Mikael Hrnqviston the introduction of the new militia in Florence in 1506

The best available account of how the new militia was introduced in Florence is in Francesco Guicciardini'sStorie fiorentine, written before 1512. Guicciardini here relates how Piero Soderini let himself be persuaded by Machiavelli, "in whom he had great confidence," to reform the Republic's militia and to return the city to the military orders of the past. Preparations had been made for the new ordinances, Guicciardini writes, but:since it was necessary for the reputation and conservation of a thing of such proportion that it passed through the council, and considering that it was a new and unusual thing, which the people would not support without first having seen some proof of it ... the Gonfalonier began, with the authority of the signoria, but without consultation, to enroll soldiers in the contado ... in the city nothing was done, because it was such a new and unusual thing that it had to be conducted little by little.Guicciardini emphasizes thus the fact that Soderini took the decision to initiate the project without first summoning the leading citizens to a pratica, as was the established practice. He gives no clear indication, though, whether the idea to begin the venture without going through the traditional channels originated with Soderini or Machiavelli.After the proposal had won the support of the signoria, Machiavelli was dispatched on 30 December 1505 to the Mugello and the Casentino regions to enroll, equip and exercise conscripts aged fifteen to forty. Through the correspondence between him and the Ten, the Florentine war committee, one can follow the early development of the project in some detail.In his first report, dispatched from Borgo San Lorenzo on 2 January, Machiavelli commented on the progress made and the local population's reaction to a new militia ordinance. Most villagers who had been summoned to the enrollment turned up quite willingly, while those who failed to present themselves had not done so mainly out of fear of being assessed for new taxes. In the local podesteria, he estimated that it would be possible to recruit about 180 men of good quality. The general reception of the militia was also encouraging: "This thing pleases all the citizens I have encountered here, and everyone counts on it to succeed; and for my own part I believe so more than ever, under the condition that one here applies that diligence that the task of reforming a province demands." On 5 February, Machiavelli wrote to the Ten from Pontassieve, complaining about the problems he had met with recently in Dicomano and San Godenzo. In thepodesteriaof Dicomano he had after great hardship been able to recruit 200 men, but this number would eventually have to be reduced considerably. The difficulty of the undertaking, he attributed to the inveterate disobedience of the people of the region and to the hostile relations between the various villages. His excuse at the end of the letter breathed frustration: "I have not been able to do these things more quickly, and he who believes otherwise, should try it himself, and he will see what it means to bring together peasants and men of this sort." In their reply of 6 February, the Ten accepted Machiavelli's excuse while emphasizing the urgency of the matter. A letter of the same date addressed to him by Marcello Virgilo, the secretary of the First Chancery, that Piero Soderini was following the progress of the militia with keen interest and that the project now had begun to gain support among the citizenry.In spite of the progress achieved in the contado and the positive reactions of the rural population, strong opposition continued in the city. During February influential citizens convened in several pratiche to discuss the arming of the countryside. According to the chronicler Cerretani, many of the assembled were opposed to the innovative idea for the simple reason that the city's past rulers had refused to adopt this policy. In the face of this conservative opinion, Piero Soderini argued that a new militia ordinance would not only lessen the city's dependence on hired troops and on the French, but also increase its chances of recovering Pisa. Soderini's view won the day and the talks resulted in the decision to create an infantry force of twelve thousand men. Five constables with experience from serving under Paolo Vitelli were appointed, and five battalions (bandiere) of two hundred men each were officially set up in the Valdisieve and the Mugello regions.On 15 February 1506, a display of four hundred infantry men from the Mugello took place in the Piazza della Signoria in the course of the traditional Carnival festivities. The event was a great success, and the diarist Luca Landucci could enthusiastically report that it had come to be viewed as "the most beautiful thing ever to have been arranged in the city of Florence." The discipline of the peasants and their colorful white and red uniforms, the traditional colors of the Florentine popolo, appear to have made a particularly strong impression on the audience. From Landucci's account we also learn that the fundamental principles underlying the project now had become public knowledge: "And these were soldiers who were to stay at home under obligation, until need arose for them to be deployed; and in this way it had been ordered that many thousands should be created in the entire contado so that there would be no need of foreigners."On 21 February, Leonardo Bartolini wrote to Machiavelli from Rome congratulating him on his achievement: "Concerning the new militia, I am very glad that it is turning out as well as you indicated to me in the past. If it is helped along as is its due, I judge that it will turn out to be a wonderful thing and I shall be very happy when I see it completed, both for the good of the public and also because it is your invention." Around this time, Machiavelli wrote to Cardinal Soderini exhorting him to persuade his brother, the gonfalonier, to place a forceful and severe military captain in command of the militia. The cardinal, who approved of the idea, passed on Machiavelli's recommendation in a letter of 4 March. The gonfalonier promptly heeded the advice, and shortly afterwards the notoriously cruel Spanish condottiere don Michele di don Giovanni da Coriglia da Valenza, better known as don Michelotto, was contracted to lead the newly created militia. Guicciardini relates how Piero Soderini charged Machiavelli to seek out beforehand the opinions of leading members of the reggimento such as Giovanbattista Ridolfi, Piero Guicciardini and Francesco Gualterotti. But when it turned out that they opposed the appointment of the Spaniard, the Gonfalonier took the proposal before the Eighty, where it was passed after a third ballot.' Due to strong opposition from theottimati, the original plan to appoint don Michelottobargello del contadohad to be abandoned, though, and on 1 April he was electedcapitano di guardia del contado e distretto di Firenzeinstead by the Eighty. The Spaniard was soon called into action. After a series of poor performances by the militia battalions at the Pisan front, Machiavelli wrote on 12 June to inform Giovanni Ridolfi, the Florentine commissioner at the camp in Cascina, that don Michelotto and a company of one hundred men were to be dispatched there to reinforce the militia and to inspire fear in the Pisans.

Mikael Hrnqvist:"Perch non si usa allegare i Romani: Machiavelli and the Florentine militia of 1506,"Renaissance QuarterlyLV:1 (2002), pp. 148-91; quotes from pp. 154-57.

Niccol Machiavelli(1469-1527)

Machiavellis brev om Savonarola frn 1498

Machiavelli och Savonarola

Machiavelli och Cesare Borgia

Om hur den nya milisen introducerades i Florens 1506

Anders Ehnmarkom Machiavellis liv efter avskedandet 1512

Machiavellis brev till Francesco Vettori 10 december 1513

Machiavelli om 1494

Redan i sin tidiga verskrnika p terza rime,Decennale Primo(1504), uppehller Machiavelli sig vid den franska invasionen 1494 och dess terverkningar p de politiska frhallandena i Italien. Machiavelli tycks hr uppfatta Karl VIII:s intg som den frmsta orsaken till det lidande och den nd som Italien tvingats utst under den tiorsperiod (1494-1504) som krnikan behandlar.

Vgbeskrivning till Machiavellis villa i San Casciano

Niccol Machiavellis komediLa mandragolai italienskt orginal.

- Niccol Machiavelli:La mandragola

Niccol Machiavellis grav, Santa Croce, Florens

Niccol Machiavelli - den kontroversielle statssekreteraren 24Niccol Machiavelli r en av idhistoriens mest kontroversiella frfattare. Florentinarens stridbarhet beror dels p hans tnkande som mnga uppfattar som provocerande eller frnsttande, men andra ser som insiktsfullt och klarsynt, dels p de enorma tolkningsproblem som hans verk gett upphov till.Machiavelli har tolkats msom som realist och uttalad anti-utopist, msom som idealist eller utopist. Det finns de som menar att han var fursteideolog och de som ser honom som hngiven republikan. Hans metod har ibland beskrivits som induktiv, ibland som deduktiv. Han har uppfattats som den frste moderne ateisten, men ocks som en fromt troende, om n ngot egensinnig, kristen. En del har i honom velat se en strng moralist, medan andra menar att han inte har ngon moral alls. Man har tillskrivit honom ett politiskt system, men ocks gjort gllande att hans tnkande r helt osystematiskt och fyllt av motsgelser, ja, att han helt enkelt saknar principer. Han har varit en inspirationsklla fr Benito Mussolini, den italienska fascimens fader, men ocks fr Antonio Gramsci, grundaren av det italienska kommunistpartiet. Moderna liberaler som Sir Isaiah Berlin och Quentin Skinner rknar honom till en av de sina.Att reda ut denna hrva av motstridiga tolkningar lter sig givetvis inte gras inom det begrnsade utrymme som hr bjuds. Vi kommer drfr att koncentrera oss p att frska identifiera ngra av de principiella utgngspunkter som ligger till grund fr Machiavellis politiska tnkande. I denna nod behandlas Machiavellis biografi, medan hans tv huvudverk,FurstenochDiscorsi(eller Liviuskommentaren) kommer att diskuteras i nod25och26.Det lilla vi vet om Machiavellis uppvxt och ungdomstid grundar sig p hans rttslrde fars bevarade dagbok. Ur den kan vi bland annat utlsa att sonen tidigt sattes i skola, dr han bland annat fick lra sig aritmetik och latin, och att fadern var humanistiskt intresserad, bland annat terfanns AristotelesNichomachiska etiken, CicerosOm pliktenoch Livius romerska historia i familjebiblioteket.Detta har ... i vr tid hnt fraGirolamo Savonarola, som med sina nyordningar bringades p fal, s snart mnniskorna slutade tro p honom. Han hade ingen mjlighet att hlla dem som hade trott kvar i tron och inte heller ngon mjlighet att f de klentrogna att tro.

Niccol Machiavelli,Fursten6

Machiavellis uppdykande p den historiska scenen lt vnta p sig till vren 1498. Frn denna tid hrstammar det ldsta av honom bevaradebrevet. Det r stllt till Riccardo Becchi, den florentinske Romambassadren, och innehller en rapport omGirolamo Savonarolas senaste predikningar. Den vid det hr laget 29-rige Machiavelli framtrder i brevet som en perceptiv och illusionsfri iakttagare, vl frtrogen med Florens inrikespolitiska frhllande, och han tar hr ppet avstnd frn vad betecknar som dominikanerns "kolorerade lgner" och manikeistiska synstt. Brevet fregriper Machiavellis diskussion i kapitel 6 avFurstendr han behandlar Savonarola som den potientielle grundaren av en ny stat i Florens. Att dominakern misslyckades tillskriver han hr det faktum att han var en "obevpnad profet", som saknade den vpnade uppbackning som fordrats fr att "hlla dem som hade trott kvar i tron" ... sedan de "slutat tro p honom".Om Machiavelli och SavonarolaNgra veckor senare arresterades Savonarola och dmdes till dden. Efter ddsdomens verkstllan rensades hans anhngare,i piagnoni, ut ur stadens styrande och administrativa organ, och i samband med denna utrensing, valdes Machiavelli till statsekreterare (segretario della Repubblica) och chef fr Andra kansliet (seconda cancelleria), som svarade fr stadens inrikesstyrelse. Han erhll ocks posten som sekreterare fr De tios rd (i Dieci), som i kristid hade till uppgift att skta Florens utrikespolitiska relationer. Machiavelli tilltrdde sina befattningar vid en tidpunkt d Florens nskade bryta den utrikespolitiska isolering som uppsttt till fljd av den Savonarola-inspirerade regimens franskvnliga politik.Med Machiavellis administrativa mbeten, vars ansvarsomrden aldrig var srskilt vl definierade, fljde ocks en lng rad diplomatiska uppdrag, som skulle ge honom tillfllen att p nra hll iaktta och analysera det storpolitiska spel som fr lng tid framver skulle komma att avgra Italiens den. Dessa uppdrag frde honom under de fjorton r han tjnade republiken bl a till Frankrike (fyra gnger), Tyskland, Rom, Milano och till en rad stder i Florens mer omedelbara nrhet. Han stiftade personligen bekantskap med Ludvig XII av Frankrike, Cesare Borgia och kejsar Maximilian av Habsburg. Det r av allt att dma dessa erfarenheter Machiavelli beropar, d han i dedikationen avFursten(1513), stlld till Lorenzo de' Medici den yngre, talar om sin "lnga erfarenhet av moderna ting", och d han i det bermdabrevet till Francesco Vettori(10.12.1513) hvdar att han gnat femton r t att "studera statskonsten (l'arte dello stato)".L. Bartolini:Niccol Machiavelli(1846), utanfr Uffizierna, Florens

Hgst p den politiska dagordning under dessa dramatiska r stod konsolideringen av den florentinska territorialstaten. Pisa hade i samband med den franska invasionen 1494 frigjort sig frn den florentinska verhgheten, i Pistoia rasade inbrdesstrider mellan Panciatichi- och Cancellieri-klanerna, och under hsten 1502 gjorde Arezzo och en rad mindre stder i den ostligt belgna Valdichiana-regionen uppror. Machiavelli, som beskte Arezzo kort efter att resningen i staden slagits ned med hjlp av franska trupper, misstnkte att revoltens verkliga anstiftare var pven Alexander VI och dennes relystne son,Cesare Borgia, som enligt den florentinske sekreterarens uppfattning strvade efter att gra sig till Toskanas hrskare.Senare under hsten 1502 skickades Machiavelli som diplomatiskt sndebud till Cesare Borgia som slagit lger med sin arm utanfr Imola p andra sidan Apenninerna. Under de dryga tre mnader som Machiavelli vistades vid Borgias hov i Imola, Cesena och Sinigaglia stiftade han ven bekantskap medLeonardo da Vincisom vid denna tid tjnstgjorde som militringenjr hos hertigen. Av Machiavellis diplomatiska rapporter och senare skrifter frstr vi att Cesare Borgia mste ha gjort ett djupt intryck p honom. I den unge hertigen tyckte han sig se en hrskargestalt som i allt vsentligt utgjorde de tvehgsna, frsiktiga och notoriskt handlingsfrlamade florentinarnas motsats. Till skillnad frn dem var Cesare Borgia djrv och fretagsam. Med list och stor, men kalkylerad och alltid vl avvgd, grymhet var han vid denna tid p god vg att terervra Kyrkostatens besittningar och skapa sig ett eget furstendme i centrala Italien. Senare iFurstenskulle Machiavelli komma att framhlla Cesare Borgia och hans metoder som det exempel som varje ny furste br flja:Nr jag ... skrskdar hertigens alla handlingar vet jag inte vad jag skulle klandra honom fr, tvrtom anser jag att man, som jag hr har gjort, kan fresl honom som frebild fr alla dem som har kommit till makten p grund av tur eller med hjlp av andras vapen.(Fursten, kap. 7)Om Machiavelli och Cesare BorgiaCesare Borgias meteorlika politiska bana skulle dock snart vnda nedt och i och med hans far, pven Alexander VI, avled i augusti 1503 var hertigens de beseglat. Trots att Cesare Borgia nu var ut ur bilden, kvarstod de flesta av Florens utrikespolitiska problem. Framfr allt fortsatte Pisas envisa kamp fr ett bevarat oberoende att utgra en nagel i florentinarnas gon. Efter ytterligare ett misslyckat frsk av den inhyrda florentinska legoarmn att inta grannstaden, brjade de styrande, och dribland gonfalonieren Piero Soderini, att lyssna till Machiavellis ider om en tergng till senmedeltidens militrsystem baserat p inhemska trupper. P Machiavellis initiativ inrttades 1506 en stende bondehr i Florens, bestende av soldater rekryterade frn den kringliggande landsbygden. I egenskap av sekreterare fr De nios rd, den myndighet som hade till uppgift att vervaka styrkan, var Machiavelli intensivt engagerad i projektet. Han kte runt i bergstrakterna ster om Florens och inspekterade rekryter, ansvarade fr provianteringen och tillbringade lnga perioder i flt. Sin politiska karrirs kanske strsta gonblick upplevde han i samband med terervringen av Pisa 1509.Om hur den nya milisen introducerades i Florens 1506Men den respit som denna framgng sknkte var blott tillfllig. Den florentinska republikens dagar var rknade.Medicerna, som aldrig gett upp hoppet om att en dag kunna tervnda till Florens, lyckades till slut utverka spanskt och pvligt std fr ett militrt angrepp p staden. I september 1512 fick Machiavellis bondehr se sig gruvligt slagen av den pvliga armn vid Prato och vgen in till Florens lg nu ppen. Sedan gonfalonieren Piero Soderini tagit till flykten, kunde medicerna, anfrda av Giuliano de' Medici, Lorenzo il Magnificos andre son, tga in i staden och terkrva sina forna privilegier.Fr Machiavellis vidkommande innebar Medicifamiljens terkomst slutet p mbetsmannakarriren. Han blev inom kort avsatt frn posten som sekreterare fr Andra kansliet och befriad frn samtliga sina offentliga uppdrag. Varfr han avskedades r och torde frblir oklart. Uppenbart r dock att den kontroversielle sekreteraren under sina r i maktens omedelbara nrhet kommit att skaffa sig mnga mktiga fiender inom Florens ledande skikt. I november samma r portfrbjds han under frdmjukande former frn Palatset och gjordes till freml fr en utredning rrande misstankar om frskingring av offentliga medel. Senare under vintern fngslades han anklagad fr delaktighet i en sammansvrjning mot medicerna.Machiavelli riskerade nu ddsstraff och han utsattes under fngelsevistelsen fr tortyr enligt den fruktadestrappado-metoden. Denna innebar att fngen hissades upp till hg hjd och hlls hngande dr i bakbundna hnder, med kroppen fritt svvande i nstan horisontell stllning, och med allt tryck vilade p de baktvridna axlarna. Efter att ha tillbringat en tid i denna plgsamma position, slpptes offret ned och fick falla fritt mot marken till dess att repet tog emot och hejdade fallet med ett hftigt ryck. Fyra omgngar av denna omilda behandling, som i regel resulterade i att den torterades axlar slets ur led, ansgs vara mer n vad de flesta tlde. Efter frigivningen skryter Machiavelli med att ha uthrdat sex sdana slpp.Machiavelli frigavs i mars 1513 som ett led i den allmnna amnesti som utfrdades i samband med kardinal Giulio de' Medicis val till pve (Leo X). Hans medverkan i den sk Boscoli-sammansvrjningen har aldrig kunnat belggas. Hur fngelsevistelsen pverkade honom som person och frfattare r en omstridd frga, och torde s frbli.Av allt att dma pbrjade MachiavelliFursten, historiens mest bermda traktat om furstemakten, under sin frvisning till lantgodset i Sant'Andrea in Percussina strax sder om Florens sommaren 1513.Epitaf p Machiavellis grav

Trots entrgna frsk att vinna de nya makthavarnas frtroende - vilket bde dedikationen avFurstenoch de mnga breven till Francesco Vettori vittnar om - var nu Machiavellis politiska och diplomatiska grning i princip till nda.Han kom visserligen mot slutet av sitt liv att erhlla ngra mindre uppdrag av officiell och halvofficiell karaktr, men hans verksamhet skulle fortsttningsvis i huvudsak domineras av hans politiska, historiska och sknlitterra frfattarskap.Frutom de tv politisk traktat som ligger till grund fr hans bermmelse -Fursten(1513) och den lnga Liviuskommentaren,Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio("Diskurser om de tio frsta bckerna av Titus Livius", c 1514-18) - skrev Machiavelli ven ett omfattande historieverk,Istorie fiorentine(1520-25), en traktat om krigskonsten,Arte della guerra(1521), ett mindre antal dikter och noveller, samt tv komedier,La mandragola("Alruna", 1520) ochClizia(1525), varav den frstnmnda ofta brukar betecknas som den italienska renssansens frmsta.

MachiavellisFursten

The militiaThe ideals of the citizen militia and the armed republic were at the heart of the civic humanist ideology. TheFlorentine Quattrocento humanistsadmiredtheancient Roman republic, itsmilitary system, and its citizen-soldier army, based on the male citizen's obligation to render military service and his right to keep and bear arms. For the civic humanists the Roman self-armed citizen,civis armatus,was aparagon of patriotism, military virtue andlove of liberty. Extremely critical about the Florentine republic's reliance on hired mercenary forces for its defence, they called for military reform and a return to old virtuous ways of the medieval commune.

Back in the Dugento, Florence had waged their limited wars with indigenuos troops. At the turn of the Trecento, the city had been able to put into the field an army of 800 fully equipped militia cavalrymen and 6,000 or perhaps even 15,000 foot soldiers. But the days of the civic militia were numbered. In the course of the Trecento, Florence and other Italian city-republics came increasingly to depend on hired mercenaries companies - under the command of so calledcondottieri(fromcondotta, Italian for "contract").The Italian condottieri have become the stuff of myth and legend. While it is true that their chief motivations were self-interest and financial gain, and that they on many occasioned changed sides and loyalties, it is equally true that some mercenary captains were recognized for their military valor and for their service to the republic. Two of them, the EnglishmanSir John Hawkwood(c. 1320-94, or Giovanni Acuto as he was commonly known in Italy) andNiccol da Tolentino(c. 1350-1435), were on their deaths given state funerals and commemorated with equestrian portraits in the Florentine Duomo.The growth of the mercenary system did not mean that military service was completely abandoned. Throughout the Renaissance, native troops continued to fight alongside the hired professional soldiers. In times of external aggression the republic continued to avail itself of temporary troop levies for its defense by imposing a so calledcomandoon the subject population, requiring them to provide one armed infantrymen for every household. Suchgente comandatawere used in the effort to reconquer Pisa in 1499 and played an important role in the ambitious attempt to overcome the Pisan defenses in 1505. However, the citizens of Florence itself, its merchants, bankers, craftsmen and other professional men, remained unarmed and continued to pay others for their xxx.Many Florentine humanists were strongly critical of this practice. Inspired by the example of the ancient Roman militia, they argued that Florence ought to revive the military spirit of the past by returning to the civic militia of the medieval commune. In hisLaudatio(1402-3), Leonardo Bruni celebrated Florence's military achievements with explicit reference to the city's Roman heritage and the military system of the Roman republic. Later, inDe militia(1421), he advocated a return to a classically inspired citizen militia based on a combination of elements derived from the military systems envisaged by Greek philosophers like Plato and Hippodamus and Romulus's Roman militia.The ideal of the armed citizen,civis armatus, reappears in Matteo Palmieri's dialogueVita civile("On the civil life," 1430-35). Palmieri devotes much space to the Roman military system, arguing that the ancient Romans had been so animated by their love oflibertythat they had had "no other thing on their mind than the health and the augmentation of the republic." (126) Their internal unity and their virtuous customs had enabled them to defeat their enemies, extend theirempire, and bring a great part of the world under their sway.Later in the Quattrocento, Alamanno Rinuccini recalled in hisDe libertate("On liberty", 1479) with nostalgy the good old days when Florentine citizens had been willing to give their blood in defence of theirpatriaand itsliberty:Yet this same people once fought powerful republics and great tyrants. They defended their liberty with success, first by sacrifice of bood and second by expenditure of vast wealth. We know how boldly, with what might and military cunning they made war against their neighbors when they saw themselves invaded or when, goaded by injuries and excessive provocations, they crossed the orders of others. (Humanism and Liberty, p. 208)These critical voices notwithstanding, the Florentine republic continued to rely on hiredcondottieriand their disloyal mercenary bands for its defence.

Michelangelo:Battle of Cascina (part), 1505, Cartoon, Private collectionContributing to the Quattrocento humanists' critical view of the mercenary system was their frustration over Florence's failure to expand its territory after the conquests of Pisa and Livorno at the beginning of the century. Following the unsuccessful attempt on Lucca in the 1430s, Florence took a predominantly defensive stance in the Italian power-game and concentrated its efforts on maintaining control over its subject cities.In hisDialogue on the Government of Florence(1521-26),Franscesco Guicciardinihas the elderly statesman Bernardo del Nero comment on this development and the Medici regime's responsibility for the decline of Florentine militaryvirtue:the Medici family, like all narrow regimes, always tried to prevent arms being possessed by the citizens and to extinguish all their virility. For this reason we have become very effeminate, and we also lack the courageousness of our forefathers. Anyone who has considered how different it is to wage war with one's own arms and to wage it with mercenary troops can judge how harmful this is to a republic. (1994, 34)Bernardo's reproach echoes Machiavelli's attack on the mercenary system in chapters 12 and 13 ofThe Prince, theDiscoursesandThe Art of War. It should also be seen in connection to Machiavelli's most ambitious military and political project during his time in office, the introduction of the new Florentine militia of 1506. >>>Related themes:empire,greatness,virtue,patria,libertyMIKAEL HRNQVISTDaniel Waley:"There is no evidence that the Florence of 1300 was a city of soft, decadent businessmen who preferred to pay others to fight on their behalf." (1968, 99)C.C. Bayley on the decline of the citizen militia in Florence:"The decline was occasioned by the harsh lessons learned on the field of battle, the fierce inner conflicts which divided the citizen body, the growing wealth of the community, and the pursuit of a policy of territorial expansion which increased the duration and burden of war." (1961, 3)

Leonardo da Vinci:The Battle of Anghiari(detail)By the end of the twelfth century, the city of Volterra legislated against their citizens serving in foreign armies.Cavallata- obligation in medieval times to keep a horse for serviceDuring the war against Milan in 1424, the hired mercenary captain Niccol Piccinino deserted with all his troops from Florence to Milan, bringing the republic to the brink of capitulation.

Sir John Hawkood- English condottiere, also known as Giovanni Acuto, in employment with the Florentine republic(Paolo Uccello,Funeral monument, Santa Maria del Fiore, Florence, 1436)Leonardo Bruniin De militia:"the aim of a soldier must be to acquire glory, not wealth."Niccol Machiavelliin theDiscoursesII.10:"not gold .. but good soldiers are the sinew of war; for gold is not sufficient to find good soldiers, but good soldiers are quite sufficient to find gold." (1996, 148)Lodovico Alamanni on the decline of Florentine military virtue:"We owe our forefathers very little ..">>>

Jacopo Pontormo:Portrait of a HalberdierNiccol Machiavellion own arms inThe Prince:"I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its own forces ...">>>

Jakob Burckhardton the Renaissance condottiere as Renaissance manIn his classical workThe Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy("Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien," 1860), the Swiss historianJakob Burckhardttraced the origins of modern individualism back to the Italian Renaissance. Burckhardt portrayed thecondottieri, the Italian mercenary captains, as a "highly developed" audacious and immoral personality, who by challenging the medieval tradition and the ideals of political legitimay, personified this new type of individual. As creators of their own states and founders of "independent dynasties of their own," thecondottieriwere the self-made men of the Renaissance.

But the highest and the most admired form of illegitimacy in the fifteenth century was presented by the Condottiere, who whatever may have been his origin, raised himself to the position of an independent ruler. At bottom, the occupation of Lower Italy by the Normans in the eleventh century was of this character. Such attempts now began to keep the peninsula in a constant ferment.It was possible for a Condottiere to obtain the lordship of a district even without usurpation, in the case when his employer, through want of money or troops, provided for him in this way; under any circumstances the Condottiere, even when he dismissed for the time the greater part of his forces, needed a safe place where he could establish his winter quarters, and lay up his stores and provisions. The first example of a captain thus portioned is John Hawkwood, who was invested by Gregory XI with the lordship of Bagnacavallo and Cotignola. When with Alberigo da Barbiano Italian armies and leaders appeared upon the scene, the chances of founding a principality, or of increasing one already acquired, became more frequent. The first great bacchanalian outbreak of military ambition took place in the duchy of Milan after the death of Giangaleazzo (1402). The policy of his two sons was chiefly aimed at the destruction of the new despotisms founded by the Condottieri; and from the greatest of them, Facino Cane, the house of Visconti inherited, together with his widow, a long list of cities, and 400,000 golden florins, not to speak of the soldiers of her first husband whom Beatrice di Tenda brought with her. From henceforth that thoroughly immoral relation between the governments and their Condottieri, which is characteristic of the fifteenth century, became more and more common. An old story--one of those which are true and not true, everywhere and nowhere--describes it as follows: The citizens of a certain town (Siena seems to be meant) had once an officer in their service who had freed them from foreign aggression; daily they took counsel how to recompense him, and concluded that no reward in their power was great enough, not even if they made him lord of the city. At last one of them rose and said, 'Let us kill him and then worship him as our patron saint.' And so they did, following the example set the Roman senate with Romulus. In fact the Condottieri had reason to fear none so much as their employers: if they were successful, they became dangerous, and were put out of the way like Roberto Malatesta just after the victory he had won for Sixtus IV (1482); if they failed, the vengeance of the Venetians on Carmagnola showed to what risks they were exposed (1432). It is characteristic of the moral aspect of the situation that the Condottieri had often to give their wives and children as hostages, and notwithstanding this, neither felt nor inspired confidence. They must have been heroes of abnegation, natures like Belisarius himself, not to be cankered by hatred and bitterness; only the most perfect goodness could save them from the most monstrous iniquity. No wonder then if we find them full of contempt for all sacred things, cruel and treacher- ous to their fellows men who cared nothing whether or no they died under the ban of the Church. At the same time, and through the force of the same conditions, the genius and capacity of many among them attained the highest conceivable development, and won for them the admiring devotion of their followers; their armies are the first in modern history in which the personal credit of the leader is the one moving power. A brilliant example is shown in the life of Francesco Sforza; no prejudice of birth could prevent him from winning and turning to account when he needed it a boundless devotion from each individual with whom he had to deal; it happened more than once that his enemies laid down their arms at the sight of him, greeting him reverently with uncovered heads, each honoring in him 'the common father of the men-at-arms.' The race of the Sforza has this special interest that from the very beginning of its history we seem able to trace its endeavors after the crown. The foundation of its fortune lay in the remarkable fruitfulness of the family; Francesco's father, Jacopo, himself a celebrated man, had twenty brothers and sisters, all brought up roughly at Cotignola, near Faenza, amid the perils of one of the endless Romagnole 'vendette' between their own house and that of the Pasolini. The family dwelling was a mere arsenal and fortress; the mother and daughters were as warlike as their kinsmen. In his thirtieth year Jacopo ran away and fled to Panicale to the Papal Condottiere Boldrino -- the man who even in death continued to lead his troops, the word of order being given from the bannered tent in which the embalmed body lay, till at last a fit leader was found to succeed him. Jacopo, when he had at length made himself a name in the service of different Condottieri, sent for his relations, and obtained through them the same advantages that a prince derives from a numerous dynasty. It was these relations who kept the army together when he lay a captive in the Castel dell'Uovo at Naples; his sister took the royal envoys prisoners with her own hands, and saved him by this reprisal from death. It was an indication of the breadth and the range of his plans that in monetary affairs Jacopo was thoroughly trustworthy: even in his defeats he consequently found credit with the bankers. He habitually protected the peasants against the license of his troops, and reluctantly destroyed or injured a conquered city. He gave his well-known mistress, Lucia, the mother of Francesco, in marriage to another, in order to be free for a princely alliance. Even the marriages of his relations were arranged on a definite plan. He kept clear of the impious and profligate life of his contemporaries, and brought up his son Francesco to the three rules: 'Let other men's wives alone; strike none of your followers, or, if you do, send the injured man far away; don't ride a hard-mouthed horse, or one that drops his shoe.' But his chief source of influence lay in the qualities, if not of a great general, at least of a great soldier. His frame was powerful, and developed by every kind of exercise; his peasant's face and frank manners won general popularity; his memory was marvelous, and after the lapse of years could recall the names of his followers, the number of their horses, and the amount of their pay. His education was purely Italian: he devoted his leisure to the study of history, and had Greek and Latin authors translated for his use. Francesco, his still more famous son, set his mind from the first on founding a powerful State, and through brilliant generalship and a faithlessness which hesitated at nothing, got possession of the great city of Milan (1450).His example was contagious. Aeneas Sylvius wrote about this time: 'In our change-loving Italy, where nothing stands firm, and where no ancient dynasty exists, a servant can easily become a king.' One man in particular, who styles himself 'the man of fortune,' filled the imagination of the whole country: Giacomo Piccinino, the son of Niccolo;. It was a burning question of the day if he, too, would succeed in founding a princely house. The greater States had an obvious interest in hindering it, and even Francesco Sforza thought it would be all the better if the list of self-made sovereigns were not enlarged. But the troops and captains sent against him, at the time, for instance, when he was aiming at the lordship of Siena, recognized their interest in supporting him: 'If it were all over with him, we should have to go back and plough our fields.' Even while besieging him at Orbetello, they supplied him with provisions: and he got out of his straits with honour. But at last fate overtook him. All Italy was betting on the result, when (1465) after a visit to Sforza at Milan, he went to King Ferrante at Naples. In spite of the pledges given, and of his high connections, he was murdered in the Castel Nuovo. Even the Condottieri who had obtained their dominions by inheritance, never felt themselves safe. When Roberto Malatesta and Federigo of Urbino died on the same day (1482), the one at Rome, the other at Bologna, it was found that each had recommended his State to the care of the other. Against a class of men who themselves stuck at nothing, everything was held to be permissible. Francesco Sforza, when quite young, had married a rich Calabrian heiress, Polissella Ruffo, Countess of Montalto, who bore him a daughter; an aunt poisoned both mother and child, and seized the inheritance.From the death of Piccinino onwards, the foundations of new States by the Condottieri became a scandal not to be tolerated. The four great Powers, Naples, Milan, the Papacy, and Venice, formed among themselves a political equilibrium which refused to allow of any disturbance. In the States of the Church, which swarmed with petty tyrants, who in part were, or had been, Condottieri, the nephews of the Popes, since the time of Sixtus IV, monopolized the right to all such undertakings. But at the first sign of a political crisis, the soldiers of fortune appeared again upon the scene. Under the wretched administration of Innocent VIII it was near happening that a certain Boccalino, who had formerly served in the Burgundian army, gave himself and the town of Osimo, of which he was master, up to the Turkish forces; fortunately, through the intervention of Lorenzo the Magnificent, he proved willing to be paid off, and took himself away. In the year 1495, when the wars of Charles VIII had turned Italy upside down, the Condottiere Vidovero, of Brescia, made trial of his strength; he had already seized the town of Cesena and murdered many of the nobles and the burghers; but the citadel held out, and he was forced to withdraw. He then, at the head of a band lent him by another scoundrel, Pandolfo Malatesta of Rimini, son of the Roberto already spoken of, and Venetian Condottiere, wrested the town of Castelnuovo from the Archbishop of Ravenna. The Venetians, fearing that worse would follow, and urged also by the Pope, ordered Pandolfo, 'with the kindest intentions,' to take an opportunity of arresting his good friend: the arrest was made, though 'with great regret,' whereupon the order came to bring the prisoner to the gallows. Pandolfo was considerate enough to strangle him in prison, and then show his corpse to the people. The last notable example of such usurpers is the famous Castellan of Musso, who during the confusion in the Milanese territory which followed the battle of Pavia (1525), improvised a sovereignty on the Lake of Como.

Jakob Burckhardt:The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy