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Fishery Performance Indicators - Peruvian Coastal Fisheries
2 Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)2 3
List of graphs
List of boxes
List of tables
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Introduction
Peruvian fisheries sector
Methodological framework The FPIs and its importance as an analytic tool for the coastal fisheries Choice of the ten coastal fisheries to be evaluated
Sources of information
Cross-sectional analysis between fisheries
Conclusions and policy recommendations
References
Annexes: results by fishery
DHC anchovy (anchoveta CHD in Spanish)Tuna fish (atún in Spanish)Eel (anguila in Spanish)BonitoChub mackerel and jack mackerel (caballa and jurel in Spanish)Shrimp (langostino in Spanish)Peruvian hake (merluza in Spanish) Mahi mahi (perico in Spanish)Giant squid (pota in Spanish)Octopus (pulpo in Spanish)
Acknowledgments
Graph 2.1:Graph 2.2:Graph 3.1:Graph 3.2:Graph 3.3:Graph 4.1:
Graph 4.2:
Graph 7.1.1:Graph 7.1.2:Graph 7.1.3:Graph 7.1.4:Graph 7.2.1:Graph 7.2.2:Graph 7.2.3:Graph 7.2.4:Graph 7.3.1:Graph 7.3.2:Graph 7.3.3:Graph 7.3.4:Graph 7.4.1:Graph 7.4.2:Graph 7.4.3:Graph 7.4.4:Graph 7.5.1:Graph 7.5.2:Graph 7.5.3:Graph 7.5.4:Graph 7.6.1:
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Contents List of graphs
CONTENTS LIST OF GRAPHS
Average annual landings in selected countries, 2007-2017Main problems of the fisheries sectorTriple Bottom LineOutput indicators and dimensionsInput components and dimensionsScores obtained in the output indicators by the 10 coastal fisheries evaluatedBetter performing and worst performing fisheries: main input and output metricsDHC anchovy: output indicatorsDHC anchovy: input componentsDHC anchovy: output dimensionsDHC anchovy: input dimensionsTuna fish: output indicatorsTuna fish: input componentsTuna fish: output dimensionsTuna fish: input dimensionsEel: output indicatorsEel: input componentsEel: output dimensionsEel: input dimensionsBonito: output indicatorsBonito: input componentsBonito: output dimensionsBonito: input dimensionsChub mackerel/jack mackerel: output indicatorsChub mackerel/jack mackerel: input componentsChub mackerel/jack mackerel: output dimensionsChub mackerel/jack mackerel: input dimensionsShrimp: output indicators
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Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
LIST OF TABLE
4 5
Quality rating that reflects the scorer’s degree of certainty about the score assignedOutput indicators, dimensions and measuresInput components, dimensions and measuresSelected fisheriesSecondary sources of informationKey FPIs’ results for each fisheryAnchovy CHD: output indicators scoresAnchovy CHD: input components scoresTuna fish: output indicators scoresTuna fish: input components scoresEel: output indicators scoresEel: input components scoresBonito: output indicators scoresBonito: input components scoresChub mackerel/jack mackerel: output indicators scoresChub mackerel/jack mackerel: input components scoresShrimp: output indicators scoresShrimp: input components scoresPeruvian hake: output indicators scoresPeruvian hake: input components scoresMahi mahi: output indicators scoresMahi mahi: input components scoresGiant squid: output indicators scoresGiant squid: input components scoresOctopus: output indicators scoresOctopus: input components scores
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103105111113120122128130137139146148
Table 3.1:
Table 3.2:Table 3.3:Table 3.4:Table 3.5:Table 5.1:Table 7.1.1:Table 7.1.2:Table 7.2.1:Table 7.2.2:Table 7.3.1:Table 7.3.2:Table 7.4.1:Table 7.4.2:Table 7.5.1:Table 7.5.2:Table 7.6.1:Table 7.6.2:Table 7.7.1:Table 7.7.2:Table 7.8.1:Table 7.8.2:Table 7.9.1:Table 7.9.2:Table 7.10.1:Table 7.10.2:
Harvest for Human Direct Consumption (HDC) and Indirect Human Consumption (IHC) in Peru
List of tables
List of boxes
Graph 7.6.2:Graph 7.6.3:Graph 7.6.4:Graph 7.7.1:Graph 7.7.2:Graph 7.7.3:Graph 7.7.4:Graph 7.8.1:Graph 7.8.2:Graph 7.8.3:Graph 7.8.4:Graph 7.9.1:Graph 7.9.2:Graph 7.9.3:Graph 7.9.4:Graph 7.10.1:Graph 7.10.2:Graph 7.10.3:Graph 7.10.4:
Box 2.1
Shrimp: input componentsShrimp: output dimensionsShrimp: input dimensionsPeruvian hake: output indicatorsPeruvian hake: input componentsPeruvian hake: output dimensionsPeruvian hake: input dimensionsMahi mahi: output indicatorsMahi mahi: input componentsMahi mahi: output dimensionsMahi mahi: input dimensionsGiant squid: output indicatorsGiant squid: input componentsGiant squid: output dimensionsGiant squid: input dimensionsOctopus: output indicatorsOctopus: input componentsOctopus: output dimensionsOctopus: input dimensions
LIST OF GRAPHS AND BOXES
107110111115116119119124124127128132133136136141142145145
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6 7Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
National Artisanal Fisheries Census
Direct Human Consumption
El Niño event – Southern Oscillation
Environmental Performance Index
European Union
Food and Agriculture Organization
Fishery Improvement Project
Fisheries Management Regulations
National Fisheries Development Fund
Fishery Peformance Indicators
Gross Domestic Product
Regional Government
Inter-American Tropical Tuna
CENPAR
DHC
ENSO/ENOS
EPI
EU
FAO
FIP
FMR
FONDEPES
FPI
GDP
GORE
IATTC
Acronyms and abbreviations
Indirect Human Consumption
Peruvian Institute of the Sea
National Institute of Statistics and Informatics
Individual Transfer Quota
Illegal, Unreported or Unregulated fishing
Marine Stewardship Council
Maximum Sustainable Yield
Non-governmental organization
Peruvian Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Agency
Organization for Artisanal Fishers
National Program of Innovation in Fisheries and AquacultureMinistry of Production
IHC
IMARPE
INEI
ITQ
IUU
MSC
MSY
NGO
OEFA
OSPA
PNIPA
PRODUCE
National Fisheries Sanitation Agency
Integrated Foreign
Trade Information System
Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería
National Superintendence of Customs and Tax Administration
Territorial Use Rights for Fishing
United States
SANIPES
SIICEX
SNP
SUNAT
TURF
US
8 9Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
I. Introduction
10 11Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
The objective of the Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)1 is to find new options for improving the sustainable usage and management of coastal fisheries in Peru. To this end, the initiative aims to strengthen the capabilities of government authorities, the private sector and local fisheries communities with a view to establishing a sustainable and responsible investment portfolio that generates returns within certain selected coastal fisheries. Moreover, it aims to support organizations or firms in drafting comprehensive investment readiness assessments and identifying potential financing routes. Finally, it aims to identify the barriers and limitations associated with drafting investment readiness assessments, and to propose solutions to mitigate these risks.
As part of this initiative and to gain a better understanding of the performance and biological characteristics of Peru’s main coastal fisheries, ten high-potential fisheries were assessed using the Fishery Performance Indicators (FPIs) framework2. FPIs are a set of multidimensional indicators employed to measure results at the economic, ecological and community levels for a specific fishery. These indicators allow for a rapid assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the fisheries studied, especially in view of the management systems in place. The resulting indicators enable to identify and analyze various aspects related to the performance of different fisheries. This is important since the ecological sustainability of fisheries is necessary to sustain livelihoods and deliver returns on investments in the sector3.
Thus, FPIs can be used to analyze various dimensions related to the development and sustainability of ten of Peru’s most important coastal fisheries. In addition, there are further objectives associated with this analysis. The first is to expand the current global FPI database to include selected Peruvian coastal fisheries. The second is to identify barriers or limitations facing users engaged in the management of selected fisheries, in terms of environmental sustainability and their capacity to obtain funding from different sources. The third is to develop both fishery-specific and more general public policy recommendations to strengthen the Peruvian fisheries industry and the way it is managed by the public sector.
The choice of ten Peruvian coastal fisheries is based on five criteria: (i) volume of annual landings (in tons); (ii) existence of Fisheries Management Regulations (FMR)4; (iii) existence of a Fishery Improvement Project (FIP)5 for the fishery in question; (iv) high potential impact on local communities; and (v) existence of considerable room for improvement in the management of the fishery. Based on
these five criteria, the following fisheries were selected: (i) anchovy for direct human consumption (DHC), (ii) giant squid, (iii) chub mackerel and jack mackerel, (iv) Peruvian hake, (v) mahi mahi, (vi) eel, (vii) tuna fish, (viii) octopus, (ix) shrimp and (x) bonito. The anchovy for indirect human consumption (IHC) fishery, in which the catch is used for the production of fish oil and meal, has not been included among the fisheries selected because it is already highly developed and adequately managed.
This report contains five additional sections. The second section provides a brief description of the fisheries industry in Peru and some of its persistent problems. The third section explains the methodology employed to estimate the FPIs for each of the ten fisheries selected. The fourth section presents the results obtained from the ten fisheries. The fifth section sets out a cross-sectional analysis between the ten fisheries. Finally, the sixth section provides the specific and general conclusions and policy recommendations for the ten fisheries selected.
1 For more information about the Project, visit the web page: www.pescaemprende.com2 Anderson, J. et al (2015) The Fishery Performance Indicators: A Management Tool for Triple Bottom Line Outcomes. Obtained from: https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0122809.3 World Bank (2012), Evaluation of new fishery performance indicators (FPIs): A case study of the blue swimming crab fisheries in Indonesia and Philippines.4 An administrative regulatory framework specific to each fishery that covers formalization criteria, access dispositions, boat capacity (minimum and maximum), among others. 5 The Fishery Improvement Projects are multi-stakeholder projects that aim to improve a fishery towards sustainability and MSC certification in different components: outcome; harvest strategy; monitoring species, habitats and ecosystems; governance and policy; and fishery specific management system.
I. INTRODUCTION
12 13Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
2. Peruvian fisheriessector
14 15Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Peru has the marine resources necessary to become a world leader in fishing. The country counts with a lengthy coastal strip where a system of surface currents (for example, the Humboldt Current) and subsurface (for example, the Cromwell Current) is developed, as well as cold water outcrop coming from Antarctica. These conditions give the Peruvian sea ecosystem unique characteristics and high productivity6. As proof of this, in 2007--2017, Peruvian landings of marine biological resources accounted for around 7% of the world total (excluding plants), putting the country in third place behind China and Indonesia7 (see Graph 2.1). Thus, Peru has the highest volume of landings in Latin America, with more than twice the average volume of marine resources harvested by the top five countries in the region (2.3 million tons).
However, the country’s fisheries industry is polarized: the industrial sector, mainly oriented toward IHC, is relatively sustainable and efficient, but the small-scale and artisanal coastal fisheries, oriented toward DHC, are mostly less efficient, in some cases overexploited and have limited access to formal sources of capital. The most significant management efforts have been concentrated on the industrial sector. In contrast, the artisanal and small-scale sector are characterized by a shortfall of information, research, and legislation. The insufficient efforts to monitor and manage these fisheries affect the sustainability of the industry and the opportunities of thousands of Peruvians engaged in this economic activity8. Moreover, weak institutions, high rotation of authorities (there have been nineteen ministers of production in the past fifteen years) and the complicated supervisory activities of the government gave rise to: (i) widespread informality in the artisanal and small-scale sector, (ii) frequent changes to the “rules of play” (for instance, there have been numerous campaigns aimed at formalizing artisanal boats that operate illegally, generating perverse incentives to increase fleet sizes and finance overfishing), and (iii) widespread disregard of current laws and regulations. Box 2.1 shows some differences between the DHC and IHC fisheries in Peru.
The approval of Legislative Decree 1084 in 2008 prompted the largest restructuring of Peru’s fisheries in forty years. The law introduced individual anchovy harvest rights and assigned them to vessels already operating in this fishery (based on their catch records and carrying capacity). As expected, the allocation of property rights gave rise to a series of benefits, curbing overcapacity at processing plants and inefficiency associated with harvesting marine resources, and the restructuring of fishing effort. The resultant rise in profits among fisheries companies has checked the “race” for resources and improved the quality of the anchovy landed and, hence, its associated products (e.g., fishmeal).
China0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1815.6
5.9 5.64.8 4.2 3.9
3.01.6
0.8 0.5
Peru EE.UU Russia Japan Chile Mexico Argentina
Average of the top 5countries in Latin America
EcuadorIndonesia
GRAPH 2.1 : Average annual landings in selected countries, 2007-20179 (millions of tons)
Moreover, great strides have been made in the calculation and application of royalties for harvest rights, but there remains significant room for improvement in this regard. The Peruvian royalty schemes have been implemented for certain fisheries. In addition, these royalties bear no relation to the income generated from resource harvesting, nor to the biological conditions of each species. In turn, the artificial segmentation between DHC and IHC has given rise to perverse incentives that promote illegal and irregular fishing practices10. Thus, the non-collection of royalties from the artisanal fleet (mainly dedicated to extracting resources for DHC) has encouraged the redirection of a percentage of the catches of different artisanal fisheries to IHC11. In addition, there is a vital need to analyze the legislative provisions for the use of resources obtained from royalties. At present, it is argued that the cost of fisheries management should be met entirely by those who benefit directly from the income generated, and not partly by the Peruvian taxpayer at large12. An ongoing challenge for the Ministry of Production, then, is to determine the adequate use of the revenues accruing from the payment of royalties for allocated harvest rights and assure the efficient and transparent allocation of these revenues through a process of accountability.
6 Chavez FP, Bertrand A, Guevara-Carrasco R, Soler P, Csirke J. (2008). The northern Humboldt Current System: Brief history, present status and a view towards the future. Progress in Oceanography; 79(2–4):95–105.7 FAO (2018). El estado mundial de la pesca y de la acuicultura. https://doi.org/CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.8 Research based on World Bank’s FPIs show that the management regime is a key determinant of fishery performance and sustainability (See Asche, F., Garlock, T. M., Anderson, J. L., Bush, S. R., Smith, M. D., Anderson, C. M., et al. (2018). Three pillars of sustainability in fisheries. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(44), 11221-11225).9 The countries showed in the graph are the top five countries worldwide (do not taking into account Peru) and the top five countries in Latin America (taking into account Peru).10 Tveteras, S, Paredes, C. E., and Peña-Torres, J. (2011). Individual vessel quotas in Peru: Stopping the race for anchovies. Marine Resource Economics 26, 225-232.11 According to the PRODUCE, it is estimated that between 60% and 75% of landings in artisanal fisheries are illegal, unreported or unregulated (IUU). PRODUCE (2016). DS N ° 006-2016-PRODUCE.12 Oceana (2017). Derechos de pesca y el gasto en la gestión de la pesquería de anchoveta. Obtained from: https://peru.oceana.org/es/blog/derechos-de-pesca-y-el-gasto-en-la-gestion-de-la-pesqueria-de-anchoveta.
Source: FAO
PERUVIAN FISHERIES SECTOR
16 17Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
In general, artisanal fisheries in Peru is open access, but access to some fisheries is restricted due to their state of overexploitation or recovery. The DHC species subject to access restrictions are the anchovy, longnose anchovy, Patagonian toothfish, Peruvian hake, sardine and eel. These fisheries have been classified as “fully exploited” or “recovering” (for instance, the Peruvian hake or eel fisheries), and access to further vessels is restricted. However, there are other fisheries that are very close to being or already overexploited (for example, mahi mahi and Peruvian grunt) but which are not subject restrictions due to a lack of scientific data to corroborate this status.
The artisanal and small-scale sector are important economic drivers for Peru, especially its coastal communities. Artisanal fisheries operations in Peru land more than 200 species of fish and shellfish each year, and account for between 15 and 20% of the landed volume (almost 1 million tons). Moreover, they provide almost 80% of the fish for DHC, directly employ more than 45,000 fishers and account for more than 100,000 indirect jobs13.
Despite the importance of artisanal fisheries to Peru’s coastal economies, there is a shortage of information and effective regulations for its sustainable management. Weak institutions and governance in the industry (characterized by a top-down approach) and insufficient allocation of harvest rights (due to inadequate regulations and an abundance of perverse incentives) pose the main risks to the sustainability of Peru’s fisheries. The main barriers currently facing the fisheries industry are: extensive informality, low technological development, vulnerability to weather phenomena, lack of long-term vision among fishers and boat owners; low level of education of fishers and boat owners; limited collaboration or marketing strategies; lack of monitoring, control or supervision of activities by government authorities; and difficulties accessing formal sources of capital.
Although the artisanal sector is organized into local associations, known as Organizations for Artisanal Fishers (OSPAs), this model has proven to have shortcomings. Fishers do not come together with the purpose of engaging in and planning economic activities. They do so in order to pursue certain social needs, taking advantage of the union-like character of the associations. As such, the artisanal sector is highly fragmented, and its associations are characterized for their institutional and organizational weakness. There are more than 1,500 OSPAs, some of them with fewer than five members - which attests to the low levels of representation within the sector. Also, the high number of associations make coordinated action that can alleviate fishing pressure and pursue more long-term goal unlikely. In this context, it is difficult to undertake commercial or developmental activities. As such, it is necessary to identify the level of organization required to develop initiatives that would help to foster associations with common interests.
One possible approach that could make artisanal and small-scale fisheries become more sustainable is to finance investments that facilitate their transition toward better management and strengthened competitiveness. Normally, this would involve upgrading vessels and equipment, but also decommissioning vessels so that the total capacity is reduced. However, the above-mentioned barriers and risks mean that financing is out of reach of most firms and associations involved in fishing.
According to the official definition of the Peruvian Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Agency (OEFA), the difference between DHC and IHC lies in the form of processing carried out by the buyer. Thus, extracted marine resources intended for direct human consumption are canned, frozen, cured or processed in some other way. In turn, marine resources for indirect human consumption are used to produce fish oil or meal14.
In Peru, between 2013 and 2017 just 25% of the landed volume (measured in tons) was used for DHC, while approximately 75% went to fish processing plants for the manufacture of fish oil and meal for IHC15. It is worth noting that more fish caught for DHC is marketed in frozen than in fresh form, and the most commonly extracted species are giant squid, anchovy, bonito, Peruvian hake, chub mackerel and jack mackerel. On the other hand, anchovy comprises 99.9% of fish caught for IHC.
Most vessels fishing for anchovy (most of it for IHC) have sophisticated fish-finding equipment, efficient fishing gear, large holds and modern cooling systems. Thus, the industrial vessels are those that harvest marine resources for IHC, while the smaller-scale and artisanal vessels are those that extract resources in small volumes for DHC16.
PERUVIAN FISHERIES SECTOR
BOX 2.1 : Harvest for Human Direct Consumption (HDC) and Indirect Human Consumption (IHC) in Peru
Landings distribution
according final use, 2013 - 2017
25%DHC
75%DHC
Source: INEI
13 Paredes, C. (2018). Mar muy rico, pescadores pobres y pescado muy caro. Gestión Newspaper.14 FAO (2010). Visión General Del Sector Pesquero Nacional. Organizacion de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentacion, 1–24.15 Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2018). Base de datos de descomposición del PBI por sectores. Obtained from: https://www.inei.gob.pe.16 Galarza, E., & Kámiche, J. (2016) Pesca artesanal: oportunidades para el desarrollo regional. See: https://doi.org/10.21678/978-9972-57-342-2.
18 19Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Small-scale and artisanal fisheries companies do not have access to formal financing sources and tend to resort to financial enablers17 or informal lenders. According to the National Census of Artisanal Maritime Fisheries (CENPAR)18, 84% of artisanal fishers have never received a loan. Moreover, of the loans, of whatever form, that were issued, 49% were financed through intermediaries (financial enablers and informal lenders). This tendency to receive financing through informal channels is due, in large part, to the difficulties fishers and boat owners face in accessing loans through the financial system, which depend on the risk profile of the borrower and the assets they can put up as collateral. If the borrowing boat owner or fisher does not own their own home, or if their vessel is not registered in the public records, these assets cannot be used as collateral. Moreover, the low and variable levels of income generated through artisanal fisheries increases the risk profile of the borrower. This is compounded by weak financial literacy and a lack of knowledge about the actual costs of obtaining capital from informal lenders in comparison with the financial system.
However, the tendency to resort to informal financing channels can also be attributed to the fishers’ preferences, which are linked primarily to payment facilities and relations of trust. Where fishing trips are less productive, informal lenders tend to have certain stipulations for repayment. In some cases, they deduct a fraction of the debt from the proceeds of subsequent trips until the established quota is repaid in full. Moreover, for some debts the payment period is indefinite. This scenario would not apply if applying for a loan from a formal financial establishment. Likewise, the relationships of trust with informal agents tend to go beyond the commercial relationships that might be expected under the financial system. For instance, financial enablers lend money not only for ends related to fishing, but also for personal needs related to health, children’s education, household expenses, and so on. In practice, this prompts fishers to overlook the excessive costs associated with these informal financing channels (such as lower returns on their catch or higher interest payments). Thus, artisanal and small-scale fisheries in Peru has grown without adding value and amid conditions of informality. This has prevented fishers, processors, firms and associations engaged in small-scale and artisanal fisheries from implementing modern forms of technology (traceability, navigation equipment or cooling systems) aboard their vessels or at the landing sites.
Informality is the main barrier to the development of artisanal fisheries: most vessels and boat owners do not possess the certification necessary to assure appropriate extraction of marine resources. According to CENPAR, although eight out of every ten vessels possess registration certificates, only three in ten are registered in the public records, and just four in ten hold national fishing access rights. Moreover,
PERUVIAN FISHERIES SECTOR
just 30% of active fishers hold a fisher’s ID card. That is, between 60 and 70% of Peru’s artisanal fleet engages in fishing on an informal basis. Even more, just 19% of artisanal vessels hold a valid sanitation protocol certificate. This situation is due largely to artisanal fisheries associations, members and firms lacking the resources needed to complete the certification procedures. Other impediments are the costs and time involved, poor administrative practices, long distances to the public offices, and a lack of knowledge of the procedures for obtaining the documentation. Moreover, the general perception among members of the artisanal fisheries associations is that formalization confers no clear benefits.
As noted above, the environmental and sanitary regulations are among the most disregarded. In part, this can be explained by limited knowledge of fisheries regulations among boat owners and fishers. For instance, in Ancash, Arequipa and Piura, 79% of fishers have received no training in this area, 60% have not been trained on good fishing practices and 95% do not have any knowledge of environmental sustainability. Poor sanitation practices during primary processing aboard vessels also has an indirect effect on ecosystem sustainability. Improper sanitation reduces the sales value of the catch and increases the resources’ shrinkage, leading to greater resource extraction so that fishers can maintain their income levels. All this can be prevented by training fishers and boat owners on environmental practices, on-board primary processing of harvested resources, and handling and management of solid waste.
In turn, fluctuations in fishing production, strongly associated with oceanographic and climatological factors, impact the earnings of fishers, boat owners and processors and increase their credit risk. Certain species tend to migrate when the ocean temperatures are higher than usual. Under normal conditions, the South American Pacific, from Chile in the south to Peru in the north (approximately south latitude 6°), is marked by low temperatures (due to the Humboldt current), and rich nutrients (because of upwelling and current divergence), creating an ecosystem with abundant marine life. This explains why Peru has such bountiful fish stocks. However, every once in a while, the weakening of trade winds favors the arrival of warm waters from the western Pacific Ocean (around the Australian coastline) that reach the South American west coast, displacing the water cooled by the Humboldt Current. Such events are known as the El Niño – Southern Oscillation (hereafter, ENSO or ENOS in Spanish), and explain
17 Person that finances the harvest activity or another financial need related to the fishing activity. This person gives financing to the harvesters conditioning them to sell their products at a lower price than the market price. 18 Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2012). Censo Nacional de la Pesca Artesanal del Ámbito Marítimo (CENPAR).
20 21Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
why anomalous temperatures of more than 0.5°C above the norm can be recorded off the western coast of South America. When ENSO coincides with a species’ breeding cycle, its stocks are placed at greater risk and the risk of losses increases considerably. However, the warm water also creates the possibility that new species associated with these currents might near the coast, partially alleviating the negative impact of ENSO and the development of the so-called opportunity fisheries.
Other problems that fishers face include poor access to education beyond the basic level (both for them and for their families), limited generational renewal and scant involvement of women and youth in the value chain. In Peru, 40% of boat owners have only been educated to primary school-level, and 52% to secondary-level. Meanwhile, 74% of active artisanal fishers (that is, those engaged in resource harvesting) are aged between 30 and 60 (adult population); 20% are above 60 (older adult population); and just 6% are aged between 18 and 29 (young adult population). As to experience in the industry, seven out of every ten fishers have been engaged in fishing for more than five years. Of all fishers, just 7% are women. According to a survey conducted by Mendoza (2015)19, women do not participate in harvesting at all, and only account for a minority of those engaged in product processing and marketing: 22% in primary processing; 11% in secondary processing; and 40% in marketing. Similarly, most of the youth involved in artisanal fisheries are concentrated in the primary and secondary processing stages. But in general, their participation along the value chain is limited by their inexperience and by parental pressure to pursue higher education.
Graph 2.2 outlines the main problems, described above, facing the fisheries industry in Peru. These have been divided into three categories: intrinsic industry conditions; drivers of success; and structural problems. Through the Peru Coastal Fisheries - Challenge Fund Initiative, it is expected to improve the environmental management of the fishing activity, by guaranteeing the financing of projects that do not increase the fishing effort and do not threaten the critical habitats of the main species harvested. In addition, within this project, training for fishers and processors on good practices in sanitary management and waste management is expected , mainly for the fishing trips and the handling activities. Training that explains the benefits of formality in the sector to fishers, processors, boat owners, among other actors would also be developed. Hence, the current formalization processes (for example, SIFORPA-I and SIFORPA-II) would be strengthened and would be complemented by other processes, such as the registration of assets or the acquisition of RUC20. 19Mendoza (2015) conducted a survey of forty companies in Peru (dedicated to the fishing or aquaculture
sector). Mendoza, D. (2015). “Consultoría sobre el análisis del rol de la mujer en los sectores de la pesca y la acuicultura en el Perú. Informe final”. FAO Peru.20 Firms’ tax code.
Intr
insi
c co
nditi
ons o
f the
sect
or
Success factors
Structural Problems
Main problems of the artisanal and small-scale
fisheries sector in Peru
Low environmental management of fishing activity
High informality in the fisheries sector
Landing points under-equipped
Low access to formal sources of financing
Climate events vulnerabilityLow level of education, high poverty and reduced level of enterpreneurship
Shortcomings in the sector governance
Poor quality of data for desicion making
Regulations focused on the development of the industrial
fishing
1 1
1
2 2
2
3 3
3
GRAPH 2.2 : Main problems of the fisheries sector
PERUVIAN FISHERIES SECTOR
22 23Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
3. Methodologicalframework
24 25Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
As noted earlier, the Fishery Performance Indicators (FPIs) are a multidimensional measurement tool created to assess management performance in a given fishery, by way of three key indicators based on the triple bottom line concept: ecology, community and economy. It has been proven that good performance in these three indicators is necessary for a fishery to attain long-term sustainability21 (see Graph 3.1)
The FPIs are a standardized, easy-to-use tool that enables the comparison of different fisheries, or a single fishery at different points in time. A good fishery management system should not neglect or overlook the performance of any of these indicators, as one taken alone is not sufficient to assure the optimal development of the fishery over time. Thus, the FPI tool can be used to measure how the management system in place in a given fishery affects various selected metrics pertaining to each of the triple bottom line indicators.
The metrics are measured on a scale of one to five, whereby one denotes very poor performance and five denotes outstanding performance. Moreover, each metric contains a description, as well as some practical examples to facilitate calculation and prevent inaccuracies of interpretation.
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
GRAPH 3.1 : Triple Bottom Line
Source: Anderson et al (2015)
Economic Sustainability
Fishery Performance
Indicators
EcologicalSustainability
CommunitySustainability
To allow for the possibility that official data may be insufficient or scarce, under the FPI calculation method each metric is assigned a score based on the quality of data used. This classification reflects the degree of accuracy regarding the metric assigned. Thus, a classification of “A” means that the data is entirely precise; “B” means that the data is highly accurate but not precise; and “C” means that the data is an approximation (see Table 3.1).
The FPIs are divided into two categories: outputs and inputs. The first category is made up of 68 metrics intended to identify and measure key factors reflecting the success or failure of the above-mentioned three indicators (ecology, community and economy). The second category consists of 54 metrics that enable or contribute to the sustainable development process of the fishery in question. Graph 3.2 details the indicators and dimensions into which the 68 outputs are grouped; while Graph 3.3 shows the components and dimensions into which the inputs are grouped. Then, tables 3.2 and 3.3 list each of the outputs and inputs, respectively.
TABLE 3.1 : Quality rating that reflects the scorer’s degree of certainty about the score assigned
An “A” rating is given if the scorer is highly confident that the score is correct.
A “B” rating is given if the scorer is highly confident the true score is within one bin of the given score.
A “C” rating reflects an educated guess about which the scorer is not able to be highly confident.
QUALITY RATING Definition
A
B
C
21 Idem 2
3.1 THE FPIS AND ITS IMPORTANCE AS AN ANALYTIC TOOL FOR THE COASTAL FISHERIES
26 27Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
GRAPH 3.2 : Output indicators and dimensions TABLE 3.2 : Output indicators and dimensions
GRAPH 3.3 : Input components and dimensions
ECOLOGY
ECO
LOGY
MACRO FACTORS
ECONOMICS
ECO
NO
MIC
S
PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY
MANAGEMENT
COMMUNITY
CO-MANAGEMENT
POST HARVEST
Dimensions:• Fish Stock Health
& Environmental Performance
Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
ProductForm
Percentage of Stocks Overfished
Degree of Overfishing
Stock Declining, Stable or Rebuilding
Regulatory Mortality
Selectivity
Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported Landings
Status of Critical Habitat
Proportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party Certification
Landings Level
Excess Capacity
Season Length
Ex-Vessel Price cf, Historic High
Ratio of Asset Value to Gross Earnings
Total Revenue cf. Historic High
Asset Value cf. Historic High
Borrowing Rate cf. Risk-free Rate
Source of Capital
Functionality of Harvest Capital
Annual Total Revenue Volatility
Annual Landings Volatility
Intra-annual Landings Volatility
Annual Price Volatility
Intra-annual Price Volatility
Spatial Price Volatility
International Trade
Final Market Wealth
Wholesale Price cf. Similar Products
Capacity of Firms to Export to the US & EU
Processing Yield
Shrink
Capacity Utilization Rate
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Dimensions:• General Environmental
Performance• Exogenous
Environmental Factors• Governance• Economic Conditions
Dimensions:• Fishing Access Rights• Harvest Rights
Dimensions:• Management Inputs• Data• Managemet Methods
Dimensions:• Markets & Market
Institutions• Infraestructure
Dimensions:• Collective Action• Participation• Community• Gender
Dimensions:• Harvest• Harvest Assets• Risk• Trade• Product Form• Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
Dimensions:• Managerial Returns• Labor Returns• Health & Sanitation• Community Services• Local Ownership• Local Labor• Career
METRICSIndicator Dimension
28 29Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Product Improvement
Final Market Use
Ex-vessel to Wholesale Marketing Margins
Borrowing Rate cf. Risk-free Rate
Source of Capital
Age of Facilities
Captains Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings
Captains wage cf. Non-fishery wages
Captain Social Standing
Processing Owners’ Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings
Processing Owners’ Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages
Processing Owners’ Social Standing
Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings
Crew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages
Crew Social Standing
Processing Workers’ Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings
Processing Workers’ Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages
Processing Workers’ Social Standing
Harvest Safety
Access to Health Care for Captains
Access to Health Care for Crew
Access to Health Care for Processing Owners
Access to Health Care for Processing Workers
Sanitation
Regional Support Businesses
Contestability & Legal Challenges
Education Access for Harvest Captains
Education Access for Crew
Education Access for Processing Owners
Education Access for Processing Workers
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
TABLE 3.3 : Input components, dimensions and metrics
METRICS
METRICS
METRICSIndicator
Component
IndicatorDimension
Dimension
Dimension
Nonresident Employment as Captains
Nonresident Ownership of Processing Capacity
Nonresident Employment as Crew
Nonresident Employment as Processing Workers
Crew Experience
Age Structure of Harvesters
Worker Experience
Disease and Pathogens
Natural Disasters and Catastrophes
Pollution Shocks and Accidents
Level of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)
Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)
Governance Quality
Governance Responsiveness
Index of Economic Freedom
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita
Proportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited Access
Transferability
Security
Durability
Flexibility
Exclusivity
Proportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based Management
Transferability
Security
Durability
Flexibility
Exclusivity
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
ProductForm
Post-HarvestAssetPerformance
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Local Ownership
ExogenousEnvironmentalFactors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General EnvironmentalFactors
Career
Local Labor
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
MAC
RO F
ACTO
RS
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TY
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)1
30 31Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Proportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations
Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & Access
Harvester Organization Influence on Business & Marketing
Days in Stakeholder Meetings
Industry Financial Support for Management
Leadership
Social Cohesion
Business Management Influence
Resource Management Influence
Labor Participation in Harvest Sector
Labor Participation in Post-Harvest Sector
Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest
Enforcement Capability
Management Jurisdiction
Level of Subsidies
Data Availability
Data Analysis
MPAs and Sanctuaries
Spatial Management
Fishing Mortality Limits
Landings Pricing System
Availability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity Information
Number of Buyers
Degree of Vertical Integration
Level of Tariffs
Level of Non-tariff Barriers
International Shipping Service
Road Quality
Technology Adoption
Extension Service
Reliability of Utilities/Electricity
Access to Ice & Refrigeration
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
METRICSDimension
CollectiveAction
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &MarketInstitutions
Infrastructure
Participation
Community
Data
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
The selection of the ten Peruvian coastal fisheries is based on five criteria: (i) volume of annual landings (in tons); (ii) existence of Fisheries Management Regulations (FMR)22; (iii) existence of a Fishery Improvement Project (FIP)23 for the fishery in question; (iv) high potential impact on local communities; and (v) existence of considerable room for improvement in the management of the fishery. The first one is calculated based on the average annual landings from 2007 to 2017. The second considers the establishment by government authorities of FMR for each fishery. These regulations encompass a set of laws and actions for the management of a given fishery in order to reconcile sustainability of resources with the receipt of economic and social benefits. The factors considered include access regimes; total permitted catch; extent of fishing effort; closure periods; fisheries seasons; minimum catch sizes; prohibited or reserved areas; fishing gear, methods and systems; and monitoring, control and supervisory actions. To date, the fisheries for which FMR exist are anchovy (DHC and IHC), giant squid, jack mackerel, chub mackerel, Peruvian hake, tuna, eel, flying fish and macro-algae. The third criteria is the existence of a fishery improvement project (FIP), intended to close the gap between the fishery in question and the Marine Stewardship Council’s (MSC) standard for sustainable fisheries, which is generally followed as a prerequisite to obtaining MSC certification. The areas covered by these projects are output; harvesting strategy; species monitoring; habitats and ecosystem; governance and policy; and specific fishery management system. The fourth criteria is the high potential impact that an improvement in the yield of the fishery could have on the communities engaged in harvesting and processing. Thus, improved management of a fishery will have a greater impact on the fisheries communities with which it is linked. The fifth and final category is the existence of significant room for improvement in the management of a fishery. If it is possible to improve the management of a particular fishery, then that fishery is eligible.
Based on these five selection criteria, the following ten fisheries were selected: giant squid, DHC anchovy, chub mackerel and jack mackerel, Peruvian hake, mahi mahi, bonito, shrimp, tuna, eel, and octopus. The IHC anchovy fishery, in which the catch is used primarily to produce fish oil and meal, has not been included among the fisheries selected because it the most developed and the best-managed fishery in Peru. Moreover, this fishery was subject to a previous FPI assessment (2012). In addition, the Peru Coastal Fisheries – Challenge Fund Initiative is oriented toward artisanal and small-scale operations, which have next-to-no involvement in this fishery. Table 3.4 shows the nineteen fisheries with the 22 Idem 423 Idem 5
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
3.2 CHOICE OF THE TEN COASTAL FISHERIES TO BE EVALUATEDComponent
32 33Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
**FMRs are a set of rules and actions that allow the management of a particular fishery. They take into account factors such as access regimes; total permitted catch; extent of fishing effort; closure periods; fishing seasons; minimum catch sizes; prohibited or reserved areas; fishing gear, methods and systems; and monitoring, control and supervisory actions.Sources: INEI, PRODUCE
*The FIP is a tool that seeks to eliminate the gap between individual fisheries and the Marine Stewardship Council’s (MSC) standard for sustainable fishing. They are generally developed as a step prior to obtaining MSC certification. The areas covered by these projects are: product, harvesting strategy, species monitoring, habitats and ecosystem, governance and policies; and specific fishery management systems.
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
greatest landed volumes over the last ten years, as well as indicating whether they have previously been subject to FIPs or FMR. The highlighted fisheries are those selected for individual FPI estimation.
Anc
hove
ta C
HI
(IHC
anc
hovy
)*
Cal
amar
(Squ
id)
Anc
hove
ta C
HD
(D
HC
anc
hovy
)
Peje
rrey
(Per
uvia
n Si
lver
slid
e)
Pota
(G
iant
Squ
id)
Atún
(Tun
a fis
h)
Jure
l (J
ack
Mac
kere
l)
Lorn
a
Caba
lla(C
hub
mac
kere
l)
Cho
ro(M
usse
ls)
Mer
luza
(P
eruv
ian
hake
)
Ang
uila
(Eel
)
Peri
co
(Mah
i Mah
i)
Pulp
o(O
ctop
us)
Boni
to
Can
grej
o(C
rab)
Con
cha
de a
bani
co
(Sca
llop)
Lang
osti
no
(Shr
imp)
Liza
3,75
3,15
3
434,
937
106,
308
8,94
073,3
33
7,0
88
29,0
64
165,
662
9,66
8
10,3
90
16,0
02
8,74
8
4,57
642,12
9
47,17
9
47,7
67
50,11
2
1,984
2,29
5
Land
ings
20
07 -2
017
(ton
s)
FIP*
FMR**
TABLE 3.4 : Selected fisheries
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
34 35Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
To estimate the FPIs, primary and secondary sources of information have been used. The secondary information sources utilized are listed in Table 3.5 and include the use of databases, research papers and reports from public and private institutions. In some cases, the information from these institutions is inexact, incomplete or simply unavailable. Thus, it is necessary to complete or validate this information by way of information from primary sources.
The primary sources employed include interviews with specialists from the Peruvian fisheries industry and government authorities, as well as information collected through fieldwork conducted alongside fishers. Group interviews were conducted to obtain the opinions of specialists representing the following institutions: the Ministry of Production (PRODUCE), the Peruvian Institute of the Sea (IMARPE) and the National Fisheries Sanitation Agency (SANIPES). Meanwhile, fieldwork was carried out alongside fishers in the region of Piura.
TABLE 3.5 : Secondary sources of information
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
3.3 SOURCES OF INFORMATION
SECONDARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Ministry of Production(PRODUCE)
National Institute of Statistics and Informatics(INEI)
Yale University (Environmental Performance Index)
National Superintendence of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT)
Peruvian Institute of the Sea (IMARPE)
World Bank
Norwegian Seafood Council
36 37Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
4. Cross-sectionalanalysis between fisheries
38 39Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
The average performance of the ten Peruvian fisheries analyzed in this report (average score of 3.44) is below the global mean value of the 121 international fisheries evaluated earlier through the FPI methodology (average score of 3.56). This should not be a surprise, given the limited resources employed to monitor and regulate these fisheries, along with weak governance of the sector and low enforcement capacity of current regulations (mostly, in terms of sanitation and environment sustainability). Hence, the overall performance of these coastal fisheries shows many opportunities for improvement.
However, there are important differences between the ten fisheries, when analyzed individually. The three Peruvian coastal fisheries with the highest FPI scores assessed in this section are all above the global average FPI result. Although they are distanced from the “frontier” of all-around sustainable fisheries globally (in some regard), their performance shows a growing trend. Furthermore, this situation can be related to specific policy measures.
Specifically, the three fisheries that perform the best in the outcome indicators (economy, ecology and community) are Peruvian hake (average score of 3.68), DHC anchovy (average score of 3.66) and eel (average score of 3.65) (see Graph 4.1). The improved performance of these fisheries is particularly visible in the ecology indicator. According to IMARPE, where once these resources were overexploited, they now show clear signs of recovery. This can be observed in the safe annual catch levels (they do not threaten biomass sustainability) and in better control and monitoring of fishing effort (quotas, catch limits and closed periods established, use of appropriate fishing gear, improved methods for assessing resources, among other aspects). Given the economic importance of these fisheries, greater resources have been allocated to the scientific study of the species’ biology and ecology, as well as the oceanographic variables that affect their availability during fisheries seasons. In addition, more information on prices, landed volumes, and market prices is now available. Meanwhile, fishers, processing workers and boat owners have greater prospects of accessing adequate health services, enrolling their children in higher education and achieving a higher income (under the community indicator). Finally, these resources enter high-value international markets where they must comply with international sanitation and labeling standards (under the economy indicator).
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS BETWEEN FISHERIES
On the other hand, the three fisheries with the worst performances in the outcome indicators are bonito (average score of 3.31), shrimp (average score of 3.08) and octopus (average score of 2.98) (see Graph 4.1). Unlike the seven other fisheries, harvesting levels in these fisheries exceed the recovery capacity of the stocks of each species. This is partly because of the indiscriminate use of some types of fishing gear, with low selectivity. Moreover, the informality prevailing at many landing points (such as beaches and coves) and the failure to subject artisanal landings to control procedures and excessive infractions (for example, landings of undersized specimens or landings during closed season) have made this situation worse. It is estimated that between 60% and 70% of the landed volume of these resources is harvested illegally, goes unreported to the authorities, or does not comply with sanitary and biological requirements (such as adequate onboard storage of catch or good primary processing practices). Since these fisheries are targeted primarily by the artisanal fleet, marketed products lack value added, and the supply chain is underdeveloped (economy indicator). Consequently, the agents who extract and process the resources have limited prospects of accessing adequate health services or giving their family members access to quality education.
Peru
vian
Hak
e
DH
C A
ncho
vy Eel
Gia
nt S
quid
Community Ecology Economics
Mah
i Mah
i
Tuna
Fis
h
Cab
alla
/ J
urel
Bon
ito
Shrim
p
Oct
opus
3.81 3.60 3.50 3.67
3.83
3.503.71 3.433.81 3.293.24 3.13 3.00
3.26
2.813.26 3.563.13 2.90
4.00 4.13 4.00 4.00
3.38
3.634.00
2.25
4.00
2.75
Better performing fisheries Worst performing fisheries
Average score: 3.68
Average score: 3.31
Average score: 3.66
Average score: 3.08
Average score: 3.65
Average score: 2.98
GRAPH 4.1 : Scores obtained in the output indicators by the 10 coastal fisheries evaluated
Sources: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinions and field work.
5
4
3
2
1
2.69
40 41Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS BETWEEN FISHERIES
We have also identified the main input metrics that can be associated with differences in the performance of these ten fisheries, as reflected in the outcome indicators (see Graph 4.2)25. The positive outcomes exhibited by the eel, Peruvian hake and DHC anchovy fisheries are largely explained by the regulatory frameworks by which they are bound. The authorities rigorously control access to these fisheries based on the FMR of each, which describe and classify the permitted types of vessels and fishing technology. Some of these fisheries have also imposed additional measures including delimited fishing zones, restrictions on increases in fishing effort and additional measures to strengthen the management system, such as juvenile catch and bycatch limits, minimum catch sizes, fishing area closure mechanisms and mandatory use of satellite beacons, among others. In addition, the authorities not only monitor resource landings, but also primary and secondary processing to ensure compliance with sanitation and environmental regulations. For example, vessels are checked if they possess the certificate of technical sanitation protocol issued by the National Fisheries Sanitation Agency, SANIPES. This serves to improve primary and secondary processing practices and product quality. In addition, the sanitation control and environmental regulation facilitate the access to high-value domestic and international markets through exploitation of the commercial networks available. As an example, approximately 94% of the landed volume of eel is exported to South Korea and Japan; 50% of Peruvian hake exports are sent to Germany and Russia; and 48% of DHC anchovy go to the United States. Access to these international destinations should be seen in relation to these measures26. Moreover, the rights that give access to harvest these resources: (i) stipulate the use of certain types of gear that are aligned with sustainable harvesting practices and (ii) and determine the duration of the annual fisheries seasons. Moreover, fishers or vessels that do not have access to their own processing plant must sign supply agreements with the PRODUCE’s Directorate of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance to ensure authorized use of the catch and prevent its misallocation for purposes other than DHC. This contributes significantly to reduce bycatch, unreported catch and unregulated catch. As a result, the implemented measures serve to strengthen food security and prevent the destruction of the marine ecosystem.
In turn, the worst performing fisheries are not subject to specific, effective regulatory frameworks, or to effective catch supervision and monitoring by government authorities; as a result, they exhibit high bycatch percentages and some resource overexploitation. Thus, there are tremendous opportunities to improve the regulatory frameworks governing artisanal fisheries (particularly in those that account for a large percentage of the overall annual landings nationwide). To this end, there is a need for periodical studies and assessments regarding the trends and dynamics of
these stocks, and for further exploration of their role in the ecosystem and the effect that harvesting has on their habitat. This data will be used to bolster the assessment system and to establish biological reference points, allowing for better demarcation of fisheries seasons, quotas sizes, access rights and authorized gear types. In particular, more effective control measures at the landing points can prevent an increase in fishing effort and secure higher returns on investments and larger economic impact on coastal communities.
The eel, Peruvian hake, and DHC anchovy fisheries have private business associations and unions with strong nationwide representation that promote the efficient management of these fisheries stocks. For instance, the National Fishery Society (SNP, in Spanish) was the main private institution behind the dialogue regarding the increase in royalties for anchovy harvest rights (both DHC and IHC), alongside PRODUCE27. In other cases, this type of market leadership allows fishers and processors voice their recommendations and ideas for a regulatory regime that promotes long-term sustainable strategies. Those who have stakes in the fisheries do normally want such solutions. Thus, the involvement of these nationwide organizations strengthens the policies implemented by the government (for instance, increasing the number of marine research expeditions per year to analyze species sustainability). They also promote compliance with all applicable regulations (for example, no fishing activity or product sales during closed periods). Finally, such private organization and management allows the stipulation of transparent product pricing and landed volumes in order to promote commercial decisions and strategies that add value.
On the contrary, in the worst performing fisheries, fishers and processors (primarily, those in the artisanal sector) are members of organizations with limited local and national coverage (largely OSPAs and other associations). The lack of linkages among the various organizations limit their means of voicing common opinions and recommendations about fisheries policies implemented by the government or voicing any opinion at all. This also makes it difficult to establish strategies that allow them to secure greater social benefits and improved resource management. It is common across different ports and coves to find distinct groups of fishers set apart not only by their fishing practices (for example, some associations may include only crab or hake fishers, while
25 Metrics with a correlation percentage greater than 50% (in absolute value) were selected.26 According to data from the SUNAT, in 2017. 27 El Comercio Newspaper (2019). SNP: Nuevo precio de derechos de pesca resta competitividad al sector.
42 43Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
others may only be open to fishers who use seine nets), but also by conflicting interests. An example of the latter happened in the Coishco district (Ancash) where an OSPA split in two smaller groups due to disputes on doing a Peruvian scallops mariculture project). This leads to confrontation and a lack of official recognition between the groups. Such conflicts hinder the implementation and development of measures that promote sustainability and benefit the communities. Because of all these differences described, it is important to ensure that fishers become more involved with their communities, develop a better awareness of the role of public institutions and work to show that formalization has a positive impact on all actors within the fisheries. Of some merit is the PRODUCE strategy of conducting workshops with association representatives in order to identify their main difficulties. These workshops aim to establish lines of action to overcome the difficulties. For instance, through these workshops, artisanal fishers will be able to access health insurance (at a cost of 20 soles per month) that covers non-occupational accidents and illnesses affecting fishers, their spouses and their children under the age of 1828. The availability of data on prices and landed volumes metric is highly correlated with the outcomes of the ecology and community indicators. In the fisheries that perform best in the outcome indicators, there is greater access to data on daily landing volumes and monthly catch levels. This allows fishers and processors to: (i) reduce their dependence on informal agents (such as merchants and enablers), (ii) strengthen marketing channels and (iii) reduce unreported and illegal catches. On the other hand, data on landed volumes is more difficult to access in the fisheries that perform more poorly in the outcome indicators. A request must be submitted to PRODUCE to obtain information that ends up being incomplete and inaccurate for decision-making. In addition, given the large share of unreported catch, the official data on landings tend to underestimate the landed volumes. This hinders the development of effective fisheries management encompassing the establishment of fisheries seasons and closed seasons, vessel quotas (as found in the Peruvian hake fishery) and closure of overexploited fisheries, among other measures.
The use of high-tech equipment is more widespread in the eel, Peruvian hake and anchovy fisheries than it is in the shrimp, bonito and octopus’ fisheries. For example, the fleet and landing points in the best-performing fisheries make better use of communication, navigation and fish-finding equipment. This result in greater fishing efficiency, in terms of shorter search times, lower costs incurred in the operation of the vessel (fuel, oil and water) and improved vessel and crew safety. Processors linked to these fisheries possess the equipment (such as fish boxes and washing centers) and
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS BETWEEN FISHERIES
refrigeration infrastructure necessary to add value during the primary and secondary processing of resources. In addition, in the more developed fisheries, landing points have designated areas for the collection and processing of solid waste generated during fishing activity. Businesses providing inputs required for the different stages of fishing operations, spanning pre-departure preparations, landing and processing, have emerged in the urban centers close to fishing areas (these include vessel maintenance services, provisions distribution, ice supplies, logistics services, and so on). In contrast, in the other less developed fisheries, the artisanal fleet uses communication and navigation equipment more than ten years old (between 20 and 30% of vessels, depending on the fishery in question).
It is important that governmental and non-governmental bodies (NGOs and civil society) and the private sector take joint action to improve the management and development of the selected fisheries. IMARPE and the private sector have led joint research expeditions to determine current biomass levels and the age structure of some species’ stocks (through acoustic and prospecting methods) have led to improvements in harvesting efficiency, reduce the uncertainty related with the state of the resources and to understand more deeply their relationship with changes in the marine environment. As a result, it has been possible to establish overall and vessel quotas, practice greater selectivity and determine catch limits that are not detrimental to the sustainability of marine ecosystems. Moreover, various NGOs, universities and private-sector social responsibility programs have supported studies on these fisheries, led projects focusing on certain problems faced by the industry, and provided different forms of technical assistance to fishers and processors (on aspects such as formalization, use of fishing gear, supply chains, among others). And within some of these fisheries, actors (fishers, boat owners and processing workers) are expressing interest in obtaining eco-certification and developing FIPs that identify existing gaps between national policies, the resource management system and the standard sustainability criteria.
In the case of the poorer-performing fisheries, there are few instances where organizations have given support to actors in the industry. One such example is the NGO Redes - Sostenibilidad Pesquera that provides training to octopus fishers from the island of Lobos de Afuera (Lambayeque region). Their training cover topics related to formalization (obtaining fishing rights and sanitation certificates) and the assessment of octopus stock levels. However, this species is classified as “overexploited” and has no
28 Metrics with a correlation percentage greater than 50% (in absolute value) were selected.
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FMR on which to base management. Moreover, the octopus fishery suffers from a lack of rigorous assessment and knowledge on biomass dynamics, and from inadequate control of harvesting and landings. Indeed, despite its seeming overfished status, there are still fishers and association members in the Lobos de Afuera area that harvest octopus for commercial sale, without taking into account minimum catch sizes. Nevertheless, even though these fishing practices are widely perceived as unsustainable in the long term, efforts to curb informal and illegal fishing activity remain inadequate. Without the assistance of organizations, artisanal fisheries such as those analyzed here have limited opportunities to access major markets or formal sources of capital (such as municipal banks, commercial banks, FONDEPES, PNIPA, and so on), or to promote their products. This situation is also related to the high diffusion of the organizations and their lack of collaboration.
Considering these results, a question that arises is how to make these fisheries obtain a similar performance to the one achieved by the top ten fisheries in the world (according to the FPI methodology)29. In the case of the DHC anchovy and the eel fisheries, it is necessary that the government authorities allocate individual transferable quotas per vessel (as for the cases of the IHC anchovy and the Peruvian hake), differentiated according to the availability of the biomass of their stocks (for example, the DHC anchovy presents two stocks, the center-north and south). This would guarantee a better management of resources and reduce the “Olympic race” generated during its extraction. In addition, this policy would increase the economic income of the companies, who would invest in their extraction and their processes to maximize the captured volumes. In the case of the eel and the Peruvian hake fisheries, international marketing networks should be chosen through electronic traceability systems and product certification along the value chain. Hence, their market value would be increased, and they would meet the quality standards in sanitation and labeling issues established by high value markets (such as the US and the EU). This requires to identify the equipment and infrastructure needs of the landing points (where there is a greater extraction of these resources), as well as in the main processing factories. Additionally, it is necessary to provide value-added products based on the Peruvian hake resource. As shown by the data, only 1% of this resource ends up in value-added products (mainly cooled and fresh products)30. In that sense, cold chambers could be implemented at the landing points to better conserve products / resources, as well as to improve packaging processes for distribution (both local and international). Other practices to be implemented are the estimation of current biomass and the recurring monitoring of the critical habitats of these resources.
The fisheries that exhibit moderate performance levels are giant squid (average score of 3.62), mahi mahi (average score of 3.50), tuna fish (average score of 3.49) and chub and jack mackerel fisheries (average score of 3.45). These results are explained mainly by the uneven performance of these fisheries in the ecology indicator. For example, the artisanal tuna fishery has a relatively high percentage of bycatch, unreported catch and unregulated catch (between 25% and 30% of landings), as well as a great uncertainty regarding the estimated population of two of its most relevant species in the eastern Pacific Ocean31. However, the most efficient control developed by this fishery is carried out by the industrial fleet, which represents the largest proportion of landings. This is a result of the lack of catch quotas (individual and overall) and the low level of supervision by authorities of compliance with the guidelines established in the FMR. On the other hand, despite the high incidence of bycatch and unreported catch in the artisanal mahi mahi and giant squid fisheries (between 60% and 75%), their reproductive activity, fertility and rapid growth rate have contributed to the resilience of both species in the face of harvesting.
In addition, the mahi mahi fishery is subject to a closed period that promotes the recovery of the species throughout the year. However, this management tool (along with the establishment of a minimal capture size) is not enough to secure the mahi mahi fishery sustainability. In this regard, there is an opportunity to develop an FMR for mahi mahi to govern the formalization of fishers, the harvest access and the catch quotas (as in the case of the chub and jack mackerel fishery). In addition, being a species that presents large displacements and a considerable distribution in international waters, as well as under the jurisdiction of different countries, it is important to joint efforts and propose policies at the regional level aimed to its conservation and sustainable capture. In the case of the giant squid fishery, it is also necessary to move towards formalization, with greater coverage and supervision of compliance with the regulations. This will contribute to shoveling the effects of illegal fishing, not declared and unregulated and reducing the possible uncertainty in their levels of exploitation.
In the case of the tuna fish and chub and jack mackerel fisheries, fishers, processors and managers enjoy higher economic returns and greater opportunities for access to public services (community indicator). This is because of the larger presence of the industrial and small-scale fleets, in which crewmembers have increased job stability
29 According to the FAO database, the ten international fisheries with the best results in the FPI methodology have an average score of 4.2.30 PRODUCE31IATTC (2018). Atunes, peces picudos y otras especies pelágicas en el Océano Pacífico oriental en 2017.
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS BETWEEN FISHERIES
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throughout the year as well as better access to healthcare and education for themselves and their families. This situation, coupled with greater access to communication, navigation, tracking and processing technologies at the landing points and aboard vessels, ensures a sustained flow of revenue. In contrast, the mahi mahi and giant squid fisheries exhibit lower economic and social returns for resource users and their families. Likewise, the lack of associations or companies with clear leadership in the management of these fisheries limits the maximum possible economic returns from harvesting in the long term.
In addition, the poor development of the production chains for these intermediate resources makes it difficult to access high-value international markets with higher health and labelling standards (such as the United States and Europe)32. In artisanal fisheries, most of the exported catch is dedicated to frozen products (mainly in the giant squid case). Fresh products are mainly destined for the domestic market (61% of the mahi mahi landings and 28% of the giant squid landings). In the case of the giant squid based products, the export destination goes to Spain and China, while for mahi mahi a large share of the exports goes to the USA. However, in both cases most of the catch is bound for the internal market. In the case of the tuna fishery, much of the high-value catch, such as the yellowfin and bigeye species, is exported to Ecuador and Germany, but as much as 40% of tuna landings are still consumed locally. In turn, chub and jack mackerel products are exported to low-value markets (such as Ghana, Nigeria and Brazil), though most consumption remains local; the lower availability of these resources in the East Pacific has caused a decrease in the volume exported to other markets33.
32 According to the Integrated Foreign Trade Information System (SIICEX). See at: http://www.siicex.gob.pe/siicex/resources/sectoresproductivos/Pesca%20Requisitos.pdf.33 Idem 18
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS BETWEEN FISHERIES
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PERUVIANHAKE
BONITO
SHRIMP
OCTOPUS
DHC ANCHOVY
EEL
BETTERPERFORMING
FISHERIES
EXCLUSIVITY INDEX
AVAILABILITY OF EX-VESSEL
PRICE & QUANTITY
INFORMATION
ILLEGAL, UNREGULATED
OR UNREPORTED LANDINGS
LEADERSHIP TECHNOLOGYADOPTION
EXTENSIONSERVICE
FINAL MARKETWEALTH
WORSTPERFORMING
FISHERIES
INPUT METRICS OUTPUT METRICS
The authorities rigorously
control access to these fisheries. They are able to do so through
FMR* for each species and the enforcement of fishing rights, In the case of
Peruvian hake, individual quotas
per vessel have been established.
Regulatory frameworks
(none of them is subject to FMR*)
governing access to these fisheries
have not been established.
There is minimal monitoring by
authorities at the landing points, and harvesting quotas or rights for each species have not been established.
These fisheries are mainly
exploited by the artisanal
fleet. Existing associations
(largely OSPAs) are fragmented and have limited
coverage or influence over
management of the fisheries.
Although the data on landed prices in these fisheries
can be readily accessed (on the IMARPE website) data on volumes is minimal (given the bycatch and unreported catch
levels).
Almost 30% of vessels and
landing points engaged in
these fisheries have access to
communication, navigation and
processing technology. However, the equipment
used is largely antiquated.
In the case of the bonito fishery,
IMARPE has shown interest in assesing
the sustainability of the resource.
As to the octopus fishery, some NGOs assist fishers with matters related to formalization and
sustainability. As far as the shrimp fishery is concerned, no data
is available.
The bonito and octopus fisheries do not have access to high-value markets. For instance,
almost all bonito landings are consumed locally.
Meanwhile, 61% of the landede volume of shrimp is exported,
primarily to the United States and Spain.
In the shrimp fishery, there is also high
juvenile bycatch given the use of bottom-set nets. Meanwhile, the
bycatch in the bonito and octopus fisheries is estimated at more
than 70% of the landed volume as a result of non-supervision of the
artisanal fleet.
These fisheries are mainly
exploited by the industrial
and small-scale fleets. The existing
associations and unions (such as the SNP**) have
greater coverage nationwide and take the lead in managing these
fisheries
Data about landing prices in these fisheries is available on the
IMARPE website, albeit not for every
port. However, information
about landed volume must be requested from
PRODUCE.
The technology adopted in these
fisheries, both aboard boats and
at the landing points, is high.
There is adequate tracking,
communication, navigation processing and waste
management equipment.
The recovery of Peruvian hake and
anchovy stocks was made possible by the studies and support provided by IMARPE and various NGOs. To date, no data is available for the eel
fishery.
Landings in these fisheries are exported
to high-value markets. In the case of the eel
fishery, 94% of lanfings are exported to South
Korea and Japan. Almost 50% of Peruvian hake exports go to Germany
and Russia, while 48% of DHC anchovy exports are sent to the United States.
The only fishery in which no illegal landings are
recorded in the eel fishery. Between 25% and 30% of landings in the Peruvian hake and DHC anchovy fisheries are unreported due to
inadequate supervision and monitoring strategies.
GRAPH 4.2 : Better performing and worst performing fisheries: main input and output metrics
Average score: 4
Average score: 1
Average score: 4.3
Average score: 3
Average score: 3.7
Average score: 2
Average score: 3.7
Average score: 2.7
Average score: 3
Average score: 2
Average score: 3
Average score: 3.3
Average score: 3
Average score: 1
*Fisheries Management Regulations or Reglamento de Ordenamiento Pesquero, in Spanish.**National Fishery Society or Sociedad Nacional de Pesquería, in Spanish.
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS BETWEEN FISHERIES
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5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
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This report shows the results of the evaluation of ten selected Peruvian coastal fisheries, by using the FPIs methodology. The FPIs are a multidimensional measurement tool created to assess management performance in each fishery, through the estimation of three indicators: ecology, community and economy. The FPIs enable the comparison of different fisheries, or a single fishery at different points in time. In addition, allow the measurement of how the management system in place in a given fishery affects various selected metrics pertaining to each of the indicators described.
The selection of the ten Peruvian coastal fisheries is based on five criteria: (i) volume of annual landings (in tons); (ii) existence of FMR; (iii) existence of a FIP for the fishery in question; (iv) high potential impact on local communities; and (v) existence of considerable room for improvement in the management of the fishery. Based on these five criteria, the DHC anchovy, eel, tuna fish, bonito, chub mackerel and jack mackerel, shrimp, Peruvian hake, giant squid, mahi mahi and octopus fisheries were selected. The anchovy fishery (for IHC) was not considered because it already has a previous FIP assessment and it is the most developed in terms of management.
The DHC anchovy biomass is not overexploited thanks to the regulatory policies (annual catch quotas) implemented for the central-north and south stocks that have allowed its stability. In addition, the implementation of a FIP in this fishery has allowed to identify and strengthen the weak points of this fishery (for example, the estimation of its biomass), and has allowed the development of adequate extraction strategies. However, around 11% of landings are processed into value-added products and 41% are lost during processing activities. Likewise, the products are destined to the local market and countries with low market value, given their low sanitary standards.
The eel stock is quite stable (with a high recovery), thanks to the regulatory policies (annual catch quotas) implemented. However, the age of the infrastructure and equipment used for harvesting and processing activities and their difficulty to be replaced (because of high investment and financial costs) hinder the development of the value chain of this species and foster the over-dependence on informal financial intermediaries. In addition, there is a record of financing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities. On the other hand, fishers and processors perceive few economic and social benefits.
The biomass status of one of the three main tuna species of the eastern Pacific (present on the Peruvian coast) is considered stable. The other two have experienced a significant reduction in their abundance, as a result of the variable entry of young species that are susceptible to capture, the increase in the fishing mortality rate, the poor selectivity of the fishing gears and the increase in illegal, unreported or unregulated landings (between 25% and 30% of landings). Volatility in the landings and in market prices, as well as the lack of financing in post-extractive activities, have generated an over-dependence on informal agents.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
TABLE 5.1 : Key FPI’s results for each fishery
RESULTSFishery (FPI’s score)
DHC ANCHOVY
(3.66)
EEL(3.65)
TUNA FISH(3.49)
By using primary (interviews with specialists, government authorities and workshops conducted with fishers) and secondary (databases, research papers and reports from public and private institutions) sources of information, we obtained the following results (see Table 5.1)
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The bonito biomass is not overexploited, due to the low impact of the fishing gears used on its habitat and its low levels of extraction (below the established annual quota). However, there is a high incidence of illegal and informal activities carried out by the artisanal fleet, as a result of the absence of a FMR. In addition, the value chain is underdeveloped, there are no value-added products and a large percentage of the resource is lost due to processing activities. Likewise, almost the entire landings are consumed locally and only a low percentage goes to countries with high sanitary standards. On the other hand, fishers and processors perceive few economic and social benefits for their activity.
Peruvian hake biomass has shown a progressive recovery since 2017, thanks to the established individual catch quotas per boat. In addition, the low volatility of landings and market prices allows fishers, processors and managers to perceive stable income flows. However, less than 1% of Peruvian hake landings becomes a value-added product, given the low development of the production chain and the limited impact of the associations on strengthening fisheries management.
The abundance and catches of chub mackerel and jack mackerel are related to the variability of the oceanographic conditions of the eastern Pacific. In some fisheries seasons, these species have low productivity levels and fishing mortality rates, while in others the harvesting is above their MSY, an aspect that could undermine the sustainability of the resource, in the long-run. In addition, the low development of the artisanal production chain of both species has caused no value-added products. Therefore, 87% of chub mackerel landings and 12% of jack mackerel landings are exported to countries with low market value. However, their prices in the international market are 57% higher than other similar species. This has benefited the managers of the sector, but not fishers and processing workers.
Mahi mahi shows no apparent signs of overexploitation due to its high resilience to overfishing and its rapid growth rate. However, little is known about the current structure and behavior of mahi mahi population in the Pacific. Deepening the knowledge of this resource is necessary to keep the catch at sustainable levels. In addition, the current participation of this species in a FIP has allowed to identify the fishery weaknesses and to establish a roadmap for the sustainability of the resource. However, the high percentage of bycatch or illegal capture (between 60% and 75%), the loss of the resource as a result of the processing activities and the low value of the products limit the increase in the income levels of the fishers, processors and managers. Despite this situation, much of the resource is exported to markets with moderate levels of GDP per capita.
Different types of shrimp stock are unknown. Some studies indicate a high catch of young individuals and between 60% and 75% of illegal or unreported catches. In addition, 62% of this resource harvested volume is lost in its processing, there are no value-added products and few suppliers that provide inputs for the realization of the fishing operations and the processing of the resources in this fishery. Despite this situation, 70% of shrimp landings are exported to the United States and the European Union, considered as premium markets. On the other hand, family members of fishers and processing workers have low chances of accessing higher education.
Giant squid is considered as an under-exploited resource. Its biological features facilitate its rapid growth and allow abundant biomass. However, the high informality of the artisanal fisheries sector, as a result of the free access regime, could undermine the sustainability of the species in the long-run. In addition, although the fishing gear used for its extraction shows high selectivity (use of long liners), the age of the equipment and the infrastructure used for harvesting and processing activities limit the increase in income levels. Therefore, fishers and processors receive income below the regional average income and have limited access to health services. Furthermore, this species is mainly sold in the frozen presentation, thanks to the low development of its production chain.
RESULTS RESULTSFishery (FPI’s score)
Fishery (FPI’s score)
BONITO(3.31)
PERUVIAN HAKE(3.68)
CHUBMACKEREL AND JACK
MACKEREL(3.45)
MAHIMAHI(3.50)
SHRIMP(3.08)
GIANTSQUID(3.62)
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
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There are no studies available on the status of the species. However, a high percentage of its stock is overfished, due to the capture of females before their sexual maturity, failure to comply with the minimum catch size (1 kg) and lack of control for compliance with the periods of closed. Likewise, a large percentage of its fishing (between 60% and 75%) incurs in some irregularities (illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing). This is mainly due to its biological availability throughout the year, the high productivity of the catching areas, the absence of a defined regulatory framework for this fishery and the low supervision of the authorities at the landing points. In addition, despite the absence of development in the production chain, about 65% of the landings were exported to the United States and the European Union.
Given the overall low average score of the ten Peruvian coastal fisheries compared to the global average FPI score (calculated as the mean FPI value for all 121 international fisheries assessed by FAO), one can conclude that the selected Peruvian fisheries represent an enormous potential for increasing the economic value of the resources. This perspective is particularly valid by taking into consideration the size of the ten fisheries in terms of landings, national consumption and exports. This will benefit people and communities relying on these marine resources as well as the Peruvian economy as a whole. Hence, the preceding analysis regarding the fisheries’ policies and management measures associated with the top three performers (and the lack thereof in the bottom three fisheries) results in concrete policy recommendations. By transferring the knowledge and experiences from the top performing fisheries to the others one can increase investment opportunities and improve the quality of livelihoods of the people that rely on the resources. In the following, the key policy recommendations to achieve harvests that are more sustainable and with greater economic value are presented.
Specifically, it is necessary to: (i) increase public spending on supervision and monitoring activities at landing points (mainly those related to artisanal fisheries), (ii) strengthen maritime surveillance during fishing operations, (iii) formulate
TABLE 5.1 : Key FPI’s results for each fishery
RESULTSFishery (FPI’s score)
regulatory frameworks with specific objectives per fishery, (iv) establish biological benchmarks and (v) enable the availability of information at landing points about resource prices and quantities extracted clear. Without these conditions, the biomass would continue to be overfished and affect the critical habitats of these species, undermining the long-term sustainability of the activity. In addition, it is important to (vi) strengthen commercial networks, (vii) reduce the intermediation of informal agents and (viii) improve the handling and processing of resources, in order to add value to the products. It should be noted that the ability to maintain the quality of the raw material to the final consumer is equally important as adding value through manufacturing processes. Hence, handling of the raw material is also a dimension that could be improved. As an alternative, the “A Comer Pescado” government Program could be strengthened as a means to consolidate the relationship between fishers and sellers. In addition, the government must carry out associativity programs under an articulation approach between agents of different stages in the production chain.
The mahi mahi and the giant squid fisheries are the most representative artisanal fisheries in Peru in terms of catch volumes. Though they are subject to different regulatory frameworks (giant squid has a FMR while mahi mahi operates with a seasonal closure scheme and a minimal capture size), both face the challenge of improving their fleet formalization processes. These fisheries obtained poor results, as a result of extensive illegal, unreported and unregulated landings; weak governance; low compliance with existing regulations; and the limited supervisory and control capacity of the authorities. In many cases, vessels operate out of unidentified landing points or without the corresponding sanitary certification. According to the CENPAR (2012), 29% of the artisanal fleet has a sanitary certificate in force. Given the current free-access regime, there is scope for improving the low economic returns of resource users (fishers and processors) in these fisheries by developing the product value chain. This requires diversification to ensure products of greater added value (for example, vacuum packaging, canning or curing), and specialization and training of resource users to this end.
In Peru, fisheries such as giant squid, anchovy and mahi mahi have been subject to pre-assessments or fisheries improvement projects (FIPs), which help to identify and establish roadmaps to improve the sustainability of stocks and their ecosystems. These efforts should be extended until both fisheries are certified to the standards established by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). In this way, higher prices and access to competitive international markets could be secured for marketed products. Thus, the economic and social returns of fishers, processors and managers in the industry would improve, and so too would those of their families and
OCTOPUS(2.98)
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
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communities, while contributing with the resources sustainability and the integrity of their ecosystems. Likewise, better certification would help all participants in fisheries (mainly artisanal ones) to achieve common objectives while strengthening the industry.
There is some commitment and cooperation between national authorities and regional and international bodies to improve fisheries management through “shared stocks” (e.g. the different tuna species). The development and consolidation of shared fisheries policies requires greater institutional robustness and the design of more efficient fishing monitoring and control programs, which would lead to improved governance. There is a need for subscribing international conventions and treaties that allocate resources to safeguard marine ecosystems, conduct comprehensive assessments of species biomass and develop technologies to modernize fishing and resource processing, as well as improve efficiency and reduce costs, and the reorganization of fishing effort. For example, if an agreement were to be established to improve the management of octopus fisheries, encourage its scientific research, design support programs for the formalization of artisanal fishers related to this resource, as well as to extend the use of selective fishing gear (e.g. traps), it would be possible in the long term to reverse the ecological damage currently caused by overfishing.
Peruvian hake, DHC anchovy and eel fisheries showed better performance in the output indicators (ecology, economics and community). These fisheries share limited access regimes and catch quotas (individual annual quota per boat, in the case of the Peruvian hake fishery) that have contributed to keep the stocks of these species at sustainable levels and have directed their recovery. In addition, they have regulatory frameworks (FMR) that determine fleet formalization criteria and establish a series of requirements for the exclusive access to the resource by boat and boat owners. However, in these fisheries irregular acts still prevail in the harvesting and processing activities (for example, landings of species below the minimum catch size, diversity of resources for purposes other than DHC, among others). It is recommended to strengthen the control and surveillance processes at the landing points, as well as to implement traceability systems that systematize the information on the origin of the products. In addition, it is necessary to extend the use of individual maximum catch limits per boat in the DHC anchovy and eel fisheries.
The fisheries that showed a worse performance are bonito, shrimp and octopus. These fisheries lack mechanisms to limit the access of vessels (mainly artisanal), do not require established formalization criteria and the control and surveillance systems are
insufficient to control landing points. There are also insufficient funds in place to control the fishers’ compliance with the measures provided for resource management (for example, closed periods). The generation of greater knowledge about the biomass of the species and its dynamics, as well as the development of a traceable and inclusive value chain (mainly in terms women and young fishers’ participation) would provide a sustainable outlook for the development of the fisheries and provide benefits to the communities involved. It is important to continue counting on the work of NGOs, universities and the scientific community on issues of formalization and sustainability of resources, so that more information can be gathered to subsequent performance evaluations and efficient public policies can be formulated.
Transparent feedback mechanisms are required in decision-making processes. These processes must include strategies in each link of the product value chain and demonstrate adaptability to the dynamics of the fishing activity (mainly, the artisanal fisheries sector). In addition, they must happen on a regular basis, be participatory (with both fishers and processors) and ensure that the information developed is easily available to the public. This should also be complemented by establishing clear responsibilities and identifying areas in charge, to avoid duplication of efforts and bureaucratic inefficiency, allowing a higher level of interaction. Finally, these mechanisms are required to be subject to periodic evaluation, both internally and externally, based on the call to key actors in the sector (public, private, academia and civil society).
Specifically, in the case of small-scale fisheries, an observatory could be developed to collect periodic (for example, quarterly) data on the status of the population of each species, its biological characteristics and its performance over time. This would allow to assess the problem of underestimation and little confidence in the data on the real volumes landed. In addition, the effects of policies related to the environmental and sustainable management of species could be quantified, such as closed seasons, ITC, new gears or fishing methods, fleet and fishers’ formalization processes, among other aspects. This observatory would need the joint efforts of IMARPE and PRODUCE, as well as the support from the main companies and NGOs in the sector, in order to guarantee comprehensive evaluation and monitoring of the data of each species at the landing points. This also implies a substantial increase in the resources allocated for management, research and extension of technology purposes.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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World Bank. (2012). Evaluation of new fishery performance indicators (FPIs): A case study of the blue swimming crab fisheries in Indonesia and Philippines. Washington DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Chavez, F., Bertrand, A., Guevara-Carrasco, R., Soler, P., & Csirke, J. (2008). The northern Humboldt Current System: Brief history, present status and a view towards the future. Progress In Oceanography(79), 95-105.
FAO. (2018). El estado mundial de la pesca y de la acuicultura. Cumplir los objetivos de desarrollo sostenible. Roma: Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura.
Asche, F., Garlock, T., Anderson, J., Bush, S., Smith, M., Anderson, C., . . . Vannuccini, S. (2018). Three pillars of sustainability in fisheries. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences(115).
Tveteras, S., Paredes, C., & Peña Torres, J. (2011). Individual Vessel Quotas in Peru: Stopping the Race for Anchovies. Marine Resource Economics(26).
PRODUCE. (2016 ). DS N° 006-2016-PRODUCE. Lima: Ministerio de la Producción.
Sueiro, J. C. (2017). Derechos de pesca y el gasto en la gestión de la pesquería de anchoveta. Lima: Oceana.
Gestión. (2018). Mar muy rico, pescadores pobres y pescado muy caro. Gestión.
FAO. (2010). Visión General Del Sector Pesquero Nacional. Roma: Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación.
INEI. (2018). Base de datos de descomposición del PBI por sectores. Lima: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática.
Galarza, E., & Kámiche, J. (2016). Pesca artesanal: oportunidades para el desarrollo regional. Lima: Universidad del Pacífico.
INEI. (2012). Censo Nacional de la Pesca Artesanal del Ámbito Marítimo (CENPAR). Lima: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática .
El Comercio. (10 de Julio de 2019). SNP: Nuevo precio de derechos de pesca resta competitividad al sector. El Comercio.
Andina. (12 de Agosto de 2019). Ministra Barrios: Pescadores artesanales podrán contratar un seguro de salud a S/ 20 mensuales. Andina.
IATTC. (2018). Los atunes, peces picudos, y otros peces pelágicos en el Pacífico oriental en 2017. California: Comisión Interamericana del Atún Tropical.
SIICEX. (Julio de 2019). SIICEX. Obtenido de Sistema Integrado de Comercio Exterior: http://www.siicex.gob.pe/siicex/resources/sectoresproductivos/Pesca%20Requisitos.pdf.
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FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
7. Annexes: Results by fishery
64 65Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
General Environmental Performance Exogenous
EnvironmentalFactors
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Governance
Risk
Trade
Production Form
HarvestRights
EconomicConditions
Fishing Access Rights
Post-Harvest AssetPerformance
CollectiveAction
DHC Anchovy
DHC Anchovy
Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
Only one dimension: “Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance”
ManagerialReturns
Participation
Labor Returns
Gender
Community
Health & Sanitation
ManagementInputs
Community Services
Data
Local Ownership
ManagementMethods
LocalLabor
Markets & Market
Institutions
Career
Infrastructure
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
The DHC anchovy fishery has great potential for development. In comparison with the anchovy for indirect human consumption (IHC) fishery, it currently comprises a very small proportion of the total landings for this species; but in recent years, it has undergone constant growth. Anchovy is a resource that occupies a key position in the Peruvian marine ecosystem as a food source for various species at higher trophic levels. Two stocks have been identified, together spanning the entire Peruvian coastline: the central-northern stock, from the 16th parallel south to the northern border; and the southern stock, from the 16th parallel south to the border with Chile, which also has access to the stock. The available biological information on the anchovy has allowed for effective management of this species. This fishery is also subject to FMR, which establishes the management framework and the annual catch quota under an open-access regime. While not overexploited, this open-access status may have negative consequences for the sustainability of the fishery.
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
GRAPH 7.1.1 : Output indicators
GRAPH 7.1.2 : Input components
Dimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Metrics with BETTER performance: Metrics with WORSE performance:
ManagerialReturns(score 4.5)
Community(score 4.5)
Post-HarvestAssetPerformance(score 2.7)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Percentage of Stocks Overfished(score 5.0)
Stock Declining, Stable or Rebuilding(score 5.0)
Selectivity(score 3.0)
Proportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party Certification(score 3.0)
The average earnings per boat owner and processing owner are higher than the average earnings in their region.
The National Fishing Society has an active participation in the improvement of the management of this fishery. In addition, the harvesters and non-harvesters do not present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity, social status or religion beliefs.
Sustainable management of the species, high rebuilding and good condition of the critical habitat.
Formal financial institutions do not provide funding for ex-post harvest activities. The financing depens on intermediaries that provide transportation access and equipment for other activities.
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. In addition, there are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative.
The biomass is not considered “overfished”, due to the fact that the north-centered and south stocks are above their MSY levels.
The National Sea Institute (IMARPE) states that the anchovy stocks (for DHC) are stable, with a high recovery rate.
The National Regulatory Framework for anchovy does not allow captures of non-targeted species above 5% percent of the total catch.
The anchovy fishery (for DHC) is not certified but has entered into a Fishery Improvement Program (FIP). This is a previous step to obtain the MSC certificaction.
Fishers have an average of more than 10 years of work experience, while processing plant workers have between 3 and 5 years of experience.
There is no evidence of the effect of diseases and pollution on this species, but there is a negative impact of the ENSO (El Niño Southern Oscillation) event.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
There is an annual maximum capture quota, but the government does not set individual quotas for the national fleet.
Career(score 4.3)
ExogenousEnvironmentalFactors(score 4.2)
LaborReturns(score 2.3)
HarvestRights(score 1.0)
ECOLOGY 4.0
7.1 DHC ANCHOVY (Anchoveta CHD in Spanish)
7.1.1 ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT DIMENSIONS
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FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Harvest(score 4.3) Fishing
AccessRights(score 4.2)
ManagerialReturns(score 4.5)
Community(score 4.5)
ExogenousEnvironmental Factors(score 4.2)
Data(score 3.0)
Trade(score 3.5)
Career(score 4.3)
CollectiveAction(score 3.3)
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
Local labor(score 3.5)
Participation(score 2.5)
Governance(score 3.0)
ManagementInputs(score 2.8)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Labor Returns(score 2.3)
Gender(score 2.3)
ProductForm (score 2.7)
Post-Harvest Asset Performance(score 2.7)
Harvest Rights(score 1.0)
Acceptable levels of harvest, high contribution of exports in the total value of the fishery
Wide gap between returns and access to higher education of captains and owners of processing plants compared to fishers and processing workers.
Active participation of private institutions in the improvement of the management of anchovy, but very low participation of women in the harvest stage
On average, macro factors have a positive effect in the fishery, highlighting the performance of exogenous environmental factors.
Available data of landings and ex-vessel prices, although management tools and methods are not appropiate
There are fishing Access Rights, with high flexibility and durability. Nevertheless, there are no individual quotas per boat.
In the last three years (2016-2018), the average annual landings have been less thatn the Maximum Sustainable Yield estimated and there is no evidence of excess capacity in this fishery’s fleet.
All boats must have a valid fishing permit to carry out extractive activities. These permits have high flexibility, durability and security.
The average earnings per boat owner and processing owner are higher than the average earnings in their region.
The National Fishing Society has an active participation in the improvement of the management of the anchovy DHC fishery. In addition, the harvesters and non harvesters do not present sharp differences in therms of ethnicity, social status or religious beliefs.
There is no evidence that DHC anchovy is affected by exogenous disease, pathogens or pollution shocks. Tolerance for La Niña or El Niño phenomena (ENSO).
There is available information about landings and ex-vessel prices in public sources. But it is not always accurate. Monthly biological information about this species is used to design public policies.
Around 48% of the landings is exported (mainly to Spain and Panama). In addition, its wholesale price is 8% higher than the global average price of similar species.
Fishers have an average of more than 10 years of work experience, while processing plant workers have between 3 and 5 years of experience.
In general, fishers (of any fishery) see associativity (through organizations, unions, guilds, among others) as a vehicle for social and political empowerment.
The current regulation in economic matters (fiscal and monetary) has facilitated the entry of investmentes and integration with the global economy.
Formal financial institutions do not provide funding for ex-post harvest activities. The financing depends on intermediaries that provide transporttation access and equipment for other activities.
There is an annual maximum capture quota, but the government does not set individual quotas for the national fleet.
There is a considerable percentage of non-local fishers. This percentage is lower for workers in processing plants.
Fishers dedicate a few days a year to meetings with stakeholders. Likewise, the public budget for the fishing sector is much greater than the contributions it receives from fishing royalties.
The weak governance, the low compliance with existing regulations and the persistent corruption and informality in the sector hinder adequate management.
Anchovy stocks located in Peru and Chile do not have single jurisdiction. Each country uses its own management tools.
According to an Oceana report, approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. In addition, there are no fishing frounds managed through a TURF or cooperative.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
There is a high participation of women in the pst-extraction stage. However, their participation in the extractive stage is very small.
About 11% are enhanced through value-added products. In addition, 41% of this resource is lost due to processing activities.
ECONOMICS 3.3PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY 2.6
COMMUNITY 3.7
CO-MANAGEMENT 3.1
MACRO FACTORS 3.8MANAGEMENT 2.6
7.1.2 ANALYSIS OF INPUT DIMENSIONS
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
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FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
ECOLOGY COMMUNITY
CO-MANAGEMENT
Fish
Sto
ck H
ealt
h &
En
viro
nmen
tal P
erfo
rman
ce
Col
lect
ive
Auc
tion
Car
eer
Com
mun
ity
Com
mun
ity
Serv
ices
Gen
der
Hea
lth
& S
anit
atio
n
Part
icip
atio
n
Har
vest
Dat
a
Labo
r ret
urns
Econ
omic
Con
diti
ons
Har
vest
Ass
ets
Man
agem
ent
Inpu
ts
Man
ager
ial R
etur
ns
Gen
eral
Env
rionm
enta
l Pe
rfor
man
ce
Prod
uct
Form
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Gov
erna
nce
Ris
k
Mar
kets
&M
arke
t In
stit
utio
ns
Trad
e
Fish
ing
Acc
ess
Rig
hts
Har
vest
Rig
hts
Loca
l Lab
or
Exog
enou
s En
viro
nmen
tal
Fact
ors
Post
-Har
vest
Ass
et
Perf
orm
ance
Man
agem
ent
Met
hods
MACRO FACTORS MANAGEMENT POST-HARVEST PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSABILITY
ECONOMICS
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Infrastructure(score 4.2)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.3)
Vessels have acceptable navigation and communication technologies, although they face high export tariffs.
Due to the existence of small scale and industrial fishing, the fishery has navigation and communication technology. It also receives training from the government and NGOs.
This fishery faces high tariff barriers for export. Vertical integration is minimal and the number of fishers’ buyers is very small.
POST-HARVEST 3.3
GRAPH 7.1.3 : Output dimensions
TABLE 7.1.1 : Output indicators scores
GRAPH 7.1.4 : Input dimensions
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
4.0
3.3
4.5
2.3 2.5
4.0 4.03.0 3.0 2.8
2.0
4.2
2.3
4.2
1.0
4.2
4.0
2.3
3.5 3.5
4.5 4.3
3.0 2.7 2.73.3 3.53.8
4.3
Percentage of Stocks OverfishedDegree of OverfishingStock Declining, Stable or RebuildingRegulatory MortalitySelectivityIllegal, Unregulated or Unreported LandingsStatus of Critical HabitatProportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party CertificationLandings LevelExcess CapacitySeason LengthEx-Vessel Price cf. Historic HighRatio of Asset Value to Gross EarningsTotal Revenue cf. Historic HighAsset Value cf. Historic HaighBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of CapitalFunctionality of Harvest CapitalAnnual Total Revenue Volatility Annual Landings Volatility Intra-annual Landings Volatility Annual Price VolatilityIntra-annual Price VolatilitySpatial Price VolatilityInternational TradeFinal Market WealthWholesale Price cf. Similar ProductsCapacity of Firms to Export to the US & EUProcessing YieldShrinkCapacity Utilization Rate Product ImprovementFinal Market UseEx-vessel to Wholesale Marketing MarginsBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of Capital Age of Facilities
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ECO
LOGY
ECO
NO
MIC
S
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
ProductForm
Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
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FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Local Ownership
ExogenousEnvironmental
Factors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General Environmental
Factors
Career
Local Labor
MAC
RO F
ACTO
RS
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TY
CollectiveAction
Participation
Community
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
Captains Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCaptains wage cf. Non-fishery wagesCaptain Social StandingProcessing Owners Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsProcessing Owners Wages cf. Non-fishery WagesProcessing Owners Social Standing Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCrew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Crew Social StandingProcessing Workers Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings Processing Workers Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Processing Workers Social Standing Harvest SafetyAccess to Health Care for CaptainsAccess to Health Care for CrewAccess to Health Care for Processing OwnersAccess to Health Care for Processing WorkersSanitationRegional Support BusinessesContestability & Legal ChallengesEducation Access for Harvest CaptainsEducation Access for CrewEducation Access for Processing OwnersEducation Access for Processing WorkersNonresident Employment as CaptainsNonresident Ownership of Processing CapacityNonresident Employment as CrewNonresident Employment as Processing WorkersCrew ExperienceAge Structure of HarverstersWorker Experience
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Disease and PathogensNatural Disasters and CatastrophesPollution Shocks and AccidentsLevel of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)Governance QualityGovernance ResponsivenessIndex of Economic FreedomGross Domestic Product (GDP) Per CapitaProportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited AccessTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based ManagementTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & AccessHarvester Organization Influence on Business & MarketingDays in Stakeholder MeetingsIndustry Financial Support for ManagementLeadershipSocial CohesionBusiness Management InfluenceResource Management InfluenceLabor Participation in Harvest SectorLabor Participation in Post-Harvest Sector
METRICSMETRICS
11
22
33
44
IndicatorComponent
DimensionDimension
55
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
TABLE 7.1.2: Input components scores
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
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FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest Enforcement CapabilityManagement JurisdictionLevel of SubsidiesData AvailabilityData AnalysisMPAs and SanctuariesSpatial ManagementFishing Mortality LimitsLandings Pricing SystemAvailability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity InformationNumber of BuyersDegree of Vertical IntegrationLevel of TariffsLevel of Non-tariff BarriersInternational Shipping ServiceRoad QualityTechnology AdoptionExtension ServiceReliability of Utilities/ElectricityAccess to Ice & Refrigeration
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
Data
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
This fishery is comprised mainly of the yellowfin, bigeye and skipjack species of tuna. The methods and gears most commonly encountered are purse-sein nets, used by the industrial fleet; and longlines, employed by artisanal vessels. Paita and Máncora are the main landing ports, followed by Coishco and Callao. Above all, the catch is processed for canning. Tuna species are highly migratory, distributed throughout the world’s oceans. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) is the agency tasked with conducting scientific analysis and formulating management strategies and recommendations regarding the species within the eastern Pacific region; Peru is a member state. In Peru, the tuna fish fishery is governed by FMR, which stipulate management measures such as control of access and fishing gear. There are also minimum catch levels and bycatch limits under Peruvian law. The fishery is open-access, which could have a negative impact on the sustainability of the resource.
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
Production Form
Post-Harvest AssetPerformance
Tuna fish Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
ManagerialReturns
Labor Returns
Health & Sanitation
Community Services
Local Ownership
LocalLabor
Career
GRAPH 7.2.1 : Output indicatorsDimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Harvest(score 4.8)
Labor Returns(score 2.3)
The landings level is approximately at Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). There is no evidence of excess capacity.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
On average, earnings of owners or captains, processing owners and managers are higher than the regional everage earnings.
There is volatility between annual landings and price. The same occurs with wholesale prices between regions.
ManagerialReturns(score 4.3)
Risk(score 2.3)
General Environmental Performance Exogenous
EnvironmentalFactors
Governance
HarvestRights
EconomicConditions
Fishing Access Rights
CollectiveAction
Tuna fish Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
Participation
Gender
Community
ManagementInputs
Data
ManagementMethods
Markets & Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
GRAPH 7.2.2 : Input componentsDimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
The country has an acceptable per capita GDP on purchasing power patiry basis, and a good score from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. In addition, there are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative.
In the 2018 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranking, Peru is ranked 64th, with a score of 61.92 The EPI considers factors such as disease, water quality, air pollution, biodiversity, natural resources and climate change.
There are no harvest rights, neither a total quota nor an individual quota.
GeneralEnvironmentalPerformance(score 4.0)
HarvestRights(score 1.0)
METRICS 1 2 3 4Component Dimension 5
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.2 TUNA FISH (Atún in Spanish)
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
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FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Only one dimension: “Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance”
Metrics with BETTER performance: Metrics with WORSE performance:
RegulatoryMortality(score 5.0)
Status of Critical Habitat(score 5.0)
Ilegal, Unregulated or Unreported Landings(score 2.0)
Proportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party Certification(score 1.0)
High level of illegal, unregulated or unreported landings. No portion of harvest with a 3rd Party Certification.
In the large-scale industrial fleet, the operation of the fishing gear and types of equipment stores almost every tuna fish which later is landed without prejudice of the penalizations on size restriction.
Species is harvested mainly by the use of seine nets and longlines. The damage on the critical habitats that could be caused by the seine nets or longlines is not significant.
In the Asia Pacific area, the estimated unreported tuna fish catch is found between 25% to 30% of the global reported catch.
No portion of the tuna fish landings has been certificated by a third party.
ECOLOGY 3.4
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Harvest(score 4.8)
ManagerialReturns(score 4.3)
Health &Sanitation(score 4.2)
Labor Returns(score 2.3)
Risk (score 2.3)
Post-Harvest Asset Performance(score 2.7)
Acceptable levels of harvest, but high volatility in annual landings and wholesale prices.
Wide gap between returns of captains and owners of processing plants compared to fishers and processing workers.
The landings level is approximately at Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). There is no evidence of excess capacity.
On average, earnings of owners or captains, processing owners and managers are higher than the regional average earnings.
High harvest safety. In addition, the access to health care is good between owners or captains, processing owners and managers.
Evidence suggests that formal financial institutions do not provide funding for ex-post harvest activities with fishery. Mainly the financing depends on intermediaries that provide access to transportation and other ex-post harvest supply chai activities.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
There is volatility between annual landings and price. The same occurs with wholesale prices between regions.
ECONOMICS 3.3
COMMUNITY 3.8
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
FishingAccessRights(score 3.8)
Community(score 3.5)
GeneralEnvironmental Factors(score 4.0)
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
CollectiveAction(score 2.0)
Governance(score 3.0)
Gender(score 2.3)
Harvest Rights(score 1.0)
In general, this dimension has a low performance due to the low influence of organized associations.
On average, macro factors have a positive effect in the fishery, highlighting the performance of general environmental factors.
There are fishing Access Rights, with high flexibility and durability. Nevertheless, there are no individual quotas per boat.
In order to harvest tuna fish, the boat owners must have an available fishing permit. This one has a high transferability security and durability.
The harvesters do nor present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity, social status or religion beliefs. In case the differences actually exist, these do not represent a problem to guarantee the social cohesion of the fishing activity within the communities.
In the 2018 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranking, Peru is ranked 64th, with score of 61.92. The EPI considers factors such as disease, water quality, air pollution, biodiversity, natural resources and climate change.
The country has an acceptable per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity basis, and a good score from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.
There are no harvet rights, neither a total quota nor an individual quota.
Very low labor participation of women in post-harvest sector, and even worse in harvest sector. But, there is women’s influence in the management of the resource because important positions related to the fishing industry are currently assigned to women.
The weak governance, the low compliance with existing regulations and the persistent corruption and informality in the sector hinder adequate management.
About 34% of the fishers are members of organized associations. These harvester organizations do not have active effort or capacity to influence business operations.
PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY 2.4
CO-MANAGEMENT 2.6
MACRO FACTORS 3.8
7.2.1 ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT DIMENSIONS 7.2.2 ANALYSIS OF INPUT DIMENSIONS
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
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FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance: Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Data(score 4.0)
ManagementInputs(score 3.8)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Available data of landings and ex-vessel prices. Single management jurisdiction.
Collected and comprehensive landings data available. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Comission (IATT) gathers a comprehensive amount of biological, environmental and technical information from several fleets in the region.
Stock’s life cycle is within a single management jurisdiction. The IATTC formally conducts scientific research, makes publications and hold meetings of the different members subscribed, showing a coordination capacity.
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing frounds managed through a TURF or cooperative (community management regions) for this fishery.
MANAGEMENT 3.3
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
ECOLOGY COMMUNITY
CO-MANAGEMENT
Fish
Sto
ck H
ealt
h &
En
viro
nmen
tal P
erfo
rman
ce
Col
lect
ive
Auc
tion
Car
eer
Com
mun
ity
Com
mun
ity
Serv
ices
Gen
der
Hea
lth
& S
anit
atio
n
Part
icip
atio
n
Har
vest
Dat
a
Labo
r ret
urns
Econ
omic
Con
diti
ons
Har
vest
Ass
ets
Man
agem
ent
Inpu
ts
Man
ager
ial R
etur
ns
Gen
eral
Env
rionm
enta
l Pe
rfor
man
ce
Prod
uct
Form
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Gov
erna
nce
Ris
k
Mar
kets
&M
arke
t In
stit
utio
ns
Trad
e
Fish
ing
Acc
ess
Rig
hts
Har
vest
Rig
hts
Loca
l Lab
or
Exog
enou
s En
viro
nmen
tal
Fact
ors
Post
-Har
vest
Ass
et
Perf
orm
ance
Man
agem
ent
Met
hods
MACRO FACTORS MANAGEMENT POST-HARVEST PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSABILITY
ECONOMICS
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Infrastructure(score 3.7)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.0)
Vessels have acceptable navigation and communication technologies, although they face high export tariffs.
The percentage of vessels and landing points with access to a navigation (sonar, radar, among others) and communications (VHF radiom cellphones, among others) is sufficiently high. International Shipping Service at average rates.
This fishery faces high tariff and a considerable level of non-tariff barriers. Its degree of vertical integration is less than 35% of harvest.
POST-HARVEST 2.8
GRAPH 7.2.3 : Output dimensions
GRAPH 7.2.4 : Input dimensions
2.3 2.5
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.03.0
3.8 3.83.5
2.0 2.02.0
3.7
1.0
4.04.04.04.0
2.3 2.3
4.8
3.4 2.7 2.83.53.5
4.2 4.3
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
TABLE 7.2.1: Output indicators scores
Percentage of Stocks OverfishedDegree of OverfishingStock Declining, Stable or RebuildingRegulatory MortalitySelectivityIllegal, Unregulated or Unreported LandingsStatus of Critical HabitatProportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party CertificationLandings LevelExcess CapacitySeason LengthEx-Vessel Price cf. Historic HighRatio of Asset Value to Gross EarningsTotal Revenue cf. Historic HighAsset Value cf. Historic HaighBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of CapitalFunctionality of Harvest CapitalAnnual Total Revenue Volatility Annual Landings Volatility Intra-annual Landings Volatility Annual Price VolatilityIntra-annual Price VolatilitySpatial Price Volatility
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ECO
LOGY
ECO
NO
MIC
S
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
78 79Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Disease and PathogensNatural Disasters and CatastrophesPollution Shocks and AccidentsLevel of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)Governance QualityGovernance ResponsivenessIndex of Economic FreedomGross Domestic Product (GDP) Per CapitaProportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited AccessTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based ManagementTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivity
METRICS METRICS
METRICS
1 1
1
2 2
2
3 3
3
4 4
4
5 5
5
Indicator IndicatorDimension Dimension
Dimension
International TradeFinal Market WealthWholesale Price cf. Similar ProductsCapacity of Firms to Export to the US & EUProcessing YieldShrinkCapacity Utilization Rate Product ImprovementFinal Market UseEx-vessel to Wholesale Marketing MarginsBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of Capital Age of FacilitiesCaptains Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCaptains wage cf. Non-fishery wagesCaptain Social StandingProcessing Owners Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsProcessing Owners Wages cf. Non-fishery WagesProcessing Owners Social Standing Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCrew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Crew Social StandingProcessing Workers Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings Processing Workers Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Processing Workers Social Standing Harvest SafetyAccess to Health Care for CaptainsAccess to Health Care for CrewAccess to Health Care for Processing OwnersAccess to Health Care for Processing WorkersSanitationRegional Support BusinessesContestability & Legal ChallengesEducation Access for Harvest CaptainsEducation Access for Crew
Trade
ProductForm
Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
Local Ownership
ExogenousEnvironmental
Factors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General Environmental
Factors
Career
Local Labor
MAC
RO F
ACTO
RS
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TY
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Component
TABLE 7.2.2: Input components scores
Education Access for Processing OwnersEducation Access for Processing WorkersNonresident Employment as CaptainsNonresident Ownership of Processing CapacityNonresident Employment as CrewNonresident Employment as Processing WorkersCrew ExperienceAge Structure of HarverstersWorker Experience
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
80 81Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Component Dimension
Days in Stakeholder MeetingsIndustry Financial Support for ManagementLeadershipSocial CohesionBusiness Management InfluenceResource Management InfluenceLabor Participation in Harvest SectorLabor Participation in Post-Harvest SectorManagement Expenditure to Value of HarvestEnforcement CapabilityManagement JurisdictionLevel of SubsidiesData AvailabilityData AnalysisMPAs and SanctuariesSpatial ManagementFishing Mortality LimitsLandings Pricing SystemAvailability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity InformationNumber of BuyersDegree of Vertical IntegrationLevel of TariffsLevel of Non-tariff BarriersInternational Shipping ServiceRoad QualityTechnology AdoptionExtension ServiceReliability of Utilities/ElectricityAccess to Ice & Refrigeration
Participation
Community
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
Data
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
Production Form
Post-Harvest AssetPerformance
Eel Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
ManagerialReturns
Labor Returns
Health & Sanitation
Community Services
Local Ownership
LocalLabor
Career
The eel fishery in Peru stretches from the border with Ecuador to the 6th parallel south; these species are found right along South America’s western seaboard, from Ecuador to Chile, with a population density that decreases from north to south. They inhabit muddy and sandy seabeds at depths ranging from 30 and 400 meters. The main landing ports are Paita and Talara, in the region of Piura, but in 2017 the main fishing areas also included Punta Sal in Tumbes and Parachique, also in Piura. Fishing is carried out mainly by way of eel traps, and almost the entire catch is bound for export, primarily to Asian markets. The eel fishery is governed by FMR that establish a management framework, minimum catch size, annual catch quota and biological reference points. Moreover, the fishery is open-access, which could have negative repercussions on the sustainability of the resource.
GRAPH 7.3.1 : Output indicators
Dimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
ManagerialReturns(score 4.5)
Labor Returns(score 2.5)
On average, earnings of owners or captains, processing owners and managers are higher than the regional average earnings.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
The landings level is less than the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). There is no evidence of excess capacity.
For the eel fishery, there has not been any enhancement of the processed product, showing a poor development in the value chain.
Harvest(score 4.5)
ProductForm(score 2.2)
7.3 EEL (ANGUILA IN SPANISH)
Proportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & AccessHarvester Organization Influence on Business & Marketing
CollectiveAction
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
1
2
3
4
5
82 83Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
General Environmental Performance Exogenous
EnvironmentalFactors
Governance
HarvestRights
EconomicConditions
Fishing Access Rights
CollectiveAction
Eel Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Only one dimension: “Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance”
Participation
Gender
Community
ManagementInputs
Data
ManagementMethods
Markets & Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
GRAPH 7.3.2 : Input componentsDimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Metrics with BETTER performance: Metrics with WORSE performance:
Fishing AccessRights(score 4.2)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.0)
Percentage of Stocks Overfished(score 5.0)
Stock Declining, Stable or Rebuilding(score 5.0)
Proportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party Certification(score 1.0)
In order to harvest eel, the boat owners must have an available fishing permit. This one has a high transferability, security and durability.
High performance due to the sustainable management of the stock, although the presence of informality and the lack of certification affect the performance of this indicator.
The fishery faces a high level of tariffs. Its degree of vertical integration is less than a 35% of harvest and there are just a small number of coordinating buyers.
The stock is not overfished since the adoption of protection policies as the maximum limit of total harvest.
The stock status is stable, with a rapidly rebuilding.
No portion of the eel landings has been certificated by a third party.
There is no evidence that eel is affected by exogenous disease, pathogens or pollution shocks. la Niña event affected negatively the stock in the Peruvian sea.
The Peruvian regulatory framework has a maximum limit of total harvest per year, in 2018 and 2019, 5,800 and 5,400 tones were set in place respectively, but ITQs are not allocated to each vessel.
ExogenousEnvironmentalFactors(score 4.2)
HarvestRights(score 1.0)
ECOLOGY 4.0
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Harvest(score 4.5)
ManagerialReturns(score 4.5)
ExogenousEnvironmental Factors(score 4.2)
Trade(score 3.3)
Career(score 4.0)
Labor Returns(score 2.5)
Governance(score 3.0)
ProductForm (score 2.2)
Post-Harvest Asset Performance(score 2.7)
Sustainable capture of the species, using old boats but is good condition. Little or no added value of the product.
Fishers with high work experience. Managers have better returns than workers in the extractive and processing stages.
Despite the negative impact of La Niña event on the biomass acceptable economic and environmental conditions explain the positive result of this indicator.
The landings level is less than the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). There is no evidence of excess capacity.
On average earnings of owners or captains, processing owners and managers are higher than the regional average earnings.
There is no evidence that the eel is affected by exogenous disease, pathogens or pollution shocks. La Niña event affected negatively the stock of eel in the Peruvian Sea.
Around 94% of the eel landings are exported (mainly to Japan and South Korea) and the remaining 6% is consumed locally. In addition, the exported products do not comply with high sanitation and labeling standards.
On average, fishers have more than 10 years of experience. All working ages are almostwell represented.
Evidence suggests that formal financial institutions do not provide funding for ex-post harvest activities within this fishery. Mainly the financing depends on intermediaries that provide access to transportation and other ex-post harvest supply chain activities
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
The governement effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, accountability and political stability are not having a good performance in the country.
For the eel fishery, there has not been any enhancement of the processed product, showing a poor development in the value chain.
ECONOMICS 3.1
COMMUNITY 3.8
MACRO FACTORS 3.8
7.3.1 ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT DIMENSIONS
7.3.2 ANALYSIS OF INPUT DIMENSIONS
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
1
2
3
4
5
84 85Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
FishingAccessRights(score 4.2)
Community(score 3.5)
Data(score 4.0)
Collective Action(score 2.0)
ManagementInputs(score 2.8)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Gender(score 2.3)
Harvest Rights(score 1.0)
The absence of strong social organizations and the low participation of women in the value chain affects the performance of this indicator.
Available information of ex-vessel prices and landings. However, the management inputs and methods are insufficient.
There are fishing access rights and an annual total quota. However, the governmetn has not established individual quotas per boat.
In order to harvest eel, the boat owners must have an available fishing permit. This one has a high transferability, security and durability.
The harvesters do not present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity, social status or religion beliefs. In case the differences actually exist, these do not represent a problem to guarantee the social cohesioin of the fishing activity within the communities.
Data is collected and comprehensive. In the executive report developed by IMARPE there is no evidence of using economic data for the management analysis of this fishery.
The Peruvian regulatory framework has a maximum limit of total harvester per year, in 2018 and 2019, 5,800 and 5400 tones were set in place respectively, but ITQs are not allocated to each vessel.
Very low labor participation of women in post-harvest sector, and even worse in harvest sector. But there is women’s influence in the management of the resource because important positions related to the fishing industry are currently assigned to women.
There are no binding institutions or authority aimed at coordinate efforts regarding eel population management amongst different countries.
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing frounds managed through a TURF or cooperative (community management regions) for this fishery.
Only 28% of the fishers are members of organized associations. These harvester organization do nor have active effort or capacity to influence business operations.
PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY 2.6
CO-MANAGEMENT 2.6
MANAGEMENT 2.9
Dimensions with BETTER performance: Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Infrastructure(score 3.2)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.0)
Vessels have acceptable navigation and communication technologies, although they face high export tariffs.
The percentage of vessels and landing points with access to a navigation (sonar, radar, among others) and communications (VHF radiom cellphones, among others) is sufficiently high.
This fishery faces a high level of tariffs. Its degree of vertical integration is less than 35% of harvest and there are just a small number of coordinating buyers.
POST-HARVEST 2.6
ECOLOGY COMMUNITY
Fish
Sto
ck H
ealt
h &
En
viro
nmen
tal P
erfo
rman
ce
Car
eer
Com
mun
ity
Serv
ices
Hea
lth
& S
anit
atio
n
Har
vest
Labo
r ret
urns
Har
vest
Ass
ets
Man
ager
ial R
etur
ns
Prod
uct
Form
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Ris
k
Trad
e
Loca
l Lab
or
Post
-Har
vest
Ass
et
Perf
orm
ance
ECONOMICS
GRAPH 7.3.3 : Output dimensions
4.04.03.7
4.0 4.04.0
2.5 2.22.73.33.23.0
4.5 4.5
CO-MANAGEMENT
Col
lect
ive
Auc
tion
Com
mun
ity
Gen
der
Part
icip
atio
n
Dat
a
Econ
omic
Con
diti
ons
Man
agem
ent
Inpu
ts
Gen
eral
Env
rionm
enta
l Pe
rfor
man
ce
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Gov
erna
nce
Mar
kets
&M
arke
t In
stit
utio
ns
Fish
ing
Acc
ess
Rig
hts
Har
vest
Rig
hts
Exog
enou
s En
viro
nmen
tal
Fact
ors
Man
agem
ent
Met
hods
MACRO FACTORS MANAGEMENT POST-HARVEST PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSABILITY
GRAPH 7.3.4 : Input dimensions
2.3 2.5
4.0 4.2 4.0 4.03.0
2.8
4.23.5
2.0 2.02.03.2
1.0
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
86 87Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
TABLE 7.3.1 : Output indicators scores
Percentage of Stocks OverfishedDegree of OverfishingStock Declining, Stable or RebuildingRegulatory MortalitySelectivityIllegal, Unregulated or Unreported LandingsStatus of Critical HabitatProportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party CertificationLandings LevelExcess CapacitySeason LengthEx-Vessel Price cf. Historic HighRatio of Asset Value to Gross EarningsTotal Revenue cf. Historic HighAsset Value cf. Historic HaighBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of CapitalFunctionality of Harvest CapitalAnnual Total Revenue Volatility Annual Landings Volatility Intra-annual Landings Volatility Annual Price VolatilityIntra-annual Price VolatilitySpatial Price VolatilityInternational TradeFinal Market WealthWholesale Price cf. Similar ProductsCapacity of Firms to Export to the US & EUProcessing YieldShrinkCapacity Utilization Rate Product ImprovementFinal Market UseEx-vessel to Wholesale Marketing MarginsBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of Capital Age of Facilities
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ECO
LOGY
ECO
NO
MIC
S
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
ProductForm
Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
Local Ownership
Career
Local Labor
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
Captains Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCaptains wage cf. Non-fishery wagesCaptain Social StandingProcessing Owners Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsProcessing Owners Wages cf. Non-fishery WagesProcessing Owners Social Standing Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCrew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Crew Social StandingProcessing Workers Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings Processing Workers Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Processing Workers Social Standing Harvest SafetyAccess to Health Care for CaptainsAccess to Health Care for CrewAccess to Health Care for Processing OwnersAccess to Health Care for Processing WorkersSanitationRegional Support BusinessesContestability & Legal ChallengesEducation Access for Harvest CaptainsEducation Access for CrewEducation Access for Processing OwnersEducation Access for Processing WorkersNonresident Employment as CaptainsNonresident Ownership of Processing CapacityNonresident Employment as CrewNonresident Employment as Processing WorkersCrew ExperienceAge Structure of HarverstersWorker Experience
METRICS 1 2 3 4Indicator Dimension
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
5
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
88 89Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
ExogenousEnvironmental
Factors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General Environmental
Factors
MAC
RO F
ACTO
RS
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TY
CollectiveAction
Participation
Community
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Disease and PathogensNatural Disasters and CatastrophesPollution Shocks and AccidentsLevel of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)Governance QualityGovernance ResponsivenessIndex of Economic FreedomGross Domestic Product (GDP) Per CapitaProportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited AccessTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based ManagementTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & AccessHarvester Organization Influence on Business & MarketingDays in Stakeholder MeetingsIndustry Financial Support for ManagementLeadershipSocial CohesionBusiness Management InfluenceResource Management InfluenceLabor Participation in Harvest SectorLabor Participation in Post-Harvest Sector
METRICS 1 2 3 4Component Dimension Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest Enforcement CapabilityManagement JurisdictionLevel of SubsidiesData AvailabilityData AnalysisMPAs and SanctuariesSpatial ManagementFishing Mortality LimitsLandings Pricing SystemAvailability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity InformationNumber of BuyersDegree of Vertical IntegrationLevel of TariffsLevel of Non-tariff BarriersInternational Shipping ServiceRoad QualityTechnology AdoptionExtension ServiceReliability of Utilities/ElectricityAccess to Ice & Refrigeration
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
Data
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Bonito is a species distributed along the entire Peruvian coastline, in inshore areas characterized by the presences of upwelling processes and ocean fronts where relatively low water temperatures predominate. Stock levels fluctuate with the seasons, and most harvesting takes place – using gillnets and purse-seine nets – during spring and summer subject to availability. Landed volumes have been rising progressively since 2011, reaching approximately 96,000 tons in 2017. The catch is primarily sold fresh, and to a lesser extent in canned and frozen form. The main export destinations are Spain and Portugal, although mainly this resource is consumed locally. In addition, no FMR have yet been established for this fishery. However, the bonito is subject to minimum catch size, bycatch percentage, gear guidelines and biological reference points. The fishery is open-access, which could have negative repercussions on the sustainability of stocks.
5
7.4 BONITO
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
TABLE 7.3.2 : Input components scoresComponent Dimension
90 91Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
Production Form
Post-Harvest AssetPerformance
Bonito Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
ManagerialReturns
Labor Returns
Health & Sanitation
Community Services
Local Ownership
LocalLabor
Career
GRAPH 7.4.1 : Output indicators
Dimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
LocalOwnership(score 4.0)
ProductForm(score 2.2)
The average earnings per boat owner and processing owner are higher than the average earnings in their regions.
This fishery shows a poor development in its value chain. In addition, 44% of this fishery is lost due to processing activities.
For this fishery, a high percentage of fishers and processing workers are residents in their regions.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average and their alternative economic activity.
ManagerialReturns(score 4.3)
LaborReturns(score 1.8)
General Environmental Performance Exogenous
EnvironmentalFactors
Governance
HarvestRights
EconomicConditions
Fishing Access Rights
CollectiveAction
Bonito Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
Participation
Gender
Community
ManagementInputs
Data
ManagementMethods
Markets & Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
GRAPH 7.4.2 : Input componentsDimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
The current regulation in economic matters (fiscal and monetary) has facilitated the entry of investments and integration with the global economy.
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative for this fishery.
In the 2018 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranking, Peru is ranked 64th, with a score of 61.92 The EPI considers factors such as disease, water quality, air pollution, biodiversity, natural resources and climate change.
There is maximum capture quota that is set annually (in 2019 the quota was 64,000 tons), but no individual quotas are assigned per boat.
GeneralEnvironmentalPerformance(score 4.0)
HarvestRights(score 1.0)
Only one dimension: “Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance”
Metrics with BETTER performance: Metrics with WORSE performance:
Percentageof StocksOverfished(score 5.0)
Status of Critical Habitat(score 5.0)
Ilegal, Unregulated or Unreported Landings(score 1.0)
Proportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party Certification(score 1.0)
High performance due to the sustainable management of the fishery stock, although the presence of informality and the lack of certification of the resource affect the performance of this indicator.
According to the National Sea Institute (IMARPE), the bonito population shows traits of a healthy state with low exploitation rates.
Considering the average depth where this resource is found (above 100 meters towards the ocean), the impacts caused by the fishing gears do not affect its habitat.
No portion of the bonito landings have been certificated by a third party
According to the Ministry of Production (PRODUCE), between 60% to 75% of the landings of artisanal fisheries (like bonito) incur in some irregularity.
ECOLOGY 3.6
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Risk(score 3.5)
Harvest(score 3.3)
ManagerialReturns(score 4.3)
LocalOwnership(score 4.0)
Health &Sanitation(score 3.3)
LaborReturns(score 1.8)
Trade(score 2.3)
ProductForm(score 2.2)
Moderate volatility of annual landings, absence of a particular regulatory framework, low export percentages and little or no value-added products.
In this fishery, the resource users are local residents and have a a high number of years of experience. In addition, managers have better returns than workers in extractive and non-extractive activities
The species shows no volatility in its prices, but a moderate volatility in its annual landings.
The annual quotas established by the Ministry of Production (PRODUCE) for the bonito harvesting are consistent with its Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) level.
The average earnings per boat owner and processing owner are higher than the average earnings in their region.
For this fishery, a high percentage of fishers and processing workers are resident in their regions.
Almost 100% of the bonito fishery is consumed locally. In addition, a high share if the exported products does not comply with international sanitation and labelign standards.
Limited access to health care by fishers, processing workers, boat owners and their families. In addition, a low percentage of exports are destined to countries with high standards of health (USA and EU).
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
This fishery shows a poor development in its value chain. In addition, 44% of this fishery is lost due to processing activities.
ECONOMICS 2.8
COMMUNITY 3.5
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.4.1 ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT DIMENSIONS
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
92 93Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
FishingAccessRights(score 3.5)
Community(score 3.0)
Participation(score 2.5)
GeneralEnvironmental Factors(score 4.0)
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
CollectiveAction(score 2.3)
Governance(score 3.0)
Gender(score 2.3)
Harvest Rights(score 1.0)
The absence of strong social organizations and the low participation of women in the value chain affect the performance of this indicator.
Despite the negative impact of La Niña phenomenon on the biomass, the good economic and environmental conditions explain the positive result in this indicator.
There are fishing Access Rights, with high flexibility and durability. Nevertheless, there are no individual quotas per boat.
All boats must have a valid fishing permit to carry out extractive activities. These permits have high flexibility, durability and security.
In this fishery, there are few recognized leaders. In addition, harvesters and non-harvesters do not present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity, social status or religion beliefs.
Fishers dedicate a few days a year to meetings with stakeholders. Likewise, the public budget for the fishing sector is much greater than the contributions it receives from fishing royalties.
In the 2018 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranking, Peru is ranked 64th, with score of 61.92. The EPI considers factors such as disease, water quality, air pollution, biodiversity, natural resources and climate change.
The current regulation in economic matters (fiscal and monetary) has facilitated the entry of investments and integration with theglobal economy.
There is a maximum capture quota that is set annually (in 2019 the quota was 64,000 tons), but no individual quotas are assigned per boat.
There is no active participation of women in the harvest and post-harvest activities. However, importan positions related to the fishing industry are currently held by women.
The weak governance, the low compliance with existing regulations and the persistent corruption and informality in the sector hinder adequate management.
Around 64% of the fishers are members of associations. These associations do not have an important impact on the resources’ management.
PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY 2.3
CO-MANAGEMENT 2.5
MACRO FACTORS 3.8 Dimensions with BETTER performance: Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Data(score 3.0)
ManagementInputs(score 3.8)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Available information of ex-vessel prices and landings. However, the management methods are insuficient.
The life cycle of the stock is managed under a single jurisdiction. IMARPE cruises to estimate biomass and establishes the annual capture based on scientific evidence.
For this fishery, the information about landings and ex-vessel prices are available in public sources (IMARPE’S web page). In addition, there is monthly biological information about this species that is used to design public policies.
Approximately 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing frounds managed through a TURF or cooperative (community management regions) for this fishery.
MANAGEMENT 2.9
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
ECOLOGY COMMUNITY
Fish
Sto
ck H
ealt
h &
En
viro
nmen
tal P
erfo
rman
ce
Car
eer
Com
mun
ity
Serv
ices
Hea
lth
& S
anit
atio
n
Har
vest
Labo
r ret
urns
Har
vest
Ass
ets
Man
ager
ial R
etur
ns
Prod
uct
Form
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Ris
k
Trad
e
Loca
l Lab
or
Post
-Har
vest
Ass
et
Perf
orm
ance
ECONOMICS
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Infrastructure(score 3.0)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.0)
Inadequate infrastructure to the access of landing points. However, there is access to refrigeration and waste management services.
The access infrastructure to the landing points is not adequate. This situation limits the export possibilities; however, on the landing points, there are always available transportation services.
There is no access to competitive prices due to limited information on market prices and high dependence on informal agents. The fishery does not face high tariffs or non-tariffs barriers.
POST-HARVEST 2.5
GRAPH 7.4.3 : Output dimensions
4.03.8
1.82.32.2
3.6 3.7
2.7
3.5
3.03.3 3.33.5
4.3
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
7.4.2 ANALYSIS OF INPUT DIMENSIONS
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
94 95Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
CO-MANAGEMENT
Col
lect
ive
Auc
tion
Com
mun
ity
Gen
der
Part
icip
atio
n
Dat
a
Econ
omic
Con
diti
ons
Man
agem
ent
Inpu
ts
Gen
eral
Env
rionm
enta
l Pe
rfor
man
ce
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Gov
erna
nce
Mar
kets
&M
arke
t In
stit
utio
ns
Fish
ing
Acc
ess
Rig
hts
Har
vest
Rig
hts
Exog
enou
s En
viro
nmen
tal
Fact
ors
Man
agem
ent
Met
hods
MACRO FACTORS MANAGEMENT POST-HARVEST PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSABILITY
GRAPH 7.4.4 : Input dimensions
2.32.3 2.5
4.0 4.0 4.03.0 3.0 3.03.0
3.83.5
2.0 2.0
1.0
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
TABLE 7.4.1: Output indicators scores
Percentage of Stocks OverfishedDegree of OverfishingStock Declining, Stable or RebuildingRegulatory MortalitySelectivityIllegal, Unregulated or Unreported LandingsStatus of Critical HabitatProportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party CertificationLandings LevelExcess CapacitySeason LengthEx-Vessel Price cf. Historic HighRatio of Asset Value to Gross EarningsTotal Revenue cf. Historic HighAsset Value cf. Historic HaighBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of CapitalFunctionality of Harvest CapitalAnnual Total Revenue Volatility Annual Landings Volatility Intra-annual Landings Volatility Annual Price VolatilityIntra-annual Price VolatilitySpatial Price Volatility
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ECO
LOGY
ECO
NO
MIC
S
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
International TradeFinal Market WealthWholesale Price cf. Similar ProductsCapacity of Firms to Export to the US & EUProcessing YieldShrinkCapacity Utilization Rate Product ImprovementFinal Market UseEx-vessel to Wholesale Marketing MarginsBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of Capital Age of FacilitiesCaptains Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCaptains wage cf. Non-fishery wagesCaptain Social StandingProcessing Owners Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsProcessing Owners Wages cf. Non-fishery WagesProcessing Owners Social Standing Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCrew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Crew Social StandingProcessing Workers Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings Processing Workers Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Processing Workers Social Standing Harvest SafetyAccess to Health Care for CaptainsAccess to Health Care for CrewAccess to Health Care for Processing OwnersAccess to Health Care for Processing WorkersSanitationRegional Support BusinessesContestability & Legal ChallengesEducation Access for Harvest CaptainsEducation Access for Crew
Trade
ProductForm
Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
96 97Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
ExogenousEnvironmental
Factors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General Environmental
Factors
MAC
RO F
ACTO
RS
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TY
CollectiveAction
Participation
Community
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Disease and PathogensNatural Disasters and CatastrophesPollution Shocks and AccidentsLevel of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)Governance QualityGovernance ResponsivenessIndex of Economic FreedomGross Domestic Product (GDP) Per CapitaProportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited AccessTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based ManagementTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivity
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest Enforcement CapabilityManagement JurisdictionLevel of SubsidiesData AvailabilityData AnalysisMPAs and SanctuariesSpatial ManagementFishing Mortality LimitsLandings Pricing SystemAvailability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity InformationNumber of BuyersDegree of Vertical IntegrationLevel of TariffsLevel of Non-tariff BarriersInternational Shipping ServiceRoad QualityTechnology AdoptionExtension ServiceReliability of Utilities/ElectricityAccess to Ice & Refrigeration
METRICS
METRICS
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
Component
Component
Dimension
Dimension
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
Data
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Education Access for Processing OwnersEducation Access for Processing WorkersNonresident Employment as CaptainsNonresident Ownership of Processing CapacityNonresident Employment as CrewNonresident Employment as Processing WorkersCrew ExperienceAge Structure of HarverstersWorker Experience
CommunityServices
LocalOwnership
LocalLabor
Career
Proportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & AccessHarvester Organization Influence on Business & MarketingDays in Stakeholder MeetingsIndustry Financial Support for ManagementLeadershipSocial CohesionBusiness Management InfluenceResource Management InfluenceLabor Participation in Harvest SectorLabor Participation in Post-Harvest Sector
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
TABLE 7.4.2: INPUT COMPONENTS SCORES Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
98 99Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Chub mackerel and jack mackerel fisheries are oriented entirely toward DHC. Both species are distributed along the Peruvian coastline, at around 100 nautical miles from the coast. Most of the vessels operating in these fisheries are industrial, although the artisanal fleet also has access. Purse-seine nets, trammel nets and longlines are used, depending on the characteristics of the vessel. Chub mackerel is marketed primarily in fresh, frozen and canned form and exported to countries such as Chile and New Zealand, while jack mackerel is chiefly canned and exported to the likes of Spain, Ghana and Brazil. These fisheries have a FMR which set down the management framework, as well as an annual quota applicable to the entire fishing fleet active within it. These fisheries are open-access, which could have negative repercussions for the sustainability of the resource.
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
Production Form
Post-Harvest AssetPerformance
Chub mackerel andjack mackerel
Chub mackerel andjack mackerel
Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
ManagerialReturns
Labor Returns
Health & Sanitation
Community Services
Local Ownership
LocalLabor
Career
GRAPH 7.5.1 : Output indicators
Dimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
ManagerialReturns(score 4.5)
Labor Returns(score 2.0)
The average earnings per boat owner and processing owner are higher than the averate earnings in their region and than their alternative economic activity since their work is comparable with management and skilled job.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
Fishers have an average of more than 10 years of work experience, while processing plant workers have between 3 and 5 years of experience.
Not all the final product is processed, the availability of raw material is variable and for the artisanal fleet there is reduced value chain in the fishery. Low-value human consumption.
Career(score 4.3)
ProductForm(score 2.3)
General Environmental Performance Exogenous
EnvironmentalFactors
Governance
HarvestRights
EconomicConditions
Fishing Access Rights
CollectiveAction
Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Only one dimension: “Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance”
Participation
Gender
Community
ManagementInputs
Data
ManagementMethods
Markets & Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
GRAPH 7.5.2 : Input components
Dimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Metrics with BETTER performance: Metrics with WORSE performance:
GeneralEnvironmentalPerformance(score 4.0)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Regulatory Mortality(score 5.0)
Status of Critical Habitat (score 5.0)
Proportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party Certification(score 1.0)
According to the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), Peru obtained in 2018 a score of 61.92.
The lack of monitoring and supervision systems in the landing points have caused that both species are considered to be fully exploited.
Considering the lack of supervision and monitoring at the landing points, it is likely that most chub mackerel and jack mackerel landings do not comply with the regulatory mortality.
The damage caused by the seine nets (main fishing gears used in this fishery) in the critical habitats is considered as non-significant and non-threatened.
None of the chub mackerel and jack mackerel landings have been certificated by a third party.
The country has an acceptable per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity basis, and a good score from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.
There is a maximum catch quota that is set annually (in 2019 the quota was 5,400 tons), but no individual quotas are assigned per boat.
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
HarvestRights(score 1.0)
ECOLOGY 4.0
According to an Oceana report, approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. In addition, there are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative.
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.5 CHUB MACKEREL AND JACK MACKEREL (CABALLA AND JUREL IN SPANISH)
7.5.1 ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT DIMENSIONS
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
100 101Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
HarvestAssets(score 3.0)
Harvest(score 3.0)
ManagerialReturns(score 4.5)
Economic Conditions(score 4.0)
GeneralEnvironmentalPerformance(score 4.0)
Career(score 4.3)
Local Labor(score 3.5)
Labor Returns(score 2.0)
Governance(score 3.0)
ProductForm (score 2.3)
Trade(score 2.5)
The stocks situation limits the ability to extract resources. In addition, a high percentage of landings goes to low value markets.
The type of work performed by the agents of the sector allows their income to be above regional earnings and their alternative economic activity.
Despite the poor governance of the sector and the negative effects of El Niño event, the country’s economic and environmental conditions are stable.
We assume that much of the value of the fleet has depreciated (given its antiquity). In order to renew the harvest assets, fishers can access to loans at low interest rates and public fundings.
The average earnings per boat owner and processing owner are higher than the average earnings in their regions and than their alternative economic activiry since their work is comparable with management and skilled jobs.
The country has an acceptable per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity basis, and a good score from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.
According to the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), Peru obtained in 2018 a score of 61.92.
According to IMARPE, the chub mackerel and jack mackerel harvesting are above their MSY established. Hence, since 2017 different strategies are being implemented in order to recover both resources.
Fishers have an average of more than 10 years of work experience, while processing plant workers have between 3 and 5 years of experience.
Around 87% of the chub mackerel and 12% of the jack mackerel landings are exported to low value markets (chub mackerel mainly to Ghana and Nigeria, and jack mackerel mainly to Brazil and France).
There is a considerable percentage of non-local boat owners.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
The weak governance, the low compliance with existing regulations and the persistent corruption and informality in the sector hinder adequate management.
Not all the final product is processed, the availability of raw material is variable and for the artisanal fleet there is a reduced value chain in the fishery. Low -value human consumption.
ECONOMICS 2.7
COMMUNITY 3.7
MACRO FACTORS 3.8
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
FishingAccessRights(score 3.8)
Community(score 3.5)
Data(score 4.0)
ManagementInputs(score 3.5)
Collective Action(score 2.3)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Gender(score 2.3)
Harvest Rights(score 1.0)
The absence of strong social organizations and the low participation of women in the value chain affects the performance of this indicator.
Information on ex-vessel prices and landings is available. In addition, IMARPE performs periodic evaluation of the stocks’ status for these resources.
Within these fisheries, there are fishing access rights established. However, there are no individual quotas per boat.
All boats must have a valid fishing permit to carry out extractuve activities. These permits have high flexibility, durability and security.
There are large groups of unions and collective institurions that lead the management of this fishery. In addition, the harvesters and non-harvesters do not present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity, social status or religion beliefs.
For this fishery, the information about landings and ex-vessel prices is available in public sources. In addition, there is monthly biological information that is used to design public policies.
Both species are found within the Peruvian exclusive zone but also in Oceanic waters under the jurisdiction of the IATTC. PRODUCE establishes the annual capture quota for both species and the IATTC supports their management.
Around 44% of fishers are members of associations related to the chub mackerel harvesting and 53% of fishers are organized in the jack mackerel fishery. There associations do not have an important impact on the resources’s management.
There is no active participation of women in the harvest and post-harvest activities.
PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY 2.4
CO-MANAGEMENT 2.6
MANAGEMENT 3.2
There is a maximum capture quota that is set annually (in 2019 the quota was 5,400 tons), but no individual quotas are assigned per boat.
According to an Oceana report, approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocea is considered a protected and reserved marine area. In addition, there are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative (community management regions) for this fishery.
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.5.2 ANALYSIS OF INPUT DIMENSIONS
102 103Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance: Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Infrastructure(score 3.5)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.7)
Despite adequate access to technology at landing points and int eh fleet, high export rates and lack of market information limit acces to competitive prices
On average, for both fisheries the fleet an the landing points have access to navigation and communication technology.
This fishery faces a high tariff barriers for export and few local and international buyers. In addition, the fishers have low bargaining power; hence it is not possible to negotiate the prices of the products.
POST-HARVEST 3.1
ECOLOGY COMMUNITY
Fish
Sto
ck H
ealt
h &
En
viro
nmen
tal P
erfo
rman
ce
Car
eer
Com
mun
ity
Serv
ices
Hea
lth
& S
anit
atio
n
Har
vest
Labo
r ret
urns
Har
vest
Ass
ets
Man
ager
ial R
etur
ns
Prod
uct
Form
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Ris
k
Trad
e
Loca
l Lab
or
Post
-Har
vest
Ass
et
Perf
orm
ance
ECONOMICS
GRAPH 7.5.3 : Output dimensions
3.8
3.8
3.5 3.5
3.5 3.5
4.3 4.04.0
2.0 2.3 2.52.7 2.7
2.7
3.03.0
4.5
CO-MANAGEMENT
Col
lect
ive
Auc
tion
Com
mun
ity
Gen
der
Part
icip
atio
n
Dat
a
Econ
omic
Con
diti
ons
Man
agem
ent
Inpu
ts
Gen
eral
Env
rionm
enta
l Pe
rfor
man
ce
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Gov
erna
nce
Mar
kets
&M
arke
t In
stit
utio
ns
Fish
ing
Acc
ess
Rig
hts
Har
vest
Rig
hts
Exog
enou
s En
viro
nmen
tal
Fact
ors
Man
agem
ent
Met
hods
MACRO FACTORS MANAGEMENT POST-HARVEST PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSABILITY
GRAPH 7.5.4 : Input dimensions
2.32.3 2.5
4.0 4.0 4.0 4.03.0
3.5
2.0
1.0
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
TABLE 7.5.1 : Output indicators scores
Percentage of Stocks OverfishedDegree of OverfishingStock Declining, Stable or RebuildingRegulatory MortalitySelectivityIllegal, Unregulated or Unreported LandingsStatus of Critical HabitatProportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party CertificationLandings LevelExcess CapacitySeason LengthEx-Vessel Price cf. Historic HighRatio of Asset Value to Gross EarningsTotal Revenue cf. Historic HighAsset Value cf. Historic HaighBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of CapitalFunctionality of Harvest CapitalAnnual Total Revenue Volatility Annual Landings Volatility Intra-annual Landings Volatility Annual Price VolatilityIntra-annual Price VolatilitySpatial Price VolatilityInternational TradeFinal Market WealthWholesale Price cf. Similar ProductsCapacity of Firms to Export to the US & EUProcessing YieldShrinkCapacity Utilization Rate Product ImprovementFinal Market UseEx-vessel to Wholesale Marketing MarginsBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of Capital Age of Facilities
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ECO
LOGY
ECO
NO
MIC
S
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
ProductForm
Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
104 105Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Local Ownership
Career
Local Labor
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
Captains Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCaptains wage cf. Non-fishery wagesCaptain Social StandingProcessing Owners Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsProcessing Owners Wages cf. Non-fishery WagesProcessing Owners Social Standing Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCrew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Crew Social StandingProcessing Workers Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings Processing Workers Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Processing Workers Social Standing Harvest SafetyAccess to Health Care for CaptainsAccess to Health Care for CrewAccess to Health Care for Processing OwnersAccess to Health Care for Processing WorkersSanitationRegional Support BusinessesContestability & Legal ChallengesEducation Access for Harvest CaptainsEducation Access for CrewEducation Access for Processing OwnersEducation Access for Processing WorkersNonresident Employment as CaptainsNonresident Ownership of Processing CapacityNonresident Employment as CrewNonresident Employment as Processing WorkersCrew ExperienceAge Structure of HarverstersWorker Experience
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ExogenousEnvironmental
Factors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General Environmental
Factors
MAC
RO F
ACTO
RS
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TY
CollectiveAction
Participation
Community
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Disease and PathogensNatural Disasters and CatastrophesPollution Shocks and AccidentsLevel of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)Governance QualityGovernance ResponsivenessIndex of Economic FreedomGross Domestic Product (GDP) Per CapitaProportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited AccessTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based ManagementTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & AccessHarvester Organization Influence on Business & MarketingDays in Stakeholder MeetingsIndustry Financial Support for ManagementLeadershipSocial CohesionBusiness Management InfluenceResource Management InfluenceLabor Participation in Harvest SectorLabor Participation in Post-Harvest Sector
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Component Dimension
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
TABLE 7.5.2: INPUT COMPONENTS SCORES
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
106 107Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest Enforcement CapabilityManagement JurisdictionLevel of SubsidiesData AvailabilityData AnalysisMPAs and SanctuariesSpatial ManagementFishing Mortality LimitsLandings Pricing SystemAvailability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity InformationNumber of BuyersDegree of Vertical IntegrationLevel of TariffsLevel of Non-tariff BarriersInternational Shipping ServiceRoad QualityTechnology AdoptionExtension ServiceReliability of Utilities/ElectricityAccess to Ice & Refrigeration
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
Data
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Peru’s shrimp fishery covers a group of decapod crustaceans most commonly encountered on the floor of the continental shelf. These resources are widely distributed throughout the eastern Pacific coast and have a preference for warm temperatures; as such, the Peruvian fishery tends to be boosted by the occurrence of El Niño – Southern Oscillation (ENSO) event. Harvesting is carried out mainly by trawlers. The ports of Pizarro and La Cruz, in the Tumbes region, record high landed volumes of this species. It is a sought-after resource whose price has been on the rise. The product is sold largely in frozen and fresh form to the United States, Spain and France. The fishery has no FMR in place, but there is an annual closed season. In general, the information available for this fishery is scarce and there is uncertainty about its exploitation status, which can have a negative impact on the sustainability of the resource (taking into account its open access regime).
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
Production Form
Post-Harvest AssetPerformance
Shrimp Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
ManagerialReturns
Labor Returns
Health & Sanitation
Community Services
Local Ownership
LocalLabor
Career
GRAPH 7.6.1 : Output indicatorsDimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Harvest(score 4.3)
ProductForm(score 2.3)
Low volatility in the annual shrimp landings and market prices. In addition, there are not important changes between regional market prices.
Although in 2017, 70% of the shrimp landings was exported to the US and the EU, the exported products show no value-added. In addition, 62% of this fishery is lost due to processing activities.
There is no available information about the shrimp biomass and its MSY. However, the average landings in the last three years (2016-2018) show that there is excess capacity in the fleet.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average and their alternative economic activity.
Risk(score 4.5)
LaborReturns(score 1.8)
General Environmental Performance Exogenous
EnvironmentalFactors
Governance
HarvestRights
EconomicConditions
Fishing Access Rights
CollectiveAction
Shrimp Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Participation
Gender
Community
ManagementInputs
Data
ManagementMethods
Markets & Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
GRAPH 7.6.2 : Input componentsDimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
EconomicCondition(score 4.0)
ManagementMethods(score 1.3)
The current regulation in economic matters (fiscal and monetary) has facilitated the entry of investments and integration with the global economy.
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative for this fishery.
The National Fishing Society has an active participation in the improvement of the management of this fishery. In addition, the harvester and non-harvesters do not present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity, social status or religion beliefs.
There are no individial quotas per vessel, nor a maximum limit of total catch.
ExogenousEnvironmentalFactors(score 4.4)
HarvestRights(score 1.0)
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.6 SHRIMP (LANGOSTINO IN SPANISH)
Component Dimension
109Peru Coastal Fisheries - Challenge Fund Initiative108 Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Only one dimension: “Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance”
Metrics with BETTER performance: Metrics with WORSE performance:
RegulatoryMortality(score 5.0)
Ilegal, Unregulated or Unreported Landings(score 1.0)
Percentage of Stocks Overfished(score 1.0)
There is overfishing of juveniles of different shrimp species by artisanal fishers and a high of unreported and illegal fishing.
Considering the low surveillance in te landing points and the lack of available information about the different species within this fishery, it is likely that most of the shrimp landings do not comply with the regulatory mortality framework.
The stock status of the different types of shrimps is considered unknown. However, some studies state that artisanal fishers near the shore overfish younger individuals.
According to the Ministry of Production (PRODUCE), between 60% to 75% of the landings of artisanal fisheries (like bonito) incur in some irregularity.
ECOLOGY 2.3
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Risk(score 4.5)
Harvest(score 4.3)
LocalLabor(score 4.0)
LocalOwnership(score 4.0)
CommunityServices(score 3.0)
LaborReturns(score 1.8)
Post-HarvestAssetPerformance(score 2.7)
ProductForm(score 2.3)
Little volatility of the shrimp landings and its prices. However, the fishing gears used are obsolete and there are no value-added products.
In this fishery, the resource users are local residents and have a a high number of years of experience. In addition, managers have better returns than fishers and processing workers. However, there is reduced access to higher education.
There is low volatility in landings and annual market prices. In addition, shrimp market prices have little variations between regions.
The shrimp biomass and its Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) is unknown. However, the average landings in the last three years (2016-2018) suggest that there is an excess if capacity in the shrimp fleet.
A high percentage of fishers and processing workers are local residents.
A high percentage of boat and processing plants owners are local residents.
The antiquity of the equipment and the infrastructure used for extraction and processing activities limit the increase in income levels and affect the sustainability of the resource (due to the use of seine nets).
Access to education by the family members of fishers and processing workers is limited. In addition, few suppliers provide inputs for fishing trips and the processing activities.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average and their alternative economic activity.
Although in 2017, 70% of the shrimp landings was exported to the US and the EU, the exported products show no value-added. In addition, 62% of this fishery is lost due to processing activities.
ECONOMICS 3.6
COMMUNITY 3.4
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
FishingAccessRights(score 3.5)
Community(score 3.0)
Participation(score 2.5)
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
CollectiveAction(score 2.3)
Governance(score 3.0)
Gender(score 2.3)
Harvest Rights(score 1.0)
The absence of strong social organizations and the low participation of women in the value chain affect the performance of this fishery in this indicator.
Good environmental performance and low vulnerability to climate events. However, it coexistes with the low institutionality of the sector.
Within this fishery, there are fishing access rights established. However, there are no individual quotas per boat, nor an annual total quota.
All boats must have a valid fishing permit to carry out extractive activities. These permits have high flexibility, durability and security.
There are no recognized leaders, hence the impact of organizations in this fishery management is null. Harvesters and non-harvesters do not present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity social status or beliefs.
Fishers dedicate a few days a year to meetings with stakeholders. Likewise, the public budget for the fishing sector is much greater than the contributions it receives from fishing royalties.
The current regulation in economic matters (fiscal and monetary) has facilitated the entry of investments and integration with the global economy.
There are no individual quotas per vessel, nor a maximum limit of total catch.
There is no active participation of women in the harvest and post-harvest activities.
The weak governance, the low compliance with existing regulations and the persistent corruption and informality in the sector hinder adequate management.
Around 44% of the fishers are members of associations. These associations do not have an important impact on the resources’ management.
PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY 2.3
CO-MANAGEMENT 2.5
MACRO FACTORS 3.9
ExogenousEnvironmental Factors(score 4.4)
There is no evidence that shrimp is affected by exogenous disease, pathogens, plastic waste, toxic algaes or similar factors. La Niña event affects negatively the resource biomass, but to a low extent.
7.6.1 ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT DIMENSIONS
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.6.2 ANALYSIS OF INPUT DIMENSIONS
110 111Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance: Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Data(score 2.0)
ManagementInputs(score 2.8)
ManagementMethods(score 1.3)
Poor management tools and methods, and little or no precise knowledge about the situation of the shrimp stock represent a problem fot hhe sustainable development of the fishery.
The government expenditure in the management of this resource is insufficient.
There are no stock assessments of this fishery, nor information for scientific purposes. Due to the composition of the fishery, the price and quantity of the landings are not very precise.
Approximately 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing frounds managed through a TURF or cooperative (community management regions) for this fishery.
MANAGEMENT 2.0
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
ECOLOGY COMMUNITY
Fish
Sto
ck H
ealt
h &
En
viro
nmen
tal P
erfo
rman
ce
Car
eer
Com
mun
ity
Serv
ices
Hea
lth
& S
anit
atio
n
Har
vest
Labo
r ret
urns
Har
vest
Ass
ets
Man
ager
ial R
etur
ns
Prod
uct
Form
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Ris
k
Trad
e
Loca
l Lab
or
Post
-Har
vest
Ass
et
Perf
orm
ance
ECONOMICS
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Infrastructure(score 2.8)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.3)
The access infrastructure to the landing points is inadequate. There is no access to competitive prices due to lack of information of market prices
The access infrastructure to the landing points is not adequate. However, there is access to refrigeration and waste management services.
The fishery faces moderate tariff and non-tariff barriers for exports. There is abscense of market information. In addition, the number of local and international buyers is reduced.
POST-HARVEST 2.6
GRAPH 7.6.3 : Output dimensions
4.0 4.3 4.5 4.34.0
1.82.32.3
3.7 3.7 3.8
2.73.33.0
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
CO-MANAGEMENT
Col
lect
ive
Auc
tion
Com
mun
ity
Gen
der
Part
icip
atio
n
Dat
a
Econ
omic
Con
diti
ons
Man
agem
ent
Inpu
ts
Gen
eral
Env
rionm
enta
l Pe
rfor
man
ce
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Gov
erna
nce
Mar
kets
&M
arke
t In
stit
utio
ns
Fish
ing
Acc
ess
Rig
hts
Har
vest
Rig
hts
Exog
enou
s En
viro
nmen
tal
Fact
ors
Man
agem
ent
Met
hods
MACRO FACTORS MANAGEMENT POST-HARVEST PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSABILITY
GRAPH 7.6.4 : Input dimensions
2.32.3 2.5
4.04.4
4.03.03.0
2.8 2.83.5
2.0 2.3
1.01.3
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
TABLE 7.6.1: Output indicators scores
Percentage of Stocks OverfishedDegree of OverfishingStock Declining, Stable or RebuildingRegulatory MortalitySelectivityIllegal, Unregulated or Unreported LandingsStatus of Critical HabitatProportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party CertificationLandings LevelExcess CapacitySeason LengthEx-Vessel Price cf. Historic HighRatio of Asset Value to Gross EarningsTotal Revenue cf. Historic HighAsset Value cf. Historic HaighBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of CapitalFunctionality of Harvest CapitalAnnual Total Revenue Volatility Annual Landings Volatility Intra-annual Landings Volatility Annual Price VolatilityIntra-annual Price VolatilitySpatial Price Volatility
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ECO
LOGY
ECO
NO
MIC
S
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
112 113Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
METRICS METRICS1 12 23 34 45 5Indicator IndicatorDimension Dimension
International TradeFinal Market WealthWholesale Price cf. Similar ProductsCapacity of Firms to Export to the US & EUProcessing YieldShrinkCapacity Utilization Rate Product ImprovementFinal Market UseEx-vessel to Wholesale Marketing MarginsBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of Capital Age of FacilitiesCaptains Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCaptains wage cf. Non-fishery wagesCaptain Social StandingProcessing Owners Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsProcessing Owners Wages cf. Non-fishery WagesProcessing Owners Social Standing Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCrew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Crew Social StandingProcessing Workers Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings Processing Workers Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Processing Workers Social Standing Harvest SafetyAccess to Health Care for CaptainsAccess to Health Care for CrewAccess to Health Care for Processing OwnersAccess to Health Care for Processing WorkersSanitationRegional Support BusinessesContestability & Legal ChallengesEducation Access for Harvest CaptainsEducation Access for Crew
Trade
ProductForm
Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
ExogenousEnvironmental
Factors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General Environmental
Factors
MAC
RO F
ACTO
RS
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TY
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Disease and PathogensNatural Disasters and CatastrophesPollution Shocks and AccidentsLevel of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)Governance QualityGovernance ResponsivenessIndex of Economic FreedomGross Domestic Product (GDP) Per CapitaProportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited AccessTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based ManagementTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivity
Education Access for Processing OwnersEducation Access for Processing WorkersNonresident Employment as CaptainsNonresident Ownership of Processing CapacityNonresident Employment as CrewNonresident Employment as Processing WorkersCrew ExperienceAge Structure of HarverstersWorker Experience
COM
MU
NIT
Y
CommunityServices
LocalOwnership
LocalLabor
Career
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5DimensionComponent
TABLE 7.6.2: Input components scores
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
114 115Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Participation
Community
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest Enforcement CapabilityManagement JurisdictionLevel of SubsidiesData AvailabilityData AnalysisMPAs and SanctuariesSpatial ManagementFishing Mortality LimitsLandings Pricing SystemAvailability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity InformationNumber of BuyersDegree of Vertical IntegrationLevel of TariffsLevel of Non-tariff BarriersInternational Shipping ServiceRoad QualityTechnology AdoptionExtension ServiceReliability of Utilities/ElectricityAccess to Ice & Refrigeration
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
Data
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Days in Stakeholder MeetingsIndustry Financial Support for ManagementLeadershipSocial CohesionBusiness Management InfluenceResource Management InfluenceLabor Participation in Harvest SectorLabor Participation in Post-Harvest Sector
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
Production Form
Post-Harvest AssetPerformance
Peruvian Hake Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
ManagerialReturns
Labor Returns
Health & Sanitation
Community Services
Local Ownership
LocalLabor
Career
The Peruvian hake fishery (merluccius gayi) is the most representative and important of the country’s demersal fisheries. The distribution, availability and abundance of this species has been historically affected by variations in oceanographic conditions and intensive fishing effort. All of this led to closure of access to this fishery in 2001. Peruvian hake is harvested primarily by trawlers and line vessels, from the northern limit (marked by the border with Ecuador) to around the 6th parallel south. However, in normal environmental conditions the species extends to around the 10th parallel south. It even reaches 15°-18°S during ENSO events, when the Cromwell Current produces oxygenation of the seabed. The main landing ports are Paita and El Ñuro, both in the Piura region. The fishery is covered by FMR, catch limits per vessel and annual closed periods, all of which have aided the recovery of stocks.
GRAPH 7.7.1 : Output indicators
Dimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
ManagerialReturns(score 4.5)
Post-HarvestAssetPerformance(score 2.7)
On average, earnings of owners or captains, processing owners and managers are higher than the regional average earnings.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
The landings level is less than the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). There is no evidence of excess capacity.
Evidence suggests that formal financial institutions do not provide funding for ex-post harvest activities within fishery. Mainly the financing depends on intermediaries that provide access to transportation and other ex-post harvest supply chain activities.
Harvest(score 4.3)
LaborReturns(score 2.3)
1
2
3
4
5
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5DimensionComponent 7.7 PERUVIAN HAKE (MERLUZA IN SPANISH)
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
Proportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & AccessHarvester Organization Influence on Business & Marketing
CollectiveAction
116 117Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
General Environmental Performance Exogenous
EnvironmentalFactors
Governance
HarvestRights
EconomicConditions
Fishing Access Rights
CollectiveAction
Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
Only one dimension: “Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance”
Participation
Gender
Community
ManagementInputs
Data
ManagementMethods
Markets & Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
GRAPH 7.7.2 : Input componentsDimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Metrics with BETTER performance: Metrics with WORSE performance:
Fishing AccessRights(score 4.2)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Stock Declining Stable or Rebuilding(score 5.0)
Percentage of Stocks Overfished(score 5.0)
Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported Landings(score 2.0)
In order to harvest hake, the boat owners must have an available fishing permit. This one has a high transferability, security and durability.
High performance due to the sustainable management of the stock, although the presence of informality and the lack of certification affect the indicator.
IMARPE states that the Peruvian hake biomass has shown a progressive recovery since 2007 and has remained above the recommended levels.
According to IMARPE, the species is considered in recovery. Additionally, the status of resource is highly dependent on oceanographic conditions, which are difficult to predict.
According to the National Sea Institute (IMARPE) between 2012 and 2017 the Peruvian hake landings were 35% higher than what it’s officially registered and established in annual quotas.
There is no evidence that Peruvian Hake is affected by exogenous disease, pathogens or similar factors, nor the pollution of tis environment.
ExogenousEnvironmentalFactors(score 4.2)
HarvestRights(score 2.0)
ECOLOGY 4.0
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Harvest(score 4.3)
ManagerialReturns(score 4.5)
ExogenousEnvironmental Factors(score 4.2)
HarvestAssets(score 3.5)
Health &Sanitation(score 4.2)
Labor Returns(score 2.3)
CommunityServices(score 3.7)
Governance(score 3.0)
ProductForm (score 2.7)
Post-Harvest Asset Performance(score 2.7)
Sustainable capture of the species, low volatility of annual landings, and little or no added value of the final product.
Adequate access to health services by managers and workers, although the income gap is significant.
The species does not show negative effect due to exogenous diseases, pathogens or environmental pollution, but the weak institutionally of the sector hinders fishing management.
The landings level is less than the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). There is no evidence of excess capacity.
On average earnings of owners or captains, processing owners and managers are higher than the regional average earnings.
There is no evidence that Peruvian hake is affected by exogenous disease, pathogens or similar factors, nor the pollution of its environment.
In this fishery, the harvest assets are older but well maintained. In addition, fishers can access to low interest rates through public sources to renew the assets. Hence, the current revenue of the fleet is still above past levels.
High harvest safety. In addition the access to health care is good between owners or captains, processing owners and managers.
Evidence suggests that formal financial institutions do not provide funding for ex-post harvest activities within this fishery. Mainly the financing depends on intermediaries that provide access to transportation and other ex-post harvest supply chain activities.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
Political activity limits in a medium grade the ability to implement effective fishing regulations.
The governement effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, accountability and political stability are not having a good performance in the country.
According to INFOPES, in 2015 less than 1% of the Peruvian Hake ladings ended up in value-added products.
ECONOMICS 3.2
COMMUNITY 3.8
MACRO FACTORS 3.8
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative for this fishery.
Only 29% of the fishers are members of organizaed associations. These harvest organizations do not have active efforts or capacity to influence business operations.
1
2
3
4
5
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.7.1 ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT DIMENSIONS
7.7.2 ANALYSIS OF INPUT DIMENSIONS
Peruvian Hake
118 119Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
FishingAccessRights(score 4.2)
Community(score 3.5)
Data(score 4.0)
Collective Action(score 2.0)
ManagementInputs(score 2.8)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Gender(score 2.3)
Harvest Rights(score 3.0)
The absence of strong social organizations and the low participation of women in the value chain affects the performance of this indicator.
Available information of ex-vessel prices and landings. However, the management inputs and methods are insufficient.
The fishers need an available fishing permit to extract the resources and the government assigns each year an individual quota per each vessel.
In order to harvest hake, the boat owners must have an available fishing permit. This one has a high transferability, security and durability.
The harvesters do not present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity, social status or religion beliefs. In case the differences actually exist, these do not represent a problem to guarantee the social cohesioin of the fishing activity within the communities.
Landing’s data is collected and comprehensive. There is available information about prices in several cities and points of sail, but there is a lack of knowledge in how the economic variables should be integrated in the analysis.
The Ministy of Production establishes an ITQ per year. The Peruvian Sea Institute (IMARPE in spanish) recommends the annual quota that will be allocated among specific boar owners.
Very low labor participation of women in post-harvest sector, and even worse in harvest sector. But there is women’s influence in the management of the resource because important positions related to the fishing industry are currently assigned to women.
The stock is not under a single jurisdiction. The same stock is in Peru and Ecuador, and each country manages it with its own regulatory and scientific authority.
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing frounds managed through a TURF or cooperative (community management regions) for this fishery.
Only 29% of the fishers are members of organized associations. These harvester organization do nor have active effort or capacity to influence business operations.
PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY 3.6
CO-MANAGEMENT 2.6
MANAGEMENT 2.9
Dimensions with BETTER performance: Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Infrastructure(score 3.8)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.2)
Vessels have acceptable navigation and communication technologies, although they face high export tariffs.
The percentage of vessels and landing points with access to a navigation (sonar, radar, among others) and communications (VHF radiom cellphones, among others) is sufficiently high.
This fishery faces a high level of tariffs and a considerable level of non-tariff barriers. Its degree of vertical integration is less than 35% of harvest.
POST-HARVEST 3.0
ECOLOGY COMMUNITY
Fish
Sto
ck H
ealt
h &
En
viro
nmen
tal P
erfo
rman
ce
Car
eer
Com
mun
ity
Serv
ices
Hea
lth
& S
anit
atio
n
Har
vest
Labo
r ret
urns
Har
vest
Ass
ets
Man
ager
ial R
etur
ns
Prod
uct
Form
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Ris
k
Trad
e
Loca
l Lab
or
Post
-Har
vest
Ass
et
Perf
orm
ance
ECONOMICS
GRAPH 7.7.3 : Output dimensions
4.04.03.7
4.0 4.24.0
2.3 2.7 2.7 3.03.33.5
4.54.3
CO-MANAGEMENT
Col
lect
ive
Auc
tion
Com
mun
ity
Gen
der
Part
icip
atio
n
Dat
a
Econ
omic
Con
diti
ons
Man
agem
ent
Inpu
ts
Gen
eral
Env
rionm
enta
l Pe
rfor
man
ce
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Gov
erna
nce
Mar
kets
&M
arke
t In
stit
utio
ns
Fish
ing
Acc
ess
Rig
hts
Har
vest
Rig
hts
Exog
enou
s En
viro
nmen
tal
Fact
ors
Man
agem
ent
Met
hods
MACRO FACTORS MANAGEMENT POST-HARVEST PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSABILITY
GRAPH 7.7.4 : Input dimensions
2.3 2.5
4.0 4.2 4.0 4.03.0 3.0
2.8
4.23.5
2.0 2.22.0
3.8
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
120 121Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
TABLE 7.7.1 : Output indicators scores
Percentage of Stocks OverfishedDegree of OverfishingStock Declining, Stable or RebuildingRegulatory MortalitySelectivityIllegal, Unregulated or Unreported LandingsStatus of Critical HabitatProportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party CertificationLandings LevelExcess CapacitySeason LengthEx-Vessel Price cf. Historic HighRatio of Asset Value to Gross EarningsTotal Revenue cf. Historic HighAsset Value cf. Historic HaighBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of CapitalFunctionality of Harvest CapitalAnnual Total Revenue Volatility Annual Landings Volatility Intra-annual Landings Volatility Annual Price VolatilityIntra-annual Price VolatilitySpatial Price VolatilityInternational TradeFinal Market WealthWholesale Price cf. Similar ProductsCapacity of Firms to Export to the US & EUProcessing YieldShrinkCapacity Utilization Rate Product ImprovementFinal Market UseEx-vessel to Wholesale Marketing MarginsBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of Capital Age of Facilities
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ECO
LOGY
ECO
NO
MIC
S
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
ProductForm
Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
Local Ownership
Career
Local Labor
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
Captains Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCaptains wage cf. Non-fishery wagesCaptain Social StandingProcessing Owners Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsProcessing Owners Wages cf. Non-fishery WagesProcessing Owners Social Standing Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCrew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Crew Social StandingProcessing Workers Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings Processing Workers Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Processing Workers Social Standing Harvest SafetyAccess to Health Care for CaptainsAccess to Health Care for CrewAccess to Health Care for Processing OwnersAccess to Health Care for Processing WorkersSanitationRegional Support BusinessesContestability & Legal ChallengesEducation Access for Harvest CaptainsEducation Access for CrewEducation Access for Processing OwnersEducation Access for Processing WorkersNonresident Employment as CaptainsNonresident Ownership of Processing CapacityNonresident Employment as CrewNonresident Employment as Processing WorkersCrew ExperienceAge Structure of HarverstersWorker Experience
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
122 123Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
ExogenousEnvironmental
Factors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General Environmental
Factors
MAC
RO F
ACTO
RS
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TY
CollectiveAction
Participation
Community
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Disease and PathogensNatural Disasters and CatastrophesPollution Shocks and AccidentsLevel of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)Governance QualityGovernance ResponsivenessIndex of Economic FreedomGross Domestic Product (GDP) Per CapitaProportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited AccessTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based ManagementTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & AccessHarvester Organization Influence on Business & MarketingDays in Stakeholder MeetingsIndustry Financial Support for ManagementLeadershipSocial CohesionBusiness Management InfluenceResource Management InfluenceLabor Participation in Harvest SectorLabor Participation in Post-Harvest Sector
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5ComponentComponent
DimensionDimension
Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest Enforcement CapabilityManagement JurisdictionLevel of SubsidiesData AvailabilityData AnalysisMPAs and SanctuariesSpatial ManagementFishing Mortality LimitsLandings Pricing SystemAvailability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity InformationNumber of BuyersDegree of Vertical IntegrationLevel of TariffsLevel of Non-tariff BarriersInternational Shipping ServiceRoad QualityTechnology AdoptionExtension ServiceReliability of Utilities/ElectricityAccess to Ice & Refrigeration
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
Data
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
The mahi mahi fishery (coryphaena hippurus) is the second-biggest artisanal fishery in Peru. It has grown markedly in recent years, exceeding 60,000 landed tons in 2015. The species is considered highly resistant due to its considerable growth and fertility rates, early sexual maturity and near-constant year-round spawning. Mahi mahi is fished primarily by artisanal line vessels and to a lesser extent by trammel netters, though the market tends to express a preference for the former. The foremost export market for the catch, primarily in frozen form, is the United States. It is a highly migratory species with a preference for warm waters. In Peru, mahi mahi can be found at distances beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast, with the highest volume of landings recorded during the summer months. Minimum catch sizes and a closure period are the chief management tools established for this fishery. It is open-access, causing negative repercussions for the sustainability of the resource.
TABLE 7.7.2 : Input components scores
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.8 MAHI MAHI (PERICO IN SPANISH)
124 125Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
Production Form
Post-Harvest AssetPerformance
Mahi Mahi Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
ManagerialReturns
Labor Returns
Health & Sanitation
Community Services
Local Ownership
LocalLabor
Career
GRAPH 7.8.1 : Output indicatorsDimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Career(score 4.0)
ProductForm(score 2.2)
The average earnings per boat owner and processing owner are higher than the average earnings in their regions and than their alternative economic activity.
In 2017, 28% of mahi mahi landings was exported to the US and the EU. In addition, 69% of this fishery is lost due to processing activities and it has shown poor development in its value chain.
Fishers have an average of more than 10 years of work experience, while processing plant workers have less than 3 years of experience.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average and their alternative economic activity.
ManagerialReturns(score 4.2)
LaborReturns(score 1.8)
General Environmental Performance Exogenous
EnvironmentalFactors
Governance
HarvestRights
EconomicConditions
Fishing Access Rights
CollectiveAction
Mahi Mahi Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
Participation
Gender
Community
ManagementInputs
Data
ManagementMethods
Markets & Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
GRAPH 7.8.2 : Input componentsDimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
ManagementMethods(score 1.3)
ExogenousEnvironmentalFactors(score 4.4)
HarvestRights(score 1.0)
Only one dimension: “Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance”
Metrics with BETTER performance: Metrics with WORSE performance:
Percentageof StocksOverfished(score 5.0)
Degree of Overfishing-Stock Status(score 5.0)
Ilegal, Unregulated or Unreported Landings(score 1.0)
The sustainability of the species allows the good performance of the indicator, despite the informality of the sector.
According to INFOPES, there is no available information regarding the mahi mahi stock. Hence its status is unkwnown.
Despite not having a deep knowledge of its status in the South Pacific, the high resistance to overfishing and the rapid growth of this species contribute to maintain apparent healthy levels.
According to the Ministry of Production (PRODUCE), between 60% to 75% of the landings of artisanal fisheries (like bonito) incur in some irregularity.
ECOLOGY 4.0
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Harvest(score 3.5)
Trade(score 3.5)
ManagerialReturns(score 4.2)
Career(score 4.0)
CommunityServices(score 3.5)
LaborReturns(score 1.8)
Post-HarvestAssetPerformance(score 2.7)
ProductForm(score 2.2)
The high quantities landed and exported improve the result in this indicator, despite the low added value of the products and the antiquity of the equipment used for extraction.
In this fishery, the resource users are local residents and have a a high number of years of experience. In addition, managers have better returns than workers in extractive and non-extractive activities
The resource has a Fishing Improvement Program (FIP) which implies the identification and action on weak points of the fishery that undermine the sustainability of the population.
Around 39% of the mahi mahi fishery is exported (mainly to the US) and the remaining 61% is consumed locally. In additionm its wholesale price is 3% higher than the global average price of similar species.
The average earnings per boat owner and processing owner are higher than the average earnings in their region and than their alternative economic activity.
Fishers have an average of more than 10 years of work experience, while processing plant workers have less than 3 years of experience.
Formal financial institutions do not provide funding for ex-post harvest activities. The financing depends on intermediaries that provide transportation access and equipment.
Access to education by family members of fishers and processing workers is limited. There are different suppliers that provide inputs for the realization of the fishing trips and the processing activities.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average and their alternative economic activity.
In 2017, 28% of mahi mahi landing was exported to the US and EU. In addition, 69% of this fishery is lost due to processing activities and it has shown poor development in its value chain.
ECONOMICS 3.0
COMMUNITY 3.5
The current regulation in economic matters (fiscal and monetary) has facilitated the entry of investments and integration with the global economy.
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative for this fishery.
The National Fishing Society has an active participation in the improvement of the management of this fishery. In addition, the harvester and non-harvesters do not present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity, social status or religion beliefs.
There are no individial quotas per vessel, nor a maximum limit of total catch.
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.8.1 ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT DIMENSIONS
126 127Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
FishingAccessRights(score 3.5)
Community(score 3.0)
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
CollectiveAction(score 2.3)
Governance(score 3.0)
Gender(score 2.3)
Harvest Rights(score 1.0)
The absence of strong social organizations and the low participation of women in the value chain affect the performance of this indicator.
Despite the negative impact of La Niña phenomenon on the biomass, the good economic and environmental conditions explain the positive result in this indicator.
Within this fishery, there are fishing access rights established. However, there are no individual quotas per boat, nor an annual total quota.
All boats must have a valid fishing permit to carry out extractive activities. These permits have high flexibility, durability and security.
In this fishery, there are few recognized leaders. In addition, harvesters and non-harvesters do not present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity, social status or religion beliefs.
The current regulation in economic matters (fiscal and monetary) has facilitated the entry of investments and integration with theglobal economy.
There are no individual quotas per vessel, nor a maximum limit of total catch.
There is no active participation of women in the harvest and post-harvest activities. However, importan positions related to the fishing industry are currently held by women.
The weak governance, the low compliance with existing regulations and the persistent corruption and informality in the sector hinder adequate management.
Around 46% of the fishers are members of associations. These associations do not have an important impact on the resources’ management.
PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY 2.3
CO-MANAGEMENT 2.5
MACRO FACTORS 3.9 Dimensions with BETTER performance: Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Data(score 3.0)
ManagementInputs(score 3.3)
ManagementMethods(score 1.3)
Information on ex-vessel prices and landigns is available. However, stock assessments are not performed and management methods and tools are insufficient.
The government expenditure in the management of this resource is insufficient. On the other hand, organizations like the IATTC have established an agenda for research regarding mahi mahi conservancy.
The information about landings and ex-vessel prices is available in public sources (IMARPE’s web page). However, there is insufficiente information regarding the state of the mahi mahi biomass.
Approximately 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing frounds managed through a TURF or cooperative (community management regions) for this fishery.
MANAGEMENT 2.5
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
ECOLOGY COMMUNITY
Fish
Sto
ck H
ealt
h &
En
viro
nmen
tal P
erfo
rman
ce
Car
eer
Com
mun
ity
Serv
ices
Hea
lth
& S
anit
atio
n
Har
vest
Labo
r ret
urns
Har
vest
Ass
ets
Man
ager
ial R
etur
ns
Prod
uct
Form
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Ris
k
Trad
e
Loca
l Lab
or
Post
-Har
vest
Ass
et
Perf
orm
ance
ECONOMICS
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Infrastructure(score 3.2)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.7)
Inadequate infrastructure to the access of landing points limits access to internatioinal markets. In addition, the abscence of market information does not allow access to competitive prices.
The access infrastructure to the landing points is not adequate. This situation limits the export possibilities; however, on the landing points, there are always available transportation services.
There is no access to competitive prices due to limited information on market prices and high dependence on informal agents. The fishery does not face high tariffs or non-tariffs barriers.
POST-HARVEST 2.9
GRAPH 7.8.3 : Output dimensions
4.04.0 4.0
1.8 2.22.7
3.23.5
3.03.73.5 3.5 3.5
4.3
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
ExogenousEnvironmental Factors(score 4.4)
There is no evidence that mahi mahi is affected by exogenous disease, pathogens, plastic waste, toxic algae or similar factors. However La Niña event affects negatively the resources biomass.
7.8.2 ANALYSIS OF INPUT DIMENSIONS
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
128 129Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
CO-MANAGEMENT
Col
lect
ive
Auc
tion
Com
mun
ity
Gen
der
Part
icip
atio
n
Dat
a
Econ
omic
Con
diti
ons
Man
agem
ent
Inpu
ts
Gen
eral
Env
rionm
enta
l Pe
rfor
man
ce
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Gov
erna
nce
Mar
kets
&M
arke
t In
stit
utio
ns
Fish
ing
Acc
ess
Rig
hts
Har
vest
Rig
hts
Exog
enou
s En
viro
nmen
tal
Fact
ors
Man
agem
ent
Met
hods
MACRO FACTORS MANAGEMENT POST-HARVEST PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSABILITY
GRAPH 7.8.4 : Input dimensions
2.32.3 2.5
4.04.4
4.03.0 3.0 3.23.0 3.3 3.5
2.7
1.01.3
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
TABLE 7.8.1: Output indicators scores
Percentage of Stocks OverfishedDegree of OverfishingStock Declining, Stable or RebuildingRegulatory MortalitySelectivityIllegal, Unregulated or Unreported LandingsStatus of Critical HabitatProportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party CertificationLandings LevelExcess CapacitySeason LengthEx-Vessel Price cf. Historic HighRatio of Asset Value to Gross EarningsTotal Revenue cf. Historic HighAsset Value cf. Historic HaighBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of CapitalFunctionality of Harvest CapitalAnnual Total Revenue Volatility Annual Landings Volatility Intra-annual Landings Volatility Annual Price VolatilityIntra-annual Price VolatilitySpatial Price Volatility
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ECO
LOGY
ECO
NO
MIC
S
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
International TradeFinal Market WealthWholesale Price cf. Similar ProductsCapacity of Firms to Export to the US & EUProcessing YieldShrinkCapacity Utilization Rate Product ImprovementFinal Market UseEx-vessel to Wholesale Marketing MarginsBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of Capital Age of FacilitiesCaptains Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCaptains wage cf. Non-fishery wagesCaptain Social StandingProcessing Owners Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsProcessing Owners Wages cf. Non-fishery WagesProcessing Owners Social Standing Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCrew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Crew Social StandingProcessing Workers Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings Processing Workers Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Processing Workers Social Standing Harvest SafetyAccess to Health Care for CaptainsAccess to Health Care for CrewAccess to Health Care for Processing OwnersAccess to Health Care for Processing WorkersSanitationRegional Support BusinessesContestability & Legal ChallengesEducation Access for Harvest CaptainsEducation Access for Crew
Trade
ProductForm
Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
130 131Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
ExogenousEnvironmental
Factors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General Environmental
Factors
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TYM
ACRO
FAC
TOR
S
CollectiveAction
Participation
Community
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Disease and PathogensNatural Disasters and CatastrophesPollution Shocks and AccidentsLevel of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)Governance QualityGovernance ResponsivenessIndex of Economic FreedomGross Domestic Product (GDP) Per CapitaProportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited AccessTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based ManagementTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivity
METRICS
METRICS
METRICS1
1
12
2
23
3
34
4
45
5
5Indicator
Component
ComponentDimension
Dimension
Dimension
Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest Enforcement CapabilityManagement JurisdictionLevel of SubsidiesData AvailabilityData AnalysisMPAs and SanctuariesSpatial ManagementFishing Mortality LimitsLandings Pricing SystemAvailability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity InformationNumber of BuyersDegree of Vertical IntegrationLevel of TariffsLevel of Non-tariff BarriersInternational Shipping ServiceRoad QualityTechnology AdoptionExtension ServiceReliability of Utilities/ElectricityAccess to Ice & Refrigeration
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
Data
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Education Access for Processing OwnersEducation Access for Processing WorkersNonresident Employment as CaptainsNonresident Ownership of Processing CapacityNonresident Employment as CrewNonresident Employment as Processing WorkersCrew ExperienceAge Structure of HarverstersWorker Experience
CommunityServices
LocalOwnership
LocalLabor
Career
Proportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & AccessHarvester Organization Influence on Business & MarketingDays in Stakeholder MeetingsIndustry Financial Support for ManagementLeadershipSocial CohesionBusiness Management InfluenceResource Management InfluenceLabor Participation in Harvest SectorLabor Participation in Post-Harvest Sector
TABLE 7.8.2: Input components scores
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
133Peru Coastal Fisheries - Challenge Fund Initiative132 Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
Production Form
Post-Harvest AssetPerformance
Giant Squid Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
ManagerialReturns
Labor Returns
Health & Sanitation
Community Services
Local Ownership
LocalLabor
Career
The giant squid fishery (dosidicus gigas) is Peru’s second largest in terms of both volume landed and economic value. The resource is distributed along the coast, with a concentration that decreases from north to south and its landing is constant throughout the year, with vessels operating from the ports of Paita and Talara. Landings are constant throughout the year. Artisanal vessels account for most of this fishery, and the bulk of the catch is intended for direct human consumption (DHC), primarily in frozen and fresh forms. Since 2011 it has had fishery management regulations (FMR) in place, which establish the access regime and management framework. However, the fishery remains open access and does not apply individual quotas or royalties. This has negative repercussions on the sustainability of stocks and, thus, on the potential of what is one of Peru’s most important fisheries.
GRAPH 7.9.1 : Output indicators
Dimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
ManagerialReturns(score 4.3)
Productform(score 2.5)
The average earnings received by boat owners and processing managers are above the regional average earnings.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
Despite the harvest activities ocurred regularly, the landings did not exceed the annual quota established in 2018.
Almost 40% of total landings are lost due to handlings, spoilage, or theft. Likewise, added-value products (as canned products) contribute only 0.3% to the fishery total revenue.
Harvest(score 4.5)
LaborReturns(score 2.0)
General Environmental Performance Exogenous
EnvironmentalFactors
Governance
HarvestRights
EconomicConditions
Fishing Access Rights
CollectiveAction
Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Only one dimension: “Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance”
Participation
Gender
Community
ManagementInputs
Data
ManagementMethods
Markets & Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
GRAPH 7.9.2 : Input components
Dimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Metrics with BETTER performance: Metrics with WORSE performance:
Fishing AccessRights(score 4.0)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Degree of Overfishing-Stock Status(score 5.0)
Percentage of Stocks Overfished(score 5.0)
Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported Landings(score 2.0)
The species shows resilience to climate events such as La Niña o El Niño, diseases and pollution of its ecosystem.
Sustainable managemente of the species, despite the con-siderable degree of informality in the sector.
Its biological conditions facilitate the rapid growth of the species, allowing a large biomass to exist.
According to the National Sea Institute (IMARPE) the giant squid is still underexploited.
High informality in this sector. Free access regime for artisanal boats and a high presence of foreign vessels in exclusive areas.
Flexibility in the transfer of fishing access rights (through the sale of boats). Existence of a particular regulatory framework for this fishery and a maximum annual quota.
ExogenousEnvironmentalFactors(score 4.6)
HarvestRights(score 1.0)
ECOLOGY 4.1
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative for this fishery (community management regions) for this fishery.
Despite that this fishery has a individual regulatory framework and a maximum limit of total harvest per year, ITQs are not allocated to each vessel.
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
7.9 GIANT SQUID (POTA IN SPANISH)
7.9.1 ANALYSIS OF OUTPUT DIMENSIONS
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
Giant Squid
134 135Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Harvest(score 4.5)
ManagerialReturns(score 4.3)
ExogenousEnvironmental Factors(score 4.6)
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
Risk(score 3.7)
LocalLabor(score 4.0)
Health &Sanitation(score 3.5)
LaborReturns(score 2.0)
Governance(score 3.0)
Harvest Assets(score 2.7)
Product Form(score 2.5)
Little volatility in the giant squid landings, despite the absence of modern equipment in the fleet and value-added products.
Wide gap between remunerations and access to higher educational services among boat owners of processing managers compared to fishers and processing workers.
On average, macro factors have a positive effect on the fishery, highlighting the impact of environmental factors.
Despite the harvest activities ocurred regularly, the landings did not exceed the annual quota established in 2018.
The average earnings received by boat owners and processing managers are above the regional average earnings.
The species shows resilience to climate events such as La Niña or El Niño diseases and pollution of its ecosystem.
The current regulation in economic matters (fiscal and monetary) has facilitated the entry of investments and integration with the global economy.
In the last 10 years, there has been little variability in the landings quantities and prices. Hence, this species shows some stability.
Low migration rates of fishers, boat owners and processing managers. There is mainly local employment involved in this fishery.
The antiquity of the experiment and the infrastructure used for harvesting and processing activities limit the increase in income levels.
High harvest safety. In addition, the access to health care is good between owners or captains, processing owners and managers.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
The weak governance, the low compliance with existing regulations and the persistent corruption and informality in the sector hinder adequate management.
The species is sold mainly as a frozen product. However, its value chain is not well developed.
ECONOMICS 3.1
COMMUNITY 3.6
MACRO FACTORS 3.9
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
FishingAccessRights(score 4.0)
Community(score 3.0)
ManagementInputs(score 3.3)
Data(score 3.0)
Collective Action(score 2.0)
ManagementMethods(score 2.0)
Harvest Rights(score 1.0)
The collective management metrics obtained a low result due to the absence of strengthened organizations.
Information on ex-vessel prices and landings is available. However, the management methods and tools are insufficient.
Within this fishery, there are fishing access rights established and an annual total quota. However, there are no individual quotas per boat.
Flexibility in the transfer of fishing access rights (through the sale of boats). Existence of a particular regulatory framework for this fishery and a maximum annual quota.
There are no significant differences in ethnicity, religion or social status that hinder the interaction among fishers, processing workers and intermediaries.
Low budget assigned in the management of the fishing sector (approximately 7.6% in 2018) and limited capacity of government agencies to avoid unregulated, illegal and unreported fishing activities.
For this fishery, the information about landings and ex-vessel prices is available. In addition, there is monthly biological information about this species that is used to design public policies.
Almost the entire fleet dedicated to the giant squid harvest is artisanal. The access right for these boats is given through the fishing permit and the technical protocol for sanitary authorization. There are no individual quotas per boat, despite having a maximum annual quota.
Around 31% of fishers are members of associations. These associations do not have an important impact on the resources’ management.
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing frounds managed through a TURF or cooperative (community management regions) for this fishery.
PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY 2.5
CO-MANAGEMENT 2.4
MANAGEMENT 2.8
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.9.2 ANALYSIS OF INPUT DIMENSIONS
136 137Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance: Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Infrastructure(score 3.0)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.0)
Poor infrastructure for access to landing points and lack of information about market prices.
A Fishery Improvement Project (FIP) is being implemented for giant squid, based on the collective action of the scientific community and some NGOs. However, the access infrastructure to the landing points is in poor condition, limiting the possibility of exporting their products.
There is no access to competitive prices due to limited information on market prices and high dependence on informal agents. In addition, the main international destinations (Spain and China) of products impose high tariffs that limit export capacity.
POST-HARVEST 2.5
ECOLOGY COMMUNITY
Fish
Sto
ck H
ealt
h &
En
viro
nmen
tal P
erfo
rman
ce
Car
eer
Com
mun
ity
Serv
ices
Hea
lth
& S
anit
atio
n
Har
vest
Labo
r ret
urns
Har
vest
Ass
ets
Man
ager
ial R
etur
ns
Prod
uct
Form
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Ris
k
Trad
e
Loca
l Lab
or
Post
-Har
vest
Ass
et
Perf
orm
ance
ECONOMICS
GRAPH 7.9.3 : Output dimensions
4.04.03.7 3.73.7
4.1
2.7 2.82.7 2.5
3.5
4.54.3
CO-MANAGEMENT
Col
lect
ive
Auc
tion
Com
mun
ity
Gen
der
Part
icip
atio
n
Dat
a
Econ
omic
Con
diti
ons
Man
agem
ent
Inpu
ts
Gen
eral
Env
rionm
enta
l Pe
rfor
man
ce
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Gov
erna
nce
Mar
kets
&M
arke
t In
stit
utio
ns
Fish
ing
Acc
ess
Rig
hts
Har
vest
Rig
hts
Exog
enou
s En
viro
nmen
tal
Fact
ors
Man
agem
ent
Met
hods
MACRO FACTORS MANAGEMENT POST-HARVEST PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSABILITY
GRAPH 7.9.4 : Input dimensions
2.3 2.5
4.0
4.6
4.0 4.03.0 3.0 3.03.33.0
2.0 2.01.0
2.0
2.0
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
TABLE 7.9.1 : Output indicators scores
Percentage of Stocks OverfishedDegree of OverfishingStock Declining, Stable or RebuildingRegulatory MortalitySelectivityIllegal, Unregulated or Unreported LandingsStatus of Critical HabitatProportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party CertificationLandings LevelExcess CapacitySeason LengthEx-Vessel Price cf. Historic HighRatio of Asset Value to Gross EarningsTotal Revenue cf. Historic HighAsset Value cf. Historic HaighBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of CapitalFunctionality of Harvest CapitalAnnual Total Revenue Volatility Annual Landings Volatility Intra-annual Landings Volatility Annual Price VolatilityIntra-annual Price VolatilitySpatial Price VolatilityInternational TradeFinal Market WealthWholesale Price cf. Similar ProductsCapacity of Firms to Export to the US & EUProcessing YieldShrinkCapacity Utilization Rate Product ImprovementFinal Market UseEx-vessel to Wholesale Marketing MarginsBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of Capital Age of Facilities
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ECO
LOGY
ECO
NO
MIC
S
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
ProductForm
Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
138 139Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Local Ownership
Career
Local Labor
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
Captains Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCaptains wage cf. Non-fishery wagesCaptain Social StandingProcessing Owners Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsProcessing Owners Wages cf. Non-fishery WagesProcessing Owners Social Standing Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCrew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Crew Social StandingProcessing Workers Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings Processing Workers Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Processing Workers Social Standing Harvest SafetyAccess to Health Care for CaptainsAccess to Health Care for CrewAccess to Health Care for Processing OwnersAccess to Health Care for Processing WorkersSanitationRegional Support BusinessesContestability & Legal ChallengesEducation Access for Harvest CaptainsEducation Access for CrewEducation Access for Processing OwnersEducation Access for Processing WorkersNonresident Employment as CaptainsNonresident Ownership of Processing CapacityNonresident Employment as CrewNonresident Employment as Processing WorkersCrew ExperienceAge Structure of HarverstersWorker Experience
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ExogenousEnvironmental
Factors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General Environmental
Factors
MAC
RO F
ACTO
RS
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TY
CollectiveAction
Participation
Community
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Disease and PathogensNatural Disasters and CatastrophesPollution Shocks and AccidentsLevel of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)Governance QualityGovernance ResponsivenessIndex of Economic FreedomGross Domestic Product (GDP) Per CapitaProportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited AccessTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based ManagementTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & AccessHarvester Organization Influence on Business & MarketingDays in Stakeholder MeetingsIndustry Financial Support for ManagementLeadershipSocial CohesionBusiness Management InfluenceResource Management InfluenceLabor Participation in Harvest SectorLabor Participation in Post-Harvest Sector
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Component Dimension
TABLE 7.9.2 : Input components scores
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
140 141Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest Enforcement CapabilityManagement JurisdictionLevel of SubsidiesData AvailabilityData AnalysisMPAs and SanctuariesSpatial ManagementFishing Mortality LimitsLandings Pricing SystemAvailability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity InformationNumber of BuyersDegree of Vertical IntegrationLevel of TariffsLevel of Non-tariff BarriersInternational Shipping ServiceRoad QualityTechnology AdoptionExtension ServiceReliability of Utilities/ElectricityAccess to Ice & Refrigeration
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
Data
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
Production Form
Post-Harvest AssetPerformance
Octopus Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work
ManagerialReturns
Labor Returns
Health & Sanitation
Community Services
Local Ownership
LocalLabor
Career
The octopus (octopus mimus) is a benthlic cephlapod that mainly inhabits the rocks and seagrass of the continental shelf, at depths of up to 30 meters. It can be found from the north of Peru to Chile. The fishery utilizes several landing points along the Peruvian coast, such as Paita (Piura), San Andrés (Ica) and Ilo (Moquegua); most harvesting is carried out by divers utilizing hooks (which guarantees its high selectivity). These species are of high economic value and are much sought after by national and international markets, especially countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal, in both frozen and fresh forms. The fishery has no FMR but is subject to temporary closures and a minimum catch size (1 kg). The fishery exhibits high levels of overfishing, perhaps because of its open-access regime, as well as the lack of supervision of the authorities regarding catches of the species during closed seasons or below the minimum size, which may have negative repercussions for sustainability.
GRAPH 7.10.1 : Output indicators
Dimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Career(score 4.0)
ProductForm(score 2.3)
On average, fishers have more than 10 years of experience. All working ages are well represented.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
We assumed that the octopus is biologically available 365 days a year. Also, there is no capture quota for this resource. Still the fishing of this resource occurs the whole year, but there is an evidence of excess capacity that is hardly to quantify.
For the octopus fishery, there has not been any enhancement of the processed product, showing a poor development in the value chain.
Harvest(score 3.8)
LaborReturns(score 1.8)
1
2
3
4
5
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.10 OCTOPUS (PULPO IN SPANISH)METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Component Dimension
142 143Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
General Environmental Performance Exogenous
EnvironmentalFactors
Governance
HarvestRights
EconomicConditions
Fishing Access Rights
CollectiveAction
Octopus Average of ten selected coastal fisheries
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Only one dimension: “Fish Stock Health & Environmental Performance”
Participation
Gender
Community
ManagementInputs
Data
ManagementMethods
Markets & Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
GRAPH 7.10.2 : Input componentsDimensions with better performance:
Dimensions with worse performance:
Metrics with BETTER performance: Metrics with WORSE performance:
General Environmental Performance(score 4.0)
ManagementMethods(score 1.3)
Status of Critical Habitat(score 5.0)
Selectivity(score 5.0)
Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported Landings(score 1.0)
Percentage of Stocks Overfished(score 1.0)
In the 2018 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranking, Peru is ranketh 64th, with a score of 61.92. The EPI considers factors such as disease, water quality, air pollution, biodiversity, natural resources, and climate change.
High percentage of stock considered in an overfishing status. It is also considered a species with high levels of illegal landings.
There are no available studies regarding the state of the critical habitats of this species. It could be assumed that, due to the fact that some octopus fishing grounds are very productive, the critical habitats are not threatened.
The octopus harvesting is done by the use of a diving compressor with a steel grapple. With this fishing gear, the fisherman has a 100% probability to select its target.
According to PRODUCE, between 60% to 75% of the artisanal fishing incur in some irregularity, and octopus is one of the five main species captured by artisanal fishers.
High percentage of stocks that are considered to be overfished. It was found that this species undergoes constantly under high fishing pressure with a considerable big amount of females been caught before sexual maturity.
The country has an acceptable per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity basis, and a good score from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.
Economic Conditions(score 4.0)
HarvestRights(score 1.0)
ECOLOGY 2.8
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Trade(score 3.5)
Career(score 4.0)
EconomicConditions(score 4.0)
General EnvironmentalPerformance(score 4.0)
Harvest(score 3.8)
Labor Returns(score 1.8)
CommunityServices(score 2.8)
Governance(score 3.0)
ProductForm (score 2.3)
Risk(score 2.5)
More than 50% of the landings are exported to markets with high purchasing power, although the value chain is not developed.
Fishers with high work experience. In the extraction zones, there are certain political activities that limit the ability to successfully implement regulations.
The government has enabled favorable economic conditions, and acceptable environmental performance. However, the government regulatory quality is weak.
About 65% of the landings is exported to United States or the European Union. Value of exports accounts for 91% of the total value.
On average, fishers have more than 10 years of experience. All working ages are well represented.
The country has an acceptable per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity basis, and a good score from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.
In the 2018 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranking, Peru is ranked 64th, with a score of 61.92. The EPI considers factors such as disease, water quality, air pollution, biodiversity, natural resources and climate change.
The octopus is biologically available 365 days a year. Also, there is no total capture quota for this resource. Although the fishing of this resource occurs the whole year, there is an evidence of excess capacity that is hardly to quantify.
There is volatility between annual landings, but not between wholesale annual prices. Few volatility in wholesale prices between regions.
The crew and processing workers receive lower economic and social benefits compared to the regional average.
Political activity limits in a medium grade the ability to implement effective fishing regulations. Some reasons of conflict are the poor conditions of the landing infrastructure and the inability to provide proper processing services.
The government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, accountability and political stability are not having a good performance in the country.
For the octopus fishery, there has not been any enhancement of the processed product, showing a poor development in the value chain.
ECONOMICS 2.9
COMMUNITY 3.3
MACRO FACTORS 3.8
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative for this fishery.
There are no harvest rights, neither a total quota nor an individual quota.
1
2
3
4
5
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
7.10.1 ANALYSIS OF OUPUT DIMENSIONS
7.10.2 ANALYSIS OF INPUT DIMENSIONS
144 145Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with BETTER performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Dimensions with WORSE performance:
FishingAccessRights(score 3.5)
Community(score 3.0)
ManagementInputs(score 2.8)
Data(score 2.0)
Collective Action(score 2.0)
ManagementMethods(score 1.3)
Gender(score 2.3)
Harvest Rights(score 1.0)
The absence of strong social organizations and the low participation of women in the value chain affects the performance of this fishery.
Lack of biological information, absence of scientific studies and inadequate management methods.
There are fishing access rights and an annual total quota. However, the government has not established individual quotas per boat.
In order to harvest octopus, the boat owners must have an available fishing permit. This one has a high transferability, security and durability.
The harvesters do not present sharp differences in terms of ethnicity, social status or religion beliefs. In case the differences actually exist, these do not represent a problem to guarantee the social cohesion of the fishing activity within the communities.
Low government expenditures on fishery management activities relative to the ex-vessel value of the harvest. There is only one subsidy category.
There are no harvest rights, neither a total quota nor an individual quota.
Very low labor participation of women in post-harvest sector, and even worse in harvest sector. But, there is women’s influence in the management of the resource because of important positions related to the fishing industry are currently assigned to women.
There is a lack of biological information regarding the octopus fishery which is reflected in the limited number of studies by IMARPE for this species. Both, biological and economic data are not used for a stock assessment.
Approximately just 0.5% of the Peruvian ocean is considered a protected and reserved marine area. There are no fishing grounds managed through a TURF or cooperative (community management regions) for this fishery.
About 68% of the fishers are members of organized associations, but these harvester organizations do not have active effort or capacity to influence business operations.
PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITY 2.3
CO-MANAGEMENT 2.4
MANAGEMENT 2.0
Dimensions with BETTER performance: Dimensions with WORSE performance:
Infrastructure(score 3.2)
Markets & Market Institutions(score 2.2)
Limited access to navigation and communication technologies. The fishery faces high level of tariffs.
On average, the artisanal octopus activity has limited access to technology. Also, there is minimal, poorly supported extension service.
The fishery faces a high level of tariffs. Its degree of vertical integration is between 35% to 70% of harvest, and there is a small number of buyers.
POST-HARVEST 2.7
ECOLOGY COMMUNITY
Fish
Sto
ck H
ealt
h &
En
viro
nmen
tal P
erfo
rman
ce
Car
eer
Com
mun
ity
Serv
ices
Hea
lth
& S
anit
atio
n
Har
vest
Labo
r ret
urns
Har
vest
Ass
ets
Man
ager
ial R
etur
ns
Prod
uct
Form
Loca
l Ow
ners
hip
Ris
k
Trad
e
Loca
l Lab
or
Post
-Har
vest
Ass
et
Perf
orm
ance
ECONOMICS
GRAPH 7.10.3 : Output dimensions
4.0
2.72.72.8 3.03.5 3.5
3.5
3.53.7 3.7 3.8
CO-MANAGEMENT
Col
lect
ive
Auc
tion
Com
mun
ity
Gen
der
Part
icip
atio
n
Dat
a
Econ
omic
Con
diti
ons
Man
agem
ent
Inpu
ts
Gen
eral
Env
rionm
enta
l Pe
rfor
man
ce
Infr
astr
uctu
re
Gov
erna
nce
Mar
kets
&M
arke
t In
stit
utio
ns
Fish
ing
Acc
ess
Rig
hts
Har
vest
Rig
hts
Exog
enou
s En
viro
nmen
tal
Fact
ors
Man
agem
ent
Met
hods
MACRO FACTORS MANAGEMENT POST-HARVEST PROPERTY RIGHTS & RESPONSABILITY
GRAPH 7.10.4 : Input dimensions
2.3 2.5
2.5
4.0 4.04.03.0 3.23.0
2.8
1.3 1.0
2.0 2.22.0
1.8 2.3
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
146 147Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
TABLE 7.10.1 : Output indicators scores
Percentage of Stocks OverfishedDegree of OverfishingStock Declining, Stable or RebuildingRegulatory MortalitySelectivityIllegal, Unregulated or Unreported LandingsStatus of Critical HabitatProportion of Harvest with a 3rd Party CertificationLandings LevelExcess CapacitySeason LengthEx-Vessel Price cf. Historic HighRatio of Asset Value to Gross EarningsTotal Revenue cf. Historic HighAsset Value cf. Historic HaighBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of CapitalFunctionality of Harvest CapitalAnnual Total Revenue Volatility Annual Landings Volatility Intra-annual Landings Volatility Annual Price VolatilityIntra-annual Price VolatilitySpatial Price VolatilityInternational TradeFinal Market WealthWholesale Price cf. Similar ProductsCapacity of Firms to Export to the US & EUProcessing YieldShrinkCapacity Utilization Rate Product ImprovementFinal Market UseEx-vessel to Wholesale Marketing MarginsBorrowing Rate cf. Risk-free RateSource of Capital Age of Facilities
METRICS 1 2 3 4 5Indicator Dimension
ECO
LOGY
ECO
NO
MIC
S
Fish Stock Health & Environmental
Performance
Harvest
HarvestAssets
Risk
Trade
ProductForm
Post-Harvest Asset
Performance
Local Ownership
Career
Local Labor
ManagerialReturns
LaborReturns
Health &Sanitation
CommunityServices
COM
MU
NIT
Y
Captains Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCaptains wage cf. Non-fishery wagesCaptain Social StandingProcessing Owners Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsProcessing Owners Wages cf. Non-fishery WagesProcessing Owners Social Standing Crew Earnings cf. Regional Average EarningsCrew Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Crew Social StandingProcessing Workers Earnings cf. Regional Average Earnings Processing Workers Wages cf. Non-fishery Wages Processing Workers Social Standing Harvest SafetyAccess to Health Care for CaptainsAccess to Health Care for CrewAccess to Health Care for Processing OwnersAccess to Health Care for Processing WorkersSanitationRegional Support BusinessesContestability & Legal ChallengesEducation Access for Harvest CaptainsEducation Access for CrewEducation Access for Processing OwnersEducation Access for Processing WorkersNonresident Employment as CaptainsNonresident Ownership of Processing CapacityNonresident Employment as CrewNonresident Employment as Processing WorkersCrew ExperienceAge Structure of HarverstersWorker Experience
METRICS 1 2 3 4Indicator Dimension
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
148 149Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES
ExogenousEnvironmental
Factors
Fishing AccessRights
Harvest Rights
EconomicConditions
Governance
General Environmental
Factors
MAC
RO F
ACTO
RS
PRO
PERT
Y R
IGH
TS &
R
ESPO
NSI
BILI
TY
CollectiveAction
Participation
Community
Gender
CO-M
AN
AGEM
ENT
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)
Disease and PathogensNatural Disasters and CatastrophesPollution Shocks and AccidentsLevel of Chronic Pollution (Stock effects)Level of Chronic Pollution (Consumption effects)Governance QualityGovernance ResponsivenessIndex of Economic FreedomGross Domestic Product (GDP) Per CapitaProportion of Harvest Managed Under Limited AccessTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvest Managed with Rights-based ManagementTransferabilitySecurityDurabilityFlexibilityExclusivityProportion of Harvesters in Industry Organizations Harvester Organization Influence on Fishery Management & AccessHarvester Organization Influence on Business & MarketingDays in Stakeholder MeetingsIndustry Financial Support for ManagementLeadershipSocial CohesionBusiness Management InfluenceResource Management InfluenceLabor Participation in Harvest SectorLabor Participation in Post-Harvest Sector
Management Expenditure to Value of Harvest Enforcement CapabilityManagement JurisdictionLevel of SubsidiesData AvailabilityData AnalysisMPAs and SanctuariesSpatial ManagementFishing Mortality LimitsLandings Pricing SystemAvailability of Ex-vessel Price & Quantity InformationNumber of BuyersDegree of Vertical IntegrationLevel of TariffsLevel of Non-tariff BarriersInternational Shipping ServiceRoad QualityTechnology AdoptionExtension ServiceReliability of Utilities/ElectricityAccess to Ice & Refrigeration
5
ManagementInputs
ManagementMethods
Markets &Market
Institutions
Infrastructure
Data
MA
NAG
EMEN
TPO
ST-H
ARV
EST
Source: PRODUCE, INEI, IMARPE, World Bank, experts’ opinion and field work.
ANNEXES : RESULTS BY FISHERY
TABLE 7.10.2 : Input components scores
METRICS METRICS1 12 23 34 45 5Component ComponentDimension Dimension
150 151Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF) Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Peru CFI-CF)
FISHERY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS - PERUVIAN COASTAL FISHERIES ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe Coastal Fisheries Initiative (CFI) is a collaborative, global effort funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) bringing together UN agencies and international conservation organizations at the forefront of efforts to improve fisheries management and conserve marine biodiversity in coastal areas through better governance and strengthening the seafood value chain. CFI is implemented by Conservation International (C I), FAO, UNDP, UNEP, the World Bank and WWF.
A key objective of the CFI Program is to find new ways to achieve the sustainable use and management of coastal fisheries, particularly through its Challenge Fund. The CFI Challenge Fund (CFI-CF) currently operates in six countries: Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Indonesia, Peru and Ecuador.
This report, Fishery Performance Indicators - Peruvian Coastal Fisheries, part of the Peru CFI-CF, was produced by a core team of The World Bank Group and external partners led by Sylvia Michele Diez, Senior Environmental Specialist. Members of the World Bank team include Miguel Angel Jorge, Senior Fisheries Specialist; Griselle Vega, Senior Agriculture Specialist; and, Jorge Guillermo Barbosa, Environmental Specialist. External consulting partners contributing to this work include the Intelfin Estudios y Consultoría team composed of Carlos Paredes, General Manager; Carlos Aparicio, Project Manager; Alberto Saldarriaga, Consultant; Celina Chigne, Consultant; Camila Alegría, Consultant; and Gonzalo Bueno, Consultant. The WWF Peru team which includes Nicolás Rovegno, Marine Program Specialist; and Rosa Chávez, Marine Program Associate Officer, contributed as well in close partnership with Intelfin Estudios y Consultoría. Advisors to the consulting teams include, Diego Solé, Fisheries Specialist, and Sigbjørn Tveteraas, Fisheries and Aquaculture Economist.
The teams are grateful for the valuable insights and technical contributions from country sector specialists, public officials, businessmen, fishers, and processors: Mariano Gutiérrez, Humboldt Institute specialist; Marco Espino, former employee at IMARPE; Luis Icochea, professor at Universidad Nacional Agraria de la Molina; Jorge Grillo, NGO Redes – Sostenibilidad Pesquera specialist; Renato Gozzer, NGO Redes – Sostenibilidad Pesquera specialist; Paolo Urquieta, fleet manager at Pesquera Majat; Daniel Flores, official at PRODUCE; Pedro Castillo, official at Production Management GORE Piura; David Fiestas, boat owner and fisher in Paita (Piura region); Walter Olaya,
CEO at Fisholg (mahi mahi and giant squid enterprise in Paita, Piura region); and Jorge Guerrero, manager at Desembarcadero Pesquero Artesanal de Máncora (Piura region).
The work was carried out with the support and advisement of Valerie Hickey, Practice Manager, Environment, Natural Resources, & Blue Economy Global Practice; Mimako Kobayashi, Senior Environmental Economist and CFI Challenge Fund task team leader; and Umou S. Al-Bazzaz, Communications Associate - CFI Challenge Fund.
The finding, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Executive Director of the World Bank, the governments they represent, or the counterparts consulted during the study process. Any factual errors are the responsibility of the team.
FURTHER INFORMATION:
For more information about the Peru: Coastal Fisheries Initiative - Challenge Fund (Pesca Emprende), go to:
http://www.pescaemprende.com
To find the Peru CFI-CF (Pesca Emprende) reports, go to:
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/peru
USA +1 202 473-10001818 H Street NW, Washington,
PERU +51 1 622-2300Avenida Álvarez Calderón 185,
San Isidro - [email protected]