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V,r1{.=
• -
•• -
- -UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ir'c,41,
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
c 7 FTHOMAS P. GORMAN, BARRETT HERRIOTT, ) No.
LYMAN, ALBERT HALEGOUA, RONALD )CFFNER and FRED COHEN, On Behalf of ) CLASS ACTION Themselves and All Others Similarly )Situated, )
) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FORPlaintiffs, ) VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL
) SECURITIES LAWSvs.
SYSTEMSOFT CORPORATION, ROBERT F. )ANGELO, WILLIAM J. O'CONNELL, PAUL ) 7' MJ. PEDEVILLANC, ROBERT N. GOLDMAN, ) - -THOMAS W. HIGGINS, RUSSELL BLAIR, )JONATHAN L. JOSEPH, W. FRANK KING, )DAVID SOMMERS, DAVID J. McNEFF and )COOPERS & LYBRAND LLP, )
)Defendants. ) Plaintiffs Demand.A (.1;- ) Trial By Jury
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 20
THE PARTIES 20
SCIENTER ALLEGATIONS 32
Actual Knowledge 32
Motive And Opportunity ' 38
DEFENDANTS' FRAUDULENT SCHEME AND COURSE OF BUSINESS . . . 38
STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR 39
BACKGROUND TO THE CLASS PERIOD 40
FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS ISSUED DURING THE CLASSPERIOD 40
SYSTEMSOFT'S FALSE FINANCIAL REPORTING DURING THE CLASSPERIOD 86
Digital Equipment Revenue 87
Distributor Revenue Recognition 89
COOPERS & LYBRAND'S PARTICIPATION IN THE FRAUD 93
INSIDER SELLING 103
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEFFor Violation Of §10(b) Of The Exchange Act AndRule 10b-5 Against All Defendants 108
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEFFor Violation Of S20(a) Of The Exchange ActAgainst Defendants Angelo and SystemSoft 110
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 111
BASIS OF ALLEGATIONS 113
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 113
JURY DEMAND 114
_ _
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1. This is an action on behalf of purchasers of the stock of
SystemSoft Corporation ("SystemSoft" or the "Company") between
1/25/96 and 3/3/97 (the "Class Period"), complaining of a
fraudulent scheme L and course of business that operated as a fraud
and deceit on purchasers of SystemSoft stock. The defendants are
SystemSoft and its top officers and directors (the "SystemSoft
Defendants") and SystemSoft's outside auditor and accounting firm
(collectively the "Defendants").
2. SystemSoft went public in 8/94 at $2.75 per share l with
annual revenues of only about $9-$10 million. However, after
SystemSoft went public, its stock was a poor performer, as the
Company sold only a few software products for use almost
exclusively in laptop computers, which limited the commercial
market for its products and its prospects for significant
profitable growth. Sy late 95, analysts became critical of
SystemSoft's growth rate and its failure to introduce new products.
SystemSoft's top insiders were upset over this criticism and
determined to overcome it by pushing SystemSoft's stock to much
higher prices so they could sell off large amounts of their
SystemSoft stock at much higher -- and more profitable -- prices.
Thus, in 1/96, SystemSoft, with great fanfare, announced the
development of a new "call-avoidance" software product called
SystemWizardm ("SystemWizard"), which would be used in both desktop
and laptop PCs and supposedly had the ability to quickly analyze
All per share amounts in this Complaint are adjusted forSystemSoft's 2-for-1 stock split effective 7/17/96, unlessotherwise stated.
-1-
and determine the cause of a PC malfunction and advise the user how
to remedy it -- thus avoiding for both PC users and PC
manufacturers the frustration and expense of calls to the PC
manufacturers' technical service centers. SystemSoft told
investors that this new SystemWizard product addressed a huge
potential market, because attempting to obtain help from the
technical assistance centers of PC manufacturers often required
frustrating and expensive telephone calls involving long periods
spent on "hold," as well as service charges of $30 per more per
call on which charge PC manufacturers still lost money. Thus,
reducing these service calls would benefit both PC users and
manufacturers.
3. In the event SystemWizard was unable to identify and
remedy the cause of the malfunction, SystemWizard also was to
enable the PC user to be connected quickly to the PC manufacturers'
technical service center with its analysis of the problem, thus
greatly facilitating the users' receipt of technical assistance.
According to SystemSoft, because its SystemWizard product would be
incorporated by major PC manufacturers into desktop PCs, as well as
laptops, this new product would access a huge market five times
larger than SvstemSoft's existing market, would be SystemSoft's
breakthrough/flagship product and would, in combination with
continued strong demand for SystemSoft's core product line, lead to
tremendous revenue and earnings per share ("EPS") growth for
systemSoft of 40%-60% over the next several years and specifically
a doubling of the size of the Company by the end of fiscal 97
("F97"), i.e., 1/31/97, with revenues and EPS of $90 million and
$.65, respectively.
-2-
4. When SystemWizard was announced, SystemSoft stated that
with the financial backing and marketing assistance of Digital
Equipment, SystemWizard would be ready for evaluation by PC OEMs by
mid-96, initial shipments would occur early in the 4th c of F96
ending 1/31/96, with volume shipments to begin in F97. SystemSoft
falsely represented in 1/96 that SystemWizard would reduce calls to
technical support by 30%, even though its internal research showed
only a 10% reduction in calls. SystemSoft also said it expected
most major PC Original Equipment Manufacturers ("OEMs") to license
and deploy SystemWizard. As SystemWizard was being developed in
F96, SystemSoft represented the "development effort . . . is
Yielding very strong support from its OEM customers," and that
SystemSoft would charge a royalty fee of at least $5 per unit.2
When SystemWizard was formally introduced in 6/96, SystemSoft
stated it had "firm commitments" from a number of PC CEMs for
"eight million units" in the next 12 months, which would generate
approximately $50 million in revenue. During the summer and fall
of 96, SystemSoft represented that in evaluations by major PC
manufacturers, SystemWizard got an "A+ from all," was "coming out
with flying colors," the product was "blowing SvstenSoft away," had
"tremendous upside" and this was the "best feeling that
[SystemSoft] ever had about a product." SystemSoft also told
investors that its new SystemWizard contracts translated into "many
millions of units" and "several million dollars of new revenue."
SystemSoft was also very positive about its new Universal Serial
Bus ("USB") product which it announced in 8196, stating that the
2 Here, as elsewhere, emphasis is has been added unlessotherwise noted.
- 3 -
product was doing very well, it had a number of companies that
would be ordering the product, and it expected the product to "take
the world by storm," generating significant F98 revenues. During
this period, SystemSoft continued to reassure investors that its
"base business is flourishing," where it was "getting faster growth
than expected" and, as a result, its PC card business would grow by
505-60% over the next two years. And, as SystemSoft reported
sequential revenue and EPS growth throughout the Class Period,
which results were audited and certified and/or reviewed and
approved by its accountants, it attributed its "record growth" and
"record results" to "customer acceptance of our products" and the
"continued accqptance of SvstemSoft's technologies by a growing
customer base." As a result of this barrage of extremely favorable
information about SystemSoft and its new SystemWizard and USB
products, SystemSoft's stock was a fantastic performer, rocketing
from $4-3/8 in mid-1/96 to a Class Period high of $36-1/2 in 9/96.
5. However, when SystemSoft reported slightly lower revenues
than anticipated for its 3rdQ F97, i.e., the three months ended
10/31/96, and announced a large contract for SystemWizard with
Packard Bell, but at lower per unit prices, SystemSoft's stock
declined. However, SystemSoft's stock continued to trade at
artificially inflated levels as the Company continued to forecast
strong F98 EPS ($.65) and unveiled a new product -- its USB
software suite, which it represented was a "huge market oppor-
tunity" for SystemSoft. Nevertheless, the decline accelerated in
12/96 and 1/97 when rumors circulated that SystemSoft's 4thQ F97
results would fall short of expectations, due to weakening demand
for SystemSoft's core products and delays in the deployment of
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SystemWizard by major PC OEMs. Although SystemSoft denied that
there were any significant problems with the Company or delays with
its new SystemWizard product and insisted that the pricing of the
Packard Bell contract was misunderstood by analysts and not a
negative development and that major deployments of SystemWizard
would occur in the near future, SystemSoft's stock ultimately fell
to S17-5/8 on 3/3/97. Then, after the close of trading on 3/3/97,
SystemSoft shocked the market by revealing that SystemWizard was,
in fact, encountering significant delays in deployment, that
shipments of SystemSoft's core CardWizard product to IBM had been
delayed and, as a result, SystemSoft's revenue and EPS growth
during F98 would be significantly lower than earlier forecast.
SystemSoft's stock collapsed on this revelation, immediately
falling to $11-1/8 and then to $7-5/8 by 3/19/97, as the market
digested the implications of these adverse developments. The
3/4/97 one-day SystemSoft stock decline of 37% on volume of 6.1
million shares was the largest one-day price decline on the largest
one-day stock trading volume in SystemSoft's history as a public
company!
6. While SystemSoft's insiders continued to attempt to
support SystemSoft's stock during 97 by assuring investors and
analysts that SystemWizard was still making good progress with
major PC OEMs, and that SystemSoft would still achieve profitable
growth throughout F98 to end 1/31/90, in fact, SystemSoft's results
stagnated, due to slowing growth of SystemSott's core business and
a lack of significant revenues from SystemWizard or USB. It was
revealed that during the Class Period, Digital Equipment had
cancelled its SystemWizard contract with SystemSoft and as a
-5-
result, SystemSoft had to pay back approximately $7 million to
Digital Equipment. Promised announcements of major OEM adoption of
or deployment of SystemWizard were delayed or never occurred.
Rather than the strong growth forecast during the Class Period for
SystemSoft during F98, due to the success of SystemWizard and
continued strong demand for SystemSoft's core CardWizard products,
in fact, symSr-, ft suffered a hideous F98. SystemSoft achieved
revenues of only about $39-$40 million, while it suffered a large
loss. The "doubling" of the Company forecasted during the Class
Period for F98, i.e., revenue of $90 million and EPS of $.65, never
occurred.
7. In discussions with analysts on 2/6198, Robert F. Angelo
admitted to being in "mortal shock" over these "embarrassing"
developments, i.e., SystemSoft's large operating loss and multi-
million dollar write-offs, and said that SystemSoft had suspended
hiring indefinitely and would, at best, breakeven in following
quarters. Angelo also said "We're writing-off [$12-$14 million]
many, many things that just had no value." He admitted that the
USB business was being spun-off as "the cost of doing USB business
continues to outweigh the short-term benefits* and that SystemSoft
was receiving no payment for the business and was writing-off its
investment in it. As to systemWizard, Angelo admitted SystemSoft
did not even know what its "installed base" of that product was,
was no longer even tracking that, and that "SystemWizard revenue
continued to experience "very long" implementation cycles which
"pushes revenue out" and even "two new wins . . . unfortunately
didn't carry a lot of revenue with them." When Angelo admitted
that these huge losses wiped out all SystemSoft's retained earnings
-6-
and "obviously put that into a large loss," one analyst erupted,
saying "so . . . you guys have . . never made a nickel at the end
of the day when you add it all up," to which Angelo said, "I agree
with you." When asked if the current write-downs related to
questions raised about SystemSoft's accounting in a Forbes article
a year earlier, Paul J. Pedevillano said, "No, it wasn't related to
that article."
S. SystemSoft's stock has never recovered from the bungled
development and unsuccessful launch of the SysterWizard product,
the termination of the Digital Equipment/SystemWizard contract, and
softening in demand for its core products, including CardWizard.
As a result, SystemSoft's stock fell to as low as $3 per share in
F98. The USB product was spun-off and a charge recorded to reflect
non-recoverable costs associated with USB. Defendant Robert
Angelo, President, Chief Executive and Operating Officer and
Chairman of the Board, was ultimately removed from overseeing
SystemSeft's day-to-day operations. The Boston Business Journal
reported this change of leadership at SystemSoft:
Deborah Besemer, who was named president and chiefoperating officer, has taken over day-to-day operations at SystemSoft. .
The move is . . an attempt to stabilizeSystemSoft's stock price . . . . Analysts have beencritical about the company . . . since SystemWizard hasyet to generate its expected revenue. . .
Aaron Edelheit, an analyst with New York-basedIndividual Investment Group, said the main problem withSystemWizard has been a lack of support from the majorplayers in the computer industry, such as Dell computerCorp. of Austin, Texas, and Compaq Computer Corp. ofHouston.
Edelheit said prolonged product testing, andallowing computer makers to have the product for free,may continue to depress SystemWizard's revenue figures
-7--
into 1998. . . . "The problem is no one's paving for ISystemWizardl."
9. Analysts were furious about the deception practiced on
them, complaining, "The Company set expectations for SystemWizard
well above what reality suggested," they were "disappointed in
management's failure, after repeated conversations, to communicate
its feeling of unrealistic expectations for SystemWizard in fiscal
1998," that they "were caught by surprise by the magnitude of the
revenue shortfall," they "hardl lost confidence in the model," and
this "serious shortfall has damaged credibility significantly,"
while characterizing SystemSoft's F98 results as "shocking."
10. Public investors who invested based on SystemSoft's
representations about the successful development and launch of
SystemWizard, continuing strong demand for systemSoft's core
products and its forecasts of strong growth in 1'98-F99, and thus
paid as high as $36-1/2 per share for SystemSoft's stock during the
Class Period, have suffered millions in damages. However,
SystemSoft's insiders who knew the truth about the delays in the
development and deployment of SystemWizard and its limited
potential, the softening demand for SystemSoft's core products and
SystemSoft's serious problems with Digital Equipment and the
inevitable cancellation of that contract, did not fare nearly so
poorly. Before the startling revelations of 3/3/97 occurred, and
SystemSoft's stock price collapsed, SystemSoft insiders --
defendants Angelo, O'Connell, Pedevillano, Goldman, Higgins, Blair,
Joseph, King and McNeff unloaded 1,070,007 shares of their
SystemSoft stock at artificially inflated prices as high as $34-1/8
per share, pocketing over $21 million in illegal insider tradinq
-8-
proceeds! All told, three of the Individual Defendants sold
between 90% and 100% of the SystemSoft stock they owned, five
Individual Defendants sold between 64% and 82% of the SystemSoft
stock they owned and one of the Individual Defendants sold 46% of
the SystemSoft stock he owned. In the aggregate, these top
SystemSoft insiders, collectively unloaded 70% of the SystemSoft
stock they actually owned, while SysterSoft stock was selling at
artificially inflated levels because they were falsifying
SystemSoft's financial results and issuing very positive but false
statements about SystemSoft's business, financial results and its
prospects for continued EPS growth. Angelo's, O'Connell's,
Pedevillano's, Goldman's, Higgins', Blair's, Joseph's, King's and
McNeff's illegal insider selling during the Class Period is
summarized below:
of
Shares Holdings TotalDefendants Sold Sold Proceeds
Angelo 245,882 74% $3,904,930Joseph 113,000 69% $2,797,932O'Connell 195,000 90% $3,495,189Pedevillano 83,250 64% $1,747,540Eiggins :06,749 93% $2,843,338Blair 83,500 82% $1,869,965King 60,000 $1,588,60CGoldman 171,125 45" $2,598,433MeNeff 7,300 100% '4 166,980
Totals: 1,070,007 70s $21,015,907
This insider selling was unusual in timing and amount, as the graph
below shows:
//
//
//
//
//
1/
-9-
SystemSoft Corp.Defendants Stock Sales January 1995 - February 1998
Dollar Volume$10 $40
$B $30
aF
1$20
a $4
4Pmr $10$2 -
Iiiml I I 1 J FM AM ... J ASONDJ FMAMJ J ASO NDJ FMAMJJASONDJF
less 1E913 1897 199t3
11. During the Class Period inside SystemSoft things were far
different regarding SystemWizard than was publicly represented by
the SystemSoft Defendants, who intentionally concealed the true
adverse state of SystemSoft's business and the SystemWizard
product. For instance:
(a) The claimed firm commitments for eight million
SystemWizard units in the next 12 months was a bogus, falsified
figure which the SystemSoft Defendants had created by adding
together the multi-year tentative commitments of all of its OEMs,
which not only included SystemWizard product to be shipped in later
years, but also, SystemWizard orders that were tentative,
provisional or subject to cancellation.
- 10 -
(b) The technical service call centers of IBM, Hewlett-
Packard, Compaq and Digital Equipment were all profitable and these
OEMs had little, if any, interest in undercutting their existing
profitable technical service center business by a product like
SystemWizard. This was especially true with respect to Digital
Equipment which, through its Multi-Vendor Technical Services Unit,
provided technical service operations for itself and other large PC
OEMs (including Compaq) and which unit was a highly profitable part
of Digital Equipment's business.
(c) By the spring of 96, SystemSoft had been informed by
Dell and Toshiba that these PC OEMs saw no end-user demand for a
SystemWizard-type product and told SystemSoft that its proposed $5-
$6 per unit pricing was "obscene" and would not result in
deployment of the product with them.
(d) SystemSoft had been told by several PC OEMs,
including Dell, that configuring the necessary server operations at
the OEMs' technical service centers for SystemWizard to work was
far too expensive, complicated and time-consuming for them to
undertake. In order for SystemWizard to work it was necessary for
the PC OEMs to "build a case" for each potential PC malfunction, an
enormously time-consuming and expensive task which could not be
justified in light of the existing technical service centers'
capability to deal with these problems.
(e) That the attempt to deploy SystemWizard at Packard-
Bell was failing and suffering long delays because Packard-Bell's
technical service center was a cheap, skeletal operation where
Packard-Bell had not accumulated in useable form in data base of
prior customer complaints about its PCs and the solutions utilized
- 11 -
and thus, Packard-Bell found it impossible to create a "knowledge
base" of its PC products in its SystemWizard server which was
indispensable to the deployment of SystemWizard in a workable
fashion.
(f) SysterSoft had originally justified the development
and marketing of SystemWizard using an assumed $12 per unit price.
However, by the spring of 96, SystemSoft was aware that competitive
pressures meant that it would not be able to charge more than $5
per unit, which greatly reduced the profitability of the product
line. However, even this fragile pricing structure was destroyed
in mid-96, when a competitor named CyberMedia told PC OEMs of its
new product, known as "First Aid 95," which would perform the same
functions as SystemWizard and that CyberMedia was willing to give
First Aid 95 to OEMs for free and attempt to make money on the
product by selling it to end users. The SystemSoft Defendants knew
this marketing approach from CyberMedia for an equivalent product
doomed SystemWizard. As a result, by the fall of 96, SystemSoft
was reduced to telling OEMs that it would give the SystenWizard
product to them for lengthy free trials and that if the PC OEM
liked the product and saved money as a result of that, SystemSoft
would then try to negotiate a price for the product going forward.
However, PC OEMs, including Dell, refused even to accept that offer
from SystemSoft as that offer would still require the PC OEM to
invest large amounts to create the "knowledge base" necessary for
the SystemWizard server at the PC OEMs' technical service center to
perform its required functions, which investment PC OEMs were very
reluctant to make. Thus, by the fall of 96, SystemWizard had
- 12 -
become a product that SystemSoft literally could not even give
away!
(g) SystemSoft's relationship with Digital Equipment
regarding SystemWizard soured early on. While Digital Equipment
was originally interested in the SystemWizard technology, by the
spring of 96, SystemSoft was chronically delinquent in providing
Digital Equipment with engineering and other documentation Digital
Equipment demanded as necessary to monitor the development of
SystemWizard. This failure created increasing tension between
Digital Equipment and SystemSoft. The deterioration of the
relationship accelerated during 96, as a dispute between SystemSoft
and Digital Equipment over the type of SystemWizard server to be
created for Digital Equipment's Multi-Vendor Service Technical
Services Unit escalated. Because of the unique nature of its
Multi-Vendor Technical Services Unit, Digital Equipment demanded a
specialized type of SystemWizard server different from that
SystemSoft was designing and developing for other PC OEMs, which
specialized SystemWizard server SystemSoft declined to develop
because of the expense and complexity of doing so. SystemSoft's
conduct in this regard, combined with Digital Equipment's growing
realization that SystemWizard, if successful, could undermine its
highly profitable Multi-Vendor Technical Services Unit operation so
soured the SystemSoft/Digital Equipment relationship that, by the
fall of 96, the SystemSoft Defendants knew that Digital Equipment
would never deploy SystemWizard and would terminate its
SystemWizard contract with SystemSoft in the near future.
12. Each of the positive statements about SystemSoft's
business during the Class Period was materially false and
- 13 -
misleading when issued. Defendants also failed to disclose, inter
alia, the following adverse information which was then known only
to Defendants due to their access to internal SystemSoft data and
disclosure of which was required to be made to make the statements
made not misleading:
(a) SystemSoft had hurried the announcement of
SvstemWizard t s development in early 96 in order to blunt criticisms
of its slow pace in developing new products and, at the time of
that announcement, in fact, SystemSoft had not completed sufficient
product development or market analysis to be able to state that
"the first products are scheduled to ship to system manufacturers
in the second quarter of 1996" or that SystemSoft would be able "to
rapidly bring this new category of call avoidance software to
market";
(b) Based upon communications with PC OEMs, the
SystemSoft Defendants knew that the market potential for
SystemWizard was nowhere near as large as represented and that most
of the large OEMs were satisfied with the status quo because
service calls gave them a chance to sell additional product to
users and were actually generating profits for them;
(c) Based upon communications with PC OEMs, the
SystemSoft Defendants knew that PC OEMs did not have anywhere near
the level of interest in deploying SystemWizard as SystemSoft was
representing and that the most important, major PC OEMs,
Compaq, Dell, Gateway and IBM, were extremely dubious about and
reluctant to license the product, and SystemSoft was only able to
service the OEM agreements it did have by agreeing to barter
transactions wherein SystemSoft would agree to accept old Pc
- 14 -
equipment in exchange for SystemWizard and by promising positions
at SystemSoft to OEM employees, including those at DEC, Hewlett-
Packard and Packard Bell;
(d) Based on marketing studies and other evaluations of
the SystemWizard product they had made, the SystemSoft Defendants
knew that there was no possibility that PC OEMs would ever pay $5
or $6 per SystemWizard unit in large volume transactions and thus
the revenue and profit potential of the SystemWizard product was
actually far less than SystemSoft was forecasting;
(e) SystemSoft did not have firm commitments from PC
OEMs to order eight million SystemWizard units in the next 12
months and, in fact, had agreed to provide millions of units to PC
OEMs for free to evaluate or test consumer reaction or on a
deferred pay basis;
(f) Due to the difficulties PC OEMs were encountering in
integrating SystemWizard into their PC products and establishing
necessary technical arrangements to accept and process service
calls from SystemWizard, the SystemSoft Defendants knew that volume
deployment of SystemWizard by PC OEMs would be materially delayed
even with those PC manufacturers that had agreed to utilize the
product. They knew that as a result SystemSoft's revenue from
SystemWizard during F98 would be far less than what was being
forecasted;
(g) None of the PC OEMs who had purportedly agreed to
utilize SystemWizard were actually firmly committed to purchase any
specific quantity of the product, but rather, only to accept
shipments for evaluation and, in fact, during such evaluation
process the OEMs were expressing considerable dissatisfaction with
- 15 -
the product, both in terms of its technical capabilities and its
cost benefit justification;
(h) Because SystemWizard was achieving extremely limited
success with PC OEMs, this product was not vastly expanding
SystemSoft's potential marketplace by opening up deskto p computers
to it. Defendants knew that, in fact, SystemSoft remained a
company dependent upon selling its products into the smaller and
slower-growing mobile or laptop part of the computer industry and
thus did not have the prospects for revenue and BPS growth being
represented;
(i) SystemSoft was not, in fact, achieving consistent
strong quarterly revenue and EPS growth as represented; but rather,
its revenues were stagnating and it was concealing the stagnation,
falsifying and manipulating its financial results by improperly
recording revenue from its Digital EguipmentiSystemWizard
development contract and from its Asian distributor and
restructuring its agreement with Intel to accelerate payments (and
revenue) from later quarters to show revenue and BPS growth during
the Class Period;
(j) SystemSoft's streak of record quarterly revenues and
BPS was not the result of the strong demand for or broad customer
acceptance of its core products as represented; but rather, was due
to the deliberate falsification of SystemSoft's financial results
by improperly recording revenue on its Digital Equipment/
SystemWizard contract and on shipments to its Asian distributor, as
detailed in T583-97;
(k) SystemSoft's revenues and EPS for the 4thQ F96 and
the lstQ, 2ndQ and 3rdQ F97 were each artificially inflated and
- 16 -
falsified due to the manipulation of SystemSoft's accounting by
improperly recording revenue on the Digital Equipment/SystemWizard
contract and on shipments to its Asian distributor, as detailed in
¶TB3-97;
(1) SystemSoft was having significant disagreements with
Digital Equipment about the development of and potential for
SvstemWizard and that product's commercial success and it was very
likely Digital Equipment would cancel its SystemWizard development
and marketing contract with SystemSoft, thus triggering a multi-
million dollar liability of SystemSoft to Digital Equipment;
(m) SystemSoft's USB software product was not ahead of
the competition, had created little, if any, customer interest and
virtually no sales, would produce little, if any, revenue in F98,
and would likely have to be sold or spun-off, creating a signifi-
cant write-down of SystemSoft's investment in that product;
(n) Demand for SystemSoft's core products, especially
CardWizard, was softening such that Defendants knew that the rate
of growth in sales of that product would decline dramatically in
the coming months in part because IBM would not order any
CardWizard products until well into F98;
(o) SystemSoft was improperly capitalizing development
costs for SystemWizard and its USE software, as it did not have any
adequate basis to believe, forecast or estimate that it would
recover those costs in the reasonably foreseeable future from sales
of the SystemWizard product at profitable prices; and
(p) As a result of the foregoing negative factors which
were negatively impacting SystemSoft's business, the SystemSoft
Defendants actually knew that the forecasts of strong revenue and
- 17 -
EPS growth during F98 due to continued strong growth and
SystemSoft's core product line, plus accelerating sales of
SystemWizard, were false when made as those forecasted results were
unachieveable.
13. The huge artificial inflation of SystemSoft's stock, the
SystemSoft Defendants' illegal insider trading during the Class
Period and the later collapse of SystemSoft's stock when the true
facts about the failure of SystemWizard to achieve commercial
success, the termination of the Digital Equipment research and
development contract, the slowing growth in sales of SystemSoft's
core products and SystemSoft's greatly diminished prospects for
future growth, are graphically displayed below:
System Soft Corp.
August 4,1994 - February 13, 1998
Daily Stock PricesClass Period Stock Sales
40 . Aug 27 - Sept 30, 1996Inas:Jars sefi 3%125 shamsfor S5,187.085
May 29 - July 3, 1096insiders selr 388,874 shame
30 — for S8,442,643
Dee 8, 190SInsider seas 4.005 sharesfor 58.3.886
Cl,
Jan 8 - 28, 1997
el- 20 Mar& 4-27 1£196r..........„.„.n ;noistmeloi070.000 shares
Insiders sell 317,008 .
shares Ter $2,378.778 y
0
10 —
• -40— ss Per bci
0 1'I 1 1 1 I' 1 1 :1 1 1 1 + 1 1 1 1 • 1 1
08/04/94 11/2/94 03/23/95 07/18/95 11/08/95 03/05/95 06/27/96 10/21/96 02113/97 06/10/97 10102197 01/28/98
09130194 01125195 05/19(95 09/13195 0108/96 05/01/96 08/23196 12/17/96 04/14/97 08106/97 11/28197
- 18 -
14. The chart below shows the price of SystemSoft stook while
Defendants were issuing their false and misleading statements about
the Company and the subsequent collapse as the previously concealed
adverse facts began to be disclosed. The chart also shows that
when compared to an index of similar stocks, SystemSoft's stock
price decline was largely due to company-specific events and not
market or industry forces:
SystemSoft Corporationvs. S&P Computer Software and Services Index
February 26 1996 - February 12,1998
600 600
SystemSoft
500 500
ao 400 400
a)6 300 300
S&P Computer Software Services Index.QC;
1) 200 200
100 100
1—S&P --SystemSol
0 0J J ASO NDJ FMA MJ J ASO ND J5
1997 1998
— 19 —
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
15. The claims asserted herein arise under §510(b) and 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C.
SS78j(b) and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. S240.10b-5.
16. Jurisdiction is conferred by §27 of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. 578aa, and 28 U.S.C. §1331.
17. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to §27 of the
Exchange Act, and 28 U.S.C. §1391(b). SystemSoft is headquartered
in this District. The false and misleading statements were made or
issued from this District and most of the Individual Defendants
live here. Thus, most of the acts and transactions giving rise to
the violations of law complained of occurred in this District.
THE PARTIES
18. (a) Plaintiff Thomas P. Gorman purchased 2,000 shares of
SystemSoft common stock on 5/3/96 at $27.67 per share, and was
damaged thereby.
(b) Plaintiff Barrett Herriott purchased 400 shares of
SystemSoft common stock on 12/23/96 at $14.94 per share, 100 shares
on 1/22/97 at $12.61 per share and 300 shares on 1/22/97 at $11.46
per share, and was damaged thereby.
(c) Plaintiff Lori Lyman purchased 300 shares of
SystemSoft common stock on 1/16/97 at $14.52 per share, and was
damaged thereby.
(d) Plaintiff Albert Halegoua purchased 6,000 shares of
SystemSoft common stock on 3/29/96 at $7.69 per share, 1,400 shares
on 6/19196 at $24.50 per share, 1,000 shares on 10/8/96 at 529.50
per share, 1,500 shares on 12/10/96 at $18-1/8 per share and 1,000
shares on 1/24/97 at $14-1/4 per share, and was damaged thereby.
- 20 -
(e) Plaintiff Ronald Offner purchased 300 shares of
SystemSoft common stock on 11/27/96 at $21 per share, and was
damaged thereby.
(f) Plaintiff Fred Cohen purchased 300 shares of
SystemSoft common stock on 12/6/96 at $17 per share, and was
damaged thereby.
19. Defendant SystemSoft maintains its headquarters
Natick, Middlesex County, Massachusetts. During the Class Period,
SystemSoft's common stock traded in an efficient market on the
NASDAQ National Market System.
20. (a) Defendant Robert F. Angelo ("Angelo") was, during
the Class Period, President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief
Operating Officer and Chairman of the Board of the Company.
Angelo, by reason of his stock ownership, management position, and
membership on SystemSoft's Board, was a controlling person of
SystemSoft and had the power and influence, and exercised the same,
to cause it to engage in the illegal conduct complained of herein.
During the Class Period and as part of the fraudulent scheme,
Angelo sold 248,882 shares of SystemSoft stock at prices as high as
$31-3/4 per share based on inside information, pocketing over $3.9
million. These sales constituted 74% of Angelo's holdings in
SystemSoft. Angelo was also given cheap stock options on 50,000
SystemSoft shares as a reward for helping to falsify SystemSoft's
F97 results and artificially inflating SystemSoft's stock during
F97. Angelo's stock sales during the Class Period were unusual in
timing and amount as set forth below:
- 21 -
SystemSoft Corp.Defendant R. Angelo Class Period Sales
$1400 $40
$1200
^$1000
$800
$3$2:21'6 $600
n_ $400 116 $10
$200
$0 $0FMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJA3ONCIJFMAMJJASONDJF
1995 is 197 1 NS
(b) Defendant Jonathan L. Joseph ("Joseph") was, at all
relevant times, Senior Vice President-P.C. Software Division of the
Company. During the Class Period and as part of the fraudulent
scheme, Joseph sold 113,000 shares of Systemsoft stock at prices as
high as $30-1/2 per share based on inside information, pocketing
over $2.7 million. These sales constituted 69% of Joseph's
holdings in SystemSoft. Joseph's stock sales during the Class
Period were unusual in timing and amount as set forth below;
//
I-
II
//
//
- 22 -
SystemSoft Corp.Defendant J. Joseph Class Period Sales
$1400 $40
$1200
$30$1000
0a"
hiss441‘[141j(if\v1 $20 -,vu
$800
1 J $400
lip.444N $1 0
•
$200
so .1 FMAMJ JASONDJ FMAMJJ ASONDJ FlulAMJ J ASO NO.IF
1995 19943 :997 1998
(c) Defendant William J. O'Connell ("O'Connell") was, at
all relevant times, Senior Vice President-Strategic Accounts and
Emerging Markets of the Company. During the Class Period and as
part of the fraudulent scheme, o'connell sold 196,000 shares of
SystemSoft stock at prices as high as $32-3/8 per share based on
inside information, pocketing over $3.4 million. These sales
constituted 90% of O'Connell's holdings in SystemSoft. O'Connell's
stock sales during the Class Period were unusual in timing and
amount as set forth below:
//
//
//
//
//
- 23 -
SystemSoft Corp.Defendant W. O'Connell Class Period Sales
12000 $40
$1500 $30
8
1-1
4141441P1 It'
a $1000 h $20
3
$500 $10
$0 $0JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJ.,ASONDJF
10E+5 1g96 'S97 1998
(d) Defendant Paul J. Pedevillano ("Pedevillano") was
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of SystemSoft from 4/93-
1/96 and was responsible for the accounting policies SystemSoft
used to account for its Digital Equipment contract. After 1/96, he
was Vice President-Business Development of the Company. During the
Class Period and as part of the fraudulent scheme, Pedevillano sold
83,250 shares of SystemSoft stock at prices as high as $32-1/2 per
share based on inside information, pocketing over $1.7 million.
These sales constituted 64% of Pedeviliano's holdings in
SystemSoft- Pedevillano's stock sales during the Class Period were
unusual in timing and amount as set forth below:
//
//
//
- 24 -
SystemSoft Corp.Defendant P. Pedevillano Class Period Sales
$1200 $40
$1000
$30
$1300
@ae $80u $20IL
$400 \i/11\t44(16411111A. $10$200 wir jp,"4/14,10,
$0 II $0JFMAMJ.,ASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJF
199S 1998 t997 1998
(e) Defendant Thomas W. Higgins ("Higgins") was, at all
relevant times, Vice President-Worldwide Sales of the Company.
During the Class Period and as part of the fraudulent scheme,
Higgins sold 106,749 shares of SystemSoft stock at prices as high
as $33-1/8 per share based on inside information, pocketing over
$2.8 million. These sales constituted 93% of Higgins' holdings in
SystemSoft. Higgins' stock sales during the Class Period were
unusual in timing and amount as set forth below:
//
//
//
//
//
//
- 25 -
SystemSoft Corp.Defendant T. Higgins Class Period Sales
$2500 $40
$2000 I-$30
$1500 Crg_
TO
$202
$1000 ro
$10
$500 I — -
$0 $0,FMAMJ JA SON01 FPAAMJ J ASONDJ FMAMJ .1 A SONDJ F
1995 toe 1997 1999
(f) Defendant Russell Blair ("Blair") was, at all
relevant times, Vice President of the Company. During the Class
Period and as part of the fraudulent scheme, Blair sold 83,500
shares of SystemSoft stock at prices as high as S34-1/8 per share
based on inside information, pocketing over $1.8 million. These
sales constituted 82% of Blair's holdings in SystemSoft. Blair's
stock sales during the Class Period were unusual in timing and
amount as set forth below:
1/
//
//
I-
1/
//
- 26 -
SystemSoft Corp.Defendant R. Blair Class Period Sales
$6,00 $40
$500 -
$3C
$400
a
E $:300 - $20 T,
5$200
-11111 111111111,111411\vol S 10$100
L ..I FM AM.) JASONDJ FMANI,J .1 A SONDJ FMAMJJ ASONDJ F
1995 1996 1997 1L
(g) Defendant David Sommers ("Sommers") was, at all
relevant times, Vice President-Finance, Treasurer and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company. During the Class Period, Sommers
did not sell any shares of SystemSoft stock because he owned no
shares outright and during the Class Period had almost no vested
stock options he was able to exercise and sell. However, Sommers
was paid a cash bonus for helping to falsify SystemSoft's F97
results and artificially inflate its stock price.
(h) Defendant W. Frank King ("King") was, at all
relevant times, a director of the Company and a member of its Audit
Committee. During the Class Period and as part of the fraudulent
scheme, King sold 60,000 shares of SystemSoft stock at prices as
high as $29-1/4 per share based on inside information, pocketing
over $1.5 million. These sales constituted 76% of King's holdings
- 27 -
in SystemSoft. King's stock sales during the class Period were
unusual in timing and amount as set forth below:
SystemSoft Corp.Defendant F. King Class Period Sales
$1200 $40
$/000
$30
8 Um r
'4 3
E $600 $20 -0
$400 1- \\SI $10
$200
SD $0JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJJASONDJF
1995 199e 1997 1998
(i) Defendant Robert N. Goldman ("Goldman") was, at all
relevant times, a director of the Company and a member of its Audit
Committee. During the Class Period and as part of the fraudulent
scheme, Goldman sold 171,126 shares of SystemSoft stock at prices
as high as $24 per share based on inside information, pocketing
over $2.5 million. These sales constituted 46% of Goldman's
holdings in SystemSoft. Goldman's stock sales during the Class
Period were unusual in timing and amount as set forth below:
//
//
//
- 28 -
SystemSoft Corp.Defendant R. Goldman Class Period Sales
$3000 $40
$2500-
1111\kitseivakiNtill $30$2on 0
$15W $20 ;
$1000 L
$10
$500
$0 $0JFMAMJJASONJELIFMANIJJASONDJFMAMJIASONDJF
1995 19E6 1997
(j) Defendant David J. McNeff ("McNeff") was, at all
relevant times, a director of the Company and a member of its Audit
Committee. During the Class Period and as part of the fraudulent
scheme, McNeff sold 7,500 shares of SystemSoft stock at prices as
high as $22.66 per share based on inside information, pocketing
over $166,900. These sales constituted 100% of MoNeff's holdings
in SystemSoft. McNeff's stock sales during the Class Period were
unusual in timing and amount as set forth below:
//
//
//
//
//
- 29 -
System Soft Corp.Defendant D. McNeff Class Period Sales
$200 $40
$150
_
$39I
a
$100 - 320 -0ti7
- $10
So sa.1 FMAMJ JA SONDJ FMAMJJASONDJFMAMJ JASONDJF
lase 19s7
21. The individuals named as defendants in 4:20(a)-(j) are
referred to herein as the "Individual Defendants." The Individual
Defendants are liable for the false statements pleaded herein at
11139, 43, 47, 49, 50, 54, 58, 65-66, 79 and 85, as those statements
were each "group-published" information, the result of the
collective action of the Individual Defendants.
22. Because of these Individual Defendants' positions with
the Company, they each had access to the adverse non-public
information about its business, finances, products, markets and
present and future business prospects via access to internal
corporate documents (including the Company's operating plans,
budgets and forecasts and reports of actual operations compared
thereto), conversations and connections with other corporate
— 30 —
officers and employees, attendance at management and/or Board of
Directors' meetings and committees thereof and via reports and
other information provided to them in connection therewith.
23. SystemSoft's Board had an Audit Committee which oversaw
the accounting and financial functions of the Company and consulted
with and reviewed the services provided by the Company's indepen-
dent auditors It met four times during 797. Goldman, King and
McNeff were the members of the Audit Committee.
24. The Individual Defendants, because of their positions
with the Company, controlled and/or possessed the power and autho-
rity to control the contents of its quarterly and annual reports,
press releases and presentations to securities analysts, which
information was conveyed through the analysts to the investing
public. Each of these defendants was provided with copies of the
Company's reports and press releases alleged herein to be mislead-
ing prior to or shortly after their issuance and had the ability
and opportunity to prevent their issuance or cause them to be
corrected. Because of their positions and access to material
non-public information each of these defendants knew that the
adverse facts specified herein had not been disclosed to and were
being concealed from the public and that the positive represen-
tations which were being made were then materially false and
misleading. Despite their duty not to sell their SystemSoft stock
under such circumstances, these defendants nonetheless did so.
25. Defendant Coopers & Lybrand LLP ("Coopers & Lybrand") is
a firm of certified public accountants. Coopers & Lybrand was
engaged by Systemsoft to provide independent accounting, business
consulting and auditing services to SystemSoft and gave SystemSoft
- 31 -
accounting advice and consultation regarding SystemSoft's annual
and quarterly reports which were filed with the SEC and publicly
distributed. Coopers & Lybrand consented to its unqualified
opinions on SystemSoft's F96 financial statements being included in
SystemSoft's F96 Report on Form 10-K and Annual Report to
Shareholders. Coopers & Lybrand directly participated in and
worked with SystemSoft to develop the bogus rationales for
SystemSoft's accounting practices for the Digital Equipment
contract, knowing that there was no reasonable basis for these
accounting practices. As a result, Coopers & Lybrand was not
independent with respect to auditing or reviewing SystemSoft's
financial statements or opining thereon, as Coopers & Lybrand was,
in effect, auditing its own work and had a stake in justifying the
correctness of accounting practices that enabled SystemSoft to
inflate its net income and EPS during the Class Period and its
underlying justifications that Coopers & Lybrand had helped create.
Coopers & Lybrand rendered false opinions on SystemSoft's F96
financial statements for the year ended 1/31/96. Coopers & Lybrand
also reviewed SystemSoft's financial results for each of the
interim quarters of F97, ended 4/31/96, 7/30/96 and 10/31/96 and
approved all these interim financial statements as filed with the
SEC and distributed to the public, knowing of their falsity.
SCIENTER ALLEGATIONS
Actual Knowledge
26. Angelo, Joseph, O'Connell, Pedevillano, Higgins, Blair
and Sommers were the top operating officers of SystemSoft. They
had daily contact with each other, as these individuals ran
SystemSoft's business on a daily basis as hands-on managers, having
- 32 -
constant contact with each other to discuss and deal with the most
important issues facing SystemSoft's business, i.e., the
development, marketing and sales of SystemWizard, SystemSoft's
Digital Equipment relationship and sales of its core products,
especially CardWizard.
27. Defendants King, Goldman and McNeff were each directors
and members of the Audit Committee of SystemSoft. These defendants
were much more involved in the management of SystemSoft than would
ordinarily have been the case with outside directors. SystemSoft
had a small Board of Directors which consisted only of these three
defendants, plus Angelo, and thus the Board was very small and
operated as a cohesive group. In addition, because SystemSoft's
business was small, these three directors were in a position to and
in fact did oversee its operations on an ongoing basis. As such,
these directors were intimately familiar with the details of the
Digital Equipment contract and the decision not to disclose the
complete terms of that contract to the public or file it as an
exhibit to SystemSoft's major SEC filings during the Class Period.
As members of the Audit Committee they also participated in the
deliberate decision which was made to misaccount for the Digital
Equipment contract by having SystemSoft recognize millions in
revenue from that contract during F96/F97, even though under the
terms of that contract, no such revenue could properly be
recognized. Similarly, these three defendants, as intimately
involved directors and members of the Audit Committee, were aware
of the problems that SystemSoft was having with its Asian
distributor and that termination of that distributor was inevitable
- 33 -
and would result in the delayed recognition of millions of dollars
of uncollectible accounts receivable.
28. Also, because of their active roles as members of the
small and intimately involved Board of Directors, these three
defendants were aware that the SystemWizard product had been
announced prematurely by the Company and that the product did not
have anywhere near the market potential the Company w as
representing it had. Further, they knew from reports they received
as directors that deployment of the product, even by those PC OEMs
that had ordered it, would be materially delayed and that it was
extremely unlikely that any of the major PC OEMs would ever order
the product in large volumes or deploy in on a full-scale basis.
29. Because of their top executive positions with SystemSoft
and involvement in the day-to-day management of its business,
defendants Angelo, Joseph, O'Connell, Pedevillano, Higgins, Blair,
King, Goldman, McNeff and Sommers each actually knew the adverse
non-public information about the delay in development and
deployment of SystemWizard, the Company's most important new
product, softening demand for its core products, including
CardWizard, the failure of the Digital Equipment partnership, the
falsifying of SystenSoft's financial results and its poor future
revenue and EPS prospects from internal corporate documents and
conversations with other corporate officers and employees and their
attendance at management and Board meetings.
30. Because vastly increased sales of SystemWizard and US8
products, continued strong growth in sales of CardWizard and
continuation of the Digital Equipment relationship were
indispensable to SystemSoft meeting its internally budgeted and
- 34 -
publicly forecast F97 revenue and EPS, each of the Individual
Defendants focused on and constantly monitored each of these key
factors affecting SystemSoft's business.
31. SystemSoft desperately needed to generate additional
revenue in order to keep its supposed streak of quarterly revenue
and EPS growth intact. However, demand for its core products was
softening and therefore the rate of growth in revenue of
products was not sufficient to enable SystemSoft to achieve revenue
and EPS growth on that basis alone. Moreover, any significant
revenue from SystemWizard was far oft in the future, due to the
delays in deployment of that product which were occurring with the
OEMs that had ordered it and the lack of significant revenue
prospects from major OEMs that were decidedly uninterested in the
product. Thus, in order to keep its apparent record of revenue and
EPS growth intact until it could try to supplement its revenues and
EPS with SystemWizard revenues, SystemSoft's insiders decided to
record and report as revenue payments made to SystemSoft by Digital
Equipment under the SystemSoft/Digital Equipment SystemWizard
contract. However, under the terms of the SystemSoft/Digital
Equipment contract, the payments being made by Digital Equipment
were, in effect, loans or advances to SystemSoft and not true
revenues which could be recorded or reported as such, as Digital
Equipment had the right to terminate the relationship and elect not
to utilize SystemWizard in its product line, in which case,
SystemSoft was obligated to repay all of the advances or loans that
Digital Equipment had made to it to date. Knowing that a detailed
analysis of the Digital Equipment/SystemSoft SystemWizard contract
would reveal these terns and the impropriety of SystemSoft's
- 35 -
accounting treatment for that contract, SystemSoft's directors and
officers decided not to include that contract as an exhibit with
SvstemSoft's SEC filings in F96 or E97, even though this was, as
SvstemSoft itself admitted, a material or important contract to
SystemSoft. Coopers & Lybrand, which was intimately involved in
this decision and approved of it, was aware that recognizing
revenue on this contract was improper and that it would be
necessary to conceal the true terms of this contract from the
public and the SEC in order to facilitate their misaccounting for
the contract.
32. The Digital Equipment/SystemSoft relationship was an
extremely important one to SystemSoft. While Intel Corporation had
also agreed to fund part of the development costs of SystemWizard,
Intel was a very large stockholder in SystemSoft and thus its
investment in developing that product was considered much less of
an endorsement of the technology and market potential of that
product than was the agreement of Digital Equipment to help fund
the development of the product, as Digital Equipment was an
independent entity, as well as a potentially large customer for the
product. The Digital Equipment relationship thus gave SystemSoft
not only a substantial public relations coup, but also provided for
it the opportunity to boost its reported revenues by including
Digital Equipment payments to it under the development contract as
current period revenue and also to boost the credibility of the
product when it was completed and ready to ship by ftaving a large
sophisticated computer OEM like Digital Equipment elect to purchase
the product and deploy it.
- 36 -
33. Thus, SystemSoft's corporate Board and top management was
extremely focused on the state of the relationship between
SystemSoft and Digital Equipment and the status of Digital
Equipment's attitude about committing to order and deploy the
SystemWizard product. This was a matter of constant attention and
frequent discussions among SystemSoft's corporate Board and top
managers. As a result, these individuals were kept apprised of the
current status of the Digital Equipment/SystemSoft relationship
throughout F96 and F97, and were aware of the serious deterioration
of that relationship during F97, and knew that it was most unlikely
that Digital Equipment would ever order SystemWizard in volume or
deploy the product and it was most likely that Digital Equipment
would terminate its relationship with SystemSoft in the near term.
Termination of the Digital Equipment/SystemSoft relationship would
be an extremely negative development for SystemSoft, as it would
require SystemSoft to repay some $7 million to Digital Equipment.
The repayment would have a material adverse impact on SystemSoft's
financial results going forward and the termination of the
relationship would indicate that Digital Equipment did not have
confidence in the commercial potential of the product and indeed
was not going to order or deploy it. SystemSoft's corporate Board
and managers determined to withhold this adverse information from
the marketplace, both to conceal from the securities markets this
very negative financial development for SystemSoft and to conceal
from the commercial or product market this very negative
development for the future of SystemWizard. As a result, even
after the Digital Equipment/SystemSoft relationship was formally
terminated in late 2/97, they deliberately concealed this
- 37 -
information. When they did disclose it several weeks later, they
buried the news in a footnote in SystemSoft's Management Discussion
and Analysis section of SystemSoft's F97 Annual Report, published
well after the Class Period ended.
Motive And Opportunity
34. In addition to having actual knowledge of the falsity of
their statements, each of the Defendants had the motive and the
opportunity to perpetrate the fraudulent scheme and course of
business described herein. During 94-95, SystemSoft was operating
in an industry in which smaller niche companies like SystemSoft
were at a competitive disadvantage and to survive SystemSoft was
attempting to grow rapidly. Rapid growth would create a larger
company, justify larger salaries to SystemSoft's corporate
management and push up its stock price, adding millions to their
wealth, based on their actual stock ownership and stock options.
35. Their motive to engage in this conduct included a desire
to attempt to continue SystemSoft's apparent record of sequential
quarterly revenue and EPS growth, to manipulate and artificially
inflate the price of SystemSoft's stock, to enhance the value of
their holdings of SystemSoft stock and/or options to purchase
SystemSoft stock, and permit SystemSoft's insiders to sell off
large portions of their SystemSoft stock at inflated prices.
DEFENDANTS' FRAUDULENT SCHEMEAND COURSE OF BUSINESS
36. Each of the Defendants is liable for making false state-
ments and as a participant in a fraudulent scheme and course of
business that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of
SystemSoft stock, including the making of false and misleading
- 38 -
statements and/or concealing material, adverse facts. The
fraudulent scheme and course of business: (i) deceived the
investing public regarding SystemSoft's products and business; (ii)
deceived the commercial markets regarding SystemSoft's success with
its products; (iii) artificially inflated the price of SystemSoft
stock; (iv) caused plaintiffs and other members of the Class to
purchase SvstemSoft stock at inflated prices; and (v) permitted
certain defendants to dispose of 1,070,007 shares of SystemSoft
stock, pocketing over $21 million in illegal insider-trading
profits.
STATUTORY SAFE HARBOR
37. The statutory safe harbor provided for forward-looking
statements under certain circumstances does not apply to any of the
allegedly false forward-looking statements pleaded in this
Complaint because the statutory safe harbor does not apply to
SystemSoft's financial statements and because none of the
particular oral forward-looking statements pleaded herein were
identified as a "forward-looking statement" when made. None of the
written forward-looking statements made were identified as forward-
looking statements. Nor was it stated as to either type of
forward-looking statement that actual results "could differ
materially from those projected." Nor did meaningful cautionary
statements identifying important factors that could cause actual
results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking
statements accompany those forward-looking statenents. In any
event, each of the forward-looking statements alleged herein was
authorized by an executive officer of SystemSoft, and was actually
known by each of the Individual Defendants to be false when made.
- 39 -
BACKGROUND TO THE CLASS PERIOD
38. SystemSoft was a very small company that went public in
8/94 at $2.75 per share with annual revenues of only about $9-$10
million. After SystemSoft went public, its stock was only a modest
performer, as the Company sold only a few products for use almost
exclusively in laptop computers which limited its prospects for
significant profitable growth. By late 95, anal ysts were critical
of SystemSoft's rate of growth and its inability successfully to
develop and introduce new products. As D.F. Carey of Rodman &
Renshaw wrote on 11/29/95 in downgrading the stock after SystemSoft
reported disappointing 3rdQ F96 revenue growth:
rWle feel that revenue growth sequentially during Ql-O3 has not reflected the perceived potential of the company's products. . . [lit now appears that the company is struggling to meet estimates, and that revenue and earnings upside is doubtful. . . Revenues from newproducts are further off than expected. Much of the excitement about SystemSoft has been related to new products under development. However, it is now clear that we must relate our investment decisions to the current core products . . . .
SystemSoft's top insiders were upset over this negative perception
and were determined to overcome it and push SystemSoft's stock to
much higher prices. Thus, in early 96, SystemSoft announced the
development of a new product -- a new "call-avoidance" software
product called SystemWizard.
FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTSISSUED DURING THE CLASS PERIOD
39. On 01/25/96, SystemSoft issued a press release entiticd
and stating:
SYSTEMSOFT TO RECEIVE FUNDING SUPPORT FROM INTEL ANDDIGITAL TO DEVELOP PRODUCTS THAT WILL AUTOMATICALLYIDENTIFY AND RESOLVE THE MOST COMMON PROBLEM FACED BYPERSONAL COMPUTER USERS; SYSTEM-WIDE PROBLEM RESOLU-
- 40 -
TION/CALL AVOIDANCE SOFTWARE WILL SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCECUSTOMER SUPPORT COSTS
* * *
Intel and Digital Equipment Corp. will provide SystemSoftwith up to several million dollars in funding,intellectual property and development assistance toaccelerate development of this new category of PCsoftware to be known as "Call Avoidance" products.SystemSoft will market and license products resultingfrom this alliance. It is estimated that productsresulting from this development effort could reduce thenumber of calls received by PC manufacturers' technicalsupport organizations by 30 percent, representing apotential annual industry-wide cost savings of more than$1 billion.
The first products are scheduled to ship to systemmanufacturers in the second quarter of 1996. The firstPCs to include problem resolution/call avoidance softwareare expected to be available during the fourth quarter ofthis year.
* * *
Digital's MCS Division which serves as the technicalsupport call center for a wide variety of OEMs includingMicrosoft, Compaq, Dell and NEC Technologies will providemarketing support for SystemSoft products developed underthis agreement. . . . To speed portions of SystemSoft'sdevelopment, Digital will also provide intellectualproperty and software associated with secure remotecommunications.
The release quoted Angelo as saying:
Digital [is] providing world-class resources that willenable SystemSoft to rapidly bring this new category ofcall avoidance software to market.
40. On 1/30/96, subsequent to the 1/25/96 press release,
SystemSoft held a conference call for securities analysts, money
and portfolio managers, institutional investors, large SystemSoft
shareholders, brokers and stock traders to discuss SystemSoft's new
SystemWizard product. During the call, Angelo made presentations
and answered questions. During the call -- and in follow-up
- 41 -
conversations with participants -- he directly disseminated
important information to the market by stating:
• SystemSoft's market research and evaluation revealed apotentially huge market for SystemWizard as this product wouldbe incorporated into desktop PCs as well as laptop computers,which would vastly expand SystemSoft's market penetration andprovide huge revenue growth for SystemSoft going forward.
• SystemSoft had determined that a royalty fee ofapproximately $5-$7 per SystemWizard unit was reasonable andcould be achieved.
• SystemSoft's development partnership with DigitalEquipment for SystemWizard would work very well and SystemSoftexpected that Digital Equipment would be utilizingSystemWizard.
• Because PC OEMs were losing significant amounts of moneyon the technical service calls being received by theirtechnical service centers, there was an enormous market demandfor SystemWizard with these PC manufacturers, as deployment ofSystemWizard would significantly reduce the number of servicecalls and thus provide a significant financial benefit to thePC OEMs.
41. On 1/31/96, Rodman & Renshaw issued a report on
SystemSoft, written by D.F. Carey, which was based on and repeated
information provided Carey in the 1/30/96 conference call and in
follow-up conversations with Angelo. The report stated:
SYSF held a mid-day conference call yesterday to furtheroutline the implications of its agreement with DEC andINTC to develop Call Avoidance software. This softwarerepresents potential cost savings of over $1 billion peryear to the PC industry.
Call Avoidance software would help PC manufacturersrecover technical support expenses. DEC provides techni-cal support to major OEMs such as Compaq, Microsoft,Dell, and NEC technologies through its MCS (MultiCustomer Support) Division. SystemSoft managementindicated a target of 20% cost reduction, which couldtranslate to $33 million in savings for Compaq.
* * *
SYSF expects revenues from the new product by 04fiscal 1997. When asked, management acknowledged plansto ship Call Avoidance software during third or fourthquarter of fiscal 1997 with revenues to follow.
- 42 -
42. On 2/27/96, systemSoft announced that its 4thQ F96
results would be better than expected. Angelo was interviewed by
Dow Jones and stated:
"Our base business is flourishing, getting faster growththan expected" . . Angelo told Dow Jones.
* * *
Angelo said the company this year will likely continue growing at the 50% to 60% rate, it has experienced over the last six years, based on itsexisting core businesses, which serve the mobile computer and hand-held devices market. Angelo further predictedthat SystemSoft's entry into the desktop PC market with a new product it is introducing this fall will bring additional revenue that would "double the company," in fiscal 1998.
43. On 2/28/96, SystemSoft reported 4thQ F96 revenues and EPS
of $7.3 million and $.06, respectively. The release was headlined
and stated:
SYSTEMSOFT ACHIEVES RECORD GROWTH FOR FOURTH QUARTER ANDYEAR END 1996
* * *
With the development of call avoidance software,SystemSoft will, for the first time, be marketing value-added products to desktop computer manufacturers. Thus, with call avoidance software, SystemSoft will begin to address a systems market that is five times the size of its current market.
* * *
During the fourth quarter, SystemSoft announced thecompletion of agreements with Intel Corporation andDigital Equipment to speed the development of CallAvoidance Software.
44. On 2/28/96, SystemSoft held a conference call for
securities analysts, money and portfolio managers, institutional
investors, large SystemSoft shareholders, brokers and stock traders
to discuss SystemSoft's business and its prospects. During the
call, Angelo made presentations and answered questions. During the
- 43 -
call -- and in follow-up conversations with participants -- Angelo
directly disseminated important information to the market by
stating:
• Demand for SystemSoft's core CardWizard productscontinued to be extremely strong and would continue so for theforeseeable future.
• SystemSoft was continuing to achieve increased marketpenetration with its core products and, as a result,SystemSoft expected extremely strong revenue growth of 50%-60%from its core product line during the next two fiscal years.
• SystemSoft was extremely pleased with its performance inthe most recent quarter and its increasing revenue and EPSreflected the continued strong demand for its core products inthe marketplace and broad customer acceptance of itstechnology.
• SystemSoft was making very good progress in developingSystemWizard and was "on track" to ship product later in F97and to achieve accelerated volume shipments in F98, whichwould generate millions in new revenue for SystemSoft.
• SystemSoft's market research and evaluation revealed apotentially huge market for SystemWizard as this product wouldbe incorporated into desktop PCs as well as laptop computers,which would vastly expand SystemSoft's market penetration andprovide huge revenue growth for SystemSoft going forward.
• SystemSoft had determined that a royalty fee ofapproximately $5-$7 per SystemWizard unit was reasonable andcould be achieved.
• SystemSoft's partnership with Digital Equipment forSystemWizard was working very well and SystemSoft expectedthat Digital Equipment would be utilizing SystemWizard.
• SystemSoft was in negotiations with every major PCmanufacturer regarding the deployment of SystemWizard and,based upon the state of those negotiations, was confident thatin each quarter going forward it would be able to make anannouncement that one or two major OEMs had accepted and woulddeploy the SystemWizard product.
• SystemWizard was in evaluation at virtually every majorPC manufacturer and was receiving extremely good reviews fromevery PC OEM, which increased SystemSoft's confidence for thesuccess of the product.
• Based on discussions with PC OEMs, SystemSoft anticipatedinitial volume deployment of the SystemWizard product in 1/97or 2/97.
- 44 -
• Due to continuing strong demand for its core products, aswell as the favorable reaction of PC OEMs to SystemWizard,SystemSoft was forecasting 40%-60% growth for the next severalyears.
45. On 2/29/96, Rodman & Renshaw issued a report on
SystemScft written by Carey, which was based on and repeated
information provided in the 2/28/96 conference call and in follow-
up conversations with Angelo. The report stated:
-- Outlook on SYSF's upcoming Call Avoidance softwareproduct remains positive. In an agreement announcedJanuary 25, SYSF will receive $8 million from DigitalEquipment and Intel to develop Call Avoidance software.The company anticipates product announcements in April orMay, followed by delivery of product in July or August.During the conference call, management alluded to thepossibility of signing two OEM agreements with major PCmanufacturers at the end of Q1 or the beginning of Q2fiscal 1997. . .
Management was forthcoming with expected revenue growthfor their core business. The company anticipates PC Cardand system level software revenue growth of 50%-60% overthe next 1-2 years.
46. On 2/29/96, Hambrecht & Quist issued a report on
SystemSoft, written by Todd Bakar, which was based on and repeated
information provided in the 2/28/96 conference call and follow-up
conversations with Angelo. The report stated:
SystemWizard, the Largest Opportunity of the Future:
A Rapidly Growing Need: It is projected that more than200 million cans will be placed to technical supportcenters in 1996, costing the PC industry nearly $4billion. As a specific example, Compaq is believed tonow encounter more than 25,000 technical support callsper day at an average cost of approximately $25 per call.These figures would equate to more than $150 million inannual technical support costs for Compaq alone. Hence,while many problems will not be automatically fixed, evena 10% or 20% reduction in the number of calls wouldtranslate into significant cost savings even for acompany of Compaq's size. SystemSoft plans on charging these various OEMs a per unit royalty of $5 to $12 basedupon a number of considerations including volume. Given the potential cost savings, this royalty appears reasonable. .
- 45 -
SystemWizard Will Roll out in 1996, but is a 1997 Oppor-tunity: . . . The company has already begun demon-strating the product to potential OEM partners includingsome of the major PC vendors. The company is targetingat least two large OEM customers by mid-year withdeliveries beginning in the July/August time frame. .[I]t remains difficult to forecast the actual revenuecontribution in fiscal 1998 (calendar 1997). At thistime, we are conservatively adding approximately $10million to our revenue forecast for SystemWizard.However, it is important to highlight that a successfullaunch and adoption of this technology could translateinto revenues dramatically larger . . than we areinitially projecting.
47. In 3/96, SystemSoft issued its F96 Annual Report which
included a letter signed by Angelo, that stated:
SystemSoft -- with the backing of Intel and DigitalEquipment -- is developing SystemWizard, our call-avoidance product that builds on the previous success ofour CardWizard product. SystemWizard uses expert systemtechnology to automatically diagnose and fix the most common problems that plagpe PC users so they do not need to pick up the phone to call for support.
* * *
SystemSoft has grown 50-60 percent annually byfocusing solely on the mobile computer market. With thedevelopment of S ystemWizard, SystemSoft will, for thefirst time, dramatically expand its market, offering thisadvanced product to the broader desktop computer market.Unit shipments in the desktop PC market are expected to exceed 50 million in 1996 -- a market that is five times larger than the mobile PC market that SystemSoft currently addresses.
48. On 4/30/96 SystemSoft's CEO Angelo appeared at the
Hambrecht & Quist Technology Conference in San Francisco. In a
formal presentation and in break-out sessions, he told the
assembled security analysts, money and portfolio managers,
institutional investors, brokers and stock traders:
• Demand for SystemSoft's core CardWizard productscontinued to be extremely strong and would continue so for theforeseeable future.
• SystemSoft was continuing to achieve increased marketpenetration with its core products and, as a result,
- 46 -
SystemSoft expected extremely strong revenue growth of 5096-60%from its core product line during the next two fiscal years.
• SystemSoft was making very good progress in developingSystemWizard and was "on track" to ship product later in F97and to achieve accelerated volume shipments in F98, whichwould generate millions in new revenue for SystemSoft.
• SystemSoft's market research and evaluation revealed apotentially huge market for SystemWizard as this product wouldbe incorporated into desktop PCs as well as laptop computers,which would vastly expand SystemSoft's market penetration andprovide huge revenue growth for SystemSoft going forward-
• SystemSoft had determined that a royalty fee ofapproximately $5-$7 per SystemWizard unit was reasonable andcould be achieved.
• SystemSoft's development partnership with DigitalEquipment for SystemWizard was working very well andSystemSoft expected that Digital Equipment would be utilizingSystemWizard.
• SystemSoft was in negotiations with several major PCmanufacturers regarding the deployment of SystemWizard and,based upon the state of those negotiations, was confident thatmajor OEMs would deploy the SystemWizard product.
• SystemWizard was in evaluation at several major PCmanufacturers and was receiving extremely good reviews, whichincreased SystemSoft's confidence for the success of theproduct.
• Because PC OEMs were losing significant amounts of moneyon the technical service calls being received by theirtechnical service centers, there was an enormous market demandfor SystemWizard with these PC manufacturers, as deployment ofSystemWizard would significantly reduce the number of servicecalls and thus provide a significant financial benefit to thePC OEMs.
• Based on discussions with PC OEMs, SystemSoft anticipatedinitial volume deployment of the SystemWizard product in 1/97or 2/97.
• As a result of the SystemWizard product and the extremelypositive reaction of PC OEMs to it, SystemSoft expected todouble the Company's revenues and profits in 198.
• Due to continuing strong demand for its core products, aswell as the favorable reaction of PC OEMs to SystemWizard,SystemSoft was forecasting 40%-50% growth for the next severalyears.
- 47 -
• SystemSoft was forecasting strong F98 revenue and EPSgrowth.
49. On 5/21/96, SystemSoft issued a release headlined and
stating:
IBM Thinkpad To Include Latest Generation Of PC CardSoftware From SystemSoft; SystemSoft Customers NowInclude The Top Five Notebook PC Manufacturers In TheWorld
SystemSoft Corporation . . . today announced thatInternational Business Machines Corp. has signed alicensing agreement to include the latest versions ofSystemSoft i s CardWizard and OardWorks software productsin its widely acclaimed ThinkPad series of notebookcomputers.
* * *
"Our partnership with IBM clearly solidifies ourposition as the undisputed global leader in the PC Cardmarket," said Robert F. Angelo, president, CEO, andchairman of SystemSoft Corporation.
50. On 5/23/96, SystemSoft reported lstQ F97 revenues, net
income and EPS of $8.1 million, $1.3 million and $.06,
respectively, via a release headlined and stating:
SYSTEMSOFT CORPORATION ANNOUNCES RECORD FIRST QUARTEREARNINGS WITH REVENUES EXCEEDING $8 MILLION
* * *
"SystemSoft has enjoyed 50 percent or greatercomparable quarterly revenue growth in every quartersince our initial public offering," stated Bob Angelo,Chairman, CEO and President of SystemSoft Corporation."Today I am delighted to report that the streak continues. In this, our eighth quarter since becoming apublicly held company, we have not only increased revenueby 55 percent, but for the first time in our historyrevenues exceeded $8 million."
"Our product family continues to grow as our OEMcustomers increasingly turn to us for advanced system level software products."
* *
- 48 -
The tremendous development effort that SystemSoft has placed on call avoidance software products is yield-ing very strong support from its OEM customers.
51. On 5/23/96, SystemSoft held a conference call for
securities analysts, money and portfolio managers, institutional
investors, large SystemSoft shareholders, brokers and stock traders
to discuss SystemSoft business and its prospects. During the call,
Angelo made presentations and answered questions and -- in follow-
up conversations with participants -- directly disseminated
important information to the market by stating:
• Demand for SystemSoft's core CardWizard productscontinued to be extremely strong and would continue so for theforeseeable future.
• SystemSoft was continuing to achieve increased marketpenetration with its core products and, as a result,SystemSoft expected extremely strong revenue growth of 50%-50%from its core product line during the next two fiscal years.
• SystemSoft was extremely pleased with its performance inthe most recent quarter and its increasing revenue and EPSreflected the continued strong demand for its core products inthe marketplace and broad customer acceptance of itstechnology.
• SystemSoft was making very good progress in developingSystemWizard and was "on track" to ship product later in F97and to achieve accelerated volume shipments in F98, whichwould generate millions in new revenue for SystemSoft.
• SystemSoft's market research and evaluation revealed apotentially huge market for SystemWizard as this product wouldbe incorporated into desktop PCs as well as laptop computers,which would vastly expand SystemSoft's market penetration andprovide huge revenue growth for SystemSoft going forward.
• SystemSoft had determined that a royalty fee ofapproximately $5-$7 per SystemWizard unit was reasonable andcould be achieved.
• SystemSoft's development partnership with DigitalEquipment for SystemWizard was working very well andSystemSoft expected that Digital Equipment would be utilizingSystemWizard.
• SystemSoft was in negotiations with several major PCmanufacturers regarding the deployment of SystemWizard and
- 49 -
confident that major OEMs would deploy the SystenWizardproduct.
• SystemWizard was in evaluation at several major PC OEMsand was receiving extremely good reviews from every PC OEM,which increased SystemSoft's confidence for the success of theproduct.
• Based on discussions with PC OEMs, SystenSoft anticipatedinitial volume deployment of the SystenWizard product in 1/97or 2/97.
• IBM's commitment to order SystemSoft's CardWizard productduring F97 or early F98 was a substantial indicator of theunderlying strong, and indeed growing, demand for thatproduct.
• As a result of the SystemWizard product and the extremelypositive reaction of PC OEMs to it, SystenSoft expected todouble the Company's revenues and profits in F98.
• Due to continuing strong demand for its core products, aswell as the favorable reaction of PC OEMs to SystemWizard,SystenSoft was forecasting 40%-50% growth for the next severalyears.
• SystemSoft was forecasting F98 revenues of at least $60million with EPS of at least $.40.
52. On 5/24/96, Hanbrecht & Quist issued a report on
SystemSoft written by Bakar, which was based on and repeated
information provided in the conference call and follow-up
conversations with Angelo. The report forecast F98 revenues and
EPS of $61 million and $.41, respectively. The report also stated:
SystenWizard to be formally introduced on June 19th. . . .
- Strong revenue and EPS growth should continue for foreseeable future fueled by core businesses and newopportunities such as SystenWizard.
* * *
A Rapidly Growing Need: It is projected that more than200 million calls will be placed to technical supportcenters in 1996, costing the PC industry nearly $4billion. . . . SystenSoft plans on chargLng thesevarious OEMs a per unit royalty of $5 to $12 based upona number of considerations including volume (although wehave conservatively forecasted a slightly lower range in
- 50 -
our own estimates). Given the potential cost savings,this royalty appears reasonable.
* * *
Strong Growth Will Likely Continue: As mentionedearlier, SystemSoft has consistently achieved 50%-plusyear-over-year revenue growth, a trend that we projectwill continue throughout the remainder of fiscal 1997 andinto fiscal 1998. eased upon stable operating margins inthe 23-24% range, earnings should also likely realizedvery attractive year-over-year growth. We are currentlyforecasting EPS of . . $0.81 [$,41, post-split] infiscal 1998. Importantly, we view our fiscal 1998 EPSestimate as potentially quite conservative given asignificantly larger contribution from SystemWizard.
53. Each of the positive statements about systemSoft between
1/25/96 and 5/24/97, as set forth in ![139-52, was materially false
and misleading when issued, and failed to disclose, inter alia, the
following adverse information which was then known only to
Defendants due to their access to internal SystemSoft data:
(a) SystemSoft had hurried the announcement of
SystemWizard's development in early 96 in order to blunt criticisms
of its slow pace in developing new products and, at the time of
that announcement, in fact, SystemSoft had not completed sufficient
product development or market analysis to be able to state that
"the first products are scheduled to ship to system manufacturers
in the second quarter of 1996" or that SystemSoft would be able "to
rapidly bring this new category of call avoidance software to
market";
(b) Based upon communications with PC OEMs, the
SystemSoft Defendants knew that the market potential for
SystemWizard was nowhere near as large as represented and that most
of the large OEMs were satisfied with the status quo because
- 51 -
service calls gave them a chance to sell additional product to
users and were actually generating profits for them;
(a) Based upon communications with PC OEMs, the
SystemSoft Defendants knew that PC OEMs did not have anywhere near
the level of interest in deploying SystemWizard as SystemSoft was
representing and that the most important major PC OEMs, i.e.,
Compaq, Dell, Gateway and IBM, were extremely dubious about and
reluctant to license the product;
(d) Based an marketing studies and other evaluations of
the SystemWizard product they had made, the SystemSoft Defendants
knew that there was no possibility that PC OEMs would ever pay $5
or $6 per SystemWizard unit in large volume transactions and thus
the revenue and profit potential of the SystemWizard product was
actually far less than SystemSoft was forecasting;
(e) Because SystemWizard was achieving extremely limited
success with PC OEMs, this product was not vastly expanding
SystemSoft's potential marketplace by opening up desktop computers
to it and thus, in fact, SystemSoft remained a company dependent
upon selling its products into the smaller and slower-growing
mobile or laptop part of the computer industry and thus did not
have the prospects for revenue and EPS growth being represented;
(f) SystemSoft was not, in fact, achieving consistent
strong quarterly revenue and EPS growth as represented; but rather,
in fact, its revenues were stagnating and it was not achieving EPS
growth which it was concealing by falsifying and manipulating its
financial results by improperly recording revenue from its Digital
Eguipment/SystemWizard development contract and from its Asian
distributor and by restructuring its agreement with Intel to
- 52 -
accelerate payments (and revenue) from later quarters to show
revenue and EPS growth during the Class Period;
(g) SystemSoft's streak of record quarterly revenues and
EPS was not the result of the strong demand for or broad customer
acceptance of its core products as represented; but rather, was due
to the deliberate falsification of SystemSoft's financial results
by improperly recordin g revenue on its Digital Equipment/
SysterWizard contract and on shipments to its Asian distributor, as
detailed in IT83-97;
(h) SystemSoft's revenues and EPS for the 4thQ F96 and
the lstQ F97 were each artificially inflated and falsified due to
the manipulation of SystemSoft's accounting procedures to
improperly record revenue on the Digital Equipment/SystemWizard
contract and on shipments to its Asian distributor, as detailed in
¶183-97;
(i) SystemSoft was having significant disagreements with
Digital Equipment about the development of and potential for
SystemWizard and that product's commercial success and it was very
likely Digital Equipment would cancel its SystemWizard contract
with SystemSoft, thus triggering a multi-million dollar liability
of SystemSoft to Digital Equipment;
(j) Demand for SystemSoft's core products, especially
CardWizard, was softening such that Defendants knew that the rate
of growth in sales of that product would decline dramatically in
the coming months in part because IBM would not order any
CardWizard products until well into F98;
(k) SystemSoft was improperly capitalizing development
costs for SystemWizard, as it did not have any adequate basis to
- 53 -
believe, forecast or estimate that it would recover those costs in
the reasonably foreseeable future from sales of the SystemWizard
product at profitable prices; and
(1) As a result of the foregoing negative factors which
were negatively impacting SystemSoft's business, Defendants
actually knew that the forecasts of strong revenue and EPS growth
during F98 due to continued strong growth and systemSoft's core
product line, plus accelerating sales of SystemWizard, were false
when made as those forecasted results were unachieveable.
54. On 6/19/96, SysterSoft issued a release announcing the
introduction of SystemWizard, which was headlined and stated:
SYSTEMSOFT'm LAUNCHES SYSTEMWIZARD T''; A BREAKTHROUGHSOFTWARE SOLUTION FOR AUTOMATIC DETECTION, DIAGNOSIS, ANDRESOLUTION OF COMPUTER SUPPORT PROBLEMS
Simplifies PC Usage, Increases Customer Satisfaction, andPotentially Reduces Technical Support Costs by Hundredsof Millions of Dollars
Company Discloses Customer Commitments for More Than 8 Million Units in First Year of Shipment
SystemSoft Corp. . . . today unveiled SysterWizard' m , acomprehensive software solution that addresses the PCindustry's escalating customer support crisis. Withparticipation from key industry leaders and majorcustomers, SystemSoft outlined and demonstrated acomplete, expert system-based software family thatsignificantly increases user satisfaction anddramatically reduces technical support calls to computerand software manufacturers.
The company also announced AST Research, DigitalEquipment Corporation, and Wang have entered intoagreements to license SystemWizard for use in theirproducts and services. In addition, the company has commitments from other unannounced manufacturers . . . .
* *
"Technical support has become the new cost frontierfor the PC industry," said Robert F. Angelo, Chairman,CEO, and President of SystemSoft. "It is one of the lastareas where OEMs can improve both their profit margins
- 54 -
and their customer satisfaction. They are extremelyenthusiastic about SystemWizard and have expressed thatsupport for us in the strongest possible way -- withsignificant license agreements for the product. . . .
. . With firm commitments for more than eightmillion units in its first year, SystemWizard is well onits way to revolutionizing the computer technical supportprocess."
55. On 6/19/96, Pedevillano was interviewed by Bloomberg
about SystemWizard. Bloomberg reported the results of that
interview late on 6/19/96:
SystemSoft already has commitments to sell 8 millionunits of its new SystemWizard software at an averageprice of $5 a unit, said Paul Pedevillano, vice presidentof strategic sales, in an interview.
Customers include computer makers AST Research Inc.,Digital Equipment Corp. and Wang Laboratories Inc., whichhave agreed to license SystemWizard in their products andservices. The software will begin shipping in July andbears a price of $4 to $12 a copy.
Most of the revenue from the new product will begenerated in fiscal 1998, which begins next February,Pedevillano said. Sales "will begin ramping up in thefiscal fourth quarter of the current year," however, - headded.
* * *
Licensing Accords
Under its agreements, AST Research and DigitalEquipment will begin shipping PCs preloaded withSystemWizard by the fourth quarter of this year, saidPedevillano. Service divisions of Digital and WangLaboratories Inc. -- which handle help-desk questions formajor computer makers -- will integrate SystemWizard intotheir service packages, he said.
SystemSoft has signed agreements with AST Researchand Wang, and it has a letter of intent with Digital,which it expects to complete by the end of the month, hesaid.
In addition, the company has letters of intent withtwo other large companies, and an oral agreement with athird company, he said, declining to name the concerns.
- 55 -
56. On 6/19196, The Boston Globe published a story on
SystemSoft after interviewing Angelo, which stated:
SystemSoft Corp. has lined up commitments for 8 million units of its new software product to be launchedtoday, a pipeline of business that will more than double the company's business next year, according to senior executives.
The new System Wizard software, to be unveiled inBoston, could generate revenues next year of $40 millionto $50 million, they said.
* * *
But sizing up the effect of System Wizard has beenno easy task for analysts. Todd Bakar of Hambrecht &Quist last month estimated the new product could generate$10 million in revenue by the company's 1998 fiscal year,which begins next January. But he cautioned the actualsales could turn out much higher.
Apparently that will be the case. Sales already in the pipeline for the software -- which will generate revenue of $4 to $12 per unit -- should outstrip that forecast by fourfold or fivefold, according to SystemSoft President Robert Angelo.
57, On 6/19/96, The Boston Globe ran another article on
SystemSoft, which stated:
Angelo said several other major computer firms have also committed to the product. He also predicted thatthe first PCs with SystemWizard would go on sale thisfall and that 8 million would be sold in the next 12 months.
58. On 8/22/96, SystemSoft reported 2ndQ F97 revenue,
net income and BPS of $9.3 million, $1.5 million and $.06,
respectively, via a release that stated:
SystemSoft Corporation today announced recordrevenues and record net income for the second quarter offiscal year 1997
* * *
First $9 Million Quarter In Company History
"I'm very pleased to report that SystemSoft has completed another record quarter of revenue and
- 56 -
earnings," said Robert F. Angelo, chairman, CEO, andpresident of SystemSoft. "Our outstanding first-half results have been driven by broad customer acceptance of our products and our continuing leadership in developingan expanded range of new technologies. These factorshelped us complete a $9 million revenue quarter for thefirst time in company history. We're excited about both our first half results . . . ."
SystemSoft's expanding product family has been a keyfactor in its revenue growth. The company's newestproduct, SystemWizard, was announced at a widely coveredpress conference following the company's annual meetingon June 19. SystemWizard is quickly becoming the company's flagship product . . . .
"What's important to note about our introduction ofSystemWizard," Angelo said, "is that it is accompanied bysubstantial unit volume commitments and knowledge-sharingpartnerships with leading OEMs such as AST Computer,Lotus Development, Wang, Ziff-Davis, and Digital Equip-ment. We've already shipped our first release for finalevaluation to our existing customer base . .
59. On 8/23/96, SystemSoft held a conference call for
securities analysts, money and portfolio managers, institutional
investors, large SystemSoft shareholders, brokers and stock traders
to discuss SystemSoft's business and its prospects. During the
call, Angelo (the CEO) and Andy Keenan (SystemSoft's controller)
made presentations and answered questions. During the call -- and
in follow-up conversations with participants -- they directly
disseminated important information to the market by stating:
• This was SystemSoft's ninth successive quarter of greaterthan 50% growth. SystemSoft had had a really good quarter.SystemSoft was growing at a rate that would keep going -- 55%all through next year.
• In the SystemWizard OEM marketplace evaluations had beencompleted with six of the ten major desktop players. Thegreat news was that SystemWizard received an A plus from all.SystemWizard continued right on track and was going throughall the evaluation processes and coming out with flyingcolors. The product was very well-positioned.
• There were millions of units committed, out of the box, to just one customer.
- 57 -
• SystemWizard had tremendous upside. SystemWizard wasjust blowing SystemSoft away. The OEMs' reviews of theproduct were just outstanding. It was the best feeling thatSystemSoft ever had about a product. SystemSoft was veryclose to closing SystemWizard deals with major OEMs.
• Volpe and H&Q were close to the Company and knew what washappening with SystemSoft, so people should read theirreports.
• SystemSoft had always grown the Company -- 27 consecutivequarters of 50% or greater revenue growth. As SystemSoft hitthe end of next year it would see a pretty dramatic increase.
• Due to the continued strong demand of its core productsand the success of its SystemWizard product, SystemSoft wasincreasing its F98 forecast to approximately $90 million inrevenue and EPS of about $.65.
During the conference call, Angelo also discussed SystemSoft's
recently announced USB product. He stated:
• USB was announced last quarter. SystemSoft was well outin front of the competition here. SystemSoft was actuallyable to sell new USB products and SystemSoft had a group ofsignificant agreements with companies that it would beannouncing, which would launch SystemSoft heavily into thatmarketplace.
• SystemSoft's USB product was doing very well and was wellpositioned. Intel and Microsoft were giving SystemSoft a lotof support and referrals for USB because SystemSoft was somuch earlier than everybody else in the marketplace.SystemSoft was going to have several companies demonstratingits product at Comdex and it would take the world by storm.
• SystemSoft was having a pleasant experience with USEpricing. SystemSoft had anticipated six months earlier thatthe price would be in the $1 range. SystemSoft thought it wasgoing to be able to tell analysts today about a commitmentwith a very very large printer company, but it did not getpermission to announce it. The software in that deal will bein the $2.50 or so range, per unit, due to the increasedcomplexity of the product.
• SystemSoft expected pretty significant revenues from USBin F98.
60. On 8/23/96, Hambrecht & Quist issued a report on
SystemSoft, written by Baker, which was based on and repeated
information from the 8/22/96 conference call and follow-up
- 58 -
conversations with Angelo and Keenan. The report forecast F98
revenue and EPS of $90 million and $.65, respectively. The report
also stated:
Demand in the core business remains strong . . . .
• The company continues to aggressively move forwardwith SystemWizard . . . .
* * *
• SystemSoft is about to embark on a major new productcycle (SystemWizard) which we believe will create furtherupside appreciation from current price levels.
61. On 9/1/96, an article appeared in Nation's Business about
SystemSoft's new SystemWizard product that stated:
[T]he company in June began shipping Systemwizard . .
* * *
Systemwizard builds on PC card software technology, but the desktop market is five times bigger than the portable business, according to industry analysts. Paul Bloom, an analyst with Volpe, Welty SL Co., an investmentbank in San Francisco, says that Systemsoft's new thrust could boost its earnings by 50 to 100 percent annually "for the next several years."
Bloom, who was with Volpe, got the information about SystemSoft's
EPS growth from Angelo. On 9/10/96, SystemSoft held a luncheon at
the Boston Harbor Hotel for securities analysts, money and
portfolio managers and institutional investors. Angelo announced
that he was not going to read the "Forward-Looking Statement
Disclaimer" that his lawyers gave him and discarded it, throwing it
on the floor. During the presentation, the Company made several
false representations. First, Angelo stated that SystemWizard
would sell for $5-$7 per unit going forward, when he knew such
prices could never be obtained. Second, Angelo stated that there
was "no direct competition," even though he knew CyberMedia not
- 59 -
only had a competitive product "First Aid 95," but was offering to
give it free to PC OEMs. Third, SystemSoft's V.P., Paul Sereiko,
gave a demonstration of how SystemWizard worked. During the
demonstration, the product appeared to quickly detect and correct
several PC set-up problems and to be ready for shipment. However,
this demonstration was bogus, the result of a pre-arranged set-up
where SystemWizard could not fail and was not at all indicative of
SystemWizard's real world actual performance capabilities at that
time.
62. On 11/19/96, SystemSoft's CEO Angelo appeared at the
Comdex/Fall 96 convention in Las Vegas. In a formal presentation
and in a break-out session, he told to the assembled security
analysts, money and portfolio managers, institutional investors,
brokers and stock traders that:
• Demand for SystemSoft's core CardWizard productscontinued to be extremely strong and would continue so for theforeseeable future,
• SystemSoft was continuing to achieve increased marketpenetration with its core products and, as a result,SystemSoft expected extremely strong revenue growth of 40%-50%from its core product line during the next two fiscal years.
• SystemSoft was making very good progress in developingSystemWizard and was "on track" to ship product later in F97and to achieve accelerated volume shipments in F98, whichwould generate some $50 million in new revenue in F98 forSystemSoft.
• SystemSoft's market research and evaluation revealed apotentially huge market for SystemWizard as this product wouldbe incorporated into desktop PCs as well as laptop computers,which would vastly expand SystemSoft's market penetration andprovide huge revenue growth for SystemSott going forward.
• SystemSoft had determined that a royalty fee ofapproximately $5-$7 per SystemWizard unit was reasonable andcould be achieved and thus expected SystemWizard to generatea minimum of $50 million in revenues during F98.
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• SystemSoft already had firm commitments from a number ofPC OEMs to purchase eight million units of SystemWizard bymid-97.
• SystemSoft was in negotiations with every major PCmanufacturer regarding the deployment of SystemWizard and,based upon the state of those negotiations, was confident thatin each quarter going forward it would he able to make anannouncement that one or two major OEMs had accepted and woulddeploy the SystemWizard product.
• SystemWizard was in evaluation at virtually every majorPC manufacturer and was receiving extremely good reviews fromevery PC OEM, which increased SystemSoft's confidence for thesuccess of the product.
• The action of certain smaller PC OEMs in agreeing topurchase SystemWizard validated this technology and showed itstremendous commercial promise.
• Based on discussions with PC OEMs, SystemSoft anticipatedinitial volume deployment of the SystemWizard product in 1/97or 2/97.
• Due to continuing strong demand for its core products, aswell as the favorable reaction of PC 0EMs to SystemWizard,SystemSoft was forecasting 40%-50% growth for the next severalyears and expected F98 revenues of at least $90 million withEPS of at least $.65.
63. On 11/22/96, the Boston Business Journal published an
article on SystemSoft which stated:
SystemSoft Corp. signed three major contracts thisweek that will boost sales of its SystemWizard, asoftware that cuts down on customers' calls to technicalsupport lines.
The deals will help rocket the Natick-based firm's sales to $96 million next year, up from this year's estimated $41.1 million, according to one industryanalyst.
U.S. Robotics Inc. of Skokie, Ill., MicronElectronics Inc. of Nampa, Ind., and AST Computer Inc. ofIrvine, Calif., all have agreed to bundle theSystemWizard software with their products.
The contracts, announced by SystemSoft at the Comdexcomputer trade show in Las Vegas this week, will bring inupwards of $10 million in sales for SystemSoft in 1997.
Earlier this year, systemSoft announced similardeals with Maynard-based Digital Equipment Corp.,
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Cambridge-based Lotus Development corp. and WangLaboratories Inc. of Lowell.
"These deals will give us exposure to millions ofusers," said Paul Sereiko, vice president of marketing atSystemSoft.
* * *
The largest contract signed was with U.S. Robotics,one of the top manufacturers of modems. U.S. Roboticswill bundle SystemWizard with its Sportster modems at thestart of the year.
SystemSoft officials estimate that the U.S. Roboticsdeal will result in the sale of between 5 million and 10million units of the software.
* * *
"These are all extremely good deals," said FrankWalsh, an analyst with Volpe, Welty & Co. in SanFrancisco. "It validates the technology."
The SystemWizard now accounts for less than 10percent of SystemSoft's overall sales, but next yearabout half of all the company's sales will be derivedfrom SystemWizard, Walsh predicted.
The information in this article was provided by Sereiko.
64. Each of the positive statements about SystemSoft's
business during the Class Period between 6/19/96 and 11/22/96, as
set forth in 11 ,5154-63, was materially false and misleading when
issued, and failed to disclose, inter alia, the following adverse
information which was then known only to Defendants due to their
access to internal SystemSoft data:
(a) Based upon communications with PC OEMs, the
SystemSoft Defendants knew that the market potential for
SystemWizard was nowhere near as large as represented and that most
of the large OEMs were satisfied with the status quo because
service calls gave them a chance to sell additional product to
users and were actually generating profits for them;
- 62 -
(b) Based upon communications with PC OEMs, the
SystemSoft Defendants knew that PC OEMs did not have anywhere near
the level of interest in deploying SystemWizard as SystemSoft was
representing and that the most important major PC OEMs, i.e.,
Compaq, Dell, Gateway and IBM, were extremely dubious about and
reluctant to license the product, and SystemSoft was only able to
service the OEM agreements it did have by agreeing to barter
transactions wherein SystemSoft would agree to accept old PC
equipment in exchange for SystemWizard and by promising positions
at SystemSoft to OEM employees, including those at DEC, Hewlett-
Packard and Packard Bell;
(c) Based on marketing studies and other evaluations of
the SystemWizard product they had made, the SystemSoft Defendants
knew that there was no possibility that PC OEMs would ever pay $5
or $6 per SystemWizard unit in large volume transactions and thus
the revenue and profit potential of the SystemWizard product was
actually far less than SystemSoft was forecasting;
(d) SystemSoft did not have firm commitments from PC
OEMs to order eight million SystemWizard units in the next 12
months and, in fact, had agreed to provide million of units to PC
OEMs for free to evaluate or test consumer reaction or on a
deferred pay basis;
(e) Most of the PC OEMs who had purportedly agreed to
utilize SystemWizard were not actually firmly committed to purchase
any specific quantity of the product, but rather, only to accept
shipments for evaluation and, in fact, during such evaluation
process the OEMs were expressing considerable dissatisfaction with
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the product, both in terms of its technical capabilities and its
cost benefit justification;
(f) Due to the difficulties PC OEMs were encountering in
integrating SystemWizard into their PC products and establishing
necessary technical arrangements to accept and process service
calls from SystemWizard, the SystemSoft Defendants knew that volume
deployment of SystemWizard by PC OEMs would be materially delayed
even with those PC manufacturers that had agreed to utilize the
product, and thus SystemSoft's revenue from SystemWizard during F98
would be far less than what was being forecasted;
(g) SystemSoft was not, in fact, achieving consistent
strong quarterly revenue and EPS growth as represented; but rather,
in fact, its revenues were stagnating and it was not achieving EPS
growth which it was concealing by falsifying and manipulating its
financial results by improperly recording revenue from its Digital
Equipment/SystemWizard development contract and from its Asian
distributor, and by restructuring its agreement with Intel to
accelerate payments (and revenue) from later quarters to show
revenue and EPS growth during the Class Period;
(h) SystemSoft's streak of record quarterly revenues and
EPS was not the result of the strong demand for or broad customer
acceptance of its core products as represented; but rather, was due
to the deliberate falsification of SystemSoft's financial results
by improperly recording revenue on its Digital Equipment/
SystemWizard contract and on shipments to its Asian distributor, as
detailed in ¶1183-97;
(1) SystemSoft's revenues and EPS for the 2ndQ F97 were
artificially inflated and falsified due to the manipulation of
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SystemSoft's accounting procedures to improperly record revenue on
the Digital Eguipment/SystemWizard contract and on shipments to its
Asian distributor, as detailed in 11S83-97;
(j) SystemSoft was having significant disagreements with
Digital Equipment about the development of and potential for
SystemWizard and that product's commercial success and it was very
likely Digital Equipment would cancel its systemWizard contract
with SystemSoft, thus triggering a multi-million dollar liability
of SystemSoft to Digital Equipment;
(k) SystemSoft's USE software product was not ahead of
the competition, had created little, if any, customer interest and
virtually no sales, would produce little, if any, revenue in F98,
and would likely have to be sold or spun-off, creating a signifi-
cant write-down of SystemSoft's investment in that product;
(1) Demand for SystemSoft's core products, especially
CardWizard, was softening such that Defendants knew that the rate
of growth in sales of that product would decline dramatically in
the coming months in part because IBM would not order any
CardWizard products until well into F98; and
(m) As a result of the foregoing negative factors which
were negatively impacting Systemsoft's business, Defendants
actually knew that the forecasts of strong revenue and EPS growth
during F98 due to continued strong growth and SystemSoft's core
product line, plus accelerating sales of SystemWizard, were false
when made as those forecasted results were unachieveable.
65. On 11/26/96, SystemSoft issued a release which reported
3rdQ F97 revenues of $10.3 million, slightly below forecasted
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levels, and net income and EPS of $1.7 million and $.07,
respectively. The release was headlined and stated:
SYSTEMSOFT CORPORATION ANNOUNCES RECORD THIRD-QUARTERREVENUES
Revenue growth exceeds 50 percent for ninth consecutivequarter since 1994 IPO
* * *
Total revenues for the quarter ending Oct. 31, 1996were $10.3 million, an increase of 67 percent over $6.2million in the corresponding quarter in fiscal 1996. Netincome for the quarter was $1.7 million on $.07 pershare, compared to $826,000 or $.04 per share for thesame period last year, an increase of 106 percent. . . .
For the first nine months of fiscal year 1997,revenues were $27.6 million, an increase of 60 percentfrom the $17.3 million in the comparable period lastyear. Net income for the first nine months of fiscal1997 was $4.5 million, an increase of 91 percent from$2.3 million last year. Earnings per share for the firstnine months increased to $.18 versus $.10 in fiscal 1996.
FIRST $10 MILLION QUARTER IN COMPANY HISTORY
"I'm very pleased to report that SystemSoftcontinued to enjoy strong revenue and earnings growth,"said Robert F. Angelo, chairman, CEO and president ofSystemSoft. "Our outstanding results through the first nine months of our fiscal year reflect the continuingadoption of SystemSoft technologies by a growing customer base. For the first time in company history, we exceeded$10 million in quarterly revenue, and our net incomegrowth has been extremely strong. Already, this has beenthe most successful year in SystemSoft history . . . ."
Earlier this month, SystemSoft also announcedadditional agreements with OEMs, peripheral manufac-turers, and knowledge partners for its SystemWizard call-avoidance software family. "We've just completed aseries of announcements of partnerships with leadingcomputer and peripheral manufacturers," said Angelo."Our impressive and growing roster of partners --bundling agreements with companies such as U.S. Robotics,Micron Electronics, Packard Bell, AST, and Digital MCS --plus knowledge agreements with Lotus Development,Netscape Communications, PictureTel, BugNet, WesternDigital, and Hayes Microcomputer -- translate into manymillions of units, several million dollars of new revenueover the next 12 months . . . . No other call-avoidance
- 66 -
player has achieved this momentum and pre-eminent position in the market."
In the third quarter, SystemSoft also announced itsnewest product, the Universal Serial Bus Software Suite,which includes firmware and software to enable desktopperipheral manufacturers and PC OEMs to support the USBstandard.
"Our USB software is important because it primarilytargets desktop peripheral-device manufacturers, whichare a new class of customers for SystemSoft," saidAngelo, "Our launch was accompanied by design winsannounced earlier with Canon, Inc. for printers; DaewooElectronics Co. for monitors; and development agreementswith Lucent Technologies Microelectronics Group and NECSemiconductor."
66. On 11/26/96, SystemSoft issued a release headlined and
stating:
SystemSoft Corp. Announces Pact With Packard Bell NEC,Inc. To License SystemWizard Call-Avoidance Software
Largest Manufacturer Of Consumer PCs Will ShipSystemWizardm Client on Packard Sell Systems
SystemSoft Corp. today announced that Packard BellNEC, Inc. -- the second-largest PC vendor in the U.S.according to International Data Corp. -- has agreed tolicense its SystemWizard call-avoidance software family.
* * *
"Our agreement with Packard Bell NEC is tremendouslyexciting to SystemSoft," said Robert F. Angelo, chairman,CEO, and president of SystemSoft. . .
67. On 11/27/96, SystemSoft held a conference call for
securities analysts, money and portfolio managers, institutional
investors, large SystemSoft shareholders, brokers and stock traders
to discuss SystemSoft's business and its prospects. During the
call, Angelo (the CEO) made presentations and answered questions.
During the call -- and in follow-up conversations with participants
-- he directly disseminated important information to the market by
stating:
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• Demand for SysterSoft's core CardWizard productscontinued to be extremely strong and would continue so for theforeseeable future.
• SystemSoft was continuing to achieve increased marketpenetration with its core products and, as a result,SystemSoft expected extremely strong revenue growth of 40%-50%from its core product line during the next two fiscal years.
• SystemSoft was extremely pleased with its performance inthe most recent quarter and its increasing revenue and EPSreflected the continued strong demand for its core products inthe marketplace and broad customer acceptance of itstechnology.
• SysterSoft already had commitments from a number of PCOEMs to purchase 6 million units of SystemWizard by mid-97.Now, in addition, Packard Bell had committed to the product inthe biggest deal to date, which would be worth $16-$20million.
• SystemSoft was "on track" to ship product later in F97and to achieve accelerated volume shipments in F98, whichwould generate millions in new revenue for SystemSoft.
• SystemSoft had agreed to a lower royalty fee forSystemWizard from Packard Bell but, due to increased volumes,SystemSoft still expected SystemWizard to generate a minimumof $40-$50 million in revenues during F98.
• SystemSoft's development partnership with DigitalEquipment for SystemWizard was working very well andSystemSoft expected that Digital Equipment would be utilizingSystemWizard.
• SystemSoft was in negotiations with every major PCmanufacturer regarding the deployment of SystemSoft and, basedupon the state of those negotiations, was confident that ineach quarter going forward it would be able to make anannouncement that one or two major OEMs had accepted and woulddeploy the SystemWizard product.
• SystemWizard was in evaluation at virtually every majorPC manufacturer and was receiving extremely good reviews fromevery PC OEM, which increased SystemSoft's confidence for thesuccess of the product.
• The slight price concessions provided to Packard Bell inorder to induce it to commit to utilize SystemSoft was notinconsistent with SystemSoft's business plan and SystemSoftwas certain that the increased volumes of SystemSoft to beshipped as a result of the Packard Bell deal and deals thatwould flow from it would result in increased SystemSoftrevenues going forward.
- 68 -
• Based on discussions with PC OEMs and the DigitalEquipment contract, SystemSoft anticipated initial volumedeployment of the SystemWizard product in 1/97 or 2/97.
• IBM's commitment to order SystemSoft's CardWizard productduring F97 or early F98 was a substantial indicator of theunderlying strong and indeed growing demand for that product.
• SystemSoft was well out in front of the competition withits USB product and had a group of significant agreements withcompanies to take volume shipments of USE products.
• SystemSoft expected significant revenues from USB in F983as royalties on this product line kicked in earlier thanexpected.
• Due to continuing strong demand for its core products, aswell as the favorable reaction of PC OEMs to SystemWizard,SystemSoft was forecasting at least 40%-50% growth for thenext several years.
• SystemSoft was forecasting F98 revenues of at least $90million with EPS of at least $.65.
68. On 11/27/96, Oppenheimer issued a report on SystemSoft
written by Poyner, which was based on and repeated information
provided in the 11/26/96 conference call and in follow-up conversa-
tions with Angelo and Sommers. The report forecast F98 EPS of $.65
and the following quarterly EPS:
1Qtr. 2Otr. 3Otr. 40tr. Year
FY 1998E Current $0.10E $0.14E $0.18E $0.23E $0.65E
The report stated:
SystemSoft . . . reported October third-quarter resultsof $0.07 on revenue of $10.3 million . . . the revenuewas about out $500,000 lower than our model . . .
* * *
Perhaps more important than the earnings release wasan additional announcement that the company had signed upPackard Bell, the largest U.S. consumer PC vendor, tobundle SystemWizard for three years on its entire productline. Phase-in of the software is to begin in Januaryand is expected to be up to full implementation by May. . . SystemSoft management estimated that the worth of the three-year deal would amount to a total of between $16 million to $20 million, the biggest deal to date for
- 69 -
SystemWizard. However, the company did concede that toland such a high-volume customer the unit pricing wasdiscounted heavily to somewhere in the area of $2-$3 perunit versus our overall average forecast of about $5 perunit in the fiscal 1998 forecast based on five millionunits. However, the import of the deal goes beyond thevolume . . . .
* * *
To date, we estimate that SystemSoft has lined up PCvendors and PC service providers that should bundleSystemWizard on at least six million units in f4=,-A1 1998, perhaps more, with the expectation of further agreements to be announced at the rate of one or two per quarter going forward. Even with a lower average royaltyrate than $5, we think the revenue visibility for this product line is looking exciting now. . . . SystemSofthas many ways to skin its revenue cat in the next fewfiscal years.
69. On 11/27/96, Hambrecht & Quist issued a report on
SystemWizard written by Bakar, which was based on and repeated
information provided in the conference call and in follow-up
conversations with Angelo and Sommers. The report forecast F98
revenues and EPS of $90 million and $.65 respectively, and the
following quarterly F98 revenue and EPS:
EPS Revenue QI$0.11E $17 millionQ2 $0.14E $20 millionQ3$0.18E $24 millionQ4 $0.22E $29 millionYear $0.65E $90.0E
The report also stated:
• Demand in the core business remains very strongdriven by accelerating revenues from recently-addedcustomers and ramping revenue contributions from therecently-introduced CardWizard NT products.
• Partnership agreements with U.S. Robotics, MicroElectronics, and, most importantly, Packard Bell forSystemWizard will enable SystemSoft to enloy acceleratingrevenue and earnings growth in F98.
• We expect SystemSoft to continue aggressivelypursuing OEM opportunities for its SystemWizardtechnology with major PC vendors in Q4 and F98.
- 70 -
* * *
. Given the number of large customers signedduring the course of fiscal 1997 (IBM, Toshiba, Apple,Texas Instruments), a broadening product line (whichshould translate into increasing per unit royalties), andthe very healthy unit shipments trends projected in thenotebook computer market in 1997, we believe thatSystemSoft will enjoy at least 40%-50% growth in the core business for the foreseeable future.
* * *
. . Most importantly, however! SystemSoftyesterday announced that Packard Bell has adopted itsSystemWizard technology for Packard Bell's entireconsumer PC line. Specifically, Packard Bell has signeda three-year agreement with SystemSoft worthapproximately $16-$20 million over the life of thecontract. Given that Packard Bell is expected to shipPCs including SystemWizard in January, we expect revenue contributions to be minimal in the fourth quarter, followed by revenues from SystemWizard of approximately85 million in fiscal 1998. All of these agreements overthe past month are clearly establishing SystemSoft as one of the leading software providers in the huge and rapidly growing technical support market. . . . In fact, we remain quite confident in the company's ability to announce at least one OEM partnership agreement for its SystemWizard technology in each and every quarter over the course of fiscal 1998.
* * *
Maintaining Estimates and Rating. As mentionedearlier ! SystemSoft has consistently achieved 50%-plusyear-over-year revenue growth in each quarter over thepast several years, a trend that we project will continue in the fourth quarter and, in fact, will accelerate in fiscal 1998. Moreover, we anticipate that demand in the core PC Card software business will remain very strongentering fiscal 1998 and will likely continue for the foreseeable future. We continue to believe thatSystemSoft will enjoy at least 40%-50% revenue growth inthis business in fiscal 1996. Most importantly, with thelaunch of its SystemWizard technology during the fourthquarter, we believe the company will enicy acceleratingrevenue and earnings momentum in each and every quarter in fiscal 1998. The company remains extremely well positioned to take advantage of the rapidly growing call avoidance market opportunity which should become quite significant beginning in calendar 1997. . . SystemSoft's fundamentals remain quite sound with the SystemWizard pay off beginning in the first quarter of fiscal 1998.
- 71 -
70. Because of concerns over SystemSoft's 3rdQ F97 revenue
shortfall and the price discount given Packard Bell on its
SystemWizard contract, SystemSoft i s stock declined to as low as
$17-3/4 on 11/27/96.
71. On 11/29/96, Oppenheimer issued a report on SystemWizard
written by Poyner. This report was written after Poyner had
extensive discussions with Angelo and was based on and repeated
information provided by him. The report forecast F98 EPS of $0.65
and the following quarterly F98 results:
10tr. 2ctr. 3Qtr. 40tr. Year
FY 1998E Current $0.10E $0.14E $0.18E $0.23E $0.65E
The report also stated:
What should have been a major piece of positivenews, the announcement of SystemWizard pact with PackardBell lasting three years that could generate $16 millionor more over the contract life, instead turned into aselloff for the stock Wednesday. Why? Investors wereconcerned that the deeply discounted price of about $2 per unit versus the more typical $4-$6 range the company had been using for earlier contracts signaled a collapsein the pricing strategy, thereby creating the potentialfor revenue disappointment in fiscal 1998. While ourforecast for fiscal 1998 had incorporated an assumptionof about five million units of SystemWizard beingdistributed by OEMs at an average of $5 a unit to yield$25 million, the Packard Bell deal does not necessarily mean that is unachievable . . . . fW]e continue to feelcomfortable at this point with our revenue assumption forthe product. But . . . the core business based on thenotebook software offerings and now software associatedwith Universal Serial Bus implementation is seeingimproved visibility and potential upside relative to ourforecast as well. And we think it is worth by itself inthe $15-$20 range without stretching relative valuation.
Thus the SystemWizard business is basically "free,"or being deemed a zero-revenue business, in our opinion.No investor, however concerned he may be about thepricing issue, should conclude that SystemWizard has zerorevenue potential. In fact, a higher-unit, lower-pricemodel is precisely the approach Microsoft . . . used sobrilliantly a few years ago when it dropped the price ofits applications Excel, Word and PowerPoint, selling them
- 72 -
in the now-famous Office suite for a three-for-the-price-of-one strategy. Investors didn't dump Microsoft becausethey figured out that unit volume would rise; competitionwould be crushed; and, most importantly, a much largerupgrade-revenue potential would be established.SystemSoft is behaving no differently in trying toestablish with lightning speed critical mass forSystemWizard that will increase unit penetration, cutcompetition off at the pass, and establish a user baseripe for further upgrades.
72. On 12/31/96, Investor's Business Daily published an
article about SystemSoft's SystemWizard product, which interviewed
O'Connell and stated:
O'Connell: I was at Dell Computer Corp. (of Austin,Texas) last week, and they get over90,000 phone calls a week. They believethat will grow to over 20 million phonecalls a year by '98. And each call costs$22 on average.
Dell management sees technical support asthe biggest issue they have to address inthe next two or three years. And this istrue for all the major manufacturers ofdesktop computers.
* *
TVD: How big is the market for SystemWizare"?
O'Connell: It's a billion dollar market.
73. On 1/13/97, SystemSoft's V.P., Sereiko, and Sommers,
SystemSoft's CFO, appeared at the Wall Street Forum-Institutional
Investors Conference at the Marriott East Side Hotel in New York
City. In a formal presentation and in a later break-out session,
Sereiko and Sommers told the assembled security analysts, money and
portfolio managers, institutional investors, brokers and stock
traders:
The SystemWizard server . . has been shipping, shippedin June and is being integrated into call centers atcompanies like AST and Packard Bell and Microntoday. . . So the bottom line is there is a sicfnificant revenue opportunity here . . Call-
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avoidance software represents a dramatic expansion of ouraddressable marketplace.
* * *
. . The Systemwizard server, which shipped to OEMcustomers in July of this year and is being integrated atAST, at Packard Bell, Micron, I've said these a few timesnow, these customers will all start shipping SystemWizard desktops . . . either the end of, targets range from theend of this month to the end of February.
* * *
. . And, last, our favorite chart. This chartrepresents, from the time the company has gone public,our steady revenue growth, and it's really a chart withwhich we're very proud. It is an indicator not only of the predictability of our performance as a company but of the stability of our earnings, revenue and earnings arowth and our, the strength, we believe, of our product development and management policies. We hit last quarter our first 10-million-dollar auarter, and that represents more than a 50 percent growth year over year. We expect that growth . . . to continue and accelerate in the future. . . .
74. On 1/14/97, Paul Sereiko, SystemSoft's V.P.-Marketing,
was interviewed at the Wall Street Forum-Institutional Investors
Conference by the NBC Private Financial Network and said:
Sereikc: [W]e use events like the Wall Street, youknow, like the Wall Street Forum and someof the other conferences that we go toperiodically to address large groups ofpeople with a very consistent message sothat everybody's hearing the same story and hopefully so we can manage against these inflated expectations that sometimes afflict high-tech companies.
Schacknow: I don't recall that there have been anyhad news announcements since Comdex,Upbeat earnings reports, a number ofmajor agreements, which we'll talk aboutin a moment. What do you think has beenthe problem? The stock has dropped quitea bit since the time we spoke at Comdex.. . [And probably not related to the performance of the company.
Sereiko: Yeah. Yeah, we have announced a lot of really great news since then. . .
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[Sjhortly after Comdex we announced ourthird quarter earnings, which were inline with expectations. We were verypleased to do that. Around the same time, we announced some significant, you know, some significant agreements, SystemWizard agreements, with one of the largest manufacturers in the world, Packard Bell, for example.
* *
You know, frankly, the news has all been very good, and we're very excited about, You know, about all the things that we've been doing, and our business has beenright on target. I think that a coupleof things, you know, a couple of thingshave happened that might have causedsome, you know, somewhat of a negativeeffect on the stock price, and one ofthem is being, you know, some miscommuni-cations about the Packard Bell contract.That contract in fact is one of the largest ones and the most significantones that this company has ever done. Wedescribed the valuation of the contracton our conference call, and it wassomehow extrapolated into a per-unitprice that was somewhat less than themarket apparently was looking for.
* * *
The fact is it's a very importantcontract for us. Packard Bell is one of the largest shippers of computers in the world . . . but I don't think that thecontract was received very well on WallStreet simply because of some, you know,erroneous math, basically.
Schacknow: Do you feel you made progress incorrecting that perception today and inother appearance like this?
Sereiko: [A]bsolutely, and . . . we've taken a lotof calls, both individually, our CEO, BobAngelo, has taken a lot of calls over thepast couple of weeks, and we've beendealing with investors as they, you know,as they call us, and I think we did make some progress this week. And, you know,one of the messages that I was trying toget across at the conference today is,
- 75 -
and one of the things that's veryinteresting about SystemSoft, is we havedelivered a very consistent, verypredictable performance over the ten-plus quarters since we've been public, and, you know, consistency and predictabilityare two of the hallmarks of things that you want to see in well-performing companies.
* *
Schacknow: SystemWizard hit the market with somegreat previews, and nice things have beensaid about it since then. How is thatparticular program going versus originalexpectations?
Sereiko: Well, you know, to tell the truth, we'vebeen on target with our expectations for the business. . We're very pleasedwith the progress . . . .
* * *
Schacknow: Okay. So tell me about plans forSystemWizard just for 1997 . . . .
* * *
Sereiko: AST, Micron, and Packard Bell are allscheduled to ship their firstSystemWizard desktop sometime before,somewhere either the end of January orearly February, that time frame, we'reexpecting to see the first shipmentsstart coming our from those OEMs.
75. On 1/22/97, Oppenheimer issued a report on SystemSoft,
written by Poyner. This report was written after Poyner had
extensive discussions with Angelo and was based on and repeated
information Angelo provided him. Angelo reviewed this report
before it was issued and assured Poyner it was substantially
accurate knowing it would be publicly issued and affect the total
mix of information impacting SystemSoft's stock price. The re'oort
forecast F98 EPS of $.65 and the following F98 quarterly results:
- 76 -
QI $.10EQ2 $.14EO3 $.18EQ4 $.23EYear $.65E
The report also stated:
SystemSoft continues to stagger under selling pressuredue most recently to concerns about the January fourthquarter's earnings performance, which We expect to bereleased in late February or early March. However, we believe the concerns are misplaced . . . .
. . . We do not, however, expect SystemWizard to bea large royalty contributor in the quarter because thelargest PC OEM signed to date, Packard Bell, is notexpected to begin deployment of the software on its PCsuntil mid February, about two weeks later than originally estimated . . . .
76. On 2/14/97, Oppenheimer issued a report on SystemSoft,
written by Poyner. This report was written after Poyner had
discussions with Angelo and Sommers and was based on and repeated
information provided him by them, and stated:
Micron Electronics announced Thursday that it isstarting to ship SystemSoft's new technical-supportsoftware, SystemWizard, with all of its Home MPC andMillennia desktops . . . . We expect the largestlicensee to date, Packard Bell, to follow suit as soon asthis month as well.
In view of the tremendous investor attention giventhe SystemWizard rollout, this announcement is a positive in that it demonstrates that SystemSoft now has a production-ready on-line system that will begin to provide some empirical data with regard to saving a PC OEM money in delivering technical support.
77. In late 2/97, the Individual Investor's Special
Situations Report issued a report on SystemSoft. This report was
written after the author had extensive discussions with Angelo and
Sommers and was based on and repeated information provided him by
them. Angelo and Sommers reviewed this report before it was issued
and assured the author it was substantially accurate knowing it
- 77 -
would be publicly issued and affect the total mix of information
impacting SystemSoft's stock price. The report stated:
SystemSoft has lost more than half its value overthe last five months, which has created a company that ismisunderstood and an excellent buying opportunity.
The downward spiral started in October 1996, whenBarron's placed SystemSoft on a list of overvaluedtechnology stocks. Subsequent bad news included lower-than-expected third quarter revenues for the period endedOctober and a report from the Center for FinancialResearch and Analysis that questioned two of thecompany's accounting policies.
Yet SSR believes that both stories have combined toforce SystemSoft into an undervalued situation.SystemSoft is growing its core business over 50% with anexciting new product about to be released . . Itsnew "call avoidance" software could not come at a bettertime
* *
[T]he market seems overly concerned about the discountedprices announced in SystemSoft's deal with Packard Bellwhich could generate $16 to $20 million in revenue. Theprice per unit was less than the more typical $4 to $6range the company used for earlier contracts.
Investors took this as a sign of collapsing pricingand the potential for a revenue shortfall. What themarket did not account for is that in most businessmodels, companies discount their product for earlyadopters to increase brand awareness. This in turn willhelp SystemSoft license SystemWizard to other potentialOEMs at a higher price. SystemSoft expects to announceone or two OEM agreements in each quarter during fiscal1998. The company is currently in negotiations with all the top 10 PC manufacturers in the world.
* * *
In fiscal 1998, look for sales growth of 122% to $91million, and earnings growth of 157% to $0.67 per share
SystemWizard, which will contribute minimal revenuein fiscal 1997, should contribute about $46 million to fiscal 1998 revenue. This comprises revenue fromSystemWizard server/engineering and royalties. Thenumber of units shipped should be between eight and ninemillion, with a price from $3 to $5. The core notebookrevenue should grow by 40%, a reasonable number based on
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industry growth and SystemSoft's past ability to grow thecore business at greater than 50%.
78. Each of the positive statements about SystemSoft's
business between 11/26/96-2/97, as detailed in 1165-77, were
materially false and misleading when issued. They also failed to
disclose, inter alia, the following adverse information which was
then known only to Defendants due to their access to internal
SystemSoft data and disclosure of which was required to be made to
make the statements made not misleading:
(a) Based upon communications with PC OEMs, the
SystemSoft Defendants knew that the market potential for
SystemWizard was nowhere near as large as represented and that most
of the large OEMs were satisfied with the status quo because
service calls gave them a chance to sell additional product to
users and were actually generating profits for them;
(b) Based upon communications with PC OEMs, the
SystemSoft Defendants knew that PC OEMs did not have anywhere near
the level of interest in deploying SystemWizard as SystemSoft was
representing and that the most important major PC OEMs, i.e.,
Compaq, Dell, Gateway and IBM, were extremely dubious about and
reluctant to license the product;
(c) Based on their discussions with PC OEMs, the
SystemSoft Defendants knew that there was no possibility that major
PC OEMs would pay for SystemWizard units in large volume in the
near term and thus the revenue and profit potential of the
SystemWizard product was actually far less than SystemSoft was
forecasting;
- 79 -
(d) Due to difficulties PC OEMs were encountering in
integrating systemWizard into their PC products and establishing
necessary technical arrangements to accept service calls from
SystemWizard, the SystemSoft Defendants knew that volume deployment
of SystemWizard by PC OEMs would be materially dela yed, even with
those PC manufacturers that had agreed to utilize the product and
thus SystemSoft's revenue from SystemWizard during F98 would be far
less than what was being forecasted;
(e) SystemSoft did not have firm commitments from PC
OEMs to pay for six million SystemWizard units and, in fact, had
agreed with several PC OEMs that they did not have to pay for the
product, but rather, could ship it on a test basis to test customer
reaction;
(f) Few of the PC OEMs who had purportedly agreed to
utilize SystemWizard were actually firmly committed to purchase any
specific quantity of the product, but rather, only to accept
shipments for evaluation and, in fact, during such evaluation
process the OEMs were expressing considerable dissatisfaction with
the product, both in terms of its technical capabilities and its
cost benefit justification;
(g) Because SystemWizard was achieving extremely limited
success with PC OEMs, it was not true that this product was vastly
expanding SystemSoft's potential marketplace by opening up desktop
computers to it and thus, in fact, SystemSoft remained a company
dependent upon selling its products into the smaller and slower-
growing mobile or laptop computer industry and thus did not have
the prospects for revenue and EPS growth being represented;
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(h) SystemSoft was not, in fact, achieving consistent
strong quarterly revenue and EPS growth as represented; but rather,
in fact, its revenues were stagnating and it was not achieving EPS
growth which it was concealing by falsifying and manipulating its
financial results by improperly recording revenue from its Digital
Equipment/SystemWizard development contract and from its Asian
distributor and by restructuring its agreement with Intel to
accelerate payments (and revenue) from later quarters to show
revenue and EPS growth during the Class Period;
(i) SystemSoft's streak of record quarterly revenues and
EPS was not the result of the strong demand for or broad customer
acceptance of its core products as represented; but rather, was due
to the deliberate falsification of SystemSoft's financial results
by improperly recording revenue on its Digital Equipment/
SystemWizard contract and on shipments to its Asian distributor, as
detailed in VI83-97;
(j) SystemSoft's revenues and EPS for the 3rdQ F97 were
artificially inflated and falsified due to the manipulation of
SystemSoft's accounting procedures to record revenue improperly on
the Digital Equipment/SystemWizard contract and revenues on
shipments to its Asian distributor, as detailed in TT83-97;
(k) SystemSoft's USB software product was not ahead of
the competition, had created little, if any, customer interest and
virtually no sales, would produce little, if any, revenue in F98,
and would likely have to be sold or spun-off, creating a signifi-
cant write-down of SystemSoft's investment in that product;
(1) Demand for SystemSoft's core products, especially
CardWizard, was softening such that Defendants knew that the rate
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of growth in sales of that product would decline dramatically in
the coming months in part because IBM would not order any
CardWizard products until well into F98;
(m) SystemSoft had been advised by Digital Equipment
that Digital Equipment was going to cancel its SystemWizard
development contract with SystemSoft, which triggered a multi-
million dollar liability of SystemSoft to Digital Equipment; and
(n) As a result of the foregoing negative factors which
were negatively impacting SystemSoft's business, Defendants
actually knew that the forecasts of strong revenue and EPS growth
during P98, due to continued strong growth and SystemSoft's core
product line, plus accelerating sales of SystemWizard, were false
when made as those forecasted results were unachieveable.
79. On 3/3/97, SystemSoft's stock traded as high as $17-5/8.
After the close of trading on 3/3/97, SystemSoft reported its 4thQ
F97 results, which were in line with expectations, due to
SystemSoft's continuing its financial and accounting manipulations.
However, SystemSoft also revealed that the implementation of
SystemWizard was taking longer than expected and it would obtain
much less revenue from SystemWizard in the first half of F98 than
it had earlier forecasted! In addition, the Company had suffered
a delay in shipments of its CardWizard product by IBM, indicating
weakening demand for its core product line. As a result, analysts
slashed their F98 revenue and EPS forecasts for SystemSoft and its
stock collapsed from $17-5/8 on 3/3/97 to as low as $11-1/8 on
3/4/97 -- a 37% one-day decline on volume of 6.1 million shares --
by far the largest one-day price decline and the largest one-day
trading volume in SystemSoft's history as a public company!
- 82 -
80. During 97, i.e., SystemSoft's F98, SystemSoft
consistently reported disappointing results with stagnant revenues
and EPS far below the levels earlier forecast, as the rollout of
SystemWizard was delayed again and again, few if any large PC GEMs
adopted the product, and the revenues from the product were way
below earlier expectations. In 5/97, SystemSoft's 10-K for the
year ended 1131/97, revealed for the first time that Digital
Equipment had cancelled its research and development contract for
SystemWizard with SystemSoft in 2/97 -- during the Class Period --
resulting in a $6.7 million liability of SystemSoft to Digital
Equipment. Ultimately, SystemSoft revealed major accounting write-
offs which would result in a large loss for F98 -- not the
substantial increase in EPS to $.65 forecast durInd the Class
Period, on revenues of only about $43 million -- less than half the
$90 million forecast during the Class Period.
81. In discussions with analysts on 2/6/98, Angelo admitted
to being in "mortal shock" over these "embarrassing" developments,
i.e., SystemSoft's large operating loss and multi-million dollar
write-offs, and said that SystemSoft had suspended hiring
indefinitely and would, at best, breakeven in following quarters.
Angelo also said "We're writing-off [$12-$14 million] many, many
things that just had no value." He admitted that the USB business
was being spun-off as "the cost of doing USB business continues to
outweigh the short-term benefits," that SystemSoft was receiving no
payment for the business and was writing-off its investment in it.
As to SystemWizard, Angelo admitted SystemSoft did not even know
what its "installed base" of that product was, was no longer even
tracking that, and that "SystemWizard revenue continued to
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experience "very long" implementation cycles which "pushes revenue
out" and even "two new wins . . unfortunately didn't carry a lot
of revenue with them." When Angelo admitted that these huge losses
wiped out all SystemSoft's retained earnings and "obviously put
that into a large loss," one analyst erupted, saying "So . . . you
guys have . . . never made a nickel at the end of the day when you
add it all up," to which Angelo said, "I agree with you." When
asked if the current write-downs related to questions raised about
SystemSoft's accounting in a Forbes article a year earlier,
Pedevillano said "No, it wasn't related to that article."
82. Angelo was ultimately removed from overseeing the day-to-
day operations. The Boston Business Journal reported on this
change of leadership at SystemSoft:
Deborah Besemer, who was named president and chiefoperating officer, has taken over day-to-day operations at SystemSoft. . .
The move is seen as an attempt to stabilizeSystemSoft's stock price and bolster the company'sefforts at marketing its latest product, SystemWizard. . .
Analysts have been critical about the company forseveral months, since SystemWizard has yet to generateits expected revenue.
* * *
Aaron Edelheit, an analyst with New York-basedIndividual Investment Group, said the main problem withSystemWizard has been a lack of support from the majorplayers in the computer industry, such as Dell ComputerCorp. of Austin, Texas, and Compaq Computer Corp. ofHouston.
Edelheit said prolonged product testing, andallowing computer makers to have the product for free,may continue to depress SystemWizard's revenue figuresinto 1998.
. . "The problem is no one's paying for it[SystemWizard]."
- 84 -
Analysts were furious -- Hambrect & Quist's Bakar complained, "The
Company set expectations for SystemWizard well above what reality
suggested." The Special Situations Report stated it was "dis-
appointed in management' s failure, after repeated conversations, to
communicate its feeling of unrealistic expectations for System-
Wizard in fiscal 1998." Poymer complained that "we were caught by
surprise by the magnitude of the revenue shortfall," "we have lost
confidence in the model," and this "serious shortfall has damaged
credibility significantly," while Bloom of Volpe characterized
SystemSoft's F98 results as "shocking." SystemSoft's apparent
Profitable growth in F96 and F97 -- due to Defendants' manipula-
tions and falsification of SystemSoft's financial statements -- and
its horrible F98 results when the Digital Equipment contract was
cancelled, demand for its core products declined and its
SystemWizard product failed to achieve significant sales, is set
forth below:
SystemSoft CorporationQuarterLy Revenues & Earnings
(in thousands, except E?S)
F1996
4/30/95 7/30/95 10/31/95 1/31/96 Year
Revenues $ 5,181 $ 5,898 $ 6,189 $ 7,321 $ 24,589Net income $ 645 $ 868 $ 826 $ 1,253 $ 3,591EPS $.03 $.04 $.04 $.06 $.16
F1997
4/30/96 7/30/96 10/31/96 1/31/97 Year
Revenues $ 8,060 $ 9,291 $10,308 $12,019 $ 39,688Net income $ 1,278 $ 1,489 $ 1,702 $ 1,950 $ 6,419EPS $.06 $.06 $.07 $.os* $.26*
Excludes effects of $46.5 million write-oft for in-process R&D from anacquisition.
P1998
4/30/97 7/30/97 10/31/97 1/31198 (Estimated byManagement)
Revenues $12,477 $12.905 $13,233 $ 4,000 -$ 5,000
Net income (loss($ 2,019 $ 749 $ 944 $15,800Y-($113,000)EPS (loss) $.08 $.03 $.04 ($ 68)-($,73(
- 85 -
SYSTEMSOFT'S FALSE FINANCIALREPORTING DURING THE CLASS PERIOD
83. In order to inflate the price of SystemSoft's stock,
SystemSoft falsely manipulated and falsified its reported results
for the 4thQ of F96 and lstQ, 2ndQ and 3rdQ of F97 through improper
revenue recognition on research and development advances from
Digital Equipment and also pursuant to distribution agreement
through the Company's Asian subsidiary, thereby materially
overstating its revenue, net income and EPS in each of 4th F96, and
IstQ, 2ndQ and 3rdQ F97. Ultimately, when its research and
development agreement with Digital Equipment was terminated,
SystemSoft had to repay Digital Equipment $6.75 million. The Asian
distribution agreement was also terminated and SystemSoft had to
take a $4 million charge to reflect the pay-off to those
distributors.
84. SystemSoft reported the following quarterly results
during the Class Period:
4thQF96 1stQF97 2ndQF97 3rdQF971/31/96 4/30/96 7/31/96 10/31/96
Revenue $7.32 M $8.05 M $9.29 M $10.31 MNet Income $1.25 M $1.28 M $1.49 M $1.70 MEPS $ 0.06 $ 0.06 $ 0.06 $ 0.07
85. SystemSoft included its 4thQ F96 results in its Form 10-K
filed with the SEC. which 10-K was signed by An gelo, Sommers,
Goldman, King and McNeff and represented that SystemSoft's F96
results were fairly presented in accordance with GAAP.
SystemSoft's lstQ, 2ndQ and 3rdQ F97 results were included in
SystemSoft's Form 10-Q's filed with the SEC. The Form 10-Q's were
signed by Angelo and Sommers. They each represented that the
- 86 -
financial statements included "all adjustments . . . necessary for
a fair presentation."
86. These representations were false and misleading when
made. SystemSoft's financial statements for 4thQ F96 and istQ,
2ndQ and 3rdQ F97 were not fair presentations of SystemSoft's
results and were presented in violation of GAAP and SEC rules.
87. GAAP are those principles recognized by the accounting
profession as the conventions, rules and procedures necessary to
define accepted accounting practice at a particular time. SEC
Regulation S-X (17 C.F.R. 5210.4-01(a)(1)) states that the
financial statements filed with the SEC which are not prepared in
compliance with GAAP are presumed to be misleading and inaccurate,
despite footnote or other disclosure. Regulation S-X requires that
interim financial statements must also comply with GAAP, with the
exception that interim financial statements need not include
disclosure which would be duplicative of disclosures accompanying
annual financial statements. 17 C.F.R. 5210.10-01(a).
Digital Equipment Revenue
88. The Defendants caused SystemSoft to falsify its reported
financial results through its improper revenue recognition on
SystemSoft's development agreements with Digital Equipment.
Pursuant to GAP, SystemSoft should have recorded funds provided
pursuant to these agreements as liabilities (advances) rather than
as income. Contrary to GAAP, SystemSoft recorded those funds as
income, thereby materially overstating the Company's reported
revenues, net income and EPS during the Class Period.
89. GAAP, as set forth in FASB Statement of Accounting
Standard ("SFAS") No. 68, Research and Development Arrangements,
- 87 -
requires that an entity should record a liability for any advances
it is obligated to repay regardless of the outcome of the research
and development project. SFAS No. 68, 4,1T5-6 state:
5. If the enterprise is obligated to repay any of thefunds provided by the other parties regardless of theoutcome of the research and development, the enterpriseshall estimate and recognize that liability. Thisrequirement applies whether the enterprise may settle theliability by paying cash, by issuing securities, or bysome other means.
6. To conclude that a liability does not exist, thetransfer of the financial risk involved with research anddevelopment from the enterprise to the other parties mustbe substantive and genuine. To the extent that theenterprise is committed to repay any of the fundsprovided by the other parties regardless of the outcomeof the research and development, all or part of the riskhas not been transferred. The following are someexamples in which the enterprise is committed to repay:
a. The enterprise guarantees, or has acontractual commitment that assures, repayment ofthe funds provided by the other parties regardlessof the outcome of the research and development.
b. The other parties can require the enterpriseto purchase their interest in the research anddevelopment regardless of the outcome.
c. The other parties automatically will receivedebt or equity securities of the enterprise upontermination or completion of the research anddevelopment regardless of the outcome.
90. SystemSoft's agreement with Digital Equipment did not
transfer financial risk with regard to the development of call-
avoidance software from SystemSoft to Digital Equipment because the
agreement required the Company to effectively repay Digital
Equipment for the engineering advances regardless of the outcome,
either through royalties or repayment. In fact, when the agreement
with Digital Equipment was terminated in 2/97, SystemSoft was
required to pay Digital Equipment $6.5 million. In its F96 Annual
Report and 4/30/97 Form 10-Q, SystemSoft for the first time
- 88 -
revealed that the agreement had been terminated in 2/97, and that
the Company would be paying Digital Equipment $5.5 million in
installments running through 10/97 and would be not receiving a
$1.25 million receivable from Digital Equipment which was
eliminated in the quarter ended 4/30/97.
Distributor Revenue Recognition
91. During F96, SystemSoft established an Asia-Pacific office
in Taipai, Taiwan and a subsidiary (SystemSoft K.K.) in Japan. In
order to report strong and increasing software license fee revenue
during the Class Period, SystemSoft improperly recognized revenue
on distribution agreements through its Asian subsidiary and office,
which agreements provided that sales to the distributors were
contingent on resale.
92. GAP, as set forth in AICPA Statement of Position ("SOP")
91-1, Software Revenue Recognition, states that revenue from
software licenses should only be recognized where certain
conditions are met, including that the software has been
unconditionally accepted. SOP 91-1 states:
If, after delivery, there is significant uncertaintyabout customer acceptance of the software, licenserevenue should not be recognized until the uncertaintybecomes insignificant.
* * *
Revenue from cancelable licenses should not berecognized until the cancellation privileges lapse.Revenue from licenses with cancellation privilegesexpiring ratably over the license period should berecognized ratably over the license period as thecancellation privileges lapse. That is consistent withcustomer obligations to pay only one monthly or periodicpayment at a time. In applying the provisions of thisparagraph, warranties that are routine, short-term, andrelatively minor and short-term rights of return, such asthirty-day, money-back guarantees, should not beconsidered cancellation privileges; they should be
- 89 -
accounted for in conformity with FASB Statement No. 5,Accounting for Contingencies, and FASB Statement No. 48,Revenue Recognition When Right of Return Exists.
As part of their standard sales terms or as mattersof practice, vendors may grant resellers rights toexchange unsold software for other software. Suchexchanges, including those referred to as "stockbalancing arrangements", are returns and should beaccounted for in conformity with FASB Statement No. 48,even if the vendors require the resellers to purchaseadditional software to exercise the exchange rights.
SOP 91-1.36, .53-.54 (footnoted added).
93. In violation of CRAP, SystemSoft improperly recognized
revenue on software licenses purportedly sold through Asian
distributors, thereby materially overstating its business and
earnings.
94. Ultimately, these distribution agreements were rescinded
when the Asian distributors could not successfully resell the
Company's products. SystemSoft was forced to take a $4 million
charge in connection with the rescission and repay the distributors
for amounts they had paid SystemSoft. SystemSoft timed the
announcement of this write-off and repayment with an announcement
of the acquisition of Radish Communications Systems, Inc. in 12/96
to minimize its actual adverse impact.
95. Due to the Company's improper revenue recognition, its
revenues, net income and EPS were overstated by at least the
following amounts:
SFAS No. 48 requires that where the buyer's obligation to paythe seller is contingent on resale of the product, recognition ofrevenue should not occur until the product is resold or the rightto return expires. SFAS No. 48, ¶56 -7.
- 90 -
44 F96 01 F97 02 F97 03 F97Reported Revenue $7.32 M $8.05 M $9.29 M $10.31 MActual Revenue $4.81 M $6.62 M $6.83 M $ 9.00 M% Overstated 52.2% 21.6% 36.1% 159s
Reported Net Income $1.25 M $1.28 M $1.49 M $ 1.70 MActual Net Inc(loss) ($.22 M) $0.58 M $0.29 M $ 1.23 M% Overstated 100% 120% 410% 36%
Reported EPS $ 0.06 $ 0.06 $0.06 $ 0.07Actual EPS ($0.01) $ 0.02 $0.01 $ 0.05% Overstated 100% 200% 500% 40%
96. Due to these accounting improprieties, the Company
presented its financial results and statements in a manner which
violated GAAP, including the following fundamental accounting
principles:
(a) The principle that interim financial reporting
should be based upon the same accounting principles and practices
used to prepare annual financial statements (APB No. 28, 110);
(b) The principle that financial reporting should
provide information that is useful to present and potential
investors and creditors and other users in making rational
investment, credit and similar decisions was violated (PASS
Statement of Concepts No. 1, 134);
(c) The principle that financial reporting should
provide information about the economic resources of an enterprise,
the claims to those resources, and effects of transactions, events
and circumstances that change resources and claims to those
resources was violated (FASB Statement of Concepts No. 1, 140);
(d) The principle that financial reporting should
provide information about how management of an enterprise has
discharged its stewardshi p responsibility to owners (stockholders)
for the use of enterprise resources entrusted to it was violated.
- 91 -
To the extent that management offers securities of the enterprise
to the public, it voluntarily accepts wider responsibilities for
accountability to prospective investors and to the public in
general (FASB Statement of Concepts No. 1, ¶50);
(e) The principle that financial reporting should
provide information about an enterprise's financial performance
during a period was violated. Investors and creditors often use
information about the past to help in assessing the prospects of an
enterprise. Thus, although investment and credit decisions reflect
investors' expectations about future enterprise performance, those
expectations are commonly based at least partly on evaluations of
past enterprise performance (FASB Statement of Concepts No. 1,
¶42);
(f) The principle that financial reporting should be
reliable in that it represents what it purports to represent was
violated. That information should be reliable as well as relevant
is a notion that is central to accounting (FASB Statement of
Concepts No. 2, ¶158-59);
(g) The principle of completeness, which means that
nothing is left out of the information that may be necessary to
insure that it validly represents underlying events and conditions
was violated (FASB Statement of Concepts No. 2, 1179); and
(h) The principle that conservatism be used as a prudent
reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainties and
risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered was
violated. The best way to avoid injury to investors is to try to
ensure that what is reported represents what it purports to
represent (FASB Statement of Concepts No. 2, 1!195, 97).
- 92 -
97. Further, the undisclosed adverse information concealed by
Defendants during the Class Period is the type of'Information
which, because of SEC regulations, regulations of the national
stock exchanges and customary business practice, is expected by
investors and securities analysts to be disclosed and is known by
corporate officials and their legal and financial advisors to be
the type of information which is expected to be and must be
disclosed.
COOPERS & LYBRAND'S PARTICIPATION IN THE FRAUD
98. Coopers & Lybrand, a firm of certified public accoun-
tants, was engaged by SystemSoft to provide independent auditing,
accounting and consulting services throughout the class Period.
Coopers & Lybrand examined and certified the financial statements
of SystemSoft for F96, ended 1731/96 and reviewed its interim
financial statements during the year ended 1/31/97. Coopers &
Lybrand represented in SystemSoft's F96 Form 10-K and Annual Report
that the financial statements of SystemSoft therein fairly
presented its financial condition and results of operation in
conformity with GAAP and had been audited in accordance with
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS").
99. As SystemSoft grew rapidly it became an increasingly
important client of Coopers & Lybrand's Boston office. The incomes
of the Coopers & Lybrand partners responsible for this account
benefited from this and they were determined to keep SystemSoft as
a client for the firm, so that they would continue to benefit
economically. Coopers & Lybrand participated in the wrongdoing
alleged herein in order to maintain its competitive position as to
other large accounting firms by retaining SystemSoft as a client,
- 93 -
protect and enhance the substantial fees which it received from
SystemSoft, maintain and increase its market share for auditing,
accounting and consulting services to be performed by its Boston
office, and increase the income received by the Coopers & Lybrand
partners responsible for the SystemSoft engagement, since their
income was directly tied to retaining accounting and auditing
clients in the Boston market.
100. In addition, Coopers & Lybrand was not independent of
SystemSoft with respect to its audit of SystemSoft's accounting for
its relationship with Digital Equipment. This was because Coopers
& Lybrand actually helped develo p SystemSoft's accounting practices
for its research and development arrangement with Digital
Equipment. Since Coopers & Lybrand was in effect so intimately
involved in developing this accountin g practice and its purported
rationale, Coopers & Lybrand was then auditing or reviewing its own
work and thus was not independent.
101. As a result of the services rendered to SystemSoft,
Coopers & Lybrand's personnel were present at SystemSoft's
corporate headquarters frequently throughout each year and had
continual access to, and knowledge of, SystemSoft's private and
confidential corporate, financial and business information and thus
knew of the true facts as alleged herein concerning SystemSoft's
actual financial condition and business problems which were
concealed from the investing public.
102. (a) Defendant Coopers & Lybrand conducted audit
examinations and participated in investigations into the business
operations, financial, accounting and management control systems of
SystemSoft. Coopers & Lybrand reviewed the company's quarterly
- 94 -
financial reports and unqualifiedly certified that SystemSoft's F96
financial statements fairly presented the Company's financial
position and results from operations in conformity with GAAP and
that said statements had been examined in accordance with GAAS. At
the time Coopers & Lybrand issued its unqualified opinion as to
SystemSoft's F96 financial statements, it knew or recklessly
disregarded the facts set forth in T1183-97. Among other things,
Coopers & Lybrand knew that SystemSoft's reported revenues, net
income and EPS were grossly overstated, because, inter alia, the
Company was improperly reporting revenues from its R&D arrangement
with Digital Equipment.
(b) Coopers & Lybrand helped further the fraud
complained of herein by permitting SystemSoft to continue to
circulate copies of SystemSoft's financial statements, which
Coopers & Lybrand had certified, even though Coopers & Lybrand knew
or recklessly disregarded the fact that they had not been prepared
in conformity with GAAP or audited in accordance with GAAS.
(c) Coopers & Lybrand reviewed SystemScft's interim
financial statements for the quarters ended 4/30/96, 7/31/96 and
10/31/96 and knew of the material falsity of the quarterly reports
filed with the SEC reporting those results and containing those
financial statements.
103. Coopers & Lybrand knew that SystemSoft's audited
financial statements for F96 and the quarterly reports issued
during F97, which Coopers & Lybrand reviewed, were presented in a
manner which violated GAAP, as described in 111183-97.
104. In connection with the work it performed for SystemSoft,
Coopers & Lybrand:
- 95 -
(a) Examined, reviewed and/or participated in reviews,
investigations and audit procedures regarding SystemSoft's
financial condition and operations. In the course of performing
such services, Coopers & Lybrand either obtained, or recklessly
disregarded, evidential matter revealing the adverse facts about
SystemSoft's business and finances described at 1![83-97, and
improperly failed to require, or make disclosure of such facts. As
a result of its reviews and audit work, Coopers & Lybrand knew that
the SystemSoft reports and financial statements described in this
Complaint were materially misleading or recklessly disregarded
facts which showed that such statements were materially misleading;
(b) Knew or recklessly disregarded facts which indicated
that it should have (i) qualified its opinion on SystemSoft's
financial statements for the F96 year ended 1131/96, or (ii)
withdrawn, corrected or modified its opinion to recognize
SystemSoft's improper accounting practices for its contract with
Digital Equipment on SystemSoft's F96 financial statements, or
(iii) not have given an opinion in light of the potentially
materially adverse effects of the undisclosed facts concerning
SystemSoft's operating income, net income, EPS and shareholders'
equity. The failure to make such a qualification, correction,
modification and/or withdrawal was a violation of GAAS, including
the Fourth Standard of Reporting; and
(c) Failed to require Systemsoft to disclose material
facts and allowed SystemSoft to make material misrepresentations
regarding the Company to its shareholders and to the investing
public during the Class Period.
- 96 -
105. In certifying SystemSoft's F96 financial statements,
Coopers & Lybrand represented that its examinations were made "in
accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards." This
statement was false and misleading in that the audit conducted by
Coopers & Lybrand was deliberately or recklessly not performed in
accordance with GAAS in the following respects:
(a) Coopers & Lybrand violated GAAS General Standard No.
3 that requires that due professional care must be exercised by the
auditor in the Performance of the audit and the preDaration of the
report;
(b) Coopers & Lybrand violated GAAS Standard of Field
Work No. 2, that requires the auditor to make a proper study of
existing internal controls, including accounting, financial and
managerial controls, to determine whether reliance thereon was
justified, and if such controls are not reliable, to expand the
nature and scope of the auditing procedures to be applied. Coopers
& Lybrand, knowing that the internal controls were insufficient,
failed to expand its auditing procedures;
(c) Coopers & Lybrand violated GAAS Standard of
Reporting No. 1 that requires the audit report to state whether the
financial statements are presented in accordance with GAAP.
Coopers & Lybrand's opinion inappropriately represented that
SystemSoft's financial statements complied with GAAP, when they did
not for the reasons herein alleged;
(d) Coopers & Lybrand also violated GAAS Standard of
Reporting No. 3 that requires informative disclosures in the
financial statements to be regarded as reasonably adequate unless
otherwise stated in the audit report. Here, the disclosures were
- 97 -
not adequate. The Notes to the financial statements failed to set
forth appropriate principles of accounting relating to SystemSoft's
relationship with Digital Equipment and its liability to poten-
tially repay Digital Equipment funds advanced to the Company. The
disclosures were further inadequate with respect to the over-
statement of SystemSoft's revenues and earnings. The audit report
of Coopers & Lybrand failed to disclose that such disclosures or
omissions of material information, as heretofore alleged, rendered
the respective financial statements false and misleading;
(e) Coopers & Lybrand violated GAAS Standard of
Reporting No. 4 that requires, when an opinion on the financial
statements as a whole cannot be expressed, that the reasons
therefore be stated. Coopers & Lybrand should have stated that no
opinion could be issued by it on SystemSoft's financial statements
or issued an adverse opinion stating that the financial statements
were not fairly presented;
(f) Coopers & Lybrand violated GAAS Standard of Field
Work No. 1 and the standards set forth in AICPA Auditing Standard
("AU") SS310, 320 and 327 by, among other things, failing to
adequately plan its audit and properly supervise the work of
assistants so as to establish and carry out procedures reasonably
designed to search for and detect the existence of errors and
irregularities which would have a material effect upon the
financial statements;
(g) Coopers & Lybrand violated Auditing Standard AU
S316.16, in that Coopers & Lybrand failed to plan and perform its
examination with an attitude of professional skepticism in
connection with the year-end F96 audits;
- 98 -
(h) Coopers & Lybrand violated Auditing standard AU
5316A.25 which sets forth the steps an auditor should take upon
suspecting accounting irregularities. AU 5316A.25 states:
If the auditor has determined that an auditadjustment is or may be, an irregularity and has eitherdetermined that the effect could be material or has beenunable to evaluate potential materiality, the auditorshould --
a. Consider the implications for other aspects ofthe audit.
b. Discuss the matter and the approach to furtherinvestigation with an appropriate level of managementthat is at least one level above those involved.
c. Attempt to obtain sufficient competent eviden-tial matter to determine whether, in fact, materialirregularities exist and, if so, their effect.
(i) Coopers & Lybrand violated Auditing Standard AU
5,316A.28 which requires auditors communicate reportable
irregularities (intentional misstatement) to the audit committee of
a company, when Coopers & Lybrand became aware of irregularities
and failed to communicate these to the audit committee:
(i) AU §316A.28 states that irregularities
involving senior management should be reported directly to the
audit committee; and
(ii) Coopers & Lybrand knew, or should have known,
that SystemSoft had improperly recognized revenue arising from
advances from Digital Equipment. Coopers & Lybrand knew that this
revenue recognition was inappropriate and forbidden under SEC
rules. Coopers & Lybrand, however, failed to fully communicate
these matters to the audit committee in violation of GAAS;
( j ) Moreover, Coopers & Lybrand violated Auditing
Standard AU 5722 which requires that auditors assure that the audit
- 99 -
committee be made aware of, and respond appropriately to, any
irregularities (intentional misstatements) the auditor discovers as
part of a review of interim financial information to be filed with
a regulatory agency, such as the SEC:
(i) AU §722.21-22 states:
.21 If, in the accountant's judgment, management doesnot respond appropriately to the accountant'scommunication within a reasonable period of time, theaccountant should inform the audit committee, or otherswith equivalent authority and responsibility (hereafterreferred to as the audit committee), of the matters assoon as practicable. This communication may be oral orwritten. If information is communicated orally, theaccountant should document the communication in appro-priate memoranda or notations in the working papers.
.22 If, in the accountant's judgment, the auditcommittee does not respond appropriately to theaccountant's communication within a reasonable period oftime, the accountant should evaluate (a) whether toresign from the engagement related to the interimfinancial information, and (b) whether to remain as theentity's auditor or stand for reelection to audit theentity's financial statements. The accountant may wishto consult with his or her attorney when making theseevaluations.
(ii) Coopers & Lybrand knew at the time it reviewed
SystemSoft's F97 interim financial statements, that they did not
reflect SystemSoft's true financial condition but failed to assure
itself that the audit committee responded appropriately; and
(k) Coopers & Lybrand violated the Second General
Auditing Standard which requires the auditor maintain independence
in mental attitude in all matters related to an assignment. AU
5220.01. Coopers & Lybrand actually helped to develop SystemSoft's
accounting practices for reporting revenue from advances under the
Digital Equipment agreement, including helping SystemSoft to
develop the rationales and projections it used to justify those
accounting practices. As a result, Coopers & Lybrand was not
- 100 -
independent with respect to auditing or reviewing SystemSoft's
financial statements or °Dining thereon, as Coopers & Lybrand was,
in effect, auditing its own work and had a stake in justifying the
correctness of an accounting practice, and its underlying
justifications, it had helped create. Coopers & Lybrand rendered
materially false opinions on SystemSoft's F96 financial statements.
Coopers & Lybrand also participated in making false statements
about SystemSoft's financial results for each of the interim
quarters of F97 by reviewing the interim financial statements
contained therein, knowing of or recklessly disregarding their
falsity. Alternatively Coopers & Lybrand over-relied on management
representations as to its relationship with Digital Equipment.
106. Coopers & Lybrand's opinion which represented that
SystemSoft's financial statements were presented in conformity with
GAAP was false and misleading because Coopers & Lybrand knew or was
reckless in not knowing that SystemSoft's financial statements
violated the principles for fair reporting and GAAP. Coopers &
Lybrand knew that GAAP, as set forth in SPAS No. 68, requires that
to conclude the advances were not a liability, the transfer of risk
to Digital Equipment must be substantive and genuine. Coopers
failed to obtain sufficient evidence of such a genuine transfer of
financial risk, thereby failing to comply with GAAS (Standard of
Field Work No. 37), causing its opinion to be false.
107. In violation of these principles, Coopers & Lybrand
certified systemSoft's financial statements even though Coopers &
Lybrand was aware that during F96 and F97, SystemSoft was
recognizing revenue from advances from Digital Equipment which
were, in fact, liabilities and that the Company's practice of
- 101 -
recognizing revenue that . violated GAAP caused SystemSoft's
financial statements not to accurately reflect its results of
operations nor its assets and liabilities and owner's equity.
108. In the course of rendering its unqualified audit
certifications on the F96 financial statements of SystemSoft,
Coopers & Lybrand knew it was required to adhere to each of the
herein-described standards and principles of GAAS, including the
requirement that the financial statements comply in all material
respects with GAAP. Coopers & Lybrand, in issuing its unqualified
opinion, knew that by doing so it was engaging in gross departures
from GAAS, thus making its opinions false, and issued such
certification with reckless disregard of whether or not GAAS was
being complied with.
109. As a result of its failure to accurately report on
SystemSoft's financial statements, Coopers & Lybrand failed in its
role as an auditor as defined by the SEC and GAAS. SEC Accounting
Series Release No. 2961 states in part:
Moreover, the capital formation process depends inlarge part on the confidence of investors in financialreporting. An investor's willingness to commit hiscapital to an impersonal market is dependent on theavailability of accurate, material and timely informationregarding the corporations in which he has invested orproposes to invest. The quality of information dissemi-nated in the securities markets and the continuingconviction of individual investors that such informationis reliable are thus key to the formation and effectiveallocation of capital. Accordingly, the audit functionmust be meaningfully performed and the accountants'independence not compromised. The auditor must be freeto decide questions against his client's interests if hisindependent professional judgment compels that result.
1981 SEC LEXIS 858, at *8-*9 (8/20/81).
- 102 -
INSIDER SELLING
110. While SystemSoft's top insiders were issuing favorable
statements about SystemSoft, the individual Defendants sold
1,070,007 shares of SystemSoft stock, for more than $21 million --
over 70% of their collective holdings of SystemSoft stock -- to
personally profit from the artificial inflation in SystemSoft's
stock price which their fraudulent scheme had created.
Notwithstanding their access to confidential information as a
result of their status as directors, officers and/or insiders of
the Company, and their corresponding duty to disclose adverse
material facts before trading in SystemSoft stock, the Individual
Defendants sold significant amounts of SystemSoft shares at arti-
ficially inflated prices in order to profit from the fraud, and did
so while in possession of material non-public information. The
Individual Defendants' insider selling during the Class Period is
detailed below:
PRICE SHARESDATE SHARES PER PROCEEDS OBTAINED BY
NAME SOLD SOLD SHARE FROM SALE OPTION PRICE
Ange._10 03/05/96 30,000 $ 6.975 $ 206,25003/13/96 16,000 $ 7.442 119,04003/14/96 14,000 $ 7.440 104,16003/22/96 20,000 $ 6.290 163,80003/27/96 5,682 $ 7.625 44,85006/27/96 4,000 $21.155 84,62006/27/96 20,000 521.720 217,20006/27/96 13,000 $21470 279,11006/27/96 6,000 021.120 126,75006/27/96 10,000 521.595 215,95006/27/96 20,000 $21_000 420,00006/27/96 4,000 $ .43506/27/96 6,000 $ .43506/27/96 13,000 $ .43506/27/96 40,000 $ .43509/01/96 57,40 $1.1008/01/96 18,750 $1.98008/30/96 10,000 $31.750 317,50008/30/96 20,000 $31_500 630,00008/20/96 10,000 $1.31008/30/95 20,000 $1.31012/02/96 4,440 $5.83001/06/97 10,000 $13.630 138,30001/09/97 20,000 $14.000 260,00001/09/97 20,000 $1.880
— 103 -
01/10/97 10.000 $13.750 137,50001/13/97 2,500 $14.200 35,0000:113/97 5,000 $13.010 68,15001/13/97 5,000 $13.500 67,50001/14/97 10,000 $14.250 142,50001/11/97 2,500 $13.500 33,75001/14/97 10,000 $1.88001/14/97 5,000 015.000 75,00001/15/97 $ 5,000 $1.880
Totals: 248 882 $3,904,930 208,640 Percent of shares -.5.c'y owned sold: 74%-
Blair 03/07/96 20,000 01.87503/19/96 20,000 $ 6.625 $ 172,50003/19/96 20,0M5 $1.87505/28/96 4,000 522.250 89,00006/10/96 10,000 $25.345 253,45006/10/96 2,500 $1.87506/10/96 5,000 $1.97506/10/96 2,500 04.31506/28/96 10,000 $21.970 219,70006/28/96 20,000 $1.87508/27/96 9,500 $28.000 266,00008/27/96 500 028.000 14,00008/27/96 8,000 $28.130 225,04008/27/96 500 $4.31008/27/96 8,000 $1.8800E/27/96 9,500 $1.88009/08/96 15,000 032.130 481,95009/08/96 15,000 $1.88009/30/96 2,500 $34.130 85,32512/02/56 4,440 05.63012/06/96 4,000 $16.760 $ 63,000
Totals: 83,500 $1,869,965 •97,440 Percent of shares actually owned sold: 827-,
Goldman 03/14/96 63,000 $ 7.443 $ 469,03503/14/96 15,000 $ 7.445 111,67503/14/96 13,126 $ 7.445 97,72303/14/96 63,000 $ .43503/14/96 15,000 $1.31003/14/96 13,126 $1.87503/14/96 80,000 $48.000 $1,920.000 91 126
Totals; 171,126 $2,598,433 Percen!= of shares actualry owned sold: 466
Higgins 03/18/96 3,750 $ 8.250 $ 30,93803/18/96 2,250 $ 8.250 18,58303/18/96 3,750 $3.12505/29/96 6,000 $22.000 132,00005/29/96 4,000 $23.500 94,00005/29/96 6,000 $4.37505/29/96 4,000 $4.37506/28/96 1,874 •$21.720 40,70306/28/96 7,503 021.720 162.90006/28/96 7,500 $4.37506/28/96 1,874 03.12508127/96 3,750 $28.190 105,71308/27/96 5,200 $29.060 145,00008/27/96 6,752 $28,130 189,87808/27/96 3,750 $29.440 110,40008/27/96 20,002 $28.500 570,00008/27/96 3,750 $29.250 109,68808/27/96 10,000 028.000 280,00008/27/96 7,505 $4.69008/27/96 3,750 $4.69008/27/96 5,000 $4.69008/27/96 10,000 $4-69008/27/96 6,750 $4.690
— 104 —
08/27/96 20,000 $4.59008/28/96 375 330.750 11,53106/26/96 6,000 330.000 180,00003/28/96 5,000 $29.380 146,90008/28/96 1,500 $30.380 45,57003/26/96 1,650 $30.500 50,32505/28/96 2,350 $30.380 71,39305/22/96 4,500 $30.250 136,12508/2E/96 2,500 i',;20.000 72,50008/26/96 2,500 $29.250 73,12506/26/96 2,350 $4.38008/28/96 1,650 $4.38008/28/96 10,000 $4.69008/28/96 6,000 94.69008/28/96 1,500 $4.69008/28/96 375 34.38308/28/96 4,500 $4.69009/09/96 551 $33.130 18,23509/09/96 123 $33.130 4,01509/09/96 1,325 $33.000 43,72509/09/96 1 333.130 3309/09/96 551 33.13005/09/96 1,325 $3.13009/09/96 0 $4.38012/02/96 $ 4,440 $5.630
Totals: 105,749 32,843,338 108,816 Percent of shares af.17=77 owned sold: , 93S
Joseph 05/29/96 16,000 $21.750 $ 348,00005/29/96 10,000 $21.345 213,45006/24/96 5,914 322.970 135,84506/24/96 1,000 $22.970 22,97006/24/96 4,066 $22.970 93,95506/24/96 1,000 31.67506/24/96 4,086 $4.31506/24/96 5,914 $4.31506/26/96 4,626 322.220 102,79006/28/96 3,106 $22.220 69,01506/28/96 5,000 322.220 112,35006/28/96 6,300 $22_595 135,57005/28/96 3,266 322.220 72,61506/28/96 6,000 $2.87536/28/96 5,000 $1.87506/28/96 3,106 $1.87506/28/96 4,626 31.87506/28/96 3,268 31.87506/28/96 5,394 $21.970 125,49106/28/96 4,106 $21_97C 90,20906/28/96 1,000 321.845 21,84306/28/96 5,894 31.87506/29/96 1,000 31.67506/28/96 4,106 $1.87508/27/96 5,500 $28.000 140,00008/27/96 3,750 329.440 110,40006/27/96 6,750 $28.130 199,67008/27/96 3,750 $29.250 109,65808/27/96 3,750 $29.180 105,71508/28/96 1,700 $30.500 51,65008/28/96 2,500 $29.250 73,12508/28/96 5,000 $29.380 146,93006/28/96 2,500 $29.000 72,50038/28/96 6,000 $30.000 1E0,00008/28/96 2,300 $30.330 69,87412/02/96 $ 4,440 35.630
Totals: 113,000 32,797,932 48,440 Percent of shares actually ow=ed sold: 896
King 07/03/96 40,000 $25.090 $1,003,6.0007/03/96 40,000 $ .880
— 105 —
08/28/96 20,000 $25.250 565,00005/28/96 8 20,000 $ .880
Totals; 60,030 $1,588,600 69O00 Percent of shares actually owned sold: 76%:
McNeff 07/01/96 3,000 '.'p'22.660 $ 07,98007/01/96 4,500 622.000 99,00007/01/96 4,520 $7.25007/01/96 $ 3,000 $7.250
ToLals: 7,500 $ 166,980 7,600Percent of shares .actually owned old: 100%-
O'Connell 03/04/96 13,000 $ 6.815 $ 88,59503/04/96 13,000 $1.31003/05/96 17,000 6 6.875 116,87503/11/96 17,000 $ 6.875 116,87503/11/96 17,000 $1.31003/13/96 20,000 $ 7.375 147,50003/13/96 20,000 $1.31003/15/96 10,00C $ 7.875 78,75003/15/96 10,000 $1.31003/20/96 10,000 $ 8.875 88,75005/29/96 9,030 $21.500 193,50005/29/96 6,000 $22.250 133,50005/29/96 5,020 622.500 112,50005/29/96 10,000 $22.125 221,25005/29/96 20,000 $1.87505/29/96 5,000 $1.31005/29/96 5,000 81.57506/05/36 10,000 $24.250 242,50006/28/96 10,000 $21.970 219,70006/28/96 10,000 $1.87508/27/96 10,000 $28.000 280,00008/27/96 6,750 $28.130 189,97808/27/96 750 $23.440 22,0E008/27/95 3,750 $28_190 205,71308/27/96 3,750 $29.250 109,68808/27/96 10,000 $1.88008/27/96 750 $1.88008/27/96 6,750 $1.88008/27/96 7,500 $1.88008/28/96 3,500 $30.250 105,87508/28/96 3,775 $30.380 114,58508/28/96 2,500 $29.300 72,50008/28/96 6,00C $30,000 180,00008/28/96 5,000 $29.350 146,90008/25/96 795 $30.500 24,24808/28/96 855 $30.500 29,07808/28/96 75 $30.380 2,27905/25/96 3,000 $30.380 91,14008/28/96 2,500 $29.250 73,12508/28/96 75 $4.31008/28/96 3,500 $1.88008/28/96 795 $4,31008/28/96 ' 5,003 81.31008/29/96 ' 3,775 $1.88005/28/96 6,000 $4.31005/28/96 855 $4.31008/28/96 5,000 $1.88008/30/96 1,000 $32.250 32,25008/30/90 1,600 $32,380 51,80808/30/96 3,400 $32.250 109,65008/30/96 1,600 $4.31008/30/90 3,400 84.31012/32/96 4,440 $5.63001/28/97 8,350 $1 880
- 106 -
01/28/97 2,500 51.880
01/28/97 5,000 $1.310
01/28/97 s 400 $4.310Totals: 196,000 $3,498,109 175,670 Percent of shares 5F.717777y owned sold: 90%
Pedevillano 03/11/96 10,000 $ 6.875 $ 68,750
03/11/96 10,000 51.310
03/14/96 10,000 $ 7.440 74,400
03/14/96 10,000 $1.313
03/19/96 7,700 $ 8.250 57,750
03/19/96 7,000 $1.310
05/28/96 5,000 $21.250 116,250
05/28/96 5,000 621.750 108,750
05/28/96 10,000 51.310
08/05/96 3,000 $24_125 72,375
06/05/96 2,000 $24_125 48,250
06/05/96 2,000 61.875
06/05/96 3,000 51.310
08/01/96 6,000 61.880
08/01/96 12,500 51.310
08/01/36 14,150 61.860
08/27/96 500 528.190 14,095
08/27/96 6,750 $28.130 189,678
08427/96 3,250 529.440 95,680
08/27/96 500 529.440 14,720
08/27/96 10,000 528.000 280,000
08/27/96 3,250 $28.190 91,618
08/27/96 503 $4.310
08/27/96 10,000 $1.800
08/27/96 500 $1.880
08/27/96 3,250 51.860
05/27/96 6,500 $1.880
09/27/96 6,750 61.880
08/27/96 3,750 51.880
08/28/96 2,000 $30.000 60,000
08/29/96 2,500 $29.000 72,500
08/28/96 2,500 $29.253 73,125
08/28/96 5,000 $29.380 146,900
08/23/96 2000, $4.310
08/28/96 10,000 $4.310
09/05/96 5,000 $1.830
09/09/96 5,000 $32.500 162,500
12/02/96 $ 4,440 $5.633Tota15: 93,250 51,747,540 127,340 Percent of shares actually owned sold: 643.:
TOTALS: 1 070 L 00 7521,015,907 924,992
111. Defendants' massive insider selling during the Class
Period is summarized below:
% of
Shares Holdings TotalDefendants. Sold Sold Droceds
Angelo 248,982 74% 53,904,930Joseph 113,000 69,' $2,797,932O'Connell 196,000 90%. $3,498,189Pedevillano 83,250 64% $1,747,540Hi ggins 106,749 93% $2,843,338Blair 83,500 62- $1,869,965King 50,000 76%. $1,588,600Ooldman 171,126 46=6' $2,593,433McNeff 7,500 100% $ 166,980
Totals: 1,070,007 70% $21,025,907
- 107 -
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
For Violation Of §10(b) Of TheExchange Act And Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants
112, Plaintiffs incorporate V11-111 by reference.
113. Each of the defendants: (a) knew the material, adverse,
non-public information about SystomSoft's financial results and
then-existing business conditions, which was not disclosed; and
(b) participated in drafting, reviewing, and/or approving the
misleading statements, releases, reports, and other public
representations of and about SystemSoft.
114. During the Class Period, Defendants disseminated or
apnroved the false statements specified above, which they knew were
misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to
disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading.
115. Defendants violated §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 in that they:
(a) Employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud;
(b) Made untrue statements of material facts or omitted
to state material facts necessary in order to make statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading; or
(c) Engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business
that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiffs and others
similarly situated in connection with their purchases of SystemSoft
common stock during the Class Period.
- 108 -
116. The undisclosed adverse information concealed by
Defendants during the Class Period is the type of information
which, because of SEC regulations, regulations of the national
stock exchanges and customary business practice, is expected by
investors and securities analysts to be disclosed and is known by
corporate officials and their legal and financial advisors to be
the type of information which is expected to he and must be
disclosed. For example:
(a) Under Item 303 of Regulation S-K, promulgated by the
SEC under the Exchange Act, there is a duty to disclose in periodic
reports filed with the SEC "known trends or any known demands,
commitments, events or uncertainties" that are reasonably likely to
have a material impact on a company's sales revenues, income or
liquidity, or cause previously reported financial information not
to be indicative of future operating results. 17 C.F.R.
§229.303(a)(1)-(3) and Instruction 3. In addition to the periodic
reports required under the Exchange Act, management of a public
company has a duty promptly "to make full and prompt announcements
of material facts regarding the company's financial condition."
SEC Release No. 34-8995, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ly,23,120A, at
17,095, 17 C.F.R. §241.8995 (10/15/70). The SEC has repeatedly
stated that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws, which are intended to ensure that the investing public is
provided with "complete and accurate information about companies
whose securities are publicly traded," apply to all public state-
ments by persons speaking on behalf of publicly traded companies
"that can reasonably be expected to reach investors and the trading
markets, whoever the intended primary audience." SEC Release No.
- 109 -
33-6504, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶23,120B, at 17,096, 17 C.F.R.
S241.20560 (1/13/84). The SEC has emphasized that "[i]nvestors
have legitimate expectations that public companies are making, and
will continue to make, prompt disclosure of significant corporate
developments." Sharon Steel Corp., SEC Release No. 18271,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶83,049, at
84,618 (11/19/81); and
(b) Schedule D of the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD") Manual, which governs companies whose securities
are included in the NASDAQ requires a NASDAQ company to "make
prompt disclosure to the public through the press of any material
information that may affect the value of its securities or influ-
ence investors' decisions." NASD Manual, Schedule D, Part II,
§1(c) (13) [¶1803(c) (13)j.
117. Plaintiffs and the Class have suffered damages in that,
in reliance on the integrity of the market, they paid artificially
inflated prices for SystemSoft stock. Plaintiffs and the Class
would not have purchased SystemSoft stock at the prices they paid,
or at all, if they had been aware that the market prices had been
artificially and falsely inflated by Defendants' misleading
statements.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
For Violation Of 520(a) Of The Exchange ActAgainst Defendants Angelo and SystemSoft
118. Plaintiffs incorporate ¶¶1-117 by reference.
119. Defendant Angelo acted as a controlling person of
SystemSoft within the meaning of S20(a) of the Exchange Act. By
reason of his position as a director and/or officer of SystemSoft
- 110 -
he had the power and authority to cause SystemSoft to engage in the
wrongful conduct complained of herein. SystemSoft controlled each
of the Individual Defendants and all of its employees.
120. By reason of such wrongful conduct, SystemSoft and Angelo
are liable pursuant to 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and
proximate result of these defendants' wrongful conduct, plaintiffs
and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection
with their purchases of SystemSoft common stock during the Class
Period.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
121. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of
all persons who purchased SystemSoft stock (the "Class") on the
open market during the Class Period. Excluded from the Class are
the Defendants herein, members of their immediate families, any
entity in which a Defendant has a controlling interest, and the
legal representatives, heirs, successors-in-interest, or assigns of
any excluded party.
122. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable. The disposition of their claims in
a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and
the Court. During the Class Period, SystemSoft had more than 22
million shares of stock outstanding, owned by hundreds of
shareholders.
123. There is a well-defined commonality of interest in the
questions of law and fact involved in this case. The questions of
law and fact common to the members of the Class which predominate
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over questions which may affect individual Class members include
the following:
(a) Whether the federal securities laws were violated by
Defendants;
(b) Whether Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented
material facts;
(c) Whether Defendants' statements omitted material
facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading;
(d) Whether Defendants knew or had reasonable grounds to
believe that their statements were false and misleading;
(e) Whether the price of SystemSoft stock was
artificially inflated during the Class Period; and
(f) The extent of damage sustained by Class members and
the appropriate measure of damages.
124. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the Class
because plaintiffs and the Class sustained damages from Defendants'
wrongful conduct.
125. Plaintiffs will adequately protect the interests of the
Class and have retained counsel who are experienced in class action
securities litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests which conflict
with those of the Class.
126. A class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.
127. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class
members would create a risk of inconsistent and varying
adjudications.
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BASIS OF ALLEGATIONS
128. Because the PSLRA, §21D(c) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C.
§78u-4(c)], requires complaints to be pleaded in conformance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, plaintiffs have alleged the
foregoing based upon the investigation of their counsel, which
included a review of SystemSoft's SEC filings, securities analysts'
reports and advisories about the Company, press releases issued by
the Company, media reports about the Company, private investi-
gations and discussions with former employees and consultants, and,
pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3), believe that after reasonable
opportunity for discovery, substantial evidentiary support will
likely exist for the allegations set forth at Ilf1 26-33, 53, 61, 64,
78, 86, 88, 90-91, 93, 95-96, 100 and 102-108.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:
1. Declaring this action to be a proper class action
pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on behalf of the Class defined herein;
2. Awarding plaintiffs and the members of the Class compen-
satory damages, including rescissory damages, where applicable;
3. Awarding plaintiffs and the members of the Class
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as well as reasonable
attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and other costs;
4. Awarding extraordinary, equitable, and/or injunctive
relief as permitted by law, equity, and federal statutory provi-
sions sued hereunder, including rescission, the imposition of a
constructive trust upon the proceeds of the Individual Defendants'
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insider trading, pursuant to Rules 64, 65, and any appropriate
state law remedies; and
5. Awarding such other relief as this Court may deem just
and proper.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury.
DATED: Pelimmulaiy 2, 1998MOULTON & CANS, LLPSTEPHEN MOULTON, BBO#358480NANCY FREEMAN CANS, BBO#184540
4r:CY FREEMAN CANS
125 Summer Street, Sixth FloorBoston, MA 02110Telephone: 617/261-4600
BARRACK, RODOS & BACINEDAVID L. KELSTON, BBO#267310
er''t 'WILT 4rr,.._ (a...A])
DAVID L. KEL TON
90 Canal Street, Fifth FloorBoston, MA 02114Telephone: 617/367-1040
- and -LEONARD BARRACKDANIEL E. BACINE3300 Two Commerce Square2001 Market StreetPhiladelphia, PA 19103Telephone: 215/963-0600
MILBERG WEISS BERSHADHYNES & LERACH LLP
WILLIAM S. LERACHALAN SCHULMAN600 West Broadway, Suite 1800San Diego, CA 92101Telephone: 619/231-1058
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LAW OFFICES OF CHRISTOPHER E.GILDEA
CHRISTOPHER E. GILDEA14322 Powderhorn RoadFort Wayne, IN 46804Telephone: 219/672-9405
LAW OFFICES OF ALFRED G.YATES, J.
ALFRED G. YATES, JR.519 Allegheny building429 Forbes AvenuePittsburgh, PA 15219Telephone: 412/391-5164
SCHIFFRIN CRAIG &BARROWAY, LLP
RICHARD S. SCHIFFRINANDREW L. BARROWAYThree Bala Plaza EastSuite 400Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004Telephone: 610/667-7706
LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL H.KELLEHER
DANIEL H. KELLEHER50 Congress StreetBoston, MA 02108Telephone: 617/227-0611
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
COMPLNTS\SYSTMSFT CPT
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