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Module Two Food Defense & Food Defense & the Psychology the Psychology of Terrorism of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator Training

Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Page 1: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

Module Two

Food Defense Food Defense & the & the

Psychology of Psychology of TerrorismTerrorism

National Center for Food Protection & Defense

Risk Communicator

Training

Page 2: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

2

Food Defense & Food Defense & the Psychology of the Psychology of

TerrorismTerrorismTopic 1

Psychology of Fear & Trust

Topic 2

The Food System as a Target of Attack

Topic 3

Natural Disasters, Terrorism & Catastrophic Events

Page 3: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Module 2 Learner OutcomesLearner Outcomes

Compare and contrast fear and trust as adaptive survival processes.

Describe the positive and negative consequences of fear, denial and panic as adaptive responses to heightened risk.

Identify the factors that make the food system vulnerable to intentional attack.

Page 4: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Learner Outcomes Learner Outcomes - continued

Compare and contrast characteristics of a natural or “traditional” disaster and an intentional terrorist attack.

Describe the psychological consequences of natural disasters and terrorism within the context of fear and trust.

Page 5: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

module two

Food Defense &Food Defense &

the Psychology of Terrorismthe Psychology of Terrorism

topic one

The Psychology of The Psychology of Fear & TrustFear & Trust

Page 6: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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TRUST • Slowly acquired

• Readily extinguished

• Difficult to re-establish

FEAR • Rapidly acquired

• Slow to extinguish

• Easily re-established

Fear & TrustFear & Trust

Fear & trust are two adaptive survival processes

Page 7: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Adjustment to riskAdjustment to risk

SOURCE: Peter Sandman, 2005

Low perceived risk High

Reactions change as risk increases.

Acceptance Fear

Denial

Panic

Page 8: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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We accept most risks We accept most risks wellwell

SOURCE: Peter Sandman, 2005

Humans usually adapt well to risk.

Acceptance Fear

Denial

Panic

Frequently Rarely

Page 9: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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FEAR as a FEAR as a adjustment reactionadjustment reaction

Fear is our natural reaction in a crisis. It is automatic It comes early It is temporary It is a small over-reaction It may need guidance It serves as a rehearsal It reduces later over-reaction

Fear is a useful

response.

Let it happen!

Fear is a useful

response.

Let it happen!

Page 10: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Reactions to Reactions to perceived riskperceived risk

Over-reaction is our initial reaction to a new, potentially serious risk.

We pauseWe become hyper-vigilantWe personalize the riskWe take extra precautions that are probably

unnecessary, or at least premature.

SOURCE: Peter Sandman

Page 11: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Heightened Fear Heightened Fear Leads to DenialLeads to Denial

Less common than fear More dangerous than fear More common response than panic Denial is reduced when:

• Legitimize the fear• Action – do something• Decision – given range of actions

Page 12: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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What is What is panic?panic?

A sudden strong feeling of fear that prevents reasonable thought or action.

While “panicky feelings” are common… panic is rare.

Page 13: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Response to the 2001 Response to the 2001 anthrax scareanthrax scare

In the 3 impacted cities:

1% - purchased gas masks

5% - purchased antibiotic prescriptions (80% of these did not take prescriptions)

98% opened mail as usual

3% consulted doctor about anxiety

Page 14: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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““Fear Fear” & “Panic Fear Fear” & “Panic Panic”Panic”

Do NOT ‘Fear Fear’ or ‘Panic Panic’

Most people can cope & manage their fear

To “Fear Fear” & “Panic Panic” can result in unwise strategies:

Withhold information

Over assure

Page 15: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Applying the conceptsApplying the concepts

Public’s Reaction to Spinach – E.coli Outbreak

August-September, 2006

Public’s Reaction to Spinach – E.coli Outbreak

August-September, 2006

Page 16: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

module two

Food Defense &Food Defense &

the Psychology of Terrorismthe Psychology of Terrorism

topic two

The Food System The Food System

as a Potential as a Potential Target of AttackTarget of Attack

Page 17: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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“I, for the life of me, cannot understand why

the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy to do.”

Tommy Thompson, former HHS SecretaryDecember 3, 2004

AP Photo

Page 18: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Food Safety… Security… Food Safety… Security… DefenseDefense

Naturally occurring orunintentional

contamination

Access to adequate food

supply

Intentional attack

on the foodsystem

Food Security

Food Safety

Food Defense

Page 19: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Food system Food system vulnerabilitiesvulnerabilities

Exposed crops

High concentrations of livestock and poultry

Vulnerability points along the farm-to-fork

chain

Large batch sizes in processing

Imported foods from a complex and global

supply chain

Growth in niche and foreign markets

Page 20: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Strategic vulnerabilitiesStrategic vulnerabilities

Ease in obtaining crop and animal pathogens Mass contamination could yield huge

consequences with minimal effort Low risk in being detected, caught, or

accidentally contaminated Substantial economic and psychological impact

– even in the case of a threat or hoax

Page 21: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Beyond the Terrorist: Beyond the Terrorist: Who are the Who are the

perpetrators?perpetrators?

Usual suspects

• Criminals• Extortionists• Subversives

- political ideologists• Terrorists

Usual suspects

• Criminals• Extortionists• Subversives

- political ideologists• Terrorists

The not so obvious• Disgruntled employees• Competitors• Mentally ill

The not so obvious• Disgruntled employees• Competitors• Mentally ill

Page 22: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Weapons of Attack: Weapons of Attack: Bioterrorism Bioterrorism

Diseases/Agents Diseases/Agents

Category A examples: Anthrax, botulism, plague, smallpox, tularemia, viral

hemorrhagic

Category B examples: Brucellosis, E.coli, salmonella, ricin,

Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB)

Category C: Emerging pathogens that could be engineered

Source: CDC

Page 23: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Foodborne disease costsFoodborne disease costs

INDUSTRY

• Product recall• Poor publicity• Loss of reputation• Legal liability costs

• Increased insur-ance costs

• Loss of business• Closure

CONSUMER

Pain & suffering Medical costs Loss of income Loss of leisure &

enjoyment Increased insurance Physical rehab Long term care Death expenses

PUBLIC

• Health care• Legislation• Plant inspection• Medical investigation& surveillance

• Prosecution costs• Education costs• Clean-up & disinfection

SOURCE: Food Alert

Page 24: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Recent FOOD DEFENSE Recent FOOD DEFENSE eventsevents

1984751 people became ill after

members of a religious cult

contaminated salad bars in 10

restaurants in Oregon with

Salmonella typhimuriumBhagwan Shree Rajneesh

AP Photo

First came the stomach cramps and nausea. Next came dizziness and disorientation. It was the chills, fever, diarrhea and vomiting that finally sent them to their doctors. Nearly a thousand of them…

Page 25: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Recent FOOD Recent FOOD DEFENSE eventsDEFENSE events

1989Terrorists phoned the U.S. embassy in Santiago and claimed to have laced all Chilean grapes with cyanide

Chilean Fruit Pulled From Shelves as U.S. Widens Inquiry on Poison By PHILIP SHENON, SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES Published: March 15, 1989

Page 26: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Post Sept. 11, 2001 Post Sept. 11, 2001 eventsevents

2002

Three Israeli-Arabs were arrested in Jerusalem for allegedly planning a mass poisoning of Israeli patrons at a local café.

Page 27: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Post Sept. 11, 2001 Post Sept. 11, 2001 eventsevents

Fall, 2002A China restaurateur added a chemical (rat poisoning) to a competitor’s food. 38 people died and hundreds were sent to hospitals.

Last updated at: (Beijing Time) Monday, September 30, 2002

China Sentences Rat Poison Killer to Death

Page 28: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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New Zealand FMD New Zealand FMD HoaxHoax

Rural community near urban center (Auckland)

May, 2005

New Zealand Prime Minister received

letter claiming Food and Mouth

Disease (FMD) was introduction on

Waiheke Island. Was eventually

determined to be a hoax. Cost was

$1.5-2 million in compensation costs

to dairy farmers on island.

Page 29: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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False claims & hoaxesFalse claims & hoaxes

Can seriously disrupt political, economic or psychological well-being

Copy cats are common & can interfere with actual response efforts

Internet is easy & effective tool for spreading false rumors

Page 30: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Consumer attitudes & Consumer attitudes & expectations about food expectations about food

defensedefense

Goal: Learn consumers priorities on spending for terrorism defense – food relative to other targets

Conducted by: The Food Industry Center, University of Minnesota & sponsored by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense in April, 2005

Sample: 4000+ adult Americans internet responses; weighted to represent population

Page 31: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Highlights of survey Highlights of survey findingsfindings

Over 90% of people believe there will be another terrorist attack in this country in the next four years.

There is less likely to be a terrorist attack on the food system than on other economic sectors.

Government and food processors are held the most responsible for both food safety & food defense, but government bears more responsibility for food defense.

Page 32: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Survey highlights Survey highlights - - continued

Retailers bear more responsibility & should bear more cost for food safety than food defense

Consequences of an attack on the food system are more serious than on other sectors.

Consumers would spend more to protect against a terrorist attack on the food system or against a chemical or biological release than they would for protecting airlines.

Page 33: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

module two

Food Defense &Food Defense &

the Psychology of Terrorismthe Psychology of Terrorism

topic three

Natural Disasters, Natural Disasters, TerrorismTerrorism

and Catastrophic and Catastrophic IncidentsIncidents

Page 34: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Natural and Natural and ‘traditional’ disasters‘traditional’ disasters

Types of natural or traditional disasters Fire, floods, earthquakes, drought,

hurricanes, tsunamis, mechanical failures, explosions, etc.

Disasters due to acts of human error (accident) or neglect

Airplane crash, fire, building collapse, mislabeled product, etc.

Page 35: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Characteristics of Characteristics of natural eventsnatural events

Well-defined time frame in terms of

beginning and ending

Sensory cues are readily availableWhere is the danger?

Where is safety?

Page 36: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Terrorist eventsTerrorist events

Types of terrorist events CBRNE categories: chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, explosive

Food defense focuses on chemical & biological

Goal of terrorism is primarily psychological – eroding sense of security & safety

Page 37: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Characteristics of Characteristics of terrorist eventsterrorist events

Intentional criminal acts directed toward others

Mysterious agents and/or source of symptoms

Random and outside of our control Potential permanent & catastrophic

harm & loss No well-defined beginning or end May not provide routine sensory cues

Page 38: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Response to terrorist Response to terrorist eventevent

MYSTERMYSTERY Y

intensifies

FEAR FEAR

These characteristics These characteristics create a different and create a different and unique emotional charge unique emotional charge than a natural or than a natural or traditional disaster.traditional disaster.

Page 39: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Food terrorism Food terrorism challengeschallenges

Contamination may not be discovered for

days or even weeks after the event

Even a threat or hoax involving the food

supply can trigger mass anxiety and

significant economic loss

May be significant number of ‘unknowns’

(‘mystery’)

Page 40: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Catastrophic potential Unfamiliar Decision processes not

understood Lack of personal control Involuntary exposure Delayed effects Children at risk Risk to future

generations

Lack of trust in relevant institutions

Much media attention Previous history Unclear benefits Potentially irreversible

effects Origins caused by

human actions (vs. act of nature)

Factors associated with Factors associated with increased public increased public

concern (fear)concern (fear)

- Covello, in NRC, 1989

Page 41: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Risk Communication Risk Communication

Goal of terrorism is to create contextual fear and to eliminate trust in the various critical US infrastructures

In response, Risk Communication can: Reduces the mystery of the agents OR

Help tolerate the mystery/uncertainty when faced significant ‘unknowns’

Less mystery yields less fear which yields more trust

Page 42: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Take AwaysTake Aways

Don’t ‘fear fear’ or experience ‘panic panic’

Most people can cope & manage their fear

If we ‘fear fear’ official reactions to terrorist attacks may provoke unnecessary & unwise steps:

Withholding information

Over assurance

Page 43: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Take Aways Take Aways – – continued

Food defense addresses an intentional attack

on the food system; food safety pertains to

natural or accidental contamination.

The dynamic nature of the food system

makes it particularly vulnerable to attack.

Page 44: Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism Module Two Food Defense & the Psychology of Terrorism National Center for Food Protection & Defense Risk Communicator

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Listen to public’s concerns & understand audience

For Effective Food DefenseBestBest

Practices

PracticesBest

Best

Practices

Practices