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From Government to Governance? Politics ofPlanning in the First Decade of the Hong Kong SpecialAdministrative RegionMEE KAM NG aa Centre of Urban Planning and Environmental Management, The University of Hong Kong ,Hong KongPublished online: 19 Dec 2008.

To cite this article: MEE KAM NG (2008) From Government to Governance? Politics of Planning in the First Decade of the HongKong Special Administrative Region, Planning Theory & Practice, 9:2, 165-185, DOI: 10.1080/14649350802041480

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From Government to Governance?Politics of Planning in the FirstDecade of the Hong Kong SpecialAdministrative RegionMEE KAM NG

Centre of Urban Planning and Environmental Management, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

ABSTRACT This paper investigates when and why a civil society will challenge growth-biasedplans, made by a top-down mode of planning within the non-democratic setting of an executivegovernment-led and economics-first society. In the controversies surrounding the Government’splans to further the filling in of the beautiful Victoria Harbour to produce land for “development” inthe first decade of the post-colonial Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR),participatory and multi-stakeholder-centred planning practices emerged when many interestedparties were dissatisfied with the official reclamation plan. Using the Protection of the HarbourOrdinance, an anti-reclamation civil society organization managed to take the government to courtand successfully stop further harbour reclamation, forcing government officials to heed alternativeviews on harbourfront planning, and to pay attention to non-government professionals ready to usetheir skills to serve the growing civil society. However, despite this early success, the progress of thecase so far suggests that participation remains tokenistic, producing minimal fundamentalinstitutional changes. Hence, professionals within and outside the government continue to face aninterrelated, two-pronged challenge: how to further empower lay citizens as they seek new ways toinstitutionalize a more participatory mode of planning governance.

Keywords: Governance; lived experiences; reclamation; non-democratic setting; civil society; role of planners

Introduction

As a former British colony, now under the ingenious “one country, two systems”arrangement of the People’s Republic of China, the Hong Kong Special AdministrativeRegion (HKSAR) continues to be a non-democratic, administrative city helmed by an“executive-led” government. The mini-constitution of the city, known as the Basic Law,has promised “no changes for 50 years”. Yet this “no changes” policy needs to beunderstood in the context of “one country, two systems” as reiterated at the SAR’s tenthanniversary by the Chairman of the National People’s Congress, Wu Bangguo: “Howevermuch power the central government decides to assign to the Special AdministrativeRegion (SAR), this is what the SAR gets. There does not exist the question of ‘residualpower’ ” (Li, 2007, EDT2). On 6 June 2008, Mr Wu further reminded the audience at a Basic

Correspondence Address: Mee Kam Ng, BA, MSc(Urban Planning), PhD, MHKIP, MRTPI, Centre of Urban Planning and

Environmental Management, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong SAR, China. Tel: (852) 2859-2276. Fax: (852) 2559-0468. Email: meekng@hku.hk

Planning Theory & Practice, Vol. 9, No. 2, 165–185, June 2008

1464-9357 Print/1470-000X On-line/08/020165-21 q 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14649350802041480

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Law forum in Beijing that the SAR’s “Chief Executive [who also attended the Forum]should play a dominant role in a political system that should not be a copy of the westernmodel of separation of powers between the branches of government” (Li, 2007, EDT2, myemphasis). Hong Kong’s political ecology has evolved a lot since its return to Chinesesovereign rule on 1 July 1997, especially after half a million people took to the streets on 1July 2003 in protest against the unpopular national security law required by Article 23 ofthe Basic Law.1 This historic march, occurring after an eventful spring when Hong Kongwas attacked by SARS virus, brought down not only the Secretaries for Health andSecurity but also, eventually, the first Chief Executive. Since then, the communities inHong Kong seem to have determined to part ways with an apathetic political cultureassociated with the colonial past and aspired to have a say in the city’s future. Smallwonder, then, that polling of people’s confidence in the “one country, two systems”principle dived 5% after Wu reminded the SAR that the source of its power could onlycome from the central government (Wong, 2007, EDT3).

The context of Hong Kong under an executive-led government, experiencing theconstraints imposed by the “one country, two systems” principle, provides an excitinglaboratory in which to understand the possible role of planning in a tug-of-war between thestate and a growing civil society. While the state seeks to maintain the existing mode ofgovernance, favouring the production of growth-orientated spatial plans, civil societyseeks to challenge that model of governance, seeking alternative methodologies forplanning. This conflict raises crucial questions that are to some extent applicable toplanners everywhere. Is planning necessarily a mere tool of the state to govern and toproduce the necessary economic spaces? Can urban planning also acknowledge the livedexperiences of different stakeholders and empower a diversified citizenry who has no rightto universal suffrage? By examining the controversies surrounding harbour reclamationplans in Hong Kong, this paper documents the struggle of civil society to counteract plansmade by the government in a non-democratic setting. In the process, it asks what role amore participatory planning process might play in transforming the relationships betweenthe state and civil society when formulating spatial development, and what positionprofessionals working on the built-environment can take in relation to that process.

This paper is made up of five sections. The second section charts an exploratory journeythrough existing literature to understand when and why civil society would challenge aspatial plan formulated via a government-dominated mode of governance. It investigatesthe possible roles participatory urban planning practices and professionals can play in theprocess, and the possible outcomes that can arise. The following section outlines theinstitutional and political setting of Hong Kong, followed by a description of the city’stop–down mode of urban planning, looking at how the system perpetuates certain“myths as truths and knowledge”, that is, elevating certain institutionalized practices asabsolute “truths”, in the development of the economics-first city.2 Section four reviews thehistory of reclamation in the city, showing that it has been a major and widely acceptedmeans to accommodate urban growth since the mid nineteenth century. However, beforethe mid 1990s, arguments over reclamation projects were usually confined to thegovernment, waterfront land owners and related business interests. The growth andmaturing of the civil society after the return of the city to Chinese rule has meant that thetop-down planning mode has been challenged for the first time by an increasingly vocalcommunity, who are demanding a voice in (re)-shaping their beloved but often segregatedand segmented harbourfront, which is currently largely inaccessible for people’senjoyment. The controversial case of the Victoria Harbour Reclamation, the anti-reclamation campaigns mounted on behalf of the civil society, and the government’s

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successes and failures in engaging the communities in different harbourfront planningand design exercises are examined in detail to understand the utility and limitations ofparticipatory urban planning in an executive government-led polity. Finally, section fivehighlights the constellation of factors that have triggered the civil society’s attempts tochallenge the government’s growth-orientated plan and reviews how successful theseattempts have been in terms of ensuring the inclusion in the plans of the lived experienceand aspirations of different stakeholders.

Theoretical Exploration: State–Civil Society Transition and Roles of Urban Planning

One afternoon, a decade before the 1997 handover when I was still a planning student,I joined my professors in attending a meeting organized by government planners tounveil the city’s Territorial Development Strategy. I was excited to learn about theirintention to relocate the international airport from a densely populated urbanneighbourhood in the heart of the city and their plans to undertake massive reclamationaround the harbour, redirecting growth and development from new towns in the NewTerritories to the city centre.3 The professors raised some questions, but no one in themeeting questioned why the government did not consult the public in the planningprocess, nor raised any doubts about the extent of the Victoria Harbour project.Consultation seemed to be an alien concept in the planning process of Hong Kong.However, in 1997, just ten years later, a private member’s bill was enacted in theLegislative Council to save the beautiful Victoria Harbour from becoming a river, if nota nullah. This was the now-famous Protection of the Harbour Ordinance, whosepassage helped to inspire a generation of civil activists to advocate for the conservationof environmental and social heritage in the city. Today, a decade after the 1997handover, social activism in planning-related issues abounds and people havechallenged the rationale and logic of the government’s various planning efforts onmany fronts. What has triggered this phenomenal change?

In the western world, economic and political restructuring unleashed by intensifiedglobalization has moved many developed places towards a mode of governance beyonda system dominated by government, though at varying paces (Jessop, 1997; Lambert &Oatley, 2002, p. 126; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 2000). This can be seen in a shift in policymaking and implementation away from top-down government-led modes towardsnetworks of cross-sectoral partnerships, characterized by shared power. As defined byStoker (2000, p. 3), “governance involves working across boundaries within the publicsector or between the public sector and private or voluntary sectors. It focuses attentionon a set of actors that are drawn from but also beyond the formal institutions ofgovernment. A key concern is processes of networking and partnership.” However, thereseems to be a dearth of literature on identifying the factors that have contributed totransforming the modes of governance in Asian cities (Devas & Delay, 2006; Ng, 2005a).One exception, perhaps, is the work of Amirahmadi and Gladstone (1996). Addressingthe unique situations of a developing country, they postulate a three-stage developmentprocess: a period of state-led growth with a strong developmental state and a weak civilsociety, followed by a transitional period when civil society becomes more powerful andenters into conflict with the state; and finally, a third period with two possible outcomes,either paralysed development caused by a dominating state or an overly strong civilsociety, or a sustained development constituted by a stable balance of power between thestate and civil society. The critical point is the “key point of transition” (Amirahmadi &Gladstone, 1996, p. 23), an historical juncture when planners should take a more active

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role in facilitating social changes, leading to a balance of power between the state and thecivil society.

How can planners identify the key point of transition? Henri Lefebvre’s theory of “theproduction of space” may provide some hints. To him, “each mode of production has its ownparticular space” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 46). Spatial practices unique to a specific mode ofproduction are often constructed as “codes”, “knowledge” or even “institutions” to justifyspatial reproduction (p. 47). To rely too much on these codes and institutionalized knowledgeto formulate plans that facilitate a particular mode of production, however, is to invitecatastrophe (p. 415) especially when the plans (the conceived spaces) are divorced from thelived experience of the people. Hence, “the production of space—has nothing incidentalabout it: it is a matter of life and death” (p. 417). Any “revolution of space”, Lefebvre argues,requires “an active and massive intervention on the part of the ‘interested parties’ ” (p. 419)and their “great inventiveness and creativity.” These can only be unleashed throughinteraction between plans made by the authorities and counter-plans made by interestedparties, the result of which can be seen “as a gauge of ‘real’ democracy” (p. 420). In otherwords, the key point of transition identified by Amirahmadi and Gladstone (1996) willprobably not take place unless the state and the civil society develop a dialectic relationship,characterized by a grave mismatch between plans conceived by the government and whatLefebvre called the actual lived experiences of the interested parties. However, what kinds ofrelationships could the state and civil society develop as they compete and cooperate torestructure space? And what roles can the planning profession play in this course ofdevelopment?

Perhaps we can find some clues in Sherry Arnstein’s 1969 seminal paper, “A Ladder ofCitizen Participation”. To Arnstein, “citizen participation . . . is . . . for citizen power. It isthe redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded fromthe political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is thestrategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals andpolicies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated, and benefits likecontracts and patronage are parceled out” (1969, p. 216). However, Arnstein discoversthat some types of participation are unhelpful, for instance a kind of “non-participation . . .to substitute for genuine participation. Their [the powerholders’] real objective is not toenable people to participate in planning or conducting programs, but to enablepowerholders to ‘educate’ or ‘cure’ the participants . . . [a process characterized by] levelsof ‘tokenism’ that allow the have-nots to hear and to have a voice . . . But under theseconditions they lack the power to ensure that their views will be heeded by the powerful.When participation is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-through, no ‘muscle,’hence no assurance of changing the status quo . . . Further up the ladder are levels of‘citizen power’ with increasing degrees of decision-making clout” (p. 218, my emphases).However, as Arnstein admits, the model does not account for the existence of differentlevels of participation such as “resistance to power redistribution” by the power holdersor a lack of capacity of the less knowledgeable citizen groups to realize people power inthe participatory process (p. 218). This last point, also raised by Amirahmadi andGladstone, suggests that planners may have an important role to play at the key point oftransition.

Less knowledgeable citizen groups not only lack the capacity to participate, they maynot even appreciate the existence of “truth politics” in the planning process. Gunder,synthesizing various authors (Bourdieu, 1998, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 1998a, 1998b; Foucault,1980, 1982, 2002; Hillier, 2002) asserts that, “Subtle and overt power asymmetries negatethe potential for democratic equality in public debate and participatory decision-making.

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This is a consequence of inequalities in cultural and financial capital distribution for theparticipants; ideological distortions, or power, which constitutes any and all ‘sociallyconstructed truths’ within debate” (Gunder, 2003, p. 240). As pointed out by McGuirk,“power takes effect through the ability to define what is accepted as knowledge, and isaccorded the authoritative status of truth. The production of knowledge is therefore aneffect of the exercise of power” (McGuirk, 2001, p. 207). What roles can planners assume inthis game of truth politics?

Forester (1999), a pioneering advocate of “planning in the face of power” forcefullyargues that “when value is at stake, argument and evidence matter, and norms of enquirytoo can be criticized” (p. 177). Similarly, Healey suggests that in a planning process“multiple rationalities” exist, each of which is “infused with particular power relationsand potential capacities to mobilise others” (Healey, 2000, p. 919). As a result, it is criticalfor planners to play active “roles in urban governance contexts, and [be] involved in thediscussion, design and management of specific actions, grasping the fine grain of theinteractive dynamics of situational specifics and broader dynamics” with a view toenhancing social justice (Healey, 2003, p. 116). In other words, planners should counteractconceived plans formulated to benefit a unique power structure through instituting aparticipatory planning process that enables various stakeholders to identify thedifferential and unjust impacts the conceived plan may have on their actual livedexperiences. As argued by Lefebvre, an active and massive intervention on the part of theinterested parties is necessary to formulate plans with great inventiveness and creativitynurtured by the rich lived experiences of the participants (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 419).

Top-Down Planning Processes and Myths as Truths in an Economics FirstNon-Democratic City

Although Hong Kong became a British colony in 1842, the growth of the city did not startuntil after 1949, when the People’s Republic of China was established. A society ofrefugees fleeing from a communist regime to the area under colonial administrationproduced a struggling population determined to survive against all odds. “The purpose ofHong Kong [was] to make money” (Rabushka, 1979), and it was “a monument to thedominance of [private] interests, and a result of the unwillingness or inability of thegovernment to alter or amend that development process” (Bristow, 1984, p. 58).Nowadays, the government is not only reluctant to change the situation, as argued by Ngand Cook (1997, p. 5), but actually has vested interests in this development process: “thegovernment of Hong Kong has a dual role as the biggest landlord and as an administratorwhich determines the development agenda in the executive-led polity in theterritory . . .Government has relied heavily on land sales as a major source of revenue.”In fact, “this vested interest of the government in land-related development has led to anemphasis on ‘economic space’ rather than ‘life space’4 in land use planning in Hong Kong”(Ng, 2005b, p. 123). Yet the government’s vested interests in land-related developmentsare not apparent because of its rhetorical advocacy of a “minimum intervention andmaximum support” or in recent years “market leads and government facilitates”economic policy (Tang, 2007). And since the government is not constituted by democraticvotes, the administration has considerable autonomous power to run the city as it sees fit.

Ng (2007) argues that this power setting has cultivated a few interrelated “myths as truths”in the planning and development context of Hong Kong. In the name of upholding freemarket operations, the government has refrained from producing macro-socio-economicplans. The absence of an overall development strategy perpetuates the compartmentalization

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and contradictions among various departments in the bureaucracy. The case is worsened bythe fact that Hong Kong is a society ruled by laws. The existence of different ordinances tosupport the detailed operations of specific policy areas easily gives an impression that theexecutive-led, top-down administration must be impartial and fair in planning the city.However, behind this facade of “market leads and government facilitates” is a governmentwith substantial discretionary power vested in law to manipulate the strategic growthdirections of the city. The legal system has legitimized a set of planning and developmentprocesses that deny citizens a right to participate and confine decision-making power to aprivileged few at the apex of the power structure. One may even argue that the process oftenobscures obvious and visible social and environmental aspects of development, renderingthem invisible, in favour of an emphasis on “making a few dollars more” by the private orquasi-private sectors, as well as the government (Ng, 2007). For instance, planning is done atthree levels in Hong Kong: the territorial, sub-regional and district (which is further dividedinto another three layers). However, only the outline zoning plans, or the developmentpermission area plans at the first layer of the district level plans, are statutory plans madeaccording to the Town Planning Ordinance (TPO) (Department of Justice, 2005). The higherlevel strategic plans and the lower level detailed plans are arrived at administratively.Although in theory the statutory planning process (both in terms of plan making anddevelopment control) is stipulated in the short, 28-section TPO, in actuality, people have littleright to participate in plan making before the outline zoning plan is ready for gazetting, andalready possesses the endorsement of all government departments and the governmentappointed Town Planning Board (TPB). Although the TPO stipulated the formation of a TPBto formulate plans and adjudicate development applications, the real planning policy makingbody is the Land Development Planning Committee within the government. In fact,according to Section 12 of the TPO:

(1) The Chief Executive in Council may—(Amended 62 of 2000 s. 3)

(1.1) revoke in whole or in part any approved plan; or(1.2) refer any approved plan to the Board for—

(1.2.1) replacement by a new plan, or(1.2.2) amendment (Department of Justice, 2005).

In other words, the Chief Executive and the appointed highest policy-making ExecutiveCouncil have the ultimate power in urban planning. Since the Planning Department isbasically an administrative department which commissions actual planning tasks fromoutside consultants, there is no section within it that deals with urban planning issues at thecommunity level. In other words, Hong Kong government knows no community planningand plans are often made according to the Planning Standards and Guidelines (establishedcodes and knowledge) rather than the researched needs and the lived experiences of acommunity. Hence, community-based socio-economic or environmental concerns areseldom known to the “armchair” plan makers. In the context of economic depressionstriggered by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the accelerated and intensified economiccompetition from neighbouring Chinese cities in recent years, the administration seldomneeds to apologize for continuing with this biased planning process because social, culturaland environmental considerations are often presented as impediments to “progress” and“development” and are therefore trivialized if not neglected in the planning anddevelopment process. The controversy of harbour reclamation and harbourfront planningis a case in point.

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Harbour Reclamation

Reclamation Practices: A Major Strategy by the Government to Accommodate Urban Growth

As shown in Figure 1, reclamation has a long history on the rugged terrain of Hong Kong.The process probably began when British troops first landed at Possession Point near theCentral District, and began to dump soil and rocks from road constructions into VictoriaHarbour (Ng & Chan, 2005, p. 146). In fact, almost the whole of the current CentralBusiness District (CBD) was built on reclaimed land, though a review of its history showsthat reclamation has been controversial from the beginning, stimulating opposition fromthe point that Hong Kong first became a British colony. The first Governor, Sir HenryPottinger, proclaimed in 1842 that all reclaimed land along the Praya [waterfront] wascrown land (Ho, 2004, p. 51), but the colonial government failed to keep track ofreclamation works done by marine land owners and by 1855 it was alleged that “some298,685 square feet of land had been reclaimed illegally” (Davis, 1949, cited in Ng & Chan,2005, p. 146). In 1856, Governor John Bowring initiated a Praya Scheme from Central toEast Point but met with fierce resistance from harbourfront landowners and merchants,which led to its suspension for 40 years despite renewed efforts by later Governors (SCMP,1982, p. 9). Then, in 1867, the government took the crown lessees to court to recover repaircosts of the Central Praya Scheme, an incident which indicated the scantiness of theresources possessed by the colonial government for building the City of Victoria.However, the waterfront landlords managed to win the case at the Supreme Court whichruled that in order to protect private property rights, the Government was not allowed toreclaim land in front of marine lots (Ng & Chan, 2005, p. 146).

Figure 1. Reclamation in Victoria Harbour (not to scale). Source: Lee & Ng (2007), p. 310.

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Under the pressures of growing population (population in 1881 was 160,402, and by1904 it was 377,850) and rising demand for land and housing, the Praya ReclamationScheme was revived by a private businessman, Paul Chater, in 1886. Chater even bypassedthe Hong Kong Governor and travelled to London to “conclude negotiations with theColonial Office” for a scheme that would guarantee financial benefits to the government atno cost. Lot owners could acquire reclaimed land with a lease of 999 years when theyhelped to fund the cost of the scheme, though they still had to pay an additional Crownrent at $200 per quarter acre (Stoner, 1989). The project was not completed until 1904. Thesuccess of the scheme firmly established the mutually beneficial relationship between landdevelopers and the government in producing land through reclamation.

With the influx of refugees and capital after the establishment of communist China in1949, Hong Kong underwent a transferred industrialization process, leading to increaseddemand for land. In the ensuing years, reclamation has become a dominant strategy toaccommodate urban growth, from Central Harbour areas to the coastal zones of the ruralNew Territories where more than 30 km2 of land had been reclaimed in the post-WWIIdecades for new town development (Ng & Cook, 1997, p. 8). However, globalization,rising production costs and the adoption of the open door policy by socialist China sincelate 1978 have led to an intense economic restructuring process in Hong Kong, requiringgrowth in central areas to facilitate the tertiarization of the economy. After the decision toremove the centrally located Kai Tak International Airport to the outlying Lantau Island, amove made possible by massive reclamation to accommodate the mega-multi-modaltransport infrastructure, the government announced in 1994 that another 23 km2 wouldbe reclaimed, of which 12.8 km2 would be in the metropolitan area (PELB, 1995). Tounderstand the scale of this figure, it is important to recognize that it is equivalent to 150years of Central Harbour reclamation (GISD, 2005), and that the territory’s totalcommercial land area is only 3 km2 (GISD, 2005). Adding 12.8 km2 to the Harbour area iscertainly not insignificant, therefore.

However, this ambitious reclamation project has not been welcomed by everyone. Thistime, resistance has not just come from the groups in the private sector that have vestedinterests at the harbourfront but also from a growing civil society. Citizens have expressedconcerns that further narrowing the beautiful Victoria Harbour would turn it into a riveror just “open water”. To many Hong Kongers, “Victoria Harbour is the source ofnourishment, a place for peace of mind and an everlasting part of our memory fromgenerations to generations” (Ng & Chan, 2005, p. 177). Since many Hong Kongers regardthe beautiful Harbour as “the symbol of Hong Kong, representing its citizens and love”(p. 179), they are stirred and upset by the prospect that the government’s reclamationplans might turn more of the Central Harbour area into land packed with skyscrapers.

Civil Society Challenging Government’s Statutory Reclamation Plans

In the early 1990s, the government announced a five-phase reclamation strategy in theCentral Harbour to connect the new airport back to the main urban areas. The aim was alsoto provide land for future projects: the Hong Kong Station of the Airport Railway, theextended overrun tunnel of the Airport Railway, the Central–Wan Chai Bypass and IslandEastern Corridor Link, the future Shatin to Central Link, and the future north Hong KongIsland line. Additionally, the construction of a world-class waterfront promenade wasplanned, as was the improvement of the environment in adjoining crowded districts byproviding new open space on the new reclamation, integrating the development with theexisting area (Figure 2) (CEDD, 2007). Strangely enough, land to accommodate commercial

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development was not mentioned, but the Central Reclamation Phase I alone has housedthe two International Financial Centres and the Four Seasons Hotel on top of theHong Kong Airport Railway Station. The Central Reclamation Phase III provides another0.86 million m2 of gross floor area (Expert Panel, 2005) for commercial use.

Between 1993 and 1998, three phases of the reclamation were carried out but theremaining two phases (Central Reclamation Phase III and Wan Chai Reclamation Phase II)have caused a lot of controversy and debate.

As Central Harbour reclamation proceeded, the Society for the Protection of theHarbour (SPH) Limited was set up. Launched in November 1995, it conducted a “Save ourHarbour” campaign in 1996, receiving 170,000 supporting signatures from the public.5 Inthe same year, the chairman (a solicitor) and vice chairman (then a legislative councilmember) drafted the Protection of the Harbour Bill, which the vice chairman, ChristineLoh, managed to pass in Legislative Council in June 1997 as a private member’s bill. Thispiece of legislation restricted reclamation in the central part of Victoria Harbour, that is,from Central to North Point.6 An April 1997 survey commissioned by the Society forProtection of the Harbour suggested that the group’s aims appeal to many Hong Kongers,revealing that 69% of interviewees were against further reclamation in Victoria Harbour(Chung, 1997). This suggests a major rift between the reclamation plans and theaspirations of the citizens.

As a result, when the government gazetted statutory plans for the remainingreclamation projects (one in Central in 1998 and one in Wan Chai, an area next to the CBD,in 2002) in a process stipulated by the TPO, they received many complaints from greengroups and the general public. A total of 70 objections were noted to the CentralReclamation Phase III project and, after rounds of negotiations with the objectors, thegovernment agreed to reduce the scale of reclamation from 38 hectares to 18 hectares.

Figure 2. The Five Phases of Central and Wan Chai Reclamation. Source: Author. Hong Kong outlinemap: http://worldmapsonline.com/images/OutlineMaps/Hong%20Kong.jpg, accessed 13 January

2008; base photo: image@2008 Digital Globe, Google Earth, accessed 13 January 2008.

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The revised plan was approved by the Chief Executive in Council in 2000 while theFinance Committee of the Legislative Council approved funding for the detailed design inthe same year. It had a smooth passage through all of the statutory procedures andcontracts were tendered so that work could start in 2003 (Ng, 2005a).

By contrast, the last phase of the five-stage reclamation plan (Wan Chai ReclamationPhase II) caused much conflict. It proposed a reclamation area of 26 hectares, including a2-hectare Harbour Park which aims to bring people to the Harbour. However, the TownPlanning Board received a total of 778 objections, most questioning the scale of thereclamation and the necessity of the Harbour Park. The Board decided to revise the planbut determined to retain the controversial park and in response, SPH initiated a judicialreview against this decision. In July 2003, the High Court ruled that the TPB had failed tocomply with section 3 of the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance, stressing that everyreclamation project should be compatible with the principles of “compelling overridingand present need, no viable alternative and minimum impairment” (Chu, 2003, paragraph95). The TPB lodged an appeal against the judgement, seeking clarification from the Courtof Final Appeal about the legal principles behind the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance.In January 2004 the Court of Final Appeal rejected the TPB’s appeal, stating definitivelythat reclamation could not be justified unless it served an overriding public need,establishing the need to show compelling and present demand along with pressingeconomic, environmental and social needs (Hong Kong High Court, 2004). With thissuccess, SPH applied for another judicial review of the Central Reclamation Phase III, butwas refused by the Court in March 2004.

With the legal issues settled, the government has had to redraw a number of planswhich involve reclamation along the harbourfront. Instead of returning the statutory plansto the TPB for revision, the government decided to set up a higher level advisorycommittee to advise the making of future harbour plans. This led to the birth of theHarbourfront Enhancement Committee (HEC) in May 2004.

Harbourfront Enhancement Committee: Successful (Tokenistic) Engagement?

The government heeded the demands of civil society, and erased the word “advisory”from the name of its new committee. Invited organizations, including the SPH, wereallowed to nominate representatives, rather than appointments being made directly by thegovernment. However, despite these innovations, the nature of the HEC is not verydifferent from its counterparts in other policy areas. It has one major task: to advise thegovernment on how to engage the public in planning the harbourfront.7 In terms ofmembership, it is constituted from government officials, private sector organizations andmany active participants in civil society organizations concerned with issues surroundingharbour reclamation. The Committee agreed that HEC meetings should be open to thegeneral public and all its documents made available via its official website.

While it was obvious then that the government’s original plans had been discredited,it was unclear exactly what should replace them. Social activists and professionalssitting on the HEC pointed out that the planning process in Hong Kong was flawed,arguing against its top-down emphasis and expressing concern about bias towardsinfrastructure-led development. Through their efforts, the HEC introduced aninnovative series of planning practices not formerly pursued in the public sector.Three sub-committees were formed in the first term of the HEC: a sub-committee onWan Chai Development Phase II Review, a sub-committee on South East KowloonDevelopment Review and a sub-committee on Harbour Plan Review which eventually

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produced a set of Harbour Planning Principles and Guidelines. In re-planning the WanChai reclamation project, the HEC managed to convince the engineers who wereleading the project in the Civil Engineering Development Department that anenvisioning stage should be included in the process—a bold and uncertain step for agroup whose main concern was to make sure that the road infrastructure would be inplace. At this envisioning stage, the HEC invited many collaborators from civiliansociety and the academic world to join the project, who helped to ensure thatsustainable development principles were produced for evaluating options that would begenerated at a later stage. Enthusiasm was rekindled by the tripartitepartnership structure, and many members of the HEC invested a considerable amountof their time in helping the government to push through a plan which they hopedwould really meet the public’s aspirations for a new, vibrant and accessible waterfront.Now through the envisioning and realization stages, the plan is currently at the detailedplanning stage, with the formal planning authority, the TPB, in control.

Another sub-committee was set up under the HEC to replan the old Kai TakInternational Airport site. This group had four guiding principles: it advocated zero-reclamation, it espoused multidisciplinary efforts, it encouraged public participation andit supported scheme robustness (Planning Department, 2005). The group’s review wentthrough three stages of public engagement, firstly, to determine the visions and key issuesfor Kai Tak, secondly to develop options within the Outline Concept Plan with “noreclamation” as a starting point, and finally to develop the Preliminary OutlineDevelopment Plan (PODD) (HEC, 2007a). The PODD was eventually adopted by theTown Planning Board, and the gazetted plan was approved in 2007. The HEC-drivenplanning process has even won an award given by Hong Kong Institute of Planners in2007 to recognize its innovative participatory planning process.

Central Reclamation Phase III: Non-participation?

However, while the government has fully engaged with the HEC in re-planning Wan ChaiReclamation Phase II and the Kai Tak old airport site, it has refused to open the court-endorsed Central Reclamation Phase III project for participatory planning and design,despite repeated suggestions made by HEC members. One can understand why thegovernment is adamant against this—with 0.86 million m2 of gross commercial floor spacesoon to be operational on the reclaimed site in the heart of the central business district, itneeds to ensure the timely provision of the additional transport infrastructure. Althoughthe statutory plan of the Central Harbour reclamation consists of quite a few so-called“comprehensive development areas” which are still open to various planning and designconsiderations, the government has fiercely guarded its sole control over the planning anddesign of this site. Hence, unlike the controversial Wan Chai harbourfront reclamation, thegeneral public has no opportunity to contribute to the future of the Central Harbourreclamation. This unfortunate situation was exposed when the actual reclamationstarted to take shape and the general public suddenly realized that some importantwaterfront heritage sites, witnesses of Hong Kong’s history as a British colony and thecity’s transformation from an industrial city to an international financial centre, wereabout to be demolished to make way for the mega road infrastructure and commercialdevelopment.

In 2006 the Government announced the planning scheme for the Central reclamationbased on the approved outline zoning plan, (Figure 3). Up until this point, the discussionhad been surrounding reclamation generally. It was only when dates for decommissioning

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and re-provisioning of the Star Ferry Pier and the demolition of the Star Ferry Clock Towerwere set that the general public suddenly realized the threat to their treasured collectivememory of these places. Many professionals argued that it would be technically feasible tokeep the Star Ferry and Queen’s Pier (Figure 4) if the P2 corridor were moved north byabout 20 feet, or six metres (Ng, T.W., 2006). In early December 2006, the Secretary forHome Affairs informed the Legislative Council that the 2001 EIA Report suggested theremoval of the Star Ferry Pier, though when the SEE (Social, Environment and Economics)Network, a circle of volunteer planners, architects, artists and lay public concerned about

Figure 3. Study Area and Key Development Sites of the Urban Design Study for the New CentralHarbourfront (Central Reclamation Phase III). Source: Adapted from Planning Department, 2007.

Figure 4. Star Ferry and Queen’s Pier within the Central Reclamation Phase III Project (Takenon 14 October 2005). Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/

Victoria_Harbour_from_City_Hall_14-Oct-2005_%281%29.jpg, accessed 13 January 2008.

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social, environmental and economic issues, went through the documents of this report,they discovered that one of the appendices written by Peter Chan had actuallyemphasized the historical significance of the Star Ferry (SEE Network, 2007). Thisdocument noted that the Star Ferry played a crucial role in the 1966–1967 riots as a resultof a five cent fare increase, that it was also a significant part of the history of transportationdevelopment in the city. The Ferry was a significant Hong Kong icon with worldwideappeal, voted as one of the 50 must see sites in the world by National Geographic.

On 11 November 2006 when the old Star Ferry Pier stopped operation, tens of thousandsof citizens flocked to the site to bid farewell to the Clock Tower, while civil societyorganizations continued to organize various activities to try to stop its demolition. Despitecontinuous and resolute protest efforts and activities organized by young passionatesocial activists (Figure 5), the Director of Environmental Protection8 issued an emergencyworks permit in mid December 2006 that allowed contractors to work through the night totear down the Clock Tower (Asprey, 2006). While the mechanical clock is dismantled andpreserved, the concrete structure of the Clock Tower was secretly trashed in a landfill site.To the government planners, the public outcry at the demolition of the Star Ferry ClockTower was puzzling and irrational because they had dutifully gone through all thestatutory planning processes which the court had verified and validated. The citizens,however, were shocked at the government’s lack of concern over issues of heritageconservation and their lack of care for spaces harbouring many collective memories. Formany, the Star Ferry was destroyed solely because the government wanted to see thedevelopment of a massive “groundscraper” on the reclaimed land.9

Figure 5a. People expressing their views on the demolition of the Star Ferry. Source: author. Figures 5band 5c. Some protestors tried to stop the demolition of the clock tower. Source: author.

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The battle over the Star Ferry was quickly followed by another over the Queen’s Pier.A neighbour of Star Ferry, in colonial days the Pier was the site where the Queen and theBritish Governors would disembark. Together with the surrounding City Hall and the

Figure 6a. The Queen’s Pier occupied by protestors. The four sets of words have two messages:“Help conserve Queen’s Pier: you are the one we miss” and “Government forcing civic revolt: we areready to fight.” Source: author. Figure 6b. A red banner at the Queen’s Pier: “Seize again the land use

decision making right.” Source: author.

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public Edinburgh Square, it was part of a historical space in the heart of the CentralDistrict.10 A number of newly formed heritage concern groups tried very hard to fight forits preservation through many channels, lobbying heritage grading authorities to applyhigher grading to the Pier in early 2007 (Figure 6), protesting and even hunger striking, butthe government’s response remained steadfast. Eventually, the government succeeded ingetting the necessary funding from the Legislative Council and managed to close the Pierin April, removing it in August 2007 with a view to reconstructing it after reclamation onthe new harbourfront. In May 2007, a belated Urban Design Study for the New CentralHarbourfront was launched by the Planning Department. However, in its publicengagement workshop, the Planning Department was heavily criticized for providingvery incomplete information and for inserting biased options into its questionnaires. Forinstance, the waterfront promenade actually consists of a 150-m long and 20-m wide berthfor the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with road access to its Headquarters at the landside, but this fact was not highlighted in the information distributed during theworkshop. Similarly, while seven out of the eight groups in the workshop opted for in siturelocation of the Queen’s Pier, this option was not even included in the questionnaire setfor participants.11

Concluding Remarks

Key Point of Transition: Triggered by Discontent?

The controversial case of Central Harbour reclamation in Hong Kong has proved Lefebvre(1991) right on at least one count: when a conceived plan made by the non-democraticadministrative government according to established codes and institutions, is divorcedfrom the lived experience and aspirations of many interested parties, “catastrophe” is inthe making. Indeed, the sentiment of the general public to object to reclamation was alsoshared by some private sector interests such as those harbourfront property owners whowould benefit from continued unobstructed harbour views. In any case, the gravemismatch between the government’s reclamation plans and the general public’saspirations for the conservation of their beloved Victoria Harbour was a key factor forthe successful launch of the Protection of the Harbour Bill and its eventual enactmentin 1997.

Yet outside of this conflict, there seem to be a constellation of historically specific reasonscontributing to the surge and partial success of this still unfolding civic movement. Theonset of the Asian financial crisis in late 1997 and the consequent economic depressionwhich lasted for more than eight years dealt a great blow to the growth-orientated city. In1997, the city’s GDP was HK$1.365 billion (US$175 million) and it was not until 2005 thatthe economy returned to a similar level (HK$1.382 billion) (CSD, 2007). Throughout theseyears of economic downturn, the city also suffered from red tides affecting fishproduction, the threat of bird flu, and the government’s insensitive handling of the SARS(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic which claimed 300 lives in 2003 (SARSExpert Committee, 2003). Hence, in the summer of 2003, when the government wanted toforce through Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law (Department of Justice, 1990) “toprohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’sGovernment, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodiesfrom conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations orbodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies”,half a million people demonstrated against the proposed legislation on 1 July 2003 (thesixth anniversary of the HKSAR).

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The economic downturn and the social discontent provoked by the administrationproduced two interesting and interrelated phenomena. Firstly, the economic downturn,marked by a stock market crash and property slump, heavily affected the livelihood ofmany professionals in the built environment. However, this also, ironically, createdvaluable spaces and opportunities for them to reflect upon their roles in society. Realizingthat in the name of progress, the city had been using reclamation to trash its pricelessnatural endowment—a deep and wide harbour—many professionals tried to be morevocal. Secondly, at the same time the once efficient and competent bureaucracy becamehugely unpopular, and to many it seemed to have lost its usual confidence. Left with fewchoices after losing the court case in the Wan Chai Reclamation Phase III project, thedisorientated bureaucrats had to accept the challenge of introducing new ways to re-planthe harbourfront sites through the establishment of the HEC. And without theprofessionals representing various civil society organizations and professional institutes,12

the HEC would not have been able to carry out various innovative experiments to engagethe general public (CCSG, 2007; Ng, M.K., 2006). However, how successful have theseparticipatory planning activities been in transforming state—civil society relationships?

Tokenistic Participation?

It is true that the HEC experiments have provided living laboratories to help interestedparticipants understand planning issues. Many of those involved came to a betterunderstanding of how envisioning should be done, reaching a deeper understanding ofsustainability indicators and coming to a realization about how to formulate spatial plansthat reflect lived experiences and aspirations through more open, transparent andengaging planning processes. These groups of planning enthusiasts will certainly be morecompetent participants in future engagement activities and conversely, some of themore open-minded government officials have also developed their capacities toappreciate the merits of involving different stakeholders at an early stage of the planningprocesses. However, unlike the enactment of the PHO, the exciting experiments of theHEC in engaging the various stakeholders seem to be only a form of tokenisticparticipation, in that the HEC has failed to institutionalize other lasting changes. In fact,after the enactment of the PHO, the government has actually abolished the ability oflawmakers to initiate any private member’s bill in the Legislative Council.

Although the HEC has contributed to the successful formulation of the Wan Chai andKai Tak statutory plans, it is just an advisory body with no legal power. The governmenthas refrained from defining clearly the differential roles and functions of the HEC andTPB, and since TPB is constituted by the TPO, it is only natural for people to pay lessattention to the advisory HEC. In fact, as reflected in the experiment of Kai Tak, many ofthe interesting ideas raised by participants in various engagement workshops were eitherscreened out or downplayed because of their impracticality in the eyes of the vettinggovernment officials. For instance, despite repeated requests from various quartersconcerning the need for a sustainable transport network linking the 328-hectare airportsite with older surrounding urban areas, this is still not a firm part of the plan and issubject to further investigation and a feasibility study. As Arnstein argues, citizens lack thepower “to ensure that their views will be heeded by the powerful . . . there is no follow-through, no ‘muscle’, hence no assurance of changing the status quo” (1969, p. 218).

Another incident that reflects the vulnerability of the existence of the HEC was thedownfall of the first Chief Executive in 2005 and the promotion (i.e. election by a 400-member Election Committee) of Donald Tsang, a senior civil servant, as the HKSAR’s

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second Chief Executive. Tsang advocates strong governance by the government, andwhen he ran for his second term in 2007, there were rumours and signs that the HECwould be dissolved. For example, throughout the preparation of the HEC symposiumon Harbourfront Enhancement Out of Public Engagement (HOPE) to mark the end of itsfour-year term in 2007, government officials indicated that funding would not be availablefor simultaneous interpretation, which was normally arranged in most HEC activities.Yet when HOPE was held in late June 2007, not only were there simultaneous interpreters,there were also cameramen present to capture the heat of discussions and variousactivities. The reason behind this volte-face was that the senior government official whofirst masterminded the HEC became the Minister for Development in Donald Tsang’s newcabinet, thus saving the HEC. Its underlying vulnerability, however, is still clear.

With the controversial Kai Tak and Wan Chai reclamation plans more or less settled,the HEC will have tougher challenges ahead. For Hong Kong society as a whole, theresumption of economic growth may mean a return to the pursuit of money, so that fewerpeople will be willing to spend their time in the participatory planning process in future. Ifland prices continue to escalate, no one can guarantee that the private sector will notfollow the footsteps of their nineteenth-century counterparts who turned from adamantprotestors of Praya reclamation to ardent supporters of reclamation in the midst of landand housing shortage and rising land prices. And as their business picks up again, will theactive professionals in HEC still have the time for the civil society groups and perhapsmore importantly, will they have the courage to challenge those who give them jobs andprojects?

Whither the Professionals?

For the current term of the HEC, its terms of reference have been changed. Their missionis now:

To advise the Government through the Secretary for Development on planning,land uses and developments along the existing and new harbourfront ofthe Victoria Harbour, with a view to protecting the Harbour; improving theaccessibility, utilization and vibrancy of the harbourfront areas; andsafeguarding public enjoyment of the Harbour through a balanced, effectiveand public participation approach, in line with the Harbour PlanningPrinciples (HPPs) and Harbour Planning Guidelines (HPGs).

Specifically, the Committee will—

(a) Provide input to the Urban Design Study for the New Central Harbourfront;(b) Advise on the planning, design and development issues including land use, transport

and infrastructure, landscape and other matters relating to the existing and newharbourfront and the adjoining areas;

(c) Advise on means to enlist greater public involvement in the planning and design ofthe harbourfront areas; and

(d) Explore a framework for the sustainable management of the harbourfront in line withthe Harbour Planning Principles and Harbour Planning Guidelines, includingpublic–private partnership. (HEC, 2008)

A task group on the design study for the New Central Harbourfront has been set up tomonitor the continuing design of the place. Another task group has been established toaddress terms of reference (d) by studying management models for the harbourfront.

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These are extremely important bodies. Though the Harbour Planning Principles andGuidelines (HEC, 2007b) highlight the importance of public engagement and sustainableplanning, and guide the design and development of the harbourfront and its surroundingareas, these have not yet become the established codes for all development. Unlessfuture knowledge and institutions working on the production and design of future spaceinclude participatory approaches, inclusion will only be tokenistic and there will be noguarantee that the lived experiences and aspirations of different stakeholders will beincorporated in future projects.

However, in an economically prosperous time when jobs and projects abound and“business as usual” is returning, are the planning-related professionals both inside andoutside of the administration ready to take up the inter-related challenges of furtherempowering the lay public through instituting a participatory mode of planninggovernance? Are they willing to produce plans that balance the need for growth withcitizens’ aspirations? Will they choose to re-position themselves as “smuggler” or“bridge” planners who have the courage to “break the rules”, “learn to surrender theobsession with control and certainty”, “develop an ability to listen to the voices of multiplepublics”, enhance “urban conversations” and “boost inclusivity” (Sandercock, 2004)?

The Central Harbour reclamation saga reveals the unequal power structure embeddedin the institutionalized codes and knowledge of the planning system, and in this senseHong Kong is at a key point of transition—a point when planners should take a moreactive role in facilitating social changes to shift the balance of power between the state andthe civil society (Amirahmadi & Gladstone, 1996, p. 23). The challenge for the planning-related professionals, therefore, is to establish an alternative set of liberating codes andknowledge and community-engaging institutions into the rubric for planningand designing spaces—to capture the great inventiveness, creativity and the rich livedexperiences (Lefebvre, 1991) of different stakeholders.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the four anonymous referees for their insightful, critical yetconstructive comments. The author would also like to express heartfelt thanks to thesuperb editorial support rendered by the Journal. All the errors that remain in the articleare, of course, the author’s sole responsibility. The funding support of the RGCCompetitive Earmarked Research Grant (HKU 7462/06J) is gratefully acknowledged.

Notes

1. According to Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shallenact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the CentralPeople’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies fromconducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Regionfrom establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.”

2. This idea of “myths as truths and knowledge” is inspired by an argument put forward by McGuirk (2001,p. 207): “power takes effect through the ability to define what is accepted as knowledge, and is accorded theauthoritative status of truth.”

3. This phase of “re-centralization” of spatial planning and development has a lot to do with China’s open doorpolicy, de-industrialization in Hong Kong and the tertiarization of its economy and the building of the cityinto a financial centre for Asia and China’s transitional economy.

4. The distinction between “life space” and “economic space” has been discussed in detail by Friedmann (1988,pp. 96–97). Life space refers to the improvement of people’s quality of life (reproduction) whereas economicspace refers to the enhancement of economic growth (production).

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5. Listed in the website of the Society for the Protection of the Harbour: http://www.harbourprotection.org/

html/all_page_a_eng.htm accessed July 2007.

6. In 1999, the Protection of the Harbour Ordinance was amended to cover the entire harbour. The most

important clauses of this short Ordinance (four sections) appear in section 3: “(1) The harbour is to be

protected as a special public asset and a natural heritage of Hong Kong people, and for that purpose there

shall be a presumption against reclamation in the harbour. (Amended 75 of 1999 s.4); and (2) All public

officials and public bodies shall have regard to the principles stated in subsection (1) for guidance in the

exercise of any powers vested in them” (Department of Justice, 1999).

7. The terms of reference for HEC include: provide feedback to and monitor the reviews on the remaining

proposed reclamation within the harbour, namely the Wan Chai North and South East Kowloon reclamation

proposal; advise on the planning, design and development issues . . . relating to the existing and new

harbourfront and the adjoining areas; advise on the means to enlist greater public involvement in the

planning and design of the harbourfront areas; and explore as a sustainable framework to manage the

harbourfront areas, including public?private partnership (HEC, 2004).

8. The Director of Environmental Protection Department (EPD) used to be a professional in the environment

field. However, after the then Director of EPD refused to grant an environmental permit to a railway

company to run a line through a man-made wetland in 2000, the Director took early retirement and the post

has since been filled by administrative officers.

9. The Government suggests the construction of a “groundscraper”, that is, the laying flat of a skyscraper

because this huge building will lie right in front of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the

seaview of which is protected by its land lease.

10. The civic space embedded within the Queen’s Pier, the Edinburgh Square and the City Hall echoes the ruling

spaces at Government Hill and the then Governor House on the southern slope via Statue Square in Central,

a powerful “political spine” comparable to “fungshui spur lines” in the New Territories. One should never

“truncate” a fungshui spur line.

11. Facts observed when the author joined the workshop on 12 May 2007.

12. Non-official members of the HEC include representatives from: the Business Environment Council, the

Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport in Hong Kong, Citizen Envisioning@Harbour (CE@H)

(a coalition of 17 organizations), the Conservancy Association (the first green group in Hong Kong), Friends

of the Earth, Hong Kong Institute of Architects, Hong Kong Institute of Landscape Architects, Hong Kong

Institute of Planners, Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors, Hong Kong Institute of Engineers, Hong Kong

Tourism Board, the Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong, the Society for Protection of the

Harbour Limited as well as some other professionals who join the Committee on a personal basis. The author

is the representative of CE@H.

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