GTRI’s Nuclear Removal Programs GTRI’s Nuclear Removal Programs

Kelly CumminsKelly CumminsDirector of Former Soviet Union and Asian Threat ReductionDirector of Former Soviet Union and Asian Threat Reduction

National Nuclear Security AdministrationNational Nuclear Security Administration

Presented to the Presented to the 2009 National Spent Fuel Program Meeting2009 National Spent Fuel Program Meeting

Nuclear Removal ObjectiveNuclear Removal Objective

Goal: Remove or dispose of excess WMD-usable nuclear materials located at civilian sites worldwide:

• Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) fresh and spent fuel from research reactors

• U.S.-origin fresh and spent nuclear fuel from research reactors

• Gap nuclear materials not covered by other removal efforts

These efforts result in permanent threat reduction because each kilogram of this dangerous material that is secured and disposed of removes it from possible diversion for malevolent purposes.

Russian-origin HEU RemovalRussian-origin HEU Removal

Scope: Partner with the IAEA and Russia to repatriate Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) fresh and spent fuel from over 20 Russian-supplied research reactors in 17 countries.

– Agreement to convert reactor to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel required for facility eligibility

– HEU fresh fuel removed under an IAEA mechanism– HEU spent fuel removed under direct contracts with the

facility

Under the February 2005 Bratislava Joint Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation, the United States and Russia developed an overall prioritized accelerated schedule of shipments.

Russian-origin HEU RemovalRussian-origin HEU Removal

Accomplishments:

• FY07 – Germany, Poland, Vietnam

• FY08 - Czech Republic, Latvia*, Bulgaria*

• FY09 – Hungary

*Latvia and Bulgaria are now HEU-free

The program goal is to complete repatriation of eligible Russian‑origin HEU spent fuel currently stored outside of research reactors by 2010.

• To date, 765 kilograms of HEU fuel have been repatriated from 10 countries

Completed Russian HEU Fuel Shipments

U.S.-origin HEU RemovalU.S.-origin HEU Removal

Scope: Repatriate U.S.-origin HEU and LEU spent nuclear fuel and HEU target material.

– Agreement to convert reactor to LEU fuel required for facility eligibility

In 2004, DOE approved a ten-year extension of this program. Currently the United States will accept eligible spent fuel that is irradiated by May 2016 and returned to the United States by May 2019.

• GTRI has repatriated 1,200 kilograms of HEU spent fuel and 3,153 kilograms of LEU spent nuclear fuel from 27 countries in 46 shipments

• 16 countries have returned all of their eligible U.S.-origin HEU fuel

U.S.-origin HEU RemovalU.S.-origin HEU Removal

Countries with Eligible U.S.-origin Material for Repatriation

U.S.-origin ShipmentsU.S.-origin Shipments

• 46 shipments completed

• 36 via Ocean to East Coast

• 8,587 spent fuel assemblies, from 27 countries

• 8 cross-country shipments completed, one west coast shipment completed

• 203 casks/7,169 assemblies to SRS19 casks/1,383 rods to INL13 casks/35 assemblies to Y-12

Shipments to DateShipments to Date

8 Shipments to INL1. South Korea2. Romania, Slovenia, Italy

and Germany3. United Kingdom4. Germany 5. Japan6. Indonesia7. Japan8. Romania

1. Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Colombia, and Chile 2. Canada3. Germany, Switzerland, Spain and Italy4. Japan, Sweden, Germany, and Spain5. Denmark, Italy, Germany, Sweden, and Greece6. Australia7. Venezuela, Uruguay, Japan, Sweden, and Spain8. Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and Taiwan9. Germany, Denmark, and Sweden10. Portugal and Denmark11. Japan (via Europe)12. Brazil and Venezuela

13. Canada14. Italy and Germany15. Japan16. Chile and Argentina17. Austria, Germany, and Netherlands18. Germany, Sweden, and Japan19. Denmark20. Denmark, Germany, and Sweden21 &22. Japan 23. Indonesia24. Germany25. Japan

26. Netherlands and Sweden27. Austria and Greece28. Netherlands and Germany29. Australia30. Japan31. Sweden32. Argentina and Brazil33. Sweden, Germany and Japan34. Portugal35. Germany and Japan36. Canada

36 shipments to SRS

2 Shipments to Y-121. Argentina2. South Korea

Upcoming ShipmentsUpcoming Shipments

– Australia: 14.6 kg HEU and 56.5 kg LEU

– Indonesia/Taiwan Joint Shipment: • 53.6 kg LEU from Indonesia• 4.8 kg of HEU and 34.8 kg of LEU from Taiwan

– Turkey/Israel Joint Shipment: • 5.0 kg of HEU from Turkey• 20.0 kg of LEU from Israel

– Japan: 5.1 kg of HEU and 282.7 kg of LEU

Gap RemovalGap Removal

Scope: Facilitate the disposition of high risk, vulnerable nuclear material not covered by other removal efforts. The materials could include:

– U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel not covered by the existing U.S.-origin fuel return program

– HEU material of non-U.S.-origin and non-Russian-origin– U.S.-origin HEU fresh research reactor fuel– Separated plutonium

Accomplishments:– Since the program began approximately 146

kilograms of HEU has been removed from Belgium Canada, the Netherlands, and Italy

StrategyStrategy

• Provide assistance to facilities in characterizing, packaging, or down blending fuel for disposition in their own domestic repository

• Assist facilities in locating viable commercial disposition options

• Where no acceptable commercial option is available, bring certain high-risk material to the United States– Revised Record of Decision approved by NNSA Administrator in

January 2009 allows GTRI “to transport up to 1 metric ton of spent nuclear fuel (Gap Material SNF) from foreign research reactor locations to the United States and safely store this Gap Material at a DOE site pending disposition.”

Program RequirementsProgram Requirements

• According to the Revised Record of Decision, material must also meet the following 4 conditions:

1) pose a threat to national security, 2) be susceptible to use in an improvised nuclear device, 3) present a high risk of terrorist threat, and4) have no other reasonable pathway to assure security from theft or

diversion

• First priority is to find a commercial disposition pathway– Approximately 100 kilograms have been sent to Areva for

disposition, working on dispositioning additional plutonium and HEU materials

Program RequirementsProgram Requirements

• Bringing gap material to SRS is considered a last resort

• Will be done on a prioritized basis, based on:– Material attractiveness

– Vulnerability

– Threat Environment

• Primary candidates are Chile and South Africa– Chile - approximately 20 kilograms of HEU spent fuel from France and

the United Kingdom

– South Africa - 130 kilograms of HEU spent fuel of South African origin