Haqqani Network in Kurram Web

7/30/2019 Haqqani Network in Kurram Web

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THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF A GROWING INSURGENCY

Jeffrey Dressler & Reza Jan

May 2011

THE HAqqANI NETWORkIN kURRAM


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All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.

2011 by the Institute for the Study of War and AEIs Critical Threats Project

Cover image courtesy of Dr. Mohammad Taqi.


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the haani networin urram

The Regional Implications ofa Growing Insurgency

A Reprt the Istitte r the Std War ad AEIs Critica Threats Prject

Jere Dresser&

Reza Ja


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This report would not have been possible without the help and hard work of numerousindividuals. The authors would like to thank Alex Della Rocchetta and David Witterfor their diligent research and critical support in the production of the report, MaggieRackl for her patience and technical skill with graphics and design, and Marisa Sullivanand Maseh Zarif for their keen insight and editorial assistance. The authors would alsolike to thank Kim and Fred Kagan for their necessary inspiration and guidance. Asalways, credit belongs to many, but the contents of this report represent the views ofthe authors alone.

ACknoWlEDgEmEnTS


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TAblE of ConTEnTS

Introduction.....................................................................................

1Brief History of Kurram Agency............................................................ 1

The Mujahideen Years & Operation Enduring Freedom .............................. 2

Surge of Sectarianism in Kurram ........................................................... 4

North Waziristan & The Search for New Sanctuary.....................................7

Recent Developments in Kurram & Haqqani Involvement.............................7

maps

Map 1: Afghanistan-Pakistan Border ...................................................... 1

Map 2: Islamabad & Kabul................................................................... 3

Map 3: Federally Administered Tribal Area .............................................. 8


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ExECuTIvE SummARy

This paper details the expansion of the Haqqani Network in Pakistans tribal areas through peace accords signed

between rival Sunni and Shia factions in Kurram Agency, Pakistan. The peace accords brought nearly four years

of continuous ghting to an end. Despite the appearance of legitimacy, the peace accords were manipulated by the

Afghanistan-focused Haqqani Network to serve its own ends. In exchange for brokering the peace between Sunnis andShias, the Haqqanis allegedly received the authority to operate through Shia-controlled terrain in central and upper

Kurram which will aid their ongoing insurgency against Afghan and coalition forces throughout eastern Afghanistan.

The Haqqanis have also demonstrated their growing power and inuence in the Pakistani tribal region in areas beyond

their historical stronghold of neighboring North Waziristan Agency.

The Haqqani Network is Afghanistans most capable and sophisticated insurgent network. ThehHaqqanis enjoy sanctuary in the tribal areas in Pakistan along the border with Afghanistan. Withthe backing of elements within the Pakistan security establishment, the Haqqanis have used theirsanctuary in the North Waziristan Agency of Pakistan to operate across the border in southeastern

Afghanistan.

In response to increased coalition activity against the Haqqani Network in both Pakistan (viahdrones) and Afghanistan (via Special Operations Forces), the Haqqanis have increasingly soughtnew Pakistani sanctuary and additional inltration routes in order to continue to battle coalitionforces for control of southeastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network has increasingly turnedtheir attention to Kurram Agency over the past several years as a potential sanctuary for theHaqqanis and afliated terrorist organizations.

Kurram is a region of special strategic importance to Afghanistan-focused insurgents. It served asha base to the Afghan Mujahideen during the war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Kurramremains coveted terrain today as it facilitates convenient access to several Afghan provinces and isalso the shortest route to Kabul from anywhere in Pakistan.

In September 2010, reports surfaced that suggested the Haqqani Network was involved in peacehnegotiations between Kurrams Shia and Sunni tribes. The Haqqani Networks earliest reportedinvolvement in Kurram peace talks dates back to early 2009, though they have been involved inghting the Shia in Upper Kurram to facilitate access to Afghanistan since at least 2008.

In exchange for brokering the peace between Sunnis and Shias, the Haqqanis allegedly received thehauthority to operate through Shia-controlled terrain in central and upper Kurram. It is likely that

other national and transnational terrorists who operate with the Haqqanis, such as al-Qaeda andLashkar-e Taiba, will join them in Kurram.

The Haqqanis will likely relocate critical elements of the network to Kurram Agency. This will havehthe dual effect of relieving pressure on the Network from U.S. drone strikes in North Waziristanand allow for greater freedom of movement for its ghters, facilitators, and leaders.

The expansion of the Haqqani Network and afliated terrorist groups will have negativehconsequences for security and stability, not just in Kurram, but in eastern Afghanistan andelsewhere in Pakistan, as it will become more difcult to identify, track, and strike national and

international terrorist groups.


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map 1: Ahaista Paista brder


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Though Sunni and Shia tribes may enjoy a briefrespite on account of the peace agreement,the Haqqani Networks expansion intoKurram will likely lead to increased militantintimidation, and expanded drone strikes. AHaqqani sanctuary in Kurram will also allowradical groups like the Pakistani Taliban andal-Qaeda to reconstitute and redouble theirefforts against the Pakistani state and NATO

forces in Afghanistan. Furthermore, thesedevelopments may facilitate an expansion ofthe Haqqani Network and afliated groupsthroughout Afghanistans eastern provinces.

brie Histr krra Aec

The history of the Shia Turi tribe in Kurramdates back to the end of the fteenth century. Anomadic tribe, the Turis established a summerheadquarters in Ariob (currently located in themodern day Afghan province of Paktia). By1700 A.D., the Turis consolidated their controlover upper Kurram and eventually droveout their rivals, the Bangash. Some Bangashembraced Shia tenets and were granted equalrights, while others ed. Today, Bangash livingin lower Kurram are almost entirely Sunniwhile those in central and upper Kurram are amix of Sunni and Shia.1

More recent sectarian violence betweenSunnis and Shias in Kurram dates to the the

Kurram is a region of special strategicimportance to Afghanistan-focused insurgents.It served as a base to the Afghan Mujahideenduring the war against the Soviet Union inthe 1980s and is coveted by insurgents todaybecause of its parrots beak shape thatprotrudes deep into eastern Afghanistan.This allows convenient access to severalAfghan provinces and is the shortest route to

Kabul from anywhere in Pakistan. This accesshas become critical for Haqqani Networkghters, who have lost much of their abilityto project force into Kabul due to coalitiontargeting of their network in southeasternAfghanistan throughout 2009 and 2010. TheHaqqanis have been pressured in their mainarea of operationsnamely the provinces ofKhost, Paktia, and Paktika along the borderwith Pakistanand have since sought new

routes into Kabul. The Haqqanis have alsocome under pressure from drone strikes intheir sanctuary of North Waziristan, near theborder with Afghanistan in Pakistans tribalareas. The Haqqani Network has successfullyexploited an ongoing Sunni-Shia rift inKurram, with at least some assistance fromthe Pakistani security establishment, in orderto expand its area of operations, open up newlines of communication to reach Kabul, and

relieve the pressure on its besieged strongholdsin North Waziristan.

In February 2011, Sunni and Shia tribesmen in Kurram Agency, a tribal region in

Pakistans Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as the North-West FrontierProvince), signed a historic peace deal that brought nearly four years of internecinewarfare to an end. As part of the agreement, Sunni militants agreed to reopen the agencysmain road that had been blockaded since April 2007. This newfound peace in Kurram,however, also allowed the Haqqani Network, an Afghanistan-focused insurgent networkand one of the most powerful and violent organizations in the region, to dramaticallystrengthen its position. The Haqqanis were inuential in brokering the peace betweenSunni and Shia tribes in return for access through Kurram to Afghanistans easternprovinces.

Itrdcti


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Among the Sunni Mujahideen ghtersoperating in the region, one in particularstands out. Osama bin Laden rst arrived inthe Pakistan-Afghanistan border region in1984, visiting the frontline camps of rebelcommander Abdul Sayyaf in Jaji, Paktia.7Sayyaf was one of the most notoriousMujahideen commanders ghting the Sovietsin Afghanistan and had constructed at leastone known facility at Khaldan, located in theborder region between northern Kurram and

Afghanistans eastern provinces of Paktiaand Nangarhar.8 Over the course of the nextseveral years, bin Laden constructed anothercamp for Arab ghters in nearby Jaji, assistingthe Afghan Mujahideen in their ght againstthe Soviets. Bin Laden fought mostly withJalalludin Haqqanis forces during the late1980s.9

Haqqani was an inuential Zadran tribal leader

and Mujahideen ghter, who led a majorfront for the Hizb-i-Islami Khalis faction inand around Khost.10 Hizb-i-Islami Khaliswas one of the unity of seven Mujahideenresistance factions that banned together toght the Soviets and Mohammad Najibullahsgovernment forces in Afghanistan during the1980s. Other Mujahideen groups includedAbdul Rasul Sayyaf s United Islamic Frontfor the Liberation of Afghanistan, Pir Sayed

Ahmed Gailanis National Islamic Front ofAfghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyars Hizb-i-Islami (distinct from the Younus Khalisfaction) and Burhanuddin Rabbanis Jamiat-eIslami.11

Within Kurram, the agencys capital ofParachinar was used as a Mujahideendistribution center and recovery areathroughout the 1980s.12 Mujahideen ghters

visited locations in Parachinar where theyreceived weapons and supplies from Peshawar,delivered by truckload every three to four

occurred sporadically, particularly duringthe Islamic holy month of Muharram andNowruz, the Persian New Year, both of whichare important in the Shia traditions.2 The 1979Islamic Revolution in Iran exacerbated thesectarian conict in Kurram. It encouragedsome Shias to demand the creation of a Shia-majority province known as Karakoram,which would include Kurram Agency andother adjoining Shia-majority parts of thecountry. The Turi tribe, allegedly with Iranian

support and funding, backed this movement,though it was later challenged and put downby Pakistans Islamist President, General Zia-ul-Haq.3

The Mujahideen Years and Operation

Enduring Freedom

During the 1980s, Kurram Agency served asa staging ground for Mujahideen participatingin jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Consequently, Kurram experienced a massiveinux of Sunni Afghans. These Sunnisbrought with them a militant ideology thatclashed with Kurrams Shia population, at atime when the latter was being radicalized bythe Iranian Revolution.4 Although there weresporadic clashes between Sunnis and Shiasthroughout the early 1980s, the rst large-scale clash occurred in 1986 when Shia Turisprevented Sunni Mujahideen ghters frompassing into Afghanistan.5 In response, Zia-ul-Haq allowed Mujahideen and local Sunnitribesmen to purge Shia Turis in the upperKurram city of Parachinar. At that time,Turi leader Allama Arif-ul-Hussaini was thespiritual leader of the Shia in Kurram. AllamaHussaini was murdered in Peshawar in August1988. Many Turis hold General Zia responsiblefor Hussainis death.6 Despite Shia resistance,

Kurram was of great strategic signicance tothe Mujahideen.

THE HAqqAnI nETWoRk In kuRRAm


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and bombings in and around Parachinar.17

In May 1988, Soviet forces began withdrawingtroops from Jalalabad, Gardez, Kandahar,

and other cities.18

In response to the Sovietwithdrawal, Afghan Mujahideen formed theAfghan Interim Government in Peshawar,Pakistan to take control of the country afterwhat they hoped would be the precipitous fallof the Soviet-backed Najibullah governmentin Kabul. Mujahideen forces in and around theTora Bora mountains began their campaignagainst the Najibullah government in March1989, focusing on the strategically important

eastern city of Jalalabad.19

Tora Bora is anarrow mountainous area adjacent to upperK rr m nd bo t thirt miles so the st of

and materiel forward to numerous borderbases close to Afghanistans southeasternprovinces.14 From the border, Mujahideenlines of communication, known as the

Logar route, ran from the Afghan districtof Jaji in Paktia province all the way to Logarprovince, just south of Kabul.15 Roughlyforty percent of all supplies used by theMujahideen in Afghanistan were broughtin via the Logar route.16 Although Sovietand Afghan government military forceswere deployed to seal the border betweenKurram and Afghanistan, it was impossible.On rare occasions, signaling the increasing

desperation of the Soviet campaign, Pakistanimilitary forces reported Afghan military


map 2: Isaaad & ka


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Surge of Sectarianism in kurram

Despite the capture of al-Qaeda militants inKurram in 2001, there were no signicantreports of violence in Kurram between 2002and 2007. As the Taliban insurgency againstthe Pakistani state started to gain momentumin 2004, however, it eventually spilled northfrom its cradle in Waziristan to other partsof the Federally Administered Tribal Areas(FATA), and brought an inux of Sunnimilitant Islamist organizations including al-Qaeda and its afliates into the region. Someof those groups, including the Punjab-basedSipah-e-Sahab Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and Jaish-e-Muhammad(JeM), began shifting to the FATA after theMusharraf government banned them in 2002.Another organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),reportedly moved to the FATA from Kashmirfollowing the devastating 2005 Kashmir

earthquake.

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The presence of groups suchas SSP, LeJ, and JeM, with a history of anti-Shia violence elsewhere in the country, all butguaranteed that communal sectarian violencewould intensify in Kurram.26

Until 2007, previous clashes between Sunnisand Shias in the agency were usually the resultof small-scale sectarian disputes and historicalanimosities. These minor clashes were quickly

resolved when they did occur, as tribal eldersand government ofcials intervened to end theghting.27 Sectarian violence largely remainedlocalized.28 Yet, the addition of Talibanghters and Sunni militants from outside theregion exacerbated these small-scale tensions,raising violence to unprecedented levels.29

On April 6, 2007, a procession of Shiaswas attacked in the agency headquarters ofParachinar, a city of 70,000 people, ignitingsectarian clashes across Kurram. Sunni andShia ghters used heavy weapons such as

that were constructed by Khalis commandersin and around Tora Bora to lay siege toSoviet and Afghan government forces in theprovince of Nangarhar.20 Fighters also usedroads that were constructed by bin Laden in1987 and stretched from Jaji, across Kurramand into Tora Bora.21 The campaign was adisaster for the Afghan Mujahideen and alliedArab ghters which became known as thesingle greatest failure of the Arab-Afghanexperience. For much of the next decade, a

cataclysmic civil war between former AfghanMujahideen factions destroyed much of whatwas left of the country.

Following the collapse of the Taliban regimein Afghanistan in 2001, al-Qaeda and afliatedghters sheltering in and around Jalalabad,Nangarhar began a mass exodus to bin Ladenscave complex in the Tora Bora Mountains.Tora Bora was terrain under the control of

Younus Khalis, who sheltered bin Laden andintroduced him to Mullah Omar. Khalis alsois considered by some to have been a fathergure to bin Laden.22 Bin Laden and roughly500 to 2000 ghters were believed to haveremained in the mountains until their escapesometime in mid-late December 2001.23 It isrumored that the majority of these ghtersed into upper Kurram Agency and tookshelter with sympathetic Sunni tribesman

before relocating to safer terrain, including theZharwar Kili cave complex in AfghanistansKhost province.24 This was a familiar pathfor bin Laden and his followers, who hadused the very same routes in the late 1980swhile battling Soviet forces in Afghanistanseast. Bin Laden and his followers did notexpect to face resistance from the powerfulShia communities in Kurram, however, inDecember 2001, approximately 200 al-Qaeda

afliated Arabs were turned over to Pakistanigovernment authorities by Shias in lowerK



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Fighters on both sides were effectivelyorganized and received signicant externalpatronage. Shia ghters were divided intotwo armed factions, Hizbullah and the MehdiMilitia, both backed by unspecied Iranianelements.31 One Sunni group, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), gave a press conferencein Peshawar on April 9, 2007 claiming that theIranians were furnishing the Shias with armsand cash and threatened to rally Sunnis fromall over the country to come to Kurram to ght

the Shias.32

The Shias accused Sunni factionsin Kurram of being supported, encouraged,and reinforced by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan(TTP) factions in Kurram, Orakzai, andWaziristan. Punjabi extremists from JeM andLeJ, as well as Haqqani-afliated ghters fromneighboring North Waziristan who soughtto expand their access to Afghanistan, alsobacked the Sunnis.33 The extent of HaqqaniNetwork involvement is discussed at length

below.

The intense ghting resulted in the closureof the Thall-Parachinar road. The road is themain artery running through Kurram thatconnects all parts of the agency to Peshawarand the rest of Pakistan.34 The road is alsothe main supply route to Kurram Agency,especially upper Kurram. The closure of theroad during the skirmishes resulted in a severe

shortage of commodities and prevented thetransportation of the wounded to hospitals inPeshawar when adequate care was not availablelocally.35 Fighting eventually petered out byApril 15, following a ceasere negotiated bythe warring tribes and a military-imposedcurfew throughout the main towns.36 Theroad between Sadda and Parachinar remainedclosed to trafc, however, effectively hemmingin the Shia in upper Kurram.37

The use of the Thall-Parachinar road is adening issue for tribes in Kurram Agency


The closure of the road became a majorgrievance for the Shia community as theconict in Kurram progressed. Sunni groupsand Taliban militants ghting the Shias realizedthe strategic importance of the road to theShias of upper Kurram and used their controlover the road as a weapon in their efforts topressure the Shias into capitulation. Indeed,guaranteeing safe usage of the road becamethe most important bargaining chip that theHaqqani Network offered the Shias when it

intervened to settle the conict in late 2010and early 2011.38

Although the shooting had stopped by lateApril 2007, the situation in Kurram didnot stabilize. Sunni tribes continued to armthemselves against the Shias. Six Sunni tribesin Kurramthe Teri Mangal, Ali Sherzai,Musazai, Wathazai, Khuyad Khel andChamkanialong with the Mamuzai tribe

from neighboring Orakzai, amassed a totalof $1.17 million (seventy million rupees) forweapons purchases.39

The tense truce between Kurrams Sunnis andShias was indeed short-lived. In November2007, ghting started anew and was muchbloodier than before.40 In the renewed ghting,over a hundred people were killed in the rsttwo days, including eleven Pakistan Army

soldiers in Parachinar.

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Troops were givenshoot-to-kill orders as part of an attempt toquell the violence.

Sunni-dominated lower Kurram traditionallyserved as a hotbed for many sectarianorganizations, including the virulently anti-Shia groups, SSP and JeM. The resumption ofsectarian violence, the entrenched presenceof highly trained anti-Shia terror groups

such as al-Qaeda, SSP and JeM, and the freshinvolvement of Pakistani Taliban militantsfrom Waziristan and Orakzai fueled increased


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known as the Murree Accords, declared an endto the ghting. Dozens of people kidnappedby both sides were released, the Thall-Parachinar road was re-opened, and internallydisplaced people (IDPs) were permitted tobegin returning home.49 The conict hadclaimed 1,500 lives and 5,000 injuries, and hadresulted in the closure of the Thall-ParachinarRoad for fteen months.50

This agreement, however, would also notlast long, as major clashes resumed in Juneand July 2009 and killed over one hundredpeople.51 By now the TTP was playing acentral role in stoking sectarian violence inKurram. Hakimullah Mehsudthe futureleader of the TTP and, at the time, the TTPcommander for Kurram, Orakzai, and KhyberAgencieswas reportedly behind much ofthe resurgent violence.52 Hakimullah hasbeen described as fervently anti-Shia, and is

said to have earned his reputation as a erceghter by demonstrating his brutality towardsthe Shias in Kurram Agency.53 An inux ofTTP militants eeing the large-scale Pakistanimilitary operation in nearby Swat district andother surrounding areas in May 2009 providedreinforcements to the renewed and expandedanti-Shia assault in the agency.54 The situationwas further exacerbated when much of theTTPs leadership and hundreds of its ghters,

who were expelled from South Waziristanduring Pakistani military operations there inOctober 2009, made their way to Orakzai andKurram agencies.55 The Pakistani military, asa result, began frequently launching air raidsand gunship attacks on TTP positions inKurram and Orakzai. A number of troopsalso moved into parts of Kurram agencyin mid-December 2009, causing rumors tospread that Kurram would be the site of the

next big military operation and promptingmany locals to ee.56

Taliban militants in Orakzai closed off theKurram-Darra Adam Khel road to Shiatrafc, closing the only other artery out ofupper Kurram besides the Thall-Parachinarroad. Fighting continued into January 2008with dozens of fatalities reported. Many Sunnifamilies even began eeing across the borderto the Afghan provinces of Khost and Paktiato escape the hostilities. It was the rst timein years that refugees owed from Pakistaninto Afghanistan. According to the UNHCR,

over 900 families (over 6,000 people) ed toAfghanistan to escape the violence.43

The Shias in upper Kurram faced dire shortagesof food and medical supplies and had begunto travel through Afghanistan in order toreach Peshawar to obtain basic supplies.44 Thecircuitous and dangerous route required aneighteen hour journey from upper Kurraminto Paktia province, and then through the

city of Jalalabad in Nangarhar province beforetraveling on to the Pakistani city of Peshawar.The journey from Kurram to Peshawar isnormally only four hours-long when usingthe Thall-Parachinar road.45 Those whorisked traveling through Sunni- and Taliban-controlled Thall or Darra Adam Khel sufferedthe possibility of improvised explosive device(IED) attacks, ambushes, kidnappings, andbeheadings.46 The Afghanistan detour was

not necessarily much safer: many of the Shiawere abused at the hands of Afghan SunniPashtuns, Afghan border police ofcials, andsoldiers of the Pakistani Frontier Corps thatmanned the checkpoints along the border.47

By the end of September 2008, followingeight straight weeks of heavy ghting, a tribaljirga, or meeting of Sunni and Shia elders,nally agreed to a ceasere.48 A peace deal

was agreed upon and signed by both sides onOctober 17, 2008 in Murree, Pakistan, just afew miles northeast of the Pakistani capital



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Afghanistan. Haqqani inltration was spurredby increasing attention and pressure on theNetworks sanctuary in North Waziristan,adjacent to Kurram Agency. The Shias refusedany settlement with the Haqqanis because theywere strongly opposed to giving the Networkunfettered access through Shia strongholds ofKurram into Afghanistan.65 Despite this, theHaqqanis persisted in their efforts to inltratethe region, as a new route into Afghanistan aswell as new Pakistani sanctuary was becoming

increasingly necessary.North Waziristan and the searchfor new sanctuary

The Haqqani Network maintains its commandand control, training, and logistical nodes inand around Miram Shah, North Waziristan.The Haqqanis are afforded protection inthis area by a local tribal leader, Haz GulBahadur, who controls the territory between

Miram Shah and the Afghanistan border withKhost. The Haqqanis, along with elementsof al-Qaeda and afliated groups, have usedMiram Shah as a sanctuary for much of theprevious decade. Until the past few years, theHaqqanis operations in North Waziristanwere largely undisturbed.

Since U.S. and coalition forces cannot operateon sovereign Pakistani territory, clandestine

operations such as the CIAs drone program are the only effective means of striking thesanctuaries of Afghan-focused insurgentsoperating from Pakistans tribal regions.Although drone strikes were recorded inPakistans tribal areas as early as 2004, theydid not accelerate to a signicant frequencyuntil 2008. Since then, drone strikes haveeffectively doubled every year until reachingtheir peak frequency during the latter half of2010. These strikes have focused heavily onthe Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda gures

By April 2010, the UN declared that thenumber of people who had ed operationsin Kurram and Orakzai since November 2009had reached 210,000.57

The spring of 2010 saw Pakistani militaryactivity in Kurram punctuated with long boutsof inghting between rival Taliban factionsin the agency.58 Throughout the confusedghting, the Thall-Parachinar Road remainedclosed to normal trafc. Movement along theroad was limited to intermittently-dispatchedconvoys escorted by the Pakistani military,and even these continued to suffer frequentmilitant ambushes and IED attacks.59 Despitethis, in July 2010, the Pakistani military declaredthat its operations had cleared militants fromover eighty percent of the agency and thatthe Thall-Parachinar Road was now safe fortravel.60 Still, most locals remained wary andmany only traveled on the road occasionally

and under escort by Pakistani troops.

61

The prolonged closure of the road had causedserious shortages of food and medicines andtriggered high ination in the price of wheatour, a local staple product. To relieve thisburden, an agreement was struck with a localaircraft service in order to provide a number ofParachinar to Peshawar ights each week, butthe ights were limited, the aircraft capacitylow and the tickets prohibitively expensive formost residents.62

In September 2010, reports surfaced thatsuggested the Haqqani Network was involvedin peace negotiations between Kurrams Shiaand Sunni tribes.63 The Haqqani Networksearliest reported involvement in Kurrampeace talks dates back to early 2009, thoughthey have been involved in ghting the Shiathere since at least 2008.64 For years, the Shiaresisted Haqqani attempts to inltrate theregion or to use the Thall-Parachinar Road as



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appears to be the result of several factors: theHaqqani Networks increasingly visible role inAfghanistans insurgency and the increasinglypotent mix of insurgent and terrorist groups

operating under the protection of the Haqqanisand Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan. Thesegroups include al-Qaeda, TTP, JeM, LeT, theIslamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), andothers.66

Sanctuary in North Waziristan providedthe Haqqanis with the ability to organize,plan, and resource spectacular attacks insoutheastern Afghanistan and even the capital

of Kabul. In the spring and summer of 2008,Haqqani-linked militants demonstrated theirreach and tactical prociency by executing

numerous attacks on coalition forces and localgovernment ofcials in eastern Afghanistan.Fighters afliated with the Haqqani Networklaunched complex attacks in Kabul in January

and February 2008, targeting the Norwegianforeign minister at the Serena Hotel andgovernment and military ofcials at a majormilitary parade, respectively.67 Additionally,Haqqani ghters attacked coalition andAfghan National Security Forces in the easternprovinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost;border outposts, government buildings,and police units were repeatedly targeted.68Attempts to overrun several district centers in

Paktia and Khost demonstrated the networksboldness and sophistication.

map 3: federa Adiistered Tria Area


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While drone strikes have increasinglytargeted the Haqqanis in North Waziristan,the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF) has also stepped up its efforts to targetthe Haqqanis in Afghanistans southeasternprovinces of Paktika, Paktia, and Khost, anarea known as Loy-Paktia (greater Paktia).Between 2009 and 2010, the Joint SpecialOperations Command (JSOC) assets inAfghanistan have increased fty to sixtypercent, totaling more than 5,000 personnel

today.

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Concurrent increases in intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in theregion have allowed JSOC units to increaseits operational tempo and execute hundredsof kill-or-capture missions. Focusing onthe Haqqani Network in Loy-Paktia, theseassets have pressured the Haqqani Networksoperations in Afghanistan.79 JSOC has targetedmid- and low-level militants operating inLoy-Paktia, which has produced intelligence

regarding how the larger network operates.Removing these low and mid-level insurgentsrequires senior Haqqani insurgents to spendtime reconstructing their networks andmotivating increasingly reluctant replacementcommanders.80

The JSOC hammer to the drone strikesanvil was designed to restrict Haqqanicross-border operations. In contrast to cross-

border militant inltration in 2008 and 2009,Haqqani Network ghters are no longer ableto enter or exit Loy-Paktia in large groupsand many are being captured or destroyed.81The net effect of these operations is that itis more difcult for the Haqqani Network tosynchronize and resource operations in Loy-Paktia.

In response to increased activity against the

Network in both Pakistan and Afghanistan,the Haqqanis have increasingly sought newPakistani sanctuary and additional inltration

The danger posed by the Haqqanis wasreinforced by their role in the December30, 2009 attack on CIA personnel in Khost.A Jordanian jihadist killed four CIA ofcerswhen he detonated an explosive vest duringa meeting to discuss the possible locationof Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaedas second-in-command.69 The suicide bomber laterappeared on a video sitting alongside TTPchief Hakimullah Mehsud, stating that he hadno intention of aiding the CIA and used the

meeting as a pretext to conduct the attack.

70

While the Haqqani Network has not publiclyclaimed credit for the attack, Siraj Haqqanidid reference both the attack and the bomberby name in an interview.71 Drone activityin North Waziristan exclusively targetedHaqqani-inuenced territory immediatelyafter the attack; every one of the seven strikesin Pakistan over the next two weeks targetedMir Ali, Miram Shah, or Datta Khel.72

The Haqqanis increasingly visible rolein Afghanistan and their linkages tointernational terrorist groups has led to anintense U.S. drone campaign on the networkssafe havens in Pakistan. After the Haqqanis2008 offensive in Afghanistan, drones struckPakistan thirty times that same year, fourteenof which targeted North Waziristan.73 Bycomparison, in 2007 there were four total

drone strikes, with three of them striking thetown of Miram Shah in North Waziristan.74Drone strikes in North Waziristan continuedto increase over the next two years, climbingto twenty-two in 2009 before soaring to morethan a hundred in 2010.75 This stepped-upcampaign has focused on areas surroundingthe Haqqani strongholds of Miram Shahand Mir Ali.76 Local and foreign ghtersassociated with the Haqqani Network and

relatives of the Haqqanis themselves wereamong the intended targets.77



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in upper, central, and lower Kurram. Themain tenets of the accord will likely mirrorthe Murree Accord of 2008, requiring thereturn of captured or deceased tribesman,the opening of the Thall-Parachinar roadand the resettlement of internally displacedpeoples who ed the violence.86 Additionally,in exchange for pressuring Sunni militants tocease attacks on the Shias, the Haqqanis andafliated groups will be provided with accessinto Afghanistan through formerly hostile

Shia terrain.

87

Until recently, the Shias have managed to resistthe expansion of insurgent-backed Sunnis inKurram. In September and October of 2010,the inuential brothers of Jalaluddin Haqqani,Khalil and Ibrahim, attended meetings betweenShia and Sunni tribal elders in Peshawarand Islamabad, respectively.88 According toindividuals with knowledge of the talks that

brokered the current truce, Khalil Haqqaniwas instrumental in reaching a settlementafter both sides were allegedly pressured byelements of the Pakistani government to heedhis authority.89

The Shias had come under increasing pressureto reach a deal with the Haqqanis sinceSeptember 2010. In September, the Pakistanisecurity services announced the closure of veborder crossing points in Upper Kurram andinterrupted small aircraft sorties used to ferrysupplies from Parachinar to Peshawar.90 Faced

with the loss of their alternate transit route toPeshawar, this development essentially forcedthe Shias to the negotiating table. Ultimately,the Shias accepted the terms of a peaceagreement that was likely dictated in largepart by the Haqqanis, according to those withknowledge of the deal.91

Though Shia leaders deny the role of theHaqqanis in brokering the peace, the available

battle ISAF for control of Loy-Paktia. TheHaqqani Network, with the active assistancefrom elements within the Pakistani securityestablishment, have increasingly turned theirattention to Kurram Agency over the pastseveral years as a potential sanctuary for theHaqqani Network and afliated groups.82

At the same time that North Waziristanbecame unsuitable for the Haqqanis, theresistance to Haqqani expansion in Kurramalso appeared to give way. The war-weary Shias,disappointed with the governments lack ofsupport (and suspicious that the governmentwas supporting Haqqani attempts to establisha hold in the area) were more willing to engagein talks than was previously the case.

Recent developments in kurramand Haani involvement

On February 5, 2011, Shia and Sunni

communities in Parachinar, Kurramannounced an end to a four-year-long feud.The years of ghting left over 2,000 peopledead and over 3,500 wounded.83 Tribesmanfrom both communities as well as membersof Pakistans legislative body, the NationalAssembly, participated in a 220-member tribaljirga that produced the newly-reached peaceaccord.84 Despite the appearance of legitimacythat the tribal jirga bestowed on the accord,

the real agreement was reached beforehandthrough several rounds of negotiationsbetween tribal elders, government ofcials,and members of the Haqqani Network.85 TheHaqqani Networks involvement in brokeringthe agreement demonstrates its growing powerand inuence in the Pakistani tribal region inareas beyond North Waziristan.

The recently-signed accord represents an

agreement between Sunnis and Shias, backedby Pakistani governmental representation, to

k h h i i



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that both tribes would be liable to take actionagainst the group in question.97 Both sides,including the outsiders who were guarantorsof the peace deal (i.e. the Haqqanis) havebeen involved in emergency talks to resolvethe latest situation.98

As it currently stands, the peace deal isvery much alive. It is, of course, subject tointerference by individual spoilers, a factor thatis unlikely to be permanently resolved giventhe plethora of groups operating in the area.It does not appear on this occasion, however,that the actions of such groups have beenable to fracture the accord reached betweenthe Sunnis and the Shias.

Conclusion

On the surface, the Haqqani-mediated peacein Kurram appears benecial to all partiesinvolved, as four years of bloody sectarian

violence has ended in Kurram. Yet, in theshort-term, the Haqqani Network, and theirafliates are the only real winners. The UnitedStates efforts to secure Afghanistan will bemore difcult as a result of the Haqqani-mediated peace in Kurram, as well as the morenarrowly dened goal of preventing the regionfrom serving as a national and transnationalterrorist safe haven. Unlike previous peaceagreements, this deal has been endorsed bythe Kurram chapter of the Pakistani Taliban(previously the main instigators of violence inthe agency), the Haqqanis, and the Pakistanigovernment. In the long-run, the end ofvicious sectarian conict will not be withoutconsequence.

Pressuring the Shias to come to terms witha Haqqani-mediated peace agreement appearsto have been the result of steady efforts within

the Pakistani security establishmentandfor good reason. For years, Shias and Sunnis

for brokering the peace between Sunnis andShias, the Haqqanis allegedly received theauthority to operate through Shia-controlledterrain in central and upper Kurram.93 It isunclear if the Haqqanis have also secured theability to operate camps and other facilitationinfrastructure in Shia-controlled terrain. It islikely that new infrastructure and facilitationoperations will be required to support notonly Haqqani ghters but also other nationaland transnational terrorists who operate with

them, such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e Taiba.The peace deal between Sunni and Shia heldstrong for nearly two months with all sidesappearing to cooperate and, for the rst time inyears, the Thall-Parachinar road was reopenedto regular, uninhibited trafc. In mid-March2011, however, some attacks resumed on Shiaconvoys. These culminated in an attack onShia vehicles in Lower Kurram near Baggan

on March 25, 2011. Up to thirteen people werekilled and as many as forty-ve kidnapped(though some were later released).94

The incident has raised, in some quarters,questions regarding the solidity of the peacedeal.95 While it may appear to herald more ofthe same broken promises as in the past, thereare several reasons why the deal should not beconsidered scuttled just yet. Unlike in previous

instances, the main warring parties have nottaken up arms against each other; the renewedattacks appear to be the work of a singlespoiler group operating in mid-lower Kurramthat is working to pressure the government toaccept its demands for the release of some ofits members in custody.96

Despite the attack on the Shias, general Sunni-Shia violence has not erupted again. In fact,both the Shia Turis and the Sunni Mangalshave made joint calls for the government totake military action against the group violating



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LeT, the IMU, and others who operate undertheir protection in North Waziristan.99 Thisrelationship has grown stronger over the pastseveral years and is likely to continue.100 It willcertainly be more difcult to identify, track,and strike national and international terroristsif al-Qaeda and others are afforded newfoundfreedom of movement and territorial sanctuaryin parts of Kurram Agency.

For Shias and Sunnis in Kurram, as well as thelong-term viability of the Pakistani state, theHaqqani-mediated peace will not be withoutconsequences. In the short term, Shias andSunnis will regain freedom of movement inand around Kurram without the threat of large-scale violence, though there will undoubtedlybe occasional skirmishes and the interferenceof spoiler groups. However, in the long run,allowing Pakistani and Afghan insurgents aswell as transnational terrorists to operate in

the region will destabilize Kurram, especiallyif it brings increased militant activity and, inresponse, increased drone strikes. If Sunnimilitants build up a signicant presence inKurram, they may be capable of overrunninglarge Shia communities in upper Kurram.Ultimately, Pakistani militant groups, such asthe TTP, may be able to use their positionsin Kurram, in addition to the Waziristans,Orakzai, and other agencies, to increase their

recruiting, build new safe havens, and mount asustained campaign bent on overthrowing thePakistani state. If such an event were to occur,the short term gains of a peace in Kurramwould be outweighed by signicant long-termchallenges both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Reza Jan is Research Analyst and the Pakistan

Team Lead for the Critical Threats Project at the

American Enterprise Institute. Jeffrey Dressler is a

Senior Research Analyst at the Institute for the Studyof War in Washington, DC.

government to intervene in the sectarianconict fueled by elements of Afghan andPakistan-focused Taliban. Yet, elementswithin the Pakistani security establishmentappeared unable to, and, once the HaqqaniNetwork got involved, unwilling to brokera peace unless it also paid dividends forthe Haqqanis. Relocating elements of theHaqqanis to Kurram also allows the PakistaniArmy to take military action in NorthWaziristan without interfering with Haqqani

operations. Pakistan has sidestepped years ofpressure from the international communityurging them to launch operations againstthe Haqqanis and their afliates in NorthWaziristan. Should the Pakistan Army nallydecide to take military action in NorthWaziristan, it will have the effect of placatingor possibly even redeeming their reputationin the international community, while leavingtheir Haqqani proxies intact elsewhere.

In helping to broker the peace in Kurram, theHaqqanis have secured critical concessionsthat will aid their operations and tacticalprociency in their ongoing campaign againstISAF and Afghan forces in Afghanistanseastern provinces. The Haqqanis will likelyrelocate critical elements of the network toKurram Agency. This will have the dual effectof relieving pressure on the network from

U.S. drone strikes in North Waziristan andallow for greater freedom of movement forits ghters, facilitators, and leaders. Securingnew sanctuary in Kurram also provides theHaqqanis with more diverse inltration routesinto Afghanistans east, especially the nearbyimportant population centers of Jalalabad,Gardez, and ultimately Kabul.

In addition to supporting their Afghan-

focused offensive, the Haqqanis expansioninto Kurram will likely increase their capacityto provide shelter and protection for national



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Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban,(Washington: University of Washington Press, 2001)

70; Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble, pp.25620 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: the true story of radicalIslam, (London: I. B. Taurus, 2004), 78; Robert D.Kaplan, Soldiers of God, (New York: Vintage Books,2001), 124-12521 Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, pp.6222 Mary Anne Weaver, Lost at Tora Bora, New YorkTimes, September 11, 200523 Tora Bora Revisited: How we failed to get bin Ladenand why it matters today, A Report to the membersof the Committee on Foreign Relations, United StatesSenate, November 30, 200924 Pentagon Brieng: Zawar Kili buildings searched,destroyed, CNN Transcripts, January 14, 200225 Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in PakistansKurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)March 19, 200926 Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in PakistansKurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)March 19, 200927 Tayyab Ali Shah, Taliban expllit Shia-Sunni divide inPakistans Kurram Tribal Agency,Jamestown Terrorism

Monitor, V. 8 I. 15, April 17, 2010. Available at http://www.j amestown.org/singl e/?n o_cach e=1&t x_ttnews[tt_news]=3626928 Khan p.11329 Jan Zalewski, Sectarian Tensions Mount in PakistansKurram Agency, 141 Killed Since Mid-June, GlobalInsight, July 9, 2009 (Source obtained from LexisNexis),Accessed: January 27, 201130 Curfew in Pakistani town after three die inclashes, AFP, April 6, 2007. Available at Nexis.comPakistan sectarian clashes continue despitecurfew, killing 8, injuring more, Xinhua,

April 7, 2007. Available at Nexis.comNegotiations Begin To Quell Sectarian Strife,Associated Press Pakistan, April 9, 2007. Available atNexis.com31 Shia deal gives militants new Afghan access,Associated Press, November 27, 201032 Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in PakistansKurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)March 19, 200933 Kurram Agency and the U.S. and PakistansDivergent Interests, STRATFOR, November 2,2010; Dr. Mohammad Taqi, Kurram: sacriced atthe global jihad alter, Daily Times, February 24,2011; Pakistani Army allows Taliban to move to new

t i K A hil ll i t

noTES

1 Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in PakistansKurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)March 19, 20092 Khan p.113 and Zahab p.83 Khan p.116; Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism inPakistans Kurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor,VII (6) March 19, 20094 Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in PakistansKurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)March 19, 20095 Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in Pakistans

Kurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)March 19, 20096 Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in PakistansKurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)March 19, 20097 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower, pp.1168Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: the true story of radical Islam,(London: I. B. Taurus, 2004), 789 Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, pp.4710 Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, pp.4711Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: in the shadow ofJihad and Afghanistan, (New York: Farrar, Straus andGiroux, 2002), 22012Mohammad Yousuf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan:The Bear Trap, (Pen and Sword Books, Yorkshire,2002), 4013J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: the rst ve years ofSoviet occupation, (Diane Publishing Co, Darby, PA,1994), 204-205; Mary Anne Weaver, Pakistan: in theshadow of Jihad and Afghanistan, (New York: Farrar,Straus and Giroux, 2002), 22014

Mohammad Yousuf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan:The Bear Trap, (Pen and Sword Books, Yorkshire,2002), 2415 Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, Afghan GuerrillaWarfare, (St. Paul, MBI Publishing, 2001), 35116 Mohammad Yousuf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan:The Bear Trap, (Pen and Sword Books, Yorkshire,2002), 2417 Barbara Crossette, Pakistan downs an Afghanintruder, New York Times, March 31, 198718 Bill Keller, Last Soviet forces leave Afghanistan after9 years, 15,000 dead, and great cost, New York Times,February 16, 1989; Afghans Helped Bin Laden FleeCountry, Ofcial Says, Los Angeles Times, September15 2005



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46 Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in PakistansKurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)

March 19, 200947 Authors interview with Special Forces previouslydeployed to southeastern Afghanistan, February 5,201148 Tribal Jirga To Hold Peace Negotiations FromToday, Business Recorder, September 25, 2008.Available at Nexis.com49 Kurram Agency Grand Jirga Brokers Peace AmongRival Factions, Business Recorder, October 17, 2008.Available at Nexis.com50 Peace pact in Pakistans Kurram Agency beingimplemented TV, BBC Monitoring Service,November 17, 2008. Available at Nexis.com51 Pakistan: 17 killed in sectarian clashes, Right VisionNews, July 1, 2009. Available at Nexis.com52 Reza Jan, The King is Dead, Long Livethe King: Hakimullah Mehsud Takes Powerin the TTP, CriticalThreats.org, September 8,2009. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.o r g / p a k i s t a n / k i n g - d e a d - l o n g - l i v e - k i n g -hakimullah-mehsud-takes-power-ttp#theelderHakimullah Mehsud named new chief of Pak Taliban,Rediff News, August 22, 2009. Available at http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/aug/22/hakimullah-mehsud-named-new-chief-of-pak-taliban.htm53 Reza Jan, The King is Dead, Long Livethe King: Hakimullah Mehsud Takes Powerin the TTP, CriticalThreats.org, September 8,2009. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.o r g / p a k i s t a n / k i n g - d e a d - l o n g - l i v e - k i n g -hakimullah-mehsud-takes-power-ttp#theelderHakimullah Mehsud named new chief of Pak Taliban,Rediff News, August 22, 2009. Available at http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/aug/22/hakimullah-mehsud-named-new-chief-of-pak-taliban.htm54

The long wait in Kurram, Right Vision News, June29, 2009. Available at Nexis.com55 Alex Rodriguez, Pakistan Taliban RegroupingOutside Waziristan, LA Times, November26, 2009. http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/26/world/la-fg-waziristan26-2009nov26Taliban good at posturing, poor at resisting, DailyTimes, October 28, 2009. Available at Nexis.com56 Fighting in Pakistan kills 7 militants, 2 troops,AP, December 13, 2010. Available at Nexis.comReza Jan, The FATA Conict after South Waziristan:Pakistans War against Militants Continues in Orakzai,

Kurram, Bajaur and North Waziristan, CriticalThreats.org, February 22, 2010. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/

/

North Waziristan, MEMRI, October 25, 2010; Dr.Mohammad Taqi, Kurram: the forsaken FATA,

Daily Times, November 4, 2010; Julie McCarthy,Taliban-allied group widens inuence in Pakistan,NPR, November 15, 2010; Farhat Taj, The Kurramconundrum, Daily Times, February 5, 201134 Karzai must stop intrusion in Kurram, TheNation, April 10, 2007. Available at Nexis.comAli Afzal Afzaal, Iqbal Hussain, Eight More Die inKurram Violence, The News, April 15, 2007. Availableat Nexis.com35 Riaz Khan, Elders broker peace in Pakistan tribalregion where sectarian clashes left 49 dead, AP, April12, 2007. Available at Nexis.com

36 Jirga negotiates truce in Pakistans Kurram agency,Hindustan Times, April 14, 2007. Available at Nexis.comOutsiders blamed for Pakistan sectarian battles,AFP,April 12, 2007. Available at Nexis.com37 Ali Afzal Afzaal, Iqbal Hussain, Eight More Die inKurram Violence, The News, April 15, 2007. Availableat Nexis.com38 Daud Khattak, A Haqqani Brokered Peacein Kurram Agency? Foreign Policy, February 16,2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/16/a_haqqani_brokered_peace_in_kurram_agency39 Javed Afridi, Kurram tribesmen start raising fundsto buy arms, The News, May 4, 2007. Available atNexis.com40 Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in PakistansKurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)March 19, 200941 91 killed in sectarian unrest, The Nation,November 18, 2007. Available at Nexis.comSaad Khan, Pakistani troops struggle to quel tribalclashes, AFP, November 19, 2007. Available at Nexis.com42

Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in PakistansKurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)March 19, 200943 Amir Shah, Hundreds of Pakistani families eesectarian violence, pour into Afghanistan, AssociatedPress, January 3, 2008. Available at Nexis.com6,000 Pak DPs in Afghanistan: UNHCR, FrontierStar, janaury 7, 2008. Available at Nexis.com44 Mariam Abou Zahab, Sectarianism in PakistansKurram Tribal Agency, Terrorism Monitor, VII (6)March 19, 200945 Daud Khattak, A Haqqani Brokered Peace

in Kurram Agency? Foreign Policy, February 16,2011. Available at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/16/a haqqani brokered peace in



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January 2008; Saboor Mangal, Two NATO SoldiersKilled 15 wounded in Khost blast, Pajhwok Afghan

News, 4 March 2008; Syed Jamal Asifkhel and AhmadShah Saber, Taliban Fighters Attack District in Paktia,Pajhwok Afghan News, 23 April 2008; Talibans Attackon Wazi Zadran Repulsed: NATO, Pajhwok AfghanNews, 19 June 2008; ANP, ISAF Repel Insurgents inKhost, Pajhwok Afghan News, 27 July 2008; TalibansAttack on Wazi Zadran Repulsed: NATO, PajhwokAfghan News, 19 June 2008.69 Gorman, Siobhan. Suicide Bombing in AfghanistanDevastates Critical Hub for CIA Activities. Wall StreetJournal, January 1, 2010.

Alissa Rubin and Mark Mazzetti. Suicide Bomber

Killed C.I.A. Operatives. New York Times, December30, 2009.

George Friedman and Scott Stewart. The KhostAttack and the Intelligence War Challenge. Stratfor,January 11, 2010.

Mazzetti, Mark. Ofcer Failed to Warn C.I.A. BeforeAttack. New York Times, October 19, 2010.

George Friedman and Scott Stewart. The KhostAttack and the Intelligence War Challenge. Stratfor,January 11, 2010.70 Umar Studio Releases Full Video of Balawi withTTP Leader. SITE Intel Group. March 2nd, 2010.

71 Interview with Sirajuddin Haqqani. Al-Balagh Media Center, released by Flashpoint Partnerson April 13, 2010.

ht tp ://www.g loba l t e r rora le r t .com/images/documents/pdf/0410/ashpoint_haqqani041210.pdf72 2010: Year of the Drone, New America Foundation73 Year of the Drone Counterterrorism StrategyInitiative. New America Foundation.74 Year of the Drone Counterterrorism StrategyInitiative. New America Foundation.75 Though the Haqqani Network is the dominantmilitant group in North Waziristan, they are not the onlygoup. It must be assumed that some of the victims arefrom international terrorist groups, including al-Qaedaand Lashkar-e-Taiba, who have sought safe haven inthe area. However, even though ghters from thesegroups are being targeted in place of Haqqani ghters,it is the Haqqani Network that actively providing themsafe haven. Therefore, there is a level of complicitybetween the Haqqani Network and members of theother terrorist groups, and drone strikes targeting thelatter is consequently linked to the Haqqanis.

Year of the Drone Counterterrorism Strategy

Initiative. New America Foundation.76 Year of the Drone Counterterrorism StrategyI iti ti N A i F d ti

57 Pakistan ghting kills up to 39 rebels, four soldiers,AFP, April 12, 2010. Available at Nexis.com

58 Pakistan: Eleven dead in reported clashbetween rival Taleban factions, Nawa-i-Waqt, March 7, 2010. Available at Nexis.comNine Taleban militant hostages killed by rival groupin northwest Pakistan, Associated Press of Pakistan,March 13, 2010. Available at Nexis.com59 Kurram travellers suffer second ambush in oneweek: Convoy attack leaves 18 dead, Right VisionNews, July 19, 2010. Available at Nexis.com60 80pc area of Kurram Agency cleared: ofcial, RightVision News, July 8, 2010. Available at Nexis.com61 Kurram travellers suffer second ambush in one

week: Convoy attack leaves 18 dead, Right Vision News,July 19, 2010. Available at Nexis.com62 Accord reached for airlifting of Kurram residents,Right Vision News, July 21, 2010. Available at Nexis.com63 Zulqar Ali, Taliban trying to end tribal clashesin Kurram, Dawn, September 16, 2010. Available athttp://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/taliban-trying-to-end-tribal-clashes-in-kurram-69064 Haqqanis two sons mediating in Kurram, Dawn,

October 21, 201065 Taliban negotiates to gain access to key Pakistanarea, BBC News South Asia, October 21, 201066 Owais Tohid, US drones are pounding PakistansNorth Waziristan. Heres why., CSMonitor, September16, 2010; Jeffrey Dressler, The Haqqani Network:From Pakistan to Afghanistan, Institute for the Studyof War, October 2010; Jeffrey Dressler, The Afghaninsurgent group that will not negotiate, The Atlantic,October 25, 201067 Attack at Luxury Hotel in Kabul Kills at Least 6.Associated Press, January 15, 2008; Haqqani Network

behind Kabul Hotel attack. Long War Journal, January15, 2008; Blast at Kabul Hotel kills six. New YorkTimes, January 15, 2008; Serena attack: four suspectsdetained. Pajhwok, January 15, 2008; Karzai safeafter Taliban attack ofcial ceremony in Kabul,Pajhwok, April 27, 2008; Afghan ofcials abashedat attempt to kill Karzai, New York Times, April 28,2008; Bomber strikes Afghan capital: at least 21 die.New York Times, July 8, 2008; Two foreigners amongfour killed in Kabul clash. Pajhwok, April 30, 200868 Attacks on Khost, Kunar proof of Karzaisstatement: Hamidzada. Pajhwok, June 24, 2008;

Ofcials claim killing over 150 militants in Paktika.Pajhwok, July 16, 2008; Al Qaeda members say theyentered Afghanistan via Pakistan. Pajhwok, July 21,



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salvage-kurram-peace-deal.html95 Fabrizio Foschini, Facts and Fiction on the Frontier:

The Haqqanis and the Kurram peace deal, AfghanAnalysts Network. Available at: http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=162796 Fabrizio Foschini, Facts and Fiction on theFrontier: The Haqqanis and the Kurram peace deal,Afghan Analysts Network. Available at: http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp? id=1627Tribal elders meet today to salvage Kurram peacedeal, Dawn, April 19, 2010. Available at http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/19/tribal-elders-meet-today-to-salvage-kurram-peace-deal.html97 Tribal elders meet today to salvage Kurram peace

deal, Dawn, April 19, 2010. Available at http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/19/tribal-elders-meet-today-to-salvage-kurram-peace-deal.html

Inamullah Khattak, Kidnapped passangers: Kurramjirga to take up issue with governor, Dawn, April 20,2010. Available at http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/20/kidnapped-passengers-kurram-jirga-to-take-up-issue-with-governor.html98 Tribal elders meet today to salvage Kurram peacedeal, Dawn, April 19, 2010. Available at http://www.dawn.com/2011/04/19/tribal-elders-meet-today-to-salvage-kurram-peace-deal.html99 Dr. Mohammad Taqi, Kurram: sacriced at theglobal jihad alter, Daily Times, February 24, 2011;Pakistani Army allows Taliban to move to newsanctuary in Kurram Agency while nally agreeing tocarry out operation against militant commanders inNorth Waziristan, MEMRI, October 25, 2010; Dr.Mohammad Taqi, Kurram: the forsaken FATA, DailyTimes, November 4, 2010; Farhat Taj, The Kurramconundrum, Daily Times, February 5, 2011; JeffreyDressler, The Haqqani Network: From Pakistan toAfghanistan, Institute for the Study of War, October2010100 The Haqqanis intimate association with al-Qaedaand others increases their standing and reputation withthe global jihadist movement, which pays dividends inrecruiting and nancing operations. In turn, al-Qaedaand others plan, shelter, and train under the protectionof the Haqqanis who are, in-turn, protected by powerfulelements within the Pakistani security establishment.

in September and October of 2008; both Haqqanimilitants and relatives of Jalaluddin Haqqani were

killed.78 Sean D. Naylor, JSOC task force battles Haqqanimilitants, Army Times, September 13, 201079 Sean D. Naylor, JSOC task force battles Haqqanimilitants, Army Times, September 13, 201080 Sean D. Naylor, JSOC task force battles Haqqanimilitants, Army Times, September 13, 201081 DOD News Brieng with Col. Luong via

Teleconference from Afghanistan DoD Transcripts,December 28, 201082 Pakistani Army allows Taliban to move to new

sanctuary in Kurram Agency while nally agreeing tocarry out operation against militant commanders inNorth Waziristan, MEMRI, October 25, 201083 Qaiser Butt, Kurram tribal region: Peace accordsigned to end years of bloodshed, The ExpressTribune, February 4, 201184 Qaiser Butt, Kurram tribal region: Peace accordsigned to end years of bloodshed, The ExpressTribune, February 4, 201185 Dr. Mohammad Taqi, Kurram: sacriced at theglobal jihad alter, Daily Times, February 24, 201186 Kurram rival tribes agree on peace accord, The

Nation, October 16, 200887 Dr. Mohammad Taqi, Kurram: sacriced at theglobal jihad alter, Daily Times, February 24, 201188 Haqqanis two sons mediating in Kurram, Dawn,October 21, 201089 Correspondence with Pakistani journalist Dr.Mohammad Taqi, February 3, 201190 Dr. Mohammad Taqi, Kurram: sacriced at theglobal jihad alter, Daily Times, February 24, 201191 Dr. Mohammad Taqi, Kurram: sacriced at theglobal jihad alter, Daily Times, February 24, 201192

Shia participants in the Haqqani-led talks include:Haji Aun Ali, Laiq Hussain, Captain Yousaf, CouncillarIqbal Hussain and MNA Sajid Turi, according to, Dr.Mohammad Taqi, Kurram: sacriced at the globaljihad alter, Daily Times, February 24, 201193 Daud Khattak, A Haqqani-brokered peace in Kurram

Agency, Foreign Policys AfPak Channel, February 16,2011; Dr. Mohammad Taqi, Kurram: sacriced at theglobal jihad alter, Daily Times, February 24, 201194 Fabrizio Foschini, Facts and Fiction on theFrontier: The Haqqanis and the Kurram peace deal,Afghan Analysts Network. Available at: http://

www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=1627Tribal elders meet today to salvage Kurram peacedeal, Dawn, April 19, 2010. Available at http://www.



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Documents

Haqqani Network in Kurram Web