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From ‘the’ Precautionary Principle toPrecautionary PrinciplesLauren Hartzell-Nicholsa
a University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USAPublished online: 15 Oct 2013.
To cite this article: Lauren Hartzell-Nichols (2013) From ‘the’ Precautionary Principleto Precautionary Principles, Ethics, Policy & Environment, 16:3, 308-320, DOI:10.1080/21550085.2013.844569
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Ethics, Policy & Environment, 2013 Vol. 16, No. 3, 308–320, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2013.844569
Feature Article
From ‘the’ Precautionary Principle to Precautionary Principles
LAUREN HARTZELL-NICHOLS University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
ABSTRACT The precautionary principle has been widely discussed in the academic, legal, and policy arenas. This paper argues, however, that there is no single precautionary principle and we should stop referring to ‘the’ precautionary principle. Instead, we should talk about ‘precaution’ and ‘precautionary approaches’ more generally and identify and defend distinct precautionary principles of limited scope. Drawing on the vast literature on ‘the’ precautionary principle, this paper further argues that the challenges of decision making under conditions of uncertainty necessitate taking a precautionary approach to decision making that will enable us to understand what particular precautionary principles require of us on a case-by-case basis.
Introduction
What is the precautionary principle? Most of us think we know the answer to this question, yet for every dozen respondents there would likely be close to a dozen different answers. The precautionary principle has been proposed as a possible guide to addressing all sorts of threats of harm in all sorts of contexts. Yet, for all the attention it has garnered, there remains much confusion surrounding this principle. The precautionary principle is often associated with the intuition that it is better to be safe than sorry; when faced with a threat of harm we should take precautionary measures, even if we are uncertain about its likelihood or extent. Alternatively, the precautionary principle is often associated with the idea that we ought to act in advance of scientific certainty to protect human health and/or the environment. But one of the most significant problems the precautionary principle faces is that there is no consensus as to how it should be formulated or interpreted. Does it matter that there is so little agreement about just what the precautionary
principle is? I think it does. In this paper I argue we should radically reframe the way we talk about the precautionary principle such that we move away from taking about ‘the’ precautionary principle and instead talk about ‘precaution’ and ‘precautionary approaches’ more generally and identify and defend distinct precautionary principles of limited scope. There are likely many different precautionary principles, each of which applies to a narrow range of threats. For example, there is likely a precautionary principle that applies to human subject testing in medical research, another that applies to warfare, another that applies to the environmental impacts of climate change, and so on. Reframing
Correspondence Address: Lauren Hartzell-Nichols, Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, 361 Savery Hall, Box 353350, Seattle, WA 98195, USA. Tel: (206) 543-5855; Fax: (206) 685-8740; Email: [email protected]
q 2013 Taylor & Francis
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precautionary approaches in this way may not seem all that significant, and not everyone will agree with me that this is the right move (e.g., Ahteensuu & Sandin, 2012; Fisher, 2002; Sandin, Peterson, Hansson, Ruden, & Juthe, 2002), but I argue that in order to restore any real normative force to talk of precaution we ought to embrace this conceptual shift. My thesis suggests that work on precaution should focus on identifying and defending precautionary principles that can be applied using precautionary decision-making procedures in, what Kerry Whiteside (2006) would call, precautionary politics. Moving away from talk of ‘the’ precautionary principle will pave a way forward that will help us make sense of the large, unified body of literature on precaution.
Abandoning Talk of ‘the’ Precautionary Principle
We face threats of harm all the time. Some of these threats, such as those posed by driving, are of our own creation. Other threats, such as those posed by tornadoes, are imposed upon us by nature. And yet other threats, such as those posed by climate change, are anthropogenic but causally remote. We even face threats of harm by simply walking down the street, or at least I do since I have a history of spraining my ankle or otherwise injuring myself while engaged in the simple task of walking. In all of these cases we may want to or believe we ought to take precautionary measures against the threats of harm we face. We wear seatbelts, communities are constantly working to improve tornado warning systems, we recognize we ought to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions,1 and I try to keep my head out of the clouds while walking. We may even want to or believe we ought to take precautionary measures to protect the environment or nonhuman animals from similar threats of harm. But how do we know when we have a moral obligation to take precautionary measures against a threat of harm and when we merely deem it prudent to do so? How does precautionary principle help us answer this question? I suggest that ‘the’ precautionary principle in fact cannot help us answer this question
since there is no single precautionary principle. The reason we should stop talking about ‘the precautionary principle’ is simple: there is no referent to this term. It is misleading and confusing to talk of ‘the’ precautionary principle when so many different things are meant by this term. Several authors have in fact explicitly noted that there is no single formulation of the precautionary principle (e.g., Harris & Holm, 2002; Hohmann, 1994; Peterson, 2007; Powell, 2010; Whiteside, 2006). Furthermore, almost no one actually thinks there is ‘a’ precautionary principle, perhaps with the exception of those who use this concept to refer to a prudential rule of thumb. ‘The’ precautionary principle would be paralyzing if it were to require precautionary measures against any and all threats of harm, since risks abound on all sides (Harris and Holm, 2002; Posner, 2004; Sandin, 2007; Sunstein, 2005). In hindsight, it makes little sense that there is such a vast literature on ‘the’ precautionary principle when almost everyone contributing to this literature would agree, upon reflection, that there is no single referent to the term around which this literature has been oriented. While some see this, or more generally the ambiguity surrounding the precautionary principle, as a reason for rejecting the precautionary principle at least in public policy (e.g., Burnett, 2009), I see it as a reason for reframing our understanding of precaution. Some authors in fact have already begun to move away from talk of ‘the’ precautionary
principle to more general discussions of precaution (e.g., Munthe, 2011; Shue, 2010; and, to a lesser extent, McKinnon, 2012). Russell Powell goes so far as to say,
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It is somewhat misleading to refer to the precautionary principle, since the doctrine enjoys no canonical formulation. Instead, it amounts to a largely disconnected constellation of legal, political, and academic articulations that fall within the rubric of what might be called the precautionary approach. (Powell, 2010, p. 183, original emphasis)
Nonetheless, Powell continues to discuss ‘the’ precautionary principle and its many formulations, seemingly just because this is the norm in the literature. I urge us to latch on to his sentiment, however, and much more clearly articulate a general precautionary approach from particular precautionary principles. Here I will identify four broad interpretations of ‘the precautionary principle’2 so as to
ground my argument that we should move away from talk of ‘the’ precautionary principle. The first answer to the question of how the precautionary principle is supposed to help us understand when to take precautionary measures is that this principle is nothing more than a prudential rule of thumb. This first interpretation of the precautionary principle is not often discussed in the literature, but it is the one most intuitively applied in everyday life. It is wise, so the thought goes, to take precautionary measures against everyday threats of harm. We wear coats when it’s cold outside, wash our hands before meals, and take care not to fall while walking down the street. This prudential understanding of ‘the’ precautionary principle captures the ‘better safe than sorry’ slogan in everyday terms. A second answer is that different versions of the precautionary principle can supply the
answer in different contexts. Many formulations of the precautionary principle have appeared both in environmental policy as well as in the academic literature (e.g., Whiteside, 2006; Zander, 2010). Formulations of the precautionary principle have been identified, for example, as strong or weak in various ways. As Jonathan Hughes says,
The concept of strength and weakness, as applied to formulations of the precautionary principle, is, therefore, multi-dimensional: formulations can vary in strength not only in the respect of the action they recommend but in respect of the seriousness of potential harm and level of evidence required to trigger that action. (Hughes, 2006, p. 452)
Others distinguish between normative and epistemic versions of the precautionary principle (e.g., Harris and Holm, 2002; Peterson, 2007; Sandin, 2007). Given the substantive differences between different formulations of the precautionary principle on these kinds of views, it seems ‘the’ precautionary principle is actually implicitly understood as a family of principles. Looking at two examples of ‘the’ precautionary principle in environmental policy
further illustrates this point.
Wingspread Precautionary Principle
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. (Raffensperger & Tickner, 1999, p. 8)
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Rio Precautionary Principle
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 15)
As is hopefully evident when these are put side by side, there are significant differences between the Wingspread precautionary principle and the Rio precautionary principle. While the Wingspread precautionary principle, for example, addresses threats of harm to human health and the environment, the Rio precautionary principle only addresses environmental concerns (though likely at least in part for anthropocentric reasons). The Rio precautionary principle includes a clause about cost-effectiveness, which some have come to associate with the precautionary principle, while the Wingspread precautionary principle makes no mention of this requirement. I could cite dozens (if not hundreds) of different versions of the precautionary principle all of which are different in important ways, but just these two prominent examples are enough to illustrate the point that there is a wide family of principles that fall into the category of ‘the’ precautionary principle. Some authors only implicitly identify the precautionary principle as a family of
principles that share a common structure by acknowledging that there are different formulations of the precautionary principle that are substantively different in content but which share certain features (e.g., Hickey and Walker, 1995; Manson, 2002; Sandin, 1999, 2007; see also O’Riordan & Jordan, 1995). Individual formulations of the precautionary principle, according to this view, may be tailored to specific applications. Nonetheless these authors often refer to ‘the’ precautionary principle while also referring to particular precautionary principles. Per Sandin’s suggestion, for example, is to require that we be very explicit and precise when presenting a particular precautionary principle, especially with respect to intentionality, uncertainty, and epistemic reasonableness (Sandin, 2007). Nonetheless, even though Sandin admits, ‘a universal precautionary principle is difficult to conceive,’ most of his discussion addresses, as he says, varieties of ‘the’ precautionary principle (Sandin, 2007, p. 109). Alan Randall also moves back and forth between talking about ‘the’ precautionary principle and a particular precautionary principle that he argues should be implemented in integrated risk management (Randall, 2011). Stephen Gardiner defends a Core Rawlsian precautionary principle implicitly endorsing this as a particularly plausible version of the wider family of precautionary principles (Gardiner, 2006). And Catriona McKinnon argues for a strong precautionary principle for climate policy on Rawlsian grounds, though she tends to favor talk of precaution or a precautionary approach over that of ‘the’ precautionary principle (McKinnon, 2012). Even people who seem to really think there is ‘a’ precautionary principle often allow
that this principle can be formulated in different ways, suggesting that in fact ‘the’ precautionary principle actually refers to a family of principles. Though many authors, like Hughes (2006), talk about ‘the’ precautionary principle, it seems that most tacitly admit that there is no single precautionary principle. Carl Cranor in fact has moved from talking about ‘the’ precautionary principle to a recognition that there are actually many versions of ‘the’ precautionary principle, hence implicitly endorsing a family of precautionary principles interpretation (Cranor, 2001, 2004). Others who are skeptical that there is a
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single precautionary principle nonetheless maintain that this implies we should limit the application of the precautionary principle, thinking of it as a general goal rather than a discrete principle (e.g., Bodansky, 1991). At the same time, some legal scholars, including Harald Hohmann, argue that the precautionary principle, ‘is now established in modern international environmental law,’ concluding there is one such thing that is ‘the’ precautionary principle (Hohmann, 1994). Even Hohmann, however, in suggesting that there are different formulations of ‘the’ precautionary principle admits that there is no one unifying statement of this principle (which he argues should be distinguished from the protective principle). This, I suggest, illustrates that even legal scholars such as Hohmann tacitly support the view that at most there is a family of precautionary principles, rather than a single precautionary principle. The third interpretation of the nature of the precautionary principle is as an approach to
risk management such that it is understood to be more of a decision-making procedure or framework than a discrete principle (e.g., Goklany, 2001, Resnik, 2003; see also Harremoes et al., 2002; Commission of the European Communities, 2000). On this view, the precautionary principle is seen as a guide to rational decision making in the face of uncertain threats of harm. This interpretation provides a framework for answering the aforementioned question, rather than providing a principled answer to it. Indur Goklany, for example argues that the only way the precautionary principle can be intelligently understood is as involving six hierarchical criteria for taking a precautionary approach to risk assessment (Goklany, 2001). His interpretation of the precautionary principle is therefore purely procedural, though this procedure is imbedded with normative content. Procedural interpretations of the precautionary principle have the advantage of building in to this principle that its components be clarified on a case-by-case basis, but these interpretations seem to lose the ‘principle’ part of the precautionary principle since procedures are not themselves principles.AsPerSandin notes of procedural interpretations, ‘“the” precautionary principle soon dissolves beyond recognition’ (Sandin, 2007, p. 105). The fourth view of the precautionary principle is captured by Kerry Whiteside’s
conclusion that ‘the precautionary principle shades off into precautionary politics’ (Whiteside, 2006, p. 150). On this view, the precautionary principle is understood as a banner for a new way of thinking about risk management in the face of uncertainty. This interpretation does not provide an answer to the above question so much as it identifies this question as precautionary in nature. Along these lines, Turner and I have noted that the precautionary principle has come to serve as a banner signifying a shared commitment to the welfare of the environment and future persons in addition to shared reservations about the effectiveness and applicability of economic cost–benefit analysis (Turner & Hartzell, 2004; O’Riordan & Jordan, 1995, make a similar point). Whiteside understands the precautionary principle as guiding us where standard assumptions about risk management do not hold by shifting the default position towards action rather than business as usual in the face of uncertain threats of harm. But he argues that there can be no 20- or 30-word juridical formulation of the precautionary principle because what is meant by ‘the precautionary principle’ is this shift in the way we approach decision making. Because of this, Whiteside suggests, and I agree, we need to rethink what the precautionary principle is and what purposes it serves. All of this points towards the fact that there clearly is no one precautionary principle, so
we should stop talking about ‘the’ precautionary principle and begin to be clearer about different precautionary approaches and what they entail. A productive way to do this
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would be to distinguish particular precautionary principles (e.g., Gardiner’s) from a general precautionary approach and precautionary decision-making frameworks (e.g., Goklany’s). Doing so will go a long way towards resolving confusion surrounding ‘the’ precautionary principle such that we will be able to make sense of the many formulations of ‘the’ precautionary principle as distinct precautionary principles and distinguish these from other more general work on precaution and precautionary approaches. Prudential understandings of ‘the’ precautionary principle, for example, may be captured in a prudential precautionary principle,while other precautionary principlesmay capture distinct prima facie moral obligations (about which I will say more in the following section). I admit that not everyone will be moved by this argument. Marko Ahteensuu and Per
Sandin, for example, claim of ‘the’ precautionary principle,
. . . instead of speaking about several principles (at least, apart from judicial studies) it seems to be more fruitful to say that there is only one principle which is formulated (or understood) in various ways. The use of singular and plural may just indicate the fact that the precautionary principle is thought of at different levels of generality. (Ahteensuu & Sandin, 2012, p. 968)
While Ahteensuu and Sandin may be right to some extent about why talk of ‘the’ precautionary principle has persisted, I maintain that it is the opposite of fruitful to continue to insist there is but one precautionary principle that is formulated in different ways. Elizabeth Fisher also says of the precautionary principle,
. . . the great variation in how it has been formulated, interpreted and implemented is not a weakness of the principle. Rather, it attests to how deeply embedded the principle has become in different legal systems and how there are sharp disagreements over the legal issues that it is a response to. (Fisher, 2002, p. 28)
In conceiving of the precautionary principle in legal terms, Fisher argues the precautionary principle, as a principle, should be inherently flexible that is more a mode of legal reasoning than a rigid rule. Fisher’s understanding of the precautionary principle is in many ways not all that different from my own. But where she sees its ambiguity as an advantage, I find the very notion of ‘the’ precautionary principle to be problematic. A precautionary principle that guides us to take steps to protect the environment for its
own sake because of its intrinsic value is not and should not be considered merely a different formulation of a precautionary principle that guides us to protect human health from the possible harmful effects of genetically modified (GM) foods. Protecting the environment for its own sake and protecting human health are substantively different ends that will sometimes require very different things of us such that a single principle that requires us to protect both will sometimes require the impossible of us. To see the force of this point one merely has to think about how different precautionary measures to protect the environment from Hurricane Katrina would have been than the precautionary measures that were in fact taken to protect human health (however insufficient these measures turned out to be). It arguably would have been much better for the environment to let Hurricane Katrina run its course, as reinforcing levees, while important to the protection of human health and property, only further interfered with natural sediment transfer. It would have been impossible for us to simultaneously take both kinds of
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precautionary measures (though admittedly there may have been some actions that simultaneously protected both human health and the environment). Similarly, looking ahead to the sorts of precautionary measures that will have to be taken to protect coastal ecosystems and human infrastructure from sea level rise we can see that what an ecocentric precautionary principle would require of us will be different than what an anthropocentric precautionary principle would require of us. Ahteensuu and Sandin want to claim that the term ‘precautionary principle’ is ‘a uniting
term for the various phrases found in official documents and in the relevant academic commentary literature’ (2012, p. 968), but there is simply too much diversity of interpretation for this term to be able to capture what ‘the’ precautionary principle has come to stand for. Earlier Sandin and coauthors said that the precautionary principle ‘can be made more precise through elaboration and practice’ (Sandin et al., 2002, p. 296), but inconsistencies between different ‘formulations’ of ‘the’ precautionary principle suggest otherwise. The fact that ‘the’ precautionary principle, even within a relatively narrow legal context, can imply radically different and even contradictory things (e.g., build levees vs. tear down levees) is deeply problematic. Interpreting ‘the’ precautionary principle as a high-level principle or guide (Petrenko & McArthur, 2010, 2011) does not get around this problem. So whereas Fisher explicitly says that she uses ‘precaution’ as shorthand for ‘the precautionary principle’ (Fisher, 2002, p. 8), we should carefully distinguishing ‘precaution’ or a ‘precautionary approach’ from particular precautionary principles. Precautionary principles should be flexible in the way Fisher describes, but this flexibility cannot extend so far as to capture all that ‘the’ precautionary principle is supposed to stand for. Nonetheless, the more general concepts of ‘precaution’ and ‘precautionary approaches’ can serve the unifying function that Ahteensuu and Sandin want to assign to ‘the’ precautionary principle. Too many different things have come to be associated with ‘the’ precautionary principle
for us to continue to talk as if there is such a thing as ‘the precautionary principle.’ Where previously ‘the precautionary principle’ has been the focus of the discourse, ‘a precautionary approach’ or simply ‘precaution’ can serve to unify the discourse.3 This is not to allow for lip service to be paid to precaution but to give normative force to precautionary principles such that we can point out when a precautionary principle demands action. Where we previously may have asked, ‘what does the precautionary principle require of us?’ We should now ask, ‘is there a precautionary principle that applies in this case, and if so what does it require?’ This understanding of precaution not only clarifies that ‘the’ precautionary principle cannot be used to justify any and all precautionary action, but it also returns meaning and normative force to precautionary principles. It will also help refocus scholarship on precaution away from vague and inconsistent discussions of ‘the’ precautionary principle and unify seemingly disparate discussions of precaution on a wide range of subjects.
Formulating and Implementing Precautionary Principles
Precautionary principles are not all expressions of some unified precautionary principle. As such, precautionary principles are likely to be diverse and not all consistent with one another. Nonetheless it would be strange to classify a principle as a precautionary principle if it did not bear some connection to the intuition that it is better to be safe than sorry and that we should sometimes act in advance of scientific certainty. The only unifying theme
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between precautionary principles therefore is precaution, yet this thread will enable us to reinterpret and repurpose much of the literature on ‘the’ precautionary principle. Work attempting to categorize different formulations of ‘the’ precautionary principle, for example, may be reinterpreted as identifying different kinds or sub-categories of precautionary principles (e.g., moral precautionary principles vs. epistemic precautionary principles) and suggesting how these principles should be formulated. Work on versions of ‘the’ precautionary principle (e.g., Gardiner’s Core precautionary principle) can be understood as articulating and defending a particular precautionary principle, as all precautionary principles will have to be independently articulated and defended. While the range of precautionary principles is likely to be vast, I am most interested in identifying moral precautionary principles that capture prima facie moral obligations, hence this is the focus of the remaining discussion in this section. In some, though certainly not all, cases we ought to take a better safe than sorry
approach and act in advance of scientific certainty. We may be prima facie obligated to take precautionary measures against threats of catastrophe, threats to human subjects of medical testing, and/or threats to endangered species, but we may not be morally obligated to take precautionary measures against breaking a nail or every conceivable threat posed by run-of-the-mill thunderstorms. Precautionary principles will therefore often be defensible in that other moral obligations will sometimes take precedence to precaution, which is why they should be understood as prima facie moral principles. Exploring the defeasibility conditions of a particular precautionary principle will likely be key to fully articulating and defending it. Moral precautionary principles will nonetheless capture cases in which we have strong moral reasons to take precautionary measures. Carefully formulating precautionary principles such that they capture particular prima facie moral obligations in an action-guiding way will therefore be both difficult and essential. Drawing on existing work both on how to formulate versions of ‘the’ precautionary
principle and on work that is critical of ‘the’ precautionary principle can provide lessons for clearly formulating precautionary principles. Turner and Hartzell, for example, identify five ways in which many formulations of the precautionary principle are unclear: first, the precautionary principle is often formulated such that it is unclear who must take responsibility for and bear the cost of precaution; second, the precautionary principle is unclear and even internally contradictory when it applies simultaneously to threats of harm to human health and the environment; third, it is often unclear what are to count as threats of harm according to the precautionary principle; fourth, it is also unclear what are to count as precautionary measures (Sandin, 2004); fifth, it is often unclear how much precaution is required by the principle (Turner & Hartzell, 2004). To be action guiding, precautionary principles should be formulated in ways that avoid these worries about lack of clarity. In particular, in order to be action guiding, precautionary principles should first clearly
identify specific responsible parties or indicate a procedure for determining such parties. Second, moral precautionary principles must be independently defended in part so that it is clear what kind of prima facie moral obligation they capture (i.e., anthropocentric, nonanthropocentric, or pluralistic). It may be that we prima facie ought to protect both human health and the environment (for nonanthropocentric reasons) and that sometimes we face moral dilemmas, but if this is the case we need some account as to why and how this is so. Third, precautionary principles must be of limited scope and address a specific kind of threat of harm. The argument as to why we should move from thinking there is ‘a’ precautionary principle to precautionary principles is, after all, partially driven by the fact
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we cannot possibly take precautionary measures against all threats of harm. And finally, in order to avoid confusion about what they entail, precautionary principles should specify what constitute appropriate precautionary measures or how to determine what precautionary measures are appropriate against a particular threat. To elaborate on this last point, ‘the’ precautionary principle has been used to justify an
extraordinarily wide range of actions, but it is often assumed that ‘the’ precautionary principle requires taking the most extreme precautionary measure available.4 George W. Bush’s concerns about weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as justifying an invasion of Iraq, for example, was commonly thought to be an application of ‘the’ precautionary principle (see Patterson & McLean, 2010, for a discussion of this case). Appeals to ‘the’ precautionary principle have also been used to publicly justify proposals to ban BPA (bisphenol A) in water bottles (e.g., Grady, 2010; Hamilton, 2009). In both of these cases, a range of precautionary measures were or are available, yet proponents of ‘the’ precautionary principle sometimes argue that we should take the most radical precautionary measures so as to fully eliminate a threat. In order to avoid such assumptions, precautionary principles should specify what appropriate precautionary measures are or how decision makers can determine what constitute appropriate precautionary measures on a case-by-case basis. And this illustrates the need for precautionary decision-making frameworks that will enable us to implement precautionary principles. Precautionary principles require a paradigm of decision making that is able to handle
uncertainties. To identify this process or framework as ‘the’ precautionary principle, however, is to confuse a process guided by a principle with that principle itself. The distinct features of the decision-making process that precautionary principles call for must be kept distinct from any particular principles because this process is about how to realize certain moral (or epistemic, etc.) obligations rather than a part of these obligations. In order to meet the challenges of decision making under conditions of uncertainty we need to distinguish between precautionary principles and precautionary decision-making frameworks. The aim of such frameworks is to enable decision makers to determine when a precautionary principle suggests precautionary measures are morally warranted and, when this is the case, what precautionary measures would appropriately address the threat of harm in question. Given that there are a range of precautionary principles, how precautionary decision-making frameworks are spelled out will vary. First, all precautionary principles address threats of harm and hence address
uncertainties. One of the unifying motivations to precautionary principles is that they are anticipatory of harm and thus apply in situations in which the future is not entirely certain. Further, while precautionary principles are narrower in focus than ‘the’ precautionary principle, each such principle addresses a class of threats of harm that can vary case-bycase. No two threats of harm are ever exactly the same and hence what a precautionary principle requires of us in any given situation will depend on the nature of that situation. Because of this, most precautionary principles must have some flexibility for accommodating uncertainty and nuance. This does not mean that precautionary principles succumb to some kind of particularism, rather it is only to say that what precautionary measures should be taken to avoid, for example, a threat of catastrophe will vary given the circumstances in which a catastrophe is threatened. Precautionary decision-making frameworks can help us implement precautionary principles on a case-by-case basis. Those who have identified ‘the’ precautionary principle with a shift in the decision
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From ‘the’ precautionary principle to precautionary principles 317
making paradigm rightly capture the need for precautionary decision making, though they fall into the trap of taking about this as ‘the’ precautionary principle. In the kinds of cases in which precautionary principles usually apply science cannot be
completely divorced from the policy process because the decision-making process must be in dialogue with the science informing it. In order for decision makers to be able to implement precautionary decision-making frameworks, scientists and analysts must engage in the policy-making process to know what information is needed and to provide guidance as to what to do with the information they provide (Brown, 2003; Tickner, 2003a). Decision makers may call on scientists and analysts to provide information, but scientists and analysts themselves must be responsive to this need and to the dynamic process of decision making in contexts of complexity and uncertainty. We must be careful not to place too much emphasis on the role of data or knowledge, however, because precautionary decision-making frameworks are meant to guide decision making even when we lack key information. The more we understand a threat the easier it will be to decide how we ought to address it, but lack of data or understanding will not be a reason on most precautionary principles for inaction. So whereas in a traditional economic risk assessment decisions may be made by calculating probable outcomes given available data, precautionary decision-making frameworks will sometimes have to emphasize that a lack of data may require erring on the side of caution in advance of scientific certainty. Precautionary decision-making frameworks embrace the complexity of decision making because, as Holm and Harris say, ‘Many moral choices are complex, and in making political decisions we should not lose sight of this complexity’ (Holm & Harris, 1999, p. 398). In discussing the ways in which science must be responsive to the needs of
precautionary decision making, Joel Ticker raises many of these same considerations. Tickner goes even farther, however, in proposing precautionary assessment, which he describes as a framework and set of procedures for implementing ‘the’ precautionary principle in environmental and health decision making (Tickner, 2003b). Tickner says that precautionary assessment is not meant ‘to replace existing decision-making structures but rather to reorient them to better support preventive, precautionary decisions in the face of uncertain complex risks’ (Tickner, 2003b, p. 266). If Tickner’s work on precautionary assessment were reframed such that it abandoned vague talk of ‘the’ precautionary principle in favor of precautionary principles, I suspect it could ground further work on what I am calling precautionary decision-making frameworks. That is, precautionary assessment may be a more general method that could be reframed to address the implementation of specific precautionary principles.
Conclusion
‘The’ precautionary principle is an ambiguous and amorphous idea that has no clear and/or consistent meaning. The intuitions that it is better to be safe than sorry and/or that we should sometimes act in advance of scientific certainty may act as prudential rules of thumb, but ‘the’ precautionary principle is not and cannot be a universal principle. We should therefore abandon talk of ‘the’ precautionary principle in favor of rigorous accounts of precautionary principles and more general talk of precaution or precautionary approaches. In order to accommodate the complexity and uncertainty associated with the (uncertain) threats of harm that precautionary principles address, we need, as many have
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pointed out, a paradigm shift in the decision-making process. Precautionary decision-making frameworks aims to accomplish just this by helping decision makers understand when a precautionary principle applies and what it requires of us. Rethinking ‘the’ precautionary principle in this way will allow for precaution to have a
more meaningful and powerful role in both public policy and our ability to understand our precautionary obligations. We might, that is, understand this interpretation as a whole as articulating the nature of what Whiteside (2006) calls precautionary politics. If we are to work on precaution, our project should be to identify and defend precautionary principles that can be applied using precautionary decision-making frameworks in precautionary politics. This interpretation admittedly limits the applicability of ‘the’ precautionary principle in public policy. Policies should no longer generically refer to or appeal to ‘the’ precautionary principle but should instead refer or appeal to specific independently justified precautionary principles or more broadly appeal to a precautionary approach. This will prevent ‘the’ precautionary principle from being used to justify any and all precautionary measures against any type of threat, which in turn will return meaning and political force to all precautionary principles.
Acknowledgements
This paper is part of a much larger project on precaution and climate change. As such, many people have helped me develop the ideas I present here. I am especially thankful for feedback and support from Derek Turner, Stephen Gardiner, Debra Satz, Josh Cohen, Tamar Schapiro, and Stephen Schneider. The view I present here, however, is my own as are any errors or misinterpretations.
Notes 1 This is not to claim anything about who ought to bear this responsibility. In other words, who the relevant ‘we’ is, is up for debate.
2 See also Ahteensuu and Sandin (2012) who go into much more detail on the history of the precautionary principle and offer another way of sorting various interpretations of it. Below I disagree with aspects of their analysis, but on the whole they offer a very valuable and up-to-date perspective of the relevant literature.
3 An anonymous reviewer of this journal suggested that a worry about my view is that we will never know what is meant by ‘the precautionary principle,’ but I see this as precisely the worry my view overcomes. We already never know what is meant by ‘the precautionary principle.’
4 I make this same point in Hartzell-Nichols 2012.
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