Frustrations of National Planning: Reality and Theory in Colombia

This article was downloaded by: [University of Western Ontario]On: 12 November 2014, At: 07:44Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of the American Institute of PlannersPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpa19

Frustrations of National Planning: Reality andTheory in ColombiaAnthony James CatanesePublished online: 27 Nov 2007.

To cite this article: Anthony James Catanese (1973) Frustrations of National Planning: Reality and Theory inColombia, Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 39:2, 93-105, DOI: 10.1080/01944367308977663

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01944367308977663

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”)contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitabilityfor any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinionsand views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy ofthe Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources ofinformation. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands,costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial orsystematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution inany form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpa19

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/01944367308977663

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01944367308977663

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Frustrations of National Planning: Reality and Theory in Colombia

Realities of national planning in Colombia are used as background for an examination of theory and models of national planning. Colombia is a democratic and relatively prosperous developing country of Latin America which has had a few periods of violent crises. National planning is highly centralized in Colombia along the lines suggested by several theorists in the United States. Yet the national planning function has been rife with frustrations and dubious successes. Such conditions merit examination of the theory of national planning in general.

Colombia should not be confused with the stereotype of a “banana republic” prone to political upheavals and tyrants of varying political persuasions. On the contrary, Colombia is a democratic, capitalistic, and stable country which has been influenced greatly by the fascination of its early leaders with the social- economic-political system of the United States. In recent years, however, there have been serious problems which threaten to change these conditions. The basic capitalist society has seen a growing trend toward governmental intervention and ownership.1 Political stability is beginning to appear fragile. Colombians, who have long prided themselves as a nation where the rule of law was paramount, have been laboring under an estado del sitio (state of siege or partial martial law) since early 1971.2 The confidence of thc people in their government and its efforts at improvement through planning is waning.

Anthony James Catanese”

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Colombia was “discovered” by the Spanish at the edge of the Great Inca Empire (Crow, 1971). Obscure In- dian tribes, whose origins still are unknown or debat- able, with such names as Chibcha, Muisca, Quimbaya. Sinli, Pijao, and Tairona, were not as politically and socially well-organized as their Inca brothers to the south. The Conquistadores were far more interested in the bright gold jewelry, gold utensils, and other common articles made of gold which appeared pro- fusely among the Indians. Spurred on by stories of the golden city of El Dorado, where princes and priests led ceremonies in which gold was thrown into a lake, the Spaniards pushed far into the Andes, looting and subduing Indian tribes as they went-in vain, for El Dorado was never found.

Colony and Republic Colonial Colombia was a larger area than at present and was proclaimed the Viceroyalty of New Granadu in 1549.3 While there were numerous abortive revolts of Indians against their Spanish and Creole masters, the first major revolution did not occur until (inter-

Anthony James Catanese, AIP, holds the B.A. from Rutgers Uni- versity; M.U.P. from New York University; and Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin, all in urban and regional planning. A faculty member of the Georgia Institute of Technology, he was Senior Fulbright Professor at the Pontificia Universidad Javer- iana, Bogota, Colombia, in 1971 and 1972.

CATANESE 93

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

estingly and coincidentally) 1776. Rebels calling themselves the Comuneros made apparent gains by butchering colonists, but their actions terminated when their leaders were executed by having their bod- ies quartered and burned.

A pattern had started, reaching its crescendo in the person of the “Liberator of the North,” Simon Bolivar. Following a series of setbacks in Venezuela, Bolivar entered Colombia in 1812 when a civil war was under way between rhose wishing a unitary government and those demanding a federation. Bolivar’s war of liberation was different from that of the United States. Bloody and macabre battles between the Span- ish and rebels led Bolivar to call for a “war to the death” with no quarter asked or given. This action and the ensuing bloodshed created the roots of an antimilitary sentiment which has survived until today in Colombia (Maingot, 1969). It further alienated the classes since the Llaneros, or lower class soldiers from the plains, were somewhat indifferent toward the Spanish and reluctant to accept orders from aristo- cratic officers; and the latter had no tolerance of the former.

The Spanish having been defeated, all the territory of the original Viceroyalty was made a Republic with Bolivar as the first President. The Republic of Gran Colombia was short-lived, and Ecuador and Venezuela withdrew in 1830. Eager for the benefits of the proposed Panama Canal, and with United States’ support, Panama withdrew in 1903.4

Bolivar’s supporters were advocates of a strongly centralized government, closely linked to the Catholic Church, with limited suffrage and civil rights; while the followers of Vice-president Francisco Santander, “The Man of Law,” wanted decentralized government, separation of church and state, and broad suffrage and civil rights. The former were the originators of the Conservative Party while the latter founded the Liberal Party which have jointly dominated Colom- bia’s government through the present.

These partisan principles were so hotly debated that animosity led to civil war. The “War of the Thousand Days” between the parties, from 1899 to 1902, resulted in the loss of over one-hundred thousand lives (Mchtyre, 1970). The Conservatives suc- ceeded in creating a highly centralized government, and the Liberals achieved some measure of church separation and universal suffrage-but the cost was high.

Roots of Violence Roots of contemporary unrest were prompted by the ideology and success of the Russian Revolution of

1917 and other socialist gains and surfaced in the 1920s. The elite of Colombia have been identified with the Conservative Party (of course there have been major exceptions), and some have been criti- cized for pursuing an aggressive and successful drive for wealth and power during this period at the expense of overall societal gains (Rippey, 1931). Nu- merous minor confrontations between parties and classes erupted, but the spark took almost thirty years to ignite the fuse of explosive violence.5

Conservatives won the presidency in 1946 by defeat- ing two Liberal candidates. Two years later, during a major Inter-American Conference in BogotP, the Lib- eral Party leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, was assassi- nated. The fuse being lit, partisan mobs burned, sacked, and destroyed most of Central Bogoti. La Violencia had ,begun and would continue for ten years.

L a Violencia emerged into armed action of peasant communities along partisan lines throughout the country. At its height, thirteen district guerrilla armies were fighting the legitimate government, and a number of “independent republics” were proclaimed in the country. Partisan peasant communities butchered each other-men, women, and children. War lords like Tiro Fijo, “Sure Shot,” appeared as hero to some, nightmare to others. The killings were widespread and while nobody knows for sure, some writers and historians estimate that between one-hundred to two- hundred thousand persons lost their lives (Guzman, et al., 1962). Yet the guerrilla armies never united- an action which could have overthrown the government which had become a dictatorship in 1958.

Political Stability General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla swept into power through a military coup. At first his tough reprisals against the rebels and paternalism toward the masses brought him popular support in the cities. Rojas, in addition to becoming rich as dictator, was reluctant about restoring civil rights and democratic processes. This led to labor and student strikes and marches in Bogoti that resulted in his overthrow in 1957, with the backing of both parties! A provisional government was empowered.

Both parties adopted the “Declaration of Sitges” in 1957 which proposed the National Front (La Frente Nacional). Rule of the country was to be divided equally between the Liberal and Conservative Parties, alternating presidents, until 1974. Colombian voters amended the constitution to legitimize the National Front. The provisional government relinquished pow-

94 AIP JOURNAL MARCH 1973

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

er to Albert0 Lleras Camargo who had been elected first National Front President in 1958 with 80 percent of the vote.

The carnage subsided and relative calm was restored. Yet La Violencia had transformed the rural peasants into a subculture and revolutionary pressure group without an orderly process of development (Torres, 1970). Rapid migration of rural peasants in- to the cities in recent years has brought with it some of this rural subculture. Yet the leaders of the guerril- las always have been urban-oriented, even though rural-based, and are now shifting to urban guerrilla tactics. Three guerrilla armies are known to exist in the rural areas at the present time: (1) Las Fuerzas Armadas de la Reuolucidn de Colombia, the guerrilla arm of the Moscow-oriented Partido Comunista de Colombia; (2) El Ejercito de Liberacidn, composed mostly of students and former students oriented toward Cuba; and ( 3 ) El Ejercito Popular de Libera- cidn, which is oriented toward Peking.

The National Front seemed to be working until the 1970 elections. While the “official” candidate of the Conservatives was constitutionally guaranteed the presidential office, three other men declared themselves “unofficial” Conservatives and entered the race against the “official” National Front Conservative, Mi- sael Pastrana Borrero. Among the “unofficial” Con- servatives was General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the former dictator, who has founded recently a third party, La Allianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO).

Originally right wing, ANAPO is now more or less a populist-socialist party. Rojas received 38.8 percent of the vote, while Pastrana won with 40.3 percent. Rojas claimed fraud and threatened violence which led Pastrana to temporarily impose martial law and later the state of siege. Due to the “unofficial” candidates, however, the National Front did not get enough votes to control either house of Congress. Congress has been placed in temporary recess and soldiers stationed in both houses after Anapistas created turmoil (lead- ing to fist fights and gunshots between congressmen) during opening weeks in the last few years. I n departamento assemblies and city councils, where any party can run candidates, a curious coalition of ANAPO and a minority faction of the Conservative Party called Betancuristas has formed which controls sixteen of the twenty-two departamentos and ten of the fifteen largest city councils (governors and mayors are appointed by the President).

CONTEMPORARY REALITIES AND DILEMMAS Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the immediate past President, is an economist and Liberal who based a great deal of

his administration’s programs on the progress possible through long-range planning at a highly centralized level. Lleras eschewed short-range planning and temporary gains and told his followers to fight for mean- ingful structural improvements in Colombia through long-range planning. This long-range planning called for investment of resources in the infrastructure needed for industrialization and economic development. When he left office in 1970, employment had been consistently high and industrial growth was around 7 percent per year-as a whole, the country was well- off. Yet the masses, both rural campesino and urban poor, as well as many bureaucrats and middle-class professionals, had never accepted the faith in long- range planning and development that Lleras put forth. I n spite of some real signs that the long-range planning approach was beginning to work, most people had grown suspicious of it-it simpIy was taking too long for most Colombians’ ways of thinking.

In the truest style of the demagogue, Rojas cam- paigned against Pastrana and the National Front in general by arguing that this long-range planning approach was denying people the jobs, land, cars, services, and lower taxes that they deserved. Although he payed lip-service to the advantages of short-range planning, he was basically advocating a kind of spontaneous public will that would dictate growth and development. Clearly the former dictator was laying the foundation for a populist-socialist party that would be suspicious of long-range planning and western-style development. The real power behind ANAPO, his daughter Maria Eugenia Rojas de Moreno (the odds- on favorite to capture the presidency in 1974), is sure to intensify party efforts in this direction. The surpris- ing appeal of the ROjaS-ANAPO argument has forced President Pastrana to institute major reforms in the areas of land ownership, housing, welfare, and urban services-often at the expense of long-range invest- ments for growth and development-as a response to mass demands and in order to thwart moves being made to mobilize the masses to overthrow the existing government by force. T o further complicate the Na- tional order, diversification of exports has been lag- ging, and the major exports of coffee and petroleum offer little hope for growth and expansion of the economy.

The contemporary manifestations of these realities are embodied in five dilemmas for Colombia (crisis is too strong a word to convey the true nature of these problems).

1. Lack of confidence. It seems to be common among people at all levels of society. Few believe that

CATANESE 95

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

the future can be designed in the present without major changes in the country. Coupled with growing distrust among the classes, each group believes that the other is using governmental institutions for their own selfish ends. National planners must frame their plans as though this dilemma did not exist and con- stantly reiterate that it is possible to make the future along lines that are reflective of national needs and ambitions. Yet few people are convinced by these arguments.

2. Rural-urban migration. There is an increase in tempo of the historical imbalance of crowded cities on the tops of mountains and virtual abandonment of the lush valleys to crops and livestock. While the dilemma is not new, the dimensions of the problems caused by needs for housing, public facilities, land ownership, and urban jobs are without precedent in Colombia.

3. Economic stagnation. It is caused by little diversification and oversensitivity to external economic conditions. The long-range approach of the Lleras administration for dealing with these problems has been put aside largely because it is not popular politically at this time. Hence while most people are well aware of the dangers of neglecting the economic problems, internal demands prohibit major efforts at resolving these problems.

4. Increasing violence. As a means of forcing institutional change, albeit short-range in nature, it is creating disorder. Despite the state of siege, there are many invasions of rural farms and urban periphery land by carnpesinos; especially bloody strikes by unions and students opting for employment and educational reforms; and an alarming increase in violent crimes (Cardona, 1969). T o reiterate, Colombians have pride in their rule of law such that these problems appear extremely critical to most people.

5. Education. While relatively good compared to many other Latin American countries, it is not very good compared to developed countries. Basic changes are needed at all levels from elementary school to university, yet the existing political and educational bu- reaucracies are resistant to change (Rodriguez, 1970).

It is toward planning that the political leaders are now looking for ways out of these dilemmas. The Lleras approach is not popular, but the concept of a highly centralized and powerful, organization is still in favor with Pastrana. Political leaders say that they believe that planners can develop comprehensive-gener- a1 plans to deal with the dilemmas. They state pub- licly that national planners shall provide the recom-

mendations for intelligent decisions to solve the problems of Colombia.

NATIONAL PLANNING IN COLOMBIA Pastrana’s continuance of the highly centralized, comprehensive-general planning agency advocated by Lleras is not new in Colombia. Since its Viceroyalty days, Colombia has known planning that has been centralized in the hands of the chief executive of the country (Amato, 1968). The only real difference today is that the technical and intellectual work is centralized in a single organization responsible to the President-the Departamento Nacional de Planeacidn (DNP) .

Enabling Acts and Powers Arising largely as a response to world conditions and the gains being made by socialist revolutionaries, a series of reforms were initiated beginning in 1921 to appease demands being made for governmental control over the economy and destiny of the country.6 The 1921 reform was passed by Congress, which restricted the location and established other regulations on industry in Colombia. A major reform in 1936 enabled the government to intervene in the economy through controls on production, distribution, and consumption. By 1945, Congress had become aware of the need to plan for the growth of the national economy and passed a reform that required the President to submit plans and programs affecting the economy to Congress for approval. The forerunner of the DNP was created in 1951 to handle most of these responsibilities and thus became the first national planning organization in Latin America. A codification of all the enabling acts was undertaken in 1968, with a general statement resulting that empowered DNP to adopt and maintain harmonious and material policies for national planning.

The DNP currently operates with powers intended to fulfill four basic objectives.

1. T o establish a national development policy in order to formulate plans and programs for the investment of the nation’s resources. 2. To coordinate, direct, and revise the functional

policy planning undertaken by the various ministries and institutes of the government.

3. T o incorporate and direct the planning and programing aspects of the national budget to ensure that functional programs and budgets of the ministries and institutes reflect national development policy-this is done in conjunction with the Direcidn Genera2 del Presupuesto, (DGP), Central Budget Office.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

4. T o provide the technical assistance and staff work for the Consejo Nacional de Politica Econdmica y Social, (CNPES), the National Council for Economic and Social Policy, which is an entity of DNP that rec- ommends the basic economic and social policies, plans, and programs for Colombia (there is no similar agency in the United States although the Council of Economic Advisers is a much weaker and limited analogy).

Despite these impressive powers, DNP has been frus- trated in getting Congress to accept its policy recommendations-even with the total support of the Presi- dent. DNP presented its major three-year national development policy to Congress in 1969, but the plan did not come to a debate primarily because it was an election year and the ANAPO strength was unknown (DNP, 1969). The national development policy recommendations were revised and modified in 1970 and 1971 and presented to Congress, yet they have not been approved to date primarily because the National Front does not have sufficient votes and ANAPO steadfastly refuses to compromise (DNP, 1970; 1971). Hence the President and Congress have split over the adop tion of the policy recommendations that Congress itself mandated. The President has made attempts to utilize the policy recommendations as executive orders for control and coordination of the ministries and institutes, but this can be circumvented by going directly to Congress.

The major thrust of the policy recommendations of DNP, which permeates through its other responsibilities and powers as well, is directed at resolving the five contemporary dilemmas discussed above. With this in mind, the general character of DNP’S proposals can be classified and examined.

National Settlement Policy A basic and consistent position of DNP has been to work for a national settlement policy which would slow down the migration from rural areas to the major cities--especially, Bogoti, Medellin, Cali, Maniza- les, and Cartagena. Unlike many other Latin Ameri- can countries, Colombia does not have a primary city which dominates its settlement pattern-instead it has a hierarchy of cities frequently found in European countries.

Highly influenced by the theoretical work of Fran- cois Perroux and his notion of the pBle de croissance, or growth pole, DNP has proposed shifting migration to such centers both old and new (Perroux, 1955; 1964). The programing of such a policy would be accomplished through the coordination of national iri-

vestments as well as some of the public-private efforts similar to those that have been developed in France (Kinsey, 1969). The growth poles are to be centers of thirty to fifty thousand population, with full facilities for education, health, business, and industry. The pro- posal has not received widespread support due to the reluctance of many planners to emulate the failures of Europe (Rodwin, 1970). Furthermore, the political climate is not right since the growth poles would take a long time to develop, and shorter periods for implementation are deemed vital by the politicians.

Economic Deuelopment Expansion Economic development is closely related to the national settlement policy in that DNP believes that cities should serve as the “motors of development” (Currie, 1965; 1966). DNP sees its role as providing for the spatial organization necessary for industrialization as well as dealing with economic planning and programing (Friedmann. 1966).

The economic planning is aimed principally at a reduction in unemployment through industrial expansion at the target rate of 7.5 percent per year. Some modifications have been made in this goal because it has become a political issue in recent times. The political issue is that industrial expansion may be good for industry but does not necessarily mean more jobs since new expansion is likely to be automated to some degree.

Major efforts are being directed by DNP to encourage capital formation to finance economic expansion. Such programs as stimulation of personal savings, lot- teries, and general efforts at redistribution of income are coordinated and guided by DNP. Yet the operating industries and institutes are somewhat autonomous, and DNP’S major problem is to strengthen its coordination effectiveness.

Educational Reform DNP has emerged as a major innovator and coordina- tor for educational reform due largely to the confidence it enjoys from the President. The basic approach of DNP is to move toward more technical and professional preparation in order to train people for jobs and move away from the traditional French liberal arts approach that Colombia has followed histori- cally (Rodriguez, 1970).

At the lower levels, the efforts are directed especially toward rural areas with the intent of training a pool of skilled persons for development of the growth centers-there is, of course, little if any guarantee that the newly trained graduates will stay in the ruraI ar-

CATANESE 97

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

eas. At the upper levels, national programs for providing subsidies to the poor for university training in critically needed fields is the major program, along with several proposals for curriculum and organizational changes. The proposals of DNP have been cnti- cized frequently as being too “vocational” and con- cerned on,ly with economic development goals and not the learning needs of an individual.

Restoring Confidence and Decreasing Violence DNP has been active in the attempts to restore confidence in the future and decrease violence-the two dilemmas are considered inseparable. The basic philosophy is that confidence cannot be restored until the rule of law is established once again in the heritage of Santander. The land reform programs are clearly intended to reduce violent invasions as well as to redis- tribute wealth. Certain appeasements are being made to squatters on the urban periphery to reduce violence and develop self-contained communities. This latter program is disliked especially by the middle class, since in essence it makes public facilities and public service jobs available to persons that are illegally and

violently taking over public or private lands. There also are several DNP proposals along the more traditional law-and-order lines.

The DNP realizes that unless all classes have a faith in the future the plans being devised will be useless. Because of this, DNP spends considerable time on public relations, seminars, conferences, educational programs, and various other promotions. It must walk a thin line that is acceptable to lower classes yet does not contribute to the growing fears of the middle class that its valuables and savings will be confiscated for redistribution to the poor-this is called la tirania de la igualdadj the tyranny of equality.

Regional and Local Planning For all intent and purposes, regional and local planning is controlled by DNP. Standards and performance criteria are administered by DNP for regional and local agencies, and most of the financing for regional planning comes from DNP. The DNP has created a model .of regionalization which is an attempt to delimit the hierarchy of central places and their hinterlands in Colombia along the classical lines of Losch and

Street scene in Bogo ti.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Christaller (DNP, 1969). While there are proposals to have the delimited regions serve as a basis for an eventual decentralization of planning responsibilities, DNP is not moving vigorously to implement its own proposals (Cardona, 1970).

A far more aggressive and potent tool for regional planning is found among the four autonomous regional development corporations. Modeled after the Tennessee Valley Authority, these corporations in the Cauca Val- ley, Savannah of Bogotb, Amazon, and Choc6 regions carry out planning which goes beyond their specific functional interests of providing power and incentives for industrialization. Yet the DNP steadfastly resists efforts that encroach upon its dominance of regional planning.

Local planning is directed largely by DNP as well. There are only a few local planning organizations, however. Since mayors are appointed by the President rather than being elected, DNP maintains its control over local planning in terms of both personnel and regulation.

U. S. Aid and Comfort Viewing national planning from an international perspective shows that Colombia has been influenced by planning programs in France, Germany, Peru, Yugo- slavia, and especially the United States. Not only has the United States provided much of the theory for national planning, it has provided most of the professional training for planners. Furthermore, the United States has contributed generously through the foreign aid program for planning and planning-related proj- ects in Colombia.

Having analyzed several years of failure for the foreign aid program in Colombia, the U. S. Comptroller General charged that national planning was “a major factor adversely affecting Colombia’s development” (U. S. Comptroller General, 1969). The analysts argued before the U. S. Senate that Colombia had failed to deal with long-range problems and instead was con- cerned with immediate needs. They argued that Co- lombia had not been able to coordinate and integrate functional planning done by ministries and institutes. Furthermore Colombia lacked sufficient data for p r a viding information needed for long-range planning and policy formulation, and Colombia had not developed a high-level professional planning corps.

Incredible as this critique may seem-the name on the report could be changed to say almost any country in the world including the United States-the United States told Colombia that i t must improve its national planning along the lines suggested or it would not re- ceive additional financial and technical assistance.

This has been interpreted by many Colombians to mean that the United States Government is insisting that Colombia implement a long-range, comprehensive-general theory of national planning-which has never been successful in the United States itself-re- gardless of whether or not the Colombians think such an approach is feasible. This is another example of the United States criticizing other countries for failures of which we are equally guilty and imposing an intellectual and organizational planning approach on another country because we think it is best for them.

THEORY AND ALTERNATIVES FOR NATIONAL PLANNING

Alternative approaches to national planning in Co- lombia may or may not offer a better solution mechanism for the contemporary dilemmas. It is interesting at this point to generalize the Colombian experience in order to examine the major theories of national planning as they form alternatives to the existing role and structure of DNP. This generalization allows for implications for national planning in other developing countries and perhaps for developed countries.

For organizational convenience, three classifications of theory are used: (1) rationality models, (2) structural change models, and (3) growth models. Classifi- cation in this manner is not meant to indicate mutual exclusiveness nor is i t meant to preclude an approach to national planning based upon an alternative mix. The major objective of this three-way classification is to provide a handle by which similarities and dissimi- larities in theory can be grasped.

Rationality Models Rationality models are based upon theories that attempt to work within the constraints imposed by social-economic-political systems in order to determine optimal solutions to problems. Such theories are related to optimality principles which state that the rational solutions to problems are found by maximizing gains and minimizing losses within the restricted solution spaces delimited by the constraints. Hence, if the system is well understood and the constraints clearly defined, rational decisions can be made by using a ge- neric cost-benefit calculus. In more general terms, a kind of mountain-view, top-down model is implied which encourages comprehensive-general roles and structure for national planning (Chase, 1945; Gross, 1953).

Nobel Laureate Jan Tinbergen has theorized that national planning should be a comprehensive process with plan-making for economic, social, and welfare

CATANESE 99

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

needs for both the short- and long-term at both the macro- and micro-level (Tinbergen, 1967). National planning in this theory emerges as a highly centralized function of government which consults with relevant groups in society. Tinbergen argues that scientif- ic approaches have evolved from such fields as econo- metrics, regional science, and planning science which are the most promising source of new techniques. He goes on to speculate that an even higher level of centralized planning, which is called “supranational” planning, is needed for such national groups as: (1) the communist bloc, (2) developed, noncommunist countries, and (3) undeveloped noncommunist countries (The Third World). This could lead to the interaction and cooperation among three supranational planning organizations that are prerequisite for what Tinbergen sees as the ultimate in the comprehensive-genera1 application of the rationality model-“ World Planning.”

John Friedmann has argued that the rationality model must be placed within the “decision environment” of developing countries since rationality as a conceptual tool must be bounded and made feasible in the real world (Friedmann, 1967). Having been influenced by his experiences in Chile and Venezuela, Friedmann relates that rationality models must be op erationalized by enlarging the basis for rationality as the key decisionmaking constraint in three ways: (1) reducing the ignorance of decisionmakers, (2) reducing the number of interests relevant to planning decisions, and (3) increasing the ability of planners to influence the actions of others. In order to attain this rationality constraint in Latin American countries, Friedmann sees four prior conditions: (1) arrangement of continuing dialogues between interest groups, (2) improvement of information p r e cesses for planning, (3) improvement of administra- tive structure and practice, and (4) decreasing the vulnerability of Latin America to external conditions and changes.

National planning is critical, in Friedmann’s theory, during the transitional stage in which a modern country is entering into an industrialized economy (Friedmann, 1966). The major function of national planning within this limited rationality model is to develop a spatial organization to sustain the transition to industrialization. Hence Friedmann states the case for bounding rationality and restricting comprehensive-general applications of rationality models to reconciliation mechanisms for spatial and economic transition variables and treating other variables as direct and indirect.

The DNP in Colombia is close to this approach in its role and structure. It is proceeding along the road to application of the higher levels of rationality described in the theory and literature. Its major omis- sion may be a reluctance and aversion to participa- tion of relevant groups in this process which no doubt has accounted for a lack of political commitment to its plans (Rodriguez, 1970). Yet beyond these proce- dural questions, i t appears that rationality models are inherently manifestations of the Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic mind, at least in the cost-benefit calculus, which may not be related to the decision environment of Colombia and other Latin American countries. For example, a competent and theoretically sound application of the rationality model in Colombia would surely appear elitist and alien to campesinos and indeed many bureaucrats. The personnel required for such an application of the model would have to be trained in a manner which is basically elitist by defini- tion (Eldredge, 1970; especially critique by W. R. Ewald). Furthermore, while much of the theory of contemporary rationality models has been developed in the United States, there has been almost no testing or applied research here, and this results in a certain degree of treating these models as commodities suited more for the export market than for home consump tion (Mann, 1967).

Structural Change Models Structural change models are based upon theories that encourage and stimulate loosening or elimination of constraints imposed by the social-economic-political systems in order to allow for new solutions to problems. Such theories hold that the planner should act more as the agent of social change or instigator of institutional reform than as the seeker of the optimal solution to problems. While the theory has been crit- icized as being somewhat unclear on the point, i t appears that optimal solutions based upon rationality concepts are not acceptable since they are feasible within the current system, while new solutions (which are implied to be superior) are possible through structural change.

Overt actions in Latin America have demonstrated that planners acting as agents of social change can lay the groundwork for revolutionary change, both violent and bloodless in nature. There is evidence, for example, to indicate that some planners had been supporting Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution before its culmination and in essence enabled an orderly shift into a socialist system (Centro de Informa- ci6n Cientifica y TCcnica, 1970). In Chile, the nation-


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

a1 planners had attained, in the opinion of Fried- mann, leadership in planning in Latin America and the greatest ability for implementation and particip- tion by the people by 1969 (Friedmann, 1971). Two years later in 1971, planners at the Oficina de Planifi- cacidn Nacional, ODEPLAN, frankly acknowledged that they had been undertaking planning efforts with the socialist coalition of Salvadore Allende prior to his election as President of Chile and the formation of the Coalicidn Unidad Popular (ODEPLAN, 1971).

There are indications that an “underground” as such may exist in Colombia composed of plannen in official agencies that are sympathetic to socialist movements or political parties aligned with socialist thought. The planning underground may be actively encouraging the existing political leadership to prom- ise more results from planning when they know that such results are unlikely to occur-some observers believe there is intellectual sabotage to frustrate any planning successes. The strategy of this movement is to lessen the confidence in the existing political order and demonstrate that planning cannot be effective within the existing social-economic-political structure of Colombia. This movement forms in essence a subculture of unknown dimensions that could be con- strued as laying the groundwork for transition to a socialist system.

The radical subculture described above is one perspective of the structural change model. Another perspective is attributed to the theorists that argue for neither radical change nor conventional methods, but rather for “reformmongering.” Albert 0. Hirschman develops a theory of problem-solving through political commitments which are possible under conditions of uncertainty that include the possibility of violent revolution (Hirschman, 1963). In Colombia, for example, Hirschman believes that land reform (redistribution of income via land ownership) was a response to the impending revolution of rural peasants and further violent invasions of large farms. This is exempla- ry of reform as a response mechanism for structural change of institutions through political compromise.

Along similar lines, the work of W. P. Mangin and John C. Turner in Latin America is illustrative of the potential for the structural change model without encouraging revolution. Mangin argues that nonretalia- tion against land invaders is in essence a structural change which serves as a foundation for solving problems (Mangin, 1967). Turner has argued that a permissive response of governments in Latin America toward land invaders would allow for the development of spontaneous communities which have inher-

ent social and economic values that could not be ob- tained through other applications of planning theory (Turner, 1968). Hence both state the case for a kind of permissive, adaptive planning partly in response to some acts which traditionally would be viewed as il- legal. A basic structural change in government can turn these acts into relevant manifestations of social and economic value that are outside of the welfare approach of capitalist countries and more appropriate in Latin America.

A final perspective on the structural change model is a Latin America adaptation of the well-known theory of “Advocacy Planning” (Davidoff, 1965; Reiner, Reimer, and Reiner, 1963). Succinctly stated, the argument is made that structural change should take place with reference to the manner in which plans are made vis-i-vis relevant client groups. Rather than a comprehensive-general plan, plans indigenous to various interest groups should reflect their respective values and goals. These plans could be submitted to a restructured planning forum for deliberation and action. Critics of this approach in Colombia have discussed the illiteracy, disorganization, and distrust among Colombian masses which would preclude the necessary consultations. Critics also debate the rele- vance of the advocacy theory in developing countries where public opinion is an elusive concept and political demagogy runs rampant.

These different perspectives of the structural change model create some confusion and stereotypes among political decisionmakers. Such stereotypes tend to create an association of the structural change model and socialist ideology. Hence the applications of the model are unpopular among the existing political leadership of Colombia and other Latin America countries. This stereotype problem and the dubious association with socialism tend to stratify planners and make it difficult for institutionalized planning to gain from potential attainments of these models.

Growth Models Growth models are based upon theories that encourage and induce economic growth either within or without existing constraints. Economic development is regarded as the triggering mechanism for the attain- ment of national prosperity. Depending upon the type of social-economic-political system in existence, varying degrees of redistribution of income among people and regions are possible. The overall concept is that economic development should be the major goal of national planning for developing countries because it will avoid political crises that dissipate energies nec-

CATANESE 101

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

essary for dealing with other planning problems (Friedmann, 1966). Furthermore it is assumed that national prosperity and redistribution of income will not only calm the masses but reestablish a framework for more action-oriented planning.

A fine example of this approach is found in Vene- zuela as practiced by its Oficina Central de Coordina- cidn y Planificacidn which is known as CORDIPLAN

(Friedmann, 1966). CORDIPLAN described the two fun- damental goals of its mission as: (1) The greatest welfare for the people through full employment and eq- uitable distribution of wealth; and (2) economic in- dependence through diversification of the economy and optimal growth. While acknowledging that these goals were indeed long-range-and could take as long as twenty years to attain-coRDIPLAN maintains that this model is in keeping with the basic needs of Vene- zuela. Some critics have been skeptical of the applica- bility of the Venezuela approach to Colombia and other Latin American countries, because they believe that political stability would not be possible through such a sustained effort over so many years.

Hirschman has written that the explanations possible for economic backwardness necessitate the modification of the growth model based upon economic development to fit within the cultural and contextual milieu of Latin America (Hirschman, 1961). Five possible explanations of economic backwardness in Latin America are: (1) supposedly intrinsic defects of the Latin American character (some would argue that

this does not dismiss oft-heard criticisms of genetic en- dowment due to the widespread mixing of Spanish and Indian bloods); (2) exploitation by imperialist countries; (3) beliefs in false economic doctrines of western countries; (4) dilemmas of both state inac- tion and excessive tampering by the state in the economy; and (5 ) rigidity in the social and economic structure. While many permutations and levels of cor- rectness are possible for different Latin American countries, these explanations of economic backwardness require that applications of growth models based upon economic development as the triggering mechanism must be special and even unique for each country.

Another contribution of Hirschman to the theory of growth models for national planning is his belief that rather than comprehensive-general plans, Latin American countries would be wiser to deal with specific policy issues (Hirschman, 1958). He argues that selective policy areas should be planned and detailed programing undertaken in a manner similar to the Monnet Plans for France’s postwar development. Such an exercise in “ad hocery” would enable government to have “pressure-inducing efforts” to initiate economic growth and “pressure-relieving efforts” so as to avoid overly ambitious, comprehensive economic development programs which are accomplished often at the expense of social needs such as education, health, public facilities, and law and order.

The specific policy issue approach of Hirschman is

Planned industrial zone about one mile from down town Bog0 tk Sector Industrial-A venida Caracas,


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

found in other works as well. Lloyd Rodwin in his study of national planning in Venezuela, Turkey, Great Britain, France, and the United States con- cluded that in all five countries national policies for development would require the germinating conditions of “crisis” and “solvability” (Rodwin, 1970). Rodwin hypothesized that nations, like people, shy away from abstract problems and avoid problems that either appear to have no solution or do not threaten to cause major troubles. Similarly, Daniel P. Moyni- han has stated that national planning in the United States would be better if it emerged as a specific policy issue approach in response to urban crisis rather than to attempt a comprehensive-general approach which he viewed as dubious even in developing countries (Moynihan, 1970).

The basic growth theory and the further perspectives added by theorists who do not believe ip comprehensive-general approaches is anathema to many planners schooled in the loftier principles of comprehensive planning. T o some comprehensive planners, this model may appear to be just an interpretation of national planning peculiar to economists. The meth- odology of the growth model is well-developed, however, and tends to be popular among established political elites and even with some socialist-revisionist ac- tivists. As several Latin American scholars have observed, however, true improvement in living conditions and prosperity requires “hard work’’-change in the philosophy of government planners for economic development does not guarantee “hard work” by the people (Caballero, 1971).

CONCLUSION: DEALING WITH FRUSTRATIONS The realities of national planning in Colombia and other developing countries pose a formidable cultural and contextual decision environment for application of the theories of national planning. These realities dictate, however, an undeniable need for variation and experimentation. Without this variation .and experimentation, and with continued attempts at whole cloth transfers of national planning models from other countries or unmodified applications of national planning theory, it would appear that national planning is destined for frustration.

Frustration is common among national planners and their believers in Colombia and other developing countries. Some of this may be blamed on the role of the planner as it has been focused narrowly on “sub- stantive methodologies,” in the words of Richard s. Bolan, which tend to use simplistic assumptions about

social change and societal decisionmaking (Bolan, 1971). This traditionally narrow role of the planner should be corrected so as to allow the use of planning methodologies that are relevant to the processes of social interaction and political change that are necessary for societal decisionmaking. Furthermore, as Martin Rein argues, national planning for policy issues must take cognizance of the inherent influence of political and social beliefs and values in policy analysis if political feasibility is to be attained (Rein, 1971).

I t would be naive to rule-out any theory of national planning in developing countries without modification and experimentation. Not only are alternative mixes possible, but conceivably an entirely new and unique model could be developed. It is the doggedness of some planning theorists and practitioners to avoid modification and experimentation that has resulted in a cleavage between national planners and popular movements in developing countries. The frustrations generated by political noncommitment to national planning and divergence between political groups and professional planners are examples of the ramifica- tions of this intransigence and pristine intellectual approach.

The Colombian experience has demonstrated the need for maturity and change in theory and application. In order to avoid the frustrations of national planning that have arisen in Colombia and other Lat- in American countries, and indeed to lay a course for national planning in the United States, certain antifrustration steps should be taken. These antifrustration steps are essentially constraints upon the promises and dogma of planning and have the effect of forcing politicization and experimentation. Four such antifrustration constraints for national planning are apparent:

1. N o t promising too much. Clearly the experience has shown that national planners have promised too much and delivered too little to be taken seriously. By constraining the major efforts of national planning to those problems that meet the Hirschman-Rodwin- Friedmann conditions of crisis and solvability, it may be possible to fulfill promises made by national planners.

2. N o t taking too long. Ma0 Tse-tung said ten thousand years is too long to wait to develop China and promptly dismissed long-range national planning as a relevant function, relying instead on short-term and readily modified plans. In some cases, it may be that five years is too long since political stability will be difficult to retain. National planning should be tai- lored to fit the peculiar time constraints of a nation,

CATANESE 103

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

but in no case should the exclusively long-range conditions continue. Similarly it is urgent that the long periods of time required to do planning be drastically reduced.

3. Experimenting. No theory or application of theory in the cultural and contextual milieu of a nation has been convincingly successful so as to serve as wor- thy of universal emulation. Taking this statement as fact, it is incumbent upon national planners to experiment with both theory and application. This experimentation should be extended to planning proposals even if there is a probability that the experiment may be a failure. While copying experiments of other countries should not be discouraged per se, there is little reason to expect success in emulation. Thus within the cultural and contextual decision environment of each nation, indigenous experimentation for problem- solving is not only desirable, it is mandatory.

4. Securing political commitment. National planning experience has shown national planners to be somewhat inept at political effectiveness. Part of this is due to the low caliber of politician that Friedmann has observed in Latin America. Yet much of it is due to the elitist mentality of national planners which c€e- ludes them into thinking that technical solutions need not be politically debated or compromised. Politiciza- tion of national planners is essential and can be undertaken in such a manner as to ensure the professional nature of the field but contribute to greater successes in implementation of planning.

Antifrustration constraints upon national planning may appear shocking and pragmatic to some observers. It may be argued that the higher calling of national planners places them in a class which is free of strife, politics, and, indeed, accountability. Many would prefer the mountain-view approach whereby planners look down upon the country they are caring for and steer it on the right course. The realities of the Colombian experience, and other examples from Latin American and other developing countries, point out the folly and irrelevance of such an a p proach. National planners should consider these antifrustration constraints if national planning is to emerge as a serious undertaking of governments that is capable of fulfilling national needs and ambitions.

Author’s Note: I wish to thank my Colombian colleagues Jorge Bernard0 Londoiio, Director of the Urban and Region- al Studies Group, and Roberto Rodriguez Silva,. Director of the Interdisciplinary Research Institute, both of the Ponti- ficia Universidad Javeriana. Both read the original manu- script and made significant suggestions.

NOTES This greatly disturbs the United States Government whose foreign aid program is the largest in Latin America and fourth largest in the world. More than 80 percent of foreign private investment in Colombia comes from United States’ corporations. More than 50 percent of all Colombian im- ports are from the United States. Colombia’s exports to the United States (mostly coffee and petroleum) account for 40 percent of all her exports. Declared in Decreto 250 of 28 February 1971 by President Pastrana who has steadfastly refused to remove it to date. In 1549, it consisted of the area of modern day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. This so infuriated Colombia that war with the United States seemed certain. The matter was settled in the 1922 Settle- ment of Differences Treaty in which Colombia received $25,000,000 from the United States for “reparations.” A brief respite developed when Colombia declared war against Nazi Germany after German submarines sunk some of her ships in the Caribbean Sea. Colombia also supported the United States with four batallions in Korea from

A good understanding of the legal basis of DNP can be gained by reviewing the following: Act0 Legislativo No. 1 de 1921; La Corte Suprema de Justicia, Gnceta Judicial No. 1832, 1928, p. 209; La Reforma Constitucional de 1936; Acto-Legis- lativo No. 1 de 1945; and Act0 Legislativo No. 1 de 1968.

1951-1953.

REFERENCES Amato, P. W. (1968) “An Analysis of Changing Patterns of Elite

Residential Areas in Bogati, Colombia.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.

Bolan, R. S. (1971) “The Social Relations of the Planner,” Journal of the American Institute of Planners 37 (Jan.): 386-398.

Caballero, E. (1971) Historia Econdmica de Colombia (Bogoti: Banco de Bogoti).

Cardona, R. (1969) Las Znvasiones de Terrenos Urbanos: Ele- mentos para un Diagnostico. Bogoti: Tercer Mundo.

(1970) Migracidn y Desarollo Urbano. Bogoti: Associa- cion Columbiana de Faculdades de Medicina.

Centro de Informacih Cientifica y Tbcnica (1970). Ensayos sobre Arquitectura e Zdeologia en Cuba Revolucionaria. Habana: Universidad de la Habana.

Chase, S . (1945) Democracy Under Pressure. New York: Twenti- eth Century Fund.

Crow, J. A. (1971) The Epic of Latin America. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday.

Currie, L. (1965) Ensayos sobre Planificacidn: Zntroduccidn a una Teoria de Desarollo Conocida como Operacidn Colombia. Bogoti: Tercer Mundo.

(1966) Accelerating Development. New York: McGraw- Hill.

Davidoff, P. (1965) “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning,” Jour- nal of the American Znstitute of Planners 31 (Nov.): 331-337.

Departamento Nacional de Planeacibn (1969a). Plan de Desarol- lo Econdmico y Social: 1969-1972. Bogoti: DNP.

(1969b) Modelo de Regionalixacidn. Bogoti: DNP.

(1970) Plan de Desarollo Econdmico y Social: 1970-1973. Bogoti: DNP.

- (1971) Plan de Desarollo Econdmico y Social: 1971-1974. Bogoti: DNP.

Eldredgc H. W. (1WO) “Toward a National Policy for Planning the Environment.” pp. 3-27 in E. Erber. ed. Urban Planning in Transition. Washington, D.C.: American Institute of Plan- ners.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Freidmann, J. (1966) Regional Development Policy: A Case Study of Venezuela. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. - (1967) “The Institutional Context,” in B. M. Gross, ed.

Action Under Planning: The Guidance of Economic Develop- ment. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 31-67.

(1971) “Urban-Regional Policies for National Development in Chile,” in F. F. Rabinovitz and F. M. Trueblood, eds. Latin American Urban Research. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, pp.

Gross, B. M. (1953) The Legislative Struggle. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Guzman, C. G., et al. (1962) La Violencia en Colombia. BogotA: Faculdad de Sociologfa, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

Hirschman, A. 0. (1958) T h e Strategy of Economic Develop- ment. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Hirschman, A. 0. (1961) “Ideologies of Economic Development in Latin America,” in A. 0. Hirschman, ed. Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, pp. 3-43.

Hirschman. A. 0. (1963) Journeys Towards Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America. New York: Twen- tieth Century Fund.

Kinsey, D. N. (1969) “The French Z. U. P. Technique of Urban Development,” Journal of the American Institute of Planners

Maingot, A. P. (1969) “Civil-Military Conflict in Urban Colom- bia,” in S. Thernstrom and R. Sennett, eds. Nineteenth Cen- tury Cities. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, pp. 297-355.

Mangin, W. P. (1967) “Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution,” Latin American Research Review 2.no.3: 65-98.

Mann, L. D. (1967) “Research for National Urban Development Planning,” in H. W. Eldredge, ed. Taming Megalopolis: VOl- ume ZZ. New York: Praeger, pp. 1042-1067.

217-246.

35 (Nov.): 369-375.

McIntyre. L. (1970) “Colombia,” National Geographic 138

Moynihan. D. P. (1970) “Toward a National Urban Policy,” in D. P. Moynihan, ed. Toward A National Urban Policy. New York: Basic Books. pp. 3-26.

Oficina de Planificacibn Nacional (1971) Plan Anual: 1971. San- tiago de Chile: ODEPLAN

Perroux, F. (1955) “Note sur la Notion de P61e de Croissance,” Economie Apliquke 8, no. 1: 307-320.

Perroux, F. (1964) L’Economie de XXbme Sibcle (Paris: Uni- versitaires de France).

Rein, M. (1971) “Social Policy Analysis as the Interpretation of Beliefs,” Journal of the American Institute of Planners 37

Reiner, J. S., E. Reimer, and T. A. Reiner. (1963). “Client Anal- ysis and the Planning of Public Programs,’’ Journal of the American Institute of Planners 29 (Nov.): 270-282.

Rippey J. F. (1931) The Capitalists and Colombia. New York: Vanguard.

Rodriguez, R. (1970) “Planning Education: The Colombian Case.” Unpublished Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Rodwin, L. (1970) Nations and Cities: A Comparison of Strate- gies for Urban Growth. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

Tinbergen, J. (1967) Dtwelopment Planning. New York: Mc- Craw-Hill.

Torres, C. (1970) “Social Change and Rural Violence in Colom- bia,’’ in I. L. Horowitz, ed. Masses in Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 503-546.

Turner, J. C. (1968) “Housing Priorities, Settlement Patterns, and Urban Development,” Journal of the American Institute of Planners 34 (Nov.): 354-363.

U. S. Comptroller General (1969) Colombia: A Case History of U. S. Aid. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Senate Committee on For- eign Relations.

(Nov.).

(Sept.): 297-310.

CATANESE 105

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

este

rn O

ntar

io]

at 0

7:44

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Documents

Frustrations of National Planning: Reality and Theory in Colombia