Gilbert v. WWE/ESPN - Joint Notice of Removal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION DOUG GILBERT and TOMMY GILBERT, as parent and next of kin to EDDIE GILBERT, Plaintiffs, v. WORLD WRESTLING ENTERTAINMENT, INC., ESPN INC., and ESPN CLASSIC, INC., Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-1086

JOINT NOTICE OF REMOVAL

Defendants World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. (WWE), ESPN, Inc. (ESPN), and

ESPN Classic, Inc. (ESPN Classic) (sometimes collectively referred to herein as

Defendants) hereby provide notice that they are removing this action originally commenced in

the Chancery Court of Henderson County, Tennessee (State Court), to the United States

District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Eastern Division. In support thereof,

Defendants state as follows:

1. Defendants exercise their right to remove this case from the State Court pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332, 1338, 1441, and 1446.

2. On or about March 11, 2015, Plaintiffs Doug and Tommy Gilbert, as parent and

next of kin to Eddie Gilbert (Plaintiffs), filed a Complaint in the State Court under the name

and style of Doug Gilbert and Tommy Gilbert, as parent and next of kin to Eddie Gilbert v.

World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., ESPN Inc., and ESPN Classic, Inc., Case No. CH-26587.

Case 1:15-cv-01086-egb Document 1 Filed 04/15/15 Page 1 of 16 PageID 1

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Plaintiffs served Defendants with the Complaint on March 17, 2015.

3. The complaint alleges a single cause of action against WWE for violation of the

right of privacy/publicity of Doug Gilbert and Eddie Gilbert (the Gilberts) based on (a) WWE

supposedly airing on television, the internet, and other media recordings of Doug Gilberts

and/or Eddie Gilberts past wrestling matches; and (b) WWE supposedly includ[ing] the

Gilberts names and likenesses in editions of the WWE Encyclopedia and other media.

Compl. 15-16.

4. The Complaint also alleges a single cause of action against ESPN and ESPN

Classic (collectively, the ESPN Defendants) for violation of the right of privacy/publicity of

the Gilberts based on ESPN supposedly airing on television, the internet, and other media

footage of Doug Gilberts and/or Eddie Gilberts past wrestling matches. Compl. 17.

5. 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) provides:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

6. This is a civil action that was instituted in the State Court and has not been tried.

A true and correct copy of the Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A. A true and correct

copy of the Summonses issued to WWE and the ESPN Defendants are attached hereto as

Collective Exhibit B.

7. As more fully set forth below, this case is properly removed to this Court under

28 U.S.C. 1441 because this Court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331,

1332, and 1338.


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8. 28 U.S.C. 1331 provides that [t]he district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United

States. Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1338, [t]he district courts have original jurisdiction of

any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to . . . copyrights.

9. 28 U.S.C. 1332 provides that [t]he district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of

$75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between citizens of different States.

I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

A. Federal Question Jurisdiction Exists Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331 & 1338

10. While plaintiffs do not allege a federal claim, their state law claim for violation of

right of privacy/publicity is predicated on, among other things, Defendants alleged use of the

Gilberts name and likeness by airing on television, the internet, and other media recordings

and/or footage of Doug Gilberts and/or Eddie Gilberts past wrestling matches. Compl. 15,

17.

11. Such a claim is completely preempted by federal copyright law and, therefore,

arise[s] under federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. See Franchise Tax Bd.

v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ([I]f a federal cause of action

completely preempts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the

federal cause of action necessarily arises under federal law.). The complete preemption

doctrine serves to recharacterize a state law claim . . . as an action arising under federal law

and converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for

purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule. Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 286 (6th Cir.

2005) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64-65 (1987)). The U.S. Supreme


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Court has found that the preemptive force of some federal statutes is so extraordinary that

they completely preempt an area of state law. Roddy v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Inc., 395 F. 3d

318, 323 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Once an area of state law has been completely

pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its

inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. Id.

12. [T]he complete preemption doctrine permits recharacterization of a plaintiffs

claim as a federal claim so that removal is proper even though the complaint may not mention a

federal basis of jurisdiction. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 286 (citations omitted); see also Powers v.

Cottrell, Inc., 728 F. 3d 509, 515 (6th Cir. 2013) (Under the complete preemption doctrine, if

a state law has been completely preempted, any claim purportedly based on the preempted state

law is considered a federal claim, and therefore removable) (citation omitted). It is an

exception to the general rule [that] the assertion of a federal defense . . . does not provide a

sufficient basis for removal. Tyree v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 973 F.Supp. 786, 789

(W.D. Tenn. 1997).

13. The Sixth Circuit has ruled that the Copyright Act is one such federal statute to

which the complete preemption doctrine applies. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 285-87 (holding

plaintiffs contract and tort claims, including unjust enrichment, misrepresentation, conversion

and injunctive relief, were preempted by copyright law). Specifically, the Sixth Circuit found

that

[t]he Copyright Act is unusually broad in its assertion of federal authority. Rather than sharing jurisdiction with the state courts as is normally the case, the statute expressly withdraws from the state courts any jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the Act and converts all state common or statutory law within the general scope of copyright into federal law to be uniformly applied throughout the nation.


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Id. at 286 (citation omitted). Accordingly, consistent with every other Federal Circuit to address

the issue, the Sixth Circuit held, Section 301 of the Copyright Act broadly preempts state law

claims, and federal law vests exclusive jurisdiction over such preempted copyright claims in the

federal courts. Id.; see also Globe-Ranger Corp. v. Software AG, 691 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir.

2012); Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 303-05 (2d Cir. 2004);

Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 230-33 (4th Cir. 1993); Bierman v. Toshiba

Corp., No. 11-15262, 2012 WL 1952122, at *2 (9th Cir. May 31, 2012) (Wallace, J. concurring)

(I would have joined the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits in holding that claims preempted

by 301(a) of the Copyright Act are regarded as arising under federal law, and therefore can

support removal.).

14. Section 301 of the Copyright Act states that all legal or equitable rights that are

equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified in

106 in works of authorship that . . . come within the subject matter of copyright . . . are

governed exclusively by this title. . . . [N]o person is entitled to any such right or equivalent

right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 17 U.S.C. 301(a).

Courts in this Circuit apply a two-part test to determine whether a state law claim is preempted

by copyright law. Stanford v. Caesars Entmt, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 749, 755 (W.D. Tenn.

2006) (citing Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F. 3d 283, 300 (6th Cir. 2004)). First, the

work must come within the scope of the subject matter of copyright as set forth in Section 102

and 103 of the Copyright Act. Id. Second, the rights granted under state law must be

equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the scope of federal copyright protection

[contained in Section 106 of the Copyright Act]. Id. The state law right at issue is equivalent

to any of the exclusive rights under 106 if the right defined by state law may be abridged by


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an act which in and of itself would infringe one of the exclusive rights. Stanford, 430 F. Supp.

2d at 758 (finding plaintiffs right of publicity and commercial appropriation of likeness claims

are preempted by copyright law) (citing Stromback, 384 F. 3d at 301).

15. In this case, Plaintiffs claim is based on WWEs alleged airing on television,

the internet, and other media recordings of Doug Gilberts and/or Eddie Gilberts past wrestling

matches and the ESPN Defendants alleged airing on television, the internet, and other media

footage of Doug Gilberts and/or Eddie Gilberts past wrestling matches. Compl. 15, 17.

Such recordings and footage unquestionably are within the subject matter of copyright

under Section 102 of the Copyright Act, as motion pictures and other audiovisual works are

expressly included within the categories of works of authorship to which copyright protection

applies. See 17 U.S.C. 102. Plaintiffs right of privacy/publicity claim seeks to prevent

Defendants from exercising their exclusive rights under 106 of the Copyright Act in such

works, including, in particular, the airing or public performance or display (as defined by

Section 106) of the works on television, internet and other media. Consequently, the claim

purports to enforce rights equivalent to rights within the general scope of copyright.

16. It is well-established that where, as here, a plaintiff asserts state law claims for

invasion of privacy/publicity, commercial appropriation of likeness, and the like against a

defendant who is doing no more than reproducing, distributing, and/or publicly performing or

displaying a copyrighted work depicting a performance by the plaintiff, the plaintiffs claims are

preempted by federal copyright law. See, e.g., Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc.,

617 F. 3d 1146, 1153-55 (9th Cir. 2010) (essence of performers right of publicity claim was

that defendants reproduced and distributed the DVDs without authorization, and thus, claim

was preempted by the Copyright Act); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. MLB Players Assoc., 805 F.2d


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663, 674-79 (7th Cir. 1986) (players right of publicity claims preempted where their

performances were fixed in copyrightable form); Armstrong v. Eagle Rock Entmt, Inc., 655 F.

Supp. 2d 779, 790 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (musicians appropriation of likeness claim is really a

copyright violation claim where musician is attempting to contest [the copyright holders]

right to create derivative works and, in turn, is preempted by the Copyright Act) (citation

omitted); Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1925 (Cal. App. Ct. 1996) (actors right of

publicity claim arising out of appearance in film was subsumed by copyright law and

preempted).

17. Significantly, WWE has previously succeeded in foreclosing such baseless and

preempted claims by prior plaintiffs seeking to interfere with WWEs exclusive copyrights. See

Somerson v. Vincent K. McMahon, 956 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354-56 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (granting

motion to dismiss claims for violation of plaintiffs right to publicity and invasion of privacy

based on WWEs reproduction and distribution of video recordings depicting plaintiff as

preempted by the Copyright Act); Blood v. Titan Sports, Inc., No. 3:94CV307-P, 1997 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 34485 (W.D.N.C. May 13, 1997) (granting WWE summary judgment because

plaintiffs state law claims for misappropriation of name and likeness in violation of his right of

publicity, invasion of privacy, unfair trade practices, unfair competition, and unjust enrichment

were preempted by Copyright Act which governed videocassette tapes at issue).

18. In fact, Somerson is on all fours with this case. The plaintiff, Somerson, was a

former-professional wrestler who alleged that WWE was airing and distributing recordings of

Somersons wrestling matches without permission. Somerson, 956 F. Supp. 2d at 1348.

Initially, WWE removed the case from state court to the U.S. District Court for the Northern

District of Georgia. Id. The federal court then granted WWEs motion to dismiss on the basis of


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the copyright preemption doctrine, holding that all of Somersons state law claims, including a

claim for violation of right of publicity like that asserted by Plaintiffs here, with respect to

WWEs use of recordings of plaintiffs wrestling matches were preempted by copyright law and

therefore legally untenable. See id. at 1354-56.

19. Likewise, ESPN has succeeded in dismissing similar right of publicity claims

under the copyright preemption doctrine. In Ray v. ESPN, former professional wrestler Steve

Wild Thing Ray claimed that ESPN misappropriated his likeness and infringed on his right of

publicity when it aired [his past wrestling] performances on its television networks without his

consent. Ray v. ESPN, Inc., No. 13-1179-CV-W-SOW, 2014 WL 2766187, at *1 (W.D. Mo.

Apr. 8, 2014) (emphasis added). Dismissing such claims as preempted by the Copyright Act,

the court pertinently held (1) the plaintiffs wrestling performances were copyrightable, and (2)

the plaintiffs complaints [were] based solely on ESPN airing video recordings depicting him in

a work of authorship, which is plainly encompassed by copyright law. Id. at *5 (emphasis

added) (citing Fleet, 50 Cal.App.4th at 1920) ([I]t was not merely [plaintiffs] likenesses which

were captured on film it was their [dramatic] performances which are, as we have seen,

copyrightable.).

20. These analogous decisions are squarely applicable here. Accordingly, as in

Ritchie, [t]he bulk of [Plaintiffs] state law claims must be recharacterized as copyright

infringement and copyright ownership claims. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287. As such, those claims

are completely preempted by copyright law and subject to removal under controlling Sixth

Circuit precedent. See id.; Rievley v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1028,

1035 (E.D. Tenn. 1999) (holding if any one of multiple state-law claims is completely


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preempted by federal statute, removal of entire complaint is proper, regardless of whether

district court might have original jurisdiction over remaining claims)

21. Based on the above analysis, this Court has jurisdiction over the present action

pursuant to its federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1338, and as such,

removal to this Court is proper.

22. To the extent that the Court ultimately determines that some portion of plaintiffs

claim does not arise under federal law for the purpose of removal, the Court should exercise its

supplemental jurisdiction over such claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(a), as those claims form

part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. 28

U.S.C. 1367(a); see also City of Chicago v. Intl College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165

(1997).

B. Diversity Jurisdiction Exists Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. 1332

1. There Is Complete Diversity Of Citizenship Between Plaintiffs and Defendants

23. In determining whether complete diversity exists, the Court considers the

citizenship of all properly joined parties. See 28 U.S.C. 1441(b). In this case, there is

complete diversity between plaintiffs and all defendants.

24. The Complaint states that plaintiffs are Tennessee citizen[s], with Plaintiff

Doug Gilbert residing in Henderson County, Tennessee, Plaintiff Tommy Gilbert being a

Tennessee citizen, and the Estate of Eddie Gilbert being or will be administered in Tennessee.

Compl. 2-3. For purposes of diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. 1332, Plaintiffs are

citizens of the State of Tennessee.

25. The Complaint alleges that Defendants WWE and the ESPN Defendants are

Delaware corporation[s]. Compl. 4-6. A corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any


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State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of

business. 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1). For purposes of diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C.

1332, each defendant is a citizen of a state other than the State of Tennessee. Neither WWE nor

the ESPN Defendants maintain any principal place of business in the State of Tennessee.

26. The Sixth Circuit has held that [d]iversity jurisdiction attaches only when all

parties on one side of the litigation are of a different citizenship from all parties on the other side

of the litigation. Boladian v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 123 Fed Appx. 165, 167 (6th Cir. 2005)

(quoting SHR Ltd. Pship v. Braun, 888 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Safeco Ins. Co. v.

City of White House, Tennessee, 36 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 1994) ([C]omplete diversity

requires that no party share citizenship with any opposing party.).

27. Thus, there is complete diversity of citizenship for purposes of jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. 1332(a).

2. The Amount In Controversy Exceeds $75,000, Exclusive Of Interest And Costs

28. The Complaint alleges that Defendants supposedly violated the Gilberts rights

of privacy and/or publicity by using their names and likenesses without permission or any license

in order to obtain profits, Compl. 24, based on (a) WWE supposedly airing on television, the

internet, and other media recordings of Doug Gilberts and/or Eddie Gilberts past wrestling

matches; (b) WWE supposedly includ[ing] the Gilberts names and likenesses in editions of

the WWE Encyclopedia and other media; and (c) the ESPN Defendants supposedly airing on

television, the internet, and other media footage of Doug Gilberts and Eddie Gilberts past

wrestling matches. Compl. 15-17.

29. Plaintiffs seek damages individually, and as the personal representative of Eddie

Gilbert. Specifically, plaintiffs seek (i) compensation for violation of their rights of


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publicity/privacy . . . in the amount to which plaintiffs are entitled as determined by a jury,

and (ii) punitive damages. See Compl. 25; Prayer for Relief 1, 4.

30. Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks an unspecified amount in damages, the

defendant satisfies its burden of proving the amount in controversy requirement when it shows

that the amount more likely than not exceeds $75,000. Crumley v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No.

11-2153, 2011 WL 1897185, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. May 18, 2011); see also Shupe v. Asplundh Tree

Expert Co., 566 Fed. Appx. 476, 478 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that removal is proper when the

defendant can show that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 by a preponderance of the

evidence). A court must conduct a fair reading of the allegations in the complaint to

determine the amount in controversy. Shupe, 566 Fed. Appx. at 478.

31. A fair reading of plaintiffs Complaint demonstrates that plaintiffs seek, on behalf

of Eddie Gilbert and themselves, unspecified damages that would exceed $75,000, if proven.

See Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res., 226 F.3d 560, 573 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming that amount in

controversy was met based on a fair reading of the complaint that sought unspecified damages,

including punitive damages). Plaintiffs claim that Defendants have obtained significant profits

from the use of the Gilberts names and likenesses from airing recordings of past wrestling

matches involving Plaintiffs on television, the internet, and other media. Compl. 15, 18.

Plaintiffs seek compensation for such alleged violation of their rights of privacy/publicity as

determined by a jury. Compl. 25; Prayer for Relief 1. Considering the breadth of these

various platforms and the allegedly significant profits supposedly obtained by WWE and the

ESPN Defendants, it is more likely than not, that Plaintiffs right of privacy/publicity claim, if

successful, would result in a verdict of greater than $75,000. See Hahn v. Auto-Owners Ins.

Group, No. 3:04-CV-380, 2006 WL 2796479, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 27, 2006) (denying motion


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to remand and finding damages alleged in complaint could easily meet jurisdictional requirement

of 28 U.S.C. 1332 where plaintiff did not limit damages to any amount, but instead requested

damages in an amount to be proven at trial).

32. In addition, Plaintiffs seek punitive damages, which must be considered when

determining whether the amount in controversy threshold is met in a diversity case, unless it is

apparent to a legal certainty that [punitive damages] cannot be recovered. Hayes, 226 F.3d at

572 (punitive damages to be considered when calculating the amount in controversy); Compl.,

Prayer for Relief 4.1

33. Plaintiffs further seek reasonable attorneys fees. See Compl., Prayer for Relief

3.2 When combined with the damages already set forth above, which when taken alone are

sufficient to exceed $75,000, it is certainly more likely than not that the total damages alleged by

plaintiffs satisfies the amount in controversy requirement.

34. Accordingly, the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement is satisfied

because plaintiffs seek an amount in excess of $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs.

35. Because there is complete diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy

exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs, this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332.

1 Defendants do not concede that punitive damages are recoverable in connection with Plaintiffs claims and reserves their right to contest such fees. If, however, punitive damages are recoverable for plaintiffs claims under applicable Tennessee law, then such fees should be included in the calculation of the amount in controversy. See Hayes, 226 F.3d at 572. 2 Defendants do not concede that attorneys fees are recoverable in connection with Plaintiffs claims and reserves their right to contest such fees. If, however, reasonable attorneys fees are recoverable for plaintiffs claims under applicable Tennessee law, then such fees would be included in the calculation of the amount in controversy. See Crumley, 2011 WL 1897185, at *3.


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II. PROCEDURAL COMPLIANCE

36. In accordance with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 1446, this Notice of Removal

is filed within thirty (30) days after March 17, 2015, the date upon which plaintiffs served

Defendants with the Complaint. Defendants remove this matter without waiving any objections

or defenses that they may have, including, without limitation, objections to sufficiency of process

or sufficiency of service thereof.

37. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441 and 1446(c), the right exists to remove this case

from the State Court to the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee,

Eastern Division, which is the district court for the district and division embracing the State

Court where the action is pending.

38. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1446(a), attached hereto are true and correct copies of the

Complaint bearing Case No. 26587 (Exhibit A), and the Summonses (Collective Exhibit B),

which is all the process, pleadings and orders served upon Defendants in this action.

39. Written Notice of Filing of Notice of Removal will be filed with the Chancery

Court of Henderson County, Tennessee on April 15, 2015 (attached hereto as Exhibit C), and

served upon plaintiffs counsel by first class mail, postage prepaid, at: Beal Law Office, 22

Monroe Avenue, Lexington, TN 38351; Donati Law Firm, 1545 Union Avenue, Memphis, TN

38104; and Futhey Law Firm PLC, 1440 Poplar Avenue, Memphis, TN 38104.

40. A true and correct copy of this Notice of Removal will also be filed with the clerk

of the State Court, as required by law, and served upon plaintiffs counsel by first class mail,

postage prepaid, at: Beal Law Office, 22 Monroe Avenue, Lexington, TN 38351; Donati Law

Firm, 1545 Union Avenue, Memphis, TN 38104; and Futhey Law Firm PLC, 1440 Poplar

Avenue, Memphis, TN 38104.


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41. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. 1446(b)(2)(A), all properly served defendants

consent to the removal of this action.

WHEREFORE, Defendants World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., ESPN, Inc., and

ESPN Classic, Inc. hereby remove this case from the Chancery Court of Henderson County,

Tennessee, where it is now pending, to this honorable Court, and respectfully request that the

Court accept jurisdiction of this action, and henceforth that this action be placed upon the docket

of the Court for further proceedings, as though this case had originally been instituted in this

Court.

Dated: April 15, 2015

Respectfully Submitted, s/ Eugene J. Podesta, Jr.__________________ Eugene J. Podesta, Jr. (No. 9831) BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOVITZ, PC First Tennessee Building 165 Madison Avenue Suite 2000 Memphis, Tennessee 38103 901-577-2213 901-577-0761 (facsimile) [email protected] Of Counsel: Jerry S. McDevitt (pro hac vice to be filed) Curtis B. Krasik (pro hac vice to be filed) K&L GATES LLP K&L Gates Center 210 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15222 412-355-6500 412-355-6501 (facsimile)


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[email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Defendant World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.

s/ Samuel D. Lipshie (signed w/permission) Samuel D. Lipshie (No. 9538) Jeffrey L. Allen (No. 26782) (application for

admission pending) BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP 1600 Division Street, Suite 700 P.O. Box 340025 Nashville, Tennessee 37203 615-252-2332 615-252-6332 (facsimile) [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Defendants ESPN, Inc. and

ESPN Classic, Inc.


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 15th day of April, 2015, I served a copy of the foregoing upon the following attorneys of record by United States First Class mail.

Robert Stevie Beal Beal Law Office 22 Monroe Avenue Lexington, TN 38351 731-968-9077 731-968-0782 (facsimile) [email protected] William B. Ryan Donati Law Firm 1545 Union Avenue Memphis, TN 38104 901-278-1004 901-278-3111 (facsimile) [email protected] Malcolm B. Futhey III Futhey Law Firm PLC Poplar Avenue Memphis, TN 38104 901-725-7525 901-726-3506 (facsimile) [email protected]

s/ Eugene J. Podesta, Jr.


Documents

Gilbert v. WWE/ESPN - Joint Notice of Removal