Barbarian invasionsBarbarian invasions.

Germanic expansion. Population increase and Huns.

Augustulus deposed by barbarians in 476.Augustulus

How dark the “Dark Ages”? Evidence of population decline.

From roving bandits to sedentary bandits.

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The feudal systemThe feudal system.

Change in the MES of military technology.y gy The great stirrup controversy.

Feudalism as a “contract.” Exchange of work for defense. Why an in-kind exchange? Serfdom: tying workers to the land.y g

Labor shortage and rent distribution.

Example: professional sports.Charlemagne crowned emperor by Pope Leo III (800 C.E.), from

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y p ( ),Grandes Chroniques de France(14th Century), Bibliothèque Nationale de France.

F d li t f i htFeudalism as a system of rights.

Although full-grown feudalism wasAlthough full grown feudalism was largely the result of the breakdown of older government and law, it both inherited law from the past and createdinherited law from the past and created it by a rapid growth of custom based on present fact. In one sense it may be defined as an arrangement ofbe defined as an arrangement of society based on contract, expressed or implied. The status of a person depended in every way on his positiondepended in every way on his position on the land, and on the other hand land-tenure determined political rights and duties

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and duties.

— The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History

F d li t f i htFeudalism as a system of rights.

The acts constituting the feudal contract were gcalled homage and investiture. The tenant or vassal knelt before the lord surrounded by his court (curia), placing his folded hands between those of the lord and thus became his ‘man’those of the lord, and thus became his man (homme, whence the word homage). … The lord in turn responded by ‘investiture’, handing to his vassal a banner, a staff, a clod of earth, a charter, or other symbol of the property or office conceded, the fief (feodum or Lehn) as it was termed …. This was the free and honourable tenure characterized by military service but thetenure characterized by military service, but the peasant, whether serf or free, equally swore a form of fealty and was thus invested with the tenement he held of his lord. The feudal nexus

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thus created essentially involved reciprocity.

— The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History

The manorial systemThe manorial system.

Villein tenancy. Disappearance of slavery.Disappearance of slavery. The custom of the manor.

Demesne obligation.Demesne obligation. Three days of week-work on

the lord’s land. An input-sharing contract.

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October, from Les très Riches Heures du Duc de Berry (c. 1412). The Chantilly Museum, Paris.

Early medieval agricultureEarly medieval agriculture.

Traditional individualistic subsistence agriculture. Shared common “wastes” with little

common-pool pressure. “Sedentary pastoralism” takes precedence

over cultivation of arable. Eventually: communal control over

common-field grazing.

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E l ti f th i l tEvolution of the manorial system.

Population growth leads to nucleationto nucleation. Peasants leave hamlets

and assemble in villages.and assemble in villages. Arable of hamlets

merged to become gvillage arable.

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June, from Les très Riches Heures du Duc de Berry (c. 1412). The Chantilly Museum, Paris.

E l ti f th i l tEvolution of the manorial system.

Population growth leads to

Labor transferred from

Population growth leads to increased demand. Labor transferred from

pastoralism to cultivation of the arable.

“Cerealization” and “destocking.” “Common of shack”: grazing on

the fallow arablethe fallow arable. Final element: scattering of

arable holdings.

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June, from Les très Riches Heures du Duc de Berry (c. 1412). The Chantilly Museum, Paris.

Crop rotationCrop rotation.

Three-course rotation in wide use by ninth century

Spring crop:O t /b l /b

Three-course rotation in wide use by ninth century.

Oats/barley or peas/beans. Harvested in summer.

Autumn sowing of wheatAutumn sowing of wheat or rye, harvested following summer.

A year fallow. Nitrogen fixing by soil

bacteriaFour seasons and seasonal labors. From

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bacteria. Manure from pasturing.

Bartholomaeus Anglicus (Bartholomew the Englishman), On the Properties of Things. France, Le Mans 15th Century. Bibliothèque Nationale de France.

The open field systemThe open-field system.

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Representative villageRepresentative village.

Ph sical st ct e Division into arable and non-arable land.

Physical structure.

“Waste” for grazing.

Arable divided into two or more fieldsor more fields. Hundreds of acres each.

Arable subdivided into Arable subdivided into elongated narrow strips. But waste not subdivided

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But waste not subdivided.

Representative villageRepresentative village.

Villeins cop holde sO ne ship st ct e Villeins, copyholders, and freeholders. Not much practical

Ownership structure.

Not much practical difference.

OFS as a villagesystem, not a manorial system.C d Commons owned collectively. Not “unowned ”

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Not unowned.

Representative villageRepresentative village.

M f hInstit tional st ct e Management of the Commons. Changeover from private to

Institutional structure.

collective rights. Use of commons. Joint expenses.

Manor court or village meeting. Set planting and harvesting Set planting and harvesting

dates. Prevented overuse of commons. Controlled private exchange of

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Controlled private exchange of strips.

Representative villageRepresentative village.

Little specialization inTechnological st ct e Little specialization in production. Except near big cities.

Technological structure.

Specialized farms didn’t use the OFS.

High transportation andHigh transportation and transaction costs.

Some activities collective. Grazing, plowing,

harvesting.

Some activities private.

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p Sowing, weeding.

The OFS: economic analysisThe OFS: economic analysis.

Fi t d d t ti t Fine-tuned adaptation to diversified autarkic production. Pastoralism and crop rotation.

Many tasks, with different levels of economies of scale and different costs of monitoring.g Manage tasks collectively when

economies of scale high and monitoring costs low.

Assign private property rights when economies of scale low and monitoring costs high.

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July, from Les très Riches Heures du Duc de Berry(c. 1412). The Chantilly Museum, Paris.

ScatteringScattering.

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S tt i l l tiScattering: early explanations.

Size of plow team Size of plow team. Land in proportion to contribution. But scattering observed even when light plow used.

Desire for equality. But there were many inequalities among peasants.

Partible inheritance Partible inheritance. But England had primogeniture.

Assarting. Creating new arable form the waste.

General problem: why does scattering persist?

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Active markets in strips.

Scattering and riskScattering and risk.

McCloskey: scattering as a form of insurance.

Variability of climate and soil over small areasareas.

Scattering as portfolio diversification in thediversification in the absence of other assets.

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assets.

Problems with the risk h th ihypothesis.

Landlords provide de facto “charity.” We don’t see less scattering in villages with

landlords.a d o ds

Scattering stabilizes relative peasant outputs, but doesn’t insure aggregate output against h kshocks. And if scattering is costly, it increases chance of

starvation.

Peasants had better methods of insurance: Livestock another portfolio asset. Extensive evidence of grain storage

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Extensive evidence of grain storage.

S tt i d th fi ld tScattering and the open-field system.

OFS i ffi i t t OFS is an efficient system for managing autarkic g gsubsistence farming when tasks differ in scale andtasks differ in scale and monitoring-cost properties. But why scattering?

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S tt i d th fi ld tScattering and the open-field system.

D hl tt i h l Dahlman: scattering helps preserve OFS. By increasing costs of private

enclosure, scattering reduces , g“hold-up” threats. Scattering protects the systemScattering protects the system

against the individual.

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S tt i d th fi ld tScattering and the open-field system.

Fenoaltea: optimal allocation of labor Fenoaltea: optimal allocation of labor. Optimal farm management would assign

labor to different parts of the fields at different times. But central direction implies costly monitoring Ownership of scattered strips preserves

incentives. Scattering protects the individual against

the system.y Collective activities (especially harvesting)

capacity constrained – not all can be harvested. Without scattering, some peasant fields would

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never be harvested at all in some years.

S t i t diSymmetric tragedies.

Common pool: Common pool: Everyone has use rights. No one has exclusion rights.g Common pool a function of scheme of

property rights, not (just) technology.T aged of the commons Tragedy of the commons: Overuse of resources. In the limit, full dissipation of rents.In the limit, full dissipation of rents.

Correctives: Create and enforce exclusion rights.

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Collective management schemes (like the OFS).

S t i t diSymmetric tragedies.

Anticommons:Anticommons: Many entities have exclusion rights

(veto power). Tragedy of the anticommons: Underuse of resources. In the limit full dissipation of rents In the limit, full dissipation of rents.

Examples: Bureaucracy, especially in post-Bureaucracy, especially in post

Soviet/developing countries. Patents in complex systems products.

Th O Fi ld S t24

The Open Field System as semicommons.

S tt i d th fi ld tScattering and the open-field system.

Smith: the semicommons Smith: the semicommons. Mixing common and private

hi t t k d t fownership to take advantage of different levels of economies of scalescale. Scattering protects individuals

against other individualsagainst other individuals. Problem of trampling and manure

allocation during grazing.

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allocation during grazing.

The OFS: economic analysisThe OFS: economic analysis.

Fi t d d t ti t Fine-tuned adaptation to diversified autarkic production. Pastoralism and crop rotation.

Many tasks, with different levels of economies of scale and different costs of monitoring.g Manage tasks collectively when

economies of scale high and monitoring costs low.

Assign private property rights when economies of scale low and monitoring costs high.

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July, from Les très Riches Heures du Duc de Berry(c. 1412). The Chantilly Museum, Paris.