agency Representative and the Agency administrator are periodically at the fire at the same time but separated. This can cause a delay (minimally) with decision making.
• We have prioritized our tactics/strategy based on realistic objectives and resource availability, fire scars, natural barriers, etc.).
• Tactics and strategy are based on exposure and the consequences to our personnel and the probability of success of the task/mission.
• If the 209 didn’t say Full Suppression, even though we are using direct, in-direct, (contain, confine) strategy the fire would be lower on the priority list.
• Management Objective- “Provide for the safety of firefighters and the public using on-going risk analysis and reasonable mitigation of identified hazards”
Findings: IC/Operations • Resources are in critical supply- we have modified our tactics and strategy based on the
resources we have and the ones we feel confident we will get (Australians, local loan of resources, etc.).
Review Element 3: Safety/Risk Management
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• Australians came with specified position specialties (Helicopter Crewmember (HECM), Safety Officer (SOF)2, etc.) and no documentation card of other qualifications. If they are assigned and that position/need was filled, they sometimes sit for 24-36 hours while the US confirms the other qualifications from their home country.
Recommendation: Out of country resources need to come with documentation of all their qualifications to enable them to be placed in critical need positions. (National)
• Reviewing Spike camp options to reduce the exposure of firefighter s to hazards (travel time, fatigue, hiking, snags, etc.) on the Clear Fork Fire. It must be controlled- it is in direct line later in the summer to reach Highway 12. The fire is supported 100% by aviation.
Finding: Plans - There are 72 IMET that are certified within the National Weather Service. IMETs are filled like other misc. overhead positions through ROSS. There are however seven (7) other IMETS from non-federal agencies (Minnesota, South Dakota, WA Department of Natural Resources, etc.) that are usually name requested and then must be approved through the Weather Service layer.
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Recommendation: All IMET that are qualified (education and refresher) should be in a pool and assigned through Resource ordering and Status System (ROSS). There are times however, due to currency (fire three years ago) that could be moved up in the rotation to enable them to maintain their qualifications.
The Taylor Creek Fire is located 10 miles west of Grants Pass, Oregon. The fire was started by lighting. The lead agency is Us USDI Bureau of Land Management. Fuels include timber, grass and brush. The FAST sat down and discussed operational objectives, challenges, opportunities for improvement with the incident commander and deputy incident commander. Commendations: The PACE model was in place, crews on the line understood what it meant
Taylor Creek Fire, OR-MED-000395
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Plastic Sphere Dispensing (PSD) drones were used for burn-out operations, reducing exposure to ground resources and not having to conduct a PSD aviation firing operation in smoky and adverse visual conditions for helicopter use (aviation resources).
A quad-helicopter style Drone was used on the fireline for scouting/observation; it was flown via visual flight path. When we were leaving, they were applying for a temporary non-visual flight operation.
The use of the Scan Eagle Drone was a “game changer” for night operation intelligence. There was good leader’s intent, members at all levels were engaged and understood what was
wanted. Utilization of a 24/48/72-hour planning meeting was very informative, it highlights the big
challenges, strategies, and tactics that the team will need to address over a three-day period (future). Seemed to help keep the big picture in mind for all the stakeholders involved.
Agency Administrators were working well to address their differences (VAR, strategies, tactics, etc.) in opinion prior to going to the IC meeting, this way it showed a unified front, everyone has some skin in the game and understands the risks involved with each decision. They share the responsibility as a group and not as individual Agencies. o The AA/AR Team has been accommodating of other agencies concerns and take time to
discuss the issues at hand. The IC’s active involvement in camp life was commended by personnel out on the line. They had
mentioned that he listened to their concerns about long lines at the caterer and fixed the issue by ordering a new caterer.
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Aerial ignition, by drone, worked well on the fireline. Observers stated that it worked more precisely than that of a manned aerial platform due to being able to pre-program GPS coordinates. This was the first time that a drone was used in the U.S. as a platform for aerial ignition.
Streaming the operational briefing to remote camps allows for a consistent message to be delivered to all firefighters at the same time. This provides consistent leaders intent incident-wide, and the delivery of key messages.
The agency representatives commented that they thought the IMT was very focused on risk mitigation measures, not just recognizing hazards.
There were two issues where a security guard witnessed firefighters smoking a suspicious substance in near/in tents at night. They marked the tent, and the employee was contacted in the morning. The IMT contacted the company owner who was very responsive and had a representative on site in a very timely manner. The employee in question was drug tested on-site and tested positive. The employee was demobed, and the employer was able to keep the crew working on the fire, without appreciable downtime. This solution made by the employer is better than previous solutions that may have resulted in the entire crew being demobed, and the responsible party not being held accountable. Per incident commander and Operations Section Chief.
When PNW2 took command of the Taylor Creek Fire, the wait for a meal was 2 hours long. That quickly affected morale for the firefighters in a negative way. PNW2 replaced the caterer for one with additional capacity to feed the larger numbers, and the attitudes and morale of the firefighters improved immediately. This was a common comment by firefighters on the Taylor Creek Fire.
The IMT has done a great job communicating leader’s intent, the streaming to the Klondike Camp is great use of technology to address a geographical problem.
The IMT established a spike camp to cut down on drive time for those resources. The IMT is very safety conscious.
The Rogue-Siskiyou Forest gave approval to use chainsaws, retardant and dozers in Wilderness early during emerging incidents.
24/48/72-hour meetings have been very effective in looking out and what to prepare for. The IMT has followed this meeting with a deliberate risk dialog with the Agencies.
Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) resources have been invaluable on several fires.
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Streaming the morning briefing has greatly improved efficiency, communication and safety of the firefighter.
There were several comments from firefighters that they have been hearing of, what seemed to be a lot more accidents this year. The FAST and Region assured them that serious, injuries, illnesses would be documented through Rapid Lessons Sharing (RLS) documentation and advisories from the involved agencies. Personnel appreciated the effort, not wanting the accidents to get lost in the busy fire season.
Finding: The FAST found that Agencies were coordinating well at the time of our visit on Taylor Creek, Klondike and Miles Fires. We did hear about difficulties working with agencies, specifically Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF) and commercial timber landowners not buying into IMT’s strategies and tactics. This occurred earlier during the emerging incidents phase of these fires and was a topic many of those we interviewed wanted to talk about. During the lightning storm that started all of these fires, ODF and the Forest Service had over 100 initial attack fires each. This created a very complex, difficult and stressful situation. Recommendation: Work on interagency dynamics prior, during and post fire season. There needs to be a robust After Action Review after the fires are out. Preseason Agency Administrator meetings for all the Agencies would help to have better coordinated fire suppression efforts during emerging incidents and extended attack in 2019. Finding: It was difficult for some personnel to hear and see the streamed briefings. The screen was too small and some of the participants had not been briefed on “how” to use the microphone. Recommendation: Briefings need to have a secure connection or be recorded then played back, ensure screen(s) are large enough for the whole audience to see, adequate speaker/presenters use of equipment (speakers varied distance from mike causing audio to muffle, be quiet etc.). Use a person/person to summarize what was provided including the use of a map. Finding: Medical 206/8-line is complicated when running an Incident within an Incident. Recommendation: Simplify the medical plan to a more user-friendly version for those in the field. Narrow it down to the most important information, such as the eight/nine-line report. Utilize a short narrative where the user only must fill in the blanks and read the information. Finding: Surge resources not knowing if they were surge resources. Recommendation: Additional training and orientation is needed with surge resources.
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Finding: Surge resources not being used appropriately – breaking up resources and utilizing then on day and night shifts. Recommendation: Develop a guideline paper for surge resources and users. Finding: The contention between Agencies is quite palpable. The underlying issue to the vast amount of recommended improvements by those on the Team and on the fireline is all related to a deep-seated source of operational differences between the agencies. They each operate by a different methodology to accomplish goals based on their individual stakeholders. A common understanding and acknowledgement of each other’s operational differences can go a long way to solidifying a unified front – such as the Agency Administrators were able to accomplish on Taylor Creek Fire. Recommendation: Strive to build interagency relationships using the model of the Agency Administrators on this fire. Agree on a course of action and move forward together as one unified front, not a us and them mentality. Finding: Reports from the field were that they were well supported and had the resources that they needed to fulfill their mission. Finding: Tense relationships at the Agency level flows down to impact the IMT. Some on the IMT said this was the worst assignment they have ever experienced, in terms of being second guessed on operational tactics. Recommendation: The fire suppression emerging incident struggles in Oregon could be improved if IMT’s were integrated as they are in most of the rest of the US. Also, centralizing dispatch centers would also greatly help. This needs to be worked on at the local and individual IMT levels. If ODF had a few employees on one of the PNW IMT’s, they would make the team stronger. Finding: The IMT has made good progress after ODF initial attack did not work on the Klondike Fire. Finding: ODF’s insistence to go take action along private lands becomes a distraction for the IMT. Many of the suggested tactics make no sense and have zero chance of success. Recommendation: Relationship dynamics with ODF must be fixed at the Regional/State levels. There needs to be high level work with honest and frank dialog to get better Agency alignment. Agreements and changes at the highest levels needs to be communicated to the local units. Local AA’s need to be held accountable to effectively manage fires and maintain relationships.
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Recommendation: Continue to utilize new technologies, such as the drone in aerial ignition. They may help to enhance operational goals and will be able to be used when other platforms may not be able to, along with controlling for the hazard of exposure in manned systems. Finding: Overhead and fireline positions are open to the idea of being more flexible with the deployment schedule. It was recognized that everyone will need a break at different points in their deployment, not on a standardized schedule. Recommendation: Ensure that Agency Administrators and resource supervisors evaluate personnel and ensure that they are healthy, fit and mentally capable of the assignment. Finding: One IHC said they had confusing instructions given them on the fireline. They received instruction from their division supervisor to burn out a section of line, but then they had another person (believed to be an ODF employee) give them decidedly different direction (to not burn and go direct). When asked who this person was, or what position they held, their answer was that he wasn’t really supposed to be there but was directing them on what to do. This person stayed around and approached the crew members at different times and attempted to direct them differently than their direction from Division/Group Supervisor (DIVS). Recommendation: They continued with the direction from their DIVS, but the other employee stayed around and continued to provide differing direction. The DIVS should have been notified and the other individual contacted by the division supervisor or branch director and removed from the fireline. Finding: In a meeting with the Rogue-Siskiyou leadership, they mentioned that they had an impression that there was a higher percentage of accidents and injuries with contract firefighters than with agency firefighters. Recommendation: It may be interesting to note that contractors in this geographic area make up a significantly higher number of firefighting resources than ever before. This may be fact based but is based on a perception and may likely be a false narrative. On August 13 there were 949 pieces of contract equipment, 129 fallers, 194 T2 or T2IA crews, and 117 EMTs or paramedics from PNW contracts assigned to fires. Finding: AA’s are getting into the tactical weeds, telling the IMT to put dozers into places that make no sense. Recommendation: It is very important to give deference (tactical decision making) to the Sections, especially Operations. This hasn’t always been the case on the Rogue-Siskiyou. The IMT has received many tactical suggestions/demands from AA’s DAA’s and private landowners. Past fire history and especially Chetco Bar has created a climate of mistrust throughout SW Oregon.
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Finding: Getting good Agency alignment has been challenging. Local relationships with landowners, operators and partners has been a challenge. Past fires are still fresh in people’s minds. The situation needs to be improved in SW Oregon. Finding: The past IMT on the Klondike, fired off private ground and the landowner wasn’t happy that they had not been notified. The FAST doesn’t have knowledge of what the situation was, or what prior communication had been made. Finding: ODF wants to ensure everything is done to prevent another Chetco Bar. Finding: ODF said there has not been independent action, everything they have done has been coordinated. Recommendation: There is certainly a difference of opinion concerning the working relationship of the Federal and State agencies: it is dependent on locale and who is giving the information. As mentioned earlier- this needs to be mended to reduce risk and exposure to firefighters and support personnel. Attended morning briefing and a briefing with the AA. Further briefing with AOBD about aviation operations. Did not visit helibases as the ASAT did it this week. Smoke kept aviation activities to a minimum. Commendations: Agency Representatives liked the
24/48/72-hour meetings for futuring out the incident
Inviting the Agency Representatives to participate in the Deliberate Risk Discussions.
Video stream live morning briefings to Klondike Fire and having IC or DIC at Klondike to deliver IC message.
Agency Representatives working together with different missions and were able to focus on the agreeing on a final product.
The use of the Scan Eagle Drone with infrared is very useful when air is smoked in and for night operations.
The Plastic Sphere Dispenser Drone and Observation Drone are very successful and valuable assets in firing out areas with limited visibility for a helicopter.
Found that “surge resources” were very helpful in completing stated objectives.
Finding Limited funding made limited resources available for both USFS and ODF. Recommendation: Fund for longer season. Finding: Agency Representatives felt that the 14-day assignment is too short and would like more flexibility in extensions or increase to 21-day assignments. Recommendation: Defer this to GMAC and NNWCG NW MAC for discussion.
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Finding: Agency Representatives feel that more successional planning is need for firefighting resources in the future.
Recommendation: Defer this to GMAC and NNWCG NW MAC for discussion. Finding: AOBD felt that his hands were tied over the use of the “Lend Lease” helicopters from ODF Recommendation: A better understanding of the helicopter situations. ODF had ordered the helicopters for the Gardner Fire and held on to them after the Gardner Fire and avoided releasing and not being able to get a fill on any future helicopter orders. Finding: Agency Representatives found that having a pre-identified interagency team from outside the area would be helpful to the “host agencies” and relieve the local area workload. Recommendation: Work with the Coordinating Group to develop the pre-identified “teams” to help facilitate the development of this type of resource. Commendations Development of 24/48/72-hour analysis of the incident and internal/AA meeting. Alive at 5 AM (external and internal program) over the iPhone, iPad and computer. Findings: Incident Commander
• A member of a contract hand crew was suspected of using an illegal drug; the crew boss initiated a urine test (crew possessed), tested positive and the employee was sent home. The Company are monitoring themselves and taking positive action.
• IMT does a 24/48/72-hour meeting with all functional areas. The Agency Administrators and Representatives attend. This process projects direction and resource need three days out and assists in strategy and tactics.
Review Element 3: Safety/Risk Management
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• Every Team member must view a video on Leadership Training by David Marquet- so everyone has the standard in mind.
• Brings in a Resource Advisor (READ) to assist local Resource Advisors in continuity of information transfer.
Recommendation: Safety and Medical (and other functions) can look 1-3 days out to work out resource placement and hazard/risk analysis. Useful for all IMT’s, AA’s and the public. Finding: Plans - IMT does live streaming of the morning Briefing to the other base camp; the operations Section Chief (tactics for the day) and then the Incident Commander (Leader’s Intent) close the briefing. Finding: Agency Administrators - BLM, ODF, USFS meet during the day and talk about Values at Risk, Safety Issues, strategies and then come to a Common Operating Picture- though there are differences, they try to come up with commonalities and a uniformed approach to the Incident Management Team, Kind of like an informal unified command. Our priorities will shift as the threats to VAR’s change. Finding: Safety/Risk Management - Management Objective- “Provide for firefighter and public safety through deliberative risk management, implementation of appropriate mitigations, clear understanding of assignments, and coordination of suppression strategies”. Finding: PIO
• Standard Low Technical Program o Traplines, phone and face to face interviews, media contacts.
• High Technology Program: Developed an Alive at 5 A.M. Facebook page. It is interactive (monitored 18+ hours per day) and contains:
o Mini-documentaries o Accurate maps and acreage o Mini-educational video(s) o And the recorded Briefing at about 8-9 a.m. after editing. o Most of this information is also loaded on Inciweb for those that do not want to be on
Facebook or Instagram. • Internally and externally- everyone can view the program. • Transparency + Frequency = trust/faith with the public.
Recommendation: IMT’s should consider this so that the public, IMT and suppression/support. personnel can get accurate real-time information. Finding: Deliberative Risk Management Analysis
• Describes Hazards, frequency of exposure/consequences and risk level; then controls and then the frequency of exposure/consequences and the residual risk level with a holistic approach by location.
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o This is a relatively new concept lumping and not splitting hazards, situations and conditions: not sure what the reception will be for Agency Administrators and Representatives- it was being developed so was not posted near the briefing area or put in the IAP.
Recommendation: Continue to explore methods for risk analysis that makes sense and is valuable to the IMT, fire suppression and support personnel. The Miles Fire is located on the Umpqua National Forest, Oregon. The fire was started by lighting. The lead agency is the USDA Forest Service. Fuels include mixed timber, timber/shrub understory, dead/down component and shrub. The FAST sat down and discussed operational objectives, challenges, opportunities for improvement with the Incident Commander and Deputy Incident Commander. Commendation: At the IMT level, there appeared to be very good communication between ICs and agreement on
incident objectives. The message from the ICs was consistent the mission presented was clear. Finding: Surge resources later than expected being used in similar role due to changes in conditions. Recommendation: Expand training for the use of surge resources for both IMTs and resources. Finding: In conversations with resource advisors and heavy equipment bosses on the Miles Fire, regarding the level of supervision, or span-of-control issues that have line supervisors feeling nervous and uncomfortable. Specific examples were of resource advisors routinely assigned to lead dozers for fireline construction. If they happened to be HEQB qualified, it was a good pairing with positive results, but in many instances, they were not qualified. In this instance, the outcome may be good, but the decision to do it isn’t. One HEQB trainee had 3 masticators assigned to him, 1 excavator, 1 feller buncher, and 2 dozers. He had a trainer assigned until he demobed, and then he did not have a trainer assigned for the rest of the assignment. There were instances of falling modules working without Felling Boss (FELB) supervision, and one FELB assigned up to 6 modules of fallers. Recommendation: There are recognized instances of critically needed middle management positions on most fires currently, these positions are fireline leadership for firefighters and equipment. If fire
Miles Fire, OR-UPF-000246
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managers continue to assign firefighters and equipment without qualified, and appropriate supervision it is only a matter of time until accidents are going to be directly attributed to the lack of supervision, and unacceptable span of control. There are several possible solutions to this; ranging from requiring supervision to be ordered along with line resources and/or equipment, bringing together task forces/equipment groups with leadership for ordering together, requiring leadership be already in place before resource orders can be approved for fill, contracting equipment bosses or task force leaders for their company’s equipment, or modifying policy to change span of control and required supervision of line resources to better reflect what we are currently doing. Attended the morning briefing and found the AOBD to interview about the aviation operations. Commendations: All aviation positions are filled with qualified aviation personnel. Have three helibases that give management the option to use with the possibility of one or two
helibases being smoked in. Aviation
o SMS risk matrix added to the bottom of the ICS-220. Finding: Issues on inconsistency of operations with National Flight Following Frequency and
National Air Guard Frequency. Flight Following has gone down numerous times and SAFECOMS and SAFNETS have been filed, along with emails to the Regional Office have been sent. – SW OREGON
Recommendation: This issue should be addressed by the Regional Office and the Forest as it is a safety issue. Funding and planning should be in the works as this has been an on-going issue.
No findings or recommendations. Commendations Extensive use of trainees Safety Expectations fold-up handout from the IC to assigned personnel.
o “It’s about caring for people” o Subjects include: Supervisors, Drivers, Today, Health and Sanitation, Safety “Teaming”, fireline
operations, and the “Five Rights”. Risk Assessment Matrix
o Not only used in the Planning Meeting but is also posted at the Briefing area and was put in the IAP every couple of operational periods.
Aviation o SMS risk matrix added to the bottom of the ICS-220 in the IAP.
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Finding: First Incident Objective: Provide for the safety of firefighters and the public through utilization of deliberate risk management standards with avenues for feedback from personnel. Finding: Contact list for “yellow, red” accidents and injuries (has contact information) for hospital liaisons). Recommendation: This short list (one-page table) includes Agency Administrators, Other Agency contacts, FMO’s, etc., in a call tree configuration that lists at the bottom-local hospital liaison contact/information. It would be a valuable tool for other T1 and T2 IMT’s to view and utilize. Finding: Leader’s intent provided in fold-up handout covering safety expectations. Recommendation: This is a handout for the team and incoming resources that Incident within and Incident (IWI), right plan, place, time, assets and duration, driver standard operating procedures (SOPs), fatigue, today- what, why is it important and how important I it and safety teaming (helping each other to be successful) that every IMT can use for Leaders Intent and expectations. Finding: 215A (Modified Risk Assessment Matrix) Recommendation: The risk assessment is split into day and night, put in the IAP periodically and posted at the Briefing area and the Planning meeting location. The risk level (high, medium, low) is calculated after the hazards, conditions and situations are listed by location; frequency and consequences determined. Mitigations, warnings and remedies are applied, and the calculations are run again, that determines the residual risk. Some of the hazards, though mitigated, still have a high- risk level- this will stimulate a conversation between IMT members internally, with Agency Administrators and others. Finding: SMS (Air Operations); The AOBD adds the Safety Management System (SMS) risk matrix at the end of the ICS-220 (aviation information). Helibase Managers (AD’s mostly) do not have a copy of the SMS risk work book. Recommendation: Have AOBD’s consider adding this to the IAP occasionally to allow non-aviation personnel see the mitigations, but especially the risk level of various missions (for the conversation). Finding: Medical Plan (ICS-206 WF) Recommendation: The medical information report is a good tool for a minimally trained medical resource to follow when responding to an injury or illness. However the information needs to be earmarked by bolding the important information for following when the responder is under stress attending a serious injury/illness. Numbering sequence is another way for a non-medically trained resource to relay the information in a critical situation.
The Daily Log provides a general timeline and actions taken by the FAST team during assignment. When possible, team members called in for their respective Regional conference calls (Aviation 0700, IC/MAC 0730, and Safety 0930).
6 August 2018 (Conference Call): 0930 call in. Attendees: Sean Stafford (Hosting), Tracy Beck (Team Lead), Dave LaFave (Operations), Neil Agren (Health/Safety), Tom Johnston (Safety), Ron George (on behalf Neil Austin (Contracting Operations), Arley Paulus, (Writer/Editor), Dan Boyle (ASAT Team Lead, guest). Absent: Doug Alexander (Aviation). Quick introduction confirming those in attendance. Briefly discussed the Aviation Safety Assistance Team (ASAT) travel plan to southern Oregon and determined it best to avoid duplication visits on sites already visited by the ASAT team. The FAST team will head north to Washington. Tracy, Neil (Ford Explorer 3 spots), Dave, Neil will have a (Jeep Cherokee), Tom, Arley (pickup truck, can take gear). Plan to meet up tomorrow 11 am for a full in-brief. Letter of Intent is in the works. Sean Stafford is gathering a contact information for ICs, Safety, ICP locations etc.
7 August 2018 (In-brief/Travel): 1100 In-brief with PNWCG. Delegation letter reviewed and signed. Crew met together to further clarify goals and next 24-hour objectives. The format and content of the document was discussed any individual limiting factors were covered. Team departed to stage in Yakima and schedule with local administrator prior to visiting sites.
8 Aug 2018 (Cougar Fire): Met with local forest leadership at the Forest Service Supervisor’s Office for the Cougar/Lost Fires. Went to the Cougar Fire ICP, met with various members of the Command and General Staff and attended evening planning meeting. The team also split up and met with safety, line crews, contract specialists, senior leadership, and the rotary aviation resources at the Fish Lake Helibase.
9 Aug 2018 (Cougar Fire): Attended morning pre-brief (operations) with Operations and attended the morning briefing. Met with Agency Administrator (AA) and Agency Representative (AR) to discuss any incident concerns. The team split up to meet with their respective functional peers. Visited Moses Lake Air Tanker Base and attended the Cooperators/Partners meeting at the local fire station.
10 Aug 2018 (Miriam Fire/Travel): Arrived at ICP, met with IMT and attended morning briefing. Team members met with Command and General Staff. Discussed the incident with the respective subject matter experts. Traveled south to stage at Medford, Oregon. Met with IMT’s in southern Oregon.
11 Aug 2018 (Taylor Creek and Klondike Fire): Attended morning briefing. Met with IMT team and met with respective areas, attended 24, 48, 72 planning meeting, met with AAs and ARs.
12 Aug 2018 (Klondike Fire/GeoMac): Watched live streaming at the morning briefing. Met with some hotshot crews, surge team resources, safety and contract UAS crews. Team also attended Oregon Southwest GeoMAC group meeting, also met with local AAs and forest leadership.
13 Aug 2018 (Miles Fire/Travel): Attended morning briefing met with aviation, hotshot crews, safety, aviation, supported local safety team prep for RLS for safety event. Began prep for out briefing. Return to Portland.
14 Aug 2018 (Portland): Out briefing with MAC group and held a FAST-After-Action Review (AAR).
2018 FAST Daily Log
Issues:
There are two issues of importance that we would like to highlight:
1) Agency administrator priority setting 2) Surge taskforces and the number of critical assets involved in those assets.
Discussion:
Prioritization is critical to the Agency Administrators strategic planning. During periods of high fire activity across numerous jurisdictional agencies within a Geographic Area , the Multi-Agency Coordination function of the National Interagency Incident Management System is implemented to assist in the coordination of critical resources between agencies and set priorities for those resources. When a particular sub Geographic area has numerous incidents the Agency Administrators within that area form a Sub Geographic Multi-Agency Coordination (Geo-MAC) group to establish priorities between agencies for critical resources. Once priorities are established by the sub Geo-MAC, the Geo-MAC coordinator facilitates the movement of those critical resource to meet the direction for the Agency Administrators.
The Agency Administrators in Southwest Oregon initiated a Southwest Oregon Sub-Geographic Multi-Agency Coordination Group on July 21, 2018 in response to multiple large fires in the sub Geographic area. This Group consisted of the Umpqua National Forest, Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest, Klamath National Forest, Roseburg BLM, Medford BLM, and Southwest Oregon District of the Oregon Department of Forestry. The inclusion of the Klamath National Forest was due to the Natchez Incident that started on the Rogue River Siskiyou National Forest and then burned onto the Klamath National Forest. This incident then included two Forest Service Regions and GACCs. The objective of the Sub Geo-MAC is to bring the local Agency Administrators together in a collective decision making process.
The role of a Sub Geographic MAC is to coordination and facilitate the Agency Administrator decisions among the incidents in their assigned area. It is a facilitation group to assist Agency Administrators in making decisions by displaying intelligence in a way that the administrators can make effective decisions in setting priorities and allocating resources. These priorities are then relayed to the PNW MAC for consideration. These priorities specifically reflect the combined negotiations and decisions between the Agency Administrators in the SWO & Klamath NF area reflected in the Sub Geographic MAC area. These decisions are specific to this Geographic area.
Over the past twenty years the process of committing critical resources has been a shared responsibility between PNW Coordination Center, PNW MAC, and Sub Geo-MACs, and works well sometimes. However during critical periods of short supply of critical resources, local sub Geo-MAC Agency Administrators lose control of critical resources and are directed by the PNW Coordination Center on the movement or reassignment of those critical assets. This process limits the ability of the local Geo-MAC coordinator to meet the Geo-MAC Agency Administrator’s collective priority and direction.
The concept of providing a group of specialized resources to support critical missions on incidents to assist in protecting resources or being able to impact the suppression effectiveness of the incident is outstanding in concept. However; this is taking critical assets out of the normal mobilization system, it is also limiting the time and continued support those critical assets provide to IMTs that have critical assignments that require the highest skill levels. And it is causing coordination and trust problems between sub Geo-MAC Agency Administrators, and the incidents they are supporting and has caused the strategic planning direction from the Agency Administrators to be lost. In some cases such as was the case of the Natchez Fire and the Miles Fire, PNWMAC’s good intensions changed the Geo-MAC Agency Administrator’s strategic direction to the detriment of the fire containment strategies.
Recommendations:
1. Allocate critical resources based on PNW MAC incident priorities, maintain those assets on the assigned incidents until the IMT and agency determine they can be released.
2. Strongly consider reducing the amount of critical resources being tied up in Surge Groups and allocate those resources as single resources to priority incidents.
3. Strongly consider the local Agency Administrator priorities with a Sub Geographic MAC, negotiations between local agencies to determine local priorities is extremely important and builds trust between agencies
4. If there is a question on Sub Geo-MAC priorities, have the PNW MAC representative contact the local agency for clarification.
Tom Andrade, Sub Geo-MAC Coordinator
Gordon Foster, Deputy
The information below highlights some key points from the 2018 Pacific Northwest Region FAST assignment. The After-Action Review (AAR) was conducted after the out brief to the Pacific Northwest Wildfire Coordinating Group, Northwest Multi-Agency Coordinating Group (PNWCG NWMAC).
• Having an Oregon Department of Forestry representative (ODF Safety Manager) support the team was beneficial. It would have been better to have had him join the team earlier (he missed two days of the 7). Having more interagency representation (Bureau of Land Management (BLM, Regional or local Department of Forestry (ODF) representation, etc.) would have given the team more of an opportunity to have candid conversations with Agency Administrator and Representatives assigned to the incidents.
• The Team dynamics were great. Within an hour of receiving the Delegation letter, personnel were northbound for a morning visit with the Command and General Staff on the Cougar Creek/Lost Fire.
• The Team Lead (Forest Supervisor) was very helpful in scheduling meetings with Incident Agency Administrators and Agency Representatives.
• Having Incident commander/safety officer/aviation specialists and hotshot representation (all with experience) was helpful in gaining trust/credibility with the personnel we had conversations with. The team composition was invaluable for information gathering.
• Splitting up the team to check out functional areas within the incident helped in not overwhelming personnel located at the fire line, helibase, and ICP, etc., and proved to be more time efficient.
• Having a writer editor to collect/centralize, collate the information helped the team focus on gathering the information, interviewing and less on writing.
• There was no executive participation from any agency, only MAC reps. There has been a history of FAST teams being assigned, making recommendations, noting deficiencies and no change taking place within the Region or within Agencies.
• FAST need a logistics person to coordinate lodging. With Regional Preparedness Level 5, numerous complex fires spread over the Region, it required numerous phone calls to multiple hotels at multiple cities to secure government lodging rates.
• A list of Agency Administrators (AAs) and Representatives (names and cell phone numbers) would help visitation coordination.
2018 FAST ASSIGNMENT AAR WHAT WENT WELL
IMPROVEMENT
• A clear expectation for FAST participants is critical. Clarify if they need government lodging, need line gear, tents or any other specialized equipment such as 4-wheel drive vehicles, flight helmets, Line PPE, etc. When traveling, ICP locations may change. Local familiarity, current maps/information will save valuable time.
• Coordinate FAST visits with RMAT, ASAT, DVs, etc. to reduce duplicity and IMT overload.
2018 FAST REPORT ONLY FINAL
Finding: Not having the required Type 1 Helibase Manager at Fish Lake, using a trainee from the Malheur rappel helicopter.
Finding: In conversations with resource advisors and heavy equipment bosses on the Miles Fire, regarding the level of supervision, or span-of-control issues that have line supervisors feeling nervous and uncomfortable. Specific examples were of resour...
2018Aug6_FAST_Delegation
SWO Sub GeoMAC White Paper Aug 2018
2018 FAST AAR FINAL

Documents

FIRE & AVIATION SAFETY