Immigration Surveillance Aff + NegResolution

Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance.FYIGeneral FYIHere’s a rundown of some key acronyms to know on this topic:

DHS= Department of Homeland Security, an agency of the U.S. federal government that was created after September 11th, 2001 to protect the country from terrorist attacks, natural disasters, etc. They are frequently behind border control policies to prevent illegal immigration and criminal smuggling.

ICE= Immigration Customs Enforcement, an enforcement agency under the DHS, which deals with security-related immigration policies. They often conduct raids of immigrants’ homes and workplaces for the purposes of deportation and detention.

Here are some other important terms to know for the topic:

TIME ’13 [TIME staff, “A Glossary of Government Surveillance,” August 1, 2013, http://nation.time.com/2013/08/01/a-glossary-of-government-surveillance/]

The National Security Agency (NSA) is the United States’ chief coordinator of signals intelligence—the collection and analysis of communication through radio, radar, and electronic means. It serves the Department of Defense, other government agencies, the Intelligence Community, private sector partners, the armed forces and international allies. Little is known about the NSA because of the sensitive nature of its operations, but the agency’s headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland is home to some of the world’s best cryptographers, computer scientists, engineers and mathematicians. General Keith B. Alexander is the current director of the National Security Agency, chief of the Central Security Service and commander of U.S. Cyber Command. John C. Inglis is the agency’s deputy director.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is an agency of the US Department of Justice with investigative jurisdiction over 200 categories of federal crime. Its primary duties include counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts, cyberwarfare research and defense, the protection of civil rights and the prosecution of violent, organized, and white collar criminal activity. The FBI is headquartered in Washington, DC but maintains hundreds of international field offices. In June 2013, President Barack Obama named James Comey Jr. to succeed Robert Mueller as director of the FBI.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was a United States law passed in 1978 that outlined procedures for the federal conduction of electronic surveillance, physical searches, and the mining of information for foreign intelligence purposes. FISA established the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court), a federal counsel that oversees the granting of surveillance warrants to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The Act also gave the President authority to conduct electronic surveillance without a court order through the Attorney General and the FISA Court. FISA garnered national attention in 2005 after the Bush administration authorized unwarranted wiretapping of US phones by the National Security Agency.

The Protect America Act (PAA) was an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that was championed by President George W. Bush and passed by Congress in 2007. In a controversial maneuver later upheld by the FISA Court, the PAA removed the requirement of a warrant for the federal surveillance of foreign intelligence targets reasonably believed to be outside the country and any Americans communicating with them. It also dramatically reduced the power of authorities such as the FISA Court and granted retroactive immunity to telecommunications providers that cooperated with the government’s surveillance agencies. The PAA was heavily criticized by civil liberties groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, which called it the “Police America Act.”

The Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, Reviewed and Effective Act (RESTORE Act) was a 2007 amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that restored the checks and balances left out of the Protect America Act. Notably, it required an individualized court warrant for the targeting of persons inside the United States, reestablished the power of the FISA Court and mandated regular audits of surveillance programs.

The FISA Amendments Act (FAA) was a law hastily pushed through Congress to establish and clarify intelligence procedure when the Protect America Act expired in 2008. The FAA enhanced protections for Americans overseas but increased the time allowed for warrantless surveillance and allowed eavesdropping in emergency situations. It also granted immunity to the telecommunications companies involved in the Bush administration’s wiretapping scandal and renewed the government’s authority to monitor electronic communications of foreigners abroad without a warrant. Section 702 of the FAA, which permits the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to target “persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information,” authorizes foreign surveillance programs like PRISM, which in 2008 were no longer protected by George W. Bush’s President’s Surveillance Program. The day that the FAA was enacted, the American Civil Liberties Union and other civil rights groups sued James R. Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, claiming that the FAA violated the first and fourth amendments. The case made its way to the Supreme Court, which decided that the groups could not challenge the FAA because they could not prove that they had personally been targets of surveillance. Congress and President Obama extended the provisions of the FAA for five more years in 2012. The law now applies through the end of 2017.

The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) was the US government’s primary legislative response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Passed a month after the attacks, it dramatically expanded the investigative powers of the executive branch, broadened the definition of terrorism, increased the budget for counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts and tightened restrictions on immigration to the United States. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act modified the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act by allowing the FBI to secretly collect records, papers and other documents—domestically or elsewhere—for use in counterterrorism or counterintelligence investigations. Section 215 was condemned by a number of organizations and public figures because it did not require the presence of a defendant or proof of probable cause before the commencement of data collection.

PRISM is an electronic surveillance data mining program operated by the United States National Security Agency under Section 702 of the PATRIOT Act. PRISM commenced operation under the supervision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court after the passage of the Protect America Act in 2007. Technically, the program cannot “target” Americans because it must operate legally under FISA; however, the information leaked in June by Edward Snowden revealed that NSA analysts can exploit a number of loopholes in surveillance legislation to obtain the private communications of Americans at home. Through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, PRISM collects the broad outlines of communications stored on the servers of nine providers: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, Youtube and Apple. The program is believed to be unconstitutional by the American Civil Liberties Union, FreedomWatch USA and other civil rights advocates.

BLARNEY is a data mining program operated by the National Security Agency alongside PRISM. According to the slides leaked by Edward Snowden, BLARNEY is an “upstream” program that collects Internet metadata in the same way that the NSA collects phone data: by sucking up information “on fiber cables and infrastructure as it flows past.” The program’s summary describes BLARNEY as “an ongoing collection program that leverages IC [intelligence community] and commercial partnerships to gain access and exploit foreign intelligence obtained from global networks.” Unlike PRISM, BLARNEY only collects metadata.

Metadata, strictly speaking, is information about data rather than data itself. In the context of the NSA leaks, metadata is information about phone and email messages that does not include their content. Examples include the time and location of phone calls or the author, date created and file size of an email. US law does not require the procurement of a warrant before obtaining metadata.

1AC1ACObservation 1 is Inherency:Immigrant surveillance has skyrocketed- it’s a central part of enforcement strategies

Kalhan ’14 [Anil, J.D. from Yale Law School, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University. A.B., Brown University, “Immigration Surveillance,” Maryland Law Review, Volume 74, Issue 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlr]

As these immigration enforcement activities have widely proliferated, and the scale of the enforcement regime’s “formidable machinery” has grown and solidified, authorities have deployed a variety of new surveillance, dataveillance, and tracking systems as key components of their enforcement strategies at every stage of the migration process.110 In this Part, I analyze the swift, extensive, and largely unconstrained implementation of these technologies, which have given rise to what I term, adapting from Jack Balkin, the immigration surveillance state: an approach to immigration governance “that features the collection, collation, and analysis of information about populations . . . to identify problems, to head off potential threats, to govern populations, and to deliver valuable social services.”111 These systems enable and routinize the collection, storage, aggregation, processing, and dissemination of detailed personal information for immigration control and other purposes on an unprecedented scale and facilitate the involvement of an escalating number of federal, state, local, private, and non-U.S. actors in immigration control activities.

This causes mass deportation and deters immigration, both legal and illegal

Kalhan ’14 [Anil, J.D. from Yale Law School, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University. A.B., Brown University, “Immigration Surveillance,” Maryland Law Review, Volume 74, Issue 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlr]

In recent decades, however, the regulation of immigration after noncitizens have entered the United States has increased dramatically. In part, post-entry enforcement serves as an extension of regulation of the territorial border, intended to apprehend noncitizens who are unlawfully present. Under what Daniel Kanstroom terms an “extended border control” model of enforcement, officials seek to deport not only unlawful entrants but also the many individuals—estimated in recent years to comprise between forty and fifty percent of all unauthorized migrants—who lawfully enter as temporary nonimmigrants and then overstay or otherwise violate their terms of admission.57 But Congress also has fashioned a second model of deportation by expanding the bases upon which individuals who are lawfully present may be “delegalized” and deported for post-entry conduct.58 The trend toward this model of what Kanstroom calls “postentry social control” has been particularly severe for individuals with postentry criminal convictions.59 Until the 1980s, only a limited number of serious crimes rendered noncitizens deportable, and in most instances, those individuals could seek discretionary relief from deportation. Since 1988, however, Congress has steadily (and at times retroactively) expanded the list of criminal deportability grounds to include a broad range of comparatively minor crimes, including a variety of misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies, and has sharply narrowed eligibility for discretionary relief.60 The consequences have been transformative, as federal officials now place unprecedented emphasis on direct post-entry enforcement within the United States. Over half of all individuals removed in recent years have been deported from inside the United States.61 Since 1999, deportation of individuals with criminal convictions has been the government’s highest stated interior enforcement priority, and the number of individuals removed on criminal grounds has increased accordingly.62 Of the 391,000 individuals removed in 2011, almost half had a prior conviction, compared to three percent in 1986.63 Moreover, as the U.S. economy has slumped since 2008 and the number of unauthorized migrants has dropped—and as southwestern border enforcement strategies have increasingly emphasized criminal prosecution rather than immediate expulsion—the number of informal, “voluntary” returns without formal removal orders, which typically occur at or near the territorial border, has plummeted.64 As a result of these shifts, lawfully present noncitizens have become immigration enforcement targets to a greater extent than ever before, and the number of formal removals arising from interior enforcement activities now significantly dwarfs the number of informal returns arising from apprehensions at or near the territorial border.65

Thus the plan:The United States Federal Government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance of non-citizens done for the purposes of deportation, detention or raids.

Observation 2 is Solvency:Federal action is key- it shapes state-level immigration policies

Carcamo ’13 [Cindy, covers immigration issues for the Los Angeles Times, “States back off from enacting immigration laws,” October 12, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/12/nation/la-na-ff-immigration-laws-20131013]

Utah mirrors a national trend of states holding back on passing immigration laws in hopes that the federal government will act on the issue, according to a study released this fall by the National Conference of State Legislatures. It's a far cry from 2011, when states enacted 162 immigration laws, many following Arizona's controversial SB 1070. By 2012, states had shrunk away from the immigration issue, especially after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected key provisions of the Arizona law that June. This year, 146 immigration laws have been enacted in 43 states and the District of Columbia. California has led the nation in providing benefits to people who are in the country illegally. New laws would allow such immigrants to obtain driver's licenses and practice law, for example. On the other end of the spectrum is Georgia, where officials this year expanded on a sweeping crackdown on illegal immigration. State law now prevents people who are in the country illegally from obtaining public housing, driver's licenses, state grants and loans. Most states have taken a more nuanced approach to immigration law this year. In the Southwest, for instance, Utah enacted legislation that excluded people who are in the country illegally from receiving new state scholarships. At the same time, legislators created a provision in a law regarding abandoned property, allowing former tenants access to a property if they needed to retrieve documents about their immigration status. In Virginia, legislators did not opt for sweeping laws like Georgia, but did ban people who are in the country illegally from obtaining concealed weapons permits. Most noteworthy is that 24 states — double the number from previous years — passed resolutions asking the federal government to step in and take the reins on immigration, according to the report by the National Conference of State Legislatures.

The plan creates room for effective immigration reform

ACLU ’13 [American Civil Liberties Union, a non-partisan organization aimed at protecting civil rights, “A STUDY IN CONTRASTS: HOUSE AND SENATE APPROACHES TO BORDER SECURITY,” House Homeland Security Committee Hearing, July 23, 2013 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86033/html/CHRG-113hhrg86033.htm]

The ACLU urges the House to reject S. 744's wasteful resource splurge on border security as irrational and damaging to border communities. Instead, Congress must prioritize the reduction of abuses in the currently-oppressive immigration and border enforcement system. That profligate enforcement has cost $219 billion in today's dollars since 1986.\50\ By jettisoning proposals for escalated border security that clash with civil liberties and thereby creating space for genuine immigration reform, Congress can ensure that the roadmap to citizenship for aspiring Americans, which is indispensable to true immigration reform, is a generous one free of unjust obstacles.

Advantage 1 is Agriculture- Global food crises are coming – stable markets are key to prevent resource wars

Lehane 1-16-15 [Sinéad Lehane, Research Manager at Future Directions International, “Shaping Conflict in the 21st Century—The Future of Food and Water Security,” http://www.brinknews.com/shaping-conflict-in-the-21st-century-the-future-of-food-and-water-security/]

Food and water security will shape the 21st century. The interconnection between the availability and access to natural resources, political and economic stability, community wellbeing and the potential for conflict are indisputable. Those who view security through a traditional lens risk overlooking the complexities of conflict triggers as we move further into the 21st century. Over the next 35 years, population growth, reduced access to fresh water and declining arable land will place mounting pressure on global food and water security. The greatest pressure will be on those countries least equipped to deal with these challenges, increasing the risk of both inter- and intra-state conflict. Food and water insecurity is not necessarily about a dearth of resources—we have enough food and water globally to meet demand. But demand for food and water is expected to outpace the supply of globally available resources. The majority of the world’s population growth to 2050 is expected to occur in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, but both regions are ill-equipped at present to access the required resources and meet the basic needs of their growing populations. Population Growth and Movement By 2050, an increasing number of countries will be unable to feed their people or quench their thirst for water. Land and water won’t move, but food and people can—and will—in response to resource scarcity. Consequently, food systems and markets around the world will continue to become progressively interdependent. In the case of food shortages, we can expect increased migration, across states and regions—but this is likely to intensify the potential for conflict.

Surveillance of undocumented workers destroys US agriculture

Devadoss and Luckstead ’11 [Stephen Devadoss, PhD in Economics from Iowa State University, is a professor at the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at the University of Idaho, Jeff Luckstead, PhD in economics from Washington State, is an Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness at the University of Arkansas, “Implications of immigration policies for the U.S. farm sector and workforce,” 7-1-11, http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Economic-Inquiry/261386342.html]

Because illegal immigration was not a serious problem in the 1960s and 1970s, legislation addressed only the number of legal immigrants allowed to enter the United States. But in the 1980s, illegal immigration began to emerge as a national problem, and extensive debates entrenched around issues such as preventing the entry of unauthorized workers, providing public services to illegal immigrants, and even legalizing these workers. Consequently, the U.S. Congress attempted to address the immigration problems by enacting the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The goals of IRCA were to eliminate the stock of undocumented workers through amnesty (2) and domestic enforcement of employer sanctions and curb the influx of illegal immigrants by increasing the border surveillance. Amnesty failed to eliminate the stock of illegal immigrants because only about half of the illegal immigrants filed for citizenship, and it created future expectation of amnesty and more illegal unauthorized entry. Furthermore, domestic sanctions on employers of undocumented workers and deportation of these workers were scantly enforced. To stop the influx of immigrants, IRCA focused heavily on tightening border control. The IRCA also legislated the H-2A program, which allowed agricultural employers to bring in guest workers during seasonal operations (ERS 2007). However, farmers complained that the cumbersome paperwork of H-2A and bureaucratic delay were not conducive to procure seasonal laborers at the time of peak farm operations such as vegetable and fruit picking. (3) In spite of IRCA's amnesty provision and strengthened control measures, illegal immigration continued to rise--about 12 million unauthorized immigrants resided in the United States in 2007 (Martin 2007) which is reaffirmed by many popular press reports--leading to an extended congressional debate that began at the start of this decade to solve the illegal immigration problem. Several bills were proposed by the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the White House, addressing issues related to increased domestic and border enforcements, (4) paths to citizenship, and guest-worker programs (Montgomery 2006). These bills were not passed because of major disagreements among lawmakers over providing citizenship and guest-worker programs. As a result of the failed legislations and the September 11 attack, the government primarily focused on border security. Accordingly, funding for border enforcement has steadily increased, (5) and resources were diverted from domestic to border enforcement. However, Boucher and Taylor (2007) documented that increased funding to secure the border did not deter undocumented workers from crossing the border because determined immigrants eventually find a way to enter the country by repeated attempts. Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) further decreased the number of human hours devoted to worksite inspection because monitoring critical infrastructure took priority (GAO 2005). For example, from 1999 to 2003, the number of human hours for domestic enforcement decreased from 480,000 to 18,000. (6,7) But, by late 2005, the U.S. government started to intensify domestic surveillance. For example, only 25 criminal arrests relating to illegal immigration occurred in 2002, but increased to 716 by 2006 and 1,103 by 2008 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2008c). Domestic surveillance has further intensified under the current administration (Meyer and Gorman 2009). According to Passel (2008), a decreasing trend in the unauthorized immigrant population is recently occurring. (8) This is largely due to worksite and border enforcements and the recent U.S. economic recession. These enforcements have exacerbated U.S. agricultural labor shortages before the 2008/2009 economic crisis. According to the National Agricultural Worker Survey, 80% of the newly hired farm labor force is from Mexico, of which 96% are unauthorized (U.S. Department of Labor 2005). Therefore, as border and domestic enforcements intensified, entry of undocumented immigrants into the U.S. farm labor force was thwarted, which led to an acute labor scarcity. For example, the Wall Street Journal (2007) reported that in 2006, about 20% of agricultural products were not harvested nationwide. Furthermore, the Rural Migration News (2007) provides a detailed and specific list of these shortages and the adverse effect on crucial cultivational operations which resulted in heavy losses. As a result, farm groups are one of the strongest allies of overhauling the current guest-worker program to bring immigrants to legally work in U.S. agriculture. For the last several decades, immigrants played a crucial role in the development and competitiveness of U.S. agricultural production (Torok and Huffman 1986). For example, Devadoss and Luckstead (2008) provide evidence of the importance of immigrant farm workers to vegetable production which is highly labor intensive. The United States has a great land endowment and ideal growing conditions; however, without immigrant labor who perform the back-breaking labor-intensive operations that U.S. low-skilled workers are unwilling to perform, agricultural productivity and total production would decline. Consequently, costs to U.S. consumers of agricultural products would increase and net exports would also decrease. In recent years, Mexican immigrant labor contributed significantly to the expansion of U.S. agricultural exports, particularly between the United States and Mexico. For example, between 1994 and 2008, net U.S. exports to the world and to Mexico increased by 82% and 200%, respectively (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008f). Devoid of these laborers, this dramatic increase would not have been possible. Although domestic and border enforcements address only the symptoms of illegal immigration, they are an important part of the immigration policy and the U.S. government devotes vast resources to prevent illegal entry and the employment of illegal aliens. The specific objectives of this paper are to: (1)analyze theoretically through illegal immigration and trade theory the effects of domestic and border enforcements on the illegal farm wage rate, commodity prices, unauthorized entry, and commodity trade between the United States and Mexico and (2) empirically implement the theoretical model through econometric estimation and simulation analysis and quantify the impacts of immigration policies on farm labor and commodity markets.

Immigrant workers are key to US agriculture, food security and job growth

McDaniel 4-1-15 [Paul, PhD in Geography and Urban Regional Analysis from the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, researcher at the American Immigration Council, “How Inaction on Immigration Impacts the Agricultural Economy,” http://immigrationimpact.com/2015/04/01/how-inaction-on-immigration-impacts-the-agricultural-economy/]

Due to its geographic diversity and natural resource abundance, the United States is one of the world’s leading agricultural producers and suppliers. Indeed, the $374 billion U.S. agriculture sector is critical to the U.S. economy, but its health depends on a functioning immigration system. From migrant workers on farms, to foreign-born scientists at agribusiness and agricultural research centers, immigrant labor is important for U.S. agriculture, and analysts predict that in the absence of immigration reform, the growth of the entire sector may stall. At an event Tuesday on immigration, agriculture, and the economy, panelists described how the status quo is harmful to employers, workers, the broader economy, and food security. Stephanie Mercier, with the Farm Journal Foundation, and author of Employing Agriculture: How the Midwest Farm Sector Relies on Immigrant Labor, observed that between 2000 and 2012, “U.S. consumption of fresh produce rose by 10.5 percent, while U.S. production rose only 1.4 percent. As a result, imports of fresh fruits and vegetables have increased by 38 percent over that period, with imports in several categories spiking well over 100 percent.” And citing a previous study, she notes that labor supply challenges and H-2A visa shortcomings are key factors in a 27 percent decline in market share for U.S. growers, accounting for $3.3 billion in missed GDP growth and $1.4 billion in unrealized farm income for 2012. Another panelist, Craig Regelbrugge, with AmericanHort, observed on AgriTalk radio that immigrants working in the agriculture sector are helping to create jobs for U.S. workers by enabling us to produce in the United States: “And when we produce here we are generating thousands upon thousands of jobs that are not on the farm necessarily. They’re related to inputs that the farmer must buy in order to produce. They’re related to things that must happen after the crop or product leaves the farm. The multiplier effect for each farmworker is said to be somewhere between 2 and 3 jobs that are created here…If we become reliant on Canada, Mexico, Central America, and…China to feed us, most of the jobs that exist here in agriculture will go offshore to support us.” Describing the perspective of farmworkers, Adrienne DerVartanian, with Farmworker Justice, noted that “when you have a majority undocumented workforce, you have a workforce that’s fearful of defending their workplace rights, of seeking improved wages and working conditions.” She explained that farmworkers should be presented with an opportunity to have lawful permanent residency and a path to citizenship, which would stabilize the agricultural labor force and result in higher wages and better working conditions. Employers would benefit through higher retention rates and improved productivity, subsequently benefitting our nation through greater food security and food safety. Panelists agreed that the future of agriculture in this country and the ability to feed ourselves is very much connected with immigration. “Clearly, U.S. agriculture in the Midwest and elsewhere in the country really needs significant reforms to how the current U.S. immigration system works,” Mercier said. “The current stalemate is very frustrating to a lot of farmers because it’s forcing them to rethink how they operate their farms, what kind of crops they plant, in a way that’s very limiting to their ability to run a good business.” Regelbrugge explained the adverse effect of delaying immigration reform: “The do-nothing strategy is a net loser because the reality is new folks aren’t coming in, and there is over time going to be attrition of the existing workforce…It doesn’t take a nuclear physicist or rocket scientist to figure out how to solve agriculture’s problem.”

The US is key to global food security

DeCapua ’12 [“US Drought Impacts Global Food Security,” http://www.voanews.com/content/us-drought-food-security-8aug12/1475641.html]

The United States is the leading producer of corn and soybeans – two commodities that developing countries rely on. However, over the past two months, prices have risen sharply as the U.S. experiences its worst drought since the 1950s. A food policy expert says effectively responding to the drought can help prevent another global food crisis More than half the United States is experiencing the dual problems of too little rain and temperatures that are too high. Shenggen Fan, head of the International Food Policy Research Institute, said that’s not only driving up prices, but contributing to price volatility as well.¶ “The U.S. plays a huge role in global food security. The U.S. is the largest food exporter – soybeans, maize and many other food commodities. So anything [that] happens in the U.S. will have global significance,” he said.

Food wars go nuclear

FDI ’12 [Future Directions International, an Australian-based independent, not-for-profit research institute, “International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points Resulting from Food and Water Insecurity,” http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/Workshop_Report_-_Intl_Conflict_Triggers_-_May_25.pdf]

There is little dispute that conflict can lead to food and water crises. This paper will consider ¶ parts of the world, however, where food and water insecurity can be the cause of conflict ¶ and, at worst, result in war. While dealing predominately with food and water issues, the ¶ paper also recognises the nexus that exists between food and water and energy security. ¶ There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 ¶ workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries ¶ across the globe are starting to take note. . ¶ He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, ¶ violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” ¶ “Hunger feeds anarchy.” ¶ This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.” ¶ He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a ¶ confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of ¶ resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.” ¶ As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over ¶ resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. ¶ A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies ¶ and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.

Food crises collapse civilization- causes disease spread, terrorism, and economic collapse

Brown ’09 [Lester, environmental analyst, founder of the Worldwatch Institute, and founder and president of the Earth Policy Institute, a nonprofit research organization, recipient of 26 honorary degrees and a MacArthur Fellowship, has won several prizes and awards, including the United Nations Environment Prize, the World Wide Fund for Nature Gold Medal, and the Blue Planet Prize, “Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/civilization-food-shortages/]

One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today’s economic crisis. For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire—and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos—and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization. I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy—most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures—forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible.¶ The Problem of Failed States¶ Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one.¶ In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the¶ spring and summer of last year climbed to the¶ highest level ever.¶ As demand for food rises faster than supplies¶ are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the¶ steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problems stem from a failure¶ to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of¶ power but its absence that puts us at risk. States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security¶ and basic social services such as education and¶ health care. They often lose control of part or all¶ of their territory. When governments lose their¶ monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate.¶ After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer¶ safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia¶ and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have¶ already put such programs in jeopardy.¶ Failing states are of international concern because¶ they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons¶ and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008¶ list of failing states, has become a base for piracy.¶ Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training.¶ Afghanistan, number seven, is the world’s¶ leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive¶ genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that¶ troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among¶ them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic¶ Republic of the Congo (number six).¶ Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nationstates to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach¶ scores of other common goals. If the system for¶ controlling infectious diseases—such as polio,¶ SARS or avian flu—breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

Diseases cause extinction

Guterl ’12 [Fred, award-winning journalist and executive editor of Scientific American, worked for ten years at Newsweek, has taught science at Princeton University, The Fate of the Species: Why the Human Race May Cause Its Own Extinction and How We Can Stop It, 1-2, Google Books, online]

Over the next few years, the bigger story turned out not to be SARS, which trailed off quickly, bur avian influenza, or bird flu. It had been making the rounds among birds in Southeast Asia for years. An outbreak in 1997 Hong Kong and another in 2003 each called for the culling of thousands of birds and put virologists and health workers into a tizzy. Although the virus wasn't much of a threat to humans, scientists fretted over the possibility of a horrifying pandemic. Relatively few people caught the virus, but more than half of them died. What would happen if this bird flu virus made the jump to humans? What if it mutated in a way that allowed it to spread from one person to another, through tiny droplets of saliva in the air? One bad spin of the genetic roulette wheel and a deadly new human pathogen would spread across the globe in a matter of days. With a kill rate of 60 percent, such a pandemic would be devastating, to say the least.¶ Scientists were worried, all right, but the object of their worry was somewhat theoretical. Nobody knew for certain if such a supervirus was even possible. To cause that kind of damage to the human population, a flu virus has to combine two traits: lethality and transmissibility. The more optimistically minded scientists argued that one trait precluded the other, that if the bird flu acquired the ability to spread like wildfire, it would lose its ability to kill with terrifying efficiency. The virus would spread, cause some fever and sniffles, and take its place among the pantheon of ordinary flu viruses that come and go each season.¶ The optimists, we found out last fall, were wrong. Two groups of scientists working independently managed to create bird flu viruses in the lab that had that killer combination of lethality and transmissibility among humans. They did it for the best reasons, of course—to find vaccines and medicines to treat a pandemic should one occur, and more generally to understand how influenza viruses work. If we're lucky, the scientists will get there before nature manages to come up with the virus herself, or before someone steals the genetic blueprints and turns this knowledge against us. ¶ Influenza is a natural killer, but we have made it our own. We have created the conditions for new viruses to flourish—among pigs in factory farms and live animal markets and a connected world of international trade and travel—and we've gone so far as to fabricate the virus ourselves. Flu is an excellent example of how we have, through our technologies and our dominant presence on the planet, begun to multiply the risks to our own survival.

Advantage 2 is the Economy- Sustainable immigration is key to the economy- solves workforce shortages

Guilford ’13 [Gwynn, economics reporter and editor for Quartz, a news publication, “The US economy needs low-skilled immigrant workers as much as it needs PhDs,” http://qz.com/75006/the-us-economy-needs-low-skilled-workers-as-much-as-it-needs-computer-science-phds/]

Immigrants have increasingly been filling low-wage jobs that Americans don’t want. And that’s not because they’re stealing US jobs. As the native workforce has become more educated—and, therefore, moved up the income chain—immigrants have increasingly met the demand for the lowest-skilled jobs (pdf, p.4). By 2012, 24% of foreign workers did not have a high school diploma, compared with just 5% of working natives. Plus, native and immigrant low-skilled workers now tend to compete for different types of jobs (pdf, p.22). And demand for those workers is growing rapidly… The highest-volume and fastest-growing job categories also tend to be low-skilled ones (pdf), according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. …particularly as the US workforce ages. Growth of the native working population in slowing, as retirees make up an increasing proportion of the overall population. This means there won’t be enough native workers to fill many of the 4 million low-skilled jobs that the economy will add by 2020, according to the BLS. Take, for example, home health and personal care aides. If the 2020 workforce breakdown stayed at current levels—around a 25-75 split between foreign-born and native workers (pdf)—the economy would be short some 700,000 of those aides by 2020. That’s a lot of sick and old people without help. Immigration of low-skilled workers drives up native wages… Research on what would happen if the US cleared a path to citizenship for its 11 million undocumented immigrants (a workable proxy for low-skilled immigrants) suggests that, as economic security encourages immigrants to consume, overall incomes will rise by $470 billion in a decade (pdf), and the economy would add 121,000 jobs each year. Plus, immigration pushes low-skilled natives up the income chain, helping to close that nagging wage gap. …and boost native productivity… Availability of domestic workers helps free up a highly productive slice of the workforce: ultra-educated women. “Domestic workers…make it possible for [high-skilled] women to enter the labor force and hold full-time jobs because they are home caring for their loves ones and maintaining the household,” Haeyoung Yoon, of the National Employment Law Project tells Quartz. “[D]omestic workers make all other work possible.” In short, more low-skilled immigrants will help women worried about “having it all,” well, have it all. …as well as immigrant productivity. As The Economist discussed in Nov. 2012, the US’s superior infrastructure and institutions alone would “supercharge” the productivity of an immigrant worker, regardless of how talented he is. With US worker productivity on the decline, this is much needed. Of course, no one’s going to set up a fancy lobbying group for gardeners, nannies and bricklayers. But they’re just as crucial to the US’s economic outlook.

Deportation shakes the entire US economy- spills over and depresses wages

Zahniser et al ‘12 [Steven Zahniser, agricultural economist at the United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, Thomas Hertz, Ph.D. in economics from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Peter B. Dixon, Professor in the Centre of Policy Studies at Victoria University, Maureen T. Rimmer, PhD in mathematics and lecturer in the Departments of Mathematics and Economics at La Trobe, “Immigration Policy and Its Possible Effects on U.S. Agriculture,” June 5, http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2012-june/immigration-policy.aspx#.VWe_189VhBf]

The results from the increased farm labor supply scenario conform to basic economic principles when the supply of one factor or input of production--such as labor, land, or machinery--becomes more plentiful. Greater availability of temporary nonimmigrant foreign-born farmworkers leads to their increased employment at lower wages. This, in turn, results in longrun increases in agricultural output and exports, above and beyond the growth projected by the base forecast. The increases in output and exports are generally larger in labor-intensive sectors such as fruit, tree nuts, vegetables, and nursery products. By Year 15 of the scenario, these four sectors experience a 1.1- to 2.0-percent increase in output and a 1.7- to 3.2-percent increase in exports, relative to the base forecast. Less labor-intensive sectors, such as grains, oilseeds, and livestock production, tend to have smaller increases, ranging from 0.1 to 1.5 percent for output and from 0.2 to 2.6 percent for exports. Accompanying this additional growth in agricultural output and employment, however, would be a relative decrease of about 5.7 percent in the number of U.S.-born and other permanent residents employed as farmworkers and a 3.4-percent relative decrease in their wage rate. In the model, U.S.-born and foreign-born permanent resident workers are assumed to compete with foreign-born temporary nonimmigrant workers in the labor market. A 3.4-percent relative decrease in the wage rate does not mean that the wage rate is projected to fall by 3.4 percent over the 15-year period of the projection. Instead, it means that the wage rate in Year 15 is projected to be 3.4 percent lower in the increased farm labor supply scenario than in the base forecast. The longrun results from the decreased unauthorized labor supply scenario show a reduction in the labor supply to agriculture with effects on agricultural output and exports that are opposite in sign from the increased farm labor supply scenario and larger in magnitude. Fruit, tree nuts, vegetables, and nursery production are again among the most affected sectors but with longrun relative declines of 2.0 to 5.4 percent in output and 2.5 to 9.3 percent in exports. These effects tend to be smaller in other, less labor-intensive, parts of agriculture--a 1.6- to 4.9-percent decrease in output and a 0.3- to 7.4-percent decrease in exports. As part of the decreased unauthorized labor supply scenario, the number of unauthorized workers employed as farmworkers falls by between 34.1 and 38.8 percent, depending on modeling assumptions, relative to the base forecast for Year 15. At the same time, the number of farmworkers who are either U.S.-born or foreign-born, permanent residents increases by about 2.4 to 4.0 percent in the long run, compared with the base forecast, and their wage rate increases by 3.3 to 7.5 percent. However, the increased farm employment of U.S.-born and other permanent resident workers is not sufficient to offset the decrease in unauthorized farmworkers. As a result, the total number of farmworkers decreases by 3.4 to 5.5 percent. Some observers question whether a reduction in the number of unauthorized workers would benefit or harm U.S.-born and other permanent resident workers. Model results suggest that wages would rise (relative to the base forecast) in some lower paying occupations where unauthorized workers are common, decrease slightly in many higher paying occupations, and decrease on average. Several factors account for the slight decrease in earnings. First, the decrease in the supply of unauthorized labor leads to a longrun relative decrease in production, not just in agriculture but in all sectors of the economy. This, in turn, reduces incomes to many complementary factors of production, including U.S.-born and foreign-born, permanent resident workers in higher paying occupations. Second, with the departure of so many unauthorized workers, the occupational distribution of U.S.-born and other permanent resident workers necessarily shifts in the direction of more hired farm work and other lower paying occupations, such as food service, child care, and housekeeping, and away from higher paying occupations (a much larger category). The effect of this compositional change is to reduce the average real wage for U.S.-born and foreign-born, permanent resident workers in all sectors of the economy, even as real wages in many lower paying occupations rise. In the long term, overall gross national product accruing to U.S.-born and foreign-born, permanent residents would fall by about 1 percent, compared with the base forecast. This result indicates that the negative economic effects generated by the departure of a significant portion of the labor force outweigh the positive effects on the wages of U.S.-born workers and other permanent residents employed in lower paying occupations. This conclusion, however, might be different in a model that reproduced current levels of unemployment, rather than describing a longrun equilibrium in which the economy is much closer to full employment.

US economic decline causes global great power wars

Duncan ’12 [Richard Duncan, former IMF consultant, financial sector specialist for the World Bank, Chief Economist Blackhorse Asset Management, The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy, Page 12, Ebooks]

The political battle over America’s future would be bitter, and quite possibly bloody. It cannot be guaranteed that the U.S. Constitution would survive. Foreign affairs would also confront the United States with enormous challenges. During the Great Depression, the United States did not have a global empire. Now it does. The United States maintains hundreds of military bases across dozens of countries around the world. Added to this is a fleet of 11 aircraft carriers and 18 nuclear-armed submarines. The country spends more than $650 billion a year on its military. If the U.S. economy collapses into a New Great Depression, the United States could not afford to maintain its worldwide military presence or to continue in its role as global peacekeeper. Or, at least, it could not finance its military in the same way it does at present. Therefore, either the United States would have to find an alternative funding method for its global military presence or else it would have to radically scale it back. Historically, empires were financed with plunder and territorial expropriation. The estates of the vanquished ruling classes were given to the conquering generals, while the rest of the population was forced to pay imperial taxes. The U.S. model of empire has been unique. It has financed its global military presence by issuing government debt, thereby taxing future generations of Americans to pay for this generation’s global supremacy. That would no longer be possible if the economy collapsed. Cost–benefit analysis would quickly reveal that much of America’s global presence was simply no longer affordable. Many—or even most—of the outposts that did not pay for themselves would have to be abandoned. Priority would be given to those places that were of vital economic interests to the United States. The Middle East oil fields would be at the top of that list. The United States would have to maintain control over them whatever the price. In this global depression scenario, the price of oil could collapse to $3 per barrel. Oil consumption would fall by half and there would be no speculators left to manipulate prices higher. Oil at that level would impoverish the oil-producing nations, with extremely destabilizing political consequences. Maintaining control over the Middle East oil fields would become much more difficult for the United States. It would require a much larger military presence than it does now. On the one hand, it might become necessary for the United States to reinstate the draft (which would possibly meet with violent resistance from draftees, as it did during the Vietnam War). On the other hand, America’s all-volunteer army might find it had more than enough volunteers with the national unemployment rate in excess of 20 percent. The army might have to be employed to keep order at home, given that mass unemployment would inevitably lead to a sharp spike in crime. Only after the Middle East oil was secured would the country know how much more of its global military presence it could afford to maintain. If international trade had broken down, would there be any reason for the United States to keep a military presence in Asia when there was no obvious way to finance that presence? In a global depression, the United States’ allies in Asia would most likely be unwilling or unable to finance America’s military bases there or to pay for the upkeep of the U.S. Pacific fleet. Nor would the United States have the strength to force them to pay for U.S. protection. Retreat from Asia might become unavoidable. And Europe? What would a cost–benefit analysis conclude about the wisdom of the United States maintaining military bases there? What valued added does Europe provide to the United States? Necessity may mean Europe will have to defend itself. Should a New Great Depression put an end to the Pax Americana, the world would become a much more dangerous place. When the Great Depression began, Japan was the rising industrial power in Asia. It invaded Manchuria in 1931 and conquered much of the rest of Asia in the early 1940s. Would China, Asia’s new rising power, behave the same way in the event of a new global economic collapse? Possibly. China is the only nuclear power in Asia east of India (other than North Korea, which is largely a Chinese satellite state). However, in this disaster scenario, it is not certain that China would survive in its current configuration. Its economy would be in ruins. Most of its factories and banks would be closed. Unemployment could exceed 30 percent. There would most likely be starvation both in the cities and in the countryside. The Communist Party could lose its grip on power, in which case the country could break apart, as it has numerous times in the past. It was less than 100 years ago that China’s provinces, ruled by warlords, were at war with one another. United or divided, China’s nuclear arsenal would make it Asia’s undisputed superpower if the United States were to withdraw from the region. From Korea and Japan in the North to New Zealand in the South to Burma in the West, all of Asia would be at China’s mercy. And hunger among China’s population of 1.3 billion people could necessitate territorial expansion into Southeast Asia. In fact, the central government might not be able to prevent mass migration southward, even if it wanted to. In Europe, severe economic hardship would revive the centuries-old struggle between the left and the right. During the 1930s, the Fascists movement arose and imposed a police state on most of Western Europe. In the East, the Soviet Union had become a communist police state even earlier. The far right and the far left of the political spectrum converge in totalitarianism. It is difficult to judge whether Europe’s democratic institutions would hold up better this time that they did last time. England had an empire during the Great Depression. Now it only has banks. In a severe worldwide depression, the country—or, at least London—could become ungovernable. Frustration over poverty and a lack of jobs would erupt into anti-immigration riots not only in the United Kingdom but also across most of Europe. The extent to which Russia would menace its European neighbors is unclear. On the one hand, Russia would be impoverished by the collapse in oil prices and might be too preoccupied with internal unrest to threaten anyone. On the other hand, it could provoke a war with the goal of maintaining internal order through emergency wartime powers. Germany is very nearly demilitarized today when compared with the late 1930s. Lacking a nuclear deterrent of its own, it could be subject to Russian intimidation. While Germany could appeal for protection from England and France, who do have nuclear capabilities, it is uncertain that would buy Germany enough time to remilitarize before it became a victim of Eastern aggression. As for the rest of the world, its prospects in this disaster scenario can be summed up in only a couple of sentences. Global economic output could fall by as much as half, from $60 trillion to $30 trillion. Not all of the world’s seven billion people would survive in a $30 trillion global economy. Starvation would be widespread. Food riots would provoke political upheaval and myriad big and small conflicts around the world. It would be a humanitarian catastrophe so extreme as to be unimaginable for the current generation, who, at least in the industrialized world, has known only prosperity. Nor would there be reason to hope that the New Great Depression would end quickly. The Great Depression was only ended by an even more calamitous global war that killed approximately 60 million people.

Empirical studies prove economic decline causes wars

Royal ’10 [Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, 213-215, online]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

InherencyImmigration surveillance nowSurveillance of immigrants has substantially increased in recent years

Kalhan ’14 [Anil, J.D. from Yale Law School, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University. A.B., Brown University, “Immigration Surveillance,” Maryland Law Review, Volume 74, Issue 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlr]

This expansion of direct post-entry enforcement consists of several component mechanisms. First, noncitizens have been subject to more extensive, ongoing monitoring and registration requirements while in the United States. While noncitizens have long been required, as a formal matter, to register and be fingerprinted upon arrival, to carry proof of registration at all times within the United States, and to notify immigration officials promptly of changes of address, these provisions went largely unenforced for decades. 66 Even today, these registration requirements largely remain a legal fiction.67 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the government did step up both its formal and informal efforts to monitor certain categories of noncitizens within the United States.68 For example, beginning soon after the attacks, the FBI initiated a program of “voluntary” interviews for thousands of Arab and Muslim men with nonimmigrant visas.69 In early 2002, the Justice Department announced plans to aggressively enforce the change of address provision, warning of severe adverse consequences for noncompliance.70 Later in 2002, the Attorney General initiated the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”), which imposed registration requirements on nonimmigrant men who were at least sixteen years old and current or former nationals of twenty-five countries, all but one predominantly Arab or Muslim. 71 Congress and DHS also tightened oversight of international students and schools where they are enrolled to ensure compliance with the terms of student visas.72 Second, DHS has devoted substantially more resources to post-entry investigations.73 In 2002, DHS launched an initiative targeting “absconders” or “fugitives,” categories that it defines to include (1) individuals with removal orders who have not departed the United States and (2) individuals who have otherwise failed to report to ICE when required.74 Between 2003 and 2010, funding for these programs spiraled from $9 million to over $230 million, increasing the personnel devoted to these programs by more than 1300%. 75 The operations conducted under these programs have involved tactics ranging from undercover investigations to high profile, paramilitary-style home and workplace raids and blanket community sweeps in apartment complexes, grocery stores, laundromats, and parks.76 Third, federal officials have enlisted hundreds of thousands of state and local law enforcement and corrections officials in immigration policing.77 These initiatives, whose particular manifestations have evolved swiftly, seek to identify potentially deportable noncitizens by screening individuals when they are arrested, convicted, and incarcerated to determine their citizenship and immigration status and potential deportability. In addition to these federal initiatives, some states and localities unilaterally have sought to become directly involved in immigration policing. For example, several states and localities—most prominently Arizona, with its controversial and widely-noted Senate Bill 1070—have authorized or required law enforcement to inquire about the immigration status of individuals they encounter and in some instances to convey that information to federal immigration officials.78 While the Supreme Court left open the possibility of as-applied challenges to Section 2 when it reviewed SB 1070, it declined to facially invalidate the provision, and it has previously signaled its willingness to tolerate an active role for state and local police in direct immigration enforcement.79

Surveillance has drastically reduced immigration

Kalhan ’14 [Anil, J.D. from Yale Law School, Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University. A.B., Brown University, “Immigration Surveillance,” Maryland Law Review, Volume 74, Issue 1, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3646&context=mlr]

In this Article, I examine a set of important but underappreciated consequences of this entrenchment of mass immigration enforcement, tracing and analyzing the evolution of immigration governance into an enduring regime of immigration surveillance. 4 By any measure, enforcement levels have soared in recent years. Federal expenditures on border and immigration control have grown fifteen-fold since 1986 and now substantially exceed expenditures on all other federal law enforcement programs combined.5 These activities have been supplemented by a dizzying array of initiatives, often administered by state, local, and private actors, that indirectly enforce immigration law by regulating access to rights, benefits, and services—including employment, social services, driver’s licenses, transportation services, and education—based on citizenship or immigration status.6 Increasingly, immigration control objectives also are pursued using criminal prosecutions.7 These initiatives have yielded a staggering, widely noted increase in the number of noncitizens formally removed from the United States.8 Much less widely noted, however, has been the full significance of that growth—including an attendant sea change in the underlying nature of immigration regulation itself, hastened by the implementation of transformative new surveillance and dataveillance technologies. Like many other areas of contemporary governance, immigration control has rapidly become an information-centered and technology-driven enterprise. At virtually every stage of the process of migrating or traveling to, from, and within the United States, both noncitizens and U.S. citizens are now subject to collection and analysis of extensive quantities of personal information for immigration control and other purposes. This information is aggregated and stored by government agencies for long retention periods in networks of interoperable databases and shared among a variety of public and private actors, both inside and outside the United States, with little transparency, oversight, or accountability.9

ICE raids nowICE is still cracking down on immigrants

Fox 2 Now 6-17-15 [News service based in St. Louis, “Surge in ICE enforcement leads to 44 arrests in St. Louis,” http://fox2now.com/2015/06/17/surge-in-ice-enforcement-leads-to-44-arrests-in-st-louis/]

A surge in Midwest enforcement by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) led to 280 arrests, 44 in St.Louis. The initiative was conducted from May 18th to June 13th. The focus was on the arrest and removal of convicted criminal aliens. Officers worked in six states: Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Kansas and Missouri. ICE reports that 40 men and 4 women were arrested in the area. Convicted criminals were from the following countries: Mexico (33), Guatemala (4), Kenya (2), and one each from Honduras, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Spain and Vietnam.

Immigration decreasingIllegal immigration is falling now

Markon 5-27-15 [Jerry, reporter for The Washington Post, “Fewer immigrants are entering the U.S. illegally, and that’s changed the border security debate,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/flow-of-illegal-immigration-slows-as-us-mexico-border-dynamics-evolve/2015/05/27/c5caf02c-006b-11e5-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html]

As the Department of Homeland Security continues to pour money into border security, evidence is emerging that illegal immigration flows have fallen to their lowest level in at least two decades. The nation’s population of illegal immigrants, which more than tripled, to 12.2 million, between 1990 and 2007, has dropped by about 1 million, according to demographers at the Pew Research Center.

SolvencyFederal action keyThe federal government should take the lead on immigration policy- states can’t undermine the plan

Cannato ‘12 [Vincent J. Cannato is an associate professor of history at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, “Our Evolving Immigration Policy,” National Affairs Issue 13, Fall 2012, http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/our-evolving-immigration-policy]

Legitimate though these state concerns may be, however, their solution is not to be found in 50 separate immigration policies. "Arizona may have understandable frustrations with the problems caused by illegal immigration while that process [of discourse] continues," the Court declared, "but the State may not pursue policies that undermine federal law." And though the power to control immigration may not be explicitly granted to the federal government under the Constitution, it is hard to imagine a modern nation-state in the 21st century in which that power does not rest firmly in the central government's hands. Nevertheless, this still means, as the Court noted, that the federal government has a responsibility to act on immigration — to pursue reform that reflects a shared "political will," and to forge that agreement through "searching, thoughtful, rational civic discourse." The history of American immigration suggests that this agreement will be reached only when the national mood and the country's politics more broadly are ready for it — and the signs indicate that now is not that moment. But settling on a sensible immigration policy will be crucial in the coming decades. Without one, it will be impossible to maintain a high standard of living and a dynamic, entrepreneurial economy while also managing the large demographic changes that continue to remake our society. In this sense, the unproductive nature of our immigration debate may be telling us something about the state of the nation more generally. Our decaying institutions have forced us to make enormously consequential decisions about the role of our government, its relationship to the individual, and the direction of the nation. As with immigration policy, our ability to settle these broader disputes satisfactorily is an open question.

Federal action is essential to shape immigration policy- states can’t reverse it

Cannato ‘12 [Vincent J. Cannato is an associate professor of history at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, “Our Evolving Immigration Policy,” National Affairs Issue 13, Fall 2012, http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/our-evolving-immigration-policy]

For all the debate that surrounds America's immigration policy, just who is responsible for enforcing that policy has rarely been in dispute in recent decades — until Arizona adopted the statute S.B. 1070. Arguing that the federal government had proved incapable of stopping the illegal immigration wreaking havoc in the state, Arizona lawmakers took matters into their own hands, enacting legislation that used state penalties and state police to try to give meaningful force to federal laws already on the books. Washington, for its part, resisted, claiming that Arizona's approach intruded on federal prerogatives. The federal-state power struggle ultimately landed before the Supreme Court, which, amid a swirl of politicized commentary on both sides of the matter, issued its ruling in June. "The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens....The federal power to determine immigration policy is well settled," opined Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Court's majority in Arizona v. United States. In a 5-3 decision (Justice Elena Kagan recused herself), the Court struck down most of the Arizona law and limited the permissible range of state activity in the realm of immigration enforcement. To allow each of the 50 states to enact its own immigration-control laws — even if those laws did not conflict with, but instead complemented, federal law — would, in the Court's view, violate the doctrine that "the States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance." In the eyes of the Court's majority, the regulation of immigration has been so thoroughly dominated by the federal government as to leave virtually no room for action by the states. Justice Antonin Scalia disagreed, writing in his dissent that such a ruling "deprives States of what most would consider the defining characteristic of sovereignty: the power to exclude from the sovereign's territory people who have no right to be there." The majority's opinion, he contended, is supported by "neither the Constitution itself nor even any law passed by Congress." Nor is it supported by the history of immigration in the United States. As Scalia noted, "In light of the predominance of federal immigration restrictions in modern times, it is easy to lose sight of the States' traditional role in regulating immigration — and to overlook their sovereign prerogative to do so." He is correct: Federalism and immigration have interacted in complicated ways since our republic was created. In fact, until the late 19th century, immigration was an issue largely left up to individual states to regulate. A look at the history of our immigration system can therefore offer some important clarification of the dispute at the heart of Arizona v. United States. But that history also has a great deal to say about our approach to immigration policy more broadly. After all, Arizona did not resolve the much bigger dilemma facing the nation: how, exactly, we should repair a national immigration system that is quite clearly broken. Designed almost five decades ago, that system has ceased to function effectively, to suit the needs and circumstances of today's society and economy, and to retain the support of the public. It is precisely the failure of that system that has driven Arizona and other states to try to fix the problem themselves, and that has prompted lawmakers at the national level to spend the better part of the past decade in pursuit of "comprehensive immigration reform." That effort has tortured the nation's politics and stoked controversy surrounding questions of race and national identity — and yet has achieved essentially nothing. Why? Here, too, history points to the answer: Our immigration policies, and the role the federal government plays in them, tend to follow American political trends more broadly. Large reforms of immigration laws have coincided with sweeping changes in the public's expectations of the federal government — during the Progressive era, in the wake of World War I, and in the heart of the Great Society period. We may well be in the midst of such a dramatic shift in our approach to government, though it is not yet evident precisely where these changing expectations will lead. We should not be surprised, then, that our immigration debate has, to date, been similarly inconclusive.

Agriculture AdvantageFood crisis coming

https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/global-food-crisis

http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/education/scientists-at-msu-warn-of-global-food-crisis/article_365f69c1-df5c-52af-b084-cfe5a23f3f0b.html

http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/blog-entry/new-project-announced-global-food-security-numbers

http://blueandgreentomorrow.com/2014/08/28/climate-change-will-trigger-global-food-crisis-says-world-bank-official/

http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1096&context=jlia

http://theplate.nationalgeographic.com/2015/04/16/while-u-s-economy-improves-food-insecurity-lingers/

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFQQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcsis.org%2Fprogram%2Ffood&ei=JCBqVaqgGIzEogS7uoKADg&usg=AFQjCNH3G9_3Ezpn2W7rBROQZ4fIYGz0nQ&sig2=R1e1uOxuz_S8Oi-PKtg6sA

http://csis.org/program/food

US key

http://www.foodandagpolicy.org/sites/default/files/AGree%20Intl%20Devl_2014.pdf

http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err-economic-research-report/err174.aspx

Alt causes

http://www.trust.org/spotlight/what-creates-food-crises/

Nuke war turns food security

http://www.app.com/story/enviroguy/2015/03/26/nuclear-war-could-ignite-global-food-crisis/70482928/

Farms declining nowWorker shortages are threatening US food security- immigration is key

Ahrens 4-5-15 [Daniel, Berkeley Political review, “An Agri-Culture of Settlement,” http://bpr.berkeley.edu/2015/04/05/an-agri-culture-of-settlement/]

Increasingly serious labor shortages are putting America’s conveniently low food prices at risk. Yet, Obama’s recent executive action on immigration does little to assuage the agricultural labor crisis and could possibly exacerbate the shortage. The shortage problem is challenging the agriculture industry to adapt and may lead to the establishment of a more efficient food system. According to a report by the National Council for Agricultural Employers, a group that represents the agriculture industry before Congress, farmers are losing 320 million dollars a year due to labor shortages. The shortage has left agriculture unpicked on branches, and fields neglected. While the government does not collect data on labor shortage costs due to the subjective nature of the measurement, the industry’s conclusions are backed up by other statistics. First, real wages are rising for agriculture workers, signifying a greater need for work. The National Agricultural Statistics Services’s Farm Labor Survey finds that real wages are on the rise at a rate of 0.8% per year. Second, the average age of the workforce is growing, suggesting fewer younger workers are entering the agricultural industry. A 2012 agricultural census from the US Department of Agriculture found that the average age of principal farmers was 58.3, up 1.2 years from 2007, and is still on the rise. Fewer workers are entering agriculture, and America’s food supply is suffering as a result. A quick glance at the US Department of Labor’s National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) finds that 75% of farm laborers were born in Mexico. Yet, immigration from Mexico fell from its peak of approximately 7 million immigrants living in the United States in 2009 to 5.8 million in 2012. Many attribute the labor shortage in agriculture to the decline in immigration from Mexico.

US agriculture is declining- profits are low

Bjerga 2-9-15 [Alan, writer for Bloomberg Business, “U.S. Farmers Watch $100 Billion-a-Year Profit Fade Away,” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-10/u-s-farmers-watch-100-billion-a-year-profit-fade-away]

Farm income this year in the U.S., the world’s top agricultural producer and exporter, is heading for a third straight decline and will post its biggest slide since the Great Depression, the government said today. While raising livestock remains profitable, as tight meat supplies keep prices high, growers of corn, soybeans and wheat saw crop and land values fall faster than many of their costs. That’s pinching sales for equipment maker Deere & Co. and seed producers including DuPont Co. “The budget picture for corn and soybeans is as negative as we’ve seen in a long time,” said Brent Gloy, an agricultural economist at Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana. “You will see some farmers not able to cover their production costs.” USDA Forecast Net-cash income from all farm activity will tumble 22 percent to $89.4 billion, the biggest drop since 1932 and the lowest since 2009, the U.S. Department of Agriculture said in a report today in Washington. Last year’s slump was 12 percent to $115.1 billion. Net income, including the value of inventory and non-cash income, was forecast to drop 32 percent to $73.6 billion, with expenses at a record $370.4 billion, the government said.

Surveillance hurts agricultureSurveillance cuts off ag labor supplies and exports- boosts commodity prices

Devadoss and Luckstead ’11 [Stephen Devadoss, PhD in Economics from Iowa State University, is a professor at the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology at the University of Idaho, Jeff Luckstead, PhD in economics from Washington State, is an Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness at the University of Arkansas, “Implications of immigration policies for the U.S. farm sector and workforce,” 7-1-11, http://www.freepatentsonline.com/article/Economic-Inquiry/261386342.html]

To examine the effect of an increase in the domestic enforcement in the United States on the illegal labor flow, d[W.sub.I] and d[P.sub.U] from Equations (11a) and (11b) are substituted into Equation (13a). Holding all other exogenous variables, except for domestic enforcement, constant in Equation (13a), the change in illegal labor flow in response to tighter domestic control is stated as: (14a) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] The first set of terms shows the wage effect. Because tighter domestic control is likely to reduce the illegal wage rate, the unauthorized entry will contract. The second set of terms demonstrates the price effect. Increased domestic enforcement will make production more expensive, leading to a higher commodity price and increased demand for labor. The net effect of domestic enforcement is to reduce the cross-border migration because the wage effect is likely to dominate the price effect. To study the effect of an increase in the domestic enforcement on commodity trade, d[W.sub.I] and d[P.sub.U] from Equations (11a) and (11b) are substituted into Equation (13b). Holding all other exogenous variables, except for domestic enforcement, constant in Equation (13b), the change in U.S. exports to Mexico is expressed as: (14b) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] The first set of terms illustrates the wage effect. Tighter domestic surveillance forces undocumented workers to return to Mexico, which will increase the Mexican workforce and reduce the Mexican wage rate. This lower wage rate will increase Mexican commodity production, leading to lower imports. The second set of terms demonstrates the price effect. Increased domestic enforcement will cause the U.S. wage rate to rise and make production more expensive, leading to a lower U.S. commodity supply. This will result in a higher commodity price and lower imports by Mexico. Thus, both effects reinforce each other in reducing U.S. exports to Mexico. To analyze the effect of heightened U.S. border enforcement on the illegal labor flow, d[W.sub.I] and d[P.sub.U] from Equations (12a) and (12b) are substituted into Equation (13a). Holding all other exogenous variables, except for border security, constant in Equation (13a), the change in illegal labor flow in response to a change in border control is written as: (15a) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] In Equation (15a), the first set of terms shows the wage effect. Strengthened border surveillance reduces the illegal entry and thus raises the illegal wage rate. Even though immigrants apprehended at the border are sent back to Mexico, the higher illegal wage rate in the United States lures them to cross the border repeatedly. The second set of terms illustrates the price effect. As the United States implements additional measures to secure its borders, fewer illegal workers enter the United States, causing the cost of production and commodity price to rise. This also results in a higher Mexican commodity price. The higher Mexican price draws would be immigrant laborers back into Mexican production, which contracts the illegal labor supply. The third set of terms represents the direct effect of an increase in U.S. border security on the illegal labor supply. As a result of the tightened border control, fewer laborers successfully cross the U.S. border, which reduces the supply of unauthorized labor. The combined effect of the three terms should result in fewer illegal laborers entering the U.S. labor market from Mexico. To examine the effect of he