NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY:

FUNDAMENTAL MORAL THEOLOGY AT THE BEGINNINGOF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J.

The author’s survey of the writings of moral theologians over thepast five years shows a deep concern about both the nature of moraltheology and the role of moral theologians. A certain urgency ani-mates much contemporary reflection calling the moralist to be chal-lenged by the vocation to serve the Church and to explore better theways Westerners can learn from other cultures. In this regard, virtueethics continues to serve as a helpful medium for such interculturaldialogue.

DEATH

MORAL THEOLOGIANS in France and the United States suffered theuntimely loss of revered colleagues. On August 14, 2004, Xavier

Thévenot died at the age of 65. His works spanning nearly four decadestreated topics such as sexuality (among the young, the old, the celibate, thehomosexual); morality and spirituality; an ethics of risk; and ethical dis-cernment.1 On August 3, 2005, William C. Spohn died at the age of 61. Afrequent contributor to these pages, he set the agenda for discussions onScripture and ethics, virtue ethics, spirituality and morality, and HIV/AIDS.2 The beloved Bill matched depth with style.

JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J., received the S.T.L. and S.T.D. degrees from the Grego-rian University and is now professor of theological ethics at Boston College. Hisprimary research interests include fundamental moral theology and its history,Aquinas’s moral theology, virtue ethics, and issues related to church leadership,HIV/AIDS, and genetics. His most recent monographs are Moral Wisdom: Lessonsand Texts from the Catholic Tradition (2004) and The Works of Mercy: The Heartof Catholicism (2004) both from Rowman & Littlefield. A new book, Paul andVirtue Ethics, with Daniel Harrington, S.J., is forthcoming, also from Rowman &Littlefield. Father Keenan wishes to thank Seongjin James Ahn for his intrepidbibliographical assistance on this article.

1 See the tribute to him by the Institut Catholique, which includes a completebibliography: http://www.catho-theo.net/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique�19 (accessedAugust 3, 2005).

2 For these Moral Notes, William Spohn wrote: “The Reasoning Heart: AnAmerican Approach to Christian Discernment,” Theological Studies 44 (1983) 30–52; “The Use of Scripture in Moral Theology,” 47 (1985) 88–102; “Virtue and

Theological Studies67 (2006)

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The death of Josef Fuchs on March 9, 2005, marks the end of a period ofrevisioning the moral theological tradition. Along with Bernard Häring (d.1998) of the Alfonsianum University and Louis Janssens (d. 2001) of theUniversity of Leuven, the Gregorian University’s Fuchs provided the foun-dations for the moral theology that developed in the light of Vatican II.Many of the issues he dedicated himself to are central to this issue’s surveyof fundamental moral theology: conscience, the Christian in the pluralisticworld, the natural law, and moral reasoning by the Christian disciple.3

Finally, the death of Pope John Paul II leaves us with images of a richlycomplex pontificate and no lack of commentary on those years. For ananalysis of the late pontiff’s moral teachings, Charles Curran considers hiswritings, especially moral truth, Christ as the source of truth, and theChurch’s role as guarantor and promoter of the truth. After examining howissues like natural law, human reason, and eschatology are woven intothese writings, Curran describes the pope’s different methods of moralargument that he employed depending on whether he addressed socialissues or sexual and fundamental issues. Curran finds a fairly innovativeand historical-mindedness in the former and a restraining classicist men-tality in the latter. Having praised the pope’s social contributions, Curranthen argues, “My primary objection to John Paul II’s approach, involvingboth ecclesiology and moral theology, is his failure to emphasize and attimes even to recognize the Catholic approach as a living tradition. In myjudgment, the glory of the Catholic self-understanding is its insistence on aliving tradition.”4

On the topic of death, several scholars made significant contributions. In

American Culture,” 48 (1986) 123–135; “The Moral Dimensions of AIDS,” 48(1988) 89–109; “Parable and Narrative in Christian Ethics,” 51 (1990) 100–14; “Pas-sions and Principles,” 52 (1991) 69–87; “The Recovery of Virtue Ethics,” 53 (1992)60–75; “The Magisterium and Morality,” 54 (1993) 95–111; “Jesus and ChristianEthics,” 54 (1995) 92–107; “Spirituality and Ethics: Exploring the Connections,” 58(1997) 109–123; with William R. O’Neill, “Rights of Passage: The Ethics of Immi-gration and Refugee Policy,” 59 (1998) 84–106; “Conscience and Moral Develop-ment,” 61 (2000) 122–38. His books include What Are They Saying about Scriptureand Ethics? (New York: Paulist, 1995) and Go and Do Likewise: Jesus and Ethics(New York: Continuum, 1999).

3 Fuchs’s last collection of essays published in English was Moral Demands andPersonal Obligations (Washington: Georgetown University, 1993). On Fuchs, seeMark Graham, Josef Fuchs on Natural Law (Washington: Georgetown University,2002); James F. Keenan, “Champion of Conscience,” America 192 (April 4, 2005)6. Also, see Éric Gaziaux, Morale de la foi et morale autonome: Confrontation entreP. Delhaye et J. Fuchs (Leuven: Peeters, 1995); Cristina L. H. Traina, “Josef Fuchsand Individual Integrity,” Feminist Ethics and Natural Law (Washington: George-town University, 1999) 169–202.

4 Charles Curran, The Moral Theology of Pope John Paul II (Washington:Georgetown University, 2005).

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The Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, Darlene Fozard Weaver be-gins her essay with the clear assertion, “Christian life is one of dying andrising with Christ.” She analyses the “natural,” “personal,” and “moral”dimensions of death by revisiting the contributions of Philippe Aries, Ol-iver O’Donovan, and Karl Rahner, among others. She speculates on howit is that we appropriate the death of Christ and so die with Christ. Echoingan insight by which the separate notions of final and fundamental optionswere once developed, Weaver speaks of death “as a wager of love.” Sheexplains, “This confrontation of one’s own death entails an interpretationof the meaning and value of one’s life, and of what and whom [sic] isworthy in it. Thus, the person’s appropriation of his death is a wager, an actof faith whereby the person entrusts himself to some source of meaningand value. Hence we may rightly call this devotion of oneself a wager oflove.”5

Christopher Vogt’s Patience, Compassion, Hope, and the Christian Art ofDying Well is based on the traditional premise that the art of learning tolive well enables us to die well. Depicting the death of Jesus in Luke’sGospel as an invitation into the dying of Christ, Vogt revisits some of themajor texts of the ars moriendi tradition examining Erasmus’s Preparingfor Death (1533), William Perkins’s Salve for the Sicke Man (1595), RobertBellarmine’s The Art of Dying Well (1619), and Jeremy Taylor’s Rule andExercise of Holy Dying (1651). To read these works and to work theirinsights into a constructive contemporary manual for the art of dying, Vogtuses the ethics of virtue, describing the patience of the sufferer, the com-passion of the caregiver, and the hope that unites them.6

Finally, Dolores Christie envisions the wholeness of Christian deathpractically by considering the personal, ethical, legal, and sacramental de-cisions and practices that one engages in facing death.7 Like Vogt’s, hers isa contemporary manual for Christian dying.

THE THEOLOGICAL NATURE OF MORAL THEOLOGY

Five years into the new century we find several essays that invite us tolook to the past in order to chart the future. One essay considers the pivotalrole John Mahoney’s The Making of Moral Theology has had in casting

5 Darlene Fozard Weaver, “Death,” in The Oxford Handbook of TheologicalEthics, ed. Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski (New York: OxfordUniversity, 2005) 254–69, at 263.

6 Christopher Vogt, Patience, Compassion, Hope and the Christian Art of DyingWell (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). In an uncommonly wise andtender book, theologian Paul Crowley meditates on Unwanted Wisdom: Suffering,the Cross, and Hope (New York: Continuum, 2005).

7 Dolores Christie, Last Rights: A Catholic Perspective on End of Life Issues(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

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moral theology’s history.8 Another asks, “Where Have All the Proportion-alists Gone?” and notes that the transitional theory was a catalyst for anexpanded interest in the connection between moral action and moralagency and engendered interest in casuistry, feminist and virtue ethics.9

Elsewhere, India’s Soosai Arokiasamy surveys the recent past and findsmuch to recommend it: the historical character of morality, an appreciationof the moral agent as relational, and an attentiveness to the challenge ofglobalization, coupled with a growing appreciation for solidarity.10 With “asense of weariness,” Anthony LoPresti examines the polarizing discoursein contemporary moral theology and recommends an expanded and rec-onciling dialogue within the field.11 Julia Fleming is less bothered by con-temporary debates and offers wise counsel: “Anyone nonplussed by therecent ‘method wars’ can take comfort in the fact that moral dispute wasnot a twentieth-century invention, as the exchanges concerning Jansenism,laxism, probabilism, and probabiliorism copiously demonstrate. Althoughmy research is still too preliminary to support a definite conclusion aboutwhat these early disagreements mean for us, it cannot be insignificant thatwe are part of a struggle between innovation and the retrieval of tradition,mercy and the emulation of martyrdom, that has shaped the history ofChristian ethics over many centuries.”12 Representative of the many en-deavors to cross cultural boundaries, Herbert Schögel and Kerstin Schlögl-Flierl published in Germany their survey of American contributions overthe past forty years.13

8 James F. Keenan, “John Mahoney’s The Making of Moral Theology,” in OxfordHandbook 503–19. Mahoney recently wrote about how the significance of thedoctrines on creation, sin, redemption, and eschatology affect our ethical consid-eration of genetics: “Christian Doctrines, Ethical Issues, and Human Genetics,”Theological Studies 64 (2003) 719–49.

9 Aline Kalbian, “Where Have All the Proportionalists Gone?” Journal of Re-ligious Ethics 30 (2002) 3–22.

10 Soosai Arokiasamy, “Moral Theology at the Turn of the Millennium: Chal-lenges and Prospects in the Mission of the Church,” in Seeking New Horizons, ed.Leonard Fernando (Delhi: ISPCK, 2002) 303–16.

11 Anthony LoPresti, “Beyond the Family Feuds: The Future of Roman CatholicMoral Theology,” Josephinum Journal of Theology 10 (2003) 175–93. For an Aus-tralian read, see Brian Lewis, “Vatican II and Roman Catholic Moral Theology—Forty Years After,” Australasian Catholic Record 80 (2003) 275–86.

12 Julia Fleming, “Preserving, Investigating, and Learning from Our Past,” Jo-sephinum 10 (2003) 230–38, at 237. Fleming frequently invokes the past to chart thepresent: “The Right to Reputation and the Preferential Option for the Poor,”Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 24.1 (2004) 73–88. We await her forth-coming study, Defending Probabilism: The Moral Theology of Juan Caramuel(Washington: Georgetown University, 2006).

13 Herbert Schögel and Kerstin Schlögl-Flierl, “Fundamentalmoral 40 Jahre nachdem II. Vatikanum,” Ethica 13 (2005) 293–302.

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This sense of taking stock of moral theology has yielded a wonderfulcollection of textbooks. Among the most accomplished is Paulinus Ike-chukwu Odozor’s Moral Theology in An Age of Renewal. In the spirit ofrenewal, Odozor begins his work with a reflection on the historical, eccle-sial, and theological contexts of the reception of both the Council and ofHumanae Vitae. From there he explains the central debates that framedmoral discourse from 1975–1995: the proprium of moral theology, the natu-ral law, the use of Scripture, the magisterium, and the absoluteness ofmoral norms. Odozor takes pains not only to demarcate debates but also toillustrate consensus. He concludes by presenting a living tradition at theservice of the Church.14

Another significant work is James Bretzke’s A Morally Complex World:Engaging Contemporary Moral Theology.15 Mapping a moral methodol-ogy, Bretzke describes the sources for moral theology as two spheres at theend of two axes. Along the rational claim axis he pivots human experienceand a normatively human anthropology; on the sacred claim axis, he situ-ates the sacred texts and the Church’s tradition. The axes intersect in thesanctuary of the conscience, whose work is to guide us in this complexworld where we rely on casuistry. He concludes by reminding us of sin andfailure. At the heart of his argument is the mode of Christian discourse, andBretzke, a skillful teacher, proposes six criteria for such discourse: com-prehensiveness, comprehensibility, coherence, credibility, being convinc-ing, and being Christian.16

Todd Salzman studies the way Scripture, nature, experience, reason, andtradition serve as the moral sources for two contemporary Catholic meth-ods of moral argument: the basic goods theory of Joseph Boyle, JohnFinnis, and Germain Grisez and the revisionism of Fuchs, Janssens, andCurran.17 In England Alban McCoy explores important philosophical con-cerns dealing with determinism, freedom, and relativism, then looks at thedeontology of Kant, the consequentialism of Bentham and Mill, and the

14 Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor, Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal: A Studyof the Catholic Tradition since Vatican II (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame,2003).

15 James T. Bretzke, A Morally Complex World: Engaging Contemporary MoralTheology (Collegeville: Liturgical, 2004).

16 Bretzke develops these in “Life Matters: 6Cs of moral Discourse,” New The-ology Review 15 (May 2002) 48–59; see also “Scripture and Ethics: Core, Context,and Coherence,” in Moral Theology: New Directions and Fundamental Issues, ed.James Keating (New York: Paulist, 2004) 88–107; “A New Pentecost for MoralTheology: The Challenge of Inculturation of Ethics,” Josephinum 10 (2003) 250–60.

17 Todd Salzman What Are They Saying about Catholic Ethical Method? (NewYork: Paulist, 2003).

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virtue ethics of Aristotle, and concludes with a study of ethics in a Christiancontext with a specific nod to Thomas Aquinas.18 Australia’s Robert Gas-coigne locates Christian ethics precisely in the pluralistic world in which welive. His responsibility ethics stresses the centrality of conscience and theneed to envision the people we will become.19 In a festschrift for James P.Hannigan, James Keating brings together more than a dozen moral theo-logians to reflect on Christian living, particularly, moral discernment, con-version, love, and the common good. In the first essay of that collection,Norbert Rigali notes the lasting influence of Bernard Häring and declaresthat the subject of moral theology’s present incarnation is “unmistakablyChristian: life in Christ. There can be no question that the new discipline istheology.”20

Rigali’s assertion rings true throughout the field of moral theology.21

Kathleen A. Cahalan forges a relationship between moral and sacramentaltheology through Häring’s work on the virtue of religion. His understand-ing of virtue as not only interior and personal, but communal and public,prompted him to explore the ramifications of a virtue that moves an entirecommunity of believers to respond collectively to the God who calls us:“We face the world with a moral task which flows from the virtue ofreligion. This assumption can have only one meaning in the light of thefollowing principle: our entire activity in the world must have a religiousformation, for all our acts must be ordered to the loving majesty of God.This means that all our moral tasks are at the same time religious tasks.”22

Cahalan’s study helps us appreciate how we are formed morally by ourvirtuous stance of reverence before God.

Klaus Demmer turns to the mystery of the Trinity and finds there theunconditioned and unlimited reconciling nature of God, which we canunderstand only through our own practices of free decision-making. Heasks: How do we discover at once the proper courses of action so as tocooperate with God who reconciles us to Godself? Here, Demmer reminds

18 Alban McCoy, An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Christian Ethics (London:Continuum, 2004).

19 Robert Gascoigne, Freedom and Purpose: An Introduction to Christian Ethics(New York: Paulist, 2004).

20 Norbert Rigali, “On Theology of the Christian Life,” Moral Theology 3–23, at19.

21 Along similar lines, see the collection of essays by the late Herbert McCabe,Law, Love, Language (New York: Continuum, 2003); also L. Roger Owens, “TheTheological Ethics of Herbert McCabe, O.P.: A Review Essay,” Journal of Reli-gious Ethics 33 (2005) 571–92.

22 Bernard Häring, The Law of Christ II (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1963) 124,as quoted in Kathleen A. Cahalan, Formed in the Image of Christ: The Sacramental-Moral Theology of Bernard Häring, C.Ss.R. (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 2004) 161.

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us, lies the problem of the hermeneutical mediation of revelation withmorality.23

Jan Jans negotiates this hermeneutical mediation by reflecting on theGod of moral theology. Following his mentor, Klaus Demmer’s lead, Jansasserts that the kingdom of God cannot be thought of as “a pre-given ideabut [as] a concrete assignment which intends to further the spirituality” ofthe Christian. This search is guided by the assumption that there is a deepconsonance between obeying God and articulating good behavior. Janshelps us to see that our encounter with God informs and is informed by ouridea and expression of right ethical conduct.24

Cataldo Zuccaro studies the relationship between Christology and mo-rality by focusing on the Christ-event as constituting the foundation ofmoral theology. In Christ we understand ourselves as participating inthe self-understanding of Christ, who knew himself to be the Son of God.Born to a new life as children of God, we see the entire foundation of theethical life residing in the conscience; there, by identifying Christ with thefundamental option for the moral life, Zuccaro gives substance and suste-nance to that often theologically remote concept. Moreover, while under-standing ourselves as wounded by sin, it is precisely in our participatoryself-understanding that we see ourselves as, in conscience, being reconciledto God and to one another and therein participating in the work ofChrist.25

The centrality of conscience continues to be invoked as moral theologyreasserts its unmistakably theological nature.26 This is evidenced by anextraordinary exchange in Australia between Cardinal George Pell of Syd-ney and Jesuit Father Frank Brennan. It began in 1999 when Pell claimed,“Catholic teachers should stop talking about the primacy of conscience.This has never been a Catholic doctrine (although this point generally cutslittle ice), but such language is not conducive to identifying what contrib-utes to human development. It is a short cut, which often leads the unini-tiated to feel even more complacent while ‘doing their own thing.’”27 In2003, he amplified his position: “In the past I have been in trouble for

23 Klaus Demmer, “Der dreifaltige Gott und die Moral,” in Christlicher Glaube,Theologie, und Ethik, ed. Wilhelm Guggenberger and Gertraud Ladner (Münster:LIT, 2002) 111–28.

24 Jan Jans, “Divine Command and/or Human Ethics? Exploring the MaieuticalDialectics between Christian Faith in God and Responsibility,” in Für die Freiheitverantwortlich, ed. Jan Jans (Freiburg: Herder, 2004) 35–47, at 36.

25 Cataldo Zuccaro, Cristologia e morale (Bologna: Dehoniane, 2003).26 Charles E. Curran, ed., Conscience (New York: Paulist, 2004); Jayne Hoose,

Conscience in World Religions (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1999).27 http://www.cis.org.au/Events/acton/acton99.html (accessed November 5, 2005).

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stating that the so-called doctrine of the primacy of conscience should bequietly dropped. I would like to reconsider my position here and now statethat I believe that this misleading doctrine of the primacy of conscienceshould be publicly rejected.”28 In 2004, he defended his critique giving atwofold reason for excluding the “primacy” of conscience: “My object istwofold: firstly to explain that increasingly, even in Catholic circles, theappeal to the primacy of conscience is being used to justify what we wouldlike to do rather than what God wants us to do. . . . My second claim is thatconscience does not . . . enjoy primacy, because conscience always involvesa human act of judgement which could be mistaken, innocently or other-wise, and the consequences of all decisions have to be played out in someordered human community. Every human community has to limit therights of its members to ‘err’ however error is defined.”29 Finally, in 2005,we find Pell’s most distilled position: “While we should follow a well-formed conscience, a well-formed conscience is hard to achieve. And if wesuspect—as surely we all sometimes must—that our conscience is under-formed or malformed in some area, then we should follow a reliable au-thority until such time as we can correct our consciences. And for Catho-lics, the most reliable authority is the Church.”30

To the Pell initiative, which seems to be about responsibility and rightregard for the primacy of the truth, Brennan responded in 2004. After anextended defense of the primacy of conscience invoking John Henry New-man, Vatican II, and Pope John Paul II, Brennan considered the socialsignificance of the stances of specific Australian bishops speaking out, inconscience, against the war in Iraq.31 Later, in an address to the NationalConference of Catholic Health Australia, Brennan turned to another sec-tor of church leadership, advocating the indispensable relevance of aninformed conscience in carrying out that ministry.32 Recently he examinedanother area of leadership, in the political arena, and, after invoking PopeBenedict XVI and others, demonstrated the necessity of conscience so asto find and determine the truth.33 In short, Brennan’s responses always

28 http://www.sydney.catholic.org.au/Archbishop/Addresses/2003530_62.shtml(accessed November 5, 2005).

29 http://www.sydney.catholic.org.au/Archbishop/Addresses/200433_853.shtml(accessed November 5, 2005).

30 George Pell, “The Inconvenient Conscience,” First Things (May 2005) 22–26,at 24.

31 http://www.acmica.org/pub_brennan-conscience.html (accessed on November5, 2005).

32 http://www.uniya.org/talks/brennan_6sep04.html (accessed on November 5,2005).

33 http://www.acu.edu.au/forms/mediastore/FBPublicLecture.pdf (accessed onNovember 5, 2005).

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return to the pivotal question: could we ever find the objective truth werewe not obliged by the primacy of conscience?34

Natural law, too, has been engaged again, but now precisely as a theo-logical concept. Following Scholastic thinking, Jean Porter advocates forthe universality of the natural law, specifically as it emerges from its theo-logical context. She acknowledges that this approach might seem confused“if we assume that rational inquiry must be purified of all historical andcultural contingencies.” Later she explains that the theory provides “a wayof thinking about the theological significance of human nature and themoralities stemming from that nature.”35

Like Porter, Eberhard Schockenhoff writes an apology for the naturallaw. Demmer’s influence can be seen again as Schockenhoff explains theeffect of history on the natural law: “Historical thinking shattered theassumption that the human person had an essential nature which was thesame, untouched by the passage of time.” He adds, “The totality of humannature in its whole richness, with its potential and capacities which are yetto be awakened, can be grasped only in history, not by an aprioristicaffirmation about its essence or by a perception of its substance whichremains limited to the consciousness.” Still Schockenhoff explains thatsince human nature is “so fortunately imperfect,” we need to understandhuman nature within the context of history, because its very nature ishistorical. Similarly, the anthropological meaning of history depends on anunderstanding of human nature in all its incompleteness.36

Schockenhoff later explains that the natural law cannot “embrace anintegral ethos which comprehended every sphere of life,” but rather is “theindispensable basis of an international human-rights politics.” Recognizingthat human dignity and human rights are founded on universally shared,fundamental assumptions of what the given task of being human is, Schock-enhoff states that “natural law affirmations remain in a ‘preliminarysphere’ which points beyond itself to ‘the fullness of the basis of life.’”37

Finally, Demmer and Schockenhoff’s claims about history are relevantfor our understanding of the moral tradition itself. Brian Johnstone argues

34 Frank Brennan, S.J., “Conscience Perspectives: The Roman Catholic View,”Gesher 3 (2005) 76–79. See also Keenan, “Conscience,” Moral Wisdom (Lanham,Md.: Sheed and Ward, 2004) 27–46.

35 Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (GrandRapids: Eerdmans, 2005) at 29, 327. See Stephen Pope, “Reason and Natural Law,”in Oxford Handbook 148–67.

36 Eberhard Schockenhoff, Natural Law and Human Dignity: Universal Ethics inan Historical World, trans. Brian McNeil (Washington: Catholic University ofAmerica, 2003) 128–29. Likewise, Porter defends the teleological concept of nature(Nature as Reason 82–103).

37 Ibid. 290–91. See also Porter’s remarks of the “underdetermination” of humanmorality by human nature (Nature as Reason 45–52).

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that “tradition is not an object, an entity apart from the Church, but thestructured life of the Church.” He elaborates: “The main task of moraltheologians, within the Tradition, is not primarily that of securing theunchanging status of human values and norms by lining them to presumedunchanging essences or decrees. . . . Rather their role is to articulate thepurposes of the moral Tradition, to show, through historical research, howand why moral teachings emerged in the tradition, and to critically evaluatesuch teachings with respect to those purposes.”38

MORAL THEOLOGIANS

Johnstone’s insight that the nature of moral theology affects the vocationof the moral theologian is important. In a festschrift honoring KarlWilhelm Merks, the German ethicist known for his work on autonomousethics and responsible freedom, Joseph Selling reflects on moral theologyas “an art, or perhaps more accurately as a skill.” Focusing on ethics ratherthan on moral theology per se, Selling writes: “Teachers of ethics, there-fore, cannot ‘make’ people be ethical, or unethical for that matter. This isone of the mistaken presumptions of the hierarchical magisterium. What anethicist might be able to do is to explain sufficiently the information thatpeople need to make ethical decisions on their own.” He concludes, “Thefocus of an ethicist, therefore, should not be some personal quest to tellother people how to be ethical or some other utopian mission to make theworld a better place. Rather, it should be a focus on the project of helpingpersons clarify their intentions and broadening their understanding of theiroptions—all of which is built upon a fundamental respect for the autonomyof the human person.”39

Selling’s ideas appear to be very different from those held by youngerAmerican colleagues. For instance, David McCarthy reflects on an essay byWilliam Portier, who notes that the end of an immigrant Catholic subcul-ture “is the single most important fact in U.S. Catholic history” over thelast fifty years.40 McCarthy claims that earlier Catholics were members ofidentifiable communities in which they were enclosed, but in the postmod-

38 Brian Johnstone, “The Argument from the Tradition in Catholic (Moral) The-ology,” Irish Theological Quarterly 69 (2004) 139–55, at 154–55. See also, JamesKeating, “Contemporary Epistemology and Theological Application of the His-torical Jesus Quest,” Josephinum 10 (2003) 343–56.

39 Joseph Selling, “The Polarity of Act and Intention,” Für die Freiheit 76–84, at78–79, 84.

40 William L. Portier, “Here Come the Evangelical Catholics,” Communio 31(2004) 35–66, at 46.

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ern world, without such a subculture, the Catholic question is not how dowe get to the table, but rather what do we bring to it.41

In New Wine, New Wineskins, we find new scholars reflecting on thevocation we share.42 Christopher Vogt considers what it means to be atheologian in the Church and remarks that the “work of a lay theologian isnot a typical lay vocation.” He adds this striking observation: “I find thatthere are no regularized, institutional, professional practices in place todevelop my connection to what David Tracy has identified as the thirdcrucial public that theologians should engage: the church.” As a corrective,Vogt proposes that the local bishop should extend an invitation to the laytheologians to preach regularly.43

Margaret Pfeil offers moral theologians a traditional identity, to be adisciple. She writes: “Transparent mediation of God’s love constitutes theessence of the theologian’s vocation as disciple because it is the way ofJesus.” She adds, “The theologian as disciple at once enters through thedoor that is Jesus Christ while also opening a way forward for others on thejourney with and to God.”44 William Mattison, in arguing that “disengagedtheology” is more prevalent than we may think, writes: “While Catholicprofessors of theology generally do not reject the importance of faith inpeople’s lives, they frequently fail to engage their students’ faith convic-tions while doing theology.”45 Assuredly his claim will warrant responsesfrom many who teach in the field.

One particular theme emerges here: the moral theologian as summoninga call to holiness. Echoing a claim by Vincent Twomey, “Holiness is theultimate object of morality,”46 Christopher Steck writes, “Christian moraltheology is not simply a deductive or rationalistic science. It requires thatits practitioner have a well-formed heart that is attuned to the Gospel andthe values at its core. In an ideal world, Catholic moral theologians wouldbe saints and scholars. However, Catholic ethicists now perform their tradein a context that often does not sustain the kind of Gospel vision associated

41 David McCarthy, “Shifting Settings from Subculture to Pluralism: CatholicMoral Theology in an Evangelical Key,” Communio 31 (2004) 85–110.

42 William Mattison III, ed., New Wine, New Wineskins: A Next Generation Re-flects on Key Issues in Catholic Moral Theology (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Little-field, 2005).

43 Christopher Vogt, “Finding a Place at the Heart of the Church,” in Mattison,New Wine 45–65, at 52, 48.

44 Margaret Pfeil, “Transparent Mediation: The Vocation of the Theologian asDisciple,” ibid. 67–76, at 73; also, “The Interpretive Task of Moral Theology: Cul-tural and Epistemological Considerations,” Josephinum 10 (2003) 261–70.

45 William Mattison III, “Dare We Hope Our Students Believe,” in Mattison,New Wine 77–102.

46 D. Vincent Twomey, “Moral Renewal through Renewed Moral Reasoning,”Josephinum 10 (2003) 210–29, at 228.

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with a saintly existence.” For this reason, he proposes a “discipleship ca-suistry” based on saintliness.47

Elsewhere, vulnerability is the word that allows Ireland’s Enda McDon-agh to consider the holy. He pauses to reflect on where we are mostvulnerable, that is, in our sexuality. Here McDonagh weaves in an elementof an ethics of risk that allows us to accept, love, and contend.48 McDonaghexplores that element of risk in the context of the work of artists, the livesof priests, and the challenge of aging.

The incompleteness of humanity, which leaves us limited and contingent,is the starting point of Joyce Kloc McClure’s investigations. This insightdoes not lead us into a frustrated existence, but rather into the uncertainworld of possibility and freedom. In this light, McClure examines the no-tion of moral luck and captures the sense of human vulnerability thatmakes our situations in life so fraught with possibility for relationality andtherein for good and evil. She concludes with a wonderful proposal for anethics of active acceptance.49

Finally, Mark Graham and Darlene Fozard Weaver explore the issues ofthe fundamental option and its relationship to moral goodness and bad-ness, as opposed to moral rightness and wrongness. In the light of thewritings of Josef Fuchs, Graham proposes that moral goodness should bemore than simply the fundamental option. He suggests identifying good-ness with consistent patterns of striving to realize morally right activity.50

In one of the most thoughtful essays of the year, Weaver underlines thereflexive character of acting and notes that, while many revisionists de-scribe how “actions ferry the fundamental option into the categoricalrealm . . . [t]he ferry ride, as it were, does not appear to make a return trip.”She invites us to reflect on the intimacy with us that God wants, so as toenrich “our understanding of the person’s innermost, fundamental re-sponse to God.”51

47 Christopher Steck, S.J., “Saintly Voyeurism: A Methodological Necessity forthe Christian Ethicist?” in Mattison, New Wine 25–44, at 40. Richard Gula offers anintegration of morality and spirituality in his The Call to Holiness: Embracing aFully Christian Life (New York: Paulist, 2003).

48 Enda McDonagh, Vulnerable to the Holy: In Faith, Morality, and Art (Dublin:Columba, 2004).

49 Joyce Kloc McClure, Finite, Contingent, and Free: A New Ethics of Acceptance(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

50 Mark Graham, “Rethinking Morality’s Relationship to Salvation: Josef Fuchs,S.J., on Moral Goodness,” Theological Studies 64 (2003) 750–72.

51 Darlene Fozard Weaver, “Intimacy with God and Self-Relation in the World:The Fundamental Option and Categorical Activity,” in Mattison, New Wine 143–63, at 155, 160. These essays inevitably lead us to consider sin; see Ronald A.Mercier reflecting on the writings of James Alison in “What Are We to Make of

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VIRTUE ETHICS

Already in this note we have seen the frequency with which moral theo-logians turn to the virtues. By its renewing influence, virtue is becomingonce again the language of ethics.52 For instance, in his final contributionto the field of moral theology, Bill Spohn writes in the Oxford Handbookabout the future agenda of the relationship between Scripture and ethics:“The most adequate ethical approach to Scripture is that of character andvirtue ethics. While the ethics of principles and the ethics of consequencesare also represented in the texts, they are subordinate to the ethics ofcharacter.”53

In that same Handbook, Jean Porter considers virtue and teases out thetension between “the tempered pessimism” of Augustine and the “soberoptimism” of Aquinas. She explains that “the language of virtue builds ina kind of flexibility, even ambiguity, that is not so evident in the languagesof law and duty.”54 That ambiguity is what allows virtue to be the mediumfor comparative ethics.

James Bretzke, for his part, looks to virtue to engage cross-culturaldialogue about ethical issues. He focuses on the discussion of human rights,considering the Confucian understanding of them as human rituals whosesacred claim is based on the Confucian Five Relationships and the virtuesof li (propriety) and hsin (fidelity). He proposes the virtues of Confucian-ism as a positive resource for both interreligious dialogue and cross-cultural ethics.55

Arguing that the emerging interest in practices of personal formationstem from virtue ethics, Aaron Stalnaker offers a comparative study on theway the early Confucian figure Xun Kuang (ca. 310–ca. 220 B.C.E.), com-monly known as Xunzi, and Augustine of Hippo developed sophisticatedaccounts of transformative spiritual exercises to help us overcome our eviland change for the better. He discovers that “the most arresting and sig-nificant commonality” between the two writers “is their shared stress on

Sin?” Josephinum 10 (2003) 271–84; Kenneth R. Himes, “Human Failing: TheMeanings and Metaphors of Sin,” in Keating, Moral Theology 145–61; James F.Keenan, “Sin,” in Keenan, Moral Wisdom 47–66.

52 See Twomey, “Moral Renewal.” Christine Swanton argues that virtue ethics isnot limited to Aristotelianism but has a plethora of expressions: Virtue Ethics: APluralistic Approach (New York: Oxford University, 2003).

53 Spohn, “Scripture,” in Oxford Handbook 93–111. See also Daniel J. Harring-ton and James F. Keenan, Jesus and Virtue Ethics: Building Bridges between NewTestament Studies and Moral Theology (Lanham, Md.: Sheed and Ward, 2002).

54 Jean Porter, “Virtue,” in Oxford Handbook 205–19, at 219 and 206.55 James T. Bretzke, “Human Rights or Human Rites?: A Confucian Cross-

Cultural Perspective,” East Asian Pastoral Review 41 (2003) 44–67.

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the need for study, learning, and reflection as the backbone of their re-spective programs of spiritual exercises.” This “intellectualism” withintheir programs of spiritual exercises is a chastened one, argues Stalnaker,because while they affirm the value of intellectual apprehension and re-flection, they question “the neutrality and absolute sovereignty of think-ing.” He adds, “Being a chastened intellectual means that one views thetask of learning not merely as gaining new information, but primarily as thetask of assimilating transformative knowledge into one’s mode of exis-tence.”56

Stalnaker begins his work with the simple question: “Does anyone everreally change?” This interest in personal transformation permeates muchof the contemporary writings on virtue ethics and resonates with the earlierclaims of Häring and Cahalan as well as Pfeil, Vogt, Weaver, Graham, andothers.57 Herein we find the summons to become better people. This callmight seem, on the face of it, self-evident, but further consideration ofrecent works lets us see that virtue ethics has an aggressive agenda: itsproponents believe that we need to be awakened from a slumber of moralcomplacency.

Describing contemporary culture as comatose, the Irish philosopher,Thomas Casey, tries to awaken humanity by inviting us to consider thevirtue of humility: “Humility is of the utmost importance for a comatoseculture. First of all, it takes humility to recognize that we are in a quagmire;secondly, it takes humility to realize that we only sink deeper into thequicksand the more we try to get out through our own unaided efforts. Theonly way to rise from the morass is by accepting help. Being humble meansrecognizing that we cannot do it on our own, but we can do everything withGod’s help.”58

The most sustained and substantive apology for virtue ethics argues thatwe must reenvision what it means to be moral. Andrew Michael Flescherrevisits the well-known and accepted claims of J. O. Urmson and David

56 Aaron Stalnaker, Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercisesin Xunzi and Augustine (Washington: Georgetown University, 2006) 386, 391. Seehis, “Comparative Religious Ethics and the Problem of Human Nature,” Journal ofReligious Ethics 33 (2005) 187–224.

57 Besides my book with Harrington (noted above), my recent works on virtueinclude “The Cardinal Virtues,” in Moral Wisdom 139–57; The Works of Mercy:The Heart of Catholicism (Lanham, Md.: Sheed and Ward, 2005); “L’Etica dellevirtù: Per una sua promozione fra i teologi moralisti italiani,” Rassegna di teologia44 (2003) 569–90; “What Does Virtue Ethics Bring to Genetics?” in Genetics,Theology, and Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Conversation, ed. Lisa Sowle Cahill(New York: Crossroad, 2005) 97–113; “Sexual Ethics and Virtue Ethics,” LouvainStudies 30.3 (2005) 183–203.

58 Thomas G. Casey, Humble and Awake: Coping with Our Comatose Culture(Springfield, Illinois: Templegate, 2004) 13.

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Heyd on works of “supererogation,” that is, those deeds beyond the call ofduty. Flescher asks the pertinent question, Does such a category makesense once one leaves a duty- based ethics? By turning to a virtue-basedethics, Flescher asks what might be required of the ordinary person. Areso-called supererogatory works beyond the call of morality?

Flescher proposes the self-understanding of Dorothy Day who believedthat her moral task was to combat poverty by assuming poverty and chal-lenged us to live and act likewise. Flescher asks: Is her invitation an idealto be admired or a real explication of our call to be moral? He makes a casefor the latter: “The virtue ethic that I will endorse maintains that if we donot work on our character development, and thereby fail to dispose our-selves to love the neighbor and subsequently act on behalf of the neighborto a much larger degree than we currently do, then we can be found to bemorally blameworthy.” He adds: “While living virtuously is not synony-mous with living altruistically, living altruistically is the kernel of livingvirtuously.”59

In a similar vein, Maria Cimperman asks the question about the signs ofthe times: With over twenty-five million dead from the infection and forty-two million people infected, why is there such a universal hesitancy torecognize the moral summons with which HIV/AIDS confronts us? InWhen God’s People Have HIV/AIDS, Cimperman develops a basic profilefor the type of people we must become if we are to be disciples in a timeof AIDS. After reflecting on the need to be historical realists, she proposesfive virtues as constitutive of contemporary discipleship: justice, prudence,fidelity, self-care, and mercy. Like Casey and Flescher, Cimperman calls usto change now and offers us the virtues as the medium for such transfor-mation.60

This need for reading the signs of the times is made more immediate andpersonal in Bertrand Lebouché and Anne Lécu’s work, which asks thequestion, “Where are you when I am Sick?” They look to the virtue ofhospitality as providing a readiness to appreciate the urgency of another’sneed.61

This sense of the impending moment, of the kairos, the fullness of timepresent in the moment, stands as a moral challenge. Being able to discern

59 Andrew Michael Flescher, Heroes, Saints, and Ordinary Morality (Washing-ton: Georgetown University, 2003) 11.

60 Maria Cimperman, When God’s People Have HIV/AIDS: An Approach toEthics, (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2005).

61 Bertrand Lebouché and Anne Lécu, Où es-tu quand j’ai mal? (Paris: Cerf,2005). On hospitality, Patrick T. McCormick proposes the virtue for sojournerstraveling to the third world: “The Good Sojourner: Third World Tourism and theCall to Hospitality,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 24.1 (2004) 89–104.

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when we are in such times is the theme of some recent retrospective work.For instance, Jon Vickery provides a gracious investigation into “the phi-losopher of virtue” Josef Pieper’s cooperation with National Socialism.Vickery uses the virtues (and vices) to understand how Pieper allowedhimself to be compromised. He names covetousness as the vice that inhib-ited Pieper from seeing prudently where he was called to stand.62

A more positive discovery is described in the tribute to the late RosaParks. Randall Bush asks, what were the character traits that enabled RosaParks to refuse to move from her seat on Montgomery bus? Bush signalsthat the virtue of faith is what convinced Parks of what she had to do. AsParks wrote, “Since I have always been a strong believer in God, I knewthat He was with me, and only He could get me through the next step. . . . Ihad no idea that history was being made. I was just tired of giving in.Somehow, I felt that what I did was right by standing up to that busdriver. . . . I chose not to move because I was right. When I made thatdecision, I knew that I had the strength of God and my ancestors withme.”63 Bush quotes Parks’s biographer: “Faith in God was never the ques-tion for Rosa Parks, it was the answer.”64

Virtue, being transformative, leads inevitably to action. Timothy Jacksonmakes this case in his study of the Christian virtue of agape. In arguing thatlove is antecedent both to other virtues and goods (as “the necessarycondition of their full enjoyment”) and to our becoming caring persons,Jackson describes three basic features of agape: “(1) unconditional willingof the good for the other, (2) equal regard for the other, and (3) passionateservice open to self-sacrifice for the sake of the other.” He adds, “the thirdputs an explicit premium on a specific action: bearing one another’s bur-dens.”65

Finally two other works argue that by realizing the here and now as themoment for transformative change and action, we actually become hap-pier. Studying research on altruism and its relation to mental and physicalhealth, Stephen Post maintains that altruistic “emotions and behaviors are

62 Jon Vickery, “Searching for Josef Pieper,” Theological Studies 66 (2005) 622–37. The same “complacency with a corrupt institution” appears in Joseph E. Cap-pizzi study, “For What Shall We Repent? Reflections on the American Bishops,Their Teaching, and Slavery in the United States, 1839–1861,” Theological Studies65 (2003) 767–91.

63 Rosa Parks, Dear Mrs. Parks (New York: Lee and Low Books, 1996) 42, asquoted in Randal K. Bush, “Remembering Rosa Parks,” Theological Studies 65(2004) 838–49, at 846.

64 Douglas Brinkley, Rosa Parks (New York: Viking , 2000) 14, as quoted inBush, op. cit. 847.

65 Timothy P. Jackson, The Priority of Love: Christian Charity and Social Justice(Princeton: Princeton University, 2003) 10.

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associated with greater well-being, health and longevity.”66 In a rivetingchapter on near death experiences, John Gibbs notes that these narrativesshare the same three common experiences: the original encounter is deeplyconsoling, filled with light and love, but it is accompanied by a flashback ofone’s life, marked by regret over events with loved ones; this leads to areform of one’s life, in which one more vigilantly pursues love and eschewsselfish misery.67

THE CHURCH AND CULTURE

In What Is and What Ought to Be: The Dialectic of Experience, Theology,and Church, Michael Lawler considers what the ethicist can bring to theChurch. Using Karl Rahner’s definition of practical theology as the “theo-logical discipline which is concerned with the church’s self-actualization inthe here and now—both that which is and that which ought to be,” Lawlerexplains the scope of his project: “Practical theology is the theologicalreflection provoked by and in response to the church’s actual situation. Itdoes not explain from deductive theological principles the church’s actualsituation, but reflects critically on the actual situation to test it for relevanceand significance in light of both the gospel and the socio-historical condi-tions of the time.”68 After exploring the “mutual mediations” of theologyand sociology, Lawler turns to the sociology of reception of the magisterialteachings on artificial contraception and divorce and remarriage.

Lawler’s work could be read alongside one by East Africa’s major moraltheologian, Laurenti Magesa, who argues that the key to the AfricanChurch’s future is inculturation, and that its leadership must account forpresent relations between Africa and Rome and between clergy and laity.Needing to move beyond a fear of making mistakes, African church leadersmust rethink ecclesial structures and reexamine the apostolic conception ofthe Church as the people of God.69 But before doing any of that, Magesawants the Church of Africa to remember its past, act as a social andpolitical conscience, restore health, defend the oppressed, and, in particu-

66 Stephen G. Post, “Altruism, Happiness, and Health: It’s Good to be Good,”International Journal of Behavioral Medicine 12 (2005) 66–77, at 66.

67 John C. Gibbs, Moral Development and Reality: Beyond the Theories of Kohl-berg and Hoffman (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2003) 195–226.

68 Karl Rahner, “Practical Theology within the Totality of Theological Disci-plines,” Theological Investigations, vol. 9 (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd,1972) 102 as quoted in Michael G. Lawler, What Is and What Ought to Be: TheDialectic of Experience, Theology, and Church (New York: Continuum, 2005) xii.

69 Laurenti Magesa, Le Catholicisme africain en mutation: Modèles d’eglises pourun siècle nouveau (Yaoundé, Cameroon: Clé, 2001).

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lar, liberate women in Africa.70 Magesa has advanced his argument withanother work that explores the actual attempts by the Church to incultur-ate in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda and to explore the resulting religious,moral, and social practices. Those interested in moral theology’s possiblerelationships with faith, liturgy, sacramental theology, and spirituality, willfind in this evaluation a concrete expression of what theology in contextcan be.71

The works of Lawler and Magesa reflect the claims of Bernd Wannen-wetsch in his essay “Ecclesiology and Ethics.” He argues that “Christianethics should be concerned with what the Church has to say, but more sowith the word that the Church has to hear.” He explains the latter as preciselythe word that the Church proclaims. The Church, therefore, must receive,incarnate, and embody the word that it receives, and the ethicist must explorenot only what the Church teaches but how it practices what it preaches.72

In Germany, Herbert Schlögel also arrived at a similar position. Studyingthe Church as the universal sacrament of holiness that sustains a commu-nity of reconciliation, while providing the space for spiritual and moralgrowth, Schlögel urges ethicists to take seriously the task of reflecting onthe Church not only in its teachings but also in its practices.73 BrianJohnstone agrees with this agenda: “The communication of the moral Tra-dition is not primarily a matter of legislation and enforcement in a juridicmode, but one of manifesting the goodness of the life that is being com-mended.”74

Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, explored this task bril-liantly as he faced divisions at the Anglican Consultative Council on June20, 2005. Reflecting on how and why the Church needs to reflect on whatit teaches, Williams suggests that “at the end of things,” God will ask us:“‘Did you so live in the experience of the Church, the Body of my Son, thata tormented world saw the possibility of hope and of joy?’ ‘Did you focusafresh on the one task the Church has to perform—living Christ in such away that his news, his call, is compelling?’”75

70 On the function of memory for African church life, see Bénézet Bujo, Foun-dations of an African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality, trans.Brian McNeil (Nairobi: Paulines, 2003) 56–100; and Benoît Awazi Mbambi Kun-gua, Panorama de la théologie négro-africaine contemporaine (Paris: L’Harmattan,2002).

71 Laurenti Magesa, Anatomy of Inculturation: Transforming the Church in Af-rica (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 2004).

72 Bernd Wannenwetsch, “Ecclesiology and Ethics,” Oxford Handbook 57–73, at62.

73 Herbert Schlögel, “Kirche und theologische Ethik—Mehr als Lehramt undMoraltheologie,” in Christlicher Glaube 175–86.

74 Johnstone, “The Argument from Tradition” 154.75 http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/sermons_speeches/050620.htm (ac-

cessed on November 3, 2005).

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The archbishop’s call to unity within his own communion is echoed in animportant work by Schlögel, in which he compares the basic ethical con-cepts of both Lutherans and Roman Catholics so as to foster greater ecu-menical dialogue. He divides his treatment into four parts: faith and con-science; human dignity and the person; guilt and sin; and overlaps anddifferences. In each part, he examines the theological traditions and therelevant issues of application and repeatedly underlines where the twotraditions are especially congruent or moving in that direction.76 I do notknow of anyone who has offered to the churches such a study in the hopeof a real unity since James Gustafson’s ground-breaking Protestant andRoman Catholic Ethics: Prospects for Rapprochement.77

These works at the service of the Church are in fact explorations of theethical culture of the Church, a topic that is getting greater attention, as lastyear’s note in Theological Studies reported.78 Those investigations promptothers to look at the cultures within which we live.79 For instance, in afestschrift celebrating Hans Rotter’s 70th birthday, Josef Römelt faces yetagain the question of promoting theological ethics in contemporary plu-ralist cultures.80 There we face the tension between pluralism and the needfor political consensus: What happens to one’s own world vision in the faceof a deeply urgent political culture? If there is a range of ethical viewpointsthat already exists, what happens when we fold theology into the discus-sion? Do the very fundamental values that guarantee democratic secularsociety stand as threats to a theological vision, and vice versa?81 In the faceof that question, Alfons Riedl proposes tolerance as the virtue for thefuture of a pluralistic humanity.82

Tanzania’s Richard Rwiza’s recent book on the connection of consciencewith virtue ethics and with inculturation argues that the acting person iscalled to self-development as both critic and member of her or his cul-ture.83 France’s Paul Valadier analyses the secularization of contemporary

76 Herbert Schlögel, Wie weit trägt Einheit? Ethische Begriffe im evangelisch-katholischen Dialog (Münster: Lit, 2004).

77 James M. Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospects forRapprochement (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978).

78 James F. Keenan, “Ethics and the Crisis in the Church,” Theological Studies 66(2005) 117–36.

79 Richard B. Miller, “On Making A Cultural Turn in Religious Ethics,” Journalof Religious Ethics 33 (2005) 409–43.

80 Josef Römelt, Christliche Ethik im pluralistischen Kontext: Eine Diskussion derMethode ethischer Reflexion in der Theologie (Münster: LIT, 2000).

81 Josef Römelt, “Theologische Ethik in der Postmoderne: Das Problem desPluralismus in Gesellschaft, Kirchen, und Theologie,” in Christlischer Glaube 27–40.

82 Alfons Riedl, “Toleranz—eine Tugend für morgen,” Für die Freiheit 238–50.83 Richard N. Rwiza, Formation of Christian Conscience in Modern Africa (Nai-

robi: Paulines, 2001).

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northern cultures and asks whether the claims of believers finding them-selves marginalized is an altogether valid one. He finds instead that thehuman person cannot live without the transcendent and that this need willnever be eradicated.84

Other theological ethicists examine their own cultures. Charles Curranreflects on the challenges that Catholic ethicists and the broader Churchface in contemporary American culture, especially in terms of absolutizingpersonal and political freedom. He writes, “Even among Catholics, wesometimes hear overly simplistic comments about the freedom and therights of conscience. Morality cannot simplistically be reduced merely tofollowing one’s conscience.”85 Slovenia’s Anton Mlinar reflects on themoral necessity of conflict negotiation and reconciliation in his home-land.86 Japan’s Haruko Okano invokes a feminist understanding of moralresponsibility to critique her own culture. Among the specific problems inher culture she considers “the potentially dangerous side of homogeneityor nationalistic togetherness, that is, the crass distinction between ‘us andothers’” and the “principle of harmony” that “not just ignores those whoare different or strange” but excludes them. Like the others, Okano ac-knowledges the good of fundamental national principles but brings to theman ethical critique.87

Sometimes the ethicist is not simply a critic of culture but seeks to sustainan endangered value within it. Mark Graham breaks new ground by cul-tivating a spirit of gratitude so as to develop a sustainable agriculturalethics. Surveying the ways we till the earth, plant our fields, raise andconsume our food, care for our livestock, and treat our farmers and labor-ers, Graham argues that only by appreciating once again the giftedness ofour land from God can we responsibly renew our farms, our heartland, andourselves. While most of contemporary theological ethics is driven to ex-amine our urban experiences, Graham calls us to recognize how essentialrural life is for the world.88

What, though, is culture? John O’Malley argues that culture is not onlya particular geographical and historical context, but often is defined by astyle of proceeding. By “culture,” he means “four large, self-validating

84 Paul Valadier, “La sécularisation en question,” Für die Freiheit 85–93.85 Charles E. Curran, “Moral Theology and American Culture,” Chicago Studies

42 (2003) 44–55, at 53.86 Anton Mlinar, “Theologische Ethik und die Notwendigkeit von Konfliktbear-

beitung am Beispeil Sloweniens,” in Christlicher Glaube 89–108.87 Haruko K. Okano, “Moral Responsibility in the Japanese Context,” Für die

Freiheit 162–69, at 167, 168.88 Mark E. Graham, Sustainable Agriculture: A Christian Ethics of Gratitude

(Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2005).

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configurations of symbols, values, temperaments, patterns of thinking, feel-ing, and behaving, and patterns of discourse. I mean especially configura-tions of patterns of discourse and thus expressions of style in the profound-est sense of the word.”89 O’Malley identifies four cultures that originatedin the ancient Western world, were subsequently expressed in Christianforms, and are manifest today: the prophetic culture that proclaims theneed to reform social structures (Jeremiah, Martin Luther, Martin LutherKing, Jr.); the academic, professional culture that seeks to understandthose structures (Aristotle, Aquinas, the university); the humanistic culturethat through rhetoric and poetry tries to persuade its hearers about issuesfacing humanity and the common good (Cicero, Erasmus, Eleanor Roose-velt); and finally, the culture of art and performance that witnesses to andcelebrates the mystery of the human condition (Phidias, Michelangelo, BillT. Davis).

O’Malley’s magisterial work needs to be engaged by moralists not onlyto further fathom the meaning of culture and its varied expressions but alsoto employ these four cultures as modes for advancing our own criticalagenda.

CONCLUSION

Moral theologians are looking to the future to critically engage theirwork, their vocation, their Church, and their local cultures in a spirit ofdialogue and growing respect. Clearly, this review, which acknowledges thepassing of many, also demonstrates a considerable rebirth in the field. Wehave begun the century mindful of the many tasks that lie ahead, andmindful of the virtues needed for those tasks.

89 John W. O’Malley, Four Cultures of the West (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity, 2004) 11.

119FUNDAMENTAL MORAL THEOLOGY