Green Paper on Housing Policy : Hong Kong SAR

8/12/2019 Green Paper on Housing Policy : Hong Kong SAR

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Severe market inelasticity is a long-term concern:

To this end, the Government should expand increased infrastructure development in a

tailored, specific manner that will meaningfully lead to multi-primate outcomes

addressing issues of severe market inelasticity. Long-term demand for property,

although difficult to predict, is healthy whilst present issues of critical unaffordability

harm Hong Kongs development as a financial, technological, and educational

powerhouse. Given Hong Kongs unique regulatory and governance framework, its

institutional strengths and strategic location embedd ed into Chinas economic

heartland, regional competition remains limited and demand for property development

will continue to increase substantially.

The Governments multifaceted role is rare and conflicting;

The Governments role as a de facto monopolist in the real estate industry is unique

both across sectors and by international standards. Resultantly, the government faces a

tradeoff between keeping prices high as a means of extracting revenue (resultantly,

keeping other forms of taxation low) and ensuring the general public has access to

affordable housing. Existing policy provides for the lowest 30% of households through

Public Rental Housing and another 20% through previous assisted ownership schemes,

while the private market caters for around 30% of households. Consequently,

suggested government policy should address the remaining 20% who are not catered

for by either mechanism, the sandwich class, as well as future generations who may

not be grandfathered into existing units.

Government Priorities

In developing a comprehensive housing policy, the Government has explicitly

focused on two primary objectives (i) housing affordability and (ii) maintaining a

healthy and financially stable real estate market that may lean against cycles and


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withstand heavy external shocks. The existence of a third objective, however, is much

accounted for in public policy but seldom unexplained in official discourse. The Hong

Kong property market is unique in its role a key pillar in the territorys economy.

Stamp duty and auction proceeds additionally comprise a substantial proportion of

around 25 30% of total Government revenues (Appendix I). Measures that may

destabilize long-term transaction volumes and price levels could eradicate a significant

source of government revenue that would otherwise have to be compensated by

increased taxation on personal income and profits.

The real-estate market structure is highly concentrated with a small number of

developers controlling the market, a situation comparably unique in an international

perspective. The territorys density, high prices and size of developments, however,

require substantial economies of scale that present challenges to more traditional,

localized structures present in other markets. With this in mind, the small number of

market participants and high market concentration make the market particularly

vulnerable to anticompetitive practices. Developers may choose to withhold stock and

act in a visible, coordinated manner whilst narrowly skirting regulations against such

practices. The recent sizeable fall in transaction volume accompanied oddly with

modest rises in price levels indicates a situation where such practices may have had

adverse effects on affordability despite the imposition of cooling measures.

The State of the Market

Housing prices in Hong Kong are by all measures, one of, if not the highest in

the world. Prices per square meter in the residential sector are estimated to be $20,660,

second only to Monaco and first among world cities. In the 2012 edition of the Knight

Frank Global Index measuring house price change, Hong Kong not only topped 55

housing markets but also accounted for the fastest pace of price growth since Q3 2008


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(Knight Frank 2012). By 2013, however, Government instituted cooling measures had

led to a drop to 17 th place only a 7.7% rise compared to previous years 23.6%

(Knight Frank 2013). This does tell the whole story. Transactions in the next quarter

following the imposition of the measures dropped 67%, falling below even 2008

levels. Annualized figures account for the highest drop in 10 years, surpassing

recorded drops for even the Eurozone, Banking and SARS Crises. Despite the 48.6%

drop in transactions, price levels still increased by a substantial 7.7% and occupancy

costs remain the worlds highest. In a 2013 Survey by Savills, relocation costs

(measuring residential and office costs) for 14 employees were the highest in Hong

Kong for the fourth consecutive year, topping other world-cities such as New York and

London (Savills). Retail and office rents are similarly world beating, with two Hong

Kong districts accounting for positions 1 and 4 in the office market respectively as well

as Hong Kong holding a substantial lead over New York as the most expensive retail

property market overall (Appendixes III and IV ). Across all market segments, there is

a severe market imbalance between demand and supply. This is not simply a problem

specific to housing or housing finance, but an imbalance present across all sectors of

the industry.

Prices in the private market, however, do not carry across to all segments of

society. Former Chief Executive Donald Tsang noted that around 50% live in

government subsidized housingthe housing issue is not one that is [endemic] to the

disad vantaged groups (Long Term Housing Strategy) . The sandwich class , those

who earn more than that allowed by government housing but not enough to withstand

high prices within the housing sector, constitute the most affected segment of society

by persistently high prices. Government priorities in housing have been driven by a

desire to minimize intervention within the market as well as promote the fair and stable


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development of the private market. Nonetheless, affordability is still a critical issue for

first- time buyers. House prices remain the worlds most unaffordable at almost 15

times higher than the Median Annual Income, more than three times higher than the

multiple given for Singapore a regime with similar supply characteristics

(Demographia). The territory, however, does have a relatively high owner-occupancy

rate at 52% but below government targets of 70%. This figure is particularly

interesting given that around 30% of housing units are Public Rental Units, leaving

around 20% potentially comprising the san dwich- class who are not catered for by

the market and government policy.

Access to housing is not the only concern of policy makers and the general

public; the investment characteristics of property are of particular significant to

methods of wealth transfer and accumulation in a territory characterized by high

private savings rates 1. The question of fairness applies more in the mind of equal

treatment across society by the government than of equal outcomes enjoyed by Hong

Kong residents. The Government has consistently maintained its policy of positive

non- interventionism espousing minimum intervention in the private sector whils t

materially safeguarding only the needs of the most needy.

Government Assisted Housing Policy

Public rental housing (PRH) constitutes the lionshare of government assisted

housing- comprising some 30% of total supply of housing units. The provision of

assistance to those with genuine housing needs has always been the heart of the

Governments housing policy. As at 31 March 2013, about 2.09 million people (about

30% of the population) lived in PRH flats. The PRH stock was about 766,300 units.

1 Gross savings (% of GDP) 28% in 2012, 30% - 32% in the years prior. Source: The World Bank


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The Government intends to continue to assist low-income families who cannot

afford private rental accommodation through PRH. The target is to keep the average

waiting time for Waiting List general applicants at around three years. As of March

2013, there were about 116,900 general applications and 111,500 non-elderly one-

person applicants under the Quota and Points System on the Waiting List for PRH. The

average waiting time for PRH general applicants is around 2.7 years.

The Government has implemented the following requirements when assessing

the genuine need of PRH recipients:

- A Waiting List is operated for the allocation of new or refurbished PRH flats to eligibleapplicants in accordance with the order of registration;

- Non-elderly one-person applicants are subject to the Quota and Points System, under which points will be assigned to them based on their age when the applications are registered,whether they are PRH tenants and their waiting time. The more points the applicant scores, theearlier the applicant will be offered a flat, subject to the fulfilment of all the PRH eligibilitycriteria;

- To be eligible, applicants and their family members must undergo comprehensive means testscovering both income and assets, and must not own or co-own or have an interest in anydomestic property in Hong Kong or have entered into any agreement ot purchase any domestic

property in Hong Kong or hold more than 50% of shares in a company which owns, directly orthrough its subsidiaries, any domestic property in Hong Kong. At the time of allocation, at leasthalf of the family members included in the application must have lived in Hong Kong for seven

years and all family members must be still living in Hong Kong;- Public rental tenancies cannot be passed on automatically from one generation to the next.

When a tenant passes away, a new authorised person (other than the surviving spouse) is subject to a comprehensive means test; and

- Long-term tenants (i.e. those who have stayed in public rental housing for 10 or more years)with income and assets exceeding prescribed limits are required to pay additional rent orvacate their flats.

(Housing Factsheet)

It is a long-established policy of the Housing Authority to set PRH rents at

relatively affordable levels. As per the Housing Ordinance, the Housing Authority

conducts reviews of rents biannually and adjusts all-inclusive PRH rents according to

the changes in the overall household income of PRH. As of March 2013, PRH rent

ranged from $290 to HK$3,880, whilst the average rent was about HK$1,540 per

month a relatively small percentage of income earned by qualifying classes.


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The Housing Authority originally implemented the policy as a relief measure from

the effects of the 1953 Shek Kip Mei fire which had left 50,000 squatter-dwelling

residents homeless. At the time, the territory had been facing massive waves of

immigration from the then newly established Peoples Republic of China, and

resultantly, settlement by these refugees-turned-residents was haphazard informal.

Government policy stemmed from a need to replace inadequate housing with

formalized forms in a way that did not increase the burden of housing on this low-

income sector of society significantly.

Today, whilst still maintaining the objective to target inadequate housing, the

rationale of the Housing Authority has developed as a means to also target specific,

disadvantaged groups (i.e. the elderly, families) whilst maintaining incentive structures

for working population to continue to better themselves. Contributions are capped vary

with means but are capped at 15%, limiting wage pressures on the lower end of the

income spectrum in the territory. Strangely enough, the Government has maintained its

longstanding free-market policies by intervening in the market to safeguard the interest

of the grassroots mitigating the impact it has as a monopolist.

Overview of Subsidized Home Ownership

Whilst issues of informality and inadequate housing had largely been addressedwith the imposition of PRH, the sandwich class of t hose who did not qualify for

PRH and also are not adequately catered for by the private market comprise a second

area necessitating government policy. Government targets were set to increase

homeownership from relatively low levels of around 30% in the late 1970s to an

optimistic 70%. To meet this demand, the Government pursued a policy of acting as

the developer for this segment of the market .


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Since 1978, about 467 800 (as at March 2013) subsidized flats have been sold

to low- to-middle income households at discounted prices under the various subsidized

home ownership schemes, including the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS), the Private

Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS) and the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS)

introduced by the Housing Authority, as well as the Flat-For-Sale Scheme and

Sandwich Class Housing Scheme of the HKHS. Such schemes provided relatively

affordable housing with discounts set at around 30 40% under market conditions.

Owner-occupancy ratios increased substantially since policy implementation,

reaching 53% by the policys sunset period in 2002. However, substantial debate had

centered on the relevance and fairness of such a policy considering some households

only temporarily qualified for such benefits and was able to resell their properties for

substantial profit. Additionally, price shocks following the 1998 and 2001 crashes

depressed property values to a state where affordability was no longer a prime issue in

the minds of the general public. Subsequently in 2002, the Government decided to end

assisted ownership policies and a permanent moratorium on the Home Ownership

Scheme was instituted:

Under the repositioned subsidised housing policy in 2002, the objectives of theGovernments housing policy are to provide public rental housing (PRH) to low-income families who cannot afford private rental housing, withdraw from playingthe role of a property developer, cease the production and sale of subsidised saleflats, and minimise intervening in the market. Encouraging the public to purchasehomes is no longer an objective of the Governments housing policy

(Relaunching of Home Ownership Scheme)

The Government held the view that increasing homeownership rates to the

target of 70% was no longer pa ramount if the public sector had to play as the

developer and interven e substantially in the market where prices and profits of

property developer had become substantially depressed compared to previous periods.


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It is not only the volume of migration entering into the territory that may affect demand

in the private market, but the quality and specific demands characteristic of it. Foreign

professionals who comprise the bulk of net migration into Hong Kong tend to have

smaller households (1-2 persons) and demand larger spaces than that is commonplace

for Hong Kong locals. Such will have an outsized footprint in expansions of demand in

the territory.

Non-local buyers account for a third source of demand for properties. In 2011,

19.5% of transactions for new properties and 6.8% in the second-hand market were

from foreign (primarily Mainland Chinese) buyers.

The effect of Mainland Chinese buyers has had an outsized impact on the Hong

Kong real estate market. In Q3 2011, PRC buyers made up 53.9% of all new sales by

value. However, after the suspension of eligibility for residency status by property

acquisition, this figure declined to 31.2% by Q3 2012. Further measures, including the

imposition of a special stamp duty on non-permanent Hong Kong residents, led to a

decline in this proportion to around 6% by the second quarter of 2013. However, the

special stamp duty and other recent cooling measures are only temporary. Speculative

and second-home demand in the territory will continue to persist in the long-run. Such

demand has only been diverted to second-choice markets other than Hong Kong and

Singapore, leading to substantial rises in property prices in Sydney and London due to

substantial increases in transactions from Mainland buyers following the imposition of

cooling measures.

Supply is severely restrained;

The natural geography has severely limited the extent which supply can

operate. The city has a mountainous terrain with most of the land remaining free from

development. Subsequently, Over 40% of the territory is protected under the Country


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Parks Ordinance whilst a further 20% remains undeveloped. The land that is developed

has taken to extreme rates of density, with Hong Kong home to 2,354 buildings over

100 meters more than triple the next highest, New York at 725 (CBTUH).

Nonetheless, Hong Kong can become increasingly innovative at looking at

constructing even taller buildings and rezoning areas where buildings are capped at

certain heights. Substantial maneuvering exists on this end of the spectrum, as zoning

has been uneven across the territory and building regulations overly strict considering

the critical imbalance between demand and supply. Prices in the territory are incredibly

high and nonetheless, could support the financial health of increasingly innovative

solutions to the supply problem.

As of present, the Government allocates the bulk of its land by which it offers

to the housing market through auctions. In the long term, however, this method will not

appropriately address the housing crisis. Land auction phase out small developers and

encourage high prices as means of distributing costs of the land back to the

Government. With this strategy, the government has curtailed the proliferation of

smaller developers stimying competition in a sector that requires much greater

oversight. Hong Kong developers are disproportionately represented amongst the

worlds largest, with players Sun Hung Kai, Henderson Land, New World

Development, Hang Lung Group and Wheelock all possessing a market capitalization

over $5 billion (Forbes). This situation raises questions as to whether developers are

abnormally large and enjoy an oligopolistic market structure in a sector that is

traditionally more localized and more competitive.

Anticompetitive practices have proliferated with regards to the real estate

market. The territory has been target of a slew of scandals, including the 2011 39

Conduit Road in which Henderson Land lied about sales in order to push up prices.


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However the most jarring of scandals has been one involving the co-chairmen of Sun

Hung Kai properties who are currently undergoing trial for indirect payments made to

high profile government figures with regards to land auctions (Yung). Such actions

suggest market malpractice and that further competition and regulation in this sector is

needed in order to best accommodate and fair and healthy real estate sector. The

government should perhaps look into expanding the use of tenders and involving non-

price considerations in land allocation policies moving away from traditional land

auctions.

The Government has entered the market insofar that it has operated the Urban

Renewal Authority. Such measures, however, need to be expanded and targeted at

regions with particularly exacerbated issues of affordability. Older areas across Eastern

and Central Kowloon still require substantial redevelopment, with removal of

substandard tenement housing an issue that requires substantial government

intervention. The Government, in this case, can take the role as market leader in

adopting innovative practices that may lead to better prices. For example, split-market

developments where buildings are divided amongst affordable, market and luxury

portions has yet to proliferate in the Hong Kong market despite its popularity in other

regions, notably in the United States.

The largest such measure the Government should intervene is the further

expansion of infrastructure networks as well as proper use of existing infrastructure

developments that will lead to multi-primate outcomes within the city ultimately

increasing sorely-needed elasticity. The development of North Lantau, in tandem with

the construction of the HK-Zhuhai-Macau link and improvement of existing the

Airport link, is capable of providing 200,000 -300,000 new units that may relieve

pressure from the city center. These road and rail connections, however, need to be


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carefully completed with an explicit emphasis on time reduction. The Government

should nto be afraid of using through-train or express services to outer regions, cutting

commute time, even if it does cannibalize price growth in more centrally located

precincts.

A last suggestion targeting increased supply is to build up retail centers across

the edge of Hong Kongs northern land border with the Mainland. Developments at

Lok Ma Chau and Lo Wu could act to absorb demand specific to the substantial

number of day-trippers, a source of some 28 million users of Hong Kong malls

annually. These measures would not only cater to demand, but also reduce congestion

and undue pressure on primarily residential areas of the city (Wong)

Financing is largely adequate in the private market;

Presently, the current system of mortgage financing is largely robust and

affordable. Interest rates are low and the small number of banks competes heavily by

lowering lending rates further. In addition, Hong Kong has one of the most developed

mortage markets in the region with a participation rate of 47% (Hofinet?) .

However, the Governments recent u se of financing as method to curb demand

(see Appendix II) has been ineffective and unfair in addressing price growth. One of

the most significant sources of demand has been the purchase of second-homes

through cash only instruments. Reducing access to credit most severely affects first-

time buyers and members of the sandwich class. As such, it is recommended that the

Government restore LTV ratios from 70 to 80% - whilst maintaining existing

restrictions on properties valued over HK$10 million. The territorys present l ow

delinquency ratios partnered with small number of robust banks may lend the market

well to restore 90% LTV specifically targeting first time buyers with good credit


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scores. However such measures must be compliant Basel III Capital Rules, and the

feasibility of such a policy should be examined.

The interest spread is also relatively high (see Appendix VII) considering low

delinquency rates encountered by mortgage banks. Recent competition through the

underpricing of lending rates is perhaps a natural development to the sector. Bank

profitability is not a concern in the territory, however anti-competitive strategies are.

The market has been supported by a rigorous regulatory framework learned lessons

learned from 1998 Asian Financial Crisis. The territory has a proven track record

showing that is able to sustain future shocks. However, caution should be given

considering how dependent Hong Kong is on the international economic environment.

Specifically, the US Dollar peg makes the territory particularly dependent to actions

undertaken by the Federal Reserve.

Real estate plays an outsized role in the ter r i tory;

Hong Kong is unique in that the real Estate industry comprises a substantial

pillar in the territorys economy . Although the sector has traditionally seen as a

cronyist sector, helping secure Hong Kongs 1 st place in The Economist s Crony

Capitalism Index, this does not do the industry justice in terms of the role and

innovation the industry has played in territorys economy. Notably, the Value Capture

Model by which the Hong Kong Metro uses increased property prices as means of

subsidizing itself has gained international praise ( ). The use of mixed-use

developments is also notable, particularly as cities in Mainland Chinese embrace the

same strategies Hong Kong has in improving accessibility and dealing with severe

shortages of space. The real estate market also benefits from being highly liquid with

good accounting and legal practices inherited from the UK jurisdiction


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Ultimately, however, the greatest concern is the role in which high prices

continue to lead to tremendous issues of unaffordability. Similarly, Hong Kong

resid ents cannot be expected to move out to the suburbs or to another city. This

market is simply not just another city in China or Asia for that matter, and cannot be

easily replaced by another location for Hong Kongs residents . Housing provision in

Hong Kong particularly necessitates a social function. While government has been

successful in catering for the lower end of the market, ensuring the development of a

robust and fair mortgage sector, and developing effective infrastructure in promoting

multi-primate centers, affordability in the private sector is severely limited. As the

most unaffordable market in the world by some margin (see Appendix V), the

Government needs to cater for the sandwich class as well as future generations who

are not grandfathered into existing units.

Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations

Hong Kong is an exceedingly fascinating case of a world city, akin to New

York and London, but one that encounters definite, regulatory limits to its territory

rendering its market as severely supply inelastic. Despite the territorys small size,

population and domestic market, this inelasticity has led to the highest property prices

across all sectors in the world.

This situation is particularly problematic, a s Hong Kongs permanent residents

cannot merely relocate to areas that suit their budgets, they themselves comprise a

relatively static market that cannot be compared to the populations in other world cities

save for Singapore. Resultantly, Hong Kong faces an affordability crisis, and in

particular, a demographic gap that is left unaccounted for both in the private and public

markets. Nonetheless, the affordability question is not entirely understood. Home

ownership rates in territory are at 52% whilst those catered by public housing comprise


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a second 30% of the market. Resultantly, further studies should focus on establishing

the needs of the remaining 18% . Are they indeed struggling young families with little

hope of attaining home ownership? Or does this remainder comprise of temporary

members whose lack of home-ownership is transitory and a natural development?

These questions deserve further analysis.

These questions, however, should delay efforts to combat the evident demand

and supply imbalance. The Hong Kong Government is in a rare situation producing

consistent budget surpluses, and thus capable of implementing substantial policy

initiatives. Ultimately, elasticity needs to be improved substantially. Tung Chee Wahs

administration saw a reversal in levels of unaffordability caused dramatic increases in

housing stock, with around 80,000 made available annually. More than ten years later,

the situation today only sees around half of such stock made available. Similarly,

Singapore, a city with broadly similar characteristics, has annual stock generation at

around 3%. Hong Kong currently operates at a measly 1%.

Resultantly, the following policy actions are strongly recommended:

The construction of 250,000 government-assisted ownership units over the next

decade, an annual addition of 0.89% to total housing stock.

Around 200,000, or around 0.7% additional stock annually, should be added to

Public Rental Housing stock over the next decade.

Supply to the private sector should be increased, leading to 300,000 to 400,000

over the next decade.

In sum, present government estimates of future stock generation should be revised

from an inadequate 1.77% annualized increase to 3% until 2024.


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Stephen, Craig. Taper threatens Hong Kong property. Wall Street Journal. 26

Jan 2014.

Vallecillo, Francys. Volume of Property Deals Plunges in Hong Kong. WorldProperty Channel. Commercial News Asia Pacific. 30 Aug 2013. URL:

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Appendixes

Appendix I: Overview of Sources of Government Revenue

2008-2009

2009-2010

2010-2011

2011-2012

2012-2013

Operatingrevenue

Directtaxes

Earnings andprofits tax

Interest tax - - - - -

Profits tax 104,15176,60

593,18

3118,6

00125,6

38Personal assessment 2,151 3,656 3,922 4,512 4,078Property tax 833 1,678 1,647 1,949 2,259

Salaries tax 39,00841,24

544,25

551,76

150,46

7Indirect

taxes

Bets and sweeps tax 12,62

0

12,76

7

14,75

9

15,76

1

16,56

5Entertainments tax - - - - -Hotel accommodation tax (1) 223 - - - -Stamp duties 32,16

242,38

351,00

544,35

642,88

0 Air passenger departure tax 1,626 1,617 1,813 1,947 2,029Cross Harbour Tunnel passage tax - - - - -Duties 6,047 6,465 7,551 7,725 8,977General rates

7,175 9,957 8,956 9,72211,20

4Motor vehicle taxes 4,981 4,816 6,657 7,070 7,466Royalties and concessions 2,389 1,596 2,452 4,849 2,736

Fees and charges (tax-loaded fees) (2) 4,870 4,895 5,113 6,769 5,127Otherrevenue

Fines, forfeitures and penalties 1,006 1,183 1,159 2,660 1,208Properties and investments 12,48

312,60

115,80

616,97

119,26

8Loans, reimbursements, contributions andother receipts 3,305 3,277 2,887 3,425 3,404Utilities 3,320 3,438 3,483 3,573 3,687Fees and charges (excluding tax-loadedfees) (2) 5,600 5,592 6,250 6,450 6,463Investmentincome

General revenueaccount

23,352

17,893

17,824

20,105

20,024

Land Fund 14,18311,19

611,07

811,21

611,12

6Total operating revenue 281,4

85262,8

60299,8

00339,4

21344,6

06Capitalrevenue

Indirecttaxes

Estate duty 176 185 213 94 137Taxi concessions - - - - -

Otherrevenue

Land transactions - - - - -Recovery from Housing Authority 471 864 142 163 230Others

3,488 5,946 1,212 2,35915,85

3Funds Capital Works

Reserve Fund Land premium (3) 16,93

639,63

265,54

584,64

469,56

3Others 6,219 2,245 2,797 3,822 4,675

Capital Investment Fund 1,917 1,232 1,357 1,386 1,482Disaster Relief Fund 5 12 4 9 1


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Loan Fund 2,101 2,276 2,238 2,389 2,240Civil Service Pension Reserve Fund 1,745 1,377 1,363 1,379 1,369Innovation and Technology Fund 416 323 272 240 214Lotteries Fund (3) 1,603 1,490 1,538 1,817 1,780

Total capital revenue 35,077

55,582

76,681

98,302

97,544

Total Government revenue 316,562

318,442

376,481

437,723

442,150

Appendix II: History of LTV Policy

Source: HOFINETAppendix III: Global Office Indices Marketview

December 2013


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Appendix IV:

June 2013

Source: CBRE


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Appendix V: Annual International Housing Affordability Survey

Source: Demographia


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Appendix VI: Global Retail Indices Marketview

Appendix VII: Hong Kong Interest Rate Policy


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Index HongKong

Singapore

Square MeterPrices

$20,660 $17,709

Rental Yields 3.00 2.41%

Rents $6,198 $4,276

Price/Rent Ratio 33 yrs 41 yrs

Price/GDP per

Cap

60.07 34.92

Roundtrip Cost 2.77% 4.67%

Rental IncomeTax (Effective)

12.16% 15.13%

Capital Gains Tax(Effective)

0.00 0.00

House Price

Change 1 year

6.3% 3.47

House PriceChange 5 years

94.89% 50.92%

House PriceChange 10 years

160.30% 77.74

Landlord andTenant Law

ProLandlord

ProLandlord

EconomicFreedom Rating

89.68 87.18

EconomicFreedom 5 years

10.82% -8.19%

CompetitivenessRating

5.36 5.63

Property Rights

Index

90 90


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Currency +/-value

$0.70 $0.85

Taxes on

Residents (Av.)

n.a. n.a.

Documents

Green Paper on Housing Policy : Hong Kong SAR