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From the Legal Personality of Nature to the Recognition

of Ecological Damages: An Analysis of the French Legal Reform after the Erika Oil Spill

___________________________________________________

Jérôme Orlhac | 260558947 | April 25, 2014

McGill University | Prof. Peter Brown | Prof. Mark Goldberg

Civilization and Environment | ENVR630 | Winter 2014

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Abstract

Compared to other branches of the Law,1 environmental law is considered to be a recent

branch since its evolution followed the major scientific discoveries of the post-Second World

War era, the growth of the population, and the ever-increasing negative impacts of Mankind on

the environment.

The doctrine written by eminent scholars has always played an important role in the

evolution of environmental law. Traditionally, through the concept of legal personality, jurists

recognize the rights of someone (including private entities and public institutions) to fight for its

rights and therefore to stand in court. The question to give rights to Nature has been in the centre

of the work of William O. Douglas and Christopher D. Stone. The idea developed in the 1970s

by these two American scholars is to grant rights to Nature per se.

Rights of Nature are now part of several legal systems, notably in the Ecuadorian

Constitution. In the meantime, the French legal system has barely changed since the Napoleonic

era and the Code civil. However, an environmental catastrophe may have pulled the trigger and

started an important legal (r)evolution. Indeed, when the tanker Erika sank of the French coast

causing major environmental impacts in 1999, the limits of the French environmental laws were

pointed out. In a recent court decision, the court recognized a pure ecological damage (préjudice

écologique pur), alongside the traditional individual, moral, and economic damages. This is

considered to be a precedent in the French legal system.

Yet this jurisprudence may be overturned in the future. In order to reinforce this major

step, a law is necessary. A bill is currently debated in the French Assembly. It is necessary to

analyse its content and its impact in order to understand what could potentially be considered

ecological damage, how the damage can be compensated, and who can be compensated for the

damage. But the recognition of ecological damage does not go as far as the recognition of a legal

personality for “natural objects.”

1 The Law is sometimes depicted as a tree with different branches: family law, criminal law, contract law, administrative law, constitutional law, and so on and so forth, the trunk being the Law with a capital “L”, defined “as a general and established entity” (Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 1996). Environmental law is harder to delimit since it is in its very own nature to impact several other branches.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ..............................................................................................................................2  

1.   Introduction.................................................................................................................4  

2.   Rights for Nature ........................................................................................................6  

2.1.   William O. Douglas’ Notion of Wilderness and its Limits ....................................6  

2.2.   Nature’s Legal Personality .....................................................................................9  

2.3.   The Contemporary Developments on Nature’s Rights ........................................11  

3.   The Erika Jurisprudence and the Limits of French Environmental Law...........14  

3.1.   The Facts and Legal Issues of the Case................................................................14  

3.2.   The Impact of the Solution of the Case ................................................................16  

4.   Towards the Recognition of a Préjudice Écologique in the Code Civil .................17  

4.1.   Civil Liability and the Recognition of the Ecological damage ............................17  

4.2.   The Judicial Procedure .........................................................................................20  

4.3.   The Compensation of the Ecological Damage and Nature’s Legal Personality ..21  

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................23  

Annex 1 .............................................................................................................................25  

Annex 2 .............................................................................................................................26  

Bibliography.....................................................................................................................27  

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In reality there is a single integral community of the Earth that includes all its component members whether human or other than human. In this community every being has its own role to fulfill, its own dignity, its inner spontaneity. Every being has its own voice. Every being declares itself to the entire universe. Every being enters into communion with other beings. This capacity for relatedness, for presence to other beings, for spontaneity in action, is a capacity possessed by every mode of being throughout the entire universe. So too every being has rights to be recognized and revered. Trees have tree rights, insects have insect rights, rivers have river rights, mountains have mountain rights.2

Thomas Berry, The Great Work (1999)

1. Introduction

The introduction of a paper starting by a conclusion is not common but, here, the

conclusion is from another author. Indeed, as a conclusion of his interesting book advocating for

the protection of trees, the head gardener of the Versailles estate, Alain Baraton, writes:

On attribue souvent, et peut-être à tort, à Antoine de Saint-Exupéry3 cette maxime que je fais mienne : On n’hérite pas la terre de ses parents, on l’emprunte à ses enfants. Il en est de même pour les arbres des villes, des campagnes et des forêts. Ils ne nous appartiennent pas, nous en sommes juste les conservateurs et notre mission première est de permettre à nos descendants de les contempler. Il devient donc urgent d’offrir aux arbres remarquables un statut juridique qui les protège vraiment et définitivement de la folie des hommes !4

Alain Baraton is far from being a jurist but he understands that the Law has a role to play in the

protection of our environment. He understands that the current laws are not entirely fulfilling this

goal. And above all, he understands that there is a need to recognize the right of some “natural

objects.”5

According to the French philosopher Luc Ferry, there are three forms of

2 Thomas Berry, The Great Work (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1999) at 4-5. 3 French writer, poet, and aviator, author of The Little Prince (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1943). 4 Alain Baraton, La Haine de l’arbre n’est pas une fatalité (Arles: Actes Sud, 2013) at 148. 5 The terms “natural objects” will be used throughout this paper since they are the terms coined by Christopher D. Stone in his famous article “Should Trees Have Standing?” Christopher D Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality, and the Environment, 3rd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 1.

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environmentalism.6 In the first form, “au travers de la nature, c’est encore et toujours l’homme

qu’il faut protéger, fût-ce de lui-même, lorsqu’il joue aux apprentis sorciers.”7 This can be

considered as the anthropocentric form of écologie. The second form gives a “signification

morale à certains êtres non humains. Elle consiste à prendre au sérieux le principe ‘utilitariste’

selon lequel il faut non seulement rechercher l’intérêt propre des hommes, mais de manière plus

générale tendre à diminuer au maximum la somme des souffrances dans le monde ainsi qu’à

augmenter autant que faire se peut la quantité de bien-être.”8 This could be considered the

utilitarian form of écologie. Finally, the third form refers to the deep ecology movement.

According to Luc Ferry, “ce n’est plus l’homme, considéré comme centre du monde, qu’il faut

au premier chef protéger de lui-même, mais bien le cosmos comme tel, qu’on doit défendre

contre les hommes.”9 This can be considered as the biocentric form. The biocentric approach is

related to the “renaissance du sentiment de compassion à l’égard des êtres naturels

[s’accompagnant] toujours d’une dimension critique à l’égard de la modernité.”10 Environmental

laws are a mix of the two first forms: the anthropocentric and the utilitarian approaches. This

paper will be focused on the third, the anthropocentric form, and more precisely on how the law

may change under its influence.

As the priest and theologian Thomas Berry writes, “ecology is not a part of law; law is an

extension of ecology”11 which implies that the Law needs to be adapted to the complexity of the

environment. It needs to take into account the diversity of the ecosystems. Human beings have a

role to play in this scheme since “humans are part of Earth’s life systems, not separate from it.”12

The goal is obvious since the “violence against our environment is [a] form of destruction that

implicates our very survival.” Therefore, “our real alma mater is the Earth, without whom we are

lost. Yet man’s most devastating drives are acts of aggression against her.”13 Through the idea of

recognizing rights to Nature, recognizing a legal personality to Nature and therefore allowing

6 Écologie in French refers to both the science and the political/social movement. Ecology in English would only refer to the science, the political/social movement being called environmentalism or ecologism. Both terns will be used in this paper. 7 Luc Ferry, Le Nouvel ordre écologique. L’arbre, l’animal et l’homme (Paris: Grasset, 1992) at 31. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid at 32. 10 Ibid at 33. 11 Thomas Berry, supra note 2 at 84. 12 Geoffrey Garver, “The Rule of Ecological Law: The Legal Complement to Degrowth Economics” (2013) 5 Sustainability 316 at 325. 13 William O Douglas, The Three Hundred Year War (New York: Random House, 1972) at 9.

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“natural objects” to stand in court, environmental laws may take a strong step towards a more

efficient protection of the environment.

The first part of this paper will be devoted to an analysis of the origin of the idea of

granting rights to Nature and the contemporary development of this idea (2). The second part of

this paper will be focused on the Erika Case and how a court decision pushed the limits of the

French environmental laws (3). Finally, the third part will analyze the French reform of civil

liability and the recognition of ecological damages (préjudices écologiques) per se. It will be

necessary to analyze such reform through the lens of the recognition of rights for Nature (4).

2. Rights for Nature

2.1. William O. Douglas’ Notion of Wilderness and its Limits

William O. Douglas was neither a scientist nor a philosopher. He was a nature lover and a

fervent conservationist. In a review of one of Douglas’ books, A. Dan Tarlock, former Professor

of Law at the University of Kentucky, called him the “most prestigious [American]

conservationist.”14 One of his main actions was trying to rally public opinion against highways

through hiking protests.15 But William O. Douglas’ most important role has been as Associate

Justice in the United States Supreme Court. His work and writings deeply influenced the

environmental movement in the US both through his passionate defense of wilderness and his

opinions on Nature’s rights.

At first glance, William O. Douglas’ vision of nature may seem to be essentially done

through the lens of “outdoor recreational use”16 yet he pursues a developed criticism of Western

modern societies. In the 1970s, conservationism was seen as “ethnocentric, sexist, and

14 A. Dan Tarlock, “A Wilderness Bill of Rights by William O. Douglas” (1967) 19/4 Stanford Law Review 895 at 896. 15 Adam M Sowards, The Environmental Justice. William O. Douglas and American Conservationism (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2009) at 31. The use of the terms “environmental justice” in the title of this book should not be mistaken with environmental justice as a social movement pursuing the civil rights movement and adding to the strong racial component an environmental component. See for example: Robert D Bullard, ed, Unequal Protection. Environmental Justice and Communities of Color (New York: Random House, 1994). 16 A. Dan Tarlock, supra note 14 at 895.

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imperialist”17 and “wilderness-users [were] primarily persons in middle and upper income

brackets who [had] both the inclination and money to travel substantial distances for extended

period.”18 As he explains, “the wilderness cannot be preserved against the pressures of

population and “progress” unless the guarantees are explicit and severely enforced, unless

wilderness values become a crusade.”19 He is aware that “wilderness values may not appeal to

all Americans. But they make up a passionate cause for millions. They are, indeed, so basic to

our national well-being that they must be honored by any free society that respects diversity.”20

And he adds: “people treasure our wilderness, as they treasure Mt. Everest, even though they are

too frail to visit it.“21

William O. Douglas has been deeply influenced by the forester and author Aldo Leopold

and his land ethics.22 It is summarized as following: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve

the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends

otherwise.”23 As Leopold explains it, “wilderness is the raw material out of which man has

hammered the artifact called civilization”24 and Justice Douglas advocated for the conservation

of this “raw material.” Leopold’s definition of conservation “is a state of harmony between men

and land.”25 Justice Douglas also pursues Henry David Thoreau and John Muir’s early work on

wilderness.26 Douglas draws on this idea of a land ethics and explains “we need a new

conservation ethic if we are to have sanctuaries of wilderness left commensurate with the need.

This ethic was described by Leopold in A Sand County Almanac.”27 Justice Douglas uses the

word “sanctuary” to emphasize the necessity of a protection of such areas.28 According to him,

the notion of tolerance is key since “one indication of the arrival of the new land ethic will be the

tolerance of the majority who want the automobile to take them everywhere, for the minority 17 Adam M Sowards, supra note 15 at 7. 18 A. Dan Tarlock, supra note 14 at 897. 19 William O Douglas, A Wilderness Bill of Rights (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1965) at 87. (Our itlics] 20 Ibid at 25-26. 21 Ibid at 85. 22 Adam M Sowards, supra note 15 at 135. “He clearly was building on Aldo Leopold’s notion of land ethic.” See also, ibid at 61. 23 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968) at 224-225. 24 Ibid at 188. 25 Ibid at 207. 26 Kerry H. Whiteside, Divided Natures. French Contributions to Political Ecology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002) at 18. 27 William O Douglas, supra note 19 at 37. [Our italics] 28 Adam M Sowards, supra note 15 at 37.

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who wants sanctuaries free of the noise and debris of civilization.”29

William O. Douglas’ Wilderness Bill of Rights is filled with examples of environmental

issues. He also develops the different components of what he calls Rights for Wilderness. As

Adam M. Sowards, author of a biography of Justice Douglas, explains, “the core of this book

lays in its extended political discussion.”30 He showed concerns about the growth of population

“with great dependence on technology on the one hand and disappearing wilderness on the other

hand.” He recognized that “only systemic change - in politics and in public’s thinking - would

alleviate the threats.”31 Therefore, he “desired to continue moving toward a stronger and more

institutionalized environmental ethic. This would require political and legal reforms to ensure

adequate protection of environmental values.”32 He also argued on the importance of public

hearing33 and the role of petitions.34 He included in his Bill of Rights “procedures for public

administration of recreational area”35 and the “revision of […] tax exemption laws to put

conservationists on a more equal footing with those who would destroy a sand dune or a river or

a sanctuary or a high ridge for the Almighty Dollar.”36

This paper is not focused on William O. Douglas’ writings, but it is interesting to note

that his late research brought him to environmental justice as a continuation of civil rights with

race or wealth as the basis of discrimination37 because, as he explained, there is a connection

between “social and ecological ills”.38 But if this paper starts with a section on William O.

Douglas’ work, it is simply because he was Judge at the Supreme Court when one of the first

cases on Nature’s Rights came up. As he explained in a famous court decision, “contemporary

public concern for protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of

standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.”39 This idea of giving

29 William O Douglas, supra note 19 at 151. 30 Adam M Sowards, supra note 15 at 76. 31 Ibid at 74. 32 Ibid at 80. 33 Ibid at 87. 34 Ibid at 89. 35 William O Douglas, supra note 19 at 100-101. 36 Ibid at 110. 37 Adam M Sowards, supra note 15 at 139. 38 Ibid at 140. 39 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (Justice Douglas dissent)

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rights to Nature follow the idea of giving a legal personality to “natural objects”, legal

personality being “the quality or state of being a legal person.”40 This necessitates a closer focus.

2.2. Nature’s Legal Personality

This section started with a focus on William O. Douglas because he deeply influenced

environmental law doctrine by the dissent decision he gave in 1972 in the Sierra Club v. Morton

case. It is considered the “most famous environmental opinion” since his idea was to push

“environmental law in new directions.”41

A brief reminder of the facts is necessary. “In 1965, the Forest Service solicited the bids

for creation development plans in the Mineral King Valley of the Sequoia National Forest.” Walt

Disney Enterprise won the bid. “The Sierra Club protested the initial call for development.” The

Sierra Club argued in court that the valley itself felt the real injury at stake. According to the

Court, the Sierra Club did not have the possibility to stand for the valley itself and did not suffer

any injury because no individual member was harmed.42 Therefore, in his dissent opinion, Justice

Douglas explained why the case should have been named “Mineral King v. Morton” after the

name of the valley itself.43 This dissent was “a pointed critique of federal land management”44

because the federal services were allowing the destruction of wilderness in the valley.

William O. Douglas built his dissent on an article published in 1972, right before the

court decision, by Christopher D. Stone.45 In a recent republication of this article, Stone explains

the three elements of legal personhood that Should Trees Have Standing set forth: “(1) that suit

be permitted in the object’s own name and interest; (2) that the calculation of damages (or

balance of equities where damages were inappropriate) include an accounting for the interests of,

or nonintrinsic value of, the object (not limited to commercial economic value); and (3) that

judgment be applied for the benefit of the object.”46 Those are the three keystones of Nature’s

40 Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, supra note 1. 41 Adam M Sowards, supra note 15 at 132. 42 Ibid at 132-133. 43 Ibid at 134. 44 Ibid at 135. 45 Christopher D Stone, “Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects” (1972) 45 South California Law Review 450. 46 Christopher D Stone, supra note 5 at 159

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Rights as seen by both Christopher D. Stone and Justice Douglas.

Even though the Sierra Club lost its case, the idea of trees having standing received both

negative and positive reactions.47 Three main criticisms have been raised. First, according to the

French philosopher Jules Ferry, quoted earlier, “la nature n’est pas un agent, un être susceptible

d’agir avec la réciprocité qu’on attend d’un alter ego juridique. C’est toujours pour l’homme

qu’il y a du droit, pour eux que l’arbre ou la baleine peuvent devenir les objets d’une forme de

respect liée à des législations - non l’inverse.”48 This lack of reciprocity between “natural

objects” and human beings does not seem to be an obstacle since the case would be brought in

court on the behalf of the “natural object.” This leads to the second criticism with a question

raised by a scholar in these terms: “at root, […] are the deep ecologists themselves not being

"anthropocentric" in believing they know what is best for the natural environment?”49 The cases

where “natural objects” would have standing will obviously be a high importance. It will not be a

simple plastic bag thrown on the floor. In Sierra Club v. Morton, it was the urbanization and the

articialisation of an entire wild area. It seems therefore obvious that “deep ecologists” (in this

case, standing would be open to different entities) could determine what would be best for

Nature. And, finally, a third criticism was based on the idea of opening the floodgates and

clogging the courts. Christopher D. Stone refutes this argument by explaining “this problem […]

is all too easily exaggerated.”50

As Michel Serres, French author of the Natural Contract,51 writes it: “Nous avons

poursuivi, au siècle dernier, l’idéal de deux révolutions, toutes deux égalitaires : le peuple

reprend ses droits politiques, rendus parce que volés ; de même les prolétaires rentrent dans la

jouissance des fruits matériels et sociaux de leur travail : recherche d’équilibre et d’équité au sein

du contrat exclusivement social, auparavant injuste ou léonin, et tendant sans cesse à le

redevenir.”52 This idea of an evolution of legal rights can be found in the historical analysis of

children’s rights, women’s rights, civil rights and so on and so forth. Nature’s right would

47 See for example the poem reproduced in annex 1 and criticizing Justice Douglas’ dissent. 48 Luc Ferry, supra note 7 at 257. 49 Philip S Elder, “Legal Rights for Nature: The Wrong Answer to the Right(s) Question” 22/2 1984 Osgood Hall Law Journal 285 at 289. 50 Christopher D Stone, supra note 5 at 165. 51 Michel Serres, The Natural Contract (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). 52 Michel Serres, “Le Contrat naturel” in Les Grands textes fondateurs de l’écologie, Ariane Debourdeau, ed (Paris: Flammarion, 2013) 291 at 304.

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therefore be in continuation. “The slavery abolition movement came about rapidly when people

questioned the morality of holding human slaves as property. [Cullinan‘s Wild Law that will be

discussed later on] suggests that the destruction of Nature destines toward a similar result.”53

That is the reason why Michel Serres would like to add “au contrat exclusivement social […] la

passation d’un contrat naturel de symbiose et de réciprocité où notre rapport aux choses laisserait

maîtrise et possession pour l’écoute admirative, la réciprocité, la contemplation et le respect, où

la connaissance ne supposerait plus la propriété, ni l’action la maîtrise.”54

2.3. The Contemporary Developments on Nature’s Rights

At the international level, several efforts have been made in order to develop this idea of

the recognition of rights for Nature. In 1982, for example, the General Assembly of the United

Nations passed the World Charter for Nature. It does not have a legal value since it has been

adopted by the General Assembly but the document nourishes the debate. The General Assembly

explains its conviction that: “Every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its

worth to man, and, to accord other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral

code of action” therefore “Nature shall be respected and its essential processes shall not be

impaired.”55 The principle 4 develops this idea: “Ecosystems and organisms, as well as the land,

marine and atmospheric resources that are utilized by man, shall be managed to achieve and

maintain optimum sustainable productivity, but not in such a way as to endanger the integrity of

those other ecosystems or species with which they coexist.”56 It does not go as far as the

recognition of rights for Nature. In the same vein, but going further, the Declaration of Rights of

Mother Earth written in 2010 in Cochabamba, Bolivia, by the so-called “World People’s

Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth,” declares that “Mother Earth is a

living being.”57 It recognizes a set of Rights of Mother Earth: right to life and to exist, right to be

respected, rights to water as a source of life, right to clean air, and so on and so forth. As the

53 Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust. Environmental Law for a New Ecological Age (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 270. 54 Michel Serres, supra note 52 at 303. 55 General Assembly of the United Nations, World Charter for Nature (28 October 1982), A/RES/37/7. 56 Ibid. 57 World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth (22 April 2010), online: Rights of Mother Earth <http://www.rightsofmotherearth.com/declaration/>

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South-African lawyer Cormac Cullinan, author of Wild Law,58 explains it, “the talk at

Cochabamba was of addressing root causes and achieving fundamental changes in how our

species relates to the Earth community.”59 Then again, this declaration does not have the value of

an international treaty since it has not been signed and ratified by countries. However, it may

influence national legal systems.

Cormac Cullinan has made another doctrinal input. His Wild Law “is built on the premise

that legal structures should reflect the functioning of the systems that they purport to govern.

Thus, wild law fundamentally takes a biocentric or Earth-centered approach, in contrast to

human-centered environmental law that, at best, tries to deduce an accurate price for natural

systems within an economics driven by human preferences.”60 Cormac Cullinan’s argument to

develop his doctrine is the will to face “the banality of biocide.”61 In one sentence, he

summarizes the legal impasse: “Exterminating life on Earth is legal.”62 As he explains from an

historical perspective, “animals, plants and almost every other aspect of the planet are, legally-

speaking, objects that are either the property of a human or artificial ‘juristic person’ such as a

company, or could at any moment become owner, for example by being captured or killed.”63 In

the same vain, in Nature’s Trust, Mary Christina Wood, Professor of Law at the University of

Oregon, writes: “the Western legal tradition allows exploitation on the theory that natural

resources can be fully privatized - altered, destroyed, used, and sold at the whim of the owner.“64

Cornac Cullinan continues his own argumentation by the following paragraph: “This means that

from the perspective of our legal systems, the billions of other species on the planet are outlaws,

and are treated as such. They are not part of the community or society that the legal systems

concern themselves with, and have no inherent right to existence or to have a habitat in which to

live.”65 Since “the only rights recognized by law are those that are enforceable in a court of law,

and these may only be held by human beings or by ‘juristic persons’ like companies,”66 then the

58 Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law. A manifesto for Earth Justice, 2nd ed (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 2011). 59 Ibid at 188. 60 Geoffrey Garver, supra note 12 at 318. 61 Cormac Cullinan, supra note 58 at 35. 62 Ibid at 67. 63 Ibid at 63. 64 Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust. Environmental Law for a New Ecological Age (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 271. 65 Cormac Cullinan, supra note 58 at 64. 66 Ibid at 63-64.

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solution should be the recognition of Rights for Nature as developed at the international level

even if it implies a limitation of human rights.67 On this point, Thomas Berry considers that “all

rights do not cancel out the rights of other modes of being to exist in their natural state. Human

property rights are not absolute. Property rights are simply a special relationship between a

particular human ‘owner’ and a particular piece of ‘property’ for the benefit of both.”68

At the national level, “in 2008, Ecuador [followed by Bolivia]69 amended its constitution

to provide that nature “has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles,

structure, functions and its processes in evolution.” While the provision cannot be applied

retroactively to join nature itself as a party in the ongoing litigation between native people in

Ecuador and the oil companies, it may reflect a shift, in Ecuador at least, from an exclusively

homocentric view of the environment to one in which some consideration of Nature itself

constrains permissible levels of “resource” exploitation.”70 However, these legal systems are not

at the center of this paper.

Cormac Cullinan has been influenced by the theologian Thomas Berry. This influence

can be found when he writes that, “within the Earth system, the well-being of the planet as a

whole is paramount. None of the components of the Earth’s biosphere can survive except within

the Earth ecosystem. This means that the well-being of each member of the Earth community is

derived from, and cannot take precedence over, the well-being of Earth as a whole.”71 It echoes

Thomas Berry’s own words:

In reality there is a single integral community of the Earth that includes all its component members whether human or other than human. In this community every being has its own role to fulfill, its own dignity, its inner spontaneity. Every being has its own voice. Every being declares itself to the entire universe. Every being enters into communion with other beings. This capacity for relatedness, for presence to other beings, for spontaneity in action, is a capacity possessed by every mode of being throughout the entire universe. So too every being has rights to be recognized and revered. Trees have tree rights, insects have insect rights, rivers have river rights, mountains have mountain rights.72

67 Ibid at 105. 68 Ibid at 103. 69 John Vidal, “Bolivia enshrines natural world's rights with equal status for Mother Earth” The Guardian, 10 April 2011, online: The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/10/bolivia-enshrines-natural-worlds-rights> 70 Christopher D Stone, supra note 5 at 164. 71 Cormac Cullinan, supra note 58 at 100. 72 Thomas Berry, supra note 2 at 4-5.

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And Thomas Berry is clear on the fact that “natural objects,” to keep the terms used by

Christopher D. Stone, “must be given legal status as sacred and inviolable.”73 Indeed, according

to Thomas Berry, every component of the Earth Community has three rights: “the right to be, the

right to habitat, and the right to fulfill its role in the ever-renewing processes of the Earth

Community.”74

After these theoretical developments, it is necessary to analyze the case of the Erika oil

spill that impacted the French coastline and its repercussion on the French legal system.

3. The Erika Jurisprudence and the Limits of French Environmental Law

3.1. The Facts and Legal Issues of the Case

On 12 December 1999, the Erika oil tanker75 broke in two and the oil slick76 that

followed polluted 400 kilometers of the French coastline.77 The tanker was 24-year-old.78 The

pollution impacted the local economy (mainly fisheries and tourism) but also destroyed several

ecosystems and killed at least 50,000 birds. This is “one of France's worst environmental

disasters.”79

Several legal questions were raised. First, since the shipwreck happened outside of the

French territorial sea, should national laws or international laws apply?80 Indeed, countries

reacted at the international level after the previous disasters involving oil tankers (Torrey Canyon

in 1967, Exxon Valdez in 1989 for the most “famous” ones) and set different mechanisms in

order to “repair” the impacts of such disasters and to determine the liability of the different 73 Ibid at 161. 74 Cormac Cullinan, supra note 58 at 101. 75 See Annex 2 for a picture of the oil tanker. 76 An oil slick is a marée noire in French, literally “black tide.” 77 France, Sénat, Proposition de loi n°546 rectifié bis visant à inscrire la notion de préjudice écologique dans le code civil, 23 May 2012. 78 Mathilde Boutonnet, “L’Erika : une vraie-fausse reconnaissance du préjudice écologique” (2013) 1 Environnement étude 2. 79 Haroon Siddique, “French Oil Giant to Pay for Environmental Disaster” The Guardian 16 January 2008. Online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/16/france.environment> 80 Vincent Rebeyrol, “« Erika » : l'inéluctable cassation ?” (2012) Recueil Dalloz 1112. “Casser une decision” (literally “to break a decision”) means that the upper court reverses the decision held in appeal.

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stakeholders. However, the international treaty on maritime pollution is considered by a famous

French environmental lawyer and former Ministre de l’environnement, Corinne Lepage, as “un

outil mis en place à la demande des pétroliers et destiné à éviter que la responsabilité de ces

derniers puisse jamais être mise en cause.”81 Indeed, another scholar adds: “the Erika case […]

illustrates the current shortcomings of the [international framework].”82 It is also necessary to

bear in mind that the Erika case was complicated by the fact that the oil tanker was registered in

Malta.83 Therefore, Maltese laws were even invoked.84 Second, should Total (the multinational

oil company and charterer of the oil tanker), the owner of the boat, the captain, or the shipping

certification firm liable in the case?

The solution will be developed later on but it is necessary to note at this point that “the

court upheld a judgment made in January 2008 by the Criminal Court in Paris against Total;

Tevere Shipping, the Italian owner of the boat; the Italian shipping agent Panship Management

and Services; and Registro Italiano Navale, or Rina, the Italian maritime certification company

that had declared the boat seaworthy.”85 What concerns our analysis is the application of national

laws, on one hand, and the recognition of the civil and criminal liability of the charterer (the oil

company Total) on the other hand.86 The civil liability results from what the judges called a faute

de témérité (literally “recklessness fault”).87 Also, the judges recognized the autonomy of the

ecological damage88 defined as “[une] atteinte directe ou indirecte portée à l'environnement et

découlant de l'infraction.”89 Since the court went beyond the French written laws, this decision

has been considered an act of creativity from the Court.90

81 Corinne Lepage, “Les véritables lacunes du droit de l’environnement” (2008) 127 Pouvoirs 123 at 131. 82 Vincent Rebeyrol, “The Erika Case: an Incitement to Rewrite the CLC” (2013) 2 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 33 at 43. 83 In maritime terms, this is considered as a “flag of convenience.” According to the International Transport Workers’ Federation, “a flag of convenience ship is one that flies the flag of a country other than the country of ownership. Cheap registration fees, low or no taxes and freedom to employ cheap labour are the motivating factors behind a shipowner's decision to 'flag out'. Online: ITF <http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/sub-page.cfm> 84 Alexia Kefalas, “À Malte, on est prêt à rejuger le naufrage de l’Erika” Le Figaro (6 April 2012), online: Le Figaro <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2012/04/06/01016-20120406ARTFIG00501--malte-on-est-pret-a-rejuger-le-naufrage-de-l-erika.php> 85 Matthew Saltmarsh, “French Court Upholds Verdict in Oil Spill” New York Times 30 March 2010. 86 Marie-Pierre Camproux-Duffrène, “Entre environnement per se et environnement pour soi : la responsabilité civile pour atteinte à l’environnement” (2012) 12 Environnement étude 14. 87 Mathilde Boutonnet, supra note 78. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid.

16

3.2. The Impact of the Solution of the Case

Damage is defined as a “loss or harm resulting from injury to person, property, or

reputation”91 and, also, “the money awarded to a party in a civil suit as compensation for the loss

or injury for which another is liable.”92 The ecological damage (préjudice écologique in French)

as recognized by the Court is innovative because it is not recognized in the written laws. Patrice

Jourdain, a French scholar specialized in civil liability, summarizes it at best:

Mais en quoi consiste ce préjudice environnemental auquel la Cour de cassation confère ses lettres de noblesse ? Une chose est sûre : il se distingue des préjudices individuels, économiques et moraux, qui résultent des atteintes à l'environnement. C'est donc dans le sens d'un préjudice écologique « pur » qu'il faut le comprendre, c'est-à-dire du préjudice qui affecte la nature, indépendamment des répercussions sur l'homme. Sa particularité est d'être un préjudice qui ne porte atteinte à aucun intérêt individuel, un préjudice sans autre victime que la nature. Bien inspirée, la cour d'appel a repris l'analyse d'un auteur […] selon laquelle il s'agit d'un préjudice « objectif », par opposition aux préjudices subjectifs subis par des sujets de droit, d'un préjudice qui consiste en la « lésion d'un intérêt conforme au droit »93

This ecological damage goes beyond the previously recognized individual, moral and economic

damages. In the Erika case, the ecological damage is distinguishable from the economic loss for

fisheries. It is also distinguishable from the moral loss of the members of environmental

association. The goal is to recognize the value of certain elements of the environment, the death

of several thousand birds for example.

This decision was not groundbreaking since it was not the first French court to recognize

ecological damage. What is of primary importance is the fact that the higher court recognized

it.94 Indeed, “si ces décisions n'étaient certes pas les premières à reconnaître l'existence d'un

préjudice écologique pur […] elles le faisaient avec une force particulière au moyen de motifs

très développés dans une affaire emblématique où les dommages étaient d'une ampleur

91 Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, supra note 1. 92 Ibid. 93 Patrice Jourdain, “Consécration par la Cour de cassation du préjudice écologique” (2013) Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 119. 94 The Cour de cassation is the equivalent of the Supreme Court of Canada for civil and criminal cases.

17

exceptionnelle.”95 However, as Pierre Jourdain explains it, “si le préjudice écologique est

désormais reconnu au plus haut niveau de la hiérarchie judiciaire, toutes les difficultés ne sont

pas résolues pour autant, loin s'en faut. Elles sont aussi bien d'ordre processuel que substantiel.”96

The main questions remaining are the following: Who can stand in court and invoke an

ecological damage since the damage is not “personnal”?97; and how can this damage be repaired?

According to him, in the meantime between the Erika decision and a legal reform, the courts

should rationalize the recognition of this damage by favoring the compensation “in kind.”98

The Erika jurisprudence is one of the main court decisions in French environmental law.

However, in civil law countries, court decisions – also called jurisprudence or precedent – do not

have the same values as common law countries. It is therefore necessary for the French

lawmakers to engrave the notion of ecological damage in the French laws, in this case, the Civil

Code, in order to secure this jurisprudential development.

4. Towards the Recognition of a Préjudice Écologique in the Code Civil

4.1. Civil Liability and the Recognition of the Ecological damage

The verdict is clear. According to Corinne Lepage, the French Environmental Law is

largely inefficient.99 However, the recognition of the ecological damage may be a turning point.

The context is favorable with the recognition of the constitutional value of several environmental

principles in 2005 in the Charte de l’environnement (precautionary principle, prevention

principle, polluter-pays principle.) This context directly influenced the judges in the Erika

95 Patrice Jourdain, supra note 93. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. “D'abord, à supposer que le préjudice écologique existe de façon autonome, se pose la question de savoir qui peut en demander réparation. La difficulté est bien connue qui réside dans le fait que l'on est en présence d'un préjudice sans victime personnalisée et sans sujet du droit à réparation.” 98 Ibid. “Mais en attendant un dispositif législatif encadrant le droit commun de la responsabilité civile, il nous semble que la jurisprudence pourrait par ses propres moyens parvenir à rationnaliser la réparation des préjudices environnementaux en privilégiant la réparation en nature et en osant prescrire des affectations des dommages-intérêts. Un peu plus d'audace suffirait.” 99 Corinne Lepage, supra note 81 at 123. “Un droit largement inefficient.”

18

decision.100 At the same time, civil liability laws are inadequate.101 For physical persons, three

kinds of damage are recognized by the laws and by the jurisprudence: physical damages, moral

damages, and material damages. In the case of environmental damages, the French laws do not

recognize the possibility of class actions. However, an association has the legal personality if its

members have been impacted by the damage.102 In the Erika case, the compensation was far

broader than that since the judges condemned the charterer of the oil tanker to refund

expenditures done by local entities and environmental associations in order to de-pollute the

coastline and favor the replacement of certain species. The notion of damage is dual because it is

both subjective (“Ils affectent les intérêts patrimoniaux ou extrapatrimoniaux des sujets de droit,

personnes physiques ou morales.”103) and objective (“Il n'atteint aucun sujet de droit.”104) The

second version characterizes the ecological damage since Nature is still exempt of legal

personality. On top of that, the recognition of the ecological damage has a punitive goal.105

The first Bill introduced, called Proposition de loi “Retailleau,” named after the member

of the Senate of France representing a département106 particularly impacted by the Erika oil spill,

contains two articles.

Art. 1386-19. – Toute personne qui cause par sa faute un dommage à l’environnement est tenue de le réparer. Art. 1386-20. – La réparation du dommage à l’environnement s’effectue prioritairement en nature.107

100 Christian Huglo, “L’inéluctable prise en compte du dommage écologique par le juge administratif” (2013) AJDA 667. See also: Marie-Pierre Camproux-Duffrène, supra note 86. 101 France, Sénat, Rapport sur la proposition de loi M. Bruno Retailleau et plusieurs de ses collègues visant à inscrire la notion de préjudice écologique dans le code civil, 17 April 2013 (Reporter: Alain Anziani) at 9. 102 Ibid at 13. 103 Mireille Bacache, “Définir les modalités de la réparation du préjudice écologique devant le juge” (2012) 7 Environnement dossier 6. 104 Ibid. 105 Laurent Neyret, “L’extension de la responsabilité civile en droit de l’environnement” (2013) 5 Responsabilité civile et assurances dossier 29. 106 A département is a local entity above the town but under the région (in size) in the French administrative system. There are 101 départements and 27 régions in France. 107 France, Sénat, Proposition de loi n°546 rectifié bis visant à inscrire la notion de préjudice écologique dans le code civil, 23 May 2012, article unique.

19

On 16 May 2013, a modified version of the Bill has been passed at the Senate of France. It still

needs to go through the French National Assembly.108 This version contained the following

articles:

Art. 1386-19. — Toute personne qui cause un dommage à l'environnement est tenue de le réparer. Art. 1386-20. — La réparation du dommage à l’environnement s’effectue prioritairement en nature. Lorsque la réparation en nature du dommage n’est pas possible, la réparation se traduit par une compensation financière versée à l’État ou à un organisme désigné par lui et affectée, dans les conditions prévues par un décret en Conseil d’État, à la protection de l’environnement. Art. 1386-21. — Les dépenses exposées pour prévenir la réalisation imminente d’un dommage, en éviter l’aggravation, ou en réduire les conséquences, peuvent donner lieu au versement de dommages et intérêts, dès lors qu’elles ont été utilement engagées.109

Three main remarks have to be made. First, the notion of fault has been withdrawn from the first

article. This evolution will imply an easier invocation of the ecological damage since no fault

will have to be proven. Second, the compensation “in kind” that will be developed later has been

completed by traditional financial compensation. Finally, the notion of prevention has been

included in the last article with compensation of the expenditures deployed in order to prevent

damages. The consequences of this Bill are directly related to the application of the polluter-pays

principle.110

Back two the three forms of environmentalism detailed in the introduction –

anthropocentrism, utilitarianism, and biocentrism – it is necessary to analyze the current reform

in the light of this distinction made by Jules Ferry. According to Marie-Pierre Camproux-

Duffrène, Professor of Law at the University of Strasbourg, “protéger l'environnement via la

responsabilité civile, c'est avoir une approche anthropocentrée du moyen juridique utilisé pour

mener à bien cet objectif qu'il ne faut pas nier. Mais cet anthropocentrisme est à relativiser. Tout

d'abord parce qu'il ne répond pas à une vision individualiste et à court terme mais cible la

protection des intérêts collectifs, des intérêts de l'espèce humaine […]. Ensuite parce qu'il

108 Marie-Christine de Montecler, “Adoption au Sénat d’une proposition de loi sur la réparation des dommages à l’environnement (2013) AJDA 1022 at 1022. 109 France, Sénat, Rapport sur la proposition de loi M. Bruno Retailleau et plusieurs de ses collègues visant à inscrire la notion de préjudice écologique dans le code civil, supra note 101 at 47. 110 Ibid at 23.

20

s'agrège à une analyse socio-écosystèmique de l'environnement […].”111 In a nutshell, the

recognition of the ecological damage would still be considered an anthropocentric approach but

it would not be a short-term individualistic approach. Indeed, the goal is to move from the

protection of the person to the protection of mankind.112 The goal is to move from the

compensation of personal interests impacted to the compensation of the general interest.113

4.2. The Judicial Procedure

“La nature ne pouvant agir elle-même en responsabilité, l'action en réparation est

nécessairement confiée à un tiers.”114 This question of who should stand for “natural objects” is

of course at the heart of our topic. Nature cannot stand for itself. It necessitates a third party to

“represent” it. According to Philippe Billet, Professor of Law at the University of Lyon, one of

the latest reports on the topic avoided the audacious recognition of a “personalization” of

Nature.115 The content of the reform is still debated but it is possible to draw on the first

reflections. The list of third parties representing “Nature’s interest” is currently the following: a

public prosecutor, the French State, a public agency, associations, and local entities. The idea of

the creation of a new public agency, the Haute Autorité Environnementale, is also debated. This

agency would be in charge to record ecological damages, realize expert assessments, take the

litigation to court, and so on and so forth.116 The authors of this report have an open position on

this point since many different stakeholders would be involved.117 On the other hand, class

actions118 are still unrecognized by French laws.

111 Marie-Pierre Camproux-Duffrène, supra note 86. [Our italics] 112 Ibid. 113 Christian Huglo, supra note 100. 114 Mireille Bacache, supra note 103. 115 Philippe Billet, “Préjudice écologique : les principales propositions du rapport Jégouzo” (2013) 11 Environnement alerte 187. “Délaissant la voie trop téméraire d'une personnalisation de l'environnement, le rapport place sa protection sous la tutelle bienveillante de diverses personnes susceptibles d'exercer l'action en réparation du préjudice écologique.” 116 Gilles J Martin, “Le rapport « pour la réparation du préjudice écologique » présenté à la garde des Sceaux le 17 septembre 2013” (2013) Recueil Dalloz 2347. 117 Dominique Guihal, “La responsabilité civile au secours de l’environnement” (2013) 216 Droit de l’environnement 326 at 327. 118 Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, supra note 1. “Class action, in law, a device that permits one or more persons to sue or be sued as representative of a large group of people interested in the matter at issue.”

21

Also discussed is the specialization of the courts through the specialization of the judges

and a better access to experts.119 Legal expert assessments are considered as “public” in France

in a sense that they are requested by the judges. “La place de l'expertise en droit de

l'environnement, notamment en contexte judiciaire et dans l'appréhension du préjudice

écologique, méritait également réflexion.” Indeed, “elle est trop souvent coûteuse, lente et d'une

efficacité douteuse. C'est sur le triple terrain de la compétence, de l'impartialité et du

financement que se situent les propositions de réforme.”120

4.3. The Compensation of the Ecological Damage and Nature’s Legal

Personality

The Erika jurisprudence does not give a precise definition of the ecological damage.

However, a report released in 2013 gives some precisions: “Il s'agit donc de viser tous les

préjudices qui ne peuvent être réparés – même s'ils l'ont parfois été – dans le cadre strict du droit

commun aujourd'hui applicable.”121 Also, a definition given by the doctrine is the following:

“l’ensemble des atteintes causées aux écosystèmes dans leur composition, leurs structures et/ou

aux fonctions des écosystèmes, au-delà et indépendamment de leurs répercussions sur les intérêts

humains.”122 This is the reason why “trifles” will not be concerned by this new civil liability in

application of the Latin adage: “de minimis non curat lex” (literally: “the law does not concern

itself with trifles”123).124 In the Bill, in the different reports and articles written on the subject, the

origin of the damage is not discussed.125 The goal is to leave the door open to legal interpretation

by the judge. A nomenclature of the ecological damages is currently studied. This nomenclature

would take the example of the Dintilhac nomenclature for physical damages.126 As an

“objective” damage, the compensation has to take into account the complexity of the

119 Dominique Guihal, supra note 117 at 327. 120 Laurent Fonbaustier, “Promouvoir et améliorer la réparation du préjudice écologique. À propos du rapport du 17 septembre 2013” (2013) 40 La Semaine Juridique Édition Générale 1006. 121 Gilles J Martin, supra note 116. 122 Laurent Neyret & Gilles J Martin, dir, Nomenclature des préjudices environnementaux (Paris: LGDJ, 2012). 123 Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, supra note 1. 124 France, Sénat, Rapport sur la proposition de loi M. Bruno Retailleau et plusieurs de ses collègues visant à inscrire la notion de préjudice écologique dans le code civil, supra note 101 at 24. 125 Dominique Guihal, supra note 117 at 326. 126 Mireille Bacache, supra note 103.

22

environment. Therefore, in the nomenclature, “ces préjudices objectifs sont ensuite affinés et

répertoriés selon les éléments de l'environnement atteints, à savoir, les atteintes au sol et à leurs

fonctions, à l'air ou à l'atmosphère et à leurs fonctions, aux eaux, aux milieux aquatiques et à

leurs fonctions et enfin aux espèces et à leurs fonctions.”127

The compensation shall be uppermost en nature (compensation “in kind”) by contrast

with purely financial compensations. The compensation “in kind” avoids the difficulty to put a

price on the damage.128 The financial compensation is subsidiary.129 Here is of course raised the

problem of the misappropriation of the funds in case of financial compensation. The distinction

between the two compensations is described as following:

“Selon le droit commun de la responsabilité, la réparation peut être en argent ou en nature. La réparation en argent consiste à condamner le responsable au simple paiement d'une indemnité. En revanche, la réparation en nature est une réparation non pécuniaire. Elle consiste pour le juge à imposer au responsable un acte, un comportement, une prestation matérielle qui vise à supprimer ou atténuer le dommage.”130

If French lawmakers recognize the ecological damage, this evolution will not be

equivalent to the recognition of a legal personality for “natural objects.” Indeed, this idea of

“trees having standing” implies a temporal component. This standing may occur before the

damage (a priori) or after the damage (a posteriori). Civil liability laws constitute a set of rules

focused on the compensation,131 in other words, an action a posteriori. With the ecological

damage, an association like the Sierra Club in Sierra Club v. Morton could not take to court an

authorization to urbanize a wild area. And that is the main flaw of the legal reform.

127 Ibid. 128 France, Sénat, Rapport sur la proposition de loi M. Bruno Retailleau et plusieurs de ses collègues visant à inscrire la notion de préjudice écologique dans le code civil, supra note 100 at 28. 129 France, Ministère de la Justice, Pour la réparation du préjudice écologique, 17 September 2013 (Reporter: Yves Jégouzo) at 48. 130 Mireille Bacache, supra note 103. 131 Ibid. “Objectif premier indemnitaire” de la responsabilité civile.”

23

Conclusion

In order to close the loop, we can go back to Alain Baraton, the head gardener of the

Versailles estate who quotes the French Académicien Jean-Marie Rouart in his book:

Évidemment [les arbres] ne manifestent pas, ne séquestrent pas les patrons ni ne saccagent les préfectures, pas plus qu’ils n’élèvent la voix dans les journaux.132 Alors pourquoi se préoccuperait-on de leur sort ? Pacifiques, bienfaisants, les arbres sont des victimes désignées dans un monde où tout réside dans le rapport de force. Ils ont un double handicap dans la mercantilisation frénétique qui nous mine : non seulement ils suscitent la convoitise parce que le bois coûte cher, mais ils sont gênants pour tous ceux qui veulent faire du profit en urbanisant à tout-va un paysage français déjà si dévasté qu’on ne songe même plus à protéger. À quoi ça sert, la beauté ? Ça rapport combien ? […] En ce bas monde, qu’est ce qui n’est pas condamné à périr si ce n’est la bêtise qui, elle, est immortelle ?133

This idea of evaluating the monetary equivalent of the “natural object” is at the heart of the

debate. As we have seen, the compensation of ecological damages should not be in priority

monetary value. This is what Justice Douglas meant by criticizing the “Almighty Dollar.”134

(Euro in this case) And this is the pitfall that French lawmakers will have to avoid by favoring

the compensation “in kind” even though the complexity of the environment may be a pitfall in

itself.

To paraphrase the French writer Émile Zola, the legal revolution is in motion, and

nothing shall stop it.135 Environmental law is in motion. From the first major laws passed in the

1970s (protection of water, protection of the air, regulation of polluting activities) through the

elevation of its main principles at the constitutional level (with the Charte de l’environnement)

and, of course, the influence of the European Union, the Law shall be considered as a important

tool to use in order to face our modern challenges. The recognition of the préjudice écologique is

a step forward. Comparative law may also provide other interesting ideas that could be

132 The author makes a reference to contemporary ways of demonstrations nourishing the news for the past decades. 133 Cited in Alain Baraton, supra note 4 at 108-109. 134 William O Douglas, supra note 19 at 110. 135 The original quote is: “La vérité est en marche, et rien de l’arrêtera.”

24

implemented in the French legal system: the doctrine of market share liability136 and the

bestowing of punitive damages in the United States of America are two examples.

136 In case of diffuse pollution for example, the causal link cannot be made between a particular activity and the pollution. The doctrine of market share liability allows the court to divide the fine between the different actors who sold the product that caused the pollution without having to prove which actor was directly responsible.

25

Annex 1

John M Naff, “Reflexions on the Dissent of Douglas, J” (1972) 58 American Bar Association Journal 820 at 820.

If Justice Douglas has his way –

O Come not that dreadful day –

We'll be sued by lakes and hills

Seeking a redress of ills.

Great Mountain peaks of name prestigious

Will suddenly become litigious.

Our brooks will babble in the courts,

Seeking damages for torts.

How can I rest beneath a tree

If it may soon be suing me?

Or enjoy the playful porpoise

While it's seeking habeas Corpus?

Every beast within his paws

Will clutch an order to show cause.

The Courts besieged on every hand,

Will Crowd with suits by chunks of land.

Ah! But vengeance will be sweet

Since this must be a two-way street.

I'll promptly sue my neighbour's tree

For shedding all its leaves on me.

26

Annex 2 Picture of the Erika sinking. Online: RFI <http://www.english.rfi.fr/environment/20100330-total-loses-erika-oil-spill-appeal>

Laurent Radisson, “Erika : une victoire judiciaire pour les victimes de la marée noire” Actu-Environnement (25 September 2012), online: Actu-environnement <http://www.actu-environnement.com/ae/news/Erika-proces-cassation-condamnation-Total-prejudice-ecologique-16639.php4>

27

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Sowards, Adam M. The Environmental Justice. William O. Douglas and American Conservationism (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 2009).

Stone, Christopher D. Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality, and the Environment, 3rd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Whiteside, Kerry H. Divided Natures. French Contributions to Political Ecology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2002).

Wood, Mary Christina. Nature’s Trust. Environmental Law for a New Ecological Age (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

SECONDARY MATERIAL: REPORTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

France, Ministère de la Justice, Pour la réparation du préjudice écologique, 17 September 2013

(Reporter: Yves Jégouzo). France, Sénat, Rapport sur la proposition de loi M. Bruno Retailleau et plusieurs de ses

collègues visant à inscrire la notion de préjudice écologique dans le code civil, 17 April 2013 (Reporter: Alain Anziani).

General Assembly of the United Nations, World Charter for Nature (28 October 1982), A/RES/37/7.

World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth (22 April 2010), online: Rights of Mother Earth <http://www.rightsofmotherearth.com/declaration/>

SECONDARY MATERIAL: NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES Kefalas, Alexia. “À Malte, on est prêt à rejuger le naufrage de l’Erika” Le Figaro (6 April 2012),

online: Le Figaro <http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2012/04/06/01016-20120406ARTFIG00501--malte-on-est-pret-a-rejuger-le-naufrage-de-l-erika.php>

Radisson, Laurent. “Erika : une victoire judiciaire pour les victimes de la marée noire” Actu-Environnement (25 September 2012), online: Actu-environnement <http://www.actu-environnement.com/ae/news/Erika-proces-cassation-condamnation-Total-prejudice-ecologique-16639.php4>

Saltmarsh, Matthew. “French Court Upholds Verdict in Oil Spill” New York Times (30 March 2010).

Siddique, Haroon. “French Oil Giant to Pay for Environmental Disaster” The Guardian (16 January 2008), online: The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/16/france.environment>

Vidal, John. “Bolivia enshrines natural world's rights with equal status for Mother Earth” The Guardian (10 April 2011), online: The Guardian

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<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/10/bolivia-enshrines-natural-worlds-rights>