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Defence & Security Industry and Market in Japan –
Opportunities for European Companies in Five Dual-Use Areas:
Maritime Security Equipment, Unmanned Vehicles,
Aeronautical Platform Integration, Sensors and Avionics
Tokyo, November 2015
Jérôme Camier
Note: This report follows and builds on a previous report from April 2015 (“EU-Japan Industrial
Cooperation and Business Potential in the Defence Sector – Opportunities for European Companies
(including SMEs)”) and is best understood in conjunction with this previous report.
EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation
日欧産業協力センター
2
Disclaimer
This study is the result of independent research undertaken in the framework of Minerva
Fellowship and does not necessarily reflect the views of the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial
Cooperation, the EU Commission or Japanese authorities. While utmost care was taken to assure
the correctness and comprehensiveness of all information used in this study, the EU-Japan Centre
may not be held responsible for any errors that might appear.
Acknowledgements
The author deeply thanks all the contributors to this study as well as the EU-Japan Centre for
Industrial Cooperation.
Copyright: © EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation
3
Contents A. Executive summary ....................................................................................................................... 5
B. Context of the report and methodology ....................................................................................... 6
1. Context of the report ................................................................................................................ 6
2. Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 6
a. Scope ..................................................................................................................................... 6
b. Definitions ............................................................................................................................. 6
c. Information sources .............................................................................................................. 6
C. Japan is still in the process of clarifying its security goals and the security ties it wants with
Europe ................................................................................................................................................... 8
1. Japan is starting to do more for its own defence, but is doing so within its alliance with the
USA 8
a. With its defence policy shift, Japan aims primarily to take more responsibility for its own
protection ..................................................................................................................................... 8
b. Japan is deepening its integration into the US defence apparatus ..................................... 11
2. Japan is getting more involved in Asia-Pacific security ........................................................... 13
a. The Indian Ocean ................................................................................................................ 14
b. The South China Sea ........................................................................................................... 14
3. Japan has yet to clarify its interest in a role in global security and in security ties with Europe
17
a. Japan seems determined to enhance its ability to be a global security actor .................... 17
b. Japan has not yet defined how it would use this new ability to be a global security actor 20
c. Japan’s interest in security ties with Europe seems real but has yet to take concrete forms
21
D. Japan has made progress in some of its defence equipment policy reforms ............................. 26
1. The JMoD has launched some potentially significant reforms of its equipment acquisition
system, with still unknown impact .................................................................................................. 26
a. The JMoD’s equipment functions have been reorganised .................................................. 26
b. Some significant procurement policy changes might be impending .................................. 28
c. The JMoD is making first steps in dual-use R&D ................................................................. 29
2. Japan is pressing ahead with its new strategy on exports, with still uncertain success chances
30
a. Japan is continuing to put in place export support tools, with some limitations ............... 30
b. At least some Japanese contractors are warming up to international business ................. 33
c. Several export projects are moving forward ....................................................................... 35
3. Japan is continuing to put in place its R&D cooperation strategy .......................................... 40
4
a. The USA is taking a more central place in Japan’s R&D cooperation strategy than might
have been expected .................................................................................................................... 40
b. Japan missed one opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of its technological
ambitions, but may be about to seize another one .................................................................... 44
c. One opportunity for Euro-Japanese technology cooperation did not materialise, but a
larger one may be in the works................................................................................................... 49
E. Cooperation opportunities exist especially in aeronautics and maritime security .................... 55
1. Aeronautics may deliver some significant opportunities ........................................................ 55
a. Despite recent setbacks, Europe and Japan may still cooperate on platforms ................... 55
b. Avionics and sensors may provide many opportunities ...................................................... 57
c. Some other types of cooperation may be possible ............................................................ 57
2. Maritime security may also become a major cooperation field ............................................. 58
a. Some platform cooperation may be possible ..................................................................... 58
b. Cooperation is more likely on parts and equipment ........................................................... 59
3. Ground robotics might also become an area of cooperation ................................................. 62
F. The EU could complement in several ways its member states’ efforts to promote cooperation
63
G. Appendices ................................................................................................................................. 65
1. Interview sources .................................................................................................................... 65
2. Acronyms, abbreviations and Japanese terms ........................................................................ 74
3. Overview of Japanese defence companies ............................................................................. 77
4. Overview of European defence companies with business in Japan ....................................... 83
5. Japan’s defence budget over time .......................................................................................... 88
6. ATLA organisation chart .......................................................................................................... 89
5
A. Executive summary
This report follows and builds on a previous report from April 2015 (“EU-Japan Industrial
Cooperation and Business Potential in the Defence Sector – Opportunities for European Companies
(including SMEs)”), and updates it for the period from April to October 2015. It is therefore best
understood in conjunction with this previous report.
As part of its ongoing defence policy shift, Japan has clarified the types of militarily operations it is
ready to conduct for its own protection but has not yet done the same at a regional and global level.
It also has yet to give concrete forms to its interest in security policy ties with Europe. It is therefore
too early to assess whether its military’s equipment needs will change, and how likely it is to
cooperate with Europe to satisfy them (see Section C.).
The country has also continued to reform its defence equipment acquisition system and to put in
place export promotion tools. It has missed one significant opportunity to evolve as an
international cooperation partner and to collaborate with Europe but it may be about to seize
new ones (see Section D.).
Business opportunities for European firms may materialise especially in the fields of aeronautics
and maritime security, particularly for advanced components and equipment, but also for certain
types of platforms (see Section E.).
In this context, all the recommendations made to EU institutions in the first report remain
relevant, since they could all contribute to stimulate this process. Indeed some have started to be
implemented (see Section F.).
Notes:
- Please refer to Appendix 1. for the functions of individuals mentioned;
- Please refer to Appendix 2. for acronyms, abbreviations and Japanese terms;
- As of October 29th, 2015, $1 = ¥121, €1 = ¥132.
6
B. Context of the report and methodology
1. Context of the report
In July 2013, the European Commission issued the Communication “Towards a more competitive
and efficient European defence and security sector”1 (see first report), which was then endorsed
by the European Council in the conclusions of its December 2013 meeting. In this communication,
the EC stated its intent to contribute to the support of the European defence industry and proposed
actions to this end. More details on these actions were offered in June 2014 in an Implementation
Roadmap “A New Deal for European Defence”2 (see first report), and in May 20153 in an
implementation status.
2. Methodology
a. Scope
This report focuses primarily on the defence market, defined here as defence-specific or dual-use
products and services sold to defence ministries, whether directly or indirectly (via prime and tier
contractors). It also covers the market represented by civilian organisations carrying out missions
that are close to the militaries’, especially the coast guards. It covers the military space market in a
limited way only, as it was addressed in a recent separate EJCIC Minerva report focused on space
(both civilian and military)4.
This report does not include cyber security, because the defence component of this topic cannot be
separated from its civilian component. Furthermore, the EU is already involved in this topic, as
demonstrated by the recently-launched EU-Japan dialogue and the designation of a policy officer in
charge of this topic at the EU Delegation to Japan.
b. Definitions
Same as in first report.
c. Information sources
The same information access difficulties were experienced as in the first report.
This report draws in large part on interviews (see Appendix 1.) with, in particular, representatives
1 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0542
2http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=7617&lang=en&title=A-New-Deal-for-Europ
ean-Defence%3A-Commission-proposes-industrial-action-plan
3 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence/files/communication-implementation-report_en.pdf
4 http://www.eu-japan.eu/sites/eu-japan.eu/files/space_EUJCIC_report.pdf
7
of:
- The EU Delegation to Japan and the embassies in Japan of the main member states that
actively support defence industrial cooperation with Japan;
- All the main EU defence firms with offices in Japan (with the exception of one that declined to
be interviewed) and certain EU defence firms without offices in Japan;
- The Japanese government (JMoD, NSS and METI);
- Many of the main Japanese defence firms and trade associations;
- Think tanks, consulting firms and media organisations.
Pieces of information for which no documentary sources are referenced were obtained mainly or
exclusively from interviews.
Several Japanese government documentary sources were used:
- The revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation of April 20155 (under the 1960
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security);
- The Legislation for Peace and Security of September 2015, a set of two laws: the Bill for the
Development of Legislation for Peace and Security, which amend several existing laws, and the
International Peace Support Bill (a new law). This legislation has not been translated into
English and it is unclear whether it will be. Only government digests are available in English.6
- The annual white paper “Defense of Japan” 20157;
- The report of the JMoD’s advisory group on defence exports8;
- The 2016 defence budget request9.
A further potentially relevant government document would be the JMoD’s Medium-to-Long Term
Defense Technology Outlook (the last version of this document10 dates from 2007). However, the
new version (“Research and Development Vision”), hoped for the end of 2015, will probably not be
released before 2016.
5 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/pdf/shishin_20150427e.pdf
6 http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000080671.pdf;
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_2-1-3_1st_0730.pdf
7 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2015.html
8 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2015/09/30c.pdf
9 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/271016.pdf
10 http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/en/data/pdf/chuchoki_en.pdf
8
C. Japan is still in the process of clarifying its security goals and the security ties it wants with Europe
Despite major moves initiated during the research period of this report, Japan has so far indicated
only the most obvious aspects of its new security policy, related to its own defence and to
Asia-Pacific security. The country has yet to specify its appetite for participation in military
operations elsewhere and for security ties with Europe. This matters for Euro-Japanese defence
industrial cooperation for two reasons:
- Because Japan’s overseas military operations may be more likely to create procurement
opportunities for European suppliers than the defence of the country’s territory;
- And because Japan will probably limit defence equipment cooperation to countries with which
it is developing broader defence cooperation, given its pacifist heritage and its insistence on
peaceful use of its equipment and technologies.
1. Japan is starting to do more for its own defence, but is doing so within its alliance with the USA
a. With its defence policy shift, Japan aims primarily to take more
responsibility for its own protection
The USA, even as it pivots towards Asia, has been asking Japan to contribute more to the defence of
its own territory, in order to focus more on containing China and deterring North Korea. This
demand clearly seems to be the main trigger if not the main cause of Japan’s defence policy shift.
i. New Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines
The revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation (under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security), released in late April 2015, reflect this rebalancing, with a more equal
burden sharing for Japan’s protection.
Firstly, as the previous version from 1997, they state: “Bilateral actions in response to an armed
attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.”11 And
over 11 pages are dedicated to measures to protect Japan, whereas only 5 describe measures to
protect other countries.
Secondly, the guidelines, compared to the 1997 version, expand the types of activities for which
Japan receives “primary responsibility”:
- The old version mentions “to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan”; the new
version adds to this “to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and
11 Page 9
9
airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches”12;
- The old version mentions “conducting operations for air defense”; the new version adds to this
“while ensuring air superiority”13;
- The old version states “The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the
protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters,
and for other operations.” The new version specifies and reinforces this as follows: “The
Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits
in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated
operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but
not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare,
anti-air warfare, and air interdiction”14;
- The new version adds, most critically, “primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile
defense operations to defend Japan”15, “for responding to large-scale disasters in Japan”16 and
“for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against
islands”17.
Highly controversially, the new guidelines also open possibilities for Japan to exercise collective
self-defense, from which it had so far shied away due to its pacifist constitution. The new
guidelines:
- State that “When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of
force […] to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan
has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack
and to deter further attacks”18;
- Provide “Examples of cooperative operations” in “situations where an armed attack against a
foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens
Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life,
liberty, and pursuit of happiness”19:
Asset protection and ship escort,
Search and rescue,
Logistics support and “interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries
12 Page 11
13 Page 11
14 Page 12
15 Page 12
16 Page 17
17 Page 13
18 Page 15
19 Pages 16-17
10
involved in the armed attack”,
Minesweeping,
BMD.
ii. New legislation
The document, like its 1997 version, states that “The Guidelines do not obligate either government
to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal
rights or obligations for either government.” Nevertheless, the Legislation for Peace and Security of
September 2015, which expands the situations in which the JSDF can intervene, seems to aim
chiefly to create the necessary legal framework to comply with the Guidelines’ obligations.
While the legislation covers multiple potential situations, the ones it defines the most clearly are
those that immediately relate to Japan’s contribution to its own defence as well as that of the USA,
particularly with regard to BMD. It allows the JSDF, in particular, to:
- Defend warships and other military assets of nations working to defend Japan;
- Provide logistical support to foreign forces in a military contingency, no longer only “in areas
surrounding Japan” (i.e. to US forces in the Korean Peninsula), as authorized by a law from 1999,
but anywhere around the world, provided that the situation would “gravely affect” Japan’s
peace and security;
- Exercise the right of collective self-defence in limited ways, when there is a “clear danger” to
Japan’s survival due to an armed attack on a country with which Japan has “close ties” and
there are “no other appropriate means” to protect Japanese citizens. This would allow Japan in
particular to use its air defence and BMD systems to destroy a ballistic missile launched by
North Korea towards Hawaii or a Chinese cruise missile targeting a US warship. Despite some
off-the-record suggestions to the contrary, this new possibility does not seem to have any
likelihood of being used with other countries than the USA.
iii. Increased defence budgets
To face these expanded responsibilities, the Japanese government intends to increase its defence
budget further, with ¥4.93 trillion requested for the fiscal year to March 2017. This would
represent a 2.3% increase versus the current fiscal year and the fourth consecutive year of budget
increase, after a decade of decline20, and would almost bring the budget back to its peak of the late
1990s and early 2000s (see Appendix 5.).
This increase, however, even if it is accepted unchanged, needs to be interpreted carefully. First, in
terms of purchasing power in USD, it is offset by the slide of the yen, engineered as part of the
“Abenomics”. Second, it is harder than ever to predict how sustainable the increase is in the context
20http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/271016.pdf
11
of Japan’s severe fiscal situation, with a public debt amounting to 250% of GDP: does it prove that
defence has and will continue to have (or may continue to have, depending on the national security
circumstances) priority in fiscal choices? Or does it make the eventual backlash from the Finance
Ministry, eager to avoid an eventual macroeconomic disaster, more likely? In a conference in
September 2015, Toru Hotchi seemed to confirm that the budget increase would not be prolonged
past the next budget year.
b. Japan is deepening its integration into the US defence apparatus
This integration is observed at the operational level:
- The revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation add to the existing Security
Consultative Committee (i.e. Two Plus Two) an Alliance Coordination Mechanism and a Bilateral
Planning Mechanism21, which were established in the beginning of November 2015. The new
Alliance Coordination Mechanism, unlike an existing mechanism, can be used not only in case
of an armed attack but also in peacetime, which enables it to deal with “grey zone” situations.
It consists of three coordination groups: one at the security policy level, with each country’s
NSC, defence and foreign ministries and armed forces; and two on joint operations – one for
the JMoD’s Joint Staff Office and US Pacific Command and one for armed forces22;
- Also in November 2015, the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (under the Security
Consultative Committee) formed a committee of representatives from the JSDF, the US Pacific
Command and US forces stationed in Japan, in charge of preparing detailed plans for response
to specific emergency situations;
- The ACSA signed in 2004 by the two countries is currently under revision23 to reflect the
revised Guidelines and the new security laws;
- The renewal of the host nation support agreement between the USA and Japan (the current
“Special Measures Agreement”24 expires in March 2016) might be used as an opportunity to
tighten this integration further25.
The integration is also obvious at the equipment level. The budget increase of the current fiscal
21 Pages 3-4
22 http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Defense-coordination-extended-to-peacetime;
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/03/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-u-s-unify-defense-operations-ne
w-body-action-plan/#.VjrGLG4sfIU
23https://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201510010036;
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/08/national/politics-diplomacy/u-s-seeks-early-accord-mutual-military
-logistic-support/#.VfENg32pjVI
24http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2011/1/0121_02.html;http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/japan/
u-s-japan-sign-new-five-year-host-nation-support-agreement-1.132428
25 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/js20150427e.html
12
year is used mainly to buy US equipment, notably:
- 17 Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft26, meant to contribute in particular to the
protection of the Senkaku islets and approved in May 2015 for FMS27, costing $3bn (together
with several Boeing UGM-84L Harpoon Block II submarine-launched missiles costing $200m);
- Three Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawks, a high-altitude, long-endurance observation
UAS, at a cost of ¥37bn28. This purchase was announced officially in January 201529 and will
probably be contracted, through FMS, in late 201530;
- 52 AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, used by the U.S. Marine Corps and built by the US
branch of BAE Systems31.
The integration is particularly striking in the area of air defence and BMD, where both Japan’s
acquisitions and the USA’s asset deployments in Japan point to an expansion of the USA’s Aegis
system in Japan and the incorporation of Japanese assets into this system:
- In June and October 2015, the US Navy homeported in Japan two additional Aegis warships
equipped with the new Baseline 9, which allows them to operate in the Navy Integrated Fire
Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA32, a data network that links the various components of the Aegis
system, especially ships and Hawkeye surveillance aircraft). The USA plans to deploy one more
such ship to Japan by 2017. (It also swapped in September 2015 its nuclear-powered carrier
USS George Washington with the newer and more modern USS Ronald Reagan.33)
- Japan seems likely to adopt NIFC-CA on two Aegis cruisers that it is currently building34 as well
26 http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/japan-v-22b-block-c-osprey-aircraft
27http://www.janes.com/article/51477/us-approves-sale-of-submarine-launched-harpoon-block-ii-to-japan?utm_ca
mpaign=PC6110_E15%20DF%20NL%20Defence%2005_19_15&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua 28
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/271016.pdf 29
http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsjapan-selects-northrops-global-hawk-and-e-2d-advanced-hawkey
e-for-isr-missions-4492135
30http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/global-hawk-uav-prepares-for-maritime-role-updated-01218/
31https://medium.com/war-is-boring/tiltrotors-radar-planes-spy-drones-and-amphibious-vehicles-japan-goes-on-a-
buying-spree-e1999663758d
32http://news.usni.org/2015/06/18/upgraded-cruiser-uss-chancellorsville-arrives-in-japan-for-forward-deployment;
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/10/19/upgraded-destroyer-uss-benfold-arrives-at-new-home-in-japan.ht
ml
33http://www.stripes.com/news/protesters-rally-against-uss-ronald-reagan-arrival-japan-security-bills-1.367929;http
://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/01/national/new-u-s-nuclear-aircraft-carrier-ronald-reagan-arrives-yokosu
ka/#.Vg3ko32pjIU
34http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/07/11/japan-naval-fire-control-china-aegis/29886
975/;http://defenseindustrydaily.us5.list-manage.com/track/click?u=329658425751766a1111efa05&id=933ecf6b1f
13
as on several other warships that it contracted Lockheed Martin in May 2015 to upgrade to
Baseline 935. Furthermore, in June 2015, a FMS to Japan was approved for 4 Northrop
Grumman E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft36 for $1.7bn.
NIFC-CA would allow Japan to link all these assets with each other and with US assets.
This equipment integration makes the operational integration of Japanese military assets into US
systems easier and indeed more inevitable, especially again with regard to BMD, given the degree
of automation and interconnection of BMD systems (made necessary by the extreme speed of
ballistic missiles). It seems likely that, should these systems detect incoming missiles or other aerial
threats, they would proceed to destroy them using US or Japanese assets as they would deem
optimal and without leaving much room for human decision or consultation.37
This would imply that the defence policy changes allowed by the security laws of September 2015
will be implemented even if their constitutionality is challenged in the future (see Section C.3.a.ii.)
and whatever the outcome of such challenges may be. More the more immediate future, it
suggests that much of the defence equipment that Japan will acquire in relation to the defence of
its territory risks remaining off-limit to European suppliers, in the name or under the pretext of
interoperability. (This restriction, nevertheless, is not absolute, since Japan’s Aegis system includes,
for example, a Thales-made Aegis fire-control system.)
2. Japan is getting more involved in Asia-Pacific security
Neither the new Guidelines nor the security laws are very explicit about the military operations in
which Japan may participate in the future in the Asia-Pacific, as opposed to more remote world
regions (see Section C.3.a.i.).
However, Japan’s diplomatic and military activity clearly shows an intention to contribute relatively
directly to the security of the region, even though it is unclear for now whether this endeavour
could create new or significantly increased equipment needs that might be covered by European
suppliers.
Japan is mainly concentrating its defence cooperation with Asian partners in the Indian Ocean
and the South China Sea, i.e. on sea lanes on which Japan depends heavily and which might be
disrupted by China. In a sign of this issue’s growing importance for Japan, Defense of Japan 2015
&e=0dc3ed3783;http://news.usni.org/2015/08/10/congress-notified-of-potential-1-5b-sale-of-aegis-combat-system
s-for-new-japanese-ship-class
35http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/lockheed-to-upgrade-japanese-aegis-destroyer-for-abm-use-0867/?utm_m
edium=textlink&utm_term=continuereading
36http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/japan-e-2d-advanced-hawkeye-airborne-early-warning-and-control-aircraft
37http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/07/11/japan-naval-fire-control-china-aegis/29886
975/
14
added to its Chapter on “Issues in the International Community” a section on “Maritime Trends”38
mainly dedicated to the East and South China Seas (as well as the Arctic).
a. The Indian Ocean
Australia is the country with which, apart from the USA, Japan is demonstrating the greatest
interest in cooperating on defence. Japan seems to hope Australia will help it to preserve the
security of the Indian Ocean and monitor Chinese activities there. This is particularly important to
Japan in the context of Mitsui’s 20% stake in an LNG project in Mozambique, which could see gas
being shipped to Japan from 201939. This nascent relationship has taken two main forms so far:
- Possible equipment cooperation, chiefly as part of Australia’s submarine programme (see
Section D.2.c.iii.). The Australian government was well represented at the MastAsia exhibition
(see Section D.2.a.i.) and Japan’s potential role in the programme was clearly the primary
reason for the presence of several European contractors. Furthermore, since February 2015 an
Australian civilian exchange officer has been dispatched at the JMoD’s Capacity Building
Support Office40;
- Joint training: In July 2015, for the first time, Japan took a small participation in Talisman Sabre,
a large, biennial US-Australian war game, with about 40 personnel from the Japanese Western
Army's Infantry Regiment (Japan’s new amphibious force) joining the US contingent.
Japan is also reinforcing its ties with India, mainly by joining this country’s bilateral cooperation
with the USA. A seventh USA-Japan-India trilateral dialogue at the assistant foreign minister level
was held in June 201541. In October 2015, Japan participated in the annual US-India Malabar naval
exercises, with a destroyer.42 While it had participated as an invitee in 2007, 2009 and 2014, it was
doing so for the first time as a permanent member. The discussions around a possible sale of US-2
(see Section D.2.c.iii.) are part of this growing relationship.
b. The South China Sea
Though Japan has no territorial claims on the sea, it is concerned by China’s, which cover virtually
the entire sea and conflict with overlapping claims of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei
and Taiwan. Indeed Japan sees its involvement in the SCS as essential to its own security due to its
importance as a key shipping route, through which about 90% of its imports transit43.
38 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_1-2-3_1st_0730.pdf
39 https://www.mitsui.com/jp/en/business/challenge/1199564_1856.html
40 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/sp/no69/sp_specialfeature.html
41http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/why-the-new-us-trilateral-dialogue-with-japan-and-india-matters/
42http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/navy/2015/10/13/japan-join-malabar-permanent-participant/
73828110/;http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/confirmed-japan-will-permanently-join-us-india-naval-exercises/ 43
http://www.dw.com/en/german-firms-eager-to-access-japans-defense-market/a-18449903
15
Japan continues to support Vietnam, mainly through capacity building44:
- By the beginning of November 2015, four of six used 600-ton coast guard vessels pledged by
Japan in 2014 had been delivered, with the last two being scheduled to be delivered by the end
of 201545;
- In September 2015, as part of the Vietnamese Communist Party leader’s first visit to Japan
since April 2009, the two countries signed cooperation documents regarding UN PKOs and the
development of their coast guards’ human resources;
- On the same occasion, Japan announced about ¥100bn of loans to Vietnam for infrastructure
that will be civilian but will presumably contribute to the country’s protection, as well as the
grant, worth ¥200m, of an undisclosed number of used coast guard boats and other maritime
security equipment.
But Japan is mainly developing its security relationship with the Philippines, the country most
exposed to China’s SCS claims. This new relationship, as part of which the Philippine President and
Defense Secretary visited Tokyo in June 2015, is taking several forms.
First, the two countries have taken part in a number of mainly symbolic military drills:
- In May 2015, the two countries conducted bilateral naval exercises for the first time since
World War II46. Two Japanese destroyers and a Philippine warship practiced a drill for
unplanned encounters, apparently about 300km from the Scarborough Shoal, claimed by the
Philippines but controlled by China since 2012 (in April 2015, China's coast guard fired water
cannon on Philippine fishermen near the shoal);
- The same month, the two countries’ coast guards staged an anti-piracy drill, featuring the
storming of a hijacked cargo vessel47. The drill, which took place in the Manila Bay, was
watched by the coast guard chiefs of 17 Asian nations, including China;
- In June 2015, simultaneously with an annual US-Philippines exercise, Japan and the Philippines
held a further drill near the island of Palawan, situated about 160 km from the disputed Spratly
islands. This search and rescue drill involved one P3-C Orion (which is primarily an
anti-submarine patrol aircraft) of the MSDF and one Philippine aircraft48;
44http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/16/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-pledges-ships-vietnams-top-lead
er-offset-china/;http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/09/15/japan-step-up-help-vietnamese-maritim
e-security/72312242/
45 http://www.stripes.com/news/japan-gives-vietnam-2-ships-to-beef-up-maritime-security-1.376884
46http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/12/national/philippines-appeals-funds-build-new-naval-base-japan-
might-help-project-part/#.VZzY_rWpjVJ
47 http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/05/06/philippines-japan-idINKBN0NR0OD20150506
48http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/22/national/japan-u-s-join-philippines-south-china-sea-navy-drills/#.
VZ9J4rWpjVJ
16
- Japan had already participated in previous years in Pacific Partnership, a multilateral
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise. However, in August 2015, it did so for the
first time off the coast of the Philippines, in presence of the Chief of Staff of the JMoD’s Joint
Staff Council.49
Second, Japan is helping the Philippines to build its defence capability, in an effort clearly
endorsed by the USA50:
- Several arm sales or donations by Japan to the Philippines have been agreed or are under
discussion (see sections D.2.a.i. and D.2.c.ii.).
- The Philippines aim, despite funding problems, to build a naval base on Palawan. Japan might
fund infrastructure around the base, though not the facility itself, and would be allowed to use
it for MSDF ship port calls51 – although there is little sign at this stage that Japan intends to
send any of its naval ships in this area other than for drills.
Third, and most strikingly, Japan seems to be considering helping to patrol the SCS or its sky. The
commander of the US Seventh Fleet said in a press interview in January 2015 that the USA would
welcome such a move, and in April 2015, Reuters reported that the Japanese military was
considering it52. In June 2015, on a visit to Tokyo, the new head of the US Pacific Command seemed
to make a similar suggestion to Japanese media53.
This would be consistent with the discussions, announced in early June 2015, on a “visiting forces
agreement” that could allow Japan to use Philippine bases for refuelling54. In the end of October
2015, after the US Navy started to patrol the 12-nautical-mile zone that China claims around some
man-made islands in the Spratly archipelago, the Japanese Defense Minister stated in a press
conference55 that supporting these operations “should be fully studied from now on. Currently, we
have no plans for a concrete response.”
Politically, such a decision would represent a major and high-risk move, both domestically and in
the relationship with China.56
49http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/15/uk-philippines-southchinasea-idUSKCN0QJ12T20150815
50 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/js20150427e.html
51http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/12/asia-pacific/new-naval-base-philippines-west-coast-militarys-top-
priority/#.VZzZGbWpjVI 52
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/29/us-usa-japan-southchinasea-idUSKBN0NK15M20150429
53http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/24/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-philippines-hail-second-day-of-
joint-drills-in-south-china-sea/#.VZ9LjLWpjVJ
54http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/05/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-will-help-boost-philippine-coas
t-guard-abe/#.VZ3rurWpjVI
55 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2015/10/27.html
56http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/21/national/politics-diplomacy/u-s-eyes-south-china-sea-patrols-will
-japan-play-role/#.Vil8om4sfIV
17
Overall, it is highly unclear whether, in the event of an actual military crisis in the SCS, Japan
might participate in any operations. During the parliamentary debate on the security bills, PM Abe
suggested it might, but did so after previously stating that shipping routes to Japan could be
diverted from the area in case of a conflict.57
3. Japan has yet to clarify its interest in a role in global security and in security ties with Europe
a. Japan seems determined to enhance its ability to be a global security actor
i. The Guidelines and security legislation create a framework to this end
Making a “proactive contribution to peace” and raising the country’s profile as a global security
actor are key goals of the Abe government. They stem not only from criticism, rising since the first
Gulf War, of its “checkbook diplomacy”, but also from a drive to align Japan’s political weight with
the size of its economy, as well as from PM Abe’s brand of nationalism (nostalgic, indeed revisionist,
though no longer aggressive) and his desire to reclaim what he perceives as the country’s past
greatness, which ended with WWII.
The creation in July 2014 of a post of Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs58 may
demonstrate an intention to raise the ministry’s ability to engage with international partners,
probably beyond the USA, although it is unclear how much power is attached to this position.
The revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation also make this intention clear. Their
very first paragraph states that “in order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any
circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and
prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond (sic), bilateral security and defense cooperation will
emphasize […] the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance”. They also state that “The Alliance will
respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such
situations cannot be defined geographically.”59
The document lists a number of areas in which the two countries may expand their “Cooperation
for Regional and Global Peace and Security”60:
- KPOs;
57http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/16/national/japans-defense-reform-tarnished-low-public-support-un
convincing-sales-pitch/#.VfoteH2pjVI
58http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/08/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-administration-finds-candidate-fi
rst-vice-defense-minister-international-affairs/#.Vfpl532pg1k 59
Page 7
60 Pages 18-20
18
- International HA/DR;
- Maritime security (“efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as
counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
counterterrorism activities.”);
- Partner Capacity Building (“maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building,
and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations.”);
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations;
- ISR;
- Training and Exercises (including “with partners”);
- Logistic support.
Furthermore, the Legislation for Peace and Security provides more specifics on the new military
tasks that the JSDF could be allowed to perform:
- Conducting ship inspections abroad, rather than only “in Japanese waters or on the
surrounding high seas”, as was so far permitted;
- Taking on more roles in UN and other PKOs, especially the protection of civilians and of foreign
forces under armed attack;
- Using its weapons in PKOs for the execution of the above missions, with rules of engagement
“better aligned with current UN standard”;
- Rescuing Japanese nationals or, in certain circumstances, non-Japanese nationals, in emergency
situations overseas (currently, the JSDF is only allowed to provide transport during evacuation
missions, without any use of force).
Furthermore, the legislation created a permanent law under which the JSDF could be dispatched
overseas to provide logistical support (expanded to ammunition including missiles, though not to
weapons per se61) to a foreign force engaged in armed combat. This eliminated the need for ad-hoc
temporary laws. However, in a concession of the LDP to its pacifist coalition partner Komeito, prior
Diet approval to each operation is still required.62
ii. This framework seems likely to stand despite its probable
unconstitutionality
These laws seem to be clearly unconstitutional and hard to reconcile with Article IX of the
Japanese Constitution63. This is particularly true of their parts mentioned above, which are farthest
61http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/05/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-defense-chief-says-sdf-deal-nu
kes-security-bills/#.Vcr3RLWpjVJ
62http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/18/national/politics-diplomacy/main-elements-abes-security-legislati
on/#.VgOVn32pjIU
63 “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In
19
from the strict defence of the national territory – whereas the parts related to Japan’s defence,
quoted in Section C.1.a., can more easily be seen as consistent with the people’s rights, protected
by other parts of the Constitution, to “live in peace" and to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness".
This is the opinion of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations64 and of over two hundred
constitutional scholars who signed a petition to this effect65, including a prominent expert who had
been selected by the ruling LPD to address a Lower House session on constitutional affairs in June
201566.
Nevertheless, the durability of the laws seems fairly assured, given that:
- The LDP still seems intent on revising the Constitution: in May 2015 it unveiled plans to
proceed with this revision in several waves, with the first happening within the next two years
and the revision of Article IX being kept for the last wave67 (although the bills’ unpopularity –
polls consistently show 60% against them68 – may make it impossible to secure a majority in
the referendum required by the constitutional revision procedure);
- Any legal challenge to the laws’ constitutionality69 would take years to produce effects. Japan
has no constitutional court and its Supreme Court, unlike its US counterpart, cannot rule on
such issues ex-ante and in principle but only when a specific party has actually been harmed,
and only after lower courts have ruled. Furthermore, the Supreme Court takes on average four
years to issue a ruling;
- It is doubtful, based on precedents and on the fact that its members are all appointed by the
order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential,
will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”
(http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html)
64 http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201508270067
65http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/12/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-security-bills-reveal-irreconcila
ble-divide-scholars-politicians/#.VZ31t7WpjVI
66http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/05/national/politics-diplomacy/experts-blast-constitutional-reinterpr
etation-lower-house-session/#.VZ3qf7WpjVI;http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/05/national/politics-diplo
macy/experts-blast-constitutional-reinterpretation-lower-house-session/#.VZ3qf7WpjVI
67http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/02/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-gears-up-to-revise-pacifist-consti
tution/#.VUsdCPCpjVI
68http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/16/national/japans-defense-reform-tarnished-low-public-support-un
convincing-sales-pitch/#.VfoteH2pjVI
69 Yasuo Hasebe, Professor of Constitutional Law at Waseda Law School, and Setsu Kobayashi, Professor Emeritus at
Keio University, announced in June 2015 that they were preparing three such lawsuits. See also
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/20/national/politics-diplomacy/opponents-vow-to-fight-laws-expandin
g-role-of-japans-military/#.VgOCpn2pjIV
20
government without Diet endorsement, that the Supreme Court would decide to take position
on key national security issues.70 This is illustrated by the failure of all the legal challenges71 to
the constitutionality of the government’s decision, in July 2014, to change by decree the official
interpretation of the Constitution (which formed the legal basis for the security laws).
b. Japan has not yet defined how it would use this new ability to be a global
security actor
The Japanese government seems eager for the JSDF’s participation in international military
operations that either serve the country’s strategic interests directly, or allow it to gain experience
with the practical and political aspects of such operations. However, it does not yet seem to have
articulated these two goals or to have defined the types of operations or geographic regions in
which it could do so.
During the intense parliamentary debate on the security laws, under strong pressure to provide
practical examples of overseas operations in which they would allow the JSDF to use force, PM
Abe could only offer demining operations in the Strait of Hormuz (he told a Diet committee in May
2015 “At present, I have no other example in my mind”)72. This possibility seems reasonable: firstly,
the Strait of Hormuz is both a potential theatre of conflict between Iran and some Gulf states and a
major route for oil shipments to Japan. Secondly, the JMoD already performed demining in the
Persian Gulf in 1991, after the first Gulf War73, in its very first post-WWII overseas mission, which
creates a precedent. Nevertheless, the Strait of Hormuz being mined seems for now to be only a
remote possibility, as PM Abe himself later acknowledged74.
With regard to operations not involving the use of force, PM Abe also suggested refuelling and
ammunition logistics “if serious military tensions or an armed conflict occur in the Middle East or
the Indian Ocean that could greatly impact Japanese ships carrying goods to Japan, and if the
United States or other countries were dealing with such situations”75. Here again, precedents exist,
notably the dispatch of military refuelling ships in the Indian Ocean in support of the western
70http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/18/national/politics-diplomacy/supreme-court-unlikely-rule-abes-art
icle-9-revamp/#.VZ37rrWpjVI
71http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/20/national/politics-diplomacy/opponents-vow-to-fight-laws-expand
ing-role-of-japans-military/#.VgOCpn2pjIV
72http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/27/national/politics-diplomacy/dpj-urges-abe-write-restrictions-defe
nse-bills/#.VZ3mzLWpjVI 73
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no24/specialfeature01.html
74http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/16/national/japans-defense-reform-tarnished-low-public-support-un
convincing-sales-pitch/#.VfoteH2pjVI
75http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/01/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-says-sdf-provide-logistic-aid-fore
ign-forces-middle-east-indian-ocean-new-laws/#.VZ3pWrWpjVI
21
intervention in Afghanistan76, but one can doubt that a government taking such step in the
foreseeable future would survive politically.
The budget request for 2016, under the subsection “Enhancement of capability to conduct overseas
activities”, lists only one equipment acquisition, of four “transport protection vehicles” for the
transportation of Japanese nationals in case of emergencies overseas.
Overall, it is unclear whether the current government has any plans for the next few years for
significant new military operations. Even when considering much broader forms of international
action than military intervention, the Japanese government’s decision in September 2015 to
contribute only financially to alleviate the refugee crisis in Europe77 does not provide evidence of
any real intent to go beyond checkbook diplomacy.
c. Japan’s interest in security ties with Europe seems real but has yet to take
concrete forms
i. Japan’s interest in security ties with Europe seems real
On the one hand, there are many indications that Japan is continuing to develop its defence
relationship with Europe. The section on “Maritime Trends”78 added to Defense of Japan 2015
includes a description of the “maritime security efforts” of NATO, the EU, the UK and France.
With certain EUMSs:
- With France, a Two-Plus-Two under the ministerial level took place in September 2015 and the
next such meeting is planned for early 2016. French warships made port calls in Japan in May
and October 2015 and, at the second time, participated in Japan’s triennial fleet review79. Also
in October 2015, the 150th anniversary of the Yokosuka naval base (which was built by a French
engineer) and meetings between IRSEM and NIDS provided opportunities for various contacts.
- The German and Japanese defence ministers met for the first time in six years in May 2015 at
Shangri-La80. In September 2015, the German Embassy in Japan and the Tokyo office of the
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung organised a full-day conference, with the participation of Japan’s
Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs (in his last day in duty before retirement), on
defence topics that seemed well targeted for the Japanese audience: the “legal basis” and the
“social” and “military aspects of operations abroad” (including “ethical dilemmas” and “the
76 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no24/specialfeature01.html
77http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/30/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-unsc-pitch-pledges-810-million-s
yria-iraq-refugee-aid-750-peace-building/#.ViBmX24sfIU
78 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_1-2-3_1st_0730.pdf
79http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/18/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-flexes-naval-muscle-u-s-signals
-wider-engagement-western-pacific/#.ViQ2zW4sfIV
80 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/pressconf/2015/05/150531b.html
22
transformation of the German Federal Armed Forces through participation in missions abroad”).
Furthermore, the two countries’ participation in anti-piracy activities off Somalia has so far
provided four opportunities for joint training exercises.
- Sweden’s defence attaché to Japan, so far based in Stockholm and dedicated only part-time to
this portfolio, relocated to Tokyo in August 2015 on a full-time basis, which suggests that the
relationship between the two countries is intensifying.
With the EU institutions:
- The joint statement released after the EU-Japan summit of May 201581 dedicated over a third
of its length to security topics.
- Several meetings at various levels have taken place between EU and Japanese officials. There
are annual talks between the EEAS’s Crisis Management Planning Director and the head of the
Operations Department of the JMoD’s Joint Staff Office. The EEAS is also represented at a
senior level at the annual Tokyo Defense Forum82.
With NATO:
- A visit of delegates of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly took place in June 2015. In September
2015, NATO’s Deputy Secretary General 83 and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation84 visited Japan. This was followed by a further visit in October 2015. NATO’s
contact point in Japan is a European embassy, Germany’s (preceded before 2015 by Poland’s).
- In September 2015, Japan participated in a “consequence management field exercise” “based
on a technological disaster scenario”, organised in Ukraine by NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster
Response Center.85
ii. Japan’s interest in security ties with Europe has yet to take concrete forms
Japan appears to hope to cooperate with Europe in three areas of common interest, related
particularly to unimpeded global trade. However, some of these areas are of moderate strategic
importance for Japan and others may test Europe’s capabilities. It is therefore too early to predict
what concrete joint actions this can lead to, and when.
Firstly, Japan hopes to see Europe taking side clearly for it and against China in respect of China’s
territorial expansion drive, both in Japanese waters and the SCS. Japan wishes to obtain not only its
moral support (some lend this meaning to the defence equipment cooperation agreements signed
81http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/29-joint-press-statement-eu-japan-summit/
82 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/data/t_d_forum/
83 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_122607.htm;
http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/japan-nato-cooperation
84 http://www.act.nato.int/dsact-country-visit-to-japan
85 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_118671.htm
23
with the UK and France) but also more concrete steps such as satellite intelligence activities and,
ideally, a military presence on the ground. The latter seems to be also desired by at least some
within the US government: at a CSIS conference in July 2015, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for South and Southeast Asia and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia
made such calls86.
However, such a prospect seems unrealistic: given Europe’s limited and already stretched military
capabilities, it is unlikely that it would commit military assets to the SCS, especially before Japan
would make such a move. Furthermore, Japan does not always appear to welcome those offers that
it does receive from Europe, in a possible reflection of divergences between political and
administrative decision makers. For example, a French-Japanese-US naval drill in May 2015, on the
occasion of a port call in Japan by a French warship, was more modest than what France proposed,
as the JMoD refused to grant flight authorisation.
Secondly, Japan is keen on Europe’s help in preserving the security of the Pacific Ocean or at least
the Indian Ocean. In addition to its base in Djibouti, France, as noted in Defense of Japan 2015,
keeps two frigates in the Pacific, although they are based in its overseas territories, which are not
optimally located from Japan’s point of view. France and the UK are also members of the
Japan-based United Nations Command (Rear) for South Korea, which helps them demonstrate a
commitment to the region.
However, Japan may have more appetite for cooperation with the UK than France, despite its more
limited regional resources than France’s (which Defense of Japan 2015 also seems to note) and the
many signs of its proximity with China. One reason for this may be the UK’s contribution to rescue
operations in the Philippines after it was hit by a typhoon in late 2013: the UK contributed several
military assets, whereas France did none, and a much greater financial contribution87. When Japan,
for the first time, commanded the Combined Task Force 15188, from June to August 2015, it
received support from the UK navy, with holds the post of deputy commander of the force.
This operation, as well as operation Atalanta (European Union Task Force 465), provides
opportunities for operational contacts between the European and Japanese militaries, as when the
EU Naval Force assumed the overall coordination of counter-piracy operations from the CTF 151 in
July 2015.89 Members of the JSDF also frequently visit EU NAVFOR’s headquarters.
Looking forward, however, there seems to be little need for further expanding the current
anti-piracy operations and no scope for new European or international operations in the Pacific or
86http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/30/us-usa-eu-southchinasea-idUSKCN0Q401B20150730
87http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/asie/video-philippines-la-logistique-un-defi-pour-l-aide-humanitaire-fran
caise_1301896.html; http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-24906526; http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-24977304
88http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2015/06/02/japan-makes-history-as-it-takes-the-lead-of-combined-task-forc
e-151/
89http://eunavfor.eu/operation-atalanta-force-headquarters-assumes-counter-piracy-coordination-role-from-ctf-151
24
Indian Oceans in which Japan might participate. NATO seems to be refocusing on the defence of
Europe, with Russia’s aggression on Ukraine and the phasing out of operations in Afghanistan
(although the situation in Syria might reverse or complicate this trend).
The EU, for its part, might conceivably launch missions, under the CSDP or other frameworks, such
as, perhaps, an antipiracy mission in the Strait of Malacca. Its 2005-2006 CSDP mission in Aceh90,
for peace agreement implementation monitoring, offers a precedent, as does its peace process
support mission in the Philippines, started in 201191. However, multiple crises in Europe’s more
immediate vicinity make such initiatives unlikely.
Thirdly, Japan shows some interest in a greater presence in Africa. This interest has both an
economic nature, with many Japanese firms seeing the continent as a future growth region, and a
security nature, with rising concerns in Japan over wars and terrorism and their possible harm on
Japanese citizens and assets. After the terrorist attack of January 21013 in Algeria, Japan increased
its number of defence attachés in Africa from two to nine.92
In addition to its past mission in Sudan93 and its current one in South Sudan94, Japan has already
dispatched a few liaison officials to the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in Germany.95 Further
contribution to CSDP missions is cautiously suggested in the joint statement of the EU-Japan
summit of May 2015 and, to make this possible, a Framework Participation Agreement is expected
to be signed.
Nevertheless, this interest is not strong enough to make Africa a core strategic region for Japan.
Substantial additional contributions to CSDP missions are therefore unlikely, whether in the form
of troop dispatches or logistical support.
Instead, Japan is likely to seek cooperation with Europe or the international community in African
security affairs in the following forms:
- A small expansion in size and/or roles of its existing contribution to the UN PKO in South Sudan
(currently about 350 personnel, mainly in infrastructure roles). In particular, JSDF personnel
there could be allowed to use their weapons to protect other countries’ troops or UN staff
90http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/pdf/07092006_factsheet_aceh-amm_en.p
df
91http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/philippines/eu_in_mindano/eu_support_peace_process/index_en.htm
92http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/10/27/national/defense-ministry-to-expand-military-attaches-in-africa-t
o-nine/#.VkLd8F4sfIU; http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no62/topics.html
93 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no24/specialfeature01.html
94http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/12/national/politics-diplomacy/ministry-mulling-expanded-role-sdf-s
outh-sudan-assuming-security-bills-pass/#.Vea0mH2pjVI;http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/21/national/c
abinet-extends-sdf-mission-south-sudan/#.VEb9xVdZHIU;
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/kokusai_heiwa/s_sudan_pko/
95 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/others/ebola/20141021_dispatch.html
25
under attack – although this change, first announced for May 201696, may not happen before
November 2016 or even later (presumably May 2017), to avoid political damage in the Diet
Upper House election in summer 201697;
- Possibly a greater financial contribution to CSDP missions (or to UN missions on which Japan
cooperates with the EU, such as the one in Niger98), or at least better coordination of Japanese
civilian aid with these missions. Japan is increasingly directing parts of its Official Development
Assistance funds to defence-related uses such as military or police training or DDR
(Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration) and security sector reform. The participation
of Japanese civilian or military staff in police missions or in the logistics of military missions
(particularly training missions) seems also possible;
- Cooperation with certain EUMSs on intelligence and on evacuation in emergencies. As
precedents, during the last crisis in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, the French military rescued the
Japanese ambassador, held in his embassy by combatants99; and, on another continent, 13
Japanese were among the individuals rescued by the German armed forces in 1997 in
Operation Dragonfly / Libelle in Tirana100
96http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/22/national/politics-diplomacy/sdf-role-south-sudan-expand-may-ne
w-security-laws/#.VgOAPH2pjIV
97http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/19/national/politics-diplomacy/expanding-sdfs-south-sudan-peaceke
eping-role-likely-delayed-late-2016/#.ViWblG4sfIU
98http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2014/12/16/japan-and-undp-team-up-t
o-help-strengthen-security-in-niger.html
99http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/04/07/l-ambassadeur-du-japon-a-abidjan-exfiltre-par-l-armee-franca
ise_1504185_3212.html
100 http://www.worldlibrary.org/article/WHEBN0010551602/Operation%20Libelle;
http://www.rp-online.de/politik/deutschland/tirana-97-das-erste-gefecht-der-bundeswehr-aid-1.2313287
26
D. Japan has made progress in some of its defence equipment policy reforms
1. The JMoD has launched some potentially significant reforms of its equipment acquisition system, with still unknown impact
(Note: a research report to be published in April 2016 will focus on the JMoD’s procurement
organisation, processes and policies.)
a. The JMoD’s equipment functions have been reorganised
i. The Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency has been established
A new defence equipment agency, (ATLA, or Soubichou in the short Japanese version), legally
established by the Japanese Diet in June 2015, was inaugurated as planned on October 1st, 2015.
Most procurement and R&D-related departments of the JMoD were merged into the ATLA:
- The Bureau of Finance and Equipment, which handled central procurement policy and planning
and also included a Technology Policy Planning Division;
- The Equipment Procurement and Construction Office (EPCO), which was in charge of the
contracting phase of central procurement (EPCO’s smaller construction part, however, remains
separate from the ATLA);
- The Technology and R&D Institute (TRDI);
- The technical departments of the staff offices, which performed some development and
requirements definition. (The staff offices, however, retain “regional procurement”, which
accounts for a third of purchasing amounts and mainly covers spare parts and consumables.)
The agency is headed by a “Commissioner” who has a seniority rank equivalent to a
Vice-Minister101. It has officially five missions102:
1. “Efficient acquisition of defense equipment (project management)”;
2. “Strengthening defense equipment and technical cooperation with foreign countries”;
3. “Conducting cost-effective and timely research and development”;
4. “Maintaining and strengthening the defense production and technology infrastructure”;
5. “Strengthening cost reduction initiatives and monitoring and audit functions”.
101 http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/japan-wants-to-streamline-its-defense-industry/
102 http://www.mod.go.jp/atla/soubichou_gaiyou.html;
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/japan-wants-to-streamline-its-defense-industry/
27
ii. It is difficult at this stage to assess how much of a change and what type of
change the ATLA will bring
Firstly, a key goal of the reorganisation is to ensure consistent decision-making from requirement
definition to R&D and procurement, and to eliminate “stovepiping” across the three armed services.
Signs of its chances of success are difficult to read for now:
- The agency’s new head103 will be Hideaki Watanabe, previously Director General of the TRDI.
This might suggest that R&D and procurement will indeed be integrated in a life-cycle approach,
but it might also give the former TRDI more power to resist integration.
- The agency’s organisation chart (see Appendix 6.) seems to leave open the possibility that the
power equilibriums of the old organisation will be preserved:
An Assistant Commissioner oversees the Secretariat and the DGs Defense Equipment
Policy, Procurement Management and Procurement Administration (or Procurement
Operations) (i.e. roughly the old Bureau of Finance and Equipment and EPCO);
A Deputy Commissioner & Chief Defense Scientist (Hirokazu Hokazono, previously
Director General for Technology) oversees the DGs Technology Strategy and Project
Management and the Research and Test Centers (i.e. roughly the old TRDI);
Four uniformed Director Generals are in charge of overseeing policy in the main
armament domains and liaising with the armed forces. The future will tell whether they
contribute to centralise decision making or, on the contrary, to keep it fragmented across
armed forces.
- Interviews suggested that the delineation of responsibilities between the ATLA and the armed
forces may leave some ambiguity.
Even if the agency does realise its stated goal, it is too early to assess whether this will benefit
suppliers, thanks to less complexity and fewer interlocutors, or harm them by reducing their
bargaining power.
Secondly, another unknown is whether the reorganisation will reduce the METI’s and Finance
Ministry’s influence on the JMoD’s spending and procurement decisions. In the previous
organisation, as part of an informal agreement between these ministries, the Director General of
the Bureau of Finance and Equipment (Toru Mimura) was seconded by the MoF and effectively
watched only over financial issues, whereas the Director General for Acquisition Reform (Masaki
Ishikawa), who formally reported to him/her, was seconded by the METI and was sole in charge of
equipment issues.
On October 1st, 2015, Mr. Mimura became Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs and, it
seems, withdrew entirely from finance and equipment topics, without any other MoF secondee
103 http://www.mod.go.jp/atla/soshiki/kanbulist.pdf (an official English translation will be provided only in February
2016)
28
being appointed to the JMoD, whereas Mr. Ishikawa became ATLA Assistant Commissioner.
On the other hand, another tool through which the METI can exert such influence is the Ordnance
Manufacturing Act of 1953, which gives it ambiguous and vaguely formulated authorisation powers
on armament production and contracting buts seems to have been less applied in recent years.
Overall, it seems more likely that the METI will lose more sway on the JMoD than the MoF, which
retains its authority on budgeting.
Thirdly, the new agency’s overall headcount is unchanged compared to the merged departments:
1.800 (of which 400 uniformed), a low figure compared to the equipment agencies of other
countries with similar defence budgets. It seems to be hoped that synergies and process
streamlining will unlock resources and increase the agency’s capacity. How likely this is to happen is
difficult to assess at this stage. It will be interesting in particular to observe:
- How the activities of DG Project Management are articulated with those of other DGs, in what
will presumably have to be a matrix organisation;
- Whether the Secretariat’s “system development” groups (in charge of project coordination for
the four main armament domains) overlap with the four armament system DGs or with the DG
Project Management or whether, on the contrary, they find their role between the strategic
and operational levels.
b. Some significant procurement policy changes might be impending
The main question that the ATLA raises is whether it will bring any reforms to the JMoD’s
equipment acquisition processes and policies, which presently remain often conservative and
idiosyncratic. Many such changes have been rumoured for months, but only two materialised
before or in the report period:
- A law passed in April 2015104 increased the maximum possible length of JMoD contracts from
five to ten years in exceptional cases. This possibility was immediately used to group several
orders of twenty P-1 maritime patrol aircraft into one, generating savings of ¥41.7bn or 10.9%
according to the JMoD. It will also be used in the next fiscal year for 17 SH-60K patrol
helicopters. The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases of December 2013105
also suggested that it could be used for destroyers;
- A shift towards project management methods has already been initiated. It is unclear, however,
how this is being implemented in practice: in addition to basic measures such as Integrated
Project Teams, the JMoD seems to be also considering introducing much more sophisticated,
indeed possibly over-dimensioned, tools such as Earned Value Management.
104 The “Special measures law concerning the term of expenditure based on obligatory assurance of national
subsidization for specific defense procurement”
105 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/equipment/pdf/2606_e_honbun.pdf
29
Other changes, which may have been held off until the agency was inaugurated, might be brought
in the future:
- Toru Hotchi claimed in a conference at MastAsia (see Section D.2.a.i.) that the JMoD would no
longer buy too expensive products, but he gave no indication on how this deeply-rooted
problem (see first report) would be addressed. Currently-widespread “Cost +” pricing will
probably start to be slowly replaced, at least in some cases, although it is unclear whether it
will be replaced by fixed prices or profit sharing. The JMoD seems intent to rely on tighter cost
audits as well as on a component cost database106 that it is building and that it supposed to
enable it to assess market prices independently from suppliers;
- The JMoD claims it will use the establishment of the ATLA as an opportunity to build up its
auditing function.107 It has not, however, announced any further measures that would increase
more directly the transparency and predictability of its acquisition process, both of which the
UH-X Army RfP has shown to remain lacking (see Section D.3.b.i.);
- There are currently no indications, even if that would seem consistent with the JMoD’s stated
intention to increase international cooperation, to make it easier for foreign suppliers to
participate in procurement directly, by simplifying the process for registration as JMoD
supplier or by issuing RfPs in English and authorising tender submissions in that language.
c. The JMoD is making first steps in dual-use R&D
Intentions, announced by the press in March 2015108, to fund military research through civilian
government agencies (especially NEDO or AIST) do not seem to have gained any traction. However,
at MastAsia (see Section D.2.a.i.), Hideaki Watanabe highlighted several cooperation agreements
signed in March 2014 with three other agencies, which suggests that this cooperation may be
expanding:
- With JAXA on helicopter technology as well as infrared sensor technology (for missile detection
from satellites);
- With JAMSTEC on communications between UUV and USV;
- With NICT on SAR data and cybersecurity.
Conversely, several initiatives have been launched to allow the JMoD to benefit in various ways
from civilian R&D. Most of these initiatives do not involve funding:
- The JMoD has started, as announced in the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological
106 Interview in European Security & Defence, June 2015;
http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/equipment/pdf/2606_e_honbun.pdf
107http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/23/national/japan-strengthen-audits-defense-equipment-agency/#.
VgOapn2pjIV
108 http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/20/us-japan-r-d-military-idUSKBN0MF2K520150320
30
Bases of December 2013109, to follow certain activities of SIP (Cross-ministerial Strategic
Innovation Promotion Program) and ImPACT (Impulsing Paradigm Change through Disruptive
Technologies Program), two programmes launched by the Council for Science, Technology and
Innovation in 2013. Some of the results they may deliver in the future, especially on aircraft
body and engines, could be of interest to the JMoD;
- The TRDI has increased exchanges with universities and research institutes (it presently has
such exchanges with about 7 and 9 respectively). Such exchanges, which only involve joint work,
have existed for many years and have occasionally resulted in patents being jointly published.
However, in July 2015, the TRDI launched, for the first time, an initiative (announced in the
Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases of December 2013) that does involve
funding, though at a very modest level: it unveiled a National Security Technology Research
Promotion Fund110, to which Japanese public and private research institution could apply for
through a call for proposals. The 28 research themes of interest identified by MOD included “Sound
Reflection Control by Meta Material Technologies”, “Advancement of the Laser System Light Source”,
“Visualization of Shock Waves in the Air”, “Use of Big Data to Solve Social Security Issues”, “Effective
Under-water Energy Transmission” and “Advancement of Materials Functions by Nano Fiber”.
The total budget was small, even considering that the scheme targets mainly fundamental research
(TRL 1-2): ¥300m, apportioned in October 2015 to six or seven projects. This budget is requested to
be increased to ¥600m for the fiscal year to March 2017111.
2. Japan is pressing ahead with its new strategy on exports, with still uncertain success chances
a. Japan is continuing to put in place export support tools, with some
limitations
i. The government is continuing to put in place export support tools
The JMoD is developing its support to defence exports in several ways:
- Even though the ATLA’s total staff is not going to be increased, its staff dedicated to export
promotion will be increased from 5 to 30, with one staff member dedicated to each key country.
The degree of expertise of this staff, however, is unknown, as it was recruited internally;
- The JMoD is also investing in intelligence on defence markets and other governments’ practices,
especially through the planned development of a database of foreign subcontractors and
109 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/equipment/pdf/2606_e_honbun.pdf
110 http://www.mod.go.jp/trdi/funding/funding.html
111 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/271016.pdf
31
products112 as well as by ordering reports from consulting firms and think tanks.
Most conspicuously, the JMoD plays a prominent role in fostering the new presence of Japanese
firms in international defence equipment exhibitions:
- Such an event took place in Japan for the first time in May 2015, with the MastAsia maritime
security exhibition in Yokohama. The exhibition was chaired by a former Japanese defence
minister, Satoshi Morimoto, and backed by the Japanese Defense Technology Foundation,
which has close ties with the TRDI. Also for the first time, uniformed JMoD personnel
demonstrated military assets on manufacturer booths. Numerous JMoD and JSDF
representatives were also among the conference speakers.
A key goal for this first event seems to have been to observe its media coverage. The
near-absence of negative reactions and of public protests (with only one single demonstrator)
convinced the JMoD to make MastAsia a biennial show, with a next date already set for May
2017.
- There was already a Japanese participation in DSEI in London in its previous edition of 2013.
However, in September 2015, the Japanese pavilion increased dramatically in size, from 36sqm
to nearly 300, and several companies exhibited outside the pavilion, especially Fujitsu and
Canon. For the first time, the JMoD had its own booth (in the pavilion), with again one
uniformed staff member.
- The 2015 edition of SEECAT, an annual security exhibition, was about 50% larger than the
previous one, and had an even clearer defence component (it does not seem, however, that it
might be used as a platform to build a Japanese defence exhibition, as it is sponsored by the
Tokyo Metropolitan Government). The ATLA had a small booth there, as well as a larger (though
peripherally located) one on the concomitant biennial Tokyo Aerospace Symposium.
- Several Japanese companies exhibited at Defense & Security 2015 in Thailand in the beginning
of November 2015113.
- In October 2016, the quadrennial Japan International Aerospace Exhibition, according to its
organiser, the SJAC, will also be larger than in 2012 and have a larger defence component,
which was minimal in 2012.
Support is coming from other ministries or government agencies as well:
- There is evidence of JETRO’s involvement, at least through market studies it has been ordering
from foreign contractors;
- The new “development cooperation charter”114 approved by the Cabinet in February 2015
112 Interview of Toru Hotchi in European Security & Defence, June 2015
113http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/02/national/japan-firms-promote-defense-equipment-security-exhi
bit-thailand/#.Vjrh_G4sfIU; http://www.siam2web.com/template/asiandefense/pdf/D&S2ExhList.pdf
114 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000138.html
32
opened the way for the use of Official Development Aid for defence-related projects. This
possibility was already used in April 2015 in the sale of ten 40-metre multirole response vessels,
made by Japan Marine United Corporation, to the Philippine Coast Guard. This sale is mostly
funded by ODA and a related loan from JICA115.
ii. It remains to be seen how effective these tools can be
Firstly, the responsibilities and priorities of the government bodies involved may need to be
clarified:
- The ATLA’s initial moves do not provide evidence that it truly sees international promotion as
a key priority. Until February 2016, it will only have a minimal, Japanese-only, home-made
website, even though work on the agency started many months before its official launch. With
regards to managers in charge of international cooperation, Toru Hotchi and, under him, the
International Equipment Manager, Hidehiro Ikematsu, only have intermediate English
proficiency.
- The METI remains responsible for defence industry and is, at least publicly, still contributing to
export promotion. It had, for instance, a booth at DSEI and participated in the German defence
industry forum of September 2015. It remains unclear how this role will be articulated with the
ATLA’s and how any potential conflict will be avoided.
- The JMoD’s efforts to open to the international market are not emulated, so far, by other
security agencies, notably the JCG, which, even as it acquires substantial volumes of foreign
equipment, remains very secretive in its procurement processes.
Secondly, there may be limits to what the government is willing or able to do to promote exports:
- Despite many public statements of intentions to push, rather than only enable and help,
export-shy Japanese companies, Toru Hotchi in interviews mentioned no specific initiatives to
this end. Furthermore, the government at times seems to exhibit similar timidity. For example,
the Japanese side of the EU-Japan Business Round Table refused to make defence industrial
cooperation one of the main sections of the work programme of its last annual meeting116, in
April 2015, apparently due to the METI’s reticence. (The topic remained a subsection of the
section on “Innovation, Information & Communication Technologies” and did not inspire
substantially new recommendations or the recognition of significant breakthroughs.)
- The JMoD and METI show no intention to encourage or indeed engineer any form of
consolidation and specialisation of the domestic industry, which is notoriously hobbled by its
unusual fragmentation and the fact that it is entirely comprised of highly diversified
conglomerates. The official discourse, both in government and industry, remains that, rather
illogically, consolidation would be useful only in case of market growth. Akiko Iimura, answering
115 http://www.janes.com/article/50818/philippine-coast-guard-signs-for-japanese-vessels
116 http://www.eu-japan-brt.eu/annual-meeting-2015
33
a media question at a MastAsia conference (see Section D.2.a.i.), only conceded that exports
would naturally bring winners and losers.
The Australian submarine programme (see Section D.2.c.iii.) gives no sign of being about to be
used as an occasion to merge even only MHI’s and KHI’s submarine businesses, not to mention
their entire defence businesses (instead, they have formed a MHI-led consortium). The UH-X
Army programme (see Section D.3.b.i.) can also be seen as a missed opportunity to consolidate
the helicopter industry, since it has the effect of giving a lifeline to FHI, which otherwise would
have run out of business in this segment.
- The JMoD seems to have no plan to put in place the kind of FMS-inspired system that many
contractors are lobbying for. The report of the JMoD’s advisory group on defence exports
deems this too expensive as well as out of proportion with the country’s potential export
volumes. The JMoD will probably go no further than performing one-off government sales on
an ad-hoc basis.
- As far as equipment standards and programme management methods are concerned,
interviews produced mixed impressions on the JMoD’s awareness of the importance of
adopting international norms or converging Japanese ones towards them. True, interoperability
is very often mentioned in the official discourse, but mainly as code for acquiring US equipment.
Japan has been offered to participate in a significant number of NATO working groups, but has
so far elected to participate in only two groups under the CNAD (Conference of National
Armaments Directors) on codification and ammunition safety. It has not requested to join the
Life Cycle Management Group and there is no indication that it has established links with the
NATO Standardisation Office.
b. At least some Japanese contractors are warming up to international
business
i. Some firms continue to appear cautious and ill prepared
At MastAsia (see Section D.2.a.i.), all the main Japanese contractors were represented, often by a
large delegation, probably at least in part in response to strong government encouragement.
However, most of them clustered in a Japanese pavilion, whereas no other country did so, and their
exhibition area was tiny compared to that of other companies of similar sizes. Many of their
representatives spoke insufficient or no English and did not seem eager to engage with foreigners.
Despite the theme of the event, several companies, such as JRC, presented only civilian products. A
few refused to discuss (such as OKI) or claimed to have no plan (such as Mitsui Engineering &
Shipbuilding) for any internationalisation of their defence activities.
Similar behaviour could also be observed at DSEI. MHI, Japan’s largest contractor, was not present.
Toshiba, perhaps in a repercussion of its accounting scandal, had a very inconspicuous booth. It had
previously (like Sinfonia Technology) cancelled at short notice its participation in a preview of
34
Japanese DSEI booths organised by the JMoD in Tokyo in July 2015 – even though this preview was,
oddly, strictly restricted to defence attachés.
At Defense & Security 2015 in Thailand, again, only four major Japanese contractors (Fujitsu, KHI,
MELCO and NEC) were represented. The other Japanese exhibitors included three makers of fire
engines and fire-fighting equipment, a parachute maker and a few intermediaries.
ii. Some other firms are showing greater readiness
Fujitsu may be the Japanese contractor readiest to export. It is unique among its peers in
possessing a significant overseas defence and security IT business, which it can use as a basis for
international activities out of Japan. It has drawn from its 3,500 staff in the UK and Ireland117 and
its smaller operations in Australia to set up a ten-strong Global Business Development Division
focused on the defence market. In the UK, it is already a consortium partner with Airbus and two
other firms to execute a government contract, Defence Information Infrastructure118. It is also
interesting to note that it was the only Japanese company exhibiting at the German defence
industry forum of September 2015 (see Section D.3.c.ii.).
NEC has also put in place a similar business development group, also with a contribution of its
overseas subsidiaries (although they have no similar defence business). At MastAsia, it was the only
exception among Japanese firms in having its own booth, which was of substantial size and was
staffed by more engaging representatives. It exhibited mainly dual-use or purely civilian security
items such as radio systems, high sensitivity cameras or harbour monitoring systems, but its more
defence-centric products (IT systems for air-defence and BMD systems) would arguably have been
hard to fit in the exhibition’s theme, maritime security.
KHI also shows some signs of taking a relatively active export posture. It started with the DSEI
preview in July 2015 to promote under its own name (with AgustaWestland’s consent) the AMCM
version of the AW/MCH-101 helicopter. On this version created for Japan, for which deliveries to
the JMoD started in March 2015, KHI handled not only manufacturing and the adaptation of
Japanese security equipment, but also the integration of mine detection and destruction systems.
AgustaWestland intends to perform any export of this version in partnership with KHI.
Furthermore, at least a few of the main shosha, such as Marubeni, are developing a defence
export activity and might even invest on their own in international cooperative projects. However,
despite inaccurate press reports119, Mitsui did not take the step of teaming up with AgustaWestland
to bid for the UH-X Army RfP (this step would have been impossible, as the competition
participation rules required a domestic platform manufacturing capability).
Other types of intermediaries are also starting to emerge, such as Crisis Intelligence, which
117 http://www.fujitsu.com/uk/solutions/industries/defence/
118 http://www.atlasconsortium.info/consortium-partners/
119 http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/17/japan-helicopter-fujibell-idUSL4N0ZX3BT20150717
35
promotes DSEI in Japan, or Taiheiyo Engineering, which is trying to put in place a market
introduction service for foreign SMEs.
c. Several export projects are moving forward
i. It is hard to know how much Japan has already exported
Only exports approved by the NSC at ministerial level are disclosed in real time. After the first two
such approvals in July 2014, two more were given: in May 2015 for the transfer of information on
submarines to Australia and in July 2015 for tablet computer parts and software for command post
displays (to be used, admittedly, in Aegis missile systems)120. Beyond this, there are indications that
many more export applications have been processed by the NSC at working level.
Information on approvals at this level and at the bureaucratic level within the METI, however, is
disclosed only in annual reports that the government has committed to publish as part of the
relaxation of the export ban in April 2014. The first report, for the fiscal year to March 2015, was
only released in mid-October 2015 121 , quite plausibly to avoid any interference with the
parliamentary debate on the security laws. It is very short in specifics, providing only two pieces of
information on export items: their countries of destination and which of three categories they
belong to, i.e. which rationale they were approved based on.
The report nonetheless seems to confirm that few “true”, commercial exports were approved: the
1,841 authorised exports listed fall into the following categories and subcategories:
- Contribution to Japan’s security: 1,731 exports, of which 1,713 for “temporary export of
equipment to the activities of the JSDF” (mainly to the USA) and, aside from a few
miscellaneous items, only 12 related to “international joint development and production” (7
to the USA and 5 to the UK);
- Promoting of peace and international cooperation (49 exports, notably to South Sudan);
- “Exports whose impact on national security is judged to be small, such as the re-export of
equipment brought into Japan by foreign police officers” (61 exports).
Furthermore, the report does not make any mention of any export authorisation request that might
have been rejected.
120http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/23/national/politics-diplomacy/japanese-firms-to-export-aegis-com
puter-system-components/#.VbXiw7WpjVJ
121http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/15/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-okd-1841-defense-equipment
-exports-fiscal-14-new-rules/#.ViBZXG4sfIV;
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2015/10/20151015007/20151015007-3.pdf
36
ii. The government is in part starting with non-sensitive items
Many of the products being promoted for now are either dual-use or relatively mundane ones:
- Those presented by Toru Hotchi in a conference at MastAsia (see Section D.2.a.i.) included
parachute fabric or emergency radio networks. On potentially more significant ones, such as
military satellite communication systems, no details were provided;
- Those featured by the ATLA on its website and at its SEECAT booth include gas masks, armoured
bulldozers and detection systems;
- One of the companies exhibiting at DSEI outside the Japan pavilion was YKK, a maker of zippers
and other fastening products.
Furthermore, much of what Japan has recently exported or is considering exporting to South-East
Asian nations, often as part of its capability building assistance, is not new, Japanese equipment
but second-hand, often American one (Japan is helped in this by high-quality maintenance):
- In the first half of 2015, both sides indicated that the Philippines might purchase used P-3C
patrol aircraft and radar-related equipment from Japan122. Other possible such items would be
three Beechcraft TC-90 King Air planes from the 1970’s that Japan uses for training and that
could be fitted with basic surface and air surveillance radar.123 (See also Section C.2.b. on
Vietnam.)
- MELCO is considering exporting used system components (radars, launchers, etc.) for the Hawk,
a ground missile system that it manufactures under license from Raytheon.
iii. Japan may take the US-2 as an opportunity to lower many export hurdles
Japan started in 2013 discussions with India over the sale of 12 US-2 flying boats made by
Shinmaywa, and the discussions seem likely to last at least another two years. Progress has been so
slow that Shinmaywa has reduced its local team in India.
This long lead time for a small batch of non-offensive products may have explanations on the Indian
side, especially the difficulty to find an appropriate local industrial partner, as required by Indian law.
But it also results from multiples hurdles on the Japanese side, which the project may be used as
an opportunity to address:
- Like many other Japanese defence programmes, the US-2’s development was funded by the
Japanese government, and the related intellectual property thus belongs to it (a “Japanese
Bayh-Dole Act” from 1999, allowing patent rights generated by government R&D funding
122http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/22/national/japan-u-s-join-philippines-south-china-sea-navy-drills/#
.VZ9J4rWpjVJ;
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/28/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-philippines-deepen-defense-ties
-leaders-meet-next-week/#.VZ3jmrWpjVI
123http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/06/us-japan-philippines-aircraft-idUSKCN0QB06920150806
37
schemes to belong to private companies, does not seem to have been frequently used).
Contrary to what had been understood in the first Minerva research project, it does not appear
after all to have yet been decided how the IP would be made available for this export project.
Many mechanisms, including royalties, production licensing or a technical assistance scheme
are on the table.
A scheme put in place in 2011-2012124 enabling the “civilianisation” of defence aircraft
“materials” does not seem likely to be resorted to, perhaps because it can be used only
domestically, or because this potential export item is outside its technical scope. The report of
the JMoD’s advisory group on defence exports125 recognises the need for better protection of
information exchanged both ways as part of cooperative projects, although, at least in its public
version, it proposes few specific solutions (it also notes the need to put in place civilianisation
scheme in areas other than aircraft).
- Japan believes India may intend to expand the aircraft’s uses beyond those that India is
currently stating and that Japan is ready to authorise (search and rescue, air ambulance,
observation, troop transport, etc). This seems plausible, given that most Indian US-2s (9 or 10
out of 12) would be built in a new plant in India, which would be uneconomical (all the more so
as this plant would come in addition to Shinmaywa’s already underused facility). Japan thinks
India may even want to weaponise the aircraft, at least to protect it from pirates, illegal
fishermen, etc. The METI seems to need a long time to design ways to monitor India’s
compliance.
- India is more explicit about its intention to build further aircraft for export markets.
Shinmaywa is not resolutely opposed to this and may have in mind a territory sharing
agreement, but striking that agreement is also likely to take time.
- The MSDF will need to be involved in any US-2 deal, as it is sole in charge of daily maintenance.
Such involvement (recognised as necessary by the JMoD advisory group’s report) would be a
first and putting it is place also appears to be a complicated process.
- Perhaps above all, the US-2, like most Japanese defence products, is expensive – almost ¥12bn
per aircraft126. Only 7 machines have been built so far, for Japan’s MSDF, and are used only for
search and rescue, with a low intensity (it is not, however, an entirely new development: it is a
further development of the PS-1, which was used for antisubmarine patrolling from the late
1960s, until sonobuoys and dipping sonars were introduced). The JMoD advisory group’s report
suggests modifying legislation to allow the JSDF to sell used equipment at a loss, but this would
not sold the problem of newly built products, even in a government-to-government sales
124 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/equipment/pdf/2606_e_honbun.pdf
125 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2015/09/30c.pdf
126http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/13/national/japans-first-international-defense-show-opens-in-yokoh
ama/#.VZzWArWpjVI
38
framework. The Finance Ministry has been consulted on the possibility to use export credit, but
this, again, seems set to be a long and uncertain decision process.
One can add two factors that do not apply to India but would make it difficult to export the US-2
to many other countries (such as, perhaps, Indonesia127):
- Its main potential export applications would be unambiguously civilian, especially fire fighting.
These applications would require significant redevelopment, which Shinmaywa appears unable
to fund. Though aeronautics is the company’s historic core business, it is today a small business
for a diversified company with activities stretching from special-purpose trucks to automatic
wire processors to thin films and surface modification. This reflects a problematic feature of the
Japanese defence industry, which is entirely comprised of large conglomerates generating
rarely more than a few percentage points of their revenues from defence and unable or
unwilling to invest in this business’s development.
- Even aside major application changes, many prospective buyers would be civilian government
agencies, especially civilian coast guards (as opposed to coast guards affiliated with militaries,
like India’s). However, the US-2 was developed and certified in Japan as a military aircraft. Not
only does Shinmaywa lack the resources for the thorough modifications that would be
necessary for civilian recertification of the US-2, but also JCAB (Japan’s Civil Aviation Bureau)
has no experience certifying aircraft for the first time. Though the Japanese industry recently
started again to develop civilian aircraft (especially the medium-size Mitsubishi Regional Jet and
the small HondaJet), after many decades of interruption, JCAB presently only has experience
certifying for use in Japan foreign aircraft that have already been certified elsewhere.
iv. Japan may also learn from the P-1 and the Australian submarine programme
The P-1
The UK government will not announce before November 2015, when it releases its new five-year
Strategic Defence and Security Review, whether it decides to recreate an antisubmarine patrolling
capability and, if it does, whether it chooses fixed-wing aircraft for this purpose. Nevertheless,
Japan is clearly pressing for consideration of KHI’s P-1, and the UK seems to have unofficially
expressed interest. In a conspicuous move, a model of this aircraft was flown overseas for the first
time in July 2015, to be demonstrated at the RIAT show in the UK128, both on the ground and in
flight.
A competition for this potential UK procurement, however, may be crowded, with, aside Boeing
(the most obvious contender, with the P-8 Poseidon), Airbus, Finmeccanica, Saab, Lockheed Martin,
127http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/12/national/indonesia-looks-buy-us-2-amphibious-aircraft-japan-bid
-show-solidarity/#.VkVtY14sfIU
128 http://aviationweek.com/blog/kawasaki-p-1-flies-air-tattoo
39
L-3 and Northrop Grumman being potentially interested.129 Both these contractors and the RUSI
called in September and October 2015 for an open competition130. Furthermore, in the beginning of
November 2015, it emerged that the SDSR would probably rule out a P-8 purchase on cost reasons.
This may be bad news for the more expensive P-1.131
On the longer term, France might also be interested in the P-1 in two decades, when its Breguet
Atlantique are due to retire, since it would probably be reluctant to buy Boeings.
Australia’s submarine programme
Japan’s largest international project by far remains its potential participation in this
competition132, SEA1000, in which proposals must be submitted by November 30th, 2015 and a
decision might be announced in March or June 2016. The NSC formally authorised in May 2015133
MHI and KHI to bid. The way this bid is being prepared is interesting for at least two reasons.
Firstly, MHI seems to have quietly taken unusual steps to seek assistance in preparing an offer
that follows international market practices. It seems to be supported by US contractors (including,
allegedly, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin)134and consultants and has hired a Japanese-American
armament expert with long experience in US government entities in Japan to act as project
manager, especially for the integration of US systems, which is a key client requirement.
Secondly, this project exposes Japan much more than the US-2 project to the need to work with
local industry and provide local content. Australian public opinion and politicians, especially in the
shipbuilding state of South Australia, increasingly demand that the country’s most expensive
defence programme ever, officially expected to cost about A$50bn (US$35-40bn – of which 20 for
building and 30 for sustainment), benefit as much as possible the local economy. About 70% local
content, like the current submarines, seems to be the unofficial expectation.
This requirement gained further importance after a sudden leadership change in the country on
September 14th 2015135, since Australia’s new prime minister may not favour Japan as openly as
Tony Abbott did: he was widely believed, probably with some reason, to have closed a hand-shake
agreement with Japanese PM Abe on this programme in 2014 and to have launched a more open
competition in February 2015 only to respond to political pressure.
129http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/dsei/2015/09/20/industry-lets-compete-uk-maritime-p
atrol/72393226/
130http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/af-releases-rfi-for-re-winging-a-10s-mdba-delivering-sea-ceptor-hardware-
in-prep-for-camm-call-for-rn-to-open-competition-on-3-1b-maritime-patrol-contract-031078/
131 http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Defence/article1627241.ece
132 http://sea1000.gov.au/current-activities/competitive-evaluation-process/
133http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/a-first-japan-will-share-classified-submarine-technical-data-with-australia/
134http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/26/us-australia-japan-defence-idUSKCN0QV06Q20150826
135http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/16/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-waits-see-whether-new-austr
alian-leader-will-rock-boat-defense/#.VfpD-H2pjVI
40
On this requirement, Japan seems to have first fared poorly but to be now learning. Its absence of
PR efforts and its reliance on secretive government-to-government talks were long criticised136. In
August 2015, a delegation of more than thirty senior contractors and JMoD representatives was
seen as delivering insufficient outreach to local subcontractors and trade unions137. The delegation
insisted it was purely following the competition rules, which require three offers: with all
submarines made in Japan; with the first submarines made in Japan and the rest in Australia; with
all submarines made in Australia. The delegation also claimed that the rules forbid preliminary
contacts with suppliers.
Shorty afterwards, several Japanese experts also voiced concerns as to the feasibility of building in
Australia within budget and performance requirements138.
However, after the Australian prime minister was replaced, Japan changed its approach significantly.
In late September 2015, the Japanese ambassador to Australia and Masaki Ishikawa, in charge of
the project in both his old and new positions, in unusual press comments, stressed Japan’s
openness to “optimising the role of Australian industry.”139 In another delegation visit to Australia
in early October 2015, Mr. Ishikawa insisted that 100% of the technology would be transferred (and,
less credibly, that “there is no problem with language and cultural issues”).140 He also announced
that the submarines offered to Australia would incorporate an Australian-developed hydrodynamic
design141.
3. Japan is continuing to put in place its R&D cooperation strategy
a. The USA is taking a more central place in Japan’s R&D cooperation strategy
than might have been expected
i. The USA will probably be a key cooperation partner for Japan
The USA is nudging Japan towards at least certain forms of international cooperation
136http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-slips-chasing-australian-subs-deal-1439841841?mod=pls_whats_news_us_bu
siness_f 137
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/26/us-australia-japan-defence-idUSKCN0QV06Q20150826;http://www.
reuters.com/article/2015/09/01/australia-japan-defence-idUSL4N1161HG20150901
138 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-15/japanese-concerns-over-submarine-deal/5743022
139http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/25/japan-happy-to-build-submarines-in-australia-if-it-wins-bid-for
-20bn-project;http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/09/29/japan-australia-submarines-idUKL4N11M2C420150929
140http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/technology-transfer-and-industry-involvement-part-of-japanese-bid-for-aust
ralias-20-billion-future-submarine-project/news-story/9f7856a2b2402a363a92506b24eb411a
141http://news.usni.org/2015/10/08/japan-outlines-bid-for-australias-sea1000-future-submarine-program
41
Whereas one might expect the USA to wish to keep Japan chiefly as a destination country for
exports and licensing, it appears on the contrary to be encouraging it to become an international
cooperation partner, at least in certain areas of interest to the USA.
The revised Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation add to the alliance an equipment
component142 that was absent from their previous version of 1997:
A paper from March 2015 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace143 suggests that the
USA may wish to tap into Japanese technologies as an important part of its Defense Innovation
Initiative or “Third Offset Strategy” (which aims to restore the USA’s technological advance on its
main potential adversaries). The paper, based on feedback from government-to-government
discussions, suggests “robotics, energy storage, artificial intelligence, and other U.S. focus areas” as
Japanese technologies that might be used, for example, to develop antisubmarine UUVs, “improve
142 Pages 22-23
143http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/10/navigating-new-u.s.-japan-defense-technology-frontier
VII. Bilateral Enterprise
The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security
and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:
A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the
two governments will:
- cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment
and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services;
- strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and
readiness;
- facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability,
and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and
- explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology.
[…]
C. Educational and Research Exchanges
Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two
governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen
communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve
as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and
reinforce cooperation.
42
the resiliency of forward bases and space-based command-and-control systems” or support US
research on electromagnetic rail guns and directed energy.
Another think tank paper, by the CSIS, from November 2014144, also suggests electromagnetic rail
guns and directed energy as a potential cooperation area.
Legal and practical frameworks for US-Japanese defence R&D cooperation
Such frameworks have long existed and are being expanded:
- The “Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the USA” of 1983,
updated in 2006145, is being complemented with a “Reciprocal Defense Procurement MoU”146
expected to be signed by the end of 2015. Such a document is necessary to waive “Buy America”
legal requirements for US purchases of Japanese specialty metals;
- The US-Japan Science and Technology Forum, which has been in place since 1980147, offers a
conduit for both government-to-government and industry-to-industry discussions and projects.
Within the STF, multiple groups, led by government officials, are in charge of projects at
different steps and of different natures. It is being revamped with i.) the addition in September
2013 of a “defense industry dialogue”, at part of which 3-4 meetings per year have been
organised; ii.) links being created with another dialogue on Roles, Missions and Capabilities; iii.)
the possible future contribution of Japanese civilian R&D organisations;
- The US Office of Naval Research148 has in Tokyo one of its six regional offices and “science
advisors” in the Yokosuka naval base and in Okinawa. It cooperates with Japan on several
projects, of which at least one, on ship hydrodynamic modelling, seems to have clear defence
applications.
US-Japanese projects
The JMoD has conducted 19 research projects with the US DoD since 1992 and is currently carrying
out two (on hybrid electric propulsion and high-speed multi-hull vessel optimization)149, as well as a
development project in the missile area (see Section D.3.b.ii.).
The main new corporate cooperation project announced over this report’s period also seems to
stem from US-Japanese exploratory government-to-government discussions rather than from a
corporate initiative. The press reported in June 2015150 that MHI plans to collaborate with a US
firm (probably General Dynamics or the US branch of BAE Systems) to develop a new propulsion
144 http://csis.org/files/publication/141120_Green_FederatedDefenseAsia_Web.pdf
145 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_3-2-2_1st_0730.pdf
146http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Japan-seeks-easier-access-to-US-defense-contracts
147 www.japan2.usembassy.govpdfswwwf-mdao-stf-brief.pdf
148 www.onr.navy.mil
149 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_3-2-4_1st_0730.pdf
150http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/23/us-japan-mitsubishi-prototype-idUSKBN0P32GQ20150623
43
system for amphibious assault vehicles.
As part of the creation, initiated in 2012, of an Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade within the
GSDF, the JMoD has decided to acquire over 50 AAV7s (see Section C.1.b.). However, the JSDF is
unsatisfied by the 40-year old vehicle’s speed (10 knots) and MHI believes it can, based on its
existing main battle tank engines and new water jet propulsion technology, help to design vehicles
reaching up to 30 knots.
This project was mentioned in March 2015 in generic terms (“Early ideas being considered include
[...] Japan-U.S. cooperation on a AAV to sell in Japan and abroad”) in the Carnegie paper, as well as,
in May 2015, in a contribution to a press story151, by a reserve US Marines officer active as a
defence consultant in Japan, Grant Newsham: “One would like to see a joint-development effort
between Japanese and US companies for next-generation advanced amphibious assault vehicles.
Following the [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle] fiasco, the US Marines in particular could benefit
from Japanese propulsion technologies and design and manufacturing capabilities.” The Strategy on
Defense Production and Technological Bases of December 2013152 also seemed to announce
international cooperation in this specific area.
ii. The USA may not be an exclusive partner
The US-Japanese relationship may not be designed as an exclusive one. The revised Guidelines
state that “the two governments will […] explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on
defense equipment and technology.” And the Carnegie paper suggests “trilateral cooperation in
certain cases involving the United States, Japan, and one other partner.” Indeed European nations,
among other advantages (see first report), might offer Japan more balanced partnerships, since
both their defence budgets and contractors are closer in size to Japan’s than the USA’s are. These
countries are also more familiar with cooperative development programmes among equal partners.
(It is unlikely, however, that the US-Japanese defence equipment relationship will be affected by
American espionage, revealed by Wikileaks in July 2015, on the Japanese government and some
Japanese companies153. If it also unclear whether armament was among the topics targeted.)
Nevertheless, one must note that Japan’s other partners might be European nations, but they
could also be yet other countries, especially:
- Australia (see Section D.2.c.iii.);
- Singapore, which sent senior defence ministry representatives to MastAsia (see Section D.2.a.i.)
and might be a future export partner in MHI’s AAV project;
151 Defense News, May 11, 2015
152 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/equipment/pdf/2606_e_honbun.pdf
153http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/05/national/politics-diplomacy/biden-calls-abe-apologize-wikileaks-
details-alleged-nsa-spying-tokyo/#.VcLVSbWpjVI
44
- Israel. This prospect is geopolitically surprising, given the importance of Japan’s relations with
oil-supplying Middle East countries. Yet it makes sense technologically, since Israel masters
some of the technologies that Japan is seeking to development, especially around UAVs and air
defence. In signs that concrete projects might be launched soon, the Israeli industry had a very
substantial presence at SEECAT 2015, with embassy support. Also, at the procurement level, IAI
was understood to be one of the suppliers interested in Japan’s RfP for refuelling aircraft (see
Section D.3.c.1.).
b. Japan missed one opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of its
technological ambitions, but may be about to seize another one
i. With the UH-X Army, Japan seemed to renounce the development of its
indigenous technological capabilities through cooperation
The JMoD’s award decision in the UH-X Army RfP (for 150 multi-use helicopters for the GSDF154, at a
total programme cost, including sustainment, estimated by the JMoD at ¥374bn155) seems to give
reasons to doubt the seriousness of Japan’s intention to expand its indigenous industry’s
development capabilities, at least in certain areas. Or, at the least, it probably shows that this
intention exists at a political level but is still competing with other political factors or has yet to
impose itself at the bureaucratic levels.
An unexpected decision
It had been widely understood that the Japanese government’s intention in this RfP was to put in
place a partnership between two contractors, one global and one Japanese, to conduct a
clean-sheet development of a new civilian platform, militarise it to fulfil the GSDF’s order, and then,
potentially, sell it to other Japanese government agencies as well as on export markets, on a
dual-use basis.
Based on this understanding of the government’s intentions, Airbus and its partner KHI built their
offer around the X9, a project started in 2012 and that still exists only as a concept.
However, to the surprise of many including, it seems, the winners as well as numerous JMoD staff
members, the programme was eventually awarded, in July 2015156, to Bell and FHI, which had
offered to militarise a civilian aircraft sold since 1981, the Bell 412 twin-engine utility platform,
154http://www.janes.com/article/53076/japan-selects-fuji-bell-option-for-uh-x-programme;http://www.latribune.fr/
entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/pourquoi-le-choix-de-tokyo-a-tant-surpris-airbus-helicopters-5
00427.html;http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/topstories/Airbus-Pitched-All-New-UH-X-for-Japan-and-Hasnt-Given-
Up_86060.html#.VhTEPG4sfVI;https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/airbus-helicopters-hopeful-japan-will-rev
erse-uh-x-d-417407/;
155 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/procurement/chotatsu/uhx_ipt/pdf/270717_shiryo.pdf
156 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2015/07/17d.html
45
and to produce it under licence.
The JMoD’s explanations are diversely convincing
After the award announcement, the JMoD provided only a short description of seven selection
criteria, which a mention of the superior contender for each criterion157, but without any further
detail on the criteria’s content and weighting and the offers’ specific performance against them.
Criteria 1-2: Bell-FHI’s solution is obviously quicker and more predictable than a new
development. It would be understandable that the JSDF insists on receiving the helicopters as soon
as possible, as it needs them for the protection of the Senkaku and other remote islands, especially
after a first award in 2012 was rescinded in 2013 due to improprieties in the tendering process158.
However, if these criteria were essential, it is surprising that a new platform development ever
seemed to be even considered. It is unclear whether they were known before the award
announcement to anyone outside the JMoD, including the contenders, which leaves many
possibilities open. Nevertheless, assuming that they had indeed guided the selection process from
the very beginning, they would seem to confirm that the JMoD was never truly looking to a new
platform, despite a different political posture – or that it was looking to a new platform without
much awareness of its inherent risks, which seems less likely.
Criterion 3 (the only performance criterion, and the only one against which Airbus-KHI’s offer is
found superior): speed – offset, however, by the shorter range of Airbus-KHI’s product.
Criterion 4: spare part supply lead times that advantaged Bell-FHI – surprisingly, since both Airbus
and KHI have substantial industrial facilities in Japan (Airbus possesses a helicopter maintenance
centre, used so far mainly for its civilian contracts).
Criterion 5: Airbus-KHI’s life-cycle cost was greater than Bell-FHI’s. While intuitive at first sight, this
assessment would deserve to be debated:
- First, it is unknown exactly how the JMoD calculates the total cost of ownership, and over what
life cycle. In the case of the UH-X Navy (see Section E.1.a.i.), it is understood that it calculates it
over fifteen years only, a very short life for such a platform. Should this be the case also for the
UH-X Army, it could favour an old platform, which is likely to have a lower purchase price but
may have a higher maintenance cost.
- Second, Airbus and KHI were offering to develop a civilian helicopter at their own expense
(which they were to recover later through exports) and to charge the JMoD only for the
militarisation of the aircraft.
Criterion 6: Bell-FHI offered better production and technological participation to domestic
companies. It seems hard to see, however, how production participation could vary much from one
Japanese OEM to another, and harder still to see how technological participation could be better in
157 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/procurement/chotatsu/uhx_ipt/pdf/270717_shiryo.pdf
158 http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBN0EL2CH20140610
46
a license production project than in a new development.
Criterion 7: Bell-FHI presented a clearer plan for sales on other markets. However, while it seems
indeed that Bell-FHI’s may have been better in form (see next), it is less likely to have been very
compelling in substance. The civilian market can presumably be disregarded, since it should be
addressed with the pre-existing civilian platform. As for the military export potential, if it existed, it
is unclear why Bell would not have exploited it over the last three decades, or why license
production in Japan would unlock it.
KHI’s behaviour may provide some clues
There are indications that collaboration between Airbus Helicopters and KHI (which was the sole
bidder in the partnership, as required by RfP rules) may not have been optimal. In particular, the
JMoD stated that it received no information on export prospects, even though it seems that Airbus
Helicopters did provide such information to KHI. This is surprising, since the two companies (and
Airbus Helicopters’s predecessor, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm) have cooperated for three decades,
especially on the BK117/EC145.
Beyond the fact that Airbus was steering the project out of Germany rather than Tokyo
(understandably, since it regarded it as a development project rather than a sales project), there
might be several reasons for this.
Firstly, KHI might have known it stood no chance to win, perhaps because of its involvement in the
improprieties that had caused a first award of the RfP to be cancelled in 2013. Indeed the JMoD
insists, understandably, that an indisputably fair and unbiased selection process was particularly
critical in the context of the impending establishment of the ATLA as well as, probably, of the
parliamentary debate on the security bills, in which the government could not afford the distraction
of a new procurement scandal. To this end, the JMoD claims to have run the process in a purely
bureaucratic, non-political manner, strictly based on the stated selection criteria.
Yet few argue that the ultimate decision made the JMoD’s acquisition process look more
transparent and predictable. Furthermore, the selection criteria were presumably consistent with
the RfP, and Japanese RfP language is known to be often vague but not to diverge fundamentally
from the real objective. This seems therefore to confirm again that a new development was never
really considered.
Another reason why KHI might have known it would lose might be because it knew the government
was favouring FHI, either to avoid consolidation of the industry (see Section D.2.a.ii.) or to settle its
ongoing litigation with the firm159.
Secondly, KHI, on the contrary, might have been sure it would win and might thus have been
complacent. But it would be surprising then that it did not actually win, since Japanese contractors
159http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/30/national/defense-ministry-ordered-pay-canceled-chopper-order/
#.VM6-xagkcvd
47
tend to take turn fairly predictably for many JMoD jobs. Bell and FHI, on the contrary, are said to
have delivered superior commercial performance. Yet if their offer, however excellent in form, had
not met in substance Japanese requirements, it presumably would not have won.
Thirdly, KHI might have felt it needed to choose between Airbus and its other European partner,
AgustaWestland (with whom it is already cooperating on the AW/MCH-101 and bid shortly
afterwards for the UH-X Navy), and had chosen AgustaWestland. Airbus Helicopters’s decision,
almost at the same time, to drop out of the UH-X Navy competition might be interpreted as
confirming that it can no longer rely on KHI as a partner.
It might be surprising, however, that KHI would have made such a choice, given not only the
anteriority of its cooperation with Airbus Helicopters, but also the broader scope for cooperation
with it and Airbus’s other divisions than with AgustaWestland (or, much more hypothetically, other
Finmeccanica companies). This scenario would imply that KHI was confident that its cooperation
with other Airbus divisions would be unaffected by Airbus Helicopters’s disappointment.
American pressure remains plausible
Ultimately, despite the JMoD’s insistence on the absence of any American mingling, it seems
conceivable that the USA, while keen to benefit from certain Japanese frontier technologies (see
Section D.3.a.i.), might be discouraging Japan from investing in other areas in which the US
industry holds strong positions. Helicopters is one of these areas, as are antisubmarine patrol
aircraft: the USA is understood to have been displeased by Japan’s decision to develop the P-1
instead of acquiring Boeing P-8s and to be now seeing a potential offer of P-1s to the UK
unfavourably.
Some assessments on decision making need to be revised
The UH-X Army reveals in any case a need to revise some of the assessments on information
sources and decision makers and influencers made by Airbus and the EUMSs supporting it:
- Airbus’s decision to offer a new development seems to have been inspired in part by the METI
(particularly by the previous Director for Defense Industry), which, unsurprisingly, wishes to
promote the indigenous industry through international cooperation. It now seems, however,
that the METI has less influence on such decisions than was thought. It did not, in any case,
convince the JMoD that this approach was safer and, on the long run, economically more
favourable than the traditional reliance on US imports and licence production.
- Similarly, it is at present highly unclear who within the JMoD holds ultimate decision power on
large programmes.
Two signs that Airbus-KHI’s offer was set to lose seem to have been ignored, more or less
understandably:
- Whereas the draft RfP circulated in the spring 2015 requested a new development, the final
one, released in June 2015, opened the door for simpler offers, including the retrofitting of an
existing platform. The frequently-observed vagueness of Japanese RfP language may in part
48
explain this.
- Defense of Japan 2015 makes only limited mentions of the programme160 that do not seem to
describe it as a clean-sheet development project. This does not help, however, to determine
whether this reflects the original conception of the programme or a more recent reversal:
whereas the document was released in late July 2015 and some of its parts were updated
shortly before, others are up to six months old.
ii. Japan may be about to pursue cooperation with the NATO Seasparrow
project
Japan informally requested around May 2015 to explore participation in the NATO Seasparrow
Consortium 161 , a 12-country consortium overseeing the ESSM programme, a ship-borne
short-range missile (though this request, first rumoured a month before being taken up by the press,
could be confirmed, no information could be obtained on when a final decision might be made).
Japan would participate in the missile’s redevelopment, the ESSM 2. Japan is already a “host nation”
of the programme, as MELCO produces the missile under licence from Raytheon and a permanent
Raytheon representative is embedded in its offices for support as well as for supervision of IP
agreements. The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases of December 2013162
mentioned, in the area of guided missiles, “the possibility of joining international joint development
as circumstances require, considering the improvement of interoperability with allies and friendly
nations.”
If Japan does join the consortium, it will be important to observe what form this membership takes
and whether Japan participates operationally in the development, or only provides funding. In the
former case, it would provide some evidence of the seriousness of its intention to become an
international equipment cooperation partner.
The novelty, however, would reside more in the multinational nature of the project than in its
content. Japan possesses some advanced capabilities in the field of missiles (especially in guided
missile technology163) and has already chosen to develop some of them through cooperation with
the USA: the development of the Standard Missile 3 block IIA (a future part of the Aegis system) has
been a cooperative project between MHI and Raytheon since its inception in 2006 (the project, to
160 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2015/DOJ2015_3-2-2_1st_0730.pdf
161http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/10/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-interested-joining-nato-anti-s
hip-missile-consortium-sources/#.VaMLtLWpjVI;http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/10/us-japan-nato-missile-
exclusive-idUSKCN0PJ2RV20150710
162 http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/equipment/pdf/2606_e_honbun.pdf
163http://aviationweek.com/defense/japan-working-anti-stealth-missile-guidance?NL=AW-05&Issue=AW-05_201508
24_AW-05_870&sfvc4enews=42&cl=article_4&utm_rid=CPEN1000001451897&utm_campaign=3582&utm_medium
=email&elq2=21082c1c94ae460e82e24f2a5fa90824
49
be completed in 2016, is estimated to have cost $1bn to each company164).
c. One opportunity for Euro-Japanese technology cooperation did not
materialise, but a larger one may be in the works
i. The UH-X Army casts doubts on Japan’s efforts to cooperate with Europe
In parallel to whether the UH-X Army award means that Japan is not genuinely pursuing the
development of its technological capabilities, another question is whether it means that the
country is not genuinely pursuing cooperation with Europe. Here again, it might be that this interest
exists mainly at the political level and in the upper bureaucratic levels, such as within the Cabinet
Office (especially the National Security Secretariat), but has not yet filtered much down into the
JMoD, or into certain parts of it.
That the bidders’ nationalities may have been a key factor in the final decision is all the more
plausible as it is hard to reconstruct the JMoD’s true goals (see Section D.3.b.i.). In that case, the
UH-X Army would feel like a smaller repeat of Japan’s selection of the F-35 in the last F-X fighter
aircraft RfP in 2011, despite the Eurofighter’s widely acknowledged technical superiority.
Smaller previous sales of military helicopters by Airbus and AgustaWestland (see Appendix 4.) had
given reasons to think that helicopters, being medium-size, relatively inexpensive platforms of a
limitedly offensive nature, were less likely to be seen as a US reserved domain. Yet the USA may
have insisted that helicopters did remain a US reserved domain after all, especially when sold in
this kind of volumes. Or perhaps the Japanese decision was a concession to the USA related to the
Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations (although this free-trade agreement failed to be closed in a
round on August 1st, shortly after the UH-X Army award, it was signed on October 5th).
Another reason to think the USA retains control on much of the JMoD’s procurement is Airbus
Defence & Space’s decision in September 2015 to withdraw from the impending procurement of
three refuelling aircraft165. The firm’s stated reason was that the mention, in the draft RfP
circulated in the spring of 2015, that the process was open to FMS proposals implied that Boeing’s
KC-46 would be selected (which it was a month later166).
ii. Japan’s efforts to cooperate with Europe are nonetheless continuing to
develop
The Japanese government is continuing to build relationships on defence technology with Europe in
164http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/07/usa-japan-missiledefense-idUSL1N0YT08K20150607?feedType=RSS
&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11563;http://www.janes.com/article/54408/dsei-2015-raytheon-rec
eives-first-sm-3-block-iia-procurement-contract
165 https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/airbus-walks-away-from-japan-tanker-rfp-416540/
166 http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/japan-to-receive-new-us-military-aircraft-by-2020/
50
several ways.
At the bilateral level
The last gathering of the semi-annual France-Japan armament committee, launched as part of the
defence equipment cooperation agreement between the two countries, took place in June 2015, on
the side of the Paris Air Show. France removed in September 2015 one significant obstacle to
cooperation with Japan when it sold its two Mistral helicopter carriers, initially built for Russia, to
Egypt167, putting an end to speculation that they might yet be delivered to Russia or indeed (less
credibly) sold to China.
The UK probably organised meetings similar to those between France and Japan on the occasion of
the DSEI exhibition of September 2015. In October 2015, the GRIPS, a local university, and the
British Embassy in Japan organised a joint forum on “Dual-Use Technology Research and Academics:
Lessons learnt from UK’s cases”, with participation of a UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser and
a DSTL representative.
The German embassy and chamber of commerce in Japan organised in September 2015, for the
third consecutive year, a “defence industry forum.” However, the government-to-government
agreement on defence equipment cooperation that has been in discussion for over a year between
the two countries is still pending, for unknown reasons. Representatives of DLR participated in the
forum and conducted on that occasion meetings with JAXA and the TRDI. Hideaki Watanabe had
previously visited the institution, together with the Fraunhofer Institute, in April 2014 and February
2015.
The agreement with Italy is also still pending the preliminary step of a memorandum on
information sharing. This document has been ready since April 2014 but remains to be signed,
despite a summit between the two countries in August 2015 and working level meetings such as
the one between Toru Hotchi and the Direzione Nazionale degli Armamenti in March 2015.
Officially this signature is waiting for the publication of a decree implementing the Act on the
Specially Designated Secrets, which came into force in December 2014.
Japan is also interested in Sweden: it is one of the countries included in a comparison on the ATLA’s
website168 between the agency and a few of its foreign equivalents (the other countries being the
UK, France, Australia, South Korea and, less expectedly, Turkey). The defence technology seminars
that the Swedish embassy had organised between 2008 and 2010 might resume, after an
interruption originally caused by the tsunami of 2011. Furthermore, the Swedish government (FOI,
FMV, Swedish Marines) was represented by several conference speakers at MastAsia.
Japan is also developing links with selected other EUMSs. Toru Hotchi visited Finland and, in March
2015, Spain, where he visited in particular the military research centre Instituto Tecnológico La
167http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/ships/2015/09/27/mistral-joins-egyptian-buys-french-gear/7
2821000/?source=nletter-%25%25__AdditionalEmailAttribute1%25%25 168
http://www.mod.go.jp/atla/soubichou_gaiyou.html
51
Marañosa.
At the multilateral level
Firstly, some contacts are starting to be established between the JMoD and the EU institutions on
equipment issues. In June 2015, a representative of the JMoD’s then Bureau of Finance and
Equipment met a representative of the EDA. In September 2015, at his request, Toru Hotchi, then
Chief Director of this Bureau, met the Director for Single Market for Public Administrations within
the EC’s DG GROW as well as an export control representative at the EEAS. Further work-level
contacts between ATLA and DG GROW and TRADE officers are expected in November 2015.
Japan’s first forays into dual-use R&D, especially its new competitive funding programme (see
Section D.1.c.) do not immediately create additional conduits for Euro-Japanese defence equipment
cooperation, because they are strictly limited to Japanese entities. Nevertheless, in his interview
with DG GROW in September 2015, Toru Hotchi expressed a strong interest in the EU’s Horizon
2020 R&D funding scheme, which already counts some civilian Japanese participants (especially in
aeronautics) and has a significant security component.
Furthermore, defence being a more sensitive topic than ever in Japan in the context of the debate
on the security bills (see Section C.3.a.ii.), JMoD funding might turn out to generate little enough
enthusiasm in the Japanese civilian research community for the JMoD to be encouraged to look for
such partners overseas. The competitive funding programme might indeed indicate such a trend:
although the JMoD received 109 applications, it selected only six or seven, which could suggest that
the quality level of the applications was generally low.
Secondly, Japan is starting to participate in certain NATO equipment programmes. It is considering
adopting NATO’s new naval communication standard, Datalink 22, and the NATO Naval Armaments
Group’s 2017 annual conference may be held in Japan, in cooperation with the next edition of
MastAsia (see Section D.2.a.i.), although this should not be confirmed before 2016.
Relatively slow progress may have purely practical reasons. These topics are hard to discuss
remotely. Europe does not have the local resources in Japan to handle such activities that the USA
has (with, in particular, the 15-strong Mutual Defense Assistance Office; a political-military affairs
unit in its embassy’s political section; and some staff following the topic in its economic section).
Japan’s resources are even more limited:
- It has no such resources in Europe, although it is considering adding an armament attaché,
possibly in Brussels, or perhaps a defence attaché to the EU (who would probably be the same
person as its defence attaché to Belgium);
- In the country, few JMoD staff members possess the necessary language skills and expertise.
According to Toru Hotchi, “At the moment, [...] the issue is that countries have a lot of
information about us, but we don’t know enough about them. It’s a sort of asymmetry. We are
receiving a lot of proposals but we are unable to reciprocate. On the present showing we are
52
not yet quite able to act as equal partners”169;
- The new ATLA (see Section D.1.a.) seems to come with additional resources for export
promotion (see Section D.2.a.i.) but not, it seems, for R&D cooperation (a new Technology
Promotion group is focused on cooperation with domestic partners).
iii. Japan’s efforts to cooperate with Europe may yet come to fruition,
particularly around submarines and trainer aircraft
Submarines
The Australian programme, SEA1000 (see Section D.2.c.iv.), represents a major potential
opportunity for Euro-Japanese cooperation. Both other contenders, DCNS and ThyssenKrupp
Marine Systems, are European (US contractors cannot bid, since they only make nuclear
submarines, whereas Australia, missing a civilian nuclear energy infrastructure, is obliged to stick to
conventional submarines). The press reported that Japan was discussing partnerships with France
and DCNS in June170 and with UK firms (BAE Systems, Babcock and others) in July171. These reports
were clearly confirmed, though at a general level.
Japan has several key advantages in the competition, especially the clear preference of the US
government for geopolitical reasons, and existing technology that may be closest to Australian
requirements. However:
- Japan is handicapped by high costs and a complete absence of experience of all stages of
international armament projects (bidding, design construction, training, sustainment, etc.) and
of national politics and local content issues (see Section D.2.c.iii.).
- Furthermore, awarding the project solely to Japan would represent a reinforcement of the
Japanese-Australian defence cooperation that might anger China more than Japan, Australia
and the USA might deem wise.
It therefore makes sense for MHI and KHI to seek a foreign industrial partner, to benefit from
their know-how and dilute geopolitical effects (although the Australian government might find this
solution legally too complex). Four partner countries or companies are conceivable:
- DCNS has significant export experience but no supply chain in place in Australia (although this
might be compensated by the much larger presence in the country of Thales, which has a 35%
stake in DCNS) and a disputed ability to meet Australian size and range requirements and to
integrate US weapon systems on its platforms (although this last problem may be less
169 Interview in European Security & Defence, June 2015
170http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/15/national/politics-diplomacy/france-eyeing-joint-bid-japan-build-
aussie-subs-report/#.VcBm67WpjVI
171http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/24/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-seen-seeking-u-k-help-best-ge
rman-bid-aussie-sub-deal/#.VbXXqrWpjVJ
53
insurmountable than claimed by some). It might therefore feel it can best participate in the
Australian programme by supporting a Japanese platform.
- The UK has lost the capability to build conventional submarines. But both BAE Systems and
Babcock can offer not only general export experience, but also very significant operational
presence in Australia (including, for Babcock, participation in the sustainment of the current
Australian submarine fleet).
- ThyssenKrupp’s ability to meet Australian size, range and depth requirements is also disputed.
But it boasts extensive export experience as well as long and substantial operational presence
in Australia.172
- Kockums built Australia’s existing submarines, mainly in Australia. However, the quality of these
submarines seems to have disappointed, which is probably why it was not asked to bid. And
Sweden regained ownership of Kockums only in July 2014, when ThyssenKrupp sold it to Saab
(it had been acquired in 1999 by the German shipyard HDW, itself acquired by ThyssenKrupp in
2005).
Trainer aircraft
Another potentially very significant opportunity could be offered in a few years by the need to
replace the JMoD’s advanced trainer aircraft. A co-development with Europe seems to be a
realistic prospect:
- KHI, which made the current T-4, will presumably lobby for a new indigenous solution, but a
new development seems unlikely to be accepted for budget reasons, and an upgrade of the
existing aircraft would provide only a short-term solution;
- The Japanese government seems unlikely to accept a straight import (for which BAE Systems,
Dassault or Aermacchi could be good candidates) in an area in which the domestic industry has
capabilities;
- Lockheed Martin would not be able to compete, due to South Korea’s involvement on its
product, the T-50.
Smaller projects are also possible
Firstly, the UK’s two existing projects with Japan were completed around September-October
2015. No information is yet publicly available on their results and follow-up, but they may lead to
more substantial cooperation:
- The CBRN protection project seems not to have been limited to the sharing of research results,
as previously understood, but to have included some testing in the UK. It might lead to some
co-development project;
172http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Contenders-for-Australian-submarine-deal-make
-their-cases
54
- The feasibility study for adapting a MELCO seeker to MBDA’S Meteor air-to-air missile might
still result in Japan purchasing modified Meteors for use on its F-35 fighters. The Meteor is
already being adapted to the F-35 for the UK, although the USA might still refuse a similar
solution for Japan.
Secondly, the UH-X Army might still ultimately lead to positive developments for the
Euro-Japanese defence industrial cooperation, in the form of consolation prizes. The UK’s deep
disappointment after the F-X in 2011 is probably one of the reasons why it was first to sign a
defence equipment cooperation agreement in July 2013 and to start two R&D projects with Japan.
55
E. Cooperation opportunities exist especially in aeronautics and maritime security
1. Aeronautics may deliver some significant opportunities
a. Despite recent setbacks, Europe and Japan may still cooperate on platforms
The outcome of the UH-X Army (see Section D.3.c.i.) might indicate that Japan generally sees
European firms as subcontractors rather than prime suppliers, and Toru Hotchi seemed to confirm
this in an interview. In August 2015, shortly after the UH-X Army results were announced, though
for separate reasons, Airbus pulled out of the refuelling aircraft (see Section D.3.c.i.) and UH-X Navy
(see below) competitions, adding to pessimism.
Despite recent signs of interest from the JMoD for European fighter aircraft technologies (which
Hideaki Watanabe also hinted at in a press interview173), substantial cooperation on such highly
strategic platforms remains inconceivable. Only very limited forms of cooperation seem possible,
along the lines of the stealth test that Japan carried out in France in 2005174.
Nevertheless, cooperation around certain types of platforms may be possible, in addition to trainer
aircraft (see Section D.3.c.iii.).
i. Manned platforms seem to be the most promising
Japan remains committed, despite issues, to the development of KHI’s indigenous C-2 transport
aircraft, which precludes an acquisition of A400Ms. However, if the C-2’s problems were to keep
accumulating to the point that it became operational only long after Japan’s current fleet must be
renewed, in three to four years, some creative form of cooperation with Airbus might come into
consideration.
The JCG purchased in April 2015 two Falcon 1000175, with an option for another three on which
further negotiations are ongoing. It may be looking to replace two Falcon 900 that it has owned
since the 1980’s. On the longer term, it might also choose to reduce the fairly high fragmentation of
its fixed-wing fleet176 through new acquisitions that might benefit European suppliers.
The UH-X Navy, an RfP for 15 multipurpose off-the-shelf helicopters, seems to have a good chance
to be won by AgustaWestland with the AW101, in partnership with KHI. Airbus withdrew simply
because it could only offer products with greater performance than required, and because
exceeding requirements is not valued in this procurement process. AgustaWestland-KHI’s sole
173http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Japan-eyes-collaborative-defense-development-at-home-a
nd-abroad?page=1
174 http://aviationweek.com/site-files/aviationweek.com/files/uploads/2014/12/asd_12_16_2014_dossier.pdf
175 http://www.janes.com/article/50863/japan-coast-guard-opts-for-falcon-2000-patrol-aircraft
176 http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/e/pamphlet.pdf
56
competitor is a Sikorsky- MHI partnership. Bidding was open between July and September 2015 and
the decision, first expected in the end of October, is still pending.
Further opportunities could be offered in the coming years by the replacement of parts of the
JSDF’s helicopter fleet, especially antisubmarine warfare177 and observation helicopters (KHI’s OH-1
and OH-6) as well as by the JSDF’s new helicopter carriers178. It seems likely that the same product
(by FHI and Bell) will be selected for some of these requirements than for the UH-X Navy. The JCG
might also need more helicopters, if it increases its number of land bases or, as it uses more large
ships179, if it bases helicopters on these ships. This is conceivable, given the political attention the
JCG receives180, in Japan’s worsening maritime security context.
ii. Some cooperation may also be possible around unmanned platforms
This is one of the cooperation areas under discussion between the French and Japanese
governments. Such platforms would most likely be non-armed: Japan does not seem to have any
interest in unmanned combat aircraft (such as BAE Systems’s Taranis demonstrator, the Dassault-led
nEUROn project or the French-British two-year project Future Combat Air System, launched in
2014); and unmanned ASW aircraft, while plausible and highly relevant for Japan, seem to be some
years off (although some European firms are also developing technologies in this field181).
However, observation UAVs, particularly MALE, may lend themselves well to cooperation, even
though few concrete indications were founded that such cooperation is being considered (at least
one firm trying to promote UAVs to the JSDF is ECA). Europe, both at the EUMS and EU level, has
identified them as a key area in which to reinforce its capabilities, and Italy, Germany and France
signed in May 2015 a Declaration of Intent for a joint programme, MALE 2020182. Japan also has
identified such a need, both for general maritime security purposes and specifically for the
surveillance of the Senkakus183 (Hideaki Watanabe also hinted at such a need in a press interview
in October 2015184).
Cooperation with Europe is only one of several possible options for Japan, which could also buy
Israeli or US products. It has already purchased several Global Hawks (see Section C.1.b.) and may
177 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/271016.pdf; see also Defense News March 23, 2015
178 http://www.janes.com/article/55847/japan-considers-ship-based-multipurpose-helicopter-acquisition
179http://amti.csis.org/the-japan-coast-guard-resourcing-and-responsibility/
180http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/20/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-aims-fivefold-increase-marine-r
esources-engineers/
181http://aviationweek.com/defense/ultra-developing-miniature-sonobuoys-studies-uav-drop-options
182http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/05/18/european-defense-ministers-to-study-male-uav-progra
m/27526023/ 183
Defense News, May 4, 2015
184http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Japan-eyes-collaborative-defense-development-at-home-a
nd-abroad?page=1
57
be under pressure to buy more. Yet this platform may be too big for at least some of Japan’s needs
and the JMoD may also be concerned about possibly being obliged to share collected data with the
USA. This, as well as the geopolitical intricacies for Japan of working with Israel, may give Europe
an edge.
Furthermore, the domestic industry may be unable to cover the JMoD’s needs by itself. FHI and
KHI already make various military UAVs, but doubts (reflected in the Strategy on Defense
Production and Technological Bases of December 2013) exist on the quality of their products. It
seems also unlikely that makers of civilian drones (for agriculture, construction, civil engineering,
mining and the entertainment and consumer market), of which Japan counts several (Yamaha,
Toboho, Fuji Imvac, etc.), would venture into the military domain.
Japan’s first “International Drone Expo”, held in May 2015, gathered fifty firms active in the area,
including a few major international players such as Parrot of France, but the vast majority of
Japanese participants did not seem to have any interest for or ability to develop products with
military applications. The only clear exception was Hitachi, which was exhibiting an unmanned
surveillance system developed with AIST and a few other partners, comprised of ground robots and
UAVs equipped with airborne electromagnetic subsurface imaging equipment (which might perhaps
be applied to ASW). Another potential exception might be Chuo Electronics Co., which develops
automated flight control systems.
b. Avionics and sensors may provide many opportunities
Toru Hotchi seemed to suggest in an interview that European subcontractors could be used mainly
as part suppliers, notably to replace Chinese suppliers, which, as a JMoD study showed, provide
30% of the parts of the equipment it purchases. European firms are already included, to some
degree, in Japanese aircraft makers’ supply chain.
There seems to be some room for expanding this European participation in Japanese supply
chains into more critical and higher-value fields, especially avionics and sensors. The P-1, should it
be sold in any form to the UK, would in all likelihood receive new such equipment, both because
the UK government would insist on involving its industry and because the Japanese government
would refuse to share confidential technology. In particular, sonobuoys and other sensors as well as
flight management systems could be replaced by UK-made equipment. Furthermore, the fact that
JETRO funded a study of the European inertial navigation market and industry indicates an intention
of the Japanese government to promote the domestic industry on this market.
Several European companies are eyeing opportunities in this field. For instance, AIM
Infrarot-Module has already sold infrared sensors to the JMoD for diverse vehicles, aircraft and
ships. It might be able to sell some for UAVs, as it does for EMT Penzberg’s reconnaissance drone
used by the German Army.
c. Some other types of cooperation may be possible
58
The field of missiles, which overlaps with aeronautics, may also provide ground for true
cooperation between equals, thanks to Japan’s advanced capabilities and experience of
international cooperation (see Section D.3.b.ii.).
Aside from cooperation on products, Euro-Japanese cooperation in aeronautics can take two other
forms:
- Cooperation on manufacturing methods. For example, some European 3D metal printing
specialists, such as BeAM, may be interested in offering their expertise to Japanese
manufacturers;
- Cooperation on services, especially maintenance. It seems that the main area of cooperation
that the JMoD has identified with Italy would be the future maintenance of the F-35 fighter
aircraft, taking advantage of the fact that both countries have been selected as regional
maintenance bases for this programme. Discussions to that effect have at least started.
2. Maritime security may also become a major cooperation field
a. Some platform cooperation may be possible
In contrast with aeronautics, unmanned maritime platforms seem more likely than manned ones,
save for the very long term, to offer ground for cooperation: while Japan has long-established
indigenous capabilities for manned ships, it may have started to develop an interest in unmanned
systems later than Europe and may need some support to acquire this type of equipment.
As far as manned platforms are concerned, the projects that seem presently to have a chance to
take place relate to small or medium-size platforms, or to cooperation on the ship design process.
Japan probably has more unmet needs for surface and underwater unmanned systems, for at least
three types of military applications:
- Demining, which might become necessary as part of its own defence, or as part of much more
speculative overseas operations (see Section C.3.b.);
- Broad types of surveillance and intelligence missions;
- Conceivably ASW, even though it is unclear whether UUVs, which are loud and can be
controlled in real time only over short distances, by cable, have potential to be used for that
purpose.
Furthermore, many of these systems can be used for civilian purposes, particularly scientific
research and exploration and production of oil and gas (or other natural resources).
The JMoD already has several ongoing projects:
59
- According to Defense News185, “At least five JMoD research projects cover a variety of
unmanned maritime ISR systems and technologies, including long-range ‘sea gliders’ [and]
cooperative networks of surface and underwater unmanned vehicles”;
- “Underwater defence technology” and “defence unmanned vehicles” are among the topics of
focus of the Defense Technology Foundation, a private entity working for the JMoD;
- At MastAsia, Hideaki Watanabe presented a project for a large-displacement UUV, to be used
for surveillance or for transport of underwater equipment, with a focus on fuel cells. He also
announced plans for “research on Power Generation System and Fuel Storage and Sensing
Technology (Acoustic Sensor and Navigation Compensation) for LDUUV”;
- At SEECAT 2015 (see Section D.2.a.i.), the ATLA was providing information on a UUV prototype
developed with IHI to support research on underwater acoustic data transmission between a
USV and a UUV. The agency also mentioned the ongoing development of a mine destructor, to
be completed within three years. It was further exhibiting a commercial leisure-type boat
modified into a USV, but stated it had no plans for further R&D in this area.
Contractors also have projects:
- IHI claims to make UUVs that gather undersea and seafloor information for resources
development186;
- MHI has been developing this technology for some years, including, it claims, for ASW187, and is
running a mine-hunter project with Thales;
- Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding makes UUVs188, although it is unclear whether any have
military applications;
- NEC presented at MastAsia a system of underwater wireless electric charging stations for UUVs.
In this context, several European companies are promoting their products.
b. Cooperation is more likely on parts and equipment
Many European firms are interested in providing parts or equipment to Japanese prime contractors
for ships and, in particular, submarines (as well as for the MSDF’s future submarine rescue ship189) –
although, in many cases, they are focusing less on Japan’s programmes than on Australia’s, to
prepare for the event that Japan might win it.
185 May 4, 2015
186http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/13/national/japans-first-international-defense-show-opens-in-yokoh
ama/#.VZzWArWpjVI
187 http://www.mhi.co.jp/technology/review/abstractj-48-4-12.html
188 http://www.mes.co.jp/english/mes_technology/factory.html
189 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/260130.pdf
60
i. Sensors are a key cooperation area
Underwater sensors
The JSDF seems to already make an intensive use of such sensors, installed on platforms or
independent190, particularly to monitor submarine activity and to protect coastal infrastructures
against terrorist and other threats. Defense News191 quoted an expert stating that “Japan is keenly
looking at advanced long-range acoustic hydrophones using optical fibre rather than traditional
electro-acoustic listening devices” and that “Additional JMoD research includes projects to improve
performance of underwater passive sonar arrays.” The budget request for the fiscal year to March
2017192 includes a new programme, with a ¥10bn budget, for the development of a “variable
depth sonar system” to be used by multiple destroyers.
Japanese firms are also developing sensors and related products:
- IHI and NEC presented at MastAsia, respectively, an autonomous fixed-point oceanographic
observation buoy system and a harbour monitoring system, including underwater acoustic
transducers, which NEC said it already exported (although it would not say to what country);
- IHI also provided at MastAsia information on an underwater vibrator (to be used as a sound
source in conjunction with passive sonars or hydrophones, for oil and gas surveying but
possibly for submarine detection as well) that seems less advanced that those under
development by CGG and other Western firms;
- JSR, a Japanese maker of semiconductor materials, claims to be developing advanced electricity
recharging technologies for drones and maritime sensors.193
Interestingly, few European companies presented similar products at MastAsia, even though
European industry does possess such technologies. This may be simply because some cooperation
in this field already exists: Thales, for example, has provided sonars to the MSDF for decades and is
developing an unmanned minesweeper with MHI. Nevertheless:
- Teledyne Reson (Denmark/USA) exhibited at SEECAT 2015 a multibeam echo sounder; it already
sold products to the Japanese police in 2008;
- Some MastAsia exhibitors, such as GISMA, Hydro Group and De Regt, presented
high-performance underwater electrical and fibre-optic connectors (De Regt, a subsidiary of
Sercel, a CGG group company, has supplied Hitachi for three years). Esterline Connection
Technologies / Souriau (a French subsidiary of Esterline of the USA) has also had for years an
operational presence on the market for severe environment connectors (including for
190http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/10/national/japan-u-s-running-undersea-listening-post-detect-chine
se-subs/#.VfpOUX2pjVI
191 May 4, 2015
192 http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/271016.pdf
193 May 4, 2015, Defense News
61
aerospace and tanks).
Space-based surveillance and intelligence systems
Euro-Japanese cooperation in this area, which overlaps with BMD, is far from obvious, given that
Japan is reinforcing:
- Its already particularly intimate relationship with the USA. The revised Guidelines for Japan-US
Defense Cooperation include a section on space cooperation that was absent from their
previous version of 1997. At the ministerial meeting in which these guidelines were formally
adopted, the establishment of a Space Cooperation Working Group194 was also announced;
- Its own capabilities by, in particular, doubling its Information Gathering Satellite constellation
from four to eight over the next ten years195;
- First export projects, in satellite communications for HA/DR and maritime security, hinted at by
Toru Hotchi at MastAsia as a future export product, or in surveillance: for example, Hitachi
presented there a system that blends satellite images and satellite Automatic Identification
System to detects ships.
Some forms of cooperation may nonetheless be worth exploring. Several already exist or could be
developed relatively easily. For example, CLS (a company backed by CNES and IFREMER) provides
space-based sea monitoring services to the JCG. And the Japanese government has already
purchased some satellite data from DLR, for civilian purposes, and might expand this into the
security and defence area.
Such cooperation might be facilitated in the case that the intended expansion of EDA’s Maritime
Surveillance (Marsur) information sharing network196 beyond the EU might reach Japan.
ii. Many other parts and equipments may provide cooperation opportunities
Many European companies see opportunities to promote weapon systems or components, either
on niches not covered by US suppliers or with a view on the Australian market. Submarine
components in general may also be a promising cooperation area and various other suppliers are
working to create or develop relationships with Japanese companies.
Furthermore, the licensing relationship started in 2009 between Kockums and Japan Marine United,
as part of which JMU built three MCM vessels with Kockums’s composite material technology, is
continuing to develop, with the first of three planned larger MCM vessels being launched in
194http://www.janes.com/article/51387/japan-details-areas-of-co-operation-with-us-under-new-outer-space-workin
g-group
195http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/04/12/japan-national-security-space-buildup/25412641/ and
Defense News, May 4, 2015
196 https://www.eda.europa.eu/our-work/projects-search/maritime-surveillance-%28marsur%29
62
October 2015197. At a presentation at MastAsia (see Section D.2.a.i.), Toru Hotchi mentioned these
vessels among potential export products.
On the Japanese side, Fujitsu is seeking to export command screens for warships as well as rugged
computers for warships and aircraft.
3. Ground robotics might also become an area of cooperation
Japan seems interested in two main ground applications of robotics: UGVs and exoskeletons (as
well as in manufacturing processes). It is discussing possible cooperation on at least the first field
with France, and Akiko Iimura also suggested it at the German defence industry forum in
September 2015. The JMoD has run its own project in the second field for several years.198
Japan has some of the most advanced firms in the area, but a key question is whether they would
tolerate any defence application of their products. True, some of them, such as Schaft (now owned
by Google), Kawada Industries and two teams formed by the NEDO with AIST and JSK lab,
participated in the DARPA Robotic Challenge199. However, the DRC, in spite of being funded by the
Pentagon, has more disaster relief than defence in mind. At this stage, makers of industrial robots
like FANUC or Yaskawa or of medical exoskeletons like Cyberdyne show extreme reluctance to
consider expanding into defence.
Perhaps as a result, several European firms are approaching the Japanese market.
197http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/27/national/anticipating-muscular-missions-msdf-launches-new-mi
nesweeper/#.VjAifW4sfIU
198https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-japanese-military-is-building-a-robotic-exoskeleton-d1ee94a71022
199http://www.theroboticschallenge.org/teams;http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/2165401
1-pitting-robots-against-each-other-shows-promise-and-many-pitfalls
63
F. The EU could complement in several ways its member states’ efforts to promote cooperation
Developments in the research period of this report have shown that the Japanese government and
Japanese firms, in spite of moving slowly, are quite probably taking the direction of international
cooperation, including with Europe. In this context, all the recommendations made to EU
institutions in the first report remain relevant, since they could all contribute to stimulate this
process. Indeed some have started to be implemented.
1. Using the EU’s existing dual-use tools to support SMEs, by:
- Organising or funding business-to- business events, or firms’ participation in these events. The
MastAsia organising company expressed interest in considering such a move, and the same
might happen with the German forum;
- Or by expanding the EDA’s or the EJCIC’s resources dedicated to this market, especially:
Enterprise Europe Network’s helpdesk200, operated by the EJCIC, which might be much
more effective if it were able to actively search for shosha and other partners on behalf of
EU firms, instead of merely circulating these firms’ requests as is presently the case;
Its cluster mapping201, which presently does not cover the defence and aeronautics
industry. This would be made easier by a new version of the European Cluster Panorama,
to be launched in 2016, which will explicitly include defence in a cluster, "Aerospace,
Vehicles and Defence"202.
2. Familiarising the Japanese government with the European defence industrial cooperation
mechanisms, to demonstrate Europe’s cooperation track record (as well as its transfer and export
control policy) but also, conceivably, to offer Japan to participate in these mechanisms. First
contacts between the JMoD’s equipment function and EDA and the EEAS (see Section D.3.c.ii.) may
be steps in this direction, and further contacts could be encouraged. An EJCIC research report on
the JMoD’s procurement system, to be published in April 2016, might be used as a basis for
exchanges with the JMoD’s on this topic.
3. Intensifying the EU’s own defence and defence equipment relationship with Japan. This
relationship is already fairly institutionalised (see Section C.3.c.i.), although it would probably need
new joint activities on the ground (see Section C.3.c.ii.) to move to a next stage.
4. Inviting Japan to cooperate in the EU’s own military research schemes. It is encouraging that
Toru Hotchi expressed interest in the security component of Horizon 2020 (see Section D.3.c.ii.),
and the beginning of a shift to dual-use research in Japan (see Section D.1.c.) may make it easier to
build on this interest. Furthermore, the Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research is moving
200 http://www.een-japan.eu/
201http://www.eu-japan.eu/sites/eu-japan.eu/files/cluster/2013_cluster_mapping_japan_report.pdf
202 "Aerospace, Vehicles and Defence"
64
forward203, which might, at a later stage (from the early 2020s), offer a conduit for military R&D
cooperation between the EC or EDA and the JMoD
5. Using the favourable momentum of the FTA/SPA negotiations and the EU’s overall relationship
with Japanese authorities to nudge them towards more transparency in defence procurement and
more openness to the European defence industry. The EU Delegation to Japan could conduct
outreach activities such as seminars and conferences and common demarches with interested
EUMS. If it is involved early in the process, it may be able support EU contenders in JMoD
procurement competitions by insisting on fairness and transparency.
203 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence/files/communication-implementation-report_en.pdf
65
G. Appendices
1. Interview sources
Organisation Interviewee – name Interviewee – function
EU governments and embassies in Japan
EU Delegation Alexander McLachlan Minister-Counsellor, Head of Political and Economic Section
France Captain Francois Duhomez Defence Attaché (until July 2015)
Christophe Pipolo Defence Attaché (from July 2015)
Germany Colonel Carsten Busch Defence Attaché
Hans-Albert Eckel DLR (German Aerospace Center), Institute of Technical Physics, Head, Studies and Concepts
Dirk Zimper Defence and Security Research, Programme Coordination
UK Yasuhiro Shimasaka UK Trade & Investment, in charge of defence and security
Italy Colonel Enzo Gasparini Casari Defence Attaché
Sweden Mikael Mineur Defence Attaché (based in Sweden until August 2015)
Netherlands Captain Willem Vermeule Defence Attaché (based in Tokyo, covering also South Korea and the Philippines)
NATO Industry Advisory Group Liviu Lazar NATO Naval Armaments Group, Defence Investment Division, Industry Policy Officer
Laurent Foissey NATO Naval Armaments Group, Staff Officer
EU firms with own presence in Japan
AgustaWestland (Finmeccanica Group) Andy Symonds President AgustaWestland Japan, in charge of defense business
Airbus Guillaume Leprince Head of Sales and Marketing, Airbus Helicopters Japan
66
Organisation Interviewee – name Interviewee – function
Francois Begaud Airbus Defence and Space, Head of Sales & Marketing Hong Kong, Japan, Philippines
Jean-Luc Valerio Airbus Defence and Space, Vice-President Sales & Marketing, North East Asia
Akos Hegyi Airbus Defence and Space, Head of EDRS Services
Laurent Rinchet Airbus Defence and Space, Vice-President, Market Development North Asia
Arne Jacobs Airbus Defence and Space, Sales Director Services
BAE Systems Masazumi Kawabata Vice President and General Manager, Japan
Emiko Takahashi Marketing Executive
Denny Petersen Head of Technical Sales, Weapon systems (BAE Bofors)
Esterline / Souriau Danielle Muyl General Manager Japan
Safran Guy Bonaud Representative Director of Turbomeca Japan (also representative of GIFAS in Japan from 2015)
Delphine Le Liboux Sales Manager, Sales & Avionics Division, Sagem
David Kintzig Sales & Marketing Manager, Naval Optronics Key Accounts, Optronics and Defense division, Sagem
Thales Jean-Louis Moraud President and CEO of Thales Japan (also representative of GIFAS in Japan until 2014)
ThyssenKrupp Nikolaus Boltze Representative Director & President (also represents Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie)
EU firms without own presence in Japan
Adimec Masahito Watanabe Application and Support Engineer
AIM Infrarot-Module GmbH Harald Ehrler Key accounts, Programs Division
Airborne Systems Peter Barrett Business Development Manager
Airsense Wolf Muenchmeyer CEO
Atlas Elektronik Bernd Baumann Senior Sales Manager, Vessel Systems
Steffen Leuthold Head of Corporate Communications and Political Affairs
Matthias Baumert Senior Exhibition Manager, International Central Marketing
Babcock Jeff Owen Director Capability & Future Business, Marine & Technology Division
67
Organisation Interviewee – name Interviewee – function
Bob Love Retired UK Rear Admiral, Deputy CEO & Managing Director Maritime, Babcock Australia
BMT David Bright Sector Director Defence
Toby Middleton Retired Colonel, Head of Business Development Amphibious Platforms
Nick Johnson Naval Architect
Bruker Joachim Stach Director Business Development CBRNE
Cobham Andreas Birke Sales Manager, Cobham Mission Equipment – Unmanned Systems (Telerob, Germany)
Constellium Kengo Yotoka Sales Manager
DCNS Aymeric Bonnaud Deputy for Power & Energy
Eric Papin Engineering & Innovation Technical Director
Olivier Vaillant Head of Marketing & Business Development
De Regt (CGG / Sercel) Jeroen Romjin Product Line Manager Defence
Diehl Alois Gnadl Head of Sales South East Asia, Thailand
Drumgrange Peter Hardman Technical Manager
Dynamit Nobel Defence Hayo Berger Events & Exhibitions
ECA Group Thomas Gérard Regional Sales Director, Singapore
Vincent Clavier Homeland Security Business Manager, USV, SDV Products Manager
ELAC Nautik (belonged until June 2015
to L3 and since to Wärtsilä)
Joergen Kroll Regional Sales Director, Naval Hydroacoustic Systems
Garant Mark Milewski General Manager
Hale Hamilton Trevor Bignold Defence Sales Manager
HP Marketing and Consulting Wuest Alexander Wuest CEO
Hydro Group Graham Wilkie Sales Director
IXBlue Yves Paturel Senior Principal Engineer
Jenoptik Andy Wahl Sales Manager, Business Unit Sensors
68
Organisation Interviewee – name Interviewee – function
Junghans (Diehl/Thales JV) Max Perrin Chief Technical Officer
Hans Oettl Sales & Marketing
Kirintec Steve Tucker Director of Sales Europe and Far East
Knott Richard Hamberger Sales and Application Manager
Stefan Langl Head of Sample Production
Kongsberg (Norway) Maureen Kelly Customer Service Manager, Hydroid (USA)
L3 Calzoni Gabri Pasini Director, Business Development
Lorienne Jean-Pascal Butté Business Development
MBDA Nigel Slade MBDA Group, Sales and Business Development, Senior Technical Advisor
Karl Wieland Naumann Bayern-Chemie, MBDA Deutschland, Director, Business Development and Strategy
Wolfgang Rieck Bayern-Chemie, MBDA Deutschland, Managing Director
Klaus Woelki TDW, MBDA Deutschland, Senior Sales Representative
Pearson Engineering Nicola Irving Head of Marketing and Communication
Plath Stefan Leo Corporate Development Consultant
Renk Bernhard Vollmer Senior Manager Sales, Marine Gears
Rheinmetall Toshiya Watanabe Vice President, Area Sales Japan, Rheinmetall Waffe Munition GmbH
Jan Seidel Vice President, Head of Business Development, Business Unit Simulation and Training
Selex ES (Finmeccanica Group) Ian Buchanan Sales Manager, Defence Communications Systems UK
Taurus (MBDA-Saab JV) Oliver Kessler Business Development Director
Wärtsilä Robin Jones Naval Segment Sales Manager, Wärtsilä UK Seals & Bearings
Tim Biswell General Manager, Composites, Wärtsilä UK Seals & Bearings
Zodiac Mil Pro Erlé Dumontier Head of Business Development (based in Singapore)
Japanese Cabinet Office
69
Organisation Interviewee – name Interviewee – function
National Security Secretariat Major General Jun Nagashima Cabinet Councilor and Deputy Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (until August 2015)
Takeshi Yoshioka Counsellor (Navy Captain), North America, Europe, Oceania, Southeast Asia, South Asia section
(until August 2015)
Hiroki Suemori Deputy Counsellor, Middle East, Africa, Latin America (handles equipment topics)
Shimpei Ara Deputy Counsellor, North America, Europe, Oceania, Southeast Asia, South Asia section
Japanese Ministry of Defence
Vice-Ministers Hideshi Tokuchi Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs (until September 2015)
Minister’s Secretariat Mitsuko Hayashi Director for Parliament Affairs, Planning Department
ATLA Masaki Ishikawa Until September 2015, Director General for Acquisition Reform; from October 2015, ATLA Assistant
Commissioner
Toru Hotchi Until September 2015, Director, Equipment Policy Division, Bureau of Finance and Equipment, and
Chief Director of the Bureau; from October 2015, Director, Equipment Policy Department
Yasuaki Sano Until September 2015, Director, Procurement Planning Division, Equipment Procurement and
Construction Office; from October 2015, head of Procurement Planning Division, Procurement
Management Department
Bureau of Finance and Equipment Dr. Yasuharu Mine Director, Office of Technology Research and Exchange, Technology Policy Planning Division
Karin Nishiyama Deputy Director, Office of Technology Research and Exchange, Technology Policy Planning Division
Miho Higashi Office of Technology Research and Exchange, Technology Policy Planning Division
Horifumi Harasaki Head of Research Laboratory on Submarine Platforms
National Institute for Defense Studies
(NIDS)
Tomonori Yoshizaki Professor and Director, Policy Simulation
Keishi Ono Professor and Head, Security and Economy Division
Hideo Tomikawa Senior Fellow
Haruhiko Takada Senior Research Fellow (Captain, JMSDF)
70
Organisation Interviewee – name Interviewee – function
Shigeki Akimoto Research Fellow, Society and Economy Division, Security Studies Department (Lieutenant Colonel)
Japanese opposition parties
Democratic Party of Japan Hiroyasu Higuchi General Manager, International Department, Administration Committee
Japanese industry organisations
Defense Technology Foundation Tsutomu Takaoka Chairman
Society of Japanese Aerospace
Companies (SJAC)
Toshiyuki Nagai Marketing Director, in charge of Japan International Aerospace Exhibition
Japanese manufacturers
Alouette Technologies Hitoshi Nohmi CEO
Fanuc Unidentified Unidentified
Fujitsu Kenjiro Ono Director, Global Business Development Division, Defense Systems Unit
Masayuki Tanaka Manager, Business Development Team, Amphibious Aircraft Export Project Office, Aircraft Division
Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Shohei Fujino Assistant Manager
Nippon Electric Company (NEC) Yasutaka Eto Manager, Global Systems Development Department, Transportation and City Infrastructure
Division
Yokogawa Masanori Ito General Manager, Sales Department, Aerospace Products Business Division
Mitsutoshi Tsukada General Manager, Business Development & Strategy Department, Aerospace Products Business
Division
Japanese trading houses
AT Communications Hitoshi Shigeno Executive Vice President
71
Organisation Interviewee – name Interviewee – function
Cornes Shingo Sadamori Product Manager, Special Products Department
Tetsuya Tomonari Team Manager, Osaka Team, Special Products Department
Kanematsu Hiroshi Ishino Aerospace & Electronics Sales Department, Electronics Systems Section
Masamitsu Kimura Aerospace & Defense Systems Sales Department, Electronics Systems Sales Section
Marubun Satoru Nakano Sales Supervisor, Defense Equipement
Nippon Aircraft Supply Sam Matsushita Director, General Manager, Marketing & Sales Promotion Department
Mitsubishi Corporation Hiroharu Okamoto Global Strategy & Business Development Department, Europe, CIS, Africa & The Middle East Team
Mitsui & Co. (Mitsui Bussan) Jun Yamakawa Manager, Defense & Security Systems Department, Aviation and Defense Systems Division
Sea Corporation Yusuke Takano Technical Department
Hirotake Saito Sales Department
Shintoa Genya Hidaka Vice President, Marketing & Business Development, Aerospace
Conference organisers
Clarion Events (DSEI) Abou Mourched Senior Sales Executive
Mast Confex Warren Edge CEO
Dr. Hans Dieter Ehrenberg Executive Advisor of MastAsia 2015 (business development director at Atlas Elektronik until May
2015 then at ThyssenKrupp)
Tokyo Big Sight Satoshi Kimura Director of International Business Development
Shinichiro Oishi Assistant Manager, International Business Development Division
Non-European and non-US companies and governments
Elbit Systems Jacob Gadot EVP Corporate projects
IAI Oren Guter Business Development, EEZ and Naval Programs
72
Organisation Interviewee – name Interviewee – function
Raytheon Mike Bosack General Manager, Tokyo Liaison Office, c/o MELCO, Raytheon Systems Support Company
US Embassy to Japan Richard Sloane Second Secretary, Economic Section
Jessica Farmer Second Secretary, Political Section, Political-Military Affairs Unit
Craig Agena Former Chief of the Mutual Defense Assistance Office
Experts – consultants
Borchert Consulting & Research Heiko Borchert CEO (also Wise Pens member)
Cheltons Consulting Simon Chelton Independent consultant, former UK Defense attaché in Tokyo
Deloitte Tohmatsu Consulting Jack Midgley Director of defense practice, Tokyo
Mitsubishi Research Institute Masanori Muto Researcher, Frontier Strategy Group (head of group), Science and Safety Policy Research Division
Nanako Tanaka Researcher, Frontier Strategy Group, Science and Safety Policy Research Division
PACE Government Services David Germroth Consultant for Airbus Defence & Space
PricewaterhouseCoopers Toshiya Banno Partner, head of Japan strategy practice
SERIC Christian Polak President
Taiheiyo Engineering Muneo Yanagisawa Representative Partner
Kenji Sugahara Senior Analyst, Director of Defence Management, CBRN Specialist (retired commander, MSDF)
Toshihide Yamauchi Chief Analyst, Councillor for Defence Management (retired captain, MSDF)
Experts – think tanks
73
Organisation Interviewee – name Interviewee – function
Canon Institute for Global Studies Ken Jimbo Senior Research Fellow
Carnegie Endowment James Schoff Senior Associate Asia Program
IFRI Celine Pajol Research Fellow
Japan Forum for Strategic Studies Grant Newsham Senior research fellow
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Paul Linnarz Resident Representative for Japan
Meiji Institute for Global Affairs Ryozo Hayashi President
Rebuild Japan Initative Foundation Izumi Wakugawa Researcher and Project Manager
RIPS (Research Institute for Peace and
Security)
Masashi Nishihara President
Tokyo Foundation Ippeita Nishida Research Fellow and Project Manager
Wise Pens Lutz Feldt Retired Vice Admiral. Director (also President of EuroDefense Deutschland e.V.)
Experts – journalists and analysts
Independent defence analyst Shinichi Kiyotani Publisher of Tokyo Defence & Aerospace Review; former HIS Jane’s correspondent
Thomson Reuters Tim Kelly Reuters Correspondent
74
2. Acronyms, abbreviations and Japanese terms
AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
ADS Aerospace, Defence, Security & space industries association (UK)
AIST National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (Japan)
AMCM Airborne Mine CounterMeasures
ASD AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe
ASDF Air Self-Defense Force
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
AUV Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
BMD Ballistic Missile Defence
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear
CNES Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy (EU)
DG GROW Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (EC)
DGA Direction Générale de l'Armement
DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (German Aerospace Center)
DoD US Department of Defense
DSTL Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (UK)
EBC European Business Council in Japan
EC European Commission
EDA European Defence Agency
EEAS European External Action Service
EJCIC EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation
EPCO JMoD’s Equipment Procurement and Construction Office
EUMS European Union Member State
EU Navfor European Union Naval Force
EUISS European Union Institute for Security Studies
FMS US Foreign Military Sales
FMV Swedish Defence Materiel Administration
FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency
FTA Free-Trade Agreement
GIFAS Groupement des Industries Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales
75
GRIPS National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
GSDF Ground Self-Defense Force
HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief
IRSEM Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JAMSTEC Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology
JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
JCG Japanese Coast Guard
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition (a guidance kit added to unguided bombs)
JETRO Japan External Trade Organization
JMoD Japanese Ministry of Defense
JMoFA Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
JSDF Japanese Self-Defense Forces
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
MALE Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (UAV)
MCM Mine CounterMeasures
METI Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MoF Ministry of Finance
MSDF Maritime Self-Defense Force
MTDP Japan’s Medium-Term Defense Program
NEDO New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization
NICT National Institute of Information and Communications Technology
NIDS National Institute for Defense Studies (JMoD)
NSC Japan’s National Security Council
NSS Japan’s National Security Strategy
OCCAR Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement (Organisation for
Joint Armament Cooperation)
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
PKO PeaceKeeping Operations
PM Prime Minister
RfP Request for Proposal
RUSI Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (UK)
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
SCS South China Sea
76
Shosha Trading house or trading company
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SJAC Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies
TRDI JMoD’s Technology and R&D Institute
Two-Plus-Two Meeting of the defence and foreign affairs ministers of two countries
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UKTI UK Trade & Investment
UKTI DSO UKTI Defence & Security Organisation
UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle
77
3. Overview of Japanese defence companies
Main Japanese defence contractors
Company Market
share
Defence as % of
revenue
Product areas Products European partners
Fuji Heavy Industries N/A N/A Aeronautics Helicopters (sole Japanese attack helicopter manufacturer)
Trainer and search-and-rescue aircraft (T-5 and T-7)
Observation and reconnaissance UAVs and target drones
Fujitsu 3.6% N/A All armed forces Electronic systems (C4I, situational awareness, Information
Management and Exploitation and Decision Support systems, etc.)
Laser-based training systems
Defense information infrastructure management
Terma: self-defense systems
for missiles
Hitachi 1.7% N/A All armed forces Electronics: geospatial intelligence solutions, C2, data link systems,
unmanned vehicle control systems, small unmanned vehicles for
data transmission
Ground Advanced Combat Infantry Equipment System (ACIES)
Engineering and ammunition supply vehicles, self-propelled
mortars and howitzers, bridges, land mine clearance machines.
Supplier: Rheinmetall
(self-propelled howitzer
platform)
Naval Sonars, acoustic mine-sweep devices; submarine combat direction
systems, etc.
Generators for ships
Suppliers : Thales (sonars), De
Regt (CGG / Sercel) (cables)
IHI (formerly
Ishikawajima-Harima
2.4% 9.8% Aeronautics Engines for P-1and C-2; parts for the F-35’s engines Safran, Rolls Royce
78
Company Market
share
Defence as % of
revenue
Product areas Products European partners
Heavy Industries)
Japan Marine United N/A N/A Naval Helicopter destroyers, icebreakers, minesweepers, patrol ships,
helicopter carrier
Japan Steel Works N/A N/A Land and Naval Howitzer, cannons, armoured vehicles Rheinmetall (licensor)
Kawasaki Heavy
Industries
14.3% 7.3% Aeronautics Fixed-wing aircraft: T-4 (trainer), P-2 (antisubmarine patrol), C-2
(military freight)
Helicopters: CH-47J/ JA, OH-1 Light observation helicopter,
AW/MCH-101 (with AMCM version)
Target drones
Engines for military helicopters
Airbus, AgustaWestland (on
AW/MCH-101) , Safran
Rolls Royce (KHI provides
sustainment)
Naval Submarines (especially propulsion), patrol and search vessels
Weapon systems Missiles
Komatsu 2.3% N/A Land Armoured vehicles, ammunition
MELCO (Mitsubishi
Electric Corporation)*
7.8% 2.8% (6-7%
according to
interviews)
All armed forces Missile systems
Airborne, seaborne and ground radars
Electro-optical censors, communication systems Radio-frequency
devices, electric countermeasures
MBDA
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industry*
19.6% 8.9% Aeronautics Fixed-wing aircraft: F-2, F-4EJ, F-15J
Helicopters: UH-60J, SH-60K, SH-60J
Small aircraft engines: TS1
Airbus
Rolls Royce (MHI provides
sustainment)
Naval Submarines (Soryu) (especially weapon systems), destroyers,
escort ships
Undersea Navigating Mine Hunting System (S-10, Type1)
Thales as supplier
79
Company Market
share
Defence as % of
revenue
Product areas Products European partners
Land Tanks (Types 90, 10), armoured vehicles
Weapon systems Anti-ship missiles: ASM-1 and 2
Other missiles: Patriot, VLS, SSM-1, AAM-3
Type 97 Torpedo
Mitsui Engineering &
Shipbuilding*
N/A N/A Naval Naval and Coastguard ships
NEC Corporation (Nippon
Electronic Company)
7.8% 2.8% All armed forces Censors: radars, sonars, acoustic buoys, infrared systems
Communications: Software Defined Radios, networks, fixed-line
communication equipment
IT systems for air-defence systems and BMD, Control and
communication systems
Naval Ship engines and generators Rolls Royce
Weapon systems Missiles, rockets
Shinmaywa Industries N/A N/A Aeronautics US-2 flying boat for search and rescue
Toshiba 3.4% 1-2% (according
to interview)
All armed forces Radars and Active Electronically Scanning Array for P-1
Mobile C2 systems for GSDF
Intelligence systems: large receivers, air-to-air intelligence systems
Lithium batteries
Weapon systems Type 81 short range SAM missiles
Sources: Market shares: Keidanren data, based on contracts, 2012-2013 fiscal year. Defence as % of revenue: Keidanren data, 2010
80
Other Japanese defence contractors
Company Product areas Products European partners
Achilles Ground, Naval Inflatable boats
Daikin Weapon systems Ammunition, warheads BAE Bofors
Junghans (licensor)
Furuno All armed forces Radars, sonars, radio communication equipment
Howa Ground Mortars, light guns Thales (licensor)
JA Electronics All armed forces Inertial navigation
JRC (Japan Radio Corporation) Naval Marine electronics
Nikon Naval Periscopes
Nippon Koki Ground Ammunition Rheinmetall
OKI Naval Sonars Thales (in the past)
Ricoh Weapon systems Ammunition fuzes
Sinfonia Technology Aeronautics Aircraft and rocket parts
Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ground, Naval Machine guns, ship guns BAE Bofors (licensor)
Yokogawa Weapon systems Ammunition
Aeronautics, Ground Displays
81
Selected shosha with defence business
Company Staff dedicated to
defence
Product areas European companies represented
AT Communications ? Space SIS Live (UK)
Swe-Dish (Swedish subsidiary of DataPath, USA)
GigaSat (Ultra Electronics Group, UK)
Airbus Defence and Space (for Skynet military satellite communications)
Cornes ? All armed forces Med-Eng (UK)
Ground Rheinmetall (for laser combat simulation)
Aeronautics Zodiac Aerospace
Itochu (and subsidiary Japan Aerospace) Several dozens? Aeronautics, naval Safran
Kanematsu ? Naval Atlas Elektronik (for torpedoes), Elac (for non-seafloor mapping products)
Marubeni About 120 All Thales, AgustaWestland, Oto Melara, Selex
Marubun ? Naval Drumgrange
Nippon Aircraft Supply ? All armed forces De Regt (CGG / Sercel), GISMA, Cobham TCS
Mitsubishi International Corporation* ? Aeronautics ?
Mitsui & Co (Mitsui Bussan)* ? Aeronautics AgustaWestland (for AW139s for the Coast Guard)
Ocean Wings ? All armed forces IXBLue
Sea Corporation ? Naval Hydroid (US subsidiary of Kongsberg, Norway), Teledyne Reson, Denmark (subsidiary
of Teledyne, USA)
Shintoa ? Aeronautics Rolls Royce, Safran
Shoushin Naval Zodiac MilPro
Sojitz ? Ground ICM
Aeronautics, naval Hale Hamilton, confidential
82
Company Staff dedicated to
defence
Product areas European companies represented
Sumitomo Corporation (and subsidiary
Sumisho Aero-Systems)
About 100 All BAE, Airbus, Thales, Rheinmetall, Saab, FN Herstal, Bruker
Toyo ? Naval ELAC Nautik
*Note: companies with similar names are separate companies:
- Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation and Mitsubishi International Corporation;
- Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding and Mitsui & Co;
- Sumitomo Heavy Industries and Sumitomo Corporation.
83
4. Overview of European defence companies with business in Japan
See also table on P-1 suppliers page XXXX
European companies with own presence in Japan
Company Local staff
(including civil
business)
Product areas Products sold in Japan Japanese partners
Airbus 100 in Tokyo +
helicopter
maintenance
centre
Helicopters 4 Super Pumas (AS-332 / EC-225) to the GSDF (+
3 to Coast Guard and fire departments)
15 EC-135 training helicopters to the MSDF (of
which 13 already delivered)
KHI (for UH-X)
Used to have two distributors: one that became a
subsidiary of Itochu, and a subsidiary of Sony. The
former purchased the latter (became EuroHeli)
and was then purchased by Airbus in 2009.
1 Airbus Defence
and Space
AT Communications (for Skynet military satellite
communications)
AgustaWestland 10 Helicopters 14 AW101 / (M)CH-101 airborne mine
countermeasures and transport helicopters,
delivered between 2003 and 2013
18 AW139s for the Coast Guard
Assembly by KHI; Mitsui and Marubeni as shosha
BAE Systems 5 Naval Nautis marine and sub-marine combat
management system (not yet in sustainment)
Ship guns and ammunition (BAE Bofors)
Nautis: NEC
Ground guns: JSW
Several shosha, mainly Sumitomo
Ship guns: SHI, Daikin for ammunition (licensee) Aerospace 2 Identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) interro- gators
84
Company Local staff
(including civil
business)
Product areas Products sold in Japan Japanese partners
in 2014
Ground Mortars, howitzers and ammunition
4 armoured vehicles (Hägglunds)
Saab (including Kockums,
acquired from ThyssenKrupp
in 2014)
1 Naval Submarine engines
4 unmanned minesweepers
Licensed in 2009 composite technology to
Universal Shipbuilding Corporation (now Japan
Marine United) to produce hull structures for
mine countermeasure vessels
Shosha: Sojitz und Sumitomo
Aerospace Four Saab 340 airplanes (to the Coast Guard)
ThyssenKrupp About 50 in
headquarters
Naval Components for ship cannons Client: Japan Steel Works. No shosha.
Ground Components for tanks Client: MHI. No shosha.
Safran 10 Helicopter engines
(Turboméca)
RTM322 engines in AW101 (developed with Rolls
Royce, later transferred in full to Turboméca)
Super Pumas’ engines
For AW101: licensed production by KHI;
Shintoha as shosha
For Super Puma: Itochu as shosha
Rolls-Royce (including MTU,
acquired in 2011)
Several dozens in
Tokyo
+ sustainment
centre
Aircraft engines About 700 engines installed, mainly from US
subsidiary Allison and on US platforms (P-3,
C-130, BR-710, OH-6), also on US-2
Sustainment partners: mainly KHI and MHI, also
IHI
Shosha: Shintoa
Ship engines Gas turbines to the MSDF, mainly for destroyers
(main types: Olympus, Tyne, Spey)
Sustainment partner: KHI
Shosha: Shintoa
Thales About 50, of which
10 defence
Naval Radars, sonars (on all Sogashima class
destroyers), fire control systems (on most
MHI, Shinmaywa, Hitachi as clients. OKI in the
past
85
Company Local staff
(including civil
business)
Product areas Products sold in Japan Japanese partners
destroyers), submarine optronics masts
Aerospace Radars, avionics and communication systems KHI as client
Land Mortars; 4 armoured troop transportation
vehicles (Bushmaster)
Mortars produced by Howa
Rohde & Schwarz About 100
(including
maintenance)
All armed forces Test and measurement equipment
Radio monitoring systems, direction finding
systems
No shosha
Clients: mainly NEC and MHI
Souriau KK (Esterline Group,
USA)
About 25 Mainly
aeronautics and
space
Severe environment connectors Sell to prime contractors and Tier 1
sub-contractors.
Shosha: confidential
Value-Added Distributor: Nihon Maruko
86
European companies selling without own presence in Japan
Company Product areas Products sold in Japan Japanese distributors
Dassault Aeronautics 4 Falcon (of which 2 in 2015, with options for
another 3)
Mitsui
Rheinmetall Ground License production of tank (MHI’s Type 90 and
10) and howitzer parts and ammunition; sale of
tank ammunition material and component
Licensees: Japan Steel Works and Nippon Koki
(for ammunition)
Client: Hitachi (self-propelled howitzer
platform)
Shosha: Sumitomo, Cornes (for laser combat
simulation)
Naval Mine disposal system License production
Oto Melara Naval Ship guns Japan Steel Works as licensee
Dynamit Nobel Defence Ground Antitank shoulder weapons
Junghans All armed forces Ammunition fuzes Daikin (licensee)
AIM Infrarot-Module All armed forces Infrared sensors
Atlas Elektronik Naval Mine killing UAV (one test unit)
Selex Ground Hostile Artillery Locating System Marubeni
FN Herstal All armed forces? Light guns Sumitomo
ICM Ground Explosive detection systems Sojitz
De Regt (CGG / Sercel) Naval Underwater cables (to Hitachi) Nippon Aircraft Supply
Nammö Missiles Rocket motors of Raytheon’s ESSM missiles,
licensed to Asahi Kasei (subsidiary of MELCO)
?
Zodiac Aerospace Aeronautics
Bruker Ground CBRNE detection Sumitomo
87
Company Product areas Products sold in Japan Japanese distributors
Drumgrange Naval Acoustic hailing devices (to the Coast Guard) Marubun
ELAC Nautik (belonged until
June 2015 to L3 and since to
Wärtsilä)
Naval Submarine phones, seafloor scanning systems,
location system for submarine rescue vessel (to
NEC)
Toyo
Hale Hamilton Naval Submarine escape system Sojitz
Zodiac MilPro Naval Inflatable boats Shoushin
IXBlue Naval, ground Underwater acoustic positioning devices;
inertial navigation system
Ocean Wings
ECA Naval Mine destructing UUVs (in the past)
Hydroid (US subsidiary of
Kongsberg, Norway)
Naval About 20 100-meter and 600-meter monitoring
UUVs
Sea Corporation
Teledyne Reson, Denmark
(subsidiary of Teledyne, USA)
Naval Multibeam Echo Sounder for seafloor mapping
(for civilian security, in the past)
Sea Corporation
CLS Space Monitoring services to the JCG ?
SIS Live (UK) Space Small satellite receivers (to JMoD) AT Communications
Swe-Dish (subsidiary of
DataPath, USA)
Space Medium-size satellite receivers (to JMoD and
police)
AT Communications
GigaSat (Ultra Electronics
Group, UK)
Space Large satellite receivers (to JMoD) AT Communications
Med-Eng (UK) Ground Explosive destructor robots Cornes
88
5. Japan’s defence budget over time
(In ¥ trillion; source: JMoD)
89
6. ATLA organisation chart
(Source: JMoD)
