TM-41002WP 03 Rev. 3

TM-41002

Prepare an updated draft of safety guide "Planning and Preparing for Emergency Response to Transport

Accidents Involving Radioactive Material" (TS-G-1.2)

IAEA Headquarters, Vienna

May-July 2011

TM-41002WP 03 Rev. 3

TM-41002WP 03 Rev. 3

Guidance for the Emergency Response by Coastal States to

Accidents on Vessels Carrying Radioactive Materials

here

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TM-41002WP 03 Rev. 3

FOREWORD

here

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TM-41002WP 03 Rev. 3

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................1

1.1. Background................................................................................................11.2. Objectives..................................................................................................11.3. Scope..........................................................................................................21.4. Structure.....................................................................................................2

2. TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS BY SEA.................................3

2.1. Types of marine Events considered...........................................................42.1.1. Collision.........................................................................................42.1.2. Contact...........................................................................................42.1.3. Foundering.....................................................................................42.1.4. Foundering scenarios represent about 4% of all identified

accidents. . Hull damage................................................................52.1.5. Fire/explosion.................................................................................52.1.6. Machinery damage.........................................................................52.17 Wrecked/stranded..............................................................................52.18 Hostile takeover.................................................................................52.19 Possible consequences.......................................................................5

2.2. Types of marine accidents considered.......................................................62.2.1. Health Impacts...............................................................................62.2.2. Environmentalimpacts....................................................................72.2.3. Economic impacts..........................................................................7

2.3. Overall risk.................................................................................................7

3. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS ON VESSELS CARRYING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS.......................................................16

3.1. Emergency Response Objectives for Maritime Emergencies..................163.2. Concept of Operations.............................................................................173.3. Response phases.......................................................................................18

3.3.1. The initial response phase............................................................183.3.2. The accident control phase...........................................................183.3.3. Fires/Explosion Response............................................................183.3.4. Treating the injured......................................................................183.3.5. Assessing the integrity of class 7 shipping containers or packages193.3.6. Mitigate Release/Spill and Start Environmental Monitoring.......193.3.7. Assess and Manage exposed and/or contaminated people...........20

3.4. The Post-emergency phase......................................................................20

4. INSTRUCTIONS...................................................................................................21

4.1. Instruction 1: Initial notification, confirmation and assessment..............214.2. Instruction 2: Response to a Transport Accident.....................................24Instruction 3: Placards, labels and markings on packages or vehicles...................274.3. Instruction 4: Assessing a package to Determin whether it is damaged..354.4. Instruction 5: Dangerous source identification based on dose rate, activity

or use........................................................................................................36

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TM-41002WP 03 Rev. 3

4.5. Instruction 6: actions on scene until arrival of emergency medical response team...........................................................................................51

4.6. Instruction 7: ON SCENE EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE......534.7. Instruction 8: TRANSPORT OF VICTIMS TO HOSPITAL..................594.8. Instruction 9: Deciding who should receive a medical examination or

later follow-up..........................................................................................614.9. Instruction 10: Public and Emergency Worker decontamination...........644.10. Monitoring Equipment.............................................................................66

5. UN NUMBER RELATED RESPONSE GUIDANCE (SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT REQUIRED)..........................................................................................................67

5.1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................675.1.1. 5.1.1 Rail transport.......................................................................675.1.2. 5.1.2 Air transport........................................................................67

5.2. THE INITIAL RESPONSE.....................................................................675.3. PROTECTION OF RESPONDERS........................................................685.4. Specific guidance based on NAERG-2008 for Emergency responders

(UN Number wise)...................................................................................695.5. Guides for Second hazard class OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL.......85

6. REFERENCES.....................................................................................................114

7. CONTRIBUTORS...............................................................................................115

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TM-41002WP 03 Rev. 3

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUNDRadioactive materials have vital uses throughout the world that include applications in medicine, research, industry, agriculture and energy generation. Often the mining, and/or manufacture of radioactive material are not in the State where the use takes place. This requires materials to be transported between States.

The transport of radioactive material by sea is an integral part of the international transport network and occurs routinely. The United Nations has recognized the need for a consistent and harmonized legal framework for the transport of all dangerous goods. The IAEA has established regulations for safe transport of radioactive material (TS-R-1). The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has established regulations for the safe transport of all dangerous goods (IMDG Code) by sea. Implementation and compliance with these international regulations will, as far as practicable, mean that the transport of radioactive material by sea is carried out safely. Despite this, vessels including those carrying radioactive material are not immune to accidents.

This transport by sea may pass near to, or through the territorial waters (see Chapter 3.6) of one or more States, for the purposes of this annex these States have been termed "Coastal States".

Coastal States are in general prepared for responding to maritime incidents and accidents in their territorial waters and in adjacent international waters. In addition many will have effective frameworks in place for emergency response to incidents involving radioactive material. However an interface between these two response systems needs to be established to ensure preparedness to respond to maritime emergencies involving radioactive material (including nuclear material). The issue at hand is that a vessel requiring emergency assistance offers some unique problems. Vessels may not be regulated by the coastal state responding to the incident or accident, for example responding to a ship registered in another state while in international waters.

Transport in general can involve accidents, while the transport of radioactive material has an enviable safety record. This annex focuses on transport emergencies where radioactive material is present.

1.2. OBJECTIVESThe document is intended to be of use to those involved in the response to a transport emergency where radioactive material is present, including States (flag States and coastal States), the ship’s crew, ship operators and owners, and others involved directly in response. It is a resource that can be used by shipping and coastal states as a reference during a response to an emergency at sea involving a vessel carrying radioactive material.

The annex describes the types of accidents that may occur at sea or in a port and provides guidance on the nature of the response that may be needed for the range of emergencies that may occur.

Guidance and advice is provided on the information that may be available during an event, where and who it may be obtained from. Generic information is provided that may be used in the absence of specific information. The risk management principles should take into account all risks associated with maritime emergencies. Guidance on the application of risk management is offered in an IMO/ICAO publication [Ref IAMSAR Manual]. The information collected should be of use in risk management related to the radiological aspects of dealing effectively and safely with maritime incidents.

Intervention levels provided in this document may be used by emergency responders as an indicator for the implementation of certain response actions and/or escalation of the response.

The information contained herein describes the interface between transport emergency response and radiological emergency response by a State and should be incorporated into existing maritime

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emergency response systems to enhance the level of preparedness to respond to transport events involving radioactive material (class 7 dangerous goods).

The document provides guidance on the type of information that should be included in a plan, but is not in itself an emergency response plan.

1.3. SCOPEThe guidance in this document is relevant to incidents and accidents occurring on vessels carrying radioactive materials in accordance with the IMDG code and supplements thereto. Cargo vessels may carry radioactive material, other dangerous goods and non-dangerous cargo. This guidance considers only those specific hazards associated with radioactive material. The IAEA recommends an all hazards approach during the planning and response to incidents and accidents.

The guidance in this document is applicable to incidents and emergencies on board vessels, in international waters, territorial waters and ports.

This guidance is only applicable to response actions performed during initial and accident control phase of an incident or emergency.

This guidance is not applicable to incidents involving the propulsion reactors on nuclear powered ships or Floating Nuclear Power Plants (FNPP’s).

Movement of materials on ships under the command of military forces are outside of the scope of this document, as are nuclear weapons and other armaments.

1.4. STRUCTURE

The first emergency responders are the staff from police, Security, Medical and fire brigade: Detailed action guides for specific responders can be referred from IAEA - Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency (2006). This document is intended to provide specific instructions to assist the response to a maritime accident involving radioactive materials.

Chapter 2 describes the type of radioactive materials transported by sea and the type of incidents and accident that may occur.

Chapter 3 describes the response to such incident and accidents. This is supported by a series of response instructions that are presented in Chapter 5. Finally chapter 5 details more specific considerations that should be taken into account depending on the type of packages that may be found onboard the vessel.

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2. TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS BY SEA

There are many different types of radioactive material that are carried by sea, and they come from many different origins. They can be loosely categorized into the following types:

Fresh nuclear fuel, spent nuclear fuel and wastes from nuclear fuel reprocessing Waste materials Low activity bulk products Industrial isotopes Minerals

Fresh nuclear fuel, spent nuclear fuel and wastes from nuclear fuel reprocessing are those associated with the civilian generation of nuclear power. This material is either very high activity or high value. It is common for these materials to be transported on dedicated ships. These materials are often subject to close supervision, and information regarding them is likely to be readily available in the event of any incident.

Waste materials can originate from any activity involving radioactive materials and they are generally sub-categorized as low level, intermediate level and high-level waste. Material from all three sub-categories is transported by sea, often in large containers. In some cases very large items of facilities are carried by sea, structures that cannot be easily broken up or carried by land may be carried by sea. In general, the greater the risk associated with the cargo the greater the active supervision will be. For many waste materials airborne risks are significant, for others direct radiation is significant.

Many products with low activity that are carried in bulk are transported by sea. A good example is the transport of container loads of smoke detectors. Information on these cargos may be difficult to obtain. Many of these products will offer effectively zero risk even when destroyed.

Radioisotopes are used by many industries around the world including, for example, the offshore oil industry. Sea transport of industrial isotopes is frequent and widespread. These sources can be very large. Most will be carried in competent authority approved packages. Identifying the package approval numbers provides good information for the largest of these sources. Primary risks from isotopes are direct radiation, airborne or surface contamination is less likely to be a significant hazard.

Many minerals contain (naturally occurring) radioactive material, the volume/mass and distances between origin and processing sites mean that sea transport is often the only viable transport method. These minerals are often extracted from the ground and are being moved for processing. As a result the hazard is not often higher than that associated with some sand beaches around the world. Even if the minerals have relatively high radiation levels the primary risk from this material is normally inhalation.

Medical isotopes are extensively used around the world for the diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions. However, a feature of medical isotopes is that the shorter the half-life is the greater the ratio of benefit/risk. As a result they are most frequently transported by air although they are also carried on some short sea crossings. Medical isotopes are normally intended to be incorporated into the human body, so single dose quantities are not likely to offer a significant risk.

There are many different types of accidents and incidents in a marine environment that can involve vessels transporting radioactive materials. An understanding of the different types of

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events and their possible significance is important for developing plans and for responding to such events. The international transport requirements are established in order to ensure that the likelihood for radiological events to occur during transport is very low. It is however recommended for coastal states to include transport events in their analyses when planning their emergency response. For most countries it would not require detailed scenario specific emergency response plans. It is however up to the individual countries to decide upon their planning requirements.

There are two likely accident locations: at sea or in/near a port. Both locations have good and bad points from a response point of view. Some of these considerations are outlined in .

Table 1: Response considerations based on location of event

IN PORT OR NEAR A POPULATION CENTRE

AT SEA

Good Points

- easier to communicate with the vessel- more response assets potentially

available- easier to evacuate crew- can potentially move the vessel to an

area away from the population centre

- security is easier- negligible health impact for ashore

populations

Bad points

- security may be more challenging depending on the proximity to population

- psycho-social and economic impacts may be more significant

- more difficult to communicate with the vessel

- fewer response assets potentially available

- more difficult to reach and assist the vessel

- difficult to evacuate crew

2.1. TYPES OF MARINE EVENTS CONSIDEREDThe International Maritime Organization classifies accidents for general cargo ships into several categories. IMO accident types ship accident categories and frequencies (based on historical data) are:

2.1.1. Collision

Collision between two ships is mostly observed in harbours, rivers/canals and coastal waters, but can also happen in open seas. The consequences can vary between slight damage to the ship structure and total loss of the ship and its cargo. A collision may also develop into other types of accidents like fire/explosion and hull damage. Collision scenarios represent about 16% of all identified accidents

2.1.2. Contact

Contact between two vessels mostly occurs in harbours and rivers/canals. The consequences vary, but they are generally of relatively low importance for safety of the crew and the cargo. Contact scenarios represent about 7% of all identified accidents

2.1.3. Foundering

Scenarios where ships sink typically occur in open sea or coastal waters and there are many different types of initiating events that can cause this. Such events are likely to require a rescue operation for the crew. It is likely that the cargo goes down with the ship. Whether the cargo is damaged or not during such an event, depends on the circumstances. In the longer perspective, cargo will normally sooner or

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later be deteriorated. Operations to recover the ship and its cargo may be considered taking the potential consequences into considerations.

2.1.4. Foundering scenarios represent about 4% of all identified accidents. . Hull damage

Hull damage is often associated with heavy weather in open sea causing cargo shift. This can lead to other scenarios e.g. sinking of the ship. These scenarios represent about 16% of all identified accidents

2.1.5. Fire/explosion

Fires and explosions on board cargo ships usually starts in the engine. Fires and explosions in cargo may also occur and are often related to lack of knowledge or exact documentation of cargo content and which precautions should be taken into account for the transported cargo. A fire/explosion may cause very severe situations threatening the safety of crew and cargo and possibly its surroundings. It should be considered that ships carrying irradiated nuclear fuels (INF) require special arrangements that are designed to mitigate the consequences of an event. Ships of this special type are classified as INF 1, 2 or 3. The different levels of ship have different protection measures to prevent severe consequences to very unlikely events (e.g. severe collision leading to a fire or explosion involving the class 7 cargo) For example, an INF3 certified ship has extensive fire fighting arrangements that should prevent a fire from coming in contact with the class 7 cargo.

Fire and explosion scenarios represent about 8% of all identified accidents

2.1.6. Machinery damage

Machinery damage is often caused by wear out of equipment, maintenance procedures not being carried out properly and failure of gauging equipment. Machinery damage in itself is not directly causing damage to cargo, but might in turn develop into dangerous situations and even emergencies threatening the safety of crew and cargo. Machinery damage scenarios account for nearly 37% of all identified accidents.2.17 Wrecked/stranded

These accidents are observed in harbours, rivers/canals and coastal waters and are distinguished as powered grounding caused by human errors or technical errors (machinery failure, steering failure) and drift grounding followed by a blackout or loss of propulsion. Wrecked/stranded scenarios represent about 22% of all identified accidents.2.18 Hostile takeover

Hostile takeover of a transport vessel is a scenario that can be foreseen but with a low probability. Such an event may lead to some of the other scenarios mentioned above. The radiological impact depends on what happens on board.

2.19 Possible consequences

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The consequences of a marine event involving class 7 cargo may have different types of primary impacts. The most important and direct impacts are:

health impacts,

environmental impacts

economic impacts.

These primary impacts can later on cause secondary effects.

The actual impact from such an event depends on a number or factors

type of accident

external conditions, where it happens, weather etc.

type of nuclides, their activities and form (solid, liquid or gas) and encapsulation

type of transport packaging

and of course the

capability to mitigate the consequences

The consequences of a marine event involving class 7 cargo are the total of the health impacts, psychosocial impacts and economic impacts. The following paragraphs examine each of these aspects. It should be noted that the guidance in the document is outside the scope of dealing with psycho-social and economic impacts; however, these aspects are important to planners and decision makers.

2.2. TYPES OF MARINE ACCIDENTS CONSIDERED

2.2.1. Health Impacts

Radiation may in general result in two different types of somatic effects:

- stochastic effects in the form of later development of cancer where the probability increases with increasing radiation doses and where it is assumed that there is no lower threshold..

- deterministic effects in the form of burns or damaged organs when the radiation doses exceed certain very high thresholds.

The international transport regulations are established to ensure that the likelihood for any event to result in any significant radiological health impact is very low. It is however recognised that, like for any other radiological event, care must be taken to ensure that radiation doses are kept as low as reasonably achievable. This especially applies to crew and first responders whenever radioactive materials are uncovered or released into the surroundings.

Psychosocial effects can manifest both in those involved in the event and in society in general. They may experience psychological effects such as post-traumatic stress and other issues relating to fear of the unknown surrounding their exposure to radiation. The psychosocial impacts for a marine transport accident are believed to be proportional to the distance from the population. If an event happens in a port then the impact would be higher than if the event happens at sea away from the population.

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2.2.2. Environmentalimpacts

Environmental impacts may occur in relation to an event during transport of radioactive materials. Such impacts might occur following a fire or an explosion if radioactive materials are released to sea or to air. This might be an immediate pollution. Environmental impacts can also be anticipated if cargo is lost overboard or cargo goes down with a ship. This can result in an immediate pollution or a pollution that occurs much later.

The nature of the radiological impact can first of all be associated with life in the sea or around the sea. For certain scenarios, the environment on land may also be impacted.

2.2.3. Economic impacts

Economic impacts

There are several parties that may me economically impacted by such an event:

Owner of ship loosing ship and income

Owner of cargo loosing cargo

Coastal state performing search and rescue operations

Coastal state doing recovery operations, if necessary.

Commercial interests in Coastal states and affected by pollution , e.g. fisheries, tourism etc

The magnitude of economic consequences will heavily depend on the event scenario, but one should recognise the fact that third parties not at all involved and with no economic interests in the transport, could be economically affected depending on scenarios and circumstances.

2.3. OVERALL RISKThe overall likelihood of an event combined with the consequence is the risk associated with the event. For marine transport accidents involving class 7 cargo, the likelihood of an initiating event leading to class 7 cargo damage is very small and the postulated consequences are very low thus giving an overall very low risk for the activity. It is not deemed necessary to have detailed plans for these types of emergencies. In general, an all hazards approach that is modified to consider some of the unique hazards of the cargo would be sufficient for most purposes.

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2.4 Legal responsibilities on responding to incidents emergencies on ships carrying radioactive material

2.4.1 The international law of the sea and State jurisdiction in respect of sea areasThe international law of the sea is a set of customary and treaty rules governing inter-State relations in respect of human activities at sea: these rules aim at distributing State jurisdiction1

over marine areas and, in particular, over ships navigating therein among the principal stakeholders, i.e. the flag State (the State of nationality of a ship) and the coastal State (the State in the vicinity of whose coast a ship is navigating) or the port State (the State in whose port a ship voluntarily finds itself).2 The customary rules of the law of the sea have undergone substantial changes in recent times and have been codified and developed in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force in 1994 and has at present over 160 States Parties.Under the law of the sea, jurisdiction over both merchant ships and government ships operated for non-commercial purposes (including warships)3 rests, in principle, with the flag State. However, the flag State’s jurisdiction is only exclusive in respect of ships navigating on the high seas, i.e. within that part of the sea which lies beyond sea areas that are adjacent to a State’s coast and that are subject, in varying degrees, to the coastal State’s jurisdiction. These are: the territorial sea and internal waters, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the continental shelf.The territorial sea, which may extend up to a maximum of 12 nautical miles (Article 3 UNCLOS), is a sea-belt adjacent to a State’s coast subject to the coastal State’s full sovereignty (Article 2.1 UNCLOS). However, all foreign ships enjoy a right of “innocent” passage4 through the territorial sea for the purpose not only of proceeding to or from the coastal State’s internal waters, but also of traversing the territorial sea without proceeding to or from internal waters (Articles 17 and 18 UNCLOS). The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage that is not innocent (Article 25.1 UNCLOS), but may not prevent or hamper innocent passage.5 Innocent passage can only be temporarily suspended in respect of specific areas of the territorial sea if such suspension is essential for the protection of the coastal State’s security (Article 25.3 UNCLOS), but no such suspension is allowed in respect of straits used for international navigation that may be included within the territorial sea of one or more States (Article 45 UNCLOS).6 Even when a crime has been committed on board the ship during passage, unless the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship or by diplomatic agents or consular officers of the flag State, the coastal State should not exercise its criminal jurisdiction to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation save when “the consequences of the crime extend to that State”, the crime is of a kind “to disturb the peace

1 In public international law, the term “State jurisdiction” is often used in a broad sense to denote a State’s governmental power in its various forms, and not only the jurisdictional competence of that State’s courts; the same goes for the law of the sea, which principally (though not exclusively) concerns States’ enforcement powers in respect of ships navigating at sea.

2 The “international law of the sea” is, therefore, part of public international law and, in principle, distinct from “maritime law” (sometimes also called “admiralty law”), which is a body of national rules (including rules on conflicts of laws) governing the relations between private entities which operate vessels at sea. However, this terminology is sometimes used inconsistently. Moreover, maritime law is obviously influenced by the law of the sea, as well as by international treaties whose object is the harmonization of national rules (including rules on conflict of laws).

3 Government ships operated for commercial purposes are treated as merchant ships.

4 Article 19 UNCLOS defines passage as “innocent” “so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State”, and gives a non-exhaustive list of activities that are incompatible with the “innocent” nature of passage, which includes acts of wilful and serious pollution.

5 The coastal State may also adopt laws and regulations relating to innocent passage in respect of, inter alia, the safety of navigation and the preservation of the environment, but such laws and regulations may not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships (unless they give effect to generally accepted international rules or standards), nor can they impose requirements that have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage (Articles 21 and 23 UNCLOS).

6 Indeed in some such straits the more favourable right of “transit passage” applies: this includes a right of overflight on the part of foreign aircraft, which is not included in the right of innocent passage (Articles 37 and 38 UNCLOS).

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of the country or the good order of the territorial sea”, or such measures are necessary for the suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs (Article 27 UNCLOS)7. The fact that a right of innocent passage through the territorial sea is enjoyed also by foreign “nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances” is confirmed by Article 23 UNCLOS, which requires such ships to carry documents and observe special precautionary measures established for them by international agreements “when exercising the right of innocent passage”. However, Article 22 UNCLOS allows the coastal State to require such ships to confine their passage to sea lanes that it may have designated for the regulation of the passage of ships. Although UNCLOS does not explicitly say so, some States interpret these provisions as allowing them to require prior notification on the part of such ships of their intention to enter their territorial sea; other States, however, have taken a different view.The breadth of a State’s territorial sea can be calculated from the low-water line along that State’s coast or, in a number of cases, from artificial baselines consisting of straight baselines drawn across bays, mouths of rivers or, in localities where the coastline is deeply indented or cut into or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast, joining other appropriate points. The waters lying on the landward side of such baselines, just like the waters of a State’s ports, are internal waters.8 Like the territorial sea, internal waters are subject to the coastal State’s full sovereignty but, unlike in the territorial sea, no right of innocent passage exists for foreign ships in internal waters except in certain special cases (Article 8 UNCLOS).9 Beyond the territorial sea, the coastal State may establish a contiguous zone, which may extend up to a maximum of 24 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea.10 The contiguous zone is a sea area within which the coastal State can take enforcement action for the purpose of punishing, or preventing, violations of its customs, fiscal immigration or sanitary laws which have occurred, or are about to occur, within its territorial sea (Article 33 UNCLOS). For our purposes, therefore, the contiguous zone is not very relevant, and can be considered as an area of high seas or of the coastal State’s EEZ, depending on whether or not an EEZ has been established.Beyond the territorial sea, the coastal State may in fact also establish an EEZ, which may extend up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea (Article 57 UNCLOS). The EEZ is a sui generis area (i.e. it is neither part of the territorial sea nor of the high seas) within which the coastal State enjoys “sovereign rights” for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of the seabed, and its subsoil, and the superadjacent waters; in addition, the coastal State has jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, maritime scientific research, and the protection of the environment (Article 56 UNCLOS). However, other States continue to enjoy in a State’s EEZ some of the traditional freedoms of the high seas, notably the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, together with “other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms” (Article 58 UNCLOS).

7 Similarly, and a fortiori, the coastal State should not stop or divert a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea for the purpose of exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to a person on board the ship (Article 28 UNCLOS).

8 An exception is constituted by the territorial sea baselines that may be drawn by an “archipelagic State”, i.e. a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos. An archipelagic State may draw straight “archipelagic baselines” joining the outermost points of the outermost islands of the archipelago, thus subjecting the entire sea area within such baselines to its sovereignty. However, the waters so enclosed are not internal waters but rather “archipelagic waters” and their regime is more similar to that of the territorial sea, since foreign ships continue to enjoy a right of innocent passage therein: indeed, in respect of specific sea lanes or air routes, there is s right of “archipelagic sea lanes passage” which, like the right of transit passage through some straits used for international navigation, includes a right of overflight by foreign aircraft (Articles 46-54 UNCLOS).

9 Although, as was pointed out above, innocent passage through the territorial sea may be for the purpose of proceeding to or from internal waters, this does not mean that the coastal State is obliged to allow foreign ships to enter its ports or other internal waters: on the contrary, in the case of ships proceeding to or from its internal waters, the coastal State has the right to take the necessary measures within its territorial sea to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters is subject (Article 25.2 UNCLOS).

10 Therefore, if the State’s territorial sea extends to 12 nautical miles from the baselines, the contiguous zone can extend to a further 12 miles from the outer limit of the territorial sea.

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Even if the coastal State has not established an EEZ, it still enjoys “sovereign rights” for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural resources of the continental shelf, an area extending up to 200 nautical miles (or, in some cases up to a maximum of 350 nautical miles) from the baselines of the territorial sea, since these rights are not dependent on any express proclamation on its part (Articles 76 and 77 UNCLOS); for the same purposes, the coastal State can also construct, or authorize the construction of, artificial islands or other installations and structures on the continental shelf, and has jurisdiction in respect thereof (Article 80 UNCLOS). However, the coastal State’s rights over its continental shelf do not otherwise affect the legal status of the superadjacent waters (Article 78 UNCLOS): therefore, if no EEZ has been established, these remain part of the high seas and thus ships of all States enjoy freedom of navigation therein.Freedom of navigation on the high seas entails that, as was pointed out above, no interference with ships is permitted on the part of States other than the flag State, which enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over ships entitled to fly its flag (Article 92 UNCLOS). There are a number of exceptions to the flag State’s exclusive jurisdiction (e.g. in respect of pirate ships, or of ships engaged in the slave trade or in unauthorized broadcasting), but most of them have no direct relevance for ships carrying radioactive material. However, mention must be made of Article 221.1 UNCLOS, whereby States have the right to “take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such casualty, which may reasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences”11. In addition, when a ship is voluntarily within a foreign port, the port State may undertake investigations and institute proceedings in respect of any discharge from that vessel in violation of applicable international rules and standards, even if the discharge occurred on the high seas (Article 218 UNCLOS).

2.4.2 The IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear MaterialThe 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material aims at achieving and maintaining worldwide effective physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes; to prevent and combat offences relating to such material; and to facilitate international cooperation to that end. The Convention applies to nuclear material in international nuclear transport and, with the exception of certain provisions, also to domestic use, storage and transport. When the 2005 Amendment enters into force, the Convention, as amended, will also cover nuclear facilities and nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, as well as sabotage.As far as the international transport of nuclear materials is concerned, under Article 3, each State Party is obliged to ensure that nuclear material “within its territory, or on board a ship or aircraft under its jurisdiction in so far as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport to or from that State”, is protected at the levels specified in the Annex to the Convention. In case of maritime transport, this obligation clearly applies to the flag State, in so far as the ship is engaged in the transport of nuclear material to or from that State. Moreover, when the ship is within a State’s territorial sea, the same obligation applies to the coastal State. However, the Convention is careful not to prejudice the right of innocent passage of foreign ships within a State’s territorial sea by not extending the applicability of Article 4.3, which obliges a State Party not to allow “the transit of its territory by land or internal waterways or through its airports or seaports” of nuclear material between States that are not parties to the Convention unless that State Party has received assurances that the nuclear material will be protected at the levels described in the Annex to the Convention.In case of theft, robbery or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material, or of credible threat thereof, all States Parties have, in accordance with their national law, an obligation to cooperate and assist any State that so requests in the recovery and protection of such material (Article 5),

11 Article 221.2 defines “maritime casualty” as “a collision of vessels, stranding or other incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a vessel or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a vessel or cargo”.

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and no distinction can be made in this respect between flag States and coastal States. The same goes for the obligation to make the intentional commission of certain acts an offence punishable by appropriate penalties under national criminal law (Article 7). However, as far as the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by States Parties is concerned, under Article 8, an obligation to establish jurisdiction over such offences is only incumbent on the national State of the offender, on the State in whose territory the offence is committed, which includes its territorial sea and internal waters, and on the flag State in case of offences committed on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State. Other States involved in international nuclear transport as exporting or importing States have the faculty, but are not obliged, to establish jurisdiction; on the other hand, any State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present is obliged to take the measures necessary to establish its jurisdiction if it does not extradite him (or her) to a State Party having established its jurisdiction in accordance with the Convention.In addition, under Article 9, the State Party in whose territory the alleged offender is present is obliged to take appropriate measures under its national law, including detention, to ensure his (or her) presence for the purpose of prosecution or extradition. In case the alleged offender is on board a foreign ship exercising innocent passage through a State Party’s territorial sea, it could be argued that, under Article 27 UNCLOS, the offence is one of those whose consequences extend to the coastal State or which are of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of its territorial sea, thus allowing the coastal State to board the ship in order to proceed to arrest him (or her), or conduct an investigation where appropriate. This applies, a fortiori, if the ship is within the State’s internal waters or is calling at one of its ports.

2.4.3 The IMO Conventions relating to the obligation to assist and to search and rescue operationsAlthough the obligation of ships to go to the assistance of vessels in distress was enshrined both in tradition and in international treaties (such as the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974), there was no international system covering search and rescue operations until the adoption, in 1979, of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), which entered into force in 1985.The general obligation for ship masters, irrespective of the ship’s flag, to proceed to the assistance of those in distress at sea is enshrined in Chapter V of the 1974 SOLAS Convention, which is generally regarded as the most important of international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships.12 The main objective of the SOLAS Convention is, however, to specify minimum standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their safety.13 Although the SOLAS Convention does refer to search and rescue services, detailed provisions relating to search and rescue operations conducted by States are not to be found in the SOLAS Convention, but rather in the 1979 SAR Convention.The technical requirements of the SAR Convention are contained in an Annex which is an integral part thereof (Article I) and which was revised in May 1998. The revised Annex to the SAR, which entered into force in January 2000, clarifies the responsibilities of the Parties and puts greater emphasis on the regional approach and co-ordination between maritime and aeronautical SAR operations. Under the Annex to the SAR Convention, the Parties are required, individually or in cooperation with other States and the IMO, to participate in the development of SAR services to ensure that assistance is rendered to any person in distress at sea, and their responsible authorities are required to take urgent steps to ensure that the necessary assistance is provided upon receiving information that any person is in distress at sea. The Parties are also required, individually or in cooperation with other States, to establish a number of basic elements of a SAR service, and to establish SAR regions by agreement with the Parties

12 The first version of the Convention was adopted in 1914, but revisions were thereafter adopted in 1929, 1948, 1960 and 1974. The 1974 version of the SOLAS Convention includes a tacit acceptance procedure, whereby amendments shall enter into force on a specified date unless, before that date, objections are received from a number of Contracting Parties.

13 Flag States are responsible for ensuring that ships under their flag comply with SOLAS requirements, and a number of certificates are prescribed as proof that this has been done. Control provisions also allow Contracting Parties to inspect ships of other Contracting Parties if there are clear grounds for believing that the ship and its equipment do not substantially comply with SOLAS requirements.

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concerned. Finally, the Parties are required to co-ordinate their SAR organizations with those of neighbouring States; where necessary, they are encouraged to co-ordinate their SAR operations with the same States and to enter into agreements with neighbouring States setting forth the conditions for entry of each other’s SAR units into or over their respective territorial sea or territory. Following the adoption of the SAR Convention, IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee has divided the world’s oceans into a number of SAR areas, in each of which the countries concerned have delimited SAR regions for which they are responsible. The 1979 SAR Convention explicitly states that it is not intended to prejudice the codification and development of the law of the sea by UNCLOS, nor “the present or future claims and legal views of any State concerning the law of the sea and the nature and extent of coastal State jurisdiction”; neither is the Convention intended to prejudice “obligations or rights of vessels provided for in other international instruments” (Article II).

2.4.4 The IAEA Conventions on early notification and assistanceThe 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident applies in the event of an accident involving selected facilities or activities of a State Party, or of persons or legal entities under its jurisdiction or control, and from which a release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which has resulted or may result in an international trans-boundary release that could be of radiological safety significance for another State (Article 1.1). Among the facilities or activities involved, special mention may be made, in this context, of “any nuclear reactor wherever located” (Article 1.2 (a)), which includes reactors on board ships navigating at sea, and of “the transport … of nuclear fuels or radioactive wastes” and of “radioisotopes for agricultural, industrial, medical and related scientific and research purposes” (Article 1.2 (d) and (e)), which includes the maritime transport of such material. In the event of such an accident, the State Party so involved has the duty to forthwith notify, directly or through the IAEA, those States which are or may be physically affected, as well as the Agency, of the nuclear accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and its exact location where appropriate; it also has the duty to promptly provide the same States, directly or through the IAEA, with available information relevant to minimizing the radiological consequences in those States (Articles 2 and 5).In the event of an accident occurring on board a ship navigating at sea, the duties referred to in the above Convention would certainly be incumbent on the flag State, irrespective of whether the accident occurs when the ship is exercising its freedom of navigation on the high seas (or within a coastal State’s EEZ or above its continental shelf) or when it is exercising its right of innocent passage through a coastal State’s territorial sea14. At least in the latter case, however, a case can be made that such duties would also be incumbent on the coastal State and the same would go, indeed a fortiori, in the case of an accident occurring while the ship is navigating within the coastal State’s internal waters or calling at one of its ports. The 1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency obliges all States Parties to cooperate between themselves and with the IAEA to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases (Article 1). More specifically, a State Party in need of assistance in the event of such an accident or emergency, “whether or not such accident or emergency originates within its territory, jurisdiction or control”, may call for such assistance from any other State Party, directly or through the IAEA, and from the Agency or, where appropriate, from other international organizations (Article 2.1). It follows that, in case of an accident occurring on

14 See, e.g. B. Moser, “The IAEA Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency”, in Nuclear Law Bulletin, No. 44 (December 1989). Pp. 10 ff., at p. 12: “For transport by ship or by aircraft, responsibility for notification under the Convention lies with the State to which the means of transport ‘belongs’. This, in the case of State-owned ships and aircraft, is the owning State and, in the case of privately-owned ships and aircraft, the State where the ship or aircraft is registered since that is the State that exercises jurisdiction”. In both cases, it can be assumed that the State concerned is the flag State.

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board a ship navigating at sea, both the flag State and any coastal State may request assistance under the Convention, irrespective of whether the accident occurs when the ship is exercising its freedom of navigation on the high seas (or within a coastal State’s EEZ) or when it is exercising its right of innocent passage through a coastal State’s territorial sea.However, a specific duty to assist is only incumbent upon the IAEA (Article 2.6), whereas States Parties whose assistance has been requested are only obliged to promptly decide and notify the requesting State Party, directly or through the Agency, whether they are in a position to render the assistance requested, and the scope and terms of the assistance that might be rendered (Article 2.3). Moreover, once a decision to assist has been taken, the requesting State is only responsible for the overall direction, control, co-ordination and supervision of such assistance “within its territory” (Article 3). Inasmuch as the term “territory” is usually interpreted as including the territorial sea but excluding other sea areas subject to the coastal State’s “sovereign rights” or jurisdiction for specific purposes only, co-ordination and supervision of assistance can only be exercised by a requesting coastal State within its territorial sea (and, a fortiori, its internal waters), whereas in case of assistance rendered on the high seas or within a coastal State’s EEZ (or above its continental shelf), each assisting ship would remain subject to the flag State’s exclusive jurisdiction. On the other hand, under Article 10.2 of the Convention, the requesting State has a number of obligations relating to death or injury to persons, damage to property, or damage to the environment caused within its “territory or other area under its jurisdiction or control” in the course of providing the assistance requested: these obligations can to both its territorial sea (and internal waters) and other sea areas, such as its EEZ or continental shelf, subject to its “sovereign rights” or jurisdiction for specific purposes, as well as to ships flying its flag on the high seas.As for the obligations incumbent on States other than the requesting State, the obligation - which, under Article 9 of the Convention, is incumbent on each State Party, at the request of the requesting State or the assisting party - to seek to facilitate the transit through their “territory” of duly notified personnel equipment and property involved in the assistance to and from the requesting State only applies to the innocent passage of foreign ships through their territorial sea; on the other hand, the fact that no such obligation applies to ships navigating within their EEZ (or above their continental shelf) is not so important, since such ships already enjoy freedom of navigation.

2.4.5 The IAEA Conventions on civil liability for nuclear damageThe 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (VC), like the earlier 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (PC), which is a regional convention adopted under the auspices of the OECD, establishes a special legal regime designed to harmonize the national law of the Contracting Parties regulating the liability for damage resulting from nuclear incidents at nuclear installations, or in the course of transport of nuclear material therefrom or thereto, and the jurisdictional competence of national courts in respect of actions for compensation of such damage. Both the VC and the PC have been revised in order to update their provisions: in the case of the VC, this was done through the adoption of the 1997 Protocol to Amend the VC on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.In order to create a treaty link between the Contracting Parties to either the VC or the PC, the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the VC and the PC was adopted in 1988. Another instrument designed to create such a treaty link – and to include States that are Parties to neither the VC nor the PC - is the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), which, however, is not yet in force; in addition to establishing a worldwide regime on nuclear liability, the CSC purports to create an international fund to increase the amount of compensation available for nuclear damage. The special regime for nuclear liability is designed to establish minimum standards of financial protection against damage resulting from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and is based on a number of fundamental principles, namely: the operator of the nuclear installation concerned is liable for nuclear damage to the exclusion of any other person potentially liable under the

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general law of torts; the operator is liable for such damage regardless of any fault on his/her part; the amount of the operator’s liability can be limited by the installation State but a minimum amount must be guaranteed; the operator must have insurance coverage for his/her liability; the operator remains liable for ten years after the nuclear incident (except that, in respect of loss of life and personal injury, the revised conventions provide for a thirty year time limitation); there must be no discrimination among victims on grounds of nationality, domicile or residence (provided that damage is suffered within the geographical scope of the applicable Convention15); the courts of only one Contracting Party have jurisdiction in respect of all actions for compensation of nuclear damage, and their final judgments must be recognized and enforced in all Contracting Parties. Jurisdictional competence for all actions for compensation of nuclear damage lies with the courts of the Contracting Party within whose territory the incident occurred (the Incident State); if, however, the incident occurred outside the territory of any Contracting Party, jurisdiction lies with the courts of the Contracting Party within whose territory the nuclear installation is situated (the Installation State).In the event of a nuclear incident occurring in the course of transport of nuclear material to or from a nuclear installation situated in the territory of a Contracting Party, the operator’s exclusive liability is reinforced by the IMO Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, whereby a person who might otherwise be liable for the damage (e.g. the carrier) is exonerated from liability if the operator is liable under one of the nuclear liability conventions or national legislation which is similar in the scope of protection afforded to victims. As for jurisdictional competence, the courts of the coastal State (being the Incident State) would have jurisdiction in the event of an incident within that State’s territorial sea (or, a fortiori, its internal waters), whereas the courts of the Installation State (which may or may not be not be the flag State) would have jurisdiction in the event of an incident occurring beyond the territorial sea; however, the revised version of both the VC and the PC (as well as the CSC) provide that the courts of the coastal State would have jurisdiction even in the event of an accident occurring within that State’s EEZ. In any case, the amount of the operator’s liability, as well as the amount of his/her insurance cover, is to be determined, within the limits set by the applicable Convention, by the law of the Installation State.The special nuclear liability regime does not cover incidents involving nuclear-powered ships, nor the maritime transport of nuclear material other than nuclear fuel and radioactive products or waste, and expressly excludes radioisotopes usable for scientific, medical, agricultural, commercial or industrial purposes. In the case of incidents involving such ships or material, therefore, each State, subject to any other applicable international treaty to which it may be a Party, is free to determine the rules applicable to civil liability for damage resulting therefrom, as well as the rules applicable to the jurisdictional competence of its courts. Such rules are not to be found in the international law of the sea which, as pointed out above, is mainly concerned with the public law aspects of State jurisdiction. Indeed, as far as jurisdictional competence is concerned, Article 229 UNCLOS expressly states that “nothing in this Convention affects the institution of civil proceedings in respect of any claim for loss or damage resulting from pollution of the marine environment”. With specific reference to nuclear-powered ships, a Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships was adopted in Brussels in 1962, but never entered into force.

15 Provisions on geographical scope are not identical in all the liability conventions. Generally speaking, however, it is possible for the Installation State to decide whether or not compensation will be available for nuclear damage suffered outside the territory of the Contracting Parties or outside their “maritime zones” (an expression that covers both the territorial sea and sea areas beyond the territorial sea subject to the coastal State’s jurisdiction for specific purposes). On the other hand, the international fund envisaged by the CSC will exclusively be available to compensate damage suffered in the territory of Contracting Parties, including their territorial sea; beyond their territorial sea, only damage suffered by nationals of Contracting Parties, or on board or by ships flying their flag, will be compensated (except that damage suffered within the Contracting Parties’ EEZs or continental shelves in connection with their exploration or exploitation will always be compensated).

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3. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS ON VESSELS CARRYING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

This chapter deals with the response to a marine transport accident involving class 7 cargo. The intent is to give responders guidance on how to respond to such an emergency. The fundamental response to a marine transport accident is very similar to a response for a land or air transport event. For these reasons, many of the responses suggested below borrow heavily from what has already been written in other IAEA documents. Where necessary, amplification for the marine environment has been given. Generic/basic monitoring equipment has been specified in Section 4.10 of this document.

The response actions in any accident can be divided into three phases: The initial phase The accident control phase The post-emergency phase

3.1. EMERGENCY RESPONSE OBJECTIVES FOR MARITIME EMERGENCIES

The main objective of the response is to save lives and mitigate the effects of the accident on property and the environment.

In responding to transport accidents involving radioactive material the main actions to be taken are to:

Rescue and provide emergency medical aid to any victims, Control fires and the other common consequences of transport accidents, Identify the hazards of the material involved, Control any radiation hazard and prevent the spread of radioactive contamination, Recover the package or packages and transport vehicle, Decontaminate personnel, Decontaminate and restore the thoroughfare and delineate the borders of other

contaminated areas, Decontaminate in the vicinity and restore to a safe state.

In addition to the objectives related to the response there may be further objectives which are more related to the desires of the public in the coastal state. These should not be underestimated. The risk to life may, in fact be vanishingly small, while the demands of society on a government to demonstrate effective control may be high. These considerations should be factored into local, regional and national plans.

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3.2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONSError: Reference source not found shows the generic response to a marine event that may contain class 7 cargo. The generic response covers a variety of outcomes and is independent of the location of the ship, whether in port or at sea. There are some slight differences to the response depending on the location of the vessel and these are discussed in the appropriate response section.

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Figure 1: Generic response to a marine event involving class 7 cargo

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3.3. RESPONSE PHASES

3.3.1. The initial response phase

Information from the stricken vessel available will depend on the nature of the event and on its progression. Some information will remain constant, while other information may change as the event progresses. The information available from the vessel may range from none at all through to extensive information relating to the status of the vessel and its cargo.

Instruction 1: Initial notification, confirmation and assessment (see Chapter 5) is provided in of this document to assist responders in the collection of information relating to the event and the dangerous goods cargo on board the vessel. Instruction 3: Placards, labels and markings on packages or vehicles can be used to assist in the identification of packages based on the information received on Dangerous Goods packages on board, or alternatively it may be used to assist in the visual identification of packages.

3.3.2. The accident control phase

A lack of initial information should not delay the response to an emergency. It is therefore important to:

Implement an all hazards approach during the initial response Ensure that fundamental emergency response objectives and procedures are

implemented Obtain valid information as soon as is practical.

As more information becomes available, the Emergency Controller and/or Incident Commander can modify the response to meet the actual hazards present.

The generic accident response for a transport emergency is provided in Instruction 2: Response to a Transport Accident.

What follows is additional guidance that is specific to the marine environment.

3.3.3. Fires/Explosion Response

Coastal and shipping States should already have plans in place to respond to maritime incidents and emergencies involving fires and explosions on a vessel. The standard, planned response should be implemented regardless of the presence of Class 7 radioactive materials on board.

Most large class 7 loads are located near midships, especially in INF class 2 and 3 ships. In this case, consideration should be made to approach the vessel from upwind on the bow or stern quarter if possible. This would minimize the risk to responders from any damaged or dispersed class 7 contents.

3.3.4. Treating the injured

Medical treatment of injured personnel should not be delayed even if radiation exposure or contamination is suspected. If it is known that casualties have been exposed and/or contaminated then assess and manage appropriately.

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Evacuation of injured personnel may not be readily available for accidents that occur at sea. In this case, consideration must be made to shelter the injured appropriately until such a time as they can be moved ashore.

The following instructions should be used to assist in the medical response:

Instruction 6: Actions On-Scene until Arrival of Emergency Medical Response Team

Instruction 7: On Scene Emergency Medical Response

Instruction 8: Transport of Victims to Hospital

3.3.5. Assessing the integrity of class 7 shipping containers or packages

Saving lives, suppressing fires and dealing with flammable, explosive and toxic materials should generally take priority before any assessment of package integrity can or should be made.

A visual inspection of the cargo may indicate whether the shipping containers or packages have been damaged. The presence of fire, smoke and fumes could preclude an initial determination in this regard.

External damage to a container or package of radioactive material does not necessarily mean that the interior packaging components have been breached. Leaking liquids, gases or powders may indicate that package integrity has been compromised. However, integrity may have failed with no visible indication.

Use Instruction 4: Assessing a Package To Determine Whether It Is Damaged.

Access to any packages that are damaged or leaking their radioactive contents in excess of the allowable limits for the normal conditions of transport should be limited. Such packages may, under proper supervision, be removed to an acceptable interim location, but should not be forwarded until repaired or reconditioned and decontaminated.

If class 7 packaging is damaged then experts should be consulted.

3.3.6. Mitigate Release/Spill and Start Environmental Monitoring

A water fog, or water curtain, is very effective if used, at some distance downwind, to reduce the concentration of radioactive particulate in a plume and to minimize the area that may eventually require decontamination.

Liquid spills on the vessel can be prevented from entering the water by closing scuppers and drains that lead overboard. Traditional spill mitigation methods can also be used on board to prevent a spill from leaving the ship.

If a radiological spill has resulted in radioactive material leaving the ship and entering the sea then there is not much that can be done to mitigate the problem. The radiation will quickly be diluted and dispersed into the aquatic environment.

If the vessel is in port then local water intake restrictions and recreational waters may have to be closed. Whether at sea or in port environmental samples will be required to eventually determine the impact on the marine environment.

With marine transport events it may be possible to relocate the vessel to an area more advantageous for reducing the impact of the release/spill on people and the environment. If the vessel is damaged then this may require the use of tug boats. Moving and anchoring the vessel away from a population centre may reduce the impact of the accident, but it may also hamper access to the required response assets.

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Start environmental monitoring as appropriate.

3.3.7. Assess and Manage exposed and/or contaminated people

Assessment of exposure may be made by using Instruction 9: Deciding Who Should Receive A Medical Examination Or Later Follow-Up.

If contamination is present then decontamination may be conducted in accordance with the guidelines in Instruction 10: Emergency Worker and Public Decontamination.

The treatment of exposed and/or contaminated people at a potential radiological event is well documented in EPR-Medical 2005i. Planners should refer to this document for guidance on responding to these types of events.

3.4. THE POST-EMERGENCY PHASEOnce the accident or incident has been declared over it would be prudent to have assurances from the vessel that:

there will be no release of radioactive substances to the environment or that the release of radioactive substances to the environment has stopped and no further releases/spills are expected;

the source of radiation is in a stable condition and that shielding is intact or has been re-established; or

there is no known risk of fire or explosion that directly threatens class 7 cargo.

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4. INSTRUCTIONS

4.1. INSTRUCTION 1: INITIAL NOTIFICATION, CONFIRMATION AND ASSESSMENT

Purpose

The objective of this activity is to promptly identify an accident and initiate an appropriate response.

It is critical that the initial notification of a marine emergency be correctly received and confirmed so that an initial assessment of severity can be made and appropriate resources can be dispatched to deal with the emergency.

Rapid assessment

Upon initial notification the following information should be gathered to help in identifying the scope and magnitude of the initial event.

Question Information

What is the name of the vessel?

Where is the vessel? Where did the event happen?

What is the nature of incident? (e.g., collision, fire etc)

What time did the incident start?

What is the status of crew?

Is medical assistance required?

Are hazardous materials being transported? Which ones?

Information from the vessel

Each vessel should have a reasonable idea of the dangerous goods being carried. This information is important for the vessel, for example to ensure that non-compatible goods are separated (segregated) from each other. In addition there should be a loading plan. However, the number of persons on a vessel can be limited, and in the event of a major life-threatening emergency it may be inappropriate for the ship to enter in to detailed communication with the coastal state since this could divert effort from the first response.

The information that could reasonably be provided by a vessel would be:

The UN number

The proper shipping name

The gross weight of the package

Additional information related to the consignor or consignee would be very valuable, since this will allow interaction with the most relevant experts on the cargo. Alternatively details of any package certification numbers will help provide information.21

Information from the cargo owner

In fact this should be extended to be the owner, the consignor or the consignee. This is likely to be the best source of information, and would be able to provide most of the information required for any response, whether the cargo is involved or not. The most appropriate source of information is the consignor.

The consignor should be able to provide extensive information concerning the packaging and the contents. They should be able to advice on what actions they consider necessary. The ability to identify the consignor will be the challenge; however there are several options for tracing them – not simply from the ship, but also from previous ports of call. There may be issues related to time zones that make immediate access to information difficult.

It is worth noting that a graded approach applies, and for the most significant cargos (carried on INF ships) the vessel or the vessel owner will be in a position to identify the cargo, the cargo owner and emergency response requirements specific to the cargo.

Information from the flag state

The flag state may be able to offer some information, but is likely to be in a similar position to a coastal state in respect to seeking information. It is recommended that information is shared by the coastal state and flag state.

Information from the last port of call

Most vessels have clearly defined routes, and the last port of call is likely to be easily determined, for example by examining the web page of the shipping line. The last port of call should be aware of all dangerous goods on the vessel (and for example in Europe there are detailed reporting arrangements).

In the event that the vessel is unable to communicate freely with the coastal state this offers the best option for securing key information regarding the cargo. It is likely that a port will be able to be contacted at any time regarding information required to respond to an emergency.

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Detailed AssessmentThe following detailed information should be ascertained once the initial response has commenced and time permits.

Question Information

What is the likely progression of the event?

What assistance is required?

When is the assistance required?

What actions have been taken or are being taken on board?

Any survey of ships damage

Where did the vessel depart from?

Where is/was the vessels next port or call?

Who is in charge?

What communication systems are available?

Who has been notified?

Who needs to be notified?

Ships log (report of event) including casualty reports

What is the nature of the cargo onboard?

Is the Dangerous Goods manifest onboard?

Is the vessel carrying class 7 cargo (Radioactive Materials)?

Can the manifest be transmitted electronically?

What are the UN Numbers of the dangerous goods cargo onboard?

Has the incident on-board potentially or actually affected the status of the cargo?

Has there been any survey of damage to packages?

Are any radiation and contamination monitoring results available?

Continual AssessmentOnce the rapid and detailed assessments are completed, it is important to continually update and assess the available information as the event develops.

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4.2. INSTRUCTION 2: RESPONSE TO A TRANSPORT ACCIDENT

DescriptionAn emergency involving radioactive material being transported in accordance with international standards.

Potential hazardsFor package types shown in Figure A7-1 with a medium and medium to high hazard level, there is a small possibility of:

1) a release resulting in an inhalation hazard near the source,

2) contamination that is hazardous if ingested and

3) hazardous levels of external exposure from being near the accident for an extended time.

Fire fighters are generally equipped with protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment, which provides good protection against radioactive contamination and inhalation of airborne radioactive material. Being in the vicinity of the material for a short period (e.g. to conduct lifesaving) should not be hazardous. There have been no reported transport emergencies involving radioactive material that have had serious radiological consequences.

Emergency response

Carrier: Perform life saving measures and provide first aid for serious injuries immediately, before

conducting radiological monitoring. Keep people away from the emergency scene and implement other actions in carrier response

guidance. Call local emergency response services. Operate under the ICS incident commander.

Incident commander (lead first responder local official): Observe from a distance and assess all possible hazards. Approach from upwind or use respiratory protection if possible and ensure those

approaching scene take action to prevent inadvertent ingestion of contamination (e.g. wear gloves, do not smoke- or eat).

Take lifesaving and first aid action immediately, before conducting monitoring. Control fires and other consequences that are an immediate threat to life. Obtain radiological assessment assistance to co-ordinate radiological response. Obtain emergency medical assistance to co-ordinate the medical response. If the emergency receives media or public attention obtain public information officer to keep

the public informed. Establish an inner-cordoned area (safety distance) Arrange to transport seriously injured people to local medical facility. If they may be

contaminated, wrap them in a blanket to control the spread of contamination. Tell those transporting the victim and the receiving medical facility that the person may be contaminated and that the risk to those treating such a patient is negligible but care should be taken to prevent inadvertent ingestion of contamination.

Gather potentially exposed or contaminated people, who are not seriously injured, in a safe location (victim assembly point) to: register them, give them a medical and radiological evaluation (triage) and arrange for their treatment.

Activate response using the ICS co-ordinated under an incident commander near the scene. Establish the incident command post upwind (Wind direction is often variable, especially in an urban area; thus, this is a secondary concern), at a safe distance and in a secure area.

If the public announcement is delayed, prepare public information and a spokesperson to be used when the news of the emergency reaches the media and public.

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Evaluate all available information; retrace the sequence of events. Be aware of the possibility that radioactive material may be a subject of illicit trafficking or other criminal act. If illicit trafficking or any criminal act is suspected, notify appropriate law enforcement authorities and integrate law enforcement into the ICS.

On the basis of data on the labels and shipping papers, take the initial action appropriate as shown in Figure A7-I:

keep people away from the emergency scene, establish cordon-off area and controlled access area;

get the names of people who may have been in the emergency area (for possible follow up); request radiological assistance from regional or national officials (if appropriate); control the potential spread of contamination (e.g. by water) if it will not delay or interfere

with other response actions. If terrorism is indicated, implement, as appropriate, the action guide for Credible or

confirmed terrorist threats. If significant public contamination or exposure is possible, implement, as appropriate, the

action guide for Public contamination/exposure. If serious overexposure is suspected, implement, as appropriate, the action guide for Serious

overexposure. If a dangerous source is to be recovered, implement, as appropriate, the action guide for

Recovery of an uncontrolled dangerous source. Monitor public response and deal with inappropriate behavior.

Radiological assessment (radiological assessor national team): Operate under the ICS incident commander. If warranted, dispatch radiation assistance team (radiological assessor) to perform

monitoring. Monitor for gamma, beta and alpha and establish an inner-cordoned area (safety distance). If there are indications that a dangerous neutron source (e.g. Cf-252, Be/Am well logging)

may be involved obtain experts to conduct neutron monitoring (possibly with IAEA assistance if not available within the State).

Brief incident commander on risks and provide measures to protect emergency workers (including law enforcement) and control their dose

Emergency medical responder/team:

Operate under the ICS incident commander. Provide medical advice and support to on scene response and local medical community on

treatment of contaminated/exposed individuals and the risk (negligible) to their staff.

Public information officer/team:

Operate under the ICS incident commander. If the emergency receives media or public attention, implement media briefings, from a

single official source, on the threat and appropriate public action. Activate a PIC if needed.Incident investigator/team:

Operate under the ICS incident commander. Conduct an investigation, in close co-operation with law enforcement if criminal activity is

suspected, to determine the cause and take appropriate action to prevent similar emergencies.

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Figure A7-1 Overview of basic emergency management actions for transport emergencies involving radioactive material

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INSTRUCTION 3: PLACARDS, LABELS AND MARKINGS ON PACKAGES OR VEHICLESFor: Determining if an event should be considered a radiological emergency based on the placards, labels and markings on packages or vehicles.

Steps (as appropriate and practical):

[Note to implementer of this manual: International and State governmental agencies issue emergency response guides providing guidance on the response to transportation emergencies involving dangerous goods including radioactive material. These guides should be available to responders because they address the full spectrum of dangerous goods transported.]

Note Step 1

Consignments of radioactive material should be accompanied by shipping documents providing information such as that listed in Step 1.

Step 1 Obtain as much of the following information as possible:

UN number, package type, and other markings; Name(s) of the radionuclide(s) (e.g. 90Sr, 137Cs); Activity of radioactive material per package in units such as MBq or GBq; Category of label applied (i.e. I-White, II-Yellow, III-Yellow); Transport Index (TI) on II- and III-Yellow labels; Dose rate at 1 m from or at the surface of the package or vehicle; and Measure contamination level on the surface of package.

Step 2 Assess the information considering:

UN numbers, package type and other marking: The United Nations number, preceded by the letters ‘UN’ is a four-digit numbers that identifies the type of dangerous goods to include radioactive material. In addition, packages are also required to be marked with the package type on the outside of the packaging. See TABLE 3 for a list of the possible danger associated with various UN numbers and package types and other markings. FIG. 2 is an example of a transport vehicle placard upon which is displayed the UN hazard class number 7 indicating the presence of radioactive material.

Package labels: Packages containing radioactive material (other than excepted packages of very low hazard radioactive material) have labels as shown in FIG. 1 that are based on the dose rate outside the package. Packages with:

- I-WHITE labels should not contain a dangerous sourceError: Reference source not found; and

- II-YELLOW or III-YELLOW labels could contain a dangerous sourceError: Reference source not found.

Activity: Calculate the A/D ratio for the activity in the package and assess the hazard of an uncontrolled (e.g. lost) or damaged source using .

Dose rates and contamination levels:

- Packages: Transport Index (TI) indicates the allowable dose rates, and contamination levels:o Multiply the TI value on the II-YELLOW and III-YELLOW labels (see FIG. 1) by

10 µSv/h to obtain the radiation level at 1 metre from the surface of a single, isolated, undamaged package when it was shipped;

27

o TABLE 2 lists the maximum allowable TI, dose rate and contamination levels for each package label; and

o Dose rates or contamination levels greater than the maximum allowed listed in TABLE 2 or as indicted by the package TI index may indicate the package is damaged.

- Vehicles: Maximum dose rate allowed on the outside a vehicle. The maximum dose rate allowed on the outside surface of a vehicle is 2 mSv/h and at 2 metres from the side of the vehicle it is 100 µSv/h. Radiation levels exceeding these levels indicate the package is damaged.

Step 3 An event could be considered a radiological emergency warranting a response if it contained an amount considered a dangerous source16 and it was uncontrolled because it was:

Lost, stolen; opened without authority, Possibly damaged for example:

- In a transport accident; - In a fire; - Leaking;- Crushed; or- With dose rates or contamination levels > than allowed.

The dose rates or contamination levels indicate the package may be damaged.

Step 4 Apply the appropriate UN Number action guidance as per TABLE 13.

Figure 3. Placard for UN number

16 If a source being transported in accordance with international requirements it is not considered a dangerous source unless control over the source is lost.

28

Note: White-I is not likely to contain a dangerous source

FIG. 1. Labels of packages

FIG. 2. UN hazard class number 7 vehicle placard indicating the presence of radioactive material.

29

TABLE 2. MAXIMUM ALLOWED RADIATION AND SURFACE CONTAMINATION LEVELS FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN TRANSPORT

Package label

category

Maximum allowed dose rate at surface

(µSv/h)

Maximum allowed dose rate

at 1 m (µSv/h)

Maximum allowed transport index

(TI)

I-White 5 < 0.5 0(No TI on label)

II-Yellow 500 10 1

III-Yellow 2 000 (2 mSv/h) 100 10

III-Yellow, Exclusive use

10 000 (10 mSv/h) >100 >10

Any package label category

Maximum allowed non-fixed contamination on external package surface

4 Bq/cm2 for β and γ and low toxicity α

emittersa

0.4 Bq/cm2 for all other alpha emitters

A NATURAL URANIUM, DEPLETED URANIUM, NATURAL THORIUM, URANIUM-235 OR URANIUM-238, THORIUM 232 AND THORIUM-230 WHEN CONTAINED IN ORES OR PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL CONCENTRATES; OR ALPHA EMITTERS WITH A HALF-LIFE OF LESS THAN 10 DAYS.

30

TABLE 3. GUIDE TO DANGER ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSPORT PACKAGE MARKINGS The following table can be used to decide the appropriate action guide to be followed by identifying the possible markings, UN number, category labels (Figure 1,2,3) available in the packages:

UN Number

Proper Shipping Name and Description Possible Marking Possible danger of an uncontrolled source

UN Response Guidance

UN 2908 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, EXCEPTED PACKAGE — EMPTY PACKAGING

UN number Not dangerous. 161

UN 2909 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, EXCEPTED PACKAGE — ARTICLES MANUFACTURED FROM NATURAL URANIUM or DEPLETED URANIUM or NATURAL THORIUM

UN number

Not dangerous. 161

UN 2910 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, EXCEPTED PACKAGE — LIMITED QUANTITY OF MATERIAL

UN numberNot dangerous. 161

UN 2911 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, EXCEPTED PACKAGE — INSTRUMENTS or ARTICLES

UN number Not dangerous. 161

UN 2912 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, LOW SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (LSA-I), non-fissile or fissile-excepted

Type IP-1, Type IP-2, Low Specific Activity (LSA), Surface Contaminated Object (SCO)

Possibly dangerous if material is inhaled or ingested. 162

UN 2913 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, SURFACE CONTAMINATED OBJECTS (SCO-I or SCO-II),non-fissile or fissile-excepted

Surface Contaminated Object (SCO)

Possibly dangerous if material is inhaled or ingested. 162

UN 2915 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TYPE A PACKAGE,non-special form, non-fissile or fissile-excepted Type A

Typically contains a dangerous source (A/D >1a) but can only be assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 5).

163

UN 2916 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TYPE B(U) PACKAGE, non-fissile or fissile-excepted Type B (U) Typically contains a dangerous

source (A/D > 100a) but can only 163

31

UN Number

Proper Shipping Name and DescriptionPossible Marking Possible danger of an

uncontrolled source UN Response

Guidancebe assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 2).

UN 2917 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TYPE B(M) PACKAGE, non-fissile or fissile-excepted

Type B (M)

Typically contains a dangerous source (A/D > 100a) but can only be assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 5).

163

UN 2919 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TRANSPORTED UNDER SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT, non-fissile or fissile-excepted

UN number Typically contains a dangerous source (A/D > 100a) but can only be assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 5).

163

UN 2977 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE, FISSILE

Type AF or B(U)F

Chemical hazard greatly exceeds radiation hazard. Contains uranium hexafluoride which is very toxic but radiation presents minimal risk.

166

UN 2978 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE, non-fissile or fissile-excepted

Type AF or B(U)F, IP

Chemical hazard greatly exceeds radiation hazard. Contains uranium hexafluoride which is very toxic but radiation presents minimal risk.

166

UN 3321 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, LOW SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (LSA-II), non-fissile or fissile-excepted

Type IP-1, Type IP-3, Low Specific Activity (LSA)

Possibly dangerous if material is inhaled or ingested. 162

UN 3322 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, LOW SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (LSA-III), non-fissile or fissile-excepted

, Type IP-2, Type IP-3, Low Specific Activity (LSA)

Possibly dangerous if material is inhaled or ingested. 162

UN 3323 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TYPE C PACKAGE,non-fissile or fissile-excepted Type C

Typically contains a dangerous source (A/D > 100a) but can only be assessed based on radionuclide

163

32

UN Number

Proper Shipping Name and DescriptionPossible Marking Possible danger of an

uncontrolled source UN Response

Guidancecontent of the package (see Instruction 5).

UN 3324 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, LOW SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (LSA-II), FISSILE

Type IP-1, Type IP-2, Low Specific Activity (LSA)

Possibly dangerous if material is inhaled or ingested. 165

UN 3325 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, LOW SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (LSA-III), FISSILE

Type IP-1, Type IP-2, Type IP-3, Low Specific Activity (LSA)

Possibly dangerous if material is inhaled or ingested. 165

UN 3326 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, SURFACE CONTAMINATED OBJECTS (SCO-I or SCO-II), FISSILE

Surface Contaminated Object (SCO), IP1 or 2

Possibly dangerous if material is inhaled or ingested. 165

UN 3327 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TYPE A PACKAGE, FISSILE, non-special form

Type A

Typically contains a dangerous source (A/D >1a) but can only be assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 5).

165

UN 3328 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TYPE B(U) PACKAGE, FISSILE

Type B (U), Type B (M)

Typically contains a dangerous source (A/D > 100a) but can only be assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 5).

165

UN 3329 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TYPE B(M) PACKAGE, FISSILE

Type B (U), Type B (M)

Typically contains a dangerous source (A/D > 100a) but can only be assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 5).

165

UN 3330 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TYPE C PACKAGE, FISSILE

Type CF

Typically contains a dangerous source (A/D > 100a) but can only be assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 5).

165

UN 3331 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TRANSPORTED UN number Typically contains a dangerous 165

33

UN Number

Proper Shipping Name and DescriptionPossible Marking Possible danger of an

uncontrolled source UN Response

GuidanceUNDER SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT, FISSILE source (A/D > 100a) but can only

be assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 5).

UN 3332 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TYPE A PACKAGE, SPECIAL FORM, non-fissile or fissile-excepted Type A; special form; non-fissile

or fissile excepted

Typically contains a dangerous source (A/D >1a) but can only be assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 5).

164

UN 3333 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, TYPE A PACKAGE, SPECIAL FORM, FISSILE

Type AF

Typically contains a dangerous source (A/D >1a) but can only be assessed based on radionuclide content of the package (see Instruction 5).

165

a. TABLE 7 provides a description of the possible health effects for different A/D ratios.

34

4.3. INSTRUCTION 4: ASSESSING A PACKAGE TO DETERMIN WHETHER IT IS DAMAGED.

Purpose: To assess the damage to the package.

1. If you can get close enough to it, use gloves and long-handled tools to wipe the package in order to verify if the radioactive contents have been released.

2. Measure the count rate on the wipe with a contamination survey meter. A consistent reading of ≥ 2x background measured in the cold zone is considered contaminated.

3. If the wipe is contaminated (measures ≥ 2x background on a contamination survey meter) or if you observe a high radiation reading*:

A radiation reading on a gamma dose rate meter is considered high at a level of:

over 2 mSv/h, on contact with the package or device

or

over 100 μSv/h, at 1 m away from the package or device

4. Maintain the hot and cold zones as established.

5. Immediately contact the national Competent Authority to inform them of the situation. This is imperative, as special precautions, packaging and permission may be necessary to transport the damaged package. The Competent Authority will advise you what to do with the package.

6. Do not attempt to move the package unless the national Competent Authority instructs you to do so.

7. If the wipe is negative and the package appears undamaged:

Recover the package and end the emergency.

35

4.4. INSTRUCTION 5: DANGEROUS SOURCE IDENTIFICATION BASED ON DOSE RATE, ACTIVITY OR USE

For: Determining if something is a dangerous source.

CAUTIONAn uncontrolled dangerous source could cause severe injuries or death (severe deterministic health effects) and are in Category I, II or III [ii].

Loss, theft or damage of a dangerous source is a radiological emergency. Anyone who was near or in contact with a dangerous source should receive a medical examination.

Steps (as appropriate and practical):

Step 1. Determine if an uncontrolled source is a dangerous source based on:

Dose rate using Part A; Activity using Part B [Error: Reference source not found, iii, iv]; or Typical use or application of the source using Part C.

Part ADose rate

Step A-1 Determine the dose rate at 1 m.

Step A-2 A dose rate greater than 100 µSv/h at 1 m indicates a dangerous.

Step A-3 See TABLE 4 for a description of the possible health effects from an uncontrolled dangerous source based on the dose rate.

Step A-4 Determine if contamination is present.

Step A-5 If contamination is present also assess the activity in the source using Part B.

Step A-6 Cordon any dangerous source and take other response action in accordance with Error: Reference source not found.

36

TABLE 4: POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECTS FROM EXTERNAL EXPOSURE FROM HANDLING OR BEING NEAR AN UNCONTROLLED SOURCE BASED ON DOSE RATEThis table only addresses external exposure from handling or being near a source with these doses rates and does not assess the possible health effects from intake, such as from a leaking source.

Dose rateat 1m

Unshielded dose ratePotential health effects from external exposure

from an unshielded source

> 1000 mSv/h Extremely dangerous to the person: Handling could cause severe local(b) deterministic health effect

less than a minute. Could be fatal if near it for minutes to hours.

> 100 mSv/h Very dangerous to the person: Handling could cause severe local(b) deterministic health effect in

minutes. Could be fatal if near it for hours to days.

>10 mSv/h Very dangerous to the person: Handling could cause severe local(b) deterministic health effect in

less than an hour. Could be fatal if near it for days to weeks(a).

>1mSv/h Dangerous to the person: Handling could cause severe local(b) deterministic health effect in

hours. Handling could cause the health effects to fetus that should be

assessed by an expert [Error: Reference source not found].

> 100 µSv/h Possibly dangerous: Unlikely to cause severe deterministic health effects. Handling could cause health effects to fetus that should be

assessed by an expert [Error: Reference source not found].

> 10 - 100 µSv/h Unlikely to be dangerous: Very unlikely to cause severe deterministic health effects. Unlikely to cause health effects to fetus.

≤ 10 µSv/h Not dangerous: No risk of severe deterministic health effects.

a. As seen in past emergencies, fatalities have resulted from living in a house containing a source with a dose rate > 20mSv/h [Error: Reference source not found]. b. For example to the hand or to the tissue next to a pocket containing the source (see Error: Reference source not found and Error: Reference source not found).

37

Part BActivity

Note for Part BDispersible materials include powders, gases and liquids, and volatile, combustible, water-soluble and pyrophoric materials.

Step B-1 For all materials calculate the ratio:

where: Ai is the activity [TBq] of each radionuclide i in the source;D1,i is the activity [TBq] for each radionuclide i listed in TABLE 5. It is the quantity of

unshielded material that can result in severe deterministic health effects from external penetrating radiation.

If the materials are dispersible (see note) calculate the ratio:

where: Ai is the activity [TBq] of each radionuclide i in the source;D2,i is the activity [TBq] for each radionuclide i listed in TABLE 5. D2 is the

quantity of dispersed material that can result in severe deterministic health effects from intake (inhalation or ingestion) or skin contamination.

Step B-2 If either of the A/D values is greater than 1 the source is a dangerous source if uncontrolled. These are Category 1, 2, or 3 sources [Error: Reference source not found].

Step B-3 See TABLE 7 for a description of the possible health effects from an uncontrolled source based on the A/D ratio.

Step B-4 Cordon any dangerous source and take other response action in accordance with Error: Reference source not found.

Part CUse or application of the source

Step C-1 Find the use of the source in TABLE 6 and the corresponding typical activity ratio (A/D)

Step C-2 Proceed with Step B-2.

38

TABLE 5. D-VALUESThe D-value is that quantity of radioactive material, which, if uncontrolled, could result in death or a permanent injury that decreases that person’s quality of life (severe deterministic effects) [Error: Reference source not found, Error: Reference source not found]. D1 values are for external exposure to penetrating radiation from an unshielded source and D2 are for exposure to dispersed material.

Radionuclide D1-valueg D2-valueh

(TBq) (TBq)H-3 ULb 2.E+03c

Be-7 1.E+00 1.E+03Be-10 3.E+02 3.E+01C-11 6.E-02 4.E+02C-14 2.E+05 5.E+01N-13 6.E-02 ULb

F-18 6.E-02 3.E+01Na-22 3.E-02 2.E+01Na-24 2.E-02 2.E+01Mg-28 2.E-02 1.E+01Al-26 3.E-02 5.E+00Si-31 1.E+01 2.E+01Si-32+a 1.E+01 7.E+00P-32 1.E+01 2.E+01P-33 7.E+03 2.E+02S-35 4.E+04 6.E+01Cl-36 3.E+02 2.E+01d

Cl-38 5.E-02 1.E+01Ar-37 ULb ULb,d

Ar-39 3.E+02 3.E+04Ar-41 5.E-02 3.E+00d

K-40 ULb ULb,d

K-42 2.E-01 1.E+01K-43 7.E-02 3.E+01Ca-41 ULb ULb,d

Ca-45 6.E+03 1.E+02Ca-47+ a 6.E-02 1.E+01Sc-44 3.E-02 1.E+01Sc-46 3.E-02 4.E+01Sc-47 7.E-01 8.E+01Sc-48 2.E-02 3.E+01Ti-44+ a 3.E-02 9.E+00V-48 2.E-02 3.E+01V-49 ULb 2.E+03Cr-51 2.E+00 5.E+03Mn-52 2.E-02 2.E+01Mn-53 ULb ULb,d

Mn-54 8.E-02 4.E+01Mn-56 4.E-02 2.E+01

39

Radionuclide D1-valueg D2-valueh

(TBq) (TBq)Fe-52+ a 2.E-02 9.E+00Fe-55 ULb 8.E+02Fe-59 6.E-02 1.E+01Fe-60+ a 6.E-02 1.E+01d

Co-55+ a 3.E-02 2.E+02Co-56 2.E-02 2.E+01Co-57 7.E-01 4.E+02Co-58 7.E-02 7.E+01Co-58m+ a 7.E-02 2.E+02Co-60 3.E-02 3.E+01Ni-59 ULb 1.E+03d

Ni-63 ULb 6.E+01Ni-65 1.E-01 2.E+01Cu-64 3.E-01 4.E+01Cu-67 7.E-01 3.E+02Zn-65 1.E-01 3.E+02Zn-69 8.E+01 3.E+01Zn-69m+ a 2.E-01 2.E+01Ga-67 5.E-01 4.E+02Ga-68 7.E-02 1.E+01Ga-72 3.E-02 2.E+01Ge-68+ a 7.E-02 2.E+01Ge-71 6.E+05 1.E+03Ge-77+ a 6.E-02 1.E+01As-72 4.E-02 9.E+01As-73 4.E+01 1.E+02As-74 9.E-02 3.E+01As-76 2.E-01 1.E+01As-77 8.E+00 4.E+01Se-75 2.E-01 2.E+02Se-79 ULb 2.E+02Br-76 3.E-02 2.E+02Br-77 2.E-01 7.E+02Br-82 3.E-02 7.E+01Kr-81 3.E+01 7.E+02Kr-85 3.E+01 2.E+03Kr-85m 5.E-01 3.E+01Kr-87 9.E-02 4.E+00Rb-81 1.E-01 2.E+03Rb-83 1.E-01 5.E+01Rb-84 7.E-02 2.E+01Rb-86 7.E-01 2.E+01Rb-87 ULb ULb,d

Sr-82 6.E-02 5.E+00Sr-85 1.E-01 7.E+01

40

Radionuclide D1-valueg D2-valueh

(TBq) (TBq)Sr-85m+ a 1.E-01 3.E+02Sr-87m 2.E-01 9.E+01Sr-89 2.E+01 2.E+01Sr-90+ a 4.E+00 1.E+00Sr-91+ a 6.E-02 2.E+01Sr-92+ a 4.E-02 1.E+01Y-87+ a 9.E-02 2.E+02Y-88 3.E-02 2.E+01Y-90 5.E+00 1.E+01Y-91 8.E+00 2.E+01Y-91m+ a 1.E-01 2.E+02Y-92 2.E-01 1.E+01Y-93 6.E-01 1.E+01Zr-88+ a 2.E-02 3.E+01Zr-93+ a ULb ULb,d

Zr-95+ a 4.E-02 1.E+01Zr-97+ a 4.E-02 9.E+00Nb-93m 2.E+03 3.E+02Nb-94 4.E-02 3.E+01d

Nb-95 9.E-02 6.E+01Nb-97 1.E-01 2.E+01Mo-93+ a 2.E+03 3.E+02d

Mo-99+ a 3.E-01 2.E+01Tc-95m 1.E-01 6.E+01Tc-96 3.E-02 3.E+01Tc-96m+ a 3.E-02 2.E+02Tc-97 ULb ULb,d

Tc-97m 2.E+02 4.E+01Tc-98 5.E-02 1.E+01d

Tc-99 ULb 3.E+01Tc-99m 7.E-01 7.E+02Ru-97 3.E-01 5.E+02Ru-103+ a 1.E-01 3.E+01Ru-105+ a 8.E-02 2.E+01Ru-106+ a 3.E-01 1.E+01Rh-99 1.E-01 1.E+02Rh-101 3.E-01 1.E+02Rh-102 3.E-02 3.E+01Rh-102m 1.E-01 4.E+01Rh-103m 9.E+02 1.E+04Rh-105 9.E-01 8.E+01Pd-103+ a 9.E+01 1.E+02Pd-107 ULb ULb,d

Pd-109 2.E+01 2.E+01Ag-105 1.E-01 1.E+02

41

Radionuclide D1-valueg D2-valueh

(TBq) (TBq)Ag-108m 4.E-02 2.E+01Ag-110m 2.E-02 2.E+01Ag-111 2.E+00 3.E+01Cd-109 2.E+01 3.E+01Cd-113m 4.E+02 4.E+01Cd-115+ a 2.E-01 2.E+01Cd-115m 3.E+00 2.E+01In-111 2.E-01 1.E+02In-113m 3.E-01 5.E+01In-114m 8.E-01 1.E+00In-115m 4.E-01 3.E+01Sn-113+ a 3.E-01 5.E+01Sn-117m 5.E-01 4.E+01Sn-119m 7.E+01 1.E+02Sn-121m+ a 1.E+02 7.E+01Sn-123 7.E+00 2.E+01Sn-125 1.E-01 8.E+00Sn-126+ a 3.E-02 7.E+00d

Sb-122 1.E-01 2.E+01Sb-124 4.E-02 1.E+01Sb-125+ a 2.E-01 3.E+01Sb-126 2.E-02 2.E+01Te-121 1.E-01 3.E+01Te-121m+ a 1.E-01 8.E+00Te-123m 6.E-01 9.E+00Te-125m 2.E+01 1.E+01Te-127 1.E+01 4.E+01Te-127m+ a 1.E+01 3.E+00Te-129 1.E+00 2.E+01Te-129m+ a 1.E+00 2.E+00Te-131m+ a 4.E-02 2.E-01Te-132+ 3.E-02 8.E-01I-123 5.E-01 3.E+01I-124 6.E-02 4.E-01I-125 1.E+01 2.E-01I-126 1.E-01 2.E-01I-129 ULb ULb,d

I-131 2.E-01 2.E-01I-132 3.E-02 6.E+00I-133 1.E-01 3.E-01I-134 3.E-02 2.E+01I-135 4.E-02 2.E+00Xe-122 6.E-02 4.E+00Xe-123+ a 9.E-02 5.E+00Xe-127 3.E-01 2.E+01

42

Radionuclide D1-valueg D2-valueh

(TBq) (TBq)Xe-131m 1.E+01 7.E+02Xe-133 3.E+00 2.E+02Xe-135 3.E-01 2.E+01Cs-129 3.E-01 1.E+03Cs-131 2.E+01 2.E+03Cs-132 1.E-01 1.E+02Cs-134 4.E-02 3.E+01Cs-134m+ a 4.E-02 1.E+04Cs-135 ULb ULb,d

Cs-136 3.E-02 2.E+01Cs-137+ a 1.E-01 2.E+01Ba-131+ a 2.E-01 1.E+02Ba-133 2.E-01 7.E+01Ba-133m 3.E-01 2.E+02Ba-140+ a 3.E-02 1.E+01La-137 2.E+01 5.E+02d

La-140 3.E-02 2.E+01Ce-139 6.E-01 2.E+02Ce-141 1.E+00 2.E+01Ce-143+ a 3.E-01 1.E+01Ce-144+ a 9.E-01 9.E+00Pr-142 1.E+00 2.E+01Pr-143 8.E+01 3.E+01Nd-147+ a 6.E-01 4.E+01Nd-149+ a 2.E-01 1.E+01Pm-143 2.E-01 2.E+02Pm-144 4.E-02 3.E+01Pm-145 1.E+01 4.E+02Pm-147 8.E+03 4.E+01Pm-148m 3.E-02 3.E+01Pm-149 6.E+00 2.E+01Pm-151 2.E-01 3.E+01Sm-145+ a 4.E+00 2.E+02Sm-147 ULb ULb,d

Sm-151 ULb 5.E+02Sm-153 2.E+00 4.E+01Eu-147 2.E-01 1.E+02Eu-148 3.E-02 3.E+01Eu-149 2.E+00 5.E+02Eu-150b 2.E+00 3.E+01Eu-150a 5.E-02 4.E+02Eu-152 6.E-02 3.E+01Eu-152m 2.E-01 2.E+01Eu-154 6.E-02 2.E+01Eu-155 2.E+00 1.E+02

43

Radionuclide D1-valueg D2-valueh

(TBq) (TBq)Eu-156 5.E-02 3.E+01Gd-146+ a 3.E-02 8.E+00Gd-148 ULb 4.E-01Gd-153 1.E+00 8.E+01Gd-159 2.E+00 3.E+01Tb-157 1.E+02 1.E+03d

Tb-158 9.E-02 5.E+01d

Tb-160 6.E-02 3.E+01Dy-159 6.E+00 5.E+02Dy-165 3.E+00 2.E+01Dy-166+ a 1.E+00 2.E+01Ho-166 2.E+00 2.E+01Ho-166m 4.E-02 3.E+01d

Er-169 2.E+03 2.E+02Er-171 2.E-01 2.E+01Tm-167 6.E-01 2.E+02Tm-170 2.E+01 2.E+01Tm-171 3.E+02 4.E+02Yb-169 3.E-01 3.E+01Yb-175 2.E+00 1.E+02Lu-172 4.E-02 6.E+01Lu-173 9.E-01 2.E+02Lu-174 8.E-01 1.E+02Lu-174m+ a 6.E-01 6.E+01Lu-177 2.E+00 1.E+02Hf-172+ a 4.E-02 6.E+00Hf-175 2.E-01 3.E+01Hf-181 1.E-01 1.E+01Hf-182+ a 5.E-02 ULb,d

Ta-178a 7.E-02 4.E+03Ta-179 6.E+00 6.E+02Ta-182 6.E-02 3.E+01W-178 9.E-01 6.E+02W-181 5.E+00 2.E+03W-185 7.E+02 1.E+02W-187 1.E-01 3.E+01W-188+ a 1.E+00 8.E+00Re-184 8.E-02 3.E+01Re-184m+ a 7.E-02 2.E+01Re-186 4.E+00 1.E+01Re-187 ULb ULb,d

Re-188 1.E+00 3.E+01Re-189 1.E+00 1.E+01Os-185 1.E-01 7.E+01Os-191 2.E+00 9.E+01

44

Radionuclide D1-valueg D2-valueh

(TBq) (TBq)Os-191m+ a 1.E+00 7.E+02Os-193 1.E+00 3.E+01Os-194+ a 7.E-01 9.E+00Ir-189 1.E+00 2.E+02Ir-190 5.E-02 6.E+01Ir-192 8.E-02 2.E+01Ir-194 7.E-01 2.E+01Pt-188+ a 4.E-02 9.E+01Pt-191 3.E-01 3.E+02Pt-193 1.E+05 3.E+03Pt-193m 1.E+01 4.E+02Pt-195m 2.E+00 3.E+02Pt-197 4.E+00 5.E+01Pt-197m+ a 9.E-01 2.E+01Au-193 6.E-01 1.E+03Au-194 7.E-02 4.E+02Au-195 2.E+00 1.E+02Au-198 2.E-01 3.E+01Au-199 9.E-01 3.E+02Hg-194+ a 7.E-02 9.E+00Hg-195m+ a 2.E-01 1.E+01Hg-197 2.E+00 3.E+01Hg-197m+ a 7.E-01 2.E+01Hg-203 3.E-01 2.E+00Tl-200 5.E-02 2.E+02Tl-201 1.E+00 1.E+03Tl-202 2.E-01 2.E+02Tl-204 7.E+01 2.E+01Pb-201+ a 9.E-02 8.E+02Pb-202+ a 2.E-01 6.E+01d

Pb-203 2.E-01 2.E+02Pb-205 ULb ULb,d

Pb-210+ a 4.E+01 3.E-01Pb-212+ a 5.E-02 9.E+00Bi-205 4.E-02 7.E+01Bi-206 2.E-02 5.E+01Bi-207 5.E-02 4.E+01Bi-210+ a 5.E+01 8.E+00Bi-210m 6.E-01 3.E-01Bi-212+ a 5.E-02 1.E+01Po-210 8.E+03 6.E-02At-211 5.E-01 1.E+01Rn-222 4.E-02 9.E+04e

Ra-223+ a 2.E-01 1.E-01Ra-224+ a 5.E-02 3.E-01

45

Radionuclide D1-valueg D2-valueh

(TBq) (TBq)Ra-225+ a 3.E-01 1.E-01Ra-226+ a 4.E-02 7.E-02Ra-228+ a 3.E-02 4.E-02Ac-225 3.E-01 9.E-02Ac-227+ a 2.E-01 4.E-02Ac-228 3.E-02 1.E+02Th-227+ a 2.E-01 8.E-02Th-228+ a 5.E-02 4.E-02Th-229+ a 2.E-01 1.E-02Th-230+ a 9.E+02 7.E-02d

Th-231 1.E+01 3.E+02Th-232+ a ULb ULb,d

Th-234+ a 2.E+00 2.E+00Pa-230+ a 1.E-01 9.E-01Pa-231+ a 8.E-01 6.E-02Pa-233 4.E-01 8.E+00U-230+ a 4.E+00 4.E-02U-232+ a 7.E-02 6.E-02 d

U-233 7.E-02e 7.E-02 d,e

U-234+ a 1.E-01e 1.E-01d,e

U-235+ a 8.E-05e 8.E-05e

U-236 ULb 2.E-01d

U-238+ a ULb ULb,d

U Natural ULb ULb,d

U Depleted ULb ULb,d

U Enriched 10-20% 8E-04e 8E-04e

U Enriched >20 % 8E-05e 8E-05e

Np-235 1.E+02 2.E+02Np-236b+ a 7.E-03e 7.E-03e

Np-236a 8.E-01 7.E+00Np-237+ a 3.E-01e 7.E-02d

Np-239 5.E-01 6.E+01Pu-236 1.E+00 1.E-01Pu-237 2.E+00 6.E+01Pu-238 3.E+02e 6.E-02Pu-239 1.E+00e 6.E-02Pu-240 4.E+00e 6.E-02Pu-241+ a 2.E+03e 3.E+00Pu-242 7.E-02e 7.E-02d,e

Pu-244+ a 3.E-04e 3.E-04d,e

Am-241 8.E+00 6.E-02Am-242m+ a 1.E+00e 3.E-01Am-243+ a 4.E-01 2.E-01Am-244 9.E-02 9.E+01Cm-240 1.E+00 3.E-01

46

Radionuclide D1-valueg D2-valueh

(TBq) (TBq)Cm-242 2.E+03 4.E-02Cm-243 6.E-01 2.E-01Cm-244 1.E+04e 5.E-02Cm-245 9.E-02e 9.E-02e

Cm-246 6.E+00e 2.E-01Cm-247 1.E-03e 1.E-03e

Cm-248 5.E-03 7.E-02d

Bk-247 8.E-02e 8.E-02e

Bk-249 1.E+01 4.E+01Cf-248+ a 1.E+02e 1.E-01Cf-249 2.E-01 1.E-01Cf-250 4.E-01 1.E-01Cf-251 7.E-01 1.E-01Cf-252 2.E-02 1.E-01Cf-253 1.E+01 4.E-01Cf-254 3.E-04 2.E-03239Pu/9Bef 1.E+00e 6.E-02241Am/9Bef 1.E+00 6.E-02

a “+” indicates the radionuclides for which the progeny were considered with the parent [Error: Reference source not found]. b "UL" - Unlimited quantity.

c The D2 value for 3H takes into account skin absorption of dispersed material. d Emergencies involving these amounts of dispersible radionuclides may result in airborne concentrations exceeding the level

assumed to be immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) based on chemical toxicity, rather than radiological effects.e D-value is based on the possibly (unlikely) of a criticality.

f The activity given is that of the alpha-emitting radionuclide, e.g. 239Pu or 241Am. These are used as neutron generators.g D1 is the quantity of unshielded material that can result in severe deterministic health effects from external penetrating radiation from an unshielded source.h D2 is the quantity of dispersed material that can result in severe deterministic health effects from intake (inhalation or ingestion) or skin contamination.

47

TABLE 6. DANGER OF UNCONTROLLED SOURCES BASED ON THEIR USESource: Ref [Error: Reference source not found]

Typical danger if uncontrolled

Typical use Typical activity ratio

A/Da

Dangerous

- Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs)- Irradiators- Teletherapy sources- Fixed multi-beam teletherapy (gamma knife) sources

A/D ≥ 1000

- Industrial gamma radiography sources- High/medium dose rate brachytherapy sources

1000 > A/D ≥ 10

- Fixed industrial gauges that incorporate high activity:o level gaugeso dredger gaugeso conveyor gauges o spinning pipe gauges

- Well logging gauges- Calibration sources

o High dose rate (> 1 mSv/h @ 1 m)o Alpha

10> A/D ≥ 1

Unlikely to be dangerous

- Low dose rate brachytherapy sources (except plaques and permanent implant sources – see below)

- Industrial gauges that do not use high activity sources- Portable gauges (moisture density gauges)- Bone densitometers - Static eliminators

1> A/D ≥ 0.01

Not dangerous in terms of a radiation hazard

- Low dose rate brachytherapy plaques and permanent implant source

- X-Ray fluorescence devices- Electron capture devices- Mossbauer spectrometry sources- Positron emission tomography (PET) check sources- Tritium signs - Depleted uranium- Non irradiated natural uranium - Check sources- Sources with exempt quantities are given in Schedule I of Ref.

[Error: Reference source not found].

A/D < 0.01

a. D is the minimum of the D1 and D2 values in TABLE 5.

48

TABLE 7. POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECTS OF AN UNCONTROLLED SOURCE BASED ON THE A/D RATIOBased on Refs. [Error: Reference source not found, Error: Reference source not found]. Risks to responders: There will be little health risks to response personnel provided they follow Error: Reference source not found.

Cancer risk: Radiological emergencies are very unlikely to result in any detectable increase in the incidence of cancer (See Error: Reference source not found).

Other concerns: Significant adverse (and unwarranted, in terms of the radiological risks involved) public reactions have occurred in the past, even though the levels of contamination and exposure were not dangerous. Such reactions have included having unnecessary abortions, discriminating against persons wrongly taken to be infectious, submitting to unnecessary and invasive medical monitoring and treatment, and boycotting local businesses and products.

CAUTIONMultiples of the A/D should not be used in assessing the risk for radionuclides for which the D-value is based on consideration of the criticality (as identified by footnote in TABLE 5). Any source with an A/D > 1 based on criticality could result deaths or injuries among those nearby if a criticality did occur.

A/D&

Categoryd

A/D1b A/D2

c

For external exposure For dispersed material released by a fire, explosion or from a leaking source

A/D≥1000Category 1

Extremely dangerous to the person:

Fatal if near it for minutes to hours.

Contact could be fatal in minutes.

Very dangerous in the locality:

Handling a leaking source could be fatal.

For fire or explosion there is little risk of severe deterministic health effects or little risk to the fetus beyond 100 m and a few square kilometres could be possibly contaminated to levels that warrant long-term controls or clean upa.

Highly unlikely it could contaminate a public water supply to dangerous levels.

1000>A/D≥10Category 2

Very dangerous to the person:

Contact could cause severe deterministic health effect in hours to minutes.

Could be fatal if near it for hours to weeks.

Very dangerous in the locality:

Handling a leaking source could be fatal.

For fire or explosion there is little risk of severe deterministic health effect or little risk to the fetus beyond 100 m and a limited area of less than a square kilometre could be possibly contaminated to levels that warrant long-term controls or clean upa.

Virtually impossible it could contaminate a public water supply to dangerous levels.

10>A/D≥1Category 3

Dangerous to the person:

Contact could cause severe deterministic health effects in hours.

For a pregnant woman in contact with or near the

Dangerous to the locality:

Handling a leaking source could cause severe deterministic health effects and if handled by a pregnant woman, health effects to fetus may be possible that should be assessed by an expert.

For fire or explosion, there is little risk of severe

49

A/D&

Categoryd

A/D1b A/D2

c

For external exposure For dispersed material released by a fire, explosion or from a leaking source

source, health effects to fetus are possible that should be assessed by an expert.

deterministic health effects or little risk to the fetus beyond 10 m and a small area of less than a fraction of a square kilometre could be possibly contaminated to levels that warrant long-term controls or clean upa.

1>A/D≥0.01Category 4

Unlikely to be dangerous:

Very unlikely to cause severe deterministic health effects

For a pregnant woman in contact with or near the source for days to weeks, health effects to fetus are possible (put unlikely) that should be assessed by an expert.

Unlikely to be dangerous:

Handling a leaking source is unlikely to cause severe deterministic health effect and if handled by a pregnant woman health effects to fetus may be possible (put unlikely) that should be assessed by an expert.

For fire or explosion there is no risk of injury from a release, but contamination of the area within 100 metres may warrant cleanupa.

A/D <.0.01Category 5

Not dangerous:

No risk of severe deterministic health effects.

Not dangerous:

No risk of severe deterministic health effects.

For fire or explosion within a few metres contamination may warrant cleanupa.

a. For a reference level of 10mSv/a from all sources [Error: Reference source not found].

b. D1 is the quantity of unshielded material that can result in severe deterministic health effects from external penetrating radiation from an unshielded source and is given in TABLE 5.

c. D2 is the quantity of dispersed material that can result in severe deterministic health effects from intake (inhalation or ingestion) or skin contamination and is given in TABLE 5.

d. See Ref. Error: Reference source not found

50

4.5. INSTRUCTION 6: ACTIONS ON SCENE UNTIL ARRIVAL OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE TEAM

User First Responder(s)

PurposeTo provide guidance to the First Responder(s) on actions to be taken on scene until arrival of Emergency Medical Response Team.

DiscussionUntil the arrival of Emergency Medical Response Team on the scene, First Responders (Facility Responder, police, fire service, or other personnel who have been adequately trained in techniques of basic first aid) can provide emergency first aid for injured person(s). Radiation exposure or contamination with radioactive material does not cause immediate signs or symptoms and, therefore, if victims are unconscious, disoriented, burned, or otherwise in distress, look for causes other than radiation.

Input Emergency situation with casualties.

Output First aid performed at the scene.

Step 1Note conventional hazards in the area (fire, smoke, steam, chemicals, electrical hazards, etc.). Search for casualties. If available, use monitoring devices to assess radiation hazards.

CAUTIONWhen responding to a known or suspected malicious act involving sealed sources, do not handle or otherwise come in contact with these sources. As long as the sources are intact, there is no contamination hazard. Exposure hazards are diminished by avoiding close proximity to any sealed source.

In a case of nuclear weapon detonation, anticipate radiological as well as conventional hazards, which must be considered before any medical care can be offered.

Step 2Call for Emergency Medical Response Team and indicate situation and location (if was not done yet).

Step 3If area is free of conventional hazards, check victims’ condition. If there is immediate life-threatening hazard in the area, remove victim first.

Step 4Apply standard first aid procedures.

NOTELife-saving procedures, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), control of hemorrhages, and fracture stabilization are to be performed only by those personnel specially 51

trained, since attempts to perform these actions by non-trained personnel may only complicate victims’ condition.

Step 5Do not move victims with severe injuries unless there is a life-threatening hazard in the area (such as fire).

NOTEIf a victim has spinal fracture or life-threatening injuries, movement may aggravate his/her condition more than would the hazardous situation.

Step 6Stay with victims until help arrives.

Step 7Brief the Emergency Medical Response Team.

52

4.6. INSTRUCTION 7: ON SCENE EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE

Emergency Medical Response Team

PurposeTo provide guidance on emergency medical response under radiological conditions for the Emergency Medical Response Team.

DiscussionThe Emergency Medical Response Team will most likely arrive on the scene shortly after notification of a radiation emergency. On-scene Controller should take charge of general response [5]. First aid actions may be in progress by First Responders.

Input Notification of an emergency; Assessment of situation at the scene.

Output Response actions at the scene in accordance with the results of medical and radiological triage.

Step 1Get briefing by the On-scene Controller upon arrival. Consider areas established by first responders (Figure C1 [6]).

If you are first at the scene, ensure safety of the area. Consider conventional hazards (fire, smoke, fumes, electrical hazards, chemicals, explosives).

CAUTION

When responding to a known or suspected malicious act involving sealed sources, do not handle or otherwise come in contact with these sources. As long as the sources are intact there is no contamination hazard. Exposure hazards are diminished by avoiding close proximity to any sealed source.

In a case of nuclear weapon detonation, anticipate radiological as well as conventional hazards, which must be considered before any medical care can be offered.

Step 2Wear protective equipment to include protective clothing, gloves, respiratory device, and boots as necessary. Wear personal dosimeters if available.

NOTEBe aware of the emergency worker turn back guidance [5]. Be trained in advance on how to apply the guidance in an emergency. Radiation contamination hazards can be avoided by use of proper protective clothing and procedures.

53

NOTEIf you are the first on the scene and it is a mass casualty radiation emergency, notify the national health authority/agency responsible for the strategic and tactical medical management of the radiation emergency. The services need to be carefully coordinated to ensure both response to the emergency and the continued provision of effective health care services to the population not immediately affected by the emergency.

FIG. C1. Areas established byfirst resposnders [6]

Step 3Perform search and rescue for injured persons as soon as possible. Remove injured persons from the hazard area into the triage area as soon as possible.

NOTEThe inner cordoned area within the safety perimeter could very often represent a direct hazard to victims and responders staying there long. Therefore, it is recommended to perform medical triage, radiological triage, and stabilization procedures in triage area outside the safety perimeter.

NOTE Use Figure C2 as guidance for actions to perform.

On scene emergency medical response Procedure C2, Pg. 6 of 6

54

Evacuee monitoring registration area

RadiologicalMonitoring and

AssessmentCentre

PublicInformation

Centre

Prevailing winddirection

* considered exposed if not proved otherwise. ** see Table D12 for criteria.*** apply criteria from Table F2 if necessary.

FIG C2. Field triage during radiation emergency

On scene emergency medical response Procedure C2, Pg. 6 of 6

55

Step 4Assess the status of the victims using the national medical triage system to ensure that priority is given to the management of life-threatening injuries.

NOTETerminology of medical triage and methods to identify the different categories vary and are a matter of preference. To avoid confusion or delays in care, standard terminology and triage methods need to be established in the country. It should be stressed that serious medical problems always have priority over radiological concerns.The triage categories (based on the medical conditions of the victims) used at the scene of the emergency could be as follows:Priority 1: Casualties in need of immediate intervention;Priority 2: Casualties in need of admission and early intervention;Priority 3: Casualties who can wait for treatment;

ORImmediate: Casualties in need of lifesaving measures performed without delay if they are to

survive;Delayed: Casualties who can wait for definitive treatment without causing additional harm;Expectant: Casualties who will not survive or will require extensive resources and time if they are

to be saved;Minor: Casualties with slight injuries, who are generally ambulatory.

Step 5Assess and treat life-threatening injuries immediately. Transport such patients into the hospital

immediately, even if contamination survey has not been done. Stabilize other victims.

NOTEVictim on backboard is handed across outer cordon line to Medical Transport Team. Do not delay transport of victim with life-threatening injury.

If necessary, request additional medical help.

NOTEMove deceased casualties to a site that is not observed readily by the public or other casualties. Keep the deceased at this site until law enforcement officer(s) have acquired any available evidence and living casualties have been moved to the health care facility. A deceased person who has been externally exposed does not represent hazard to the responders. No special precautions are needed. Special precautions are needed only in case of internal or external contamination of the deceased person. In case the contamination is already discovered (using the usual methods of individual monitoring) appropriate radiation tag needs to be placed on the body (above the cover sheet with the purpose to be visible) before removing the contaminated body from the scene. On the scene of the emergency deceased casualties require basic preliminary decontamination before they are moved to the morgue or they are ready for release to designated place. Activities on the scene with regard to deceased casualties depend on the character of the radiation emergency and number of injured and/or deceased victims.

On scene emergency medical response Procedure C2, Pg. 6 of 6

56

Step 6Cover wounds with sterile dressings. Prepare injured persons for transport to the hospital.

Step 7Initiate radiological survey of patients left on the scene (after those with life-threatening injuries have been already moved to the ambulance cars). Require assistance from Radiological Assessor. Perform radiological triage on the basis of radiological survey. Use the results of radiological survey and triage for appropriate medical and other actions.

NOTEIt is possible to perform radiological survey during stabilization of victim if monitoring procedures do not interfere with medical actions.

NOTEDetailed description, criteria and guidance for radiological survey and triage are presented in the Procedure D7.

Step 8Isolate contaminated non-critically injured victims. Remove all clothing found to be contaminated unless medically contraindicated. In cold environmental conditions, remove external contaminated clothing only just prior to transport. Use the following steps in removing the clothing:

cut the clothing from head to toe and down the sleeves fold cut parts of the material back under itself as it is cut roll up the material.

By removing the clothing in such a way, it will be turned inside out. This will reduce the possibility of spreading contamination.

NOTESee Appendix VIII for procedure of undressing contaminated victim.

Step 9Ensure that Radiological Assessor has initiated evaluation of observable parameters for immediate dose assessment (see Table F3 for details). Use results of dose assessment provided by Radiological Assessor for selection of people requiring registration for long term follow-up.

Step 10Isolate (bag and secure) clothing, shoes, and personal belongings.

NOTEIf malicious act is suspected, retain all items for forensic investigation.

Step 11Make sure you have the records of radiological survey of the victims. Provide the records (Worksheet C1) to the Dosimetry Team in the hospital.

On scene emergency medical response Procedure C2, Pg. 6 of 6

57

Step 12Ask the police to obtain names and addresses of the involved persons for further interview(s) in accordance with Worksheet C2.

Step 13Inform the receiving hospital about the nature of the conventional injuries and of any known or suspected exposure or contamination with radioactive materials. Identify the radioactive materials if known.

Step 14Undergo personal and equipment contamination check performed by Radiological Assessor / Decontamination Team [4].

NOTEWhen the medical conditions of victims do not require urgent hospitalization DO NOT leave the scene of an emergency without being checked for possible personal contamination. DO NOT take any equipment out of the scene area prior to being checked for possible contamination.If you have to leave the scene urgently, contamination control procedures should be done as soon as reasonable.

NOTEUnder hazardous working conditions (heat, fire, fumes, etc.), there may be a need to medically check emergency responders for fitness (pulse, temperature, blood pressure, etc.) at pre- and post-entry to the emergency scene.

Step 15Submit personal dosimeters to responsible person or organization (according to arrangements for keeping of dose records) for evaluation of personal doses.

On scene emergency medical response Procedure C2, Pg. 6 of 6

58

4.7. INSTRUCTION 8: TRANSPORT OF VICTIMS TO HOSPITAL

Ambulance Transport Team

PurposeTo provide guidance for transfer of victims from the emergency scene to the hospital emergency department.

DiscussionIf possible, victims are to be transported by qualified medical or paramedical personnel who have not entered the controlled area on scene. Exposed victims require no special handling while contaminated victims are handled and transported using contamination control procedures. If there is any doubt, assume all victims are contaminated until proven otherwise. Continue medical assessment and treatment during transport when necessary.

Input Victims on site ready to be transported to the hospital emergency department.

Output Medical response actions during transportation of the victims; Delivery of victims to the ambulance reception area of the hospital.

Step 1Upon arrival on scene wear personal dosimeters if available. Wear additional protective clothing if necessary and available, but always wear gloves.

NOTEMembers of the Medical Transport Team should not eat, drink, smoke or apply make-up at the emergency scene, in the ambulance vehicle, or at the hospital until they have been surveyed and released by the appropriate service of the hospital (Radiation Protection Support Group).

Step 2Place the ambulance stretcher on the clean side of the outer cordoned line and unfold a clean sheet or blanket over it. Members of an Emergency Medical Response Team inside the cordoned area need to place the victims on a backboard and pass the victims across the outer cordoned line to the prepared stretcher of the Medical Transport Team. Do not remove the victim from the backboard.

Step 3Cover victim by folding a sheet or blanket over him/her and securing it in place.

Step 4Transport victims to the ambulance reception area of the hospital emergency department or alternative designated emergency hospital reception area for patients.

59

NOTEIn a mass casualty radiation emergency (usually as a result of malicious act), implement provisions to assess the concerns of members of the public (worried-well) about radiation exposure. Arrange to alert local medical facilities of the potential for arrival of concerned people if there is widespread public concern.

Step 5Assess victims’ vital status during transport and intervene appropriately. Check status of intravenous lines started in the controlled area.

Step 6Advise the receiving hospital of any change in the victims’ medical status. Ask for any special instructions the hospital may have.

Step 7Use contamination control during transport. Change gloves as necessary.

Step 8Follow the hospital’s emergency response procedure upon arrival.

Step 9Do not return to regular service (except for life saving transport) until you, the vehicle, and equipment have been monitored and decontaminated (if necessary) by the appropriate service of the hospital (Radiation Protection Support Group) or other qualified dosimetry service.

Step 10Submit personal dosimeters to responsible person or organization (according to arrangements for keeping of dose records) for evaluation of personal doses.

60

4.8. INSTRUCTION 9: DECIDING WHO SHOULD RECEIVE A MEDICAL EXAMINATION OR LATER FOLLOW-UP

For: Deciding who may have been significantly exposed to warrant a medical examination or later follow-up.

OVERVIEWAn immediate medical examination, consultation and treatment should be provided for those who may have received a dose that could cause severe deterministic health effects.

People should be registered for later follow-up if they may have received a dose that could warrant taking long-term medical actions to detect and effectively treat late radiation-induced health effects (e.g. cancers).

Steps: (as appropriate and practical):Step 1Promptly identify who should receive an immediate medical examination, before

estimating dose, based on: TABLE 9. INDICTORS OF POSSIBLE SERIOUS OVEREXPOSURES AND MEDICAL ACTION.

Step 2Later estimate the dose quantities listed in TABLE 8 for those involved. Refs. [Error: Reference source not found,Error: Reference source not found] provides instructions that may be useful for this purpose. Consider:

Identification of potentially exposed individuals based on: - Registry form (Error: Reference source not found);- Personal dose record (Error: Reference source not found);- Locations during the emergency; and- Public information campaigns conducted as soon as feasible to identify those

who were exposed but not registered. Potential exposure sources and pathways. Data on radiation conditions including:

- Maps of dose rates and contamination concentrations;- Estimates of source activities and time spent in each location; - Contamination levels on items, food, and people;- Realistic reconstruction of exposure pathways; - Medical symptoms and bioassay; and,

Documentation of data, methods and assumptions used.

Step 3Based on dose estimate determine who should receive immediate medical examination and who should be registered for later medical follow-up using the dose criteria in TABLE 8.

Step 4Ensure that all those who are registered receive a plain language explanation of their results (see Error: Reference source not found) and are informed where they may get additional information. Tell them that this is precautionary.

61

TABLE 8. DOSE CRITERIA FOR MEDICAL ACTIONSThis table provides doses that, if received, call for an immediate medical examination or later follow-up [Error: Reference source not found, Error: Reference source not found]. It does not address the two primary ways of determining if someone should receive medical follow-up or examination: 1) their activities during the emergency (see TABLE 9 ) and 2) observation of clinical symptoms of exposure (see Error: Reference source not found).

Caution: These criteria are not for determining their course of treatment (See Ref. [Error: Referencesource not found] or consult with experts for guidance on examinations and treatment). Health effects resulting from radiation exposure can only be assessed properly by experts. Others, such as local physicians, usually do not have the expertise needed to make such assessments; however, such expertise can be obtained through the IAEA or WHO.

Dose criteriaa Medical response actions if dose receivedADred marrow, ext

b 1 Gy Provide immediate medical examination and counseling by experts

Below these doses reassure those exposed that the risk of health effects is small, but later medical follow up by experts may be warranted.

ADfetus, ext c 0.1 Gy

ADskin, srf d 10 Gy

AD()thyroid e 2 Gy

Hfetus, intakef 0.5 Sv

ADstg 25 Gy

Eh 100 mSv in a month

Register for later follow up.Below these doses, reassure those exposed that there is no significant risk of health effects.

Hfetusi 100 mSvi for

the full period of in-

utero development

Counselling by experts to allow informed decisions to be made in individual circumstances based on Ref Below these doses, reassure those exposed that there is no significant risk of health effects

Hthyroid j 100mSv in a

monthRegister for later follow up.Below these doses, reassure those exposed that there is no significant risk of health effects

a Severe deterministic effects are not expected in any organ (e.g. fetus, skin, thyroid, lungs) if these dose criteria are not exceeded.

b ADred marrow, ext is the RBE weighted absorbed dose to the red marrow from external exposure. It is used as an indication that other internal organs (e.g. lungs, small intestine, gonads, thyroid) may have received a dose resulting in severe deterministic effects.

c ADfetus,ext is the RBE weighted absorbed dose to the fetus from external exposure in a uniform field of strongly penetrating radiation.

d ADskin srf is the RBE weighted dose to the derma from skin surface contamination.e AD(Δ)thyroid is the RBE weighted dose to the thyroid delivered over a period Δ of 30 days calculate as shown in Ref.[ Error:

Reference source not found].f Hfetus,intake is the committed equivalent dose in fetus from intake.g ADst is the RBE-weighted dose to soft tissue adjacent to the source.h E is the total effective dose (mSv) and is the sum of the effective dose from external exposure, the committed effective

dose from inhalation, and the committed effective dose from ingestion.

62

TABLE 9. INDICTORS OF POSSIBLE SERIOUS OVEREXPOSURES AND MEDICAL ACTION

Indicator Medical action

Possible symptoms of radiation injuries to include onset of vomiting within hours of exposure or a burn with no apparent cause accompanied by other information indicating that radiation exposure was the cause of the symptoms

Register and provide for an immediate medical examination in accordance with Error: Reference source not found.

Possibly handling a leaking (contaminated) or unshielded dangerous source(see ). (e.g., work with scrap metal)

Being within 100 metres of a fire or explosion involving a dangerous source (see ).

Handled a source with a dose rate ≥ 1000 Sv/h at 1 m.

Pregnant women who has handled a source with a dose rate ≥ 100 Sv/h at 1 m.

Skin contamination ≥ OIL4 (see Error: Reference source not found).

Immediately available dose estimates (e.g. from Error: Reference source not found).

Take action indicated in TABLE 8.

If a person has handled a source with a dose rate ≥ 100 Sv/h at 1 m. Register and estimate the dose to determine if medical follow-up is indicated by TABLE 8.

Being in area where OIL2 (see Error: Reference source not found) was exceeded.

May have ingested contaminated food, water or milk produced in a contaminated area.

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4.9. INSTRUCTION 10: PUBLIC AND EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION

For: Conducting public and emergency worker decontamination.

Steps: (as appropriate and practical):Caution

Monitoring is primarily performed to determine who should receive a medical examination. Everyone who could be contaminated should be decontaminated at the scene or instructed to decontaminate at home.

Step 1Protect yourself from contamination. Wear gloves; change gloves regularly; keep hands away from mouth and do not eat or drink without washing hands.

Step 2Determine the level of decontamination to be performed (Field or Full). This depends upon what can be set up and performed promptly. Consider:

For large numbers consider field decontamination of hand and face only, which requires:

- facilities for washing hands and face and removing some outer clothing, if weather permits;

- security;- protection from the weather;- controlled entrance and exit points; - sufficient personnel to support the operation; and- sufficient supplies.

For small numbers consider full decontamination, which requires:

- separate shower/change areas for men and women;- complete clean clothing that provides protection from the weather conditions;- security;- protection from the weather, if required;- controlled entrance and exit points; and- sufficient personnel to support the operation.

Step 3Ensure sufficient supplies for the level of decontamination to be performed:

Replacement for removed clothing;

Plastic bags, tags, registry forms and receipt forms;

Water, mild soap, wash cloths for washing/showering; and

Gloves and protective clothing for the decontamination team.

Step 4Establish a decontamination area outside the inner cordoned area as appropriate for the level decontamination as determined in Step 2.

Step 1 Perform a preliminary dose rate screening first (if not already done). Cordon any objects with a dose rate greater than 100 μSv/h at 1 m and assess anyone who may have been in contact with such an object using TABLE 9. INDICTORS OF POSSIBLE SERIOUS OVEREXPOSURES AND MEDICAL ACTION.

Step 5Do not delay urgently needed medical treatment. Give first aid, register patients, and immediately transport seriously injured people for further treatment, sending

64

their Registry form with them. Assume they are contaminated; wear gloves and wrap in a blanket and remove outer clothing before transport if feasible.

Step 6Decontaminate following the instructions in Part A below:

Part A

Instructions for performing on-scene decontaminationStep 1. Keep families together if feasible and ask adults to assist children or others if needed.Step 2. Instruct people to follow the procedure below to the extent feasible:

For field decontamination For full decontamination To avoid smoking, eating or drinking

without washing hands; To remove as much outer clothing as

conditions and replacement clothing permit; To place removed clothing in bags with a tag

identifying owner; To wash face and hands with water or with a

wet cloth; To as soon as feasible after being released

to:- Shower and change all clothing;- Place clothing removed in a bag for

possible later collection.

To avoid smoking, eating or drinking without washing hands;

To completely remove clothes; To place removed clothing in bags with a

tag identifying owner; To shower with water and mild soap (as

available). To carefully wash hair, face and hands;

To don new clothing or wraps provided.

Step 3. . Send them for a medical examination, if indicted and available. Send their REGISTRY FORM with them.

Step 4. For those not sent for a medial examination:

Provide information on where they can get further instructions once they are released.

Issue a receipt for contaminated clothing and personal items.

Complete and collect the individual’s REGISTRY FORM and send to the Exposure Screening and Dose Reconstruction Manager (as assigned) or the RA.

Release them.

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4.10. MONITORING EQUIPMENT Measuring instrumentation

Type of instrument Physical quantity measured ReportingUnit(a) MDA(b) or range RemarksAirborne gamma spectrometric survey system Surface activity concentration Bq/m2 1 to 5 kBq/m2 for Cs-137© Radionuclide-specific; linked to navigation

systemAirborne dose rate survey system Dose rate Sv/h 0.1 μSv/h Linked to navigation systemVehicle-borne gamma spectrometric survey system Surface activity concentration Bq/m2 Radionuclide-specific; linked to navigation

systemAlpha/beta contamination monitor Surface activity concentration Bq/m2, cps Beta: 1, alpha: 0.1 Bq/cm2 Sensitive area: ≥ 100 cm2

Personal contamination monitor Surface activity concentration Bq/m2, cps Beta/gamma: 1 Bq/cm2 Earphones optionMultipurpose gamma/beta survey monitor Dose rate Sv/h 0.05 μSv/h – 100 mSv/hTelescopic gamma probe Dose rate Sv/h 0.1 μSv/h – 10 Sv/hNeutron dose rate meter Neutron dose rate Sv/h, cps 1 μSv/h Energy: thermal to 14 MeV Neutron fission meter Neutron multiplicity cps, Y2F Radionuclide specific Deviation from normal distribution of

multiplicityHand-held radionuclide identifier Radionuclide NA Radionuclide specific Identify radioisotopes

Self-reading dosimeter External gamma dose Sv or Gy 1 μSv – 10 Sv Alarm function availableGamma dose rate Sv/h 5 μSv/h – 1 Sv/hPersonal dosimeter External gamma dose Sv or Gy 10 μSv – 10 Sv TLD, film badge, glass dosimeter, OSL

dosimeterHPGe in-situ gamma ray spectrometry system Surface activity concentration Bq/m2 1 kBq/m2 of Cs-137 Calibrated also for samplesMobile laboratory gamma spectrometry system Activity concentration Bq/L, Bq/kg Radionuclide specific Portable; with shieldingGamma/beta surface contamination monitor Surface activity concentration Bq/m2, cps Beta/gamma: 1 Bq/cm2

(a) or equivalent(b) minimum detectable activity© with NaI detector (16 l), altitude 40 m, speed 70 km/h, acquisition time 2 seconds, uniform surface contamination(d) at 40 to 50 km/h

66

5. UN NUMBER RELATED RESPONSE GUIDANCE(SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT REQUIRED)

Chapter 5. Guidance for Emergency Responders for road based accidents / incidents involves radioactive material – Class 7

(by UN Number)

5.1. INTRODUCTION The guides given on following pages are for first responder of emergencies caused by incidents/accidents occurring during the transport of radioactive material on land. The emergency responders shall be specially trained for their emergency duties. He/She is the only responsible person during the initial phase of the accident. First responder could be the person such as police, fire, security and medical first aid or ambulance personnel. Such people should be trained to recognize the incident involving radioactive material and to perform their normal limited functions in the radiological environment. Taking into account the fundamental principles of radiological protection and the knowledge of the accident condition, saving lives and fighting fires have much higher priority over anything else.

5.1.1. 5.1.1 Rail transport

Another most common mode of transport on land is rail transport. The road transport emergency response procedure is generally applicable to rail transport. However, railways have their own internal network of communication involving train crews, railway control points and consigning organizations. The first responder shall be well identified and the railway emergency response system shall be properly integrated into a general emergency system for transport accidents involving dangerous goods.

5.1.2. 5.1.2 Air transport

Air transport accidents can occur either at airports or at locations along the route of the aircraft. The first emergency response for road transport is generally not applicable to air transport, except in the case of an accident occurring at an airport. An accident that occurs as a result of a crash of an aircraft may require a response in remote or not easily accessible areas, and may pose problems in locating and collecting the radioactive material. In the event of an aircraft accident, the visual identification of the presence of packages of radioactive material depends on the ability to see their labels or placards.

A major consideration is that transport accidents may occur in any location, including remote areas where access may be difficult and in populated areas where control of access by the public may be required. The Response plans may have to be implemented on difficult terrain and under adverse weather conditions. An accident could occur at the border of two states/countries, where accident site may be in one country whereas the activity may release up to the land of other country. The first responder from both sides may be required to be present at site in such cases.

5.2. THE INITIAL RESPONSEThe initial response to an emergency involving radioactive material is often carried out based on indications of the hazards such as labels, signs or placards indicating the presence of a hazardous

67

material, the appearance of medical symptoms in exposed individuals or readings from specialized instruments.

The first emergency responders are the staff from police, Security, Medical and fire brigade: Detailed action guides for specific responders can be referred from IAEA - Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency (2006).

During first actions after an accident, emergency actions by the local first responders should be directed towards:

Saving lives; Attending to any injured persons; Isolating the location; Preventing or extinguishing fires; Identifying hazards; Determining the actions necessary to prevent a further threat to human life, property or the

environment; Calling for the appropriate expert support.

5.3. PROTECTION OF RESPONDERS See the sign of radioactive shown in Figure 1,2,3. Avoid touching suspected radioactive

items; Perform only life saving and other critical tasks near a potentially dangerous radioactive

source; Avoid the smoke or use available respiratory protection equipment (for response personnel)

within 100 metres of a fire or explosion involving a potentially dangerous radioactive source; Keep the hands away from the mouth and do not smoke, eat or drink until your hands and

face are washed (to avoid inadvertent ingestion); Change clothes and shower as soon as possible.

Figure 1. Radioactive material identification symbol

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5.4. SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BASED ON NAERG-2008 FOR EMERGENCY RESPONDERS (UN NUMBER WISE)

Guidance Number: 161

Radioactive material with low level of radiation hazards

UN 2908 UN 2909 UN 2910UN 2911

Potential Hazards

HEALTH

Radiation presents minimal risk to transport workers, emergency response personnel and the public during transportation accidents. Packaging durability increases as potential hazard of radioactive content increases.

Very low levels of contained radioactive materials and low radiation levels outside packages result in low risks to people. Damaged packages may release measurable amounts of radioactive material, but the resulting risks are expected to be low.

Some radioactive materials cannot be detected by commonly available instruments.

Packages do not have RADIOACTIVE I, II, or III labels. Some may have EMPTY labels or may have the word “Radioactive” in the package marking and some have UN number.

FIRE OR EXPLOSION

Some of these materials may burn, but most do not ignite readily.

Many have cardboard outer packaging; content (physically large or small) can be of many different physical forms.

Radioactivity does not change flammability or other properties of materials.

Public Safety:PUBLIC SAFETY

Observe from the safe distance of at least 1 m. CALL Emergency Response Telephone Number on

Shipping Paper first. If Shipping Paper not available or no answer, refer to appropriate telephone number listed on the inside back cover.

Priorities for rescue, life-saving, first aid, fire control and other hazards are higher than the priority for measuring radiation levels.

Radiation Authority must be notified of accident conditions. Radiation authority is usually responsible for decisions about radiological consequences and closure of emergencies.

As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area for at least 25 meters (75 feet) in all directions.

Stay upwind. Keep unauthorized personnel away. Detain or isolate uninjured persons or equipment suspected

to be contaminated; delay decontamination and cleanup

69

until instructions are received from Radiation Authority.PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and structural firefighters’ protective clothing will provide adequate protection.

EVACUATION Large Spill Consider initial downwind evacuation for at least 100 meters

(330 feet).Fire When a large quantity of this material is involved in a major

fire, consider an initial evacuation distance of 300 meters (1000 feet) in all directions.

Emergency Response:FIRE Presence of radioactive material will not influence the fire

control processes and should not influence selection of techniques.

Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk. Do not move damaged packages; move undamaged

packages out of fire zone.Small Fire Dry chemical, CO2, water spray or regular foam.

Large Fire Water spray, fog (flooding amounts).

SPILL OR LEAK

Do not touch damaged packages or spilled material. Cover liquid spill with sand, earth or other non-combustible

absorbent material. Cover powder spill with plastic sheet or tarp to minimize

spreading.FIRST AID Call emergency medical service.

Medical problems take priority over radiological concerns. Use first aid treatment according to the nature of the injury. Do not delay care and transport of a seriously injured person. Give artificial respiration if victim is not breathing. Administer oxygen if breathing is difficult. In case of contact with substance, immediately flush skin or eyes with

running water for at least 20 minutes. Injured persons contaminated by contact with released material are not a

serious hazard to health care personnel, equipment or facilities. Ensure that medical personnel are aware of the material(s) involved, take

precautions to protect themselves and prevent spread of contamination.

Guidance Number: 162

Radioactive Material Low to Moderate Level Radiation Hazard

UN 2912 UN 2913 UN 3321 UN 3322

Potential Hazards

70

HEALTH:

Radiation presents minimal risk to transport workers, emergency response personnel and the public during transportation accidents. Packaging durability increases as potential hazard of radioactive content increases.

Undamaged packages are safe. Contents of damaged packages may cause higher external radiation exposure or both external and internal radiation exposure if contents are released.

Low radiation hazard when material is inside container. If material is released from package or bulk container, hazard will vary from low to moderate. Level of hazard will depend on the type and amount of radioactivity, the kind of material it is in, and/or the surfaces it is on.

Some material may be released from packages during accidents of moderate severity but risks to people are not great.

Released radioactive materials or contaminated objects usually will be visible if packaging fails.

Some exclusive use shipments of bulk and packaged materials will not have “RADIOACTIVE” labels. Placards, markings and shipping papers provide identification.

Some packages may have a “RADIOACTIVE” label and a second hazard label like chemical toxicity and pyrophoric. The second hazard is usually greater than the radiation hazard; so follow this GUIDE as well as the response GUIDE for the second hazard class label.

Some radioactive materials cannot be detected by commonly available instruments.

Runoff from control of cargo fire may cause low-level pollution.

FIRE OR EXPLOSION

Some of these materials may burn, but most do not ignite readily.

Uranium and Thorium metal cuttings may ignite spontaneously if exposed to air (see GUIDE 136).

Nitrates are oxidizers and may ignite other combustibles (see GUIDE 141).

Public Safety:PUBLIC SAFETY:

CALL Emergency Response Telephone Number on Shipping Paper first. If Shipping Paper not available or no answer, refer to appropriate telephone number listed on the inside back cover.

Priorities for rescue, life-saving, first aid, fire control and other hazards are higher than the priority for measuring radiation levels.

Observe from the safe distance of at least 10 m. Radiation Authority must be notified of accident conditions.

Radiation Authority is usually responsible for decisions about radiological consequences and closure of emergencies.

As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or

71

leak area for at least 25 meters (75 feet) in all directions. Stay upwind. Keep unauthorized personnel away. Detain or isolate uninjured persons or equipment suspected

to be contaminated; delay decontamination and cleanup until instructions are received from Radiation Authority.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and structural firefighters’ protective clothing will provide adequate protection.

EVACUATION

Large Spill Consider initial downwind evacuation for at least 100 meters

(330 feet).Fire When a large quantity of this material is involved in a major

fire, consider an initial evacuation distance of 300 meters (1000 feet) in all directions.

Emergency Response:

FIRE

Presence of radioactive material will not influence the fire control processes and should not influence selection of techniques.

Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk. Do not move damaged packages; move undamaged

packages out of fire zone.Small Fire Dry chemical, CO2, water spray or regular foam.

Large Fire Water spray, fog (flooding amounts). Dike fire-control water for later disposal.

SPILL OR LEAK

Do not touch damaged packages or spilled material. Cover liquid spill with sand, earth or other non-combustible

absorbent material. Dike to collect large liquid spills. Cover powder spill with plastic sheet or tarp to minimize

spreading.

FIRST AID

Call emergency medical service. Medical problems take priority over radiological concerns. Use first aid treatment according to the nature of the injury. Do not delay care and transport of a seriously injured person. Give artificial respiration if victim is not breathing. Administer oxygen if breathing is difficult. In case of contact with substance, immediately flush skin or eyes with

running water for at least 20 minutes. Injured persons contaminated by contact with released material are not a

serious hazard to health care personnel, equipment or facilities. Ensure that medical personnel are aware of the material(s) involved, take

precautions to protect themselves and prevent spread of contamination.

Guidance Number: 163 UN 2915 UN 2916

72

Radioactive Material with Low to High Level of Radiation Hazard

UN 2917UN 3323 UN 2919

Potential Hazards

HEALTH:

Radiation presents minimal risk to transport workers, emergency response personnel and the public during transportation accidents. Packaging durability increases as potential hazard of radioactive content increases.

Undamaged packages are safe. Contents of damaged packages may cause higher external radiation exposure or both external and internal radiation exposure if contents are released.

Radiation presents minimal risk to transport workers, emergency response personnel and the public during transportation accidents. Packaging durability increases as potential hazard of radioactive content increases.

Undamaged packages are safe. Contents of damaged packages may cause higher external radiation exposure, or both external and internal radiation exposure if contents are released.

Type A packages (cartons, boxes, drums, articles, etc.) identified as “Type A” by marking on packages or by shipping papers contain non-life endangering amounts. Partial releases might be expected if “Type A” packages are damaged in moderately severe accidents.

Type B packages, and the rarely occurring Type C packages, (large and small, usually metal) contain the most hazardous amounts. They can be identified by package markings or by shipping papers. Life threatening conditions may exist only if contents are released or package shielding fails. Because of design, evaluation and testing of packages, these conditions would be expected only for accidents of utmost severity.

The rarely occurring "Special Arrangement" shipments may be of Type A, Type B or Type C packages. Package type will be marked on packages, and shipment details will be on shipping papers.

Radioactive White-I labels indicate radiation levels outside single, isolated, undamaged packages are very low (less than 0.005 mSv/h (0.5 mrem/h)).

Radioactive Yellow-II and Yellow-III labeled packages have higher radiation levels. The transport index (TI) on the label identifies the maximum radiation level in mrem/h one meter from a single, isolated, undamaged package.

Some radioactive materials cannot be detected by commonly available instruments.

Water from cargo fire control may cause pollution.FIRE OR EXPLOSION

Some of these materials may burn, but most do not ignite readily.

73

Radioactivity does not change flammability or other properties of materials.

Type B packages are designed and evaluated to withstand total engulfment in flames at temperatures of 800°C (1475°F) for a period of 30 minutes.

Public Safety:

PUBLIC SAFETY

Observe from the safe distance of at least 10 m. CALL Emergency Response Telephone Number on

Shipping Paper first. If Shipping Paper not available or no answer, refer to appropriate telephone number listed on the inside back cover.

Priorities for rescue, life-saving, first aid, fire control and other hazards are higher than the priority for measuring radiation levels.

Radiation Authority must be notified of accident conditions. Radiation Authority is usually responsible for decisions about radiological consequences and closure of emergencies.

As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area for at least 25 meters (75 feet) in all directions.

Stay upwind. Keep unauthorized personnel away. Detain or isolate uninjured persons or equipment suspected

to be contaminated; delay decontamination and cleanup until instructions are received from Radiation Authority.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and structural firefighters’ protective clothing will provide adequate protection will provide adequate protection against internal radiation exposure, but not external radiation exposure.

EVACUATION

Large Spill Consider initial downwind evacuation for at least 100 meters

(330 feet).Fire When a large quantity of this material is involved in a major

fire, consider an initial evacuation distance of 300 meters (1000 feet) in all directions.

Emergency Response:

FIRE

Presence of radioactive material will not influence the fire control processes and should not influence selection of techniques. Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk.

Do not move damaged packages; move undamaged packages out of fire zone.

Small Fire Dry chemical, CO2, water spray or regular foam.

Large Fire Water spray, fog (flooding amounts). Dike fire-control water for later disposal.

SPILL OR LEAK

Do not touch damaged packages or spilled material. Damp surfaces on undamaged or slightly damaged

74

packages are seldom an indication of packaging failure. Most packaging for liquid content has inner containers and/or inner absorbent materials.

Cover liquid spill with sand, earth or other non-combustible absorbent material.

FIRST AID

Call emergency medical service. Medical problems take priority over radiological concerns. Use first aid treatment according to the nature of the injury. Do not delay care and transport of a seriously injured person. Give artificial respiration if victim is not breathing. Administer oxygen if

breathing is difficult. In case of contact with substance, immediately flush skin or eyes with

running water for at least 20 minutes. Injured persons contaminated by contact with released material are not a

serious hazard to health care personnel, equipment or facilities. Ensure that medical personnel are aware of the material(s) involved, take

precautions to protect themselves and prevent spread of contamination.

75

Guidance Number: 164

Radioactive Materials in special form with Low to High Level of External Radiation Hazard

UN 3332

Potential Hazards

HEALTH:

Radiation presents minimal risk to transport workers, emergency response personnel and the public during transportation accidents. Packaging durability increases as potential hazard of radioactive content increases.

Undamaged packages are safe; contents of damaged packages may cause external radiation exposure, and much higher external exposure if contents (source capsules) are released.

Contamination and internal radiation hazards are not expected, but not impossible.

Type A packages (cartons, boxes, drums, articles, etc.) identified as “Type A” by marking on packages or by shipping papers contain non-life endangering amounts. Partial releases might be expected if “Type A” packages are damaged in moderately severe accidents.

Type B packages, and the rarely occurring Type C packages, (large and small, usually metal) contain the most hazardous amounts. They can be identified by package markings or by shipping papers. Life threatening conditions may exist only if contents are released or package shielding fails. Because of design, evaluation and testing of packages, these conditions would be expected only for accidents of utmost severity.

Radioactive White-I labels indicate radiation levels outside single, isolated, undamaged packages are very low (less than 0.005 mSv/h (0.5 mrem/h)).

Radioactive Yellow-II and Yellow-III labeled packages have higher radiation levels. The transport index (TI) on the label identifies the maximum radiation level in mrem/h one meter from a single, isolated, undamaged package.

Radiation from the package contents, usually in durable metal capsules, can be detected by most radiation instruments.

Water from cargo fire control may cause pollution.

FIRE OR EXPLOSION

Packaging can burn completely without risk of content loss from sealed source capsule.

Radioactivity does not change flammability or other properties of materials.

Radioactive source capsules and Type B packages are designed and evaluated to withstand total engulfment in flames at temperatures of 800°C (1475°F) for a period of 30 minutes.

Public SafetyPUBLIC SAFETY

Observe from the safe distance of at least 10 m. CALL Emergency Response Telephone Number on

76

Shipping Paper first. If Shipping Paper not available or no answer, refer to appropriate telephone number listed on the inside back cover.

Priorities for rescue, life-saving, first aid, fire control and other hazards are higher than the priority for measuring radiation levels.

Radiation Authority must be notified of accident conditions. Radiation Authority is usually responsible for decisions about radiological consequences and closure of emergencies.

As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area for at least 25 meters (75 feet) in all directions.

Stay upwind. Keep unauthorized personnel away. Delay final cleanup until instructions or advice is received

from Radiation Authority.PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and structural firefighters’ protective clothing will provide adequate protection against internal radiation exposure, but not external radiation exposure.

EVACUATION

Large Spill Consider initial downwind evacuation for at least 100 meters

(330 feet).Fire When a large quantity of this material is involved in a major

fire, consider an initial evacuation distance of 300 meters (1000 feet) in all directions.

Emergency Response:

FIRE

Presence of radioactive material will not influence the fire control processes and should not influence selection of techniques. Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk.

Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk. Do not move damaged packages; move undamaged

packages out of fire zone.Small Fire Dry chemical, CO2, water spray or regular foam.

Large Fire Water spray, fog (flooding amounts).

SPILL OR LEAK

Do not touch damaged packages or spilled material. Damp surfaces on undamaged or slightly damaged packages

are seldom an indication of packaging failure. Contents are seldom liquid. Content is usually a metal capsule, easily seen if released from package.

If source capsule is identified as being out of package, DO NOT TOUCH. Stay away and await advice from Radiation Authority.

FIRST AID Call emergency medical service. Medical problems take priority over radiological concerns. Use first aid treatment according to the nature of the injury. Do not delay care and transport of a seriously injured person. Persons exposed to special form sources are not likely to be

77

contaminated with radioactive material. Give artificial respiration if victim is not breathing. Administer oxygen if breathing is difficult. Injured persons contaminated by contact with released

material are not a serious hazard to health care personnel, equipment or facilities.

Ensure that medical personnel are aware of the material(s) involved, take precautions to protect themselves and prevent spread of contamination.

78

Guidance Number: 165

Fissile Radioactive Materials with Low to High Level of Radiation Hazard

UN 3324UN 3325UN 3326UN 3327UN 3328UN 3329UN 3330UN 3331UN 3333

Potential Hazards

HEALTH

Radiation presents minimal risk to transport workers, emergency response personnel and the public during transportation accidents. Packaging durability increases as potential radiation and criticality hazards of the content increase.

Undamaged packages are safe. Contents of damaged packages may cause higher external radiation exposure, or both external and internal radiation exposure if contents are released.

Type AF or IF packages, identified by package markings, do not contain life-threatening amounts of material. External radiation levels are low and packages are designed, evaluated and tested to control releases and to prevent a fission chain reaction under severe transport conditions.

Type B(U)F, B(M)F and CF packages (identified by markings on packages or shipping papers) contain potentially life endangering amounts. Because of design, evaluation and testing of packages, fission chain reactions are prevented and releases are not expected to be life endangering for all accidents except those of utmost severity.

The rarely occurring "Special Arrangement" shipments may be of Type AF, BF or CF packages.

Package type will be marked on packages, and shipment details will be on shipping papers.

The transport index (TI) shown on labels or a shipping paper might not indicate the radiation level at one meter from a single, isolated, undamaged package; instead, it might relate to controls needed during transport because of the fissile properties of the materials.

Alternatively, the fissile nature of the contents may be indicated by a criticality safety index (CSI) on a special FISSILE label or on the shipping paper.

Some radioactive materials cannot be detected by commonly available instruments.

Water from cargo fire control is not expected to cause pollution.

FIRE OR EXPLOSION

These materials are seldom flammable. Packages are designed to withstand fires without damage to contents.

Radioactivity does not change flammability or other properties of materials.

Type AF, IF, B(U)F, B(M)F and CF packages are designed and evaluated to withstand total engulfment in flames at temperatures of 800°C (1475°F) for a period of 30 minutes.

Public Safety:PUBLIC Observe from the safe distance of at least 10 m.

79

SAFETY

CALL Emergency Response Telephone Number on Shipping Paper first. If Shipping Paper not available or no answer, refer to appropriate telephone number listed on the inside back cover.

Priorities for rescue, life-saving, first aid, fire control and other hazards are higher than the priority for measuring radiation levels.

Radiation Authority must be notified of accident conditions. Radiation Authority is usually responsible for decisions about radiological consequences and closure of emergencies.

As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area for at least 25 meters (75 feet) in all directions.

Stay upwind. Keep unauthorized personnel away. Detain or isolate uninjured persons or equipment suspected

to be contaminated; delay decontamination and cleanup until instructions are received from Radiation Authority.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and structural firefighters’ protective clothing will provide adequate protection against internal radiation exposure, but not external radiation exposure.

EVACUATION

Large Spill Consider initial downwind evacuation for at least 100 meters

(330 feet).Fire When a large quantity of this material is involved in a major

fire, consider an initial evacuation distance of 300 meters (1000 feet) in all directions.

Emergency Response:

FIRE

Presence of radioactive material will not influence the fire control processes and should not influence selection of techniques.

Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk. Do not move damaged packages; move undamaged

packages out of fire zone.Small Fire Dry chemical, CO2, water spray or regular foam.

Large Fire Water spray, fog (flooding amounts).

SPILL OR LEAK

Do not touch damaged packages or spilled material. Damp surfaces on undamaged or slightly damaged packages

are seldom an indication of packaging failure. Most packaging for liquid content has inner containers and/or inner absorbent materials.

Liquid Spill Package contents are seldom liquid. If any radioactive

contamination resulting from a liquid release is present, it probably will be low-level.

FIRST AID Call emergency medical service. Medical problems take priority over radiological concerns. Use first aid treatment according to the nature of the injury.

80

Do not delay care and transport of a seriously injured person. Give artificial respiration if victim is not breathing. Administer

oxygen if breathing is difficult. In case of contact with substance, immediately flush skin or

eyes with running water for at least 20 minutes. Injured persons contaminated by contact with released

material are not a serious hazard to health care personnel, equipment or facilities.

Ensure that medical personnel are aware of the material(s) involved, take precautions to protect themselves and prevent spread of contamination.

81

Guidance Number: 166

Uranium Hexafluoride / Radioactive Materials with chemical hazard (Corrosive)

UN 2977UN 2978

Potential Hazards

HEALTH

Radiation presents minimal risk to transport workers, emergency response personnel and the public during transportation accidents. Packaging durability increases as potential radiation and criticality hazards of the content increase.

Chemical hazard greatly exceeds radiation hazard. Substance reacts with water and water vapor in air to form

toxic and corrosive hydrogen fluoride gas and an extremely irritating and corrosive, white-colored, water-soluble residue.

If inhaled, may be fatal. Direct contact causes burns to skin, eyes, and respiratory

tract. Low-level radioactive material; very low radiation hazard to

people. Runoff from control of cargo fire may cause low-level

pollution.FIRE OR EXPLOSION

Substance does not burn. The material may react violently with fuels. Containers in protective overpacks (horizontal cylindrical

shape with short legs for tie downs), are identified with "AF", "B(U)F" or "H(U)" on shipping papers or by markings on the overpacks. They are designed and evaluated to withstand severe conditions including total engulfment in flames at temperatures of 800°C (1475°F) for a period of 30 minutes.

Bare filled cylinders, identified with UN2978 as part of the marking (may also be marked H(U) or H(M)), may rupture in heat of engulfing fire; bare empty (except for residue) cylinders will not rupture in fires

Radioactivity does not change flammability or other properties of materials.

Public Safety:PUBLIC SAFETY

Observe from the safe distance of at least 10 m. CALL Emergency Response Telephone Number on

Shipping Paper first. If Shipping Paper not available or no answer, refer to appropriate

telephone number listed on the inside back cover. Priorities for rescue, life-saving, first aid, fire control

and other hazards are higher than the priority for measuring radiation levels.

Radiation Authority must be notified of accident conditions. Radiation Authority is usually responsible for decisions about radiological consequences and closure of

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emergencies. As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak

area for at least 25 meters (75 feet) in all directions. • Stay upwind. • Keep unauthorized personnel away.

Detain or isolate uninjured persons or equipment suspected to be contaminated; delay, decontamination and cleanup until instructions are received from Radiation Authority.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Wear positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).

Wear chemical protective clothing that is specifically recommended by the manufacturer.

It may provide little or no thermal protection. Structural firefighters' protective clothing provides limited

protection in fire situations ONLY; it is not effective in spill situations where direct contact with the substance is possible.

EVACUATION

Small Spill Isolate in all directions of at least 30 m (100 feet).Large Spill Isolate in all directions of at least 60 meters (200 feet).

Fire When a large quantity of this material is involved in a major

fire, consider an initial evacuation distance of 300 meters (1000 feet) in all directions.

Emergency Response:

FIRE

FIRE DO NOT USE WATER OR FOAM ON MATERIAL ITSELF. Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk.Small Fire Dry chemical or CO2.Large Fire Water spray, fog or regular foam. Cool containers with flooding quantities of water until well

after fire is out. If this is impossible, withdraw from area and let fire burn. ALWAYS stay away from tanks engulfed in fire.

SPILL OR LEAK

Do not touch damaged packages or spilled material Without fire or smoke, leak will be evident by visible and irritating vapors

and residue forming at the point of release. Use fine water spray to reduce vapors; do not put water directly on point

of material release from container. Residue buildup may self-seal small leaks. Dike far ahead of spill to collect runoff water.

FIRST AID Call emergency medical service. Medical problems take priority over radiological concerns. Use first aid treatment according to the nature of the injury. Do not delay care and transport of a seriously injured

person. Give artificial respiration if victim is not breathing.

Administer oxygen if breathing is difficult.

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In case of contact with substance, immediately flush skin or eyes with running water for at least 20 minutes.

Effects of exposure (inhalation, ingestion or skin contact) to substance may be delayed.

Injured persons contaminated by contact with released material are not a serious hazard to health care personnel, equipment or facilities.

Ensure that medical personnel are aware of the material(s) involved, take precautions to protect themselves and prevent spread of contamination.

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5.5. GUIDES FOR SECOND HAZARD CLASS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Guidance Number: 136

SUBSTANCES - SPONTANEOUSLY COMBUSTIBLE - TOXIC AND/OR CORROSIVE (AIR-REACTIVE)

Uranium, Thorium metal cuttings /shavings

Emergency Response

FIRE

Small Fire Water spray, wet sand or wet earth.Large Fire Water spray or fog.Do not scatter spilled material with high pressure water streams. Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk.Fire involving Tanks or Car/Trailer Loads Fight fire from maximum distance or use unmanned hose

holders or monitor nozzles. Cool containers with flooding quantities of water until well after

fire is out. Withdraw immediately in case of rising sound from venting

safety devices or discoloration of tank. ALWAYS stay away from tanks engulfed in fire.

SPILL OR LEAK

Fully encapsulating, vapor protective clothing should be worn for spills and leaks with no fire.

Eliminate all ignition sources (no smoking, flares, sparks or flames in immediate area).

Do not touch or walk through spilled material. Do not touch damaged containers or spilled material unless

wearing appropriate protective clothing. Stop leak if you can do it without risk.Small Spill Cover with water, sand or earth. Shovel into metal container

and keep material under water.Large Spill Dike for later disposal and cover with wet sand or earth. Prevent entry into waterways, sewers, basements or confined

areas.FIRST AID Move victim to fresh air.

Call emergency medical service. Give artificial respiration if victim is not breathing. Administer oxygen if breathing is difficult. In case of contact with substance, keep exposed skin areas

immersed in water or covered with wet bandages until medical attention is received.

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Removal of solidified molten material from skin requires medical assistance.

Remove and isolate contaminated clothing and shoes at the site and place in metal container filled with water. Fire hazard if allowed to dry.

Effects of exposure (inhalation, ingestion or skin contact) to substance may be delayed.

Keep victim warm and quiet. Ensure that medical personnel are aware of the material(s)

involved and take precautions to protect themselves.

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Guidance Number: 141 OXIDIZERS LIKE NITRATES and OXIDIZING SOLIDS

POTENTIAL HAZARDS

FIRE OR EXPLOSION

These substances will accelerate burning when involved in a fire.

May explode from heat or contamination. Some may burn rapidly. Some will react explosively with hydrocarbons (fuels). May ignite combustibles (wood, paper, oil, clothing, etc.). Containers may explode when heated. Runoff may create fire or explosion hazard.

HEALTH

Toxic by ingestion. Inhalation of dust is toxic. Fire may produce irritating, corrosive and/or toxic gases. Contact with substance may cause severe burns to skin and

eyes. Runoff from fire control or dilution water may cause pollution.

PUBLIC SAFETY

CALL Emergency Response Telephone Number on Shipping Paper first. If Shipping

Paper not available or no answer, refer to appropriate telephone number listed on the

inside back cover. As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak

area in all directions for at least 50 meters (150 feet) for liquids and at least 25 meters

(75 feet) for solids. Keep unauthorized personnel away. Stay upwind. Keep out of low areas. Ventilate closed spaces before entering.

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Wear positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).

Wear chemical protective clothing that is specifically recommended by the manufacturer.

It may provide little or no thermal protection. Structural firefighters’ protective clothing will only provide

limited protection.

EVACUATION

Large Spill Consider initial downwind evacuation for at least 100 meters

(330 feet).Fire

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If tank, rail car or tank truck is involved in a fire, ISOLATE for 800 meters (1/2 mile) in all directions; also, consider initial evacuation for 800 meters (1/2 mile) in all directions.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

FIRE

Small Fire Use water. Do not use dry chemicals or foams. CO2 or

Halon® may provide limited control.Large Fire Flood fire area with water from a distance. Do not move cargo or vehicle if cargo has been exposed to

heat. Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk.

Fire involving Tanks or Car/Trailer Loads Fight fire from maximum distance or use unmanned hose

holders or monitor nozzles. Cool containers with flooding quantities of water until well

after fire is out. ALWAYS stay away from tanks engulfed in fire. For massive fire, use unmanned hose holders or monitor

nozzles; if this is impossible,withdraw from area and let fire burn.

SPILL OR LEAK

Keep combustibles (wood, paper, oil, etc.) away from spilled material.

Do not touch damaged containers or spilled material unless wearing appropriate protective clothing.

Stop leak if you can do it without risk.Small Dry Spill With clean shovel place material into clean, dry container and

cover loosely; move containers from spill area.Large Spill Dike far ahead of spill for later disposal.

FIRST AID

Move victim to fresh air. • Call 911 or emergency medical service.

Give artificial respiration if victim is not breathing. Administer oxygen if breathing is difficult. Remove and isolate contaminated clothing and shoes. Contaminated clothing may be a fire risk when dry. In case of contact with substance, immediately flush skin or

eyes with running water for at least 20 minutes. Keep victim warm and quiet. Ensure that medical personnel are aware of the material(s)

involved and take precautions to protect themselves.

Generic Guidance for Emergency Responders

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(All Class 7 Transport Accidents)Draft by: Mr. Cris A., NZ

1. General advice to emergency services responding to a land transport incident involving radioactive material

If there are life-threatening injuries send casualties to hospital without delay.

CAUTION

Female workers who may be pregnant or nursing should not participate in emergency operations.

If it is suspected that radioactive contamination has been released:

Keep appliances and crews upwind. Cordon area. (see below for appropriate cordon distances) Set up a single entry and exit point to incident area. Extinguish fires. Refer to any placards, markings, documentation for information and/or advice. If dust/smoke and/or other airborne contamination are suspected:

Use available respiratory protection equipment and avoid the smoke near its source.

Cover mouth with a mask or handkerchief, if respiratory protection is not available. - Avoid inadvertent ingestion, keep hands away from mouth, do not smoke, eat or drink. - Keep your skin covered, wear gloves.

When treating or transporting contaminated persons prevent inadvertent ingestion by using normal barrier methods (standard precautions) such as surgical gloves and masks. Keep hands away from mouth. Wash hands regularly.

Ensure your name and activities performed are recorded — for possible follow-up and dose reconstruction.

Get monitored for radioactive contamination and if not immediately possible, shower and change clothing as soon as possible.

2. Establishment of cordoned area (safety perimeter)

If monitoring equipment is unavailable :Intact package Immediate area around the package Situation unknown or an unshielded or damaged radioactive source or package

30 m radius

Fire, explosion or major spillage involving high risk radioactive material

300 m radius

If monitoring equipment is available:Radiation dose rate of 100 μSv/h (0.1 mSv/h)

Radius of the area where these levels are measured.

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3. Emergency Responder Dose Limitation

If monitoring equipment:- unavailable available Perform only life saving actions within 1 m. of suspected dangerous radioactive materials/device

If the dose rate is greater than 100 mSv/h: Perform only life saving actions Limit total time to less than 30

minutes. Do not proceed into an area with

dose rate of greater than 1 Sv/h (1000 mSv/h) unless authorised by the Emergency Controller

Minimise time within 10 metres of suspected dangerous radioactive materials

Minimise time within area if dose rate is greater than 10 mSv/h.

4. Decontamination of the public and responders

CAUTION

Transport or treatment of seriously injured victims should not be delayed for decontamination. Their outer clothing should be removed, they should be wrapped in a blanket and tagged as possibly contaminated.

Personal survey measurements <3 times mean background >3 times mean background No decontamination required Indicate need for decontamination -

not to eat, drink or smoke and to keep hands away from mouth - to remove outer clothing and to place the clothing in bags with a tag identifying owner - to wash or shower with soap and water

5. Monitoring and decontamination of vehicles and important equipment/items Vehicle/equipment/item survey measurements:

< 3 times means background > 3 times mean background

Release the vehicle/ equipment for normal use

Decontaminate using fire hoses, scrub brushes and detergents.

Re-survey the contaminated areas

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Tag indicating need for monitoring and decontamination before release to normal use

Return to emergency use

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APPENDIX I. REGULATORY AND EPER GUIDANCE

I.1.Transport regulations

I.1.1. IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials

The IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials (TS-R-1) are the basis of all international regulations for the transport of radioactive materials

The objective of the Regulations is to establish requirements that must be satisfied to ensure safety and to protect persons, property and the environment from the effects of radiation in the transport of radioactive material. This protection is achieved by requiring:

(a) Containment of the radioactive contents;

(b) Control of external radiation levels;

(c) Prevention of criticality; and

(d) Prevention of damage caused by heat.

A graded approach to safety is adopted which ensures that as the risks associated with activity of the contents of the package increases so does the robustness of the packaging. Three general severity levels are considered:

(a) Routine conditions of transport (incident free);

(b) Normal conditions of transport (minor mishaps);

(c) Accident conditions of transport.

TS-R-1 specifies the requirements for several types of packages which are designed and tested to demonstrate their ability to withstand, as appropriate, these three conditions of transport.

The package types appropriate for marine transport are:

Excepted packages which are designed to withstand routine conditions of transport Industrial (IP1, IP2, IP3) and Type A packages which are designed to withstand routine

and normal conditions of transport Type B packages which are designed to withstand routine, normal and accident

conditions of transport.

Fissile material may be carried in Industrial, Type A, Type B, or Type H packages. In these circumstances the package has to be designed to withstand accident conditions of transport and also to take account of the additional risks associated with its fissile content. The packages designations will include the letter F when fissile material is carried.

i IAEA EPR-2005 Medical - Generic procedures for medical response during a nuclear or radiological emergencyii [?] <RS-G-1.9>INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,

Categorization of Radioactive Sources. Safety Standards series No RS-G-1.9, IAEA, Vienna, (2005).

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The regulations also identify, Low Specific Radioactive Material (LSAI, LSA II, LSA III) and Surface Contaminated Objects (SCO I, SCO II). In some circumstances LSA I material and SCO I material can be transported unpackaged but in general terms LSA material and SCO are transported in industrial packages.

The regulations permit the use of an “overpack” which is an enclosure used by a single consignor to contain one or more packages and to form one unit for convenience of handling and stowage during transport. Typically an overpack could be a standard ISO freight container.

One key requirement of international regulations is that, “if it is evident that a package is damaged or leaking, or if it is suspected that the package may have leaked or been damaged, access to the package shall be restricted and a qualified person shall, as soon as possible, assess the extent of contamination and the resultant radiation level of the package. The scope of the assessment shall include the package, the conveyance, the adjacent loading and unloading areas, and, if necessary, all other material which has been carried in the conveyance. When necessary, additional steps for the protection of persons, property and the environment, in accordance with provisions established by the relevant competent authority, shall be taken to overcome and minimize the consequences of such leakage or damage.”

Were a spillage of material from packages reported and the ship needs to call at a coastal state port then another requirement comes in to play, and the packages would effectively need to be re-consigned, “packages which are damaged or leaking radioactive contents in excess of allowable limits for normal conditions of transport may be removed to an acceptable interim location under supervision, but shall not be forwarded until repaired or reconditioned and decontaminated.”

The provisions of TS-R-1 are intended to cover transport of packages by any mode. Modal variations to the transport regulations are covered in mode specific documents which for maritime transport is the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code)

The IAEA has published a number of guidance documents to support the implementation of TS-R-1. For the purposes of this document the relevant IAEA guidance material is

Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material Safety Guide, IAEA Safety Standards Series, No. TS-G-1.1

Planning and Preparing for Emergency Response to Transport Accidents Involving Radioactive Material Safety Guide IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-G-1.2 (ST-3)

I.1.2. The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code(IMDG)

The IMO’s IMDG Code contains all of the provisions of TS-R-1 together with additional information relevant to sea transport such as:

Stowage provisions The Emergency Schedules (EmS) guide The Medical First Aid Guide (MFAG) Reporting procedures Shipboard plan requirements The INF code

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The code covers all dangerous goods which are divided into nine different classes. All radioactive material is allocated to Class 7 in the code and it is often referred to as Class 7 Dangerous Goods

The IMDG code is adopted by member states of the IMO for inclusion into national legislation. Compliance with the requirements of the code ensures that the transport of all classes of dangerous goods is carried out in such a way that the risks to people, property and the environment are minimised

The guidance for shipboard emergency plans in the supplement to the code recommends that those plans should identify and address, as a minimum, the following potential emergency situations:

Fire Damage to the ship

I.1.3. Pollution

Unlawful acts threatening the safety of the ship and the security of its passengers and crew.

Personnel accidents Cargo-related accidents Emergency assistance to other ships

The significance of these different situations to the response required by Coastal States is explored further in section 3.3 of this guidance.

Additional guidance is given on shipboard plans for ships which comply with the INF code. []

The marine environment is hazardous, and the safety record associated with radioactive material transport is excellent. As a result, the most likely event involving a ship carrying radioactive material is unlikely to affect the cargo. The presence of radioactive material (and other dangerous goods) could however lead to complications in response.

This document seeks to provide information that can be used in many scenarios, taking in to consideration the fact that the major risk to life is unlikely to be related to the cargo.

I.2. Information requirements for DG cargo by sea

There are several mandatory and advisory provisions for maritime transport. These may be supplemented regionally or nationally by special requirements. There are several sources of information that can be considered for Dangerous Goods Cargo on board a vessel.

The vessel

The cargo owner

The flag state

The last port of call

Each of these could have a role during an emergency, and each will have different information and different availability. Some suggestions for consideration are set out in the following paragraphs. This section concentrates on information related to the cargo – not to the event. The information in shipping documents and its relevance in an emergency are:

The identification of the consignor and consignee, including their names and addresses

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o This information is very important – it allows access to extensive information from sources not directly responding to any incident.

The UN number preceded by the letters “UN” (see Appendix III).

o The UN number gives important information regarding the amount of material being carried and the ability of the package to withstand accidents.

The proper shipping name.

o The proper shipping name supplements the UN number and allows slightly more specific details to be known.

The UN class number “7” (see Appendix IV).

o This simply confirms that the material is radioactive.

The name or symbol of each radionuclide or a general description for a mixture.

o This can be useful, but it should be noted that for complex mixtures the ability to record sufficient detail is limited. For most materials moved by sea, other than by INF ship, the information will be sufficient to guide much of the response.

The physical and chemical form of the material.

o This information helps since it allows prediction of the response of the material to specific accident scenarios, and to sea water.

The maximum activity of the radioactive contents (for fissile material mass may be used in place of activity).

o The maximum activity is obviously useful, and will guide the decisions on the potential hazards involved.

The category of the package, i.e. I-WHITE, II-YELLOW, III-YELLOW (see Appendix IV).

o All packages containing radioactive material have external radiation levels. The package category is a guide to the radiation level on the surface of the package.

The TI.

o The transport index is a guide to the radiation level at one meter from the surface of the package – together with the surface dose rate this enable simple models to be developed to estimate dose rates at any distance from an undamaged package.

For fissile material the CSI (see Appendix IV).

o If the material is fissile it is one of the most significant materials to be carried. The higher the CSI , the more important it is to control operations with the package.

The identification mark for each competent authority approval certificate.

o For any package with an identity mark this is very important information. The mark will allow tracing of certificates, safety cases, design information, approving authorities etc.

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Where required the statement “EXCLUSIVE USE SHIPMENT”

o Where this term is used it is a sign that there are important reasons for operational control of the package – this could be due to very high radiation levels for example.

For LSA-II, LSA-III, SCO-I and SCO-II, the total activity of the consignment as a multiple of A2.

o LSA and SCO are materials that provide degrees of protection because of their form. The scale of the potential hazard is given by the multiple of A2. Levels of 10 A2 are important.

In addition the consignor needs to provide the carrier a statement regarding emergency arrangements appropriate to the consignment, but the competent authority certificates need not necessarily accompany the consignment. Instead the consignor is required to have sent copies of each applicable competent authority certificate to the competent authority of the country of origin of the shipment and to the competent authority of each country through or into which the consignment is to be transported.

A graded approach is taken throughout the regulations and for the most significant shipments a “Shipment Notification” is required to be made to the competent authority of each country through or into which larger consignments are to be transported. This notification is required for:

Type C packages or type B(U) packages containing radioactive material with an activity greater than 3000A1 or 3000A2, as appropriate, or 1000 TBq;

Type B(M) packages;

Shipments under special arrangement.

The information in the notification includes sufficient information to enable the identification of the package or packages (including all applicable certificate numbers and identification marks); information on the date of shipment, the expected date of arrival and proposed routing; the names of the radioactive materials or nuclides; descriptions of the physical and chemical forms of the radioactive material; and the maximum activity of the radioactive contents (for fissile material, the mass of fissile material may be used in place of activity).

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APPENDIX II. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Emergency preparedness and response must follow an all hazards approach, remembering that the risks associated with bad weather at sea can be much more significant than the risks associated with dangerous goods on the vessel. There are several different preparedness and response guidelines to consider:

A maritime emergency

An incident involving cargo

A casualty at sea

Transport of radioactive material

A radiation emergency

This document seeks to provide pointers to key aspects of each of these, all of which may be important in any one event. At the core of any maritime work is the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, better known as SOLAS.

The Convention is also one of the oldest of its kind: the first version was adopted in 1914, following the sinking of the Titanic with the loss of more than 1500 lives. Since then there have been four more versions of SOLAS. The present version was adopted in 1974 and entered into force in 1980.

In order to provide an easy reference to all SOLAS requirements applicable from 1 July 2009, a consolidated text of the SOLAS Convention is available from IMO containing its Protocols of 1978 and 1988 and all amendments in effect from that date.

The fully updated edition features an annex to the Convention regarding the SOLAS forms of certificates contains the fully revised safety certificates for nuclear passenger and cargo ships and the list of certificates and documents required to be carried on board ships, as revised, is also added.

II.1. Maritime EPER

There are several guides provided by IMO related to maritime emergencies and also some appropriate training.

II.1.1. INTERNATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT CODE (ISM Code) AND GUIDELINES ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISM CODE

The ISM Code is mandatory under SOLAS for passenger ships (including high-speed craft), oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers, cargo ships, cargo high-speed craft and mobile offshore drilling units of 500 gross tonnage and upwards. The updated edition includes a number of new amendments relating, for instance, to: development of plans for shipboard operations; emergency preparedness; reports and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and hazard occurrences; and certification and verification. This Code came into force on 1 January 2010

II.1.2. POCKET GUIDE TO RECOVERY TECHNIQUES

The guide was prepared by the Sub- Committee on Radio communications and Search and Rescue at its tenth session (March 2006) and gives guidance to seafarers on recovering people in distress at sea. The guide is intended to be used as a reference document which should be read now and referred to

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again while proceeding to the scene of an emergency, as part of the preparation for a recovery operation. The guide’s principal aims are to help you – as master or crew of a responding ship – to:

• Assess and decide upon appropriate means of recovery aboard your own vessel;

• Train in the use of these means of recovery, in general preparation for emergencies; and

• Prepare yourselves and your vessel when actually responding to an emergency.

II.1.3. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON SEARCH AND RESCUE,

The International Conference on Maritime Search and Rescue, in April 1979, concerned the establishment of an international maritime search and rescue (SAR) plan covering the needs for ship reporting systems, SAR services and the rescue of persons in distress at sea. Included in the publication are:

• Final Act of the Conference;

• International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), 1979;

• Resolutions adopted by the Conference.

It includes amendments to the International Convention on SAR which were adopted by resolution MSC.155(78) in May 2004. These amendments came into force on 1 July 2006.

II.1.4. INTERNATIONAL AERONAUTICAL AND MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE MANUAL (IAMSAR Manual)

Jointly published by IMO and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the three-volume IAMSAR Manual provides guidelines for a common aviation and maritime approach to organizing and providing search and rescue (SAR) services. Each volume can be used as a stand-alone document or, in conjunction with the other two volumes, as a means to attain a full view of the SAR system. The three volumes of the latest edition of the IAMSAR Manual came into force on 1 June 2008. These manuals are essential to guide the risk assessment in relation to maritime emergencies following the all-hazards approach. See TABLE XXX in section 3.5.

II.1.5. IAMSAR MANUAL, VOLUME I – Organization and Management

Volume I discusses the global SAR system concept, establishment and improvement of national and regional SAR systems and co-operation with neighbouring States to provide effective and economical SAR services.

II.1.6. IAMSAR MANUAL, VOLUME II – Mission Co-ordination

Volume II assists personnel who plan and co-ordinate SAR operations and exercises.

II.1.7. IAMSAR MANUAL, VOLUME III – Mobile Facilities

Volume III is intended to be carried aboard rescue units, aircraft and vessels to help with performance of a search, rescue or on-scene coordinator function, and with aspects of SAR that pertain to their own emergencies

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II.1.8. MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE ADMINISTRATION (Model course)

This course is intended to provide an introduction to the objectives, functions and operations of a maritime search and rescue (SAR) service. It covers the administrative and operational functions of a SAR service; the governing framework of conventions, manuals, resolutions, circulars and other relevant documents; communication functions and facilities; risk analysis and risk management; the design, equipment and operation of maritime rescue co-ordination centres; SAR facilities; harmonization with aeronautical SAR services; public relations and SAR training.

II.2. Maritime cargo EPER

Specific guidance is offered for dangerous goods, in terms of emergency preparedness and response.

II.2.1. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME DANGEROUS GOODS CODE (IMDG Code)

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), as amended, deals with various aspects of maritime safety and contains in chapter VII the mandatory provisions governing the carriage of dangerous goods in packaged form or in solid form in bulk. The carriage of dangerous goods is prohibited except in accordance with the relevant provisions of chapter VII, which are amplified by the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code.

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78), deals with various aspects of prevention of marine pollution, and contains, in its Annex III, the mandatory provisions for the prevention of pollution by harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form. Regulation 1.2 prohibits the carriage of harmful substances in ships except in accordance with the provisions of Annex III, which are also amplified by the IMDG Code.

In accordance with the Provisions concerning Reports on Incidents Involving Harmful Substances (Protocol I to MARPOL 73/78), incidents involving losses of such substances from ships must be reported by the master or other person having charge of the ship concerned. Each substance defined as harmful to the marine environment is identified as a marine pollutant in column 4 of its entry in the Dangerous Goods List and in the Index of the IMDG Code by the letter P.

The IMDG Code that was adopted by IMO resolution A.716 (17) and amended by Amendments 27 to 30 was recommended to Governments for adoption or for use as the basis for national regulations in pursuance of their obligations under regulation VII/1.4 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention, as amended, and regulation 1.3 of Annex III of MARPOL 73/78. The IMDG Code, as amended, attained mandatory status from 1 January 2004 under the umbrella of SOLAS, 1974; however, some parts of the Code continue to be recommendatory. Observance of the provisions of the Code harmonizes the practices and procedures followed in the carriage of dangerous goods by sea and ensures compliance with the mandatory provisions of the SOLAS Convention and of Annex III of MARPOL 73/78.

From 1 January 2011, the provisions of the IMDG Code, 2010 Edition could be applied on a voluntary basis, pending their official entry into force on 1 January 2012 without any transitional period.

The IMDG Code contains the requirements for packaging, information and emergency instructions relating to radioactive cargo.

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II.2.2. IMDG CODE SUPPLEMENT

The supplement is one of the most important documents when considering response to an incident that has affected radioactive cargo.

The International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code relates to the safe carriage of dangerous goods by sea, but does not include all details of procedures for packing of dangerous goods or actions to take in the event of an emergency or accident involving personnel who handle goods at sea. These aspects are covered by the publications that are associated with the IMDG Code, which are included in the Supplement.

Within a continuing process of revision of publications that are relevant to the IMDG Code, The EmS Guide: Emergency Response Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous Goods has been further amended at the eighty-first session of MSC in May 2008 and the details have been described in MSC.1/Circ.1262. The International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes on board Ships has also been amended by resolution MSC.241(83).

The Supplement also includes descriptions of the reporting procedures for incidents involving dangerous goods.

Of particular importance are EmS guides, Fire schedule India (F-I) - , Spillage schedule Sierra (S-S) and Table 20 dealing with casualties contaminated with radioactive materials (see section 5).

II.3. Maritime casualty EPER

II.3.1. ILO/IMO/WHO INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL GUIDE FOR SHIPS

The third edition of the International Medical Guide for Ships shows designated first-aid providers how to diagnose, treat, and prevent the health problems of seafarers on board ship. It is consistent with the latest revisions of both the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines and the International Health Regulations. The International Labour Organization’s Maritime Labour Convention 2006 stipulates that all ships shall carry a medicine chest, medical equipment and a medical guide. The International Medical Guide for Ships supports a main principal of that convention; to ensure that seafarers are given health protection and medical care as comparable as possible to that which is generally available to workers ashore.

II.3.2. IMDG CODE SUPPLEMENT

This supplement is mentioned in section 2.2.2 and contains important information on cargo emergencies. The Supplement also includes texts of the Medical First Aid Guide.

II.4. RAM Transport EPER

The IAEA publishes safety standards related to the transport of radioactive material. TS-G-1.2 relates, in particular, to emergency preparedness and response for radioactive material in transport.

II.5. IAEA Emergency Preparedness and Response standards and guides

One of the statutory functions of the IAEA is to establish or adopt standards of safety for the protection of health, life and property in the development and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The IAEA’s safety standards are not legally binding in Member States but may be

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adopted by them, at their own discretion, for use in national regulations in respect of their own activities.

The IAEA is authorized under its statutes: to provide for the application of its standards for the protection of health, life and property to peaceful nuclear activities; and to foster the exchange of information relating to nuclear activities. Moreover, under the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, one of the Agency’s functions is to collect and disseminate to States Parties and Member States information concerning relevant methodologies, techniques and available results of research relating to response to nuclear accidents or radiological emergencies; and to develop appropriate radiation monitoring programmes and procedures.

The IAEA fulfils these functions in part through publication of, amongst others, Safety Reports (SR), Technical Reports (TR), Technical Documents (TECDOC), and Accident Reports. There is a specific series for IAEA publications in the area of emergency preparedness and response - the EPR series. All these publications are informational in nature. They may describe good practices and give practical examples and detailed methods that can be used to meet safety standards. They do not establish requirements or make recommendations.

II.5.1. IAEA Safety Standard Series No.GS-R-2: Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

The Safety Requirements publication establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in any State. Their implementation is intended to minimize the consequences for people, property and the environment of any nuclear or radiological emergency. Fulfilment of the requirements will also contribute to the harmonization of arrangements in the event of a transnational emergency.

The requirements are intended to be applied by authorities at the national level by means of adopting legislation, establishing regulations and assigning responsibilities.

The requirements also apply to the off-site jurisdictions that may need to make an emergency intervention in a State that adopts the requirements.

The types of practices and sources covered by these requirements include the transport of radioactive material.

The Safety requirements describe that the practical goals of emergency response, in a nuclear or radiological emergency, are:

(a) To regain control of the situation;

(b) To prevent or mitigate consequences at the scene;

(c) To prevent the occurrence of deterministic health effects in workers and the public;

(d) To render first aid and to manage the treatment of radiation injuries;

(e) To prevent, to the extent practicable, the occurrence of stochastic health effects in the population;

(f) To prevent, to the extent practicable, the occurrence of non-radiological effects on individuals and among the population;

(g) To protect, to the extent practicable, property and the environment;

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(h) To prepare, to the extent practicable, for the resumption of normal social and economic activity.

Taking measures towards achieving these goals (undertaking interventions) is governed at all times by the principles established in the Safety Fundamentals publication on Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources [2] and derived from the recommendations of the ICRP [4, 5]. These principles are:

“Justification of intervention: Any proposed intervention shall do more good than harm.”

“Optimization of intervention: The form, scale and duration of any intervention shall be optimized so that the net benefit is maximized.”

The goals of emergency response are most likely to be achieved in accordance with the principles for intervention by having a sound programme for emergency preparedness in place as part of the infrastructure for protection and safety [3].

Emergency preparedness also helps to build confidence that an emergency response would be managed, controlled and co-ordinated effectively.

The practical goal of emergency preparedness may be expressed as:

To ensure that arrangements are in place for a timely, managed, controlled, co-ordinated and effective response at the scene, and at the local, regional, national and international level, to any nuclear or radiological emergency.

II.5.2. IAEA Safety Guide No.GS-G-2.1: Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

The primary objectives of GS-G-2.1 are:

To provide guidance on those selected elements of the Requirements (GS-R-2) for which guidance has been requested by Member States and for which there is an international consensus on the means to meet these requirements;

To describe appropriate responses to a range of emergencies;

To provide background information, where appropriate, on the past experience that provided a basis for the Requirements (GS-R-2), thus helping the user to better implement arrangements that address the underlying issues.

The guidance presented in GS-G-2.1 concerns emergency preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency. The range of possible nuclear or radiological emergencies of concern is enormous, extending from a general emergency at a nuclear power plant to emergencies involving lost, stolen or found radioactive material. The guidance presented is applicable to the entire range of emergencies, concentrated on the general aspects of emergency preparedness.

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II.5.3. IAEA Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) series

The IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) has produced the Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) series. The documents are intended to provide Member States with practical guidance, and operational procedures that can be used to implement emergency response arrangements for all types of radiological and nuclear incidents and emergencies, including those associated with the transport of radioactive materials. Following are descriptions of those documents within this series that are relevant to the planning and response to transport accidents involving radioactive or nuclear materials. Relevant sections of these documents are referenced in Section 4 which describes the response to such an accident.

EPR-Method 2003

This publication provides a practical, step-by-step method for developing integrated operator, local and national capabilities for emergency response. This publication concerns preparations for radiation emergencies. The range of potential radiation emergencies of concern is enormous, extending from a major reactor emergency to emergencies involving lost or stolen radioactive material. This method covers planning for the entire range.

The method recognizes that a minimum level of preparedness is appropriate in every State, even in those without any known practices using nuclear or radioactive material, because any State could be affected by an emergency involving transport, lost or stolen sources, or trans boundary contamination.

EPR-First Responders 2006

The objective of EPR-First responders 2006 is to provide practical guidance for those responding within the first few hours of a radiological emergency. This includes the emergency service personnel who would initially respond at the local level and the national officials who would support this early response.

The publication provides guidance to the emergency services responding to radiological emergencies. EPR-First Responders 2006 is consistent with the Safety Requirements No. GS-R-2 and the concepts contained in EPR-Method 2003.

EPR-Field Manual 201X

The first responders, who would be the first to arrive on the scene of a radiological emergency, are not expected to have expertise or experience in radiation protection. If required, the local first responders would request and receive pre-planned support in the form of one or more radiation specialists provided by the national (or local) government. These radiation specialists would have the capability of assessing radiological conditions and mitigating the radiological consequences in accordance with international standards. In EPR-Field Manual 201X the radiation specialists include a national radiological assessor (RA), who would direct the radiological response and could be supported by a national radiological assessment and control team (RACT). This Field Manual provides guidance for those functions that should be performed early by the RA/RACT.

This Field Manual builds upon information in EPR-First Responders 2006 and refers to the data and instructions in EPR-Data Manual 201X. The users of EPR-Field Manual 201X are expected to be familiar with these manuals and have access to them during the response.

EPR-Field Manual 201X will be most effective if the manual is used as the basis for a national or local version that takes into account the specifics of such jurisdictions. However, it is recognized that

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for various reasons, the manual may not be adapted and therefore it has been designed to enable its use directly as written.

The radiological emergencies covered by this manual include transport emergencies involving radioactive material.

EPR-Data Assessment 201X

The manual is for use by national radiation specialists to assess data that should be available early on in the response to a radiological emergency in order to adjust the criteria being used to make response decisions and to estimate the dose to individuals in order to determine if medical evaluation and treatment are needed. EPR-Data Assessment 201X provides easy to use methods to estimate the dose received based on information that should be available early in an emergency for the purpose of determine who should receive a medical evaluation or treatment.

EPR-Medical 2005

The aim of EPR-Medical 2005 is to provide practical guidance to the medical community for medical emergency preparedness and response, describing the tasks and actions of different members of an emergency medical response organization within the national, regional or local medical infrastructure and in accordance with international guidance.

This manual provides generic response procedures for medical personnel responding to different types of radiation emergencies. The manual covers procedures of medical response applicable during radiation emergencies involving the transport of radioactive material.

The manual provides the tools, generic procedures, and data needed for initial medical response to radiation emergencies. It explains the roles and responsibilities of the members of the emergency medical response organization within the general response organization.

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APPENDIX III. DESIGN, APPROVAL AND SURVIVABILITY OF PACKAGES

Radioactive materials are transported in packages designed to meet the regulatory requirements. The Regulations identify packages; for each type of package the Regulations specify the limit on the permitted quantity of radioactive material. A graded approach is applied.

III.1.1.Content limits for packages

Excepted packages:

o The quantity of the content should be within regulatory limits.

Industrial Package (IP) Type 1/2/3:

o Radioactive materials with a low specific activity as specified in the Regulations and non-radioactive materials with their surfaces contaminated with radioactive materials within the limits specified in the Regulations.

Type A packages:

o Radioactive materials with activity not exceeding A1 / A2.

Type B(U) / (M) packages:

o Radioactive materials with activity exceeding A1 / A2.

Type C packages:

o Radioactive materials with activity limit approved by competent authority, mainly important in air transport.

o Type B(U)/(M) and Type C packagings are designed to be sturdy and “accident-resistant”.

III.1.2.Design requirements for excepted packages

The package design should comply with the requirements specified below. This sets out a basic level for all packages.

Handling and tie-down features

It should be easy to handle and transport the package.

Any lifting attachments on the package should not fail when used in the intended manner. Even if the lifting attachments fail, the package should continue to meet the other regulatory requirements. The design should include appropriate safety factors to cover snatch lifting.

It should be possible to properly secure the package in or on the conveyance during transport.

External features

Attachments and any other features on the outer surface of the package which could be used to lift it should be able to safely support its mass without failure. Alternatively such attachments could be

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removable or otherwise rendered incapable of being used during transport.

The external surfaces should be free from protruding features.

It should be easy to decontaminate the external surface of the package.

The outer layer of the package should prevent the collection and the retention of water.

If any features which are not part of the package are added to the package at the time of transport they should not reduce the safety of the package.

Under routine conditions of transport the package may experience acceleration, vibration or vibration resonance. There should be no deterioration in the containment of the radioactive material nor in the integrity of the package as a whole. In particular, nuts, bolts and other securing devices should not become loose or be released unintentionally, even after repeated use.

Other features

The materials of the packaging and any components or structures should be physically and chemically compatible with each other and with the radioactive contents. Account should be taken of their behaviour under irradiation.

All valves through which the radioactive contents could escape should be protected against unauthorized operation.

The package should remain intact under the ambient temperatures and pressures that are likely to be encountered in routine conditions of transport.

For radioactive material having other dangerous properties the package design should satisfy the relevant regulations.

III.1.3.Design Requirements for Industrial packages Type IP-1

a) A Type IP-1 package should be designed to meet the requirements prescribed for excepted packages.

b) The smallest overall external dimension of the package should not be less than 10 cm.

III.1.4.Design Requirements for Industrial packages Type IP-2

a) A package to be qualified as a Type IP-2 should be designed to meet the requirements prescribed for Type IP-1.

b) It should comply with the requirements of the free drop test and the stacking test.

III.1.5.Design Requirements for Industrial packages Type IP-3

A package to be qualified as a Type IP-3 should be designed to meet the requirements prescribed for Type IP-1 and, in addition, the following requirements:

General

The design and manufacturing techniques should be in accordance with national or international standards, or other requirements, acceptable to the competent authority. A feature such as a seal should be provided on the exterior of the package. The seal should not be readily breakable. While intact, it will be evidence that the package has not been opened. Under normal and accident

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conditions of transport the forces on the tie-down attachments on the package should not impair the ability of the package to meet the Regulatory requirements.

Package components

The components of the package should withstand temperatures ranging from –40°C to +70°C. The freezing temperatures for liquids and the potential degradation of packaging materials within the given temperature range should be taken into consideration.

Containment integrity

The containment system should be securely closed by a positive fastening device which cannot be opened unintentionally or by a pressure which might arise within the package. The containment system should retain its radioactive contents under a reduction of ambient pressure to 60 kPa. All valves, other than pressure relief valves, should be provided with an enclosure to retain any leakage from the valve. If the package is intended for the transport of liquid radioactive material it should have provision for ullage to accommodate variations in the temperature of the contents, dynamic effects and filling dynamics.

Shielding integrity

If the radiation shield encloses a component of the containment system it should prevent the unintentional release of that component from the shield.

Test requirements

The package should comply with the requirements of water spray test, free drop test, stacking test and penetration test.

III.1.6.Alternative requirements for Type IP-2 and Type IP-3

Packages may be used as Type IP-2 or Type IP-3 if they follow certain alternative requirements related to:

1. the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods, Model Regulations; or

2. the International Organization for Standardization document ISO 1496/1: “Series 1 Freight Containers — Specifications and Testing — Part 1: General Cargo Containers for General Purposes” excluding dimensions and ratings;

3. as well as alternative tests.

III.1.7.Design requirements of Type A packages

Type A packages should be designed to meet the requirements prescribed for Type IP-3 package. Note that the alternative design requirements for Type IP-3 package are not relevant to Type A package.

The package should comply with the requirements of water spray test, free drop test, stacking test and penetration test.

If a Type A package is designed to contain liquid radioactive material it should comply with the requirements of additional tests for Type A packages designed for liquids and gases prescribed in the Regulations and be provided with either:

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- sufficient absorbent material to absorb twice the volume of the liquid contents; or

- a double containment system.

If a Type A package is designed to contain gases it should be subjected to additional tests for Type A packages designed for liquids and gases.

III.1.8.Design requirements for Type B(U) Packages

Type B(U) packages should be designed to meet the requirements specified for Type A packages. The additional tests for Type A packages designed for liquids and gases prescribed in the Regulations do not apply to Type B(U) packages.

Under an assumed ambient temperature of 38°C and a specified solar heat input the heat generated within the package by the radioactive contents should not, under normal conditions of transport impair the containment integrity and the shielding integrity of the package.

The package design should provide for the possible effects of the heat. If the package is not to be transported under exclusive use, the temperature of the accessible surfaces of a package should not exceed 50°C. This temperature estimate should be made assuming an ambient temperature of 38°C. Solar heat input should be ignored.

If the package is to be transported under exclusive use, the maximum temperature of any surface readily accessible should not exceed 85°C. The package design may include barriers or screens which are intended to give protection to persons. Credit should be given to the presence of such barriers and screens. The barriers or screens need not be subjected to any test.

The package should comply with the requirements of water spray test, free drop test, stacking test, the penetration test and with the requirements of the tests for demonstrating ability to withstand accident conditions of transport.

The acceptance criteria following the tests are prescribed in terms of the permitted limits of activity release.

The package design should not include a pressure relief system from the containment system which would allow the release of radioactive material to the environment during transport.

The package should not have a maximum normal operating pressure in excess of a gauge pressure of 700 kPa.

The package should be designed for an ambient temperature range from -40°C to +38°C.

III.1.9.Design requirements for Type B(M) Packages

Type B(M) packages should meet the requirements for Type B(U) packages. However, for packages to be transported solely within a specified country or solely between specified countries, some of the conditions assumed in the design may be different from those prescribed in the Regulations with the approval of the competent authorities of these countries.

Intermittent venting of Type B(M) packages may be permitted during transport (but is not common), provided that the operational controls for venting are acceptable to the relevant competent authorities.

III.1.10. Design requirements for Type C Packages

Type C packages are designed to survive tests which simulate an air accident.

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III.2. Test requirements for packages

III.2.1.Preparation of a specimen for testing

All specimens should be inspected before testing in order to identify and record faults or damage. The external features of the specimen should be clearly identified. This will help in making clear reference to any part of the specimen.

III.2.2.Tests for IP-2, IP-3 and Type A packages

Tests for demonstrating ability to withstand normal conditions of transport

The tests prescribed by the Regulations to demonstrate the ability of the package to withstand normal conditions of transport are the water spray test, the free drop test, the stacking test and the penetration test. Specimens of the package should be subjected to the free drop test, the stacking test and the penetration test, preceded in each case by the water spray test.

Water spray test

The specimen should be subjected to a water spray test that simulates exposure to rainfall of approximately 5 cm per hour for at least one hour.

Free drop test

The specimen should drop onto the target so as to suffer maximum damage in respect of the safety features to be tested. The height of drop would depend on the mass of the specimen. The target should be unyielding.

For rectangular fibreboard or cylindrical fibreboard packages or wood packages additional drops may be required.

Free drop distance for testing packages to normal conditions of transport

Package mass (kg) Free drop distance (m)

Package mass < 5000 1.2

5000 < Package mass < 10, 000 0.9

10000 < Package mass < 15, 000 0.6

15000 < Package mass 0.3

Stacking test

Unless the shape of the packaging effectively prevents stacking, the specimen should be subjected, for a period of 24 h, to a compressive load. The value of the load should be the greater of the following:

- 5 times the maximum weight of the package; and

- The equivalent of 13 kPa multiplied by the vertically projected area of the package.

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Penetration test

A bar of diameter 3.2 cm, with a mass of 6 kg should be dropped 1m onto the centre of the weakest part of the specimen.

Acceptance criteria for IP-2, IP-2 and Type A packages: (i) There should be no loss or dispersal of the radioactive contents; and (ii) the increase in the maximum radiation level at any external surface of the package should not be more than a 20%.

III.2.3.Tests for Type B(U) / (M) packages

III.2.3.1. Tests for demonstrating ability to withstand normal conditions of transport

The package should comply with the requirements of water spray test, free drop test, stacking test and penetration test.

Acceptance criteria: The loss of radioactive contents should not be more than 10–6A2 per hour.

III.2.3.2. Tests for demonstrating ability to withstand accident conditions of transport

The specimen should be subjected to the cumulative effects of the mechanical test and the thermal test in that order. Following these tests, either this specimen or a separate specimen should be subjected to the water immersion test or the enhanced water immersion test, as applicable.

Mechanical test

The mechanical test consists of three different drop tests. Only two of the three drop tests would apply to a given package design.

Drop I test

The specimen should drop from a height of 9 m onto the target. The objective of the test is to cause maximum damage to the specimen.

Drop II

The specimen should drop from a height of 1 m onto a15cm diameter, 20cm long solid mild steel bar rigidly mounted perpendicularly on the target. The objective of the test is to cause maximum damage to the specimen.

Drop III

The specimen should be positioned on the target so as to suffer maximum damage by the drop of a 500 kg mass solid mild steel 1 m by 1 m plate from 9 m onto the specimen.

Thermal test

The thermal test should consist of: exposure of a specimen to a thermal environment of an average temperature of at least 800°C for a period of 30 minutes.. During and following the test the specimen should not be artificially cooled and any combustion of materials of the specimen should be permitted to proceed naturally.

Water immersion test

The specimen should be immersed under a head of water of at least 15 m. The period of immersion should not be less than eight hours. Alternatively, the specimen may be subjected to an external gauge pressure of at least 150 kPa.

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Enhanced water immersion test

This test will apply only to packages designed for a radioactive content of activity more than 105 A2.

The specimen should be immersed under a head of water of at least 200 m. The period of immersion should not be less than one hour. Alternatively, the specimen may be subjected to an external gauge pressure of at least 2 MPa.

Acceptance criteria:

The radiation level at 1 m from the surface of the package should not exceed 10 mSv/h with the maximum radioactive contents that the package is designed to contain.

The accumulated loss of radioactive contents in a period of one week should not be more than A2 for most radionuclides..

Following the enhanced water immersion test there should be no rupture of the containment system.

III.2.4.Tests for Type C packages

A Type C package is required to be assessed for its response to the water spray test, the free drop test, the stacking test, the penetration test, the mechanical test, the thermal test, water immersion test, enhanced water immersion test, if applicable and also the drop I test, the drop III test, the puncture/tearing test, the enhanced thermal test and the impact test.

Acceptance criteria:

(i) The radiation level at 1 m from the surface of the package should not exceed 10 mSv/h with the maximum radioactive contents which the package is designed to contain; and

(ii) the accumulated loss of radioactive contents in a period of one week should not be more than A 2

for most radionuclides.

III.2.5.Requirement for design approval certificates

III.2.5.1. Unilateral approval of design of special form radioactive material

The special form radioactive material design, either as an indispersible solid or as a sealed capsule or sealed source, requires unilateral Competent Authority approval. Unilateral approval of a design of special form radioactive material means that the approval is required to be issued by the Competent Authority of the country of origin of the design only.

III.2.5.2. Multilateral approval of low dispersible radioactive material

The design for LDM requires multilateral approval. In this context, multilateral approval means approval issued by the concerned competent authority of the country of origin of the design, and also, approval by the competent authority of the country through or into which the consignment is to be transported.

III.2.5.3. Approval of Type B(U) and Type C package designs

The design of a Type B(U) package and of a Type C package require unilateral approval, except that a Type B(U) package design for the transport of low dispersible radioactive material requires multilateral approval.

III.2.5.4. Approval of Type B(M) package designs

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Each Type B(M) package design would require multilateral approval.

III.2.5.5. Approval of other designs

There is no need to obtain the competent authority approval in the case of LSA-III radioactive material.

There is no need to obtain the competent authority approval in the case of Type IP-1/2/3 or a Type A package designed for a non-fissile or fissile-excepted radioactive material.

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APPENDIX IV. GLOSSARY

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6. REFERENCES

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7. CONTRIBUTORS

ANNEX

Information from CS meetings

iii [?] <GS-G-2.1>FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1, IAEA, Vienna (2007).

iv [?] <D val>INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Dangerous quantities of radioactive material (D-values), EPR-D-VALUES, IAEA, Vienna, (2006)

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