HEARING OF HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE

SUBJECT: IS THERE A HUMAN RIGHTS DOUBLE STANDARD? U.S. POLICY TOWARD

SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, AND UZBEKISTAN.

CHAIRED BY: REP. WILLIAM DELAHUNT (D-MA)

WITNESSES: AMR HAMZAWY, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AT THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR

INTERNATIONAL PEACE; MARTHA OLCOTT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE AT THE CARNEGIE

ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE; THOMAS MALINOWSKI, ADVOCACY DIRECTOR

AT HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH; THOMAS LIPPMAN, ADJUNCT SCHOLAR AT THE MIDDLE

EAST INSTITUTE

2172 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

2:01 P.M. EDT, THURSDAY, JUNE 14, 2007

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*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* This hearing of the Subcommittee on International

Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight will come to order. Today

we're continuing a -- in our series of hearings on the disparate

treatment by the United States government with respect to countries with

troubling human rights records. Our first hearing in the series

addressed U.S. policy towards Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia. In our

hearing today we will hear testimony on -- relative to Saudi Arabia,

Iran, and Uzbekistan, and I noted that one of our witnesses also added a

section relative to Pakistan, and I welcome those observations. Before I

read a rather brief statement pending arrival of my friend and colleague

from California, the Ranking Member Mr. Rohrabacher, why don't I proceed

to introduce our witnesses?

Let me begin with Tom Malinowski, who is the Washington advocacy

director at Human Rights Watch. Prior to joining Human Rights Watch, he

was a special assistant to President Clinton, and senior director for

foreign policy speechwriting at the National Security Council. From 1994

to 1998, he was a speechwriter for Secretaries of State Christopher and

Albright, and a member of the State Department policy planning staff.

He's also worked for the Ford Foundation and as a legislative aide to

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. He studied at the University of

California at Berkeley and Oxford University, and is a member of the

Council on Foreign Relations. And the gentleman who just arrived who's

now sitting to my right -- let me introduce Mr. Rohrabacher, the ranking

member of the subcommittee.

Amr Hamzawy is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace. He has previously taught at Cairo University and

the Free University of Berlin. He received his Ph.D. from the Free

University of Berlin where he worked as an assistant professor at the

Center for Middle Eastern Studies. He also holds Masters degrees from

the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague and the University of

Amsterdam. He obtained his Bachelor of Science from Cairo University. He

has been published frequently, and it includes titles such as "The Saudi

Labyrinth: Evaluating the Current Political Opening", and "Human Rights

in the Arab World."

Martha Brill Olcott is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace in Washington, D.C. Her book, "Central Asia's Second

Chance", examines the economic and political development of this

ethnically diverse and strategically vital region in the context of the

changing security that's post-9/11. She is professor emerita at Colgate

University and has previously served as a director of the Central Asian

American Enterprise Fund. Prior to her work at the Carnegie Endowment,

Ms. Olcott served as special consultant to former Secretary of State

Lawrence Eagleburger, who actually was a witness earlier today before

the full committee, and she holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.

Tom Lippman is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute. He spent

over 30 years as a reporter and editor for The Washington Post covering

the war in Iraq, and served as diplomatic national security and Middle

East correspondent while based in Cairo. He is the author of "Inside the

Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia" as well as

"Madeline Albright and the New American Diplomacy", "Egypt After

Nasser", and "Understanding Islam". He is a member of the Council on

Foreign Relations and received his degree from Columbia University.

I've had the opportunity to read the written statements submitted by all

of our witnesses, and I must acknowledge that I was very impressed with

the scholarship involved and the experience that it reflected. We look

-- obviously look forward to hearing from you and engaging in a

conversation.

With that, why don't I turn to my colleague, Mr. Rohrabacher?

*_REP. DANA ROHRABACHER (R-OH):_* Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for

holding this particular hearing and making the decision to look into

this issue and bring up this matter of importance for discussion. Today

we are asking whether the United States treats Saudi Arabia differently

than we do other countries and specifically Uzbekistan and Iran.

Is there a double standard in our policies towards Saudi Arabia as

compared to those other countries?

Since Franklin Roosevelt first met with King Saud back at 1945, every

American president seems to have had close ties with Saudi Arabia. From

Lyndon Johnson, John F. Kennedy, Bill Clinton, Jimmy Carter, Ronald

Reagan, and both of the Bushes. Every president in the last six decades

seems to have been determined that an alliance with the Saudi royal

family is in the best interest of our country.

Yet, as we all know, Saudi extremists were mostly responsible for the

atrocities of 9/11. We've also seen a radical form of Wahhabism being

financed and spread throughout the world in an effort to beat back

moderate Muslims -- all of this of course financed from Saudi Arabia.

Saudis operate under surreal law, where there is no democracy, no

freedom of press, no freedom of religion. The cultural and religious

police monitor the average citizen in Saudi Arabia. Apostasy is a

capital crime and women are treated like property, so I look forward to

hearing from our panelists in terms of how we should approach Saudi

Arabia and is there a double standard.

Mr. Chairman, as we discuss this issue, which is based on human rights

and a standard of human rights that we believe that there shouldn't be a

double standard of human rights, we should not overlook the fact that

this week, a senior member of our committee this week hosted a reception

to honor a delegation of Communist Chinese National People's Congress.

Now I was astonished when I received an invitation to this event, which

as I say being hosted in the United States Capital by one of our own

members, and it is giving status and establishing a personal recognition

of these members of the communist party's apparatus that controls China.

And when we talk about double standards -- I mean, this is a double

standard that is right here in out midst, right here -- right among us

as members of Congress. Should we be treating people who are

representing a regime -- not the people of a country but a regime that

is the worst human rights abuser in the world?

I mean, if Saudi Arabia is a human rights abuser, which it is, China is

the worst in the world. And even though the Saudis repress people of

other faith, the communist party in China represses people of all faith,

and Saudi Arabia at least doesn't arrest Falun Gong or people who want

to worship God in the way that Falun Gong does and then sell their

organs and murder them and sell their organs from prison.

Yes, we need to talk about double standards and I'm very happy we're

going to be discussing that double standard that we have with Saudi

Arabia today. I appreciate your leadership on that, but we need to make

sure that if we do talk about double standards, that we don't turn the

blind's eye to this type of double standard with China, as we should

know that of course, the business community of the United States drives

our policy towards China, and they could give a damn about human rights

abuses in China. And I would say that probably today we may learn that

maybe the same driving force that has to do with our relations with the

Saudi royal family. So let us note that this isn't the only double

standard that surrounds us.

With that said, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the witnesses

today. Appreciate your leadership in bringing up this issue.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* I thank the gentleman for his statement.

And does the vice chair of the subcommittee Mr. Carnahan wish to make

any opening remarks?

*_REP. RUSS CARNAHAN (D-MO):_* No, I'm confident that the Chairman and

ranking members has covered --

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Has covered it all?

*_REP. CARNAHAN:_* -- covered it very well and look forward to --

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* I haven't actually made a statement yet.

*_REP. CARNAHAN:_* Then you've definitely covered it well Mr. Chairman.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Okay, let me just briefly address the subject of

today's hearing.

When President Bush in his second inaugural address set forth his vision

for his foreign policy, he pledged America to the ultimate goal of

ending tyranny in our world. And his speech last week in Prague, he

recommitted himself to what he called a freedom agenda. And I do not

doubt his sincerity. Let me be clear on that.

Let me read a quote uttered by President Bush.

"All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know the United States

will not ignore your oppression or excuse your oppressors. When you

stand for liberty, we will stand for you. By our efforts, we have lit a

fire, a fire in the minds of men. It warms those who feel its power, it

burns those who fight its progress. And one day this untamed fire of

freedom will reach the darkest corners of our world."

As I said, I commend the president for this vision. And I would note the

eloquence of this statement. It's a vision I dare say that's shared by

all America, members of Congress, and all those who are concerned with

America's global role, including myself obviously.

Where there are deficiencies, however, in this vision's implementation.

We can't bring fire to those dark corners of the world on a selective

basis when in some of those dark corners we are not offering the fire of

liberty. We are not even providing a flash light because when we closely

associate ourselves with some of those leaders who preside over those

dark corners, and do not give voice persistently and constantly for the

values of freedom and the necessity for respect for human rights, we

open ourselves to the accusation of not practicing what we preach, but

being hypocritical.

And let me suggest that this undermines the very goals that were

articulated in that eloquent remark by President Bush. It results in a

glaring dichotomy between our rhetoric and our deeds and makes us

vulnerable, as I said, to the accusation of double standards. Even our

friends inevitably question the sincerity of our commitment to human

rights and the rule of law; the very values which are the cornerstone of

our democracy and the very values which I would suggest have made the

United States an inspiration through our history. And it provides fodder

for those who resent our observations of their conduct visa vise human

rights.

I noted last week a statement by President Putin, and this is what he

had to say in response to a reporter at the G-8 Summit.

"Let us not be hypocritical about democratic freedoms and human rights.

I already said I have a copy of Amnesty International's Report,

including on the United States, there is probably no need to repeat this

so as not to offend anyone."

I don't want to continue on, but -- and I also want to be clear that I'm

not questioning the integrity of the report that are issued by our

Department of State in terms of the various countries.

But when we see disparate treatment based upon policy considerations,

without a concomitant, persistent voice to those with whom we ally

ourselves about their behavior, we hurt ourselves, I would suggest, in

the long term, because it erodes the respect that the rest of the world

has in terms of the implementation of that vision that was articulated

by President Bush.

Well, let's begin.

Mr. Lippman. We do have a five-minute rule. If you're able to -- I can

see Dr. Olcott just had a look of disbelief -- that we honor in the

breach in this particular subcommittee. But if you can be somewhat

concise we'd appreciate it so that then we can have a conversation.

Mr. Lippman.

*_MR. LIPPMAN:_* (Off mike.)

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Mr. Lippman, can you hit the button?

*_MR. LIPPMAN:_* There. Is that better?

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Good.

*_MR. LIPPMAN:_* Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and offer my views on this

very interesting and important subject. This is a summary of my written

testimony, which you have.

The question before the subcommittee is whether there's a double

standard on human rights in American policy towards Saudi Arabia, Iran

and Uzbekistan. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the answer is yes and there

always has been under every American president since the 1930s. The U.S.

relationship with Saudi Arabia has never been measured by our own

standards of human rights, individual liberty or religious freedom. If

we used those tests, the Saudis would fail them all, but we don't use

those tests and we hardly ever have.

In fact, our official policy has long been to do the opposite, to make

allowances for Saudi Arabia's internal system rather than confront it.

In 1951, the State Department issued a comprehensive statement of policy

towards Saudi Arabia that stipulated that the United States should, and

I quote, "observe the utmost respect for Saudi Arabia's sovereignty,

sanctity of the holy places and local customs. In all our efforts to

carry out our policies in Saudi Arabia, we should take care to serve as

guide or partner and avoid giving the impression of wishing to dominate

the country."

That has been our policy pretty much ever since. And therefore, while

all the negative findings about Saudi Arabia issued every year in the

State Department's reports on human rights and religious freedom are

true, they are essentially irrelevant to the bilateral, strategic and

economic relationship.

And we should not assume that the citizens of Saudi Arabia desire to

order their society according to our standards of individual liberty and

personal freedom. They are driven by other imperatives. When I was there

last month, I was reminded again that Saudi Arabia is an evolving

society, not a static one. The Saudis wrestle every day with fundamental

issues of justice, individual opportunity, political evolution and

women's rights. They will decide those matters according to their own

standards based on Islam and Islamic law, the family, Arabian tradition

and economic imperatives. They are only marginally susceptible to input

from us on those subjects.

When Americans first established a presence in Saudi Arabia, exploring

for oil in the 1930s and building a military relationship in the 1940s,

the country's founding king, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, laid down the terms

for our doing so in a famous dictum: "We will use your iron," he said,

but leave our faith alone." What he meant was that Saudi Arabia wanted

and needed American technology and American capital to develop what was

then one of the world's poorest countries, but it had no interest in

becoming a liberal, democratic, pluralistic society. It is a religious,

hierarchical, traditional society where Islam is the purpose of the

state. And as far as I can tell, it does not much wish to be anything else.

In the 1920s, King Abdul Aziz had to take to the field of battle against

his own fanatical militias to establish the principle that non-Muslim's

could be admitted into the sacred land of Arabia for any reason. Having

done that, he sought to placate his xenophobic people by limiting the

work of those foreign infidels to economic development and minimizing

their social and cultural impact on his subjects. All his successors

have sought to follow the same path.

Saudi Arabia gave American companies the right to develop the Saudi oil

fields. Saudi Arabia invested billions in American goods and services,

and Saudi Arabia stood by the United States during the Cold War, always

on condition that we keep our hands off Saudi domestic and social affairs.

By and large, the United States has adhered to that agreement for more

than six decades. This has not been a partisan issue in this country.

Every president since Franklin Roosevelt -- of whatever party -- has

basically decided that Saudi Arabia is too important to alienate. At

times, our deference to Saudi Arabia has bordered on the obsequious,

especially in the policy of the State and Defense Departments until the

1970s to refrain from assigning Jews to work there.

President Kennedy came the closest to any serious effort to promote

reform in Saudi Arabia. He put pressure on the Saudis to abolish

slavery, with considerable success, and to end their ban on Jewish

visitors and workers with almost no success. Yet, even Kennedy did not

approach a serious breach in relations over human rights. On the

contrary, he supported Saudi Arabia in his proxy war against Nasser's

Egypt during the civil conflict in Yemen.

Even President Carter, who made human rights the cornerstone of his

foreign policy, praised the rulers of Saudi Arabia effusively and

refrained from pressing them about internal affairs. When he arrived in

Riyadh in 1978 -- and I was there at the time to watch this -- President

Carter greeted his hosts with these words, quote, "Seeing the generosity

of this welcome, I feel that I am among my own people, and I know that

my steps will not be hindered because I walk in the same steps as your

majesty toward a common goal of even greater friendship among our

people, between our two countriesm, and of peace for all the people of

the world."

The reason President Carter swallowed hard and uttered those words of

praise was that he wanted something important for the Saudis, namely

support for the Camp David Peace Initiative. If the Saudis mistreated

women or stifled the press or tortured prisoners, that was troubling,

but not sufficiently important to prevail over more urgent concerns.

Sometimes we Americans have wanted access to Saudi oil. Sometimes we've

wanted Saudi political and moral support to keep communism out of the

Arab world. Sometimes we've wanted Saudi money to finance the Afghan

Mujahedeen in their struggle against the Soviet Union or the Nicaraguan

Contras. Today, we want Saudi help in the so- called war on terror.

Always, there seems to be some imperative in Washington that trumps our

concern for human rights. Saudi Arabia is not Burma. Saudi Arabia is

important and we need the Saudis, and that's why this happens.

The attacks of September 11th prompted many Americans to look beyond the

longstanding don't ask, don't tell policy about Saudi Arabia and examine

that country more closely. Many did not like what they saw. Editorial

writers, strategy analysts and some members of Congress called for the

United States to get tough on a country that appeared to be fostering

extremism. But after the onset of domestic terrorism in Saudi Arabia in

2003, the Saudis to some extent saw the error of their ways and tried to

get right with Washington. They modified their education and financial

policies and their banking rules, more or less in cooperation with the

United States.

And now, after the 9/11 commission report has exonerated the royal

family, and after repeated testimony from Bush administration officials

that the Saudis are more help than hindrance in combating terrorism, the

public clamor in this country has receded and Saudi Arabia is once again

in good standing, even though internally, it remains much the same.

When Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz -- then crown prince and now king --

visited President Bush at his Texas ranch in 2005, the two issued a

joint statement that basically gave Saudi Arabia a free ride on the

issue of human rights and domestic reform -- democratic reform. The

United States, it said, considers that nations will create institutions

that reflect the history, culture and traditions of their own societies

and it does not seek to impose its own style of government on the

government and people of Saudi Arabia.

In my opinion, President Bush and all his predecessors for the past 70

years have made the right choice. The people of Saudi Arabia are

incomparably better off today in every economic and material way than

they were in their grandfather's day. How they run their country is and

will remain up to them.

Thank you very much.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Thank you, Mr. Lippman.

Tom Malinowski.

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

Thanks for having me.

I'll start my statement by saying that I agreed with your remarks, Mr.

Chairman. We have a president now who believes that promoting democratic

freedoms, particularly in the Muslim world, is essential to fighting

terrorism.

And like you, I don't question the sincerity of that belief; I think he

is a true believer in that principle. I also think he happens to be right.

But given this conviction on his part, you'd think that the more central

a country was to the fight against terrorism, the more vigorously the

administration would promote democracy there. More often than not, the

opposite has been true. That the more the administration has needed

another country in the short-run to capture or kill individual

terrorists, the less eager it's been to press that country to reform in

ways that will dry up support for terrorism itself.

Now I don't think there could ever be perfect consistency in life,

unless you want to be consistently unprincipled. Doing the wrong thing

all the time is easy. Doing the right thing all the time is very hard.

And I'd rather have a foreign policy that's inconsistently right than

one that's consistently wrong.

I also don't think the United States should treat every human rights

violator exactly the same way. We need to do what's effective in each

particular case and that's going to vary from country to country. But

while our tactics may vary from country to country, from place to place,

I don't think our voice should be varying. There's no reason why the

United States can't speak honestly, clearly and publicly about human

rights to every country in the world, including its closest allies.

But the United States is most effective in promoting liberty around the

world when people out there believe that we're rising about our own

narrow self interest, when they believe that we're defending universal

ideals. If instead our rhetoric about democracy is seen as a weapon that

we only use against our enemies, people around the world become

extremely cynical about everything we do in the name of freedom. Under

such circumstances dictators in places like Cuba and Iran can much more

easily deflect U.S. criticism by saying that we're being selective. And

dissidents in these countries also don't really trust that we're really

on their side and they have a harder time working with us. We become

less credible, less effective.

So with that in mind, let me focus on the countries, on the examples

that you've put to us, briefly. With respect to Iran, I think that the

administration's strong public focus on human rights is completely

appropriate. By speaking loudly and clearly about human rights there,

the United States can connect with the many Iranians -- especially young

people who are themselves eager to live in a more open society.

Now America's human rights message can drive a wedge between the Iranian

people and their leaders. What undermines that message is the

administration's saber rattling, which does the opposite -- it unites

the Iranian people and their leaders. Threats, of force give the Iranian

regime a longer lease in life, in my view, than it might otherwise have

if it couldn't use tensions with the United States to distract its

people from their grave domestic problems.

Now here's something else that doesn't help in the case of Iran -- the

administration's constant public assertion that it's providing financial

assistance to those who are struggling inside the country for democracy

and human rights. In fact, no U.S. aid money is actually reaching

dissidents inside the country. It couldn't -- and they wouldn't accept

it even if they could. But the Iranian government has used these in

public announcements to accuse its dissidents falsely of taking U.S.

money and it's persecuted them for it. These dissidents, including Nobel

Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, have been begging the administration to

stop making these claims but somehow those appeals have fallen on deaf

ears. It's long past time for that to stop.

Now with respect to Uzbekistan, the story is a bit more complicated.

Immediately after 9/11, I think you could say would be a good example of

a double standard. We needed Uzbekistan as a launching pad for military

operations in Afghanistan -- they gave us a base; we gave them increased

assistance; the administration muted its criticism. But that policy

began to evolve. The Congress tied aid to Uzbekistan to human rights

progress.

Administration became more critical -- eventually it suspended aid. Then

in 2005 we had the terrible massacre of unarmed protestors by the Uzbek

security forces in the city of Andijon. After that, the administration

condemned those events very vigorously. It staged an airlift of some of

the victims of those events out of the region against very angry

objections of the government of Uzbekistan. As a result of that, the

Uzbeks kicked the United States military out of the base. And to its

credit the administration didn't mute its criticism at that point in

order to save its military relationship.

Nevertheless, the administration didn't follow up on that by imposing

sanctions on the Uzbek government, as the European Union did immediately

after the events in Andijon. The Pentagon still had over- flight and

drive-through rights in Uzbekistan, it argued against any further

measures that might alienate the Uzbek leadership. And I think the rest

of the administration basically lost interest in the country. We're now

paying almost no attention to Uzbekistan.

I'd say that the current policy is basically to wait for the current

dictator of the country, Islam Karimov, to pass from the scene. And I

think that's not a -- it's not a wise policy -- it's not a policy at

all. I think there needs to be more support for civil society inside

Uzbekistan and more pressure, including targeted sanctions on its

government. There's legislation in the Senate being introduced by

Senators McCain and Biden, that would do that and I hope that the House

would follow suit as well.

I'd also say, as an aside, that there is a lesson of our experience with

Uzbekistan that we might want to apply now to another military

relationship we're developing with another country in the region, and

that's Azerbaijan. You all have heard the proposal on the table that the

Russians have put on the table to put a -- the missile defense system in

Azerbaijan. I've no idea what the administration is going to do there

but I sure hope that they've learned the lesson that they're betting our

long-term security on a long-term military partnership with an

inherently unstable country in that part of the world -- inherently

unstable authoritarian country -- is a very bad idea.

Now Saudi Arabia represents a much more obvious double standard, as my

friend Tom Lippman explained in much more detail than I will. For years

the Saudis were basically exempt from our global human rights policies.

That did change very slightly after September 11th and I'd say, to be

fair, that quiet U.S. pressure has contributed to a very modest

beginning of an internal reform process in the Saudi kingdom.

One very modest example of that is that my organization, Human Rights

Watch, has been able to visit Saudi Arabia in the last year -- conduct

interviews with Saudi citizens, even visit some penal facilities. And

the administration has quietly raised human rights issues with the

Saudis in the last few years, but the key word here is "quiet." This is

done behind the scenes. There isn't public criticism. The administration

has been much more reluctant to speak publicly about Saudis problems

than it has been with any other close ally in the Middle East, including

Egypt.

There's a strategic dialogue between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

It has many working groups on many issues but not on human rights. We've

cited them for violations of religious freedom -- most recently human

trafficking, but they haven't been sanctioned for those violations.

Again, I agree with Tom Lippman's analysis on why that is.

I don't agree that it's the right thing, though. I mean, I do think that

while we need to take care in HOW we speak to the Saudis about human

rights, we DO need to speak to them about it. That our silence on human

rights in Saudi Arabia doesn't resonate well actually with the growing

number of ordinary Saudis who want change in the kingdom. And it

resonates particularly badly elsewhere in the Middle East. It makes it

seem as if, again, we only care about human rights abuses when they

happen in Iran, when they happen in countries we don't like, but we

don't care when it happens in country that we do like. And therefore

people conclude we're not being sincere.

As you said, I did want to throw one other country into the mix and

that's Pakistan because I really think that today, this week, it's

probably THE most egregious example of a double standard. We are right

now in the middle of a remarkable and growing movement in Pakistan

that's been led by the country's lawyers to try to bring about a return

to democratic government in that country.

Last week President Bush was asked about this, he responded by praising

General Musharraf's democracy and dismissing these protests as, quote

unquote, "posturing."

Those kinds of statements, in my view, align the United States behind

one man in Pakistan against virtually every decent segment of society

there, against the very people who are most likely to be friendly to the

United States. And given General Musharraf's growing reliance on the

Islamists in his country and his consequent refusal to crack down on the

Taliban elements who are killing our troops in Afghanistan, I'd say this

policy is as contrary to our security interests as it is to our values.

We need a very clear statement in the next few days from the president,

the State Department and from you all about the need for a return to

democratic institutions and the rule of law in Pakistan. It's not about

General Musharraf or any other individual. It's about those institutions

and our need to defend them.

With that, I'll close. And thank you again for the opportunity to

testify, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Thank you so much, Mr. Malinowski.

Dr. Olcott.

*_MS. OLCOTT:_* Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify

today. And I will make some general points and then do an abridged

version of my testimony.

Four quick points. First, obviously I don't like human rights abuses or

human rights abusers. Secondly, I don't like double standards. Thirdly,

I recognize that the U.S. has to protect its national security

interests. But fourthly, I don't believe we can get states to alter

behavior we find troubling simply by criticizing them. And I have really

spent the last 20 years grappling with the question of how we get a

state like Uzbekistan in particular to change the way it treats its

citizens.

I was really struck by the chairman's remarks about the double standard.

I think that in the Uzbek case, the Uzbeks firmly believe that their

relationship to the U.S. has been -- that they've been a victim of a

double standard by the U.S.

They really believe that the U.S. has ignored human rights abuses of

other states in the region if those states have been more strategically

important to the U.S.; for example, if they have oil and gas. And the

example the Uzbeks always point to when they're criticized on the

question -- I mean, their country of particular concern on religious

rights -- what makes them angry, it's not that they've been labeled that

way, but the Turkmen weren't and they were. You know, so these states do

look at how we treat neighboring states and their treatment.

That said, I think the story of the Uzbek-U.S. relationship is a story

of misunderstandings and miscues on both sides, and it's really a story

in which the Uzbek people have paid the biggest price.

The question I see before us is what the U.S. can do to increase the

prospects for Uzbekistan's development of democratic political and

economic institutions, and do it in a way that doesn't sacrifice U.S.

long-, medium- or short-term security.

I think that the situation in Uzbekistan is quite different from either

Saudi Arabia or Iran in that it's more akin to the problems we find in

other post-Soviet states and those post-Soviet states in which they're

still ruled by a founding communist-era political figure.

So that gives us hope. In a sense, it gives us more ability to maneuver.

It's not a system that's rooted in several generations of transfers of

authority within a single elite.

The miscue is -- and I think this has really hampered the process of

political developments in our relationship -- is that Karimov really --

Islom Karimov, who rules Uzbekistan -- really thought that he could

become a friend to the U.S. somewhat akin to what Pakistan was in the

Cold War. And that has really -- was a goal throughout, a goal that he

thought he achieved at 9/11, and then again discovered he didn't.

I want to skip through the history to try to get to the present. I think

it's important to remember that Karimov did give lip service to

democratic goals during his first year after independence, and even

participated in a contested, albeit neither free nor fair, election for

his presidency, so that in theory it is possible for them to do

different things than they have done.

The relationship with Uzbekistan -- to leap forward, I think the

security relationship with Uzbekistan really predated 9/11. And I think

it's really important to note that this cooperation was not simply

because of the attack on Afghanistan. In fact, the U.S., under President

Clinton, sent armed unmanned drones looking for al Qaeda from

Uzbekistan, looking for bin Laden. So it was something to build on in

the immediate aftermath with 9/11.

I think that the prospects of U.S. pressure for economic -- I mean, then

you had 9/11 and this new friendship. I think that this new friendship

was really seen by the Uzbek elite, by pro-reform elements within that

elite, as something that they viewed with real enthusiasm. And I think

that they expected something of a double standard with regard to the

enormous political commitment they made. I mean, they signed this

document in March 2002, agreeing within a five-year period to have free

and fair elections and a democratic Parliament and a whole host of

things that the elite themselves recognized was impossible.

But they hoped that this would push the government towards making

reforms and not become a litmus test for future funding. I mean, they

really didn't understand the process by which Congress makes decisions.

But the central focus of this elite was really to get the Karimov

government to jump-start economic reform. And here again you have a tale

of frustration, where the World Bank and the IMF came in and they set

new granting target for the Uzbeks and the Uzbeks did not meet these

benchmarks for reform. They felt that the benchmarks didn't give them

enough resources. And I can talk about that if anybody's interested. And

then the World Bank and IMF felt that the benchmarks themselves were

fair and had to be met.

In this environment, it did not take long for the U.S.-Uzbek

relationship to go sour and both sides to walk away unhappy. The Uzbeks

really expected massive assistance in the aftermath of September 11th.

They expected a double standard. They expected to get the kind of money

that a state like Israel or Egypt got. That's what they thought they

were getting.

And I think in that environment they would have swallowed what they saw

as a bitter pill of human rights reform; you know, that they would have

done something, I believe, but this is like other people don't. And

again, we're going down, as I said in my testimony, Robert Frost's poem,

"The Road Not Taken." You know, you can't talk about what didn't occur.

And this is very definitely something that didn't occur.

But I think that it's important to note that the military partnership

was in deep trouble before Andijan and that there was a good chance we

would have lost the base even at that point, even if Andijan had not

occurred. In fact, in the draft of my book that was going to press at

Andijan, I already talked about the base possibly being lost. So I think

we have to get the timing of the events right.

That said, Andijan creates this enormous hole in the relationship that

doesn't go away, the fact that the Uzbek government used excessive force

to quell largely unarmed civilian demonstrations. Whether things would

have occurred differently if we had been in the middle of a multi-year

retraining program for Uzbek security forces when these demonstrations

occurred or if the security relationship was healthier, would the Uzbeks

have allowed an international investigation?

Personally, I think that they would have, had there been a healthy

security relationship at that point. But Karimov had nothing -- he felt

he had nothing to lose, and he was willing to lose what he lost. And

that really is the problem of reform.

Let me just come to my concluding remarks. I think now, two years after

Andijan, those of us who wish to promote change in Uzbekistan are still

stuck between a rock and a hard place. While the Uzbek regime does not

enjoy its relative isolation under the EU sanctions that were talked

about, and at risk of sanction by the U.S., nonetheless, the Karimov

regime is much more securely rooted now than it was two years ago, in

large part because they've consolidated their security forces.

President Karimov's term ends in December. And if recent constitutional

changes in Kazakhstan are at all indicative, and I think they are, then

I think Karimov will also amend his constitution to give him the right

to stay in power the rest of his life.

And it will be very hard given the relative acquiescence of the U.S. and

the EU countries to the changes in the Kazakh constitution -- it will be

very hard to introduce any sanctions predicated on changes on the Uzbek

constitution. So it's impossible to predict how long Karimov will remain

in power. And I believe that the transition after his death could take

several years to bring real reform elements to any likelihood of taking

power.

Finally, I would say there is not a well-developed alternative political

living either inside the country or outside the country. Those living

outside the country are relatively few in number and almost entirely

lacking in the kind of political or administrative experience necessary

to transform Uzbekistan in the presence of a large elite that is largely

unhappy with these people. The majority of the Uzbek population and

especially those living in rural areas are less educated today than they

were 16 years ago unless committed to secular values than the like

population was at the same time -- at the time of independence.

The continued isolation of the Karimov regime means that in five to 10

years the rural population will be even less exposed to secular ideas or

more removed from the technology basis force of globalization than they

are today. The Uzbek population, I would argue, is paying for the

sanctions that we have levied against or will levy against their top

leaders. If a half dozen of its government officials can't go to Europe

or visit their children studying there then in their minds it is logical

that all Uzbeks should have more difficulty getting to Europe or to the

U.S. to study. Fortunately, some of the restrictions against study in

the U.S., which were indirectly applied, have been lessened but those

seeking independent study opportunities in the U.S. is still at a

disadvantage when they return home. So who in the end is paying a bigger

price for our limited engagement with the Uzbek government -- the top

elite or the ordinary population?

One of the problems -- this is my last point -- with our current

application of the stick and the promise of a carrot is that even in the

best of times, the carrot has been far smaller and less tasty than the

one that the government in Tashkan is expected to receive. So its

withdrawal is of less consequence than we would like and the prospects

for applying a logistic are highly unlikely.

I'm just going to stop right there. Thank you.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Thank you, Dr. Olcott.

Dr. Hamzawy?

*_MR. HAMZAWY:_* Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting me to

testify today. Allow me to start by making two general points before

turning into Saudi Arabia and human rights conditions in Saudi Arabia.

My first general point is with regard to the distinction between

rhetoric and policies on the ground. And I do believe the double

standards with regards to human rights conditions in the Middle East

cannot be simply addressed by getting the administration to get out

consistent rhetoric. This is not an issue of rhetoric. And I must

confess that in our part of the world, American rhetoric -- official

rhetoric from the U.S. has been discredited especially in the last year.

So regardless of whether we have a consistency of rhetoric or not, it's

not what really matters today.

What really matters today is action. What really matters today are

policy measures that the U.S. conducts in the region, that the U.S. puts

forward in the region. And as long as we have the dichotomy between

America-friendly regimes and America's perceived enemies -- both of them

abuse human rights. We have systematic abusers of human rights in

countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco -- all these four

countries are allies of the U.S. We have systematic abuses of human

rights in Iran and other countries which are perceived to be enemies for

the U.S. In both patterns, we have abuses -- systematic abuses -- and I

stress system -- these are not sporadic abuses -- these are systematic

abuses of human rights and conditions with regard to political

participation and potential for democratizations that are really

depressing.

We just need to look at yesterday -- the sequence of violence which took

place in three Arab capitals, in Iraq -- in Baghdad -- in Beirut and

moving to Gaza and Palestine. So conditions are similar. We are faced

with autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes. Some of them are

America-friendly, some are not. And as long as the distinction in

tackling the human rights abusers is based on whether they are friendly

or not, the U.S. unfortunately will get nowhere.

Second point is I do believe that even in the case of Saudi Arabia, an

ally, which is very crucial for the U.S.' role in the Middle East as of

now especially against the background what's happening in Iraq -- and

this leaves a big elephant in the room when we speak about Saudi Arabia

today -- it's less about oil and it's less about regional conditions in

general, it's more about Iraq and the security needs of the U.S. and

Iraq -- even considering Iraq and the Iraqi turmoil, there are chances

for the U.S. to press the Saudi ruling elite with regard to human rights

abusers and with regards to violations of citizens -- civil and

political rights.

Let me know turn to basically summarizing the two major points of my

testimony which I submitted earlier to the committee. Saudi Arabia --

and here I agree with my friend Tom Lippman -- Saudi Arabia has

witnessed a degree of political dynamism in recent years. Since 2002 the

government of Saudi Arabia has pursued different reform policies. Most

relevant measures have been the reform of the appointed quasi-

legislative council, the so-called Shura Council by expanding slightly

its competencies, the holding of partial municipal elections. I have a

note here that woman were excluded as voters and as candidates from the

municipal elections that took place in 2005. And finally the

legalization, for the first time in Saudi history, of a few civil

society actors as well as what Mr. Malinowski mentioned allowing human

rights organizations -- Western human rights organizations to partially

operate in Saudi Arabia.

So these were significant measures. When we look at Saudi reality and

the fact that Saudi Arabia has been lacking any sense of political

pluralism, any sense of dynamism -- its public space over the last

years. Yet, these measures have not in any substantial way changed or

altered the authoritarian nature of Saudi politics. The royal family,

El-Sauud, and its allies, the Wahhabi religious establishment, remain in

control, repaying their domineering position in society. And they have

retained their ability to block reforms, bring them to a standstill and

even to reverse them in the case of changing conditions. Human rights

abusers, human rights violations have not decreased. Religious

intolerance continues regardless whether we look at the educational

system or whether we look at the treatment of significant minorities in

the Saudi society primarily the Shi'a minority of the Eastern provinces.

The United States faces a set of difficult challenges in pushing for

freedom and human rights in Saudi Arabia. One has to confess that the

United States lacks in the Saudi case the leverage of economic or

military aid that can be conditioned to the implementation of reformed

measures or to improvement in the realm of human rights.

On the contrary, the American economy depends on a great extent on Saudi

Arabia which as got even more important in recent years promoting

democracy, freedom, human rights in Saudi Arabia is therefore inherently

difficult -- especially when we add to it the regional picture -- the

wider regional picture over the last three years. The U.S. pressed Saudi

Arabia to an extent after 9/11 with regard to political reform, with

regard to human rights abuses and violations. But with the development

in Iraq -- with the Iraqi turmoil and especially keeping in mind

substantial worries that the U.S. does have, the possibility of a total

destabilization in the Gulf that the administration has minimized --

especially on Saudi Arabia -- and has in fact minimized its rhetoric on

issues pertaining to human rights democratization.

A quick comparison between statements that the administration put out in

2003 to 2004 with 2006 and 2007 makes the case. This is becoming less

and less of an issue for the administration, even in terms of threats--

keeping in mind what I said that it's not really about policy actions.

Now, taking all these conditions into consideration, I do believe that

there are at least two entry points for the U.S. to press the Saudi

royal family, to press the Saudi government with regard to democracy and

human rights conditions.

The first point is as a government-to-government level. And Mr.

Malinowski mentioned the strategic dialogue which was initiated in 2005

between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. And so far issues pertaining to human

rights have been excluded from the strategic dialogue. And one entry

point which can be pushed forward and where the U.S. can really make a

good case for simply integrating the issue, just discussing the issue in

a more systematic manner -- not pressing Saudis in a quiet fashion, not

pressing Saudis sporadically depending on regional conditions and

whether they need them and what kind of security needs the U.S. might be

looking for from the Saudis in any specific moment of time, but

integrating in a systematic structure and mannered issues we think the

human rights conditions, religious tolerance, status of women in

society, political participation of Saudi citizens.

And these are not issues that are invented in the U.S., and here I

disagree with my friend, Tom Lippman. These are not issues that are

simply invented in Washington, D.C. or in Western capitals. We have

homegrown -- homegrown Saudi voices, homegrown opposition movements in

Saudi Arabia. These -- they are not organized. They do not have

constituencies, but these are authoritarian conditions that do exist,

but we have voices coming out -- coming up in Saudi Arabia asking for

improvement in the area of human rights, asking for better participation

in -- in politics, and asking for a better treatment of Sunni and Shi'a,

of majority and minority, in Saudi Arabia.

So we have -- we have an entry point at the government-to- government

level. We have a second entry point -- and this is my final remark -- we

have a second entry point at the non-governmental level where the U.S.

should intensify contact with civil society actors in Saudi Arabia.

I mentioned earlier that one of the minimal -- the four measures that

were taken in the last year, has been the expansion, the establishment

of Saudi civil society organizations. Many of them are controlled by the

government directly or, if not, they are monitored by the government. At

least there are a few -- there are a few organizations that are coming

up, and there is a need to intensify contact with them. This will

necessitate joint efforts by the administration as well as American

foundations operating in the fields of democracy promotion and human

rights.

The Saudi government needs to be pressured to lessen its authoritarian

regulations with regard to the international cooperation between Saudi

civil society actors and American democracy promotion and civil society

and human rights organizations. Without these two entry points, any

talk, any rhetoric, even imagining or dreaming that the rhetoric might

become consistent in the coming years, this will not add, or change, the

picture of lost credibility of the U.S. because of the persistence of

closing an eye, if not the two eyes, with regard to allies and focusing

on human rights violations that are in fact sometimes, in so-called U.S.

enemies, less in terms of scale and less in terms of their impact, as

compared to some -- some of America's best allies in the region.

Thank you very much.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Well, thank you. Your presentations were outstanding,

and I look forward to having a conversation. I know your presentations

have provoked a number of questions that will be posed. Before I turn,

I'm just going to be -- I just want to ask one question before I

recognize the ranking member and then turn to Mr. Payne from New Jersey,

who has also joined us.

I have a sense that the term "democracy promotion" has an implication,

or an understanding, particularly among -- particularly in the Middle

East and in Central -- and elsewhere that raises -- raises concerns, is

oftentimes misinterpreted as meaning the United States is prepared to

impose a form of government. If we -- if we reconfigured, if you will,

the -- I don't want to call it a debate, but the conversation away from

democracy promotion to respect for human rights, universally declared

human rights -- we have a number of international conventions dealing

with human rights that various states, many of whom, from our

perspective, according to the Department of State country reports, do

not comply with -- would it -- would it have a better -- would it be

able to be received in some countries in a different way than it's

currently -- than it's currently received? I don't know if I'm being

clear, but words do have nuances, and you know, we appropriate money for

democracy promotion in various countries that we select. Now, I don't

think we select -- I don't think we appropriate dollars for democracy

promotion in Saudi Arabia, but we certainly do in Iran. And therefore, I

think it provides the Iranian regime an opportunity to point out that

democracy promotion is simply a disguise for an American effort towards

regime change, as opposed to the promotion of American values. American

values -- at least we here believe them to be tantamount to human rights

as enumerated in the Helsinki Accords and various international

treaties. Wouldn't we be better off as a Congress to substitute or to

examine the language that we use in terms of how we present these issues

for the rest of the world?

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* Yes. (Laughter.)

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* I like it when I get that kind of an -- (inaudible).

Dr. Olcott.

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* You know, the -- the key distinction -- I mean, to

me the distinction doesn't matter. I mean, I -- we -- democracy

promotion is American language --

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* It doesn't matter to me, either.

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* You know, it's the way we talk about these things.

We talk about liberty, we talk about freedom. This is -- these are the

words that resonate to us. But they don't resonate as well

internationally. It's just an objective fact.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Well, I think you pointed out in your testimony, Mr.

Malinowski, I mean, we've -- I've had visits from Iranians who have

pled, really, "Do not -- do not appropriate money. We will not take it.

It does not aid our cause. In fact, it denigrates our efforts because it

provides a -- a rationale for the regime to crack down harder." And it

isn't just from Arabians. It's from other nations.

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* Yeah. Well, there are two separate questions there.

One is the language that you use.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Right.

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* And I think you're -- you're right. We're more

effective -- and we all want to be effective here; it's not just about

sounding good -- we're more effective internationally if we appeal to

universal principles that everybody feels are their own, rather than

principles that sound like they're just made in the USA. So absolutely.

You know, the human rights rhetoric just works better than the democracy

rhetoric, even though to me the difference is meaningless.

In terms of the money issue, I mean, I think you just -- you have to

listen to people on the ground who are fighting for the values that we

care about. There are many dissidents around the world, civil society

groups, opposition political parties, that welcome financial support

from the United States, and we ought to be providing it. There are many

other places where that is absolutely not true, and Iran is one of those

cases. Most of the money the U.S. is appropriating is actually going to

broadcasting inside Iran, and most Iranian dissidents I speak to are

very much in favor of that. They welcome that. What they don't want is

for us to be saying that we are sending money inside Iran to help them

fight their battle. Number one, we're not doing it. We're saying we're

doing it; we're not actually doing it. And two, by saying we're doing

it, we're placing a target on their backs.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Dr. Olcott --

*_MS. OLCOTT:_* Yeah. I'd like to say a few things. I think the move to

a more value-neutral vocabulary; i.e., not as tied to American values,

is really critical. I think we do best when we're talking about

universal values. When we're talking about international conventions

that a country itself has signed, we stand very strongly.

I disagree with Mr. Malinowski on some of the questions of the funding.

I think we have to couple these conversations. When we tie human rights

to the -- giving a particular group legal registration in the country,

we're tying our hands. I mean, I think we have to separate our

consideration of those questions. It's a question of what increases our

ability to get these changes, and I'm not convinced that always -- that

making a litmus test the registration of NGOs that we have labeled

should be registered is the appropriate litmus test.

I think we have to have the potential for decoupling the two things,

especially when we go in in a case like Uzbekistan and we'll give

funding to groups that are human rights groups that are also directly

tied to notions of regime change, and we won't give money to government

groups that also claim that they are trying to do various forms of legal

reform. I mean, we just -- we add to the burden at each level of

conditionality that we put in, and we have to find ways that at least

begin discussion with regimes that we don't like that they're willing to

engage on. And then it's easier to take the next step, I think, of

conditionality with things that we want them to change. Uzbekistan's a

strange case because most U.S. NGOs can't get funded, but -- can't get

in, but NBI (ph) still is able to operate there. So -- I mean, I think

we really have to be very -- learn how to be more savvy in playing with

some of these really difficult cases to reform where they don't have to

take our money. And that's the problem.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Dr. Hamzawy?

*_MR. HAMZAWY:_* I disagree to an extent with regard to the language

issue. We tend to ignore that there have been -- and to a very

considerable degree -- a development in the region -- in the Middle East

throughout the 1990s, especially in the last years where concepts like

democracy, human rights have become part of local debates and

discussions. Democracy and human rights -- you will find them -- the two

concepts -- on every single political platform, be it government- based

or opposition-based. So we are not in a way imposing democracy and human

rights on that. So the language is used, and at a different level it's

very hard to find any value-free concepts. So these concepts -- all of

them are loaded -- are value-loaded. The question will be whether we can

correspond in a systematic and an intelligent (segue ?), as my colleague

Dr. Olcott said, to homegrown rhetoric.

The second issue is the fine line between submitting to the logic of

authoritarian autocratic regimes when they play the game of national

sovereignty and tell you, "No intervention, no interference, do not fund

them." The fine line between submitting to this logic and creating

spaces where the U.S. can still reach out to democracy advocates, civil

society access, human rights organizations in a country like Morocco,

Egypt or Saudi Arabia or Uzbekistan without discrediting them. I am --

sometimes I am -- I feel that we submit too fast and -- in a systematic

way to the logic of authoritarian, autocratic regimes where -- when they

wave the flag of national sovereignty, and tell the U.S., "Do not --

it's none of your business." It's not true.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* But my point is in terms of the rhetoric and the use

of -- and maybe I'm making a false distinction here, although there

seems to be some disagreement when I speak about democracy promotion as

opposed to human rights. I think Dr. Olcott -- you know, summed it up

better than I did when there's a certain universality regarding human

rights. There are -- you know, conventions. There are international

treaties with concomitant obligations that regimes, both those who

respect and those who denigrate human rights, have signed onto. You

know, we talk about sovereignty and in new democracy -- I mean, we're --

I believe in democracy and human rights. But I think -- and I'm

guessing, and that's why I'm seeking input from you -- I'm guessing that

democracy is so identified with the United States and the United States'

low standing at this moment in time all over the world that in terms of

how we market and package what we want to achieve in terms of our goals,

which are democracy and human rights, reliance on the term "human

rights, civil liberties, political freedoms" is a -- it's a better cause

as we engage in conversation and diplomacy.

*_MR. HAMZAWY:_* I mean, you need a case-by-case approach. And I will

address myself just to the Arab world, and there are two patterns. Let

me compare Egypt to Saudi Arabia very quickly. Egypt, I would say in

terms of packaging -- promoting civil liberties, political freedoms --

it's acceptable to use the term "democracy." It's not identified 100

percent with the U.S. I mean, Egypt has a different political history.

Now Saudi Arabia is a different case, but in Saudi Arabia we run the

risk -- when you use democracy and when you use human rights because

there have been extensive debates on religious reservations with regard

to international conventions and treaties of human rights. And Mr.

Malinowski will -- and Tom Lippman will know them. Saudi Arabia has a

conservative social fabric -- has had intensive debate on whether human

rights in a universal sense apply to a Saudi society that is based on

Islam and on religion or not. So we run more or less into a very -- into

the very same risk, using democracy or human rights.

And here what I meant by making a distinction between submitting to the

government logic -- to the official logic and trying to listen to

homegrown voices -- Saudi liberals, Saudi moderates, Islamists,

nonviolent Islamists -- who have been advocating democracy and human

rights in a universal sense. Leaning on their rhetoric -- using their

rhetoric will make it easier for the U.S. or any center of power

interested in promoting democracy to make the case.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Mr. Lippman?

*_MR. LIPPMAN:_* Mr. Chairman, it seems to me as I listen to your

questions that you seem to be advocating a process similar to the

Helsinki process that we used with the Soviet Union, saying this is what

you signed, right?

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Right.

*_MR. LIPPMAN:_* And -- right. And so with -- really, with all of these

countries except Saudi Arabia, or many of them, there are -- there's

language in U.N. agreements -- the language of their own constitutions --

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Right.

*_MR. LIPPMAN:_* -- is available to say, "This is what we believe in and

this is what we'd like you to uphold." I think in this part of the world

-- in the Middle East now, it's complicated by the fact that in many

ways we don't hold the moral high ground. I -- the -- which you might

call the anecdotal impact of incidents like Abu Ghraib, of the violence

in Iraq which seems to have followed the establishment of a democratic

system that we promoted -- it takes -- it seems to me that it undermines

whatever rhetorical position we might otherwise effectively take. It's

not a propitious moment for us to pursue that line, it seems to me

unfortunately.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Mr. Rohrabacher.

*_REP. ROHRABACHER:_* Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

You know, sometimes I feel like we just can't win, but years ago I

remember I was -- reached out to the moderate Muslim community here in

the United States and gave speech after speech and talked about

democracy, and the importance of the United States promoting democracy

in the Muslim world. And I received really a positive response. I mean,

it was overwhelmingly positive. That was before we started making moves

to try to promote democracy in the Muslim world. And as soon as the

United States started promoting democracy in the Muslim world --

especially in terms of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, all of a sudden those

people who were applauding the idea -- the concept of democracy in the

Muslim world began to turn in a very negative way toward the United

States and being involved in the Middle East.

You know, there was -- first of all, we tried an economic embargo

against Saddam Hussein, you know. Now it's understandable those people

say we should never have invaded Iraq and never used force like this.

Well, we tried an embargo and those people who generally are saying we

should never have invaded opposed the embargo as well. It was the

embargo that eventually brought on -- by the way, the Oil-for- Food

Scandal this committee investigated. The -- so we had the embargo, and

all of a sudden we heard with the embargo that there was, of course,

millions of people who were languishing in squalor and not having enough

food and not having the medicine -- the tens of thousands of children

that were dying. Of course that was laid on our doorstep, not the

doorstep of Saddam Hussein, who we had provided enough revenue from

Oil-for-Food to pay for all of those things. But instead, he of course

used the money for other things. He stole it and then he used it for

military purposes.

But the United States, by and large, by the very same people who had

said they were for democracy in the Muslim world, did not side with the

United States on that -- chose instead to become the nitpickers of the

United States. And then, of course, when we used in-military

intervention in order to bring democracy to Iraq, of course, then that

was even way beyond that. That was not even conceivable.

I do not know what people in the Muslim world believe -- how they

believe that we will have a liberalization and a democratization of

these countries that are now -- whether they're pro-American

authoritarians or whether they're anti-American authoritarian regimes --

how do people expect there's going to be a democratization? Is this

going to be a democracy and human rights are going to be left under

their pillow by the tooth fairy and they'll just wake up and it will be

given to them as a present without any cost? No. There is a cost.

And maybe we should just give up and just say, this is not our strategy,

because the people there aren't going to back us when we may have an

attempt to actually get something done. And then of course, if we use

the words about human rights -- as the chairman has aptly pointed out --

we use the words about human rights, and then we don't do anything in

our actions, which you've suggested that actions aren't taking place --

well, then we're viewed as hypocrites. So maybe we should just shut up

and let the world go. No. I disagree with that.

I'm with human rights watch here and the fact is, we need to be strong

advocates of human rights around the world. And let me note, for our

witness, I couldn't agree with you more about your analysis of what's

going on in Pakistan. What's going on in Pakistan? The fact is that the

army, which is telling us they're the only alternative to radical Islam,

the army is allied with radical Islam in Pakistan. It always has been.

Those of us who've been active on that issue understand that it's the

secular elements there, the pro-democratic elements that have been the

enemy of Islam and the army has been the ally of radical Islam in

Pakistan. So if we want to base our policy on what's going to help

radical Islam it's let's not support a military dictatorship in Pakistan.

Mr. Lippman, I found your remarks a little bit disturbing because of

some of the words you were using about "our standards." I don't think

democracy and human rights are our standards. I think it's a universal

standard. Using the words "they will decide." Who's they? If we're

talking about a dictatorship or an authoritarian country like Saudi

Arabia, who is they? "They" isn't the people. "They" is an elite group

of people in the royal family, and perhaps some others who they've cut

some deals with in the Wahhabi movement there and their cronies. And

then in the end, where it said that, you know, they're going to be the

ones making the decisions. And the fact is, I don't know, in your

remarks if you just assume that what the Saudi government says it

doesn't wish to be anything else. It -- what's it? I mean, all the

people of Saudi Arabia don't wish to be anything else? How do you know?

Do we have an open discussion so we can determine if that's "it" -- it

represents the will of the people? If these people are not going to have

any type of open discussion and a free election, people willing to talk

back and forth, how do you know it isn't the wish of the people to have

something else? Maybe it'd be good to --

*_MR. LIPPMAN:_* Well, Mr. Rohrabacher, I would -- first I would also

suggest that you hear from Dr. Hamzawy on this subject.

*_REP. ROHRABACHER:_* All right.

*_MR. LIPPMAN:_* His knowledge is greater than mine, but in my

experience, I think you'll see that I don't necessarily accept the

premise that there's some great gap between the leadership of the

country and the masses of the people. Saudi Arabia is not North Korea.

By and large, in my experience there -- which goes back now 30 years --

if our standard is that we wish a government to function with the

consent of the governed, I believe Saudi Arabia -- the government, the

system of Saudi Arabia -- generally meets that standard.

There is, as Dr. Hamzawy said, a constant (free sol ?), you might say,

of dissent, of desire to do things better, of distress about corruption.

But if you read most of the manifestos that have come out within the

limited range of freedom that people in Saudi Arabia have to express

themselves, by and large they seek reform and change within the present

system -- not replacement of the present system.

Saudi Arabia is a deeply conservative society, which as far as I can

tell, is largely content to function according to the rules of Islam and

Islamic law.

*_REP. ROHRABACHER:_* That's as far as you can tell.

*_MR. LIPPMAN:_* Well, as far as one can tell. That is correct.

*_REP. ROHRABACHER:_* And let me just say, I will agree with you that

when you talk about consent of the governed, which is what we're really

talking about here, that it doesn't necessarily have to take exactly the

shape -- we're not trying to superimpose our exact type of democracy on

people when we talk about human rights and democracy. And consent of the

governed is important.

Would you like to comment on that?

*_MR. HAMZAWY:_* I agree with what you said. We really do not know. And

how could we know? I mean, this is a society where we do not have -- I

mean, we have a minimal degree of beginning political pluralism, as I

said. A few civil society organizations. We have individual voices, but

we have no access to popular constituencies in Saudi Arabia. And in a

way, this is the legacy of autocratic regimes. We simply -- we are left

to either believe or disbelieve in the logic and rhetoric of governing

and ruling elites. We do not know our popular constituencies.

*_REP. ROHRABACHER:_* That is precisely correct.

*_And let me note:_* If you talk about hypocrisy, I mean, what is

hypocrisy about people, except people who, when they leave their

country, are deeply involved in all sorts of incredibly anti-religious

-- or not anti-religious -- but things that Muslims would consider to be

sinful, but then they go back home and they put their robes on and act

in a totally different way and act very piously. And we know that many

people from Saudi Arabia and the Saudi Arabian leadership do exactly

that as they go to Las Vegas and lose millions of dollars at the

roulette wheel.

*_MR. LIPPMAN:_* Sir, the other way to look at it -- and understand. I

hold no grief for Saudi Arabian way of life. I would not want to live

that way myself and I wouldn't want my family to live that way. But the

other side of the point that you just raised about how the Saudis live

differently when they go home is that they all do go home.

You may recall a period when there were -- Southern California had tens,

maybe hundreds of thousands of dissident Iranians. People who had come

to this country to study. The Saudis were always very proud of the fact

that when the Iranians students -- they were so unhappy with their

country that when they came here they stayed. And the Saudi Arabian

students, when they came here and finished their education they went home.

*_REP. ROHRABACHER:_* Well, that happens when the government doesn't

confiscate someone's wealth, you know, and that the people who are over

here are the sons and daughters of the elite. That's, I think, one of

the explanations of that.

Let me note for the record that I had a resolution that I put forward in

19 -- excuse me -- 2003. Unfortunately, Mr. Lantos and I -- originally

the ones who supported this -- and it was condemning the lack of human

rights in Saudi Arabia. I'll just submit this for the record. I think

many of the things that we pointed are still true in Saudi Arabia today.

Look, we have a country in Saudi Arabia -- I saw no problem with during

the -- during World War II for us to ally with Joe Stalin in order to

defeat Adolf Hitler. No problem with that. I don't find any problem,

also, with making short-term adjustments for the relationships with

less-than-free societies in order to defeat radical Islam, if indeed in

the long run it will lead us to where we want to go: the end of World

War II, the defeat of Nazism, and then we had to totally compromise it

in eliminating the possibility of a pro-freedom movement in the future

-- as long as we're doing that.

Now, unfortunately, what we have to realize today is that with Saudi

Arabia, during this time period, they have been financing the war

against us. So here we are closing a blind eye to the human rights

abuses in Saudi Arabia, while at the same time they have been building

these mosques in which anti-American and anti-western sentiment is being

stirred up so they can create a whole generation of people -- especially

in Pakistan -- who'll hate us and join this anti- western war against

our way of life. That made no sense.

In terms of Uzbekistan, I've had a lot -- you know, I know Mr. Karimov

and I have had -- was deeply involved with that region of the world

prior to 9/11. And I was -- I had a personal discussion with Mr. Karimov

and told him the best thing that he could possibly do for himself and

the country would be to declare that he would not be a candidate in the

next election and declare free and open elections, and he would be known

as the father of his country, and everything would be forgiven and he

would go down in history as a hero.

Unfortunately, he didn't follow that advice. He was upset about maybe

the fact that he believed we were getting -- he was getting shortchanged

from what he did expect for his support of us during the war in

Afghanistan. That could be an explanation.

Mr. Chairman, that does underscore your point that the war in Iraq -- by

going into Iraq, perhaps we didn't have the resources to fulfill the

expectations of those people like Mr. Karimov who helped us defeat the

Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

So would you like to comment on that?

*_MS. OLCOTT:_* I'm very interested in your comment about President

Karimov, because, I mean, I too share your view that he should step down

now and he should have stepped down before. But I don't think he's

capable, unfortunately, of making that decision, and that's really bad

for the Uzbek people especially.

I agree with what you said about the war in Iraq bleeding the resources.

I think the whole question to me of reconstruction projects in

Afghanistan could only have succeeded if it was a strong regional

project, and that would have created the kind of economic incentive.

So it didn't require for a country like Uzbekistan to feel they were

getting something out of the relationship. It didn't require the kind of

double standard that would make human rights activists mad. It did

require a kind of regional approach to rebuilding Afghanistan, which we

really haven't done.

So it's not just that we have this relationship that's gone sour, but

all the problems we're having in Afghanistan are really part and parcel

of not having diverted enough resources, human or material, to that

problem.

But, no, I think that if we had done that, we would have created enough

economic incentives for the kind of political reforms that the Uzbeks

have to do, because, in my mind, that's the line that works best, at

least in Central Asia, that if you have economic reforms, you generate a

part of the elite to become defenders of the political reform, because

they need economic transparency. They need legal transparency.

*_REP. ROHRABACHER:_* Well, this type of evolution -- I hope that we can

have evolutions like that. I haven't seen much of it happen around the

world. Usually there's some sort of coup or death and some general

allies with somebody who then decides they can be democratic, but

there's been some sort of upheaval in the establishment rather than an

evolution by --

*_MS. OLCOTT:_* I think Kazakhstan is the test case of whether we get

this. I mean, I think there are a lot of hopeful signs that they'll have

that kind of evolution, but it's in no way preordained. But I think

where you have deeply rooted elites, it's very hard, unless they see it

as their economic benefit.

*_REP. ROHRABACHER:_* Let me -- (inaudible) -- and then I'll finish my

-- end this to just say that -- and then I'll make sure you get a chance

to comment, our friend from Human Rights Watch.

Look, with all the talk about hypocrisy and double standards, I accept

that there are some -- there's some hypocrisy and double standard in any

type of historic situation. You have to make decisions that you believe

are going to get you beyond a crisis. If your buildings are being blown

up and thousands of people are being slaughtered, you make certain

decisions to get you beyond that point.

However, with that said, I think the United States -- it behooves the

United States to have a long-term commitment to human rights and not

ever to even create a short-term commitment that will prevent us from

maintaining that long-term goal.

With that said, when people talk about the United States being

hypocrites, I'm sorry, I don't accept somebody being upset about Abu

Ghraib, where there was mistreatment of some prisoners, and then we

immediately came in and, of course, tried to correct it by arresting

those people who were not doing what was right, those soldiers that were

not doing right, while those same people criticize us for that while

they turn a blind eye or even condone the mass bombings of civilians

that are going on in Iraq today.

You know, don't tell me about hypocrisy when people are turning a blind

eye to the slaughter of innocent civilians that's going on in Iraq

while, oh, yes, we turned people off because we mistreated people at Abu

Ghraib. I'm sorry, I'm not going to apologize for that. Once we learned

there was something wrong, we tried to correct it. Those people who are

attacking the United States for that sort of thing, they need to sit

back and see if they're being honest with themselves and honest with the

world.

So, with that, our human rights friend wants to probably comment on

something like that.

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* Is this on? Yeah.

Let me try to introduce some healthy disagreement here on a couple of

points. First, on this question of resources, I totally agree on

Afghanistan. We should have pumped much, much more there, both

economically and militarily, in every possible way. I think, as a

general rule, that's right.

But with respect to Uzbekistan, I couldn't disagree more. I think, you

know, the notion that if we had paid Karimov more, if we had pumped $1

billion in there and treated him like Pakistan, that he would have seen

the light or felt that he needed to do more for the United States, I

think, profoundly misunderstands the nature of that regime.

I think that kind of largess in that situation, in fact, increases the

determination of rulers to cling to power, because they get to benefit

from the largess.

*_REP. ROHRABACHER:_* No it doesn't misinterpret the regime, but

misinterprets the strategies that will work. That never worked with a

dictator -- smother him with money, hug him, and he's going to become --

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* Yeah. And I mentioned Pakistan for a reason. I mean,

it really has had the opposite effect in Pakistan. It's entrenched the

military in a position of authority. You know, they used the largess to

essentially take control of the economic life of the country. And, in

fact, that kind of largess diminishes the likelihood of real

market-based economic reforms that will then empower a middle class,

which will then lead to the kind of political change that we want as the

opposite impact of what my friend, I think, suggested.

You know, the notion that if we'd done that, they wouldn't have

machine-gunned a crowd of innocent people in Andijan, I think, is just

wrong. I think, you know, the very same thing would have happened and we

would have been faced with the same choice.

In terms of your comment, Mr. Rohrabacher, I totally agree there is no

comparison between anything the United States has done and the mass

murder of innocent people in Iraq every single day by these bombers. At

the same time, we are held, rightly so, to a far higher standard.

You know, when Saddam Hussein was torturing people in this prison,

nobody around the world was saying, "Well, gosh, Saddam's doing it, so

that makes it legitimate." When the president of the United States --

and forget about Abu Ghraib, but when he defends the use of secret

detention, when he says waterboarding is okay, that has a profoundly

negative impact on all of our work around the world. When the chief

defender of human rights in the world begins to make those kinds of

excuses and equivocations, the whole framework begins to fall apart. So

I think that's the distinction.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Thank you, Mr. Malinowski. And I concur with -- we do

claim a certain moral authority, and we ought to be the standard. We

ought to be the benchmark. And we ought not ever to allow an erosion in

terms of those standards, because what I believe is America inspires

because of those standards. They don't hate us because of our values.

They believe us. Rather, they're disappointed because there is a

perception that we haven't met our own standards.

And I would submit that's the basis for why we see the perception of the

rest of the world -- and not just Europeans, and not just Latin

Americans, and not just people I the Middle East, but people here in

this country, and a growing number that are concerned about that.

With that, let me yield to the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.

*_REP. DONALD PAYNE (D-NJ):_* Thank you very much. And I too concur with

the Chairman and the gentleman who witnessed, who said that we are held

to a different standard. I think that our ranking member has a lot of

passion and he's really worked through the administrations -- going

through the Cold War, and he has a distinguished record.

However, I definitely disagree that we cannot wallow down into the

depths of dictators and bloodthirsty leaders and say that, you know,

because they do it, we can do it. I mean if we ever start to equate

ourselves to these people around the world, we're in serious trouble --

I mean, very serious trouble.

As a matter of fact, even growing up as a kid all I heard about was

December 7th, "the day that will go down in infamy," the secret attack

of the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese forces, the imperial

forces of Japan -- and even though we did have a little inkling that

there was some aggression being built up. And then for us to say we've

got to do a preemptive strike on Iraq, you know, some people around the

world are equating what is the difference between that "day that went

down in infamy" and the day that we had preemptive strike in Iraq,

because someone said there are weapons of mass destruction, biological

weapons -- just made up a lot -- the reasons kept changing and finally

it came down to regime change.

Well, you start going in bombing countries and destroying them because

you want to change a president, you know, where's the world going? So I

do think that as we fight this so-called war on terror we have to be

very careful in how -- you know, Dante's Inferno there were seven levels

to purgatory, you know, I don't know if we're supposed to get down to

the lowest level to equate ourselves to our enemies.

But let me just ask, you know, was it Mr. Malinowski -- hope I'm saying

it almost right -- about Iran. Human rights activists there said, you

know, please let us do this alone -- our concern about being identified

with the U.S. You know, in Venezuela we got all involved in the

election, and I think even in -- might have been Peru, another Latin

America country where the U.S. cozied up to a particular party -- and

that was actually used to help defeat the ones that we thought we were

helping.

So what do you think about it? The administration has actually asked for

$75 million for Iran to help opposition activists. Now they're saying,

thanks, but no thanks. Please let us do it ourselves. What do you --

what -- do you think that the administration should certainly listen to

what Iranians are saying? Or do you think that they should continue to

try to help with this funding?

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* They're not listening very well. Here's what Iranian

dissidents say to us and what I think they said to the administration.

They want the United States to be speaking out on human rights in their

country. They want us to be raising this issue -- these issues with the

Iranian government. In fact, they don't want to United States to cut a

deal on the nuclear issue and on other things that gives Iran a lot of

aid without raising the human rights issue as part of that.

And I think most of them are absolutely fine -- and, in fact, supportive

of spending money on things like broadcasting into Iran, which increases

the flow of information. They also want us to be spending money on

exchanges and on anything that increases contact between the two

societies because the more -- the more people-to- people contact we

have, you know, on things like academic exchanges and other things that

are non-political, the easier it is for them to find space to do

political activism.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Would the gentleman yield for a moment?

*_REP. PAYNE:_* Yes, go right ahead.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* If you can expand just a moment. I don't think many

Americans, and certainly not most members of Congress, are aware that

there are exchanges that are in existence between Iranians and the

United States at this moment in time?

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* Well, at this moment it's pretty much frozen because

the Iranian government has been arresting, as you know, Iranian

Americans who've been involved in some of these, you know, very

below-the-radar-screen dialogues.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Do we have Iranians studying in the United States or

participating in any exchanges?

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* There have been -- I'm not sure if they're Iranian

students -

(Cross talk.)

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Dr. Hamzawy, could you?

I'm sorry, Don, --

(Cross talk)

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* I mean, this is all very much below the radar screen.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* I understand.

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* They're -- they're --

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* I'll keep it below the radar screen.

(Laughter.)

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* That's right. They also, frankly, want dialogue

between the U.S. government and the Iranian government. And one reason

they want this is because the, you know, the position of the Iranian

government, or the Ahmadinejad regime is -- you know, if you talk to the

Americans, you're a traitor. But if every Iranian sees on television the

Iranian government talking to the Americans, it would be far more

difficult for the Iranian government to enforce that point of view with

respect to these citizens -- the citizen dialogues which they think are

so important.

So they want all of that. The one thing that they don't want is for the

United States to be saying that we are sending money inside Iran to help

the dissidents to help political activists, to support human rights and

democracy, because that puts a target on their back. The truth is we're

not sending it in. And yet we say we are.

If you look at -- you know, the State Department put out a fact sheet

just about a week or 10 days ago in which it describes how we're

spending this money. And there's a line in there, you know, some of this

money supports people inside Iran who are fighting for democracy and

human rights. And what they mean by that is, well the broadcasting does

that indirectly, and they run some seminars outside Iran that Iranians

go to -- and so indirectly it does that. And they're trying to

exaggerate the impact of these programs by saying we're helping people

inside, but the effect that has on Iranians inside is very, very

negative. And they've been begging the administration to stop

advertising that -- to stop saying we're sending money inside.

So I think, you know, when you all consider the money, and the

appropriation, I'm not saying you shouldn't earth appropriating money

for things like broadcasting. I think you should be. But I think you

should be absolutely clear in what you say and urge the administration

to be clear, that this is not meant to be pumping money inside Iran to

be helping these groups because it isn't, and because that hurts them.

*_REP. PAYNE:_* Yeah, just in the same questioning, the -- there were

some recent arrests, as you know -- what was his name, Haleh Esfandiari

-- worked for the Wilson Center in Washington, and it was a program

being subsidized by government funds. Do you know how this particular

case is proceeding and the prospects of the arrest? And do you think

that the government did that as a, you know, sort of a -- as a reaction

against this sort of funding that they hear is happening?

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* I don't think they did it because of the funding,

they're doing it because they're threatened by these contacts; they're

threatened by these exchanges; they're threatened by the notion of civil

society. The funding gives them a pretext. The funding gives them a sort

of nationalistic pretext to crack down on these groups, which resonates

with some Iranians, with parts of Ahmadinejad's base.

So it's not that they -- they would be a kinder, gentler government if

we stopped saying these things; they wouldn't be, of course. But this is

giving them a pretext that they wouldn't otherwise have. And again, the

bottom line is the very dissidents we want to be supporting are asking

us please, don't do this. I think that -- that should be enough.

And, you know, there are precedents for this. One -- one story I

remember, back in the1980s Congress appropriated funding to help the

Solidarity labor union in Poland. It was a great gesture; everybody

wanted to help Solidarity in that difficult time. Money was

appropriated; Solidarity said, "Oh, actually, no. We can't -- we don't

want to take this, because the Communist government in Poland will label

us as a puppet of the United States if we take this money." And so the

Reagan administration said, "Okay, very well. What do you want us to use

it for?" And Solidarity said, "Well, we have a medical crisis in Poland.

We need ambulances. Use that money to pay for ambulances for our

national health service," which they did, and Solidarity got credit for

what was turned into humanitarian assistance. I mean, that's a good

example of an administration that was listening to people on the ground

who were fighting for these goals. And I don't quite understand why it's

been hard to break through with -- with the current administration on

this issue.

*_REP. PAYNE:_* Just on -- to continue on Iran before my time expires,

the -- it's interesting to note that many younger people, there's a --

there's a pretty pro-U.S. thread that runs through many Iranian younger

people. I mean, our -- you know, the styles, the music. They just --

it's not an anti-American sentiment, and I wonder if there's some way

that, you know, which is positive -- as a matter of fact, my alma mater,

Seton Hall University School of Diplomacy, actually invited the former

president of Iran three or four years ago to come and speak at the

university and, of course, caught all kind of -- all kind of devilment

from people by doing this. But I think that these are the kind of

things, as you mentioned, that -- tat we should be doing more -- more

of. I just wonder, what do you think about the -- about the recent

statement by the -- because he's an Independent from Connecticut,

Senator Lieberman, who has the bright idea, "Let's just go bomb Iran." I

mean, how do you think that'll -- think that's a good diplomatic tool to

help us try to win over our people?

*_MR. MALINOWSKI:_* Well, as I suggested in my testimony, I think if our

goal is to unite the Iranian people with their leadership, that's a

really good way of doing it.

*_REP. PAYNE:_* Right. Absolutely.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* Mr. Payne, if you'd yield, I just -- I know that Mr.

Meeks has an appointment. I'm going to come right back to you --

*_REP. PAYNE:_* Oh. Okay, sure.

*_REP. DELAHUNT:_* -- but I want to give him an opportunity, because

he's a man with a very frenetic, busy schedule. So with that, let me

yield to Mr. Meeks of New York, co-chair of the Caribbean Caucus.

*_REP. GREGORY MEEKS (D-NY):_* I -- I come at this, you know, in

listening, and I heard what the ranking member, who I respect a great

deal, he had to say. But when we talk about democracy, and I can't help

but think, as I travel, individuals -- democracy could mean anything to

anybody. Just the word "democracy." What are you talking about,

democracy? And what kind of democracy and democracy for who? Because you

can have a country that is -- you know, that's a so-called democracy,

but yet the people within the country still, or some -- or a fragment of

that, really don't see democracy. And so, you know, it takes a lot for

the people from within to come together to try to make a difference to

do something.

And I think that for me, I'm my country's biggest critic. I think I

should be. I think that's part of my responsibility. I would hope that

others, you know, would soon be their country's biggest critic. But I

think that when folks look at us, you know, they look at certain things.

There was a recent report that came out of a group of economists from

the Economists Intelligence Unit who are the people that publish The

Economist, The Economist magazine -- along with a number of U.S.

universities and President Carter, the Dalai Lama, Archbishop Desmond

Tutu, Harry Fulbright, et cetera, a number of others, that came up with

this program to try to determine, you know who's the most peaceful

nation, et cetera. And -- and they did it with 121 countries -- 121

countries. Where did the United States fall? I mean, and I think -- was

part of it -- and in there he talked about to determine, it talked about

human rights, prison population, violence, access to weapons, military

expenditure, and -- and the United States, out of 121, ranked 96 -- 96.

And that's what happens when we go out and we start talking to people

and trying to tell people what to do without having put or placing the

highest standard on ourselves. That's why those of us in this

government, if we want others to respect what we say, we've got to hold

our government to a higher standard, if we want folks to listen to us

and appreciate us. Especially the grassroots folks.

And I've talked to poor people, you know, when you talk to folks over

there, they say, "Well, you know, conditions of a lot folks in the

United States is not right," and then I just think about our history.

Democracy was, I guess, supposed to have been here for over, you know,

200 years, 250 years, but it sure wasn't that way for people of African

descent in the United States of America. Surely was not that way, in our

so-called democracy. And so people get the question of whether, you

know, you're talking about just telling you to do what we tell you to do

because we're telling you to do it, and trying to throw it down

somebody's throat, or working with people so that they can in fact

accomplish what they want to accomplish. And I think that's exactly when

you're talking about -- you know, when you said give them ambulances, as

opposed to -- well, you're listening to people then. Too often, we don't

want to listen to anybody. We tell you how to do it, and if you don't do

it the way we tell you how to do it, then you're not with us. That's

what, you know, people feel. It's starting to happen now, not only with

individuals in the Middle East; it's starting to happen with some of our

allies. It's starting to happen with some of the Europeans. You know,

they're starting to get upset about how we push this thing called

democracy, as opposed to working with people, as opposed to trying to

understand.

I mean, I'm concerned. This guy, for example, in Iran, Ahmadinejad, he's

a bad guy. One of my questions -- and I just throw that out real quick

-- but the way that we're talking about we want to have, you know,

democracy. And I was looking at, you know, some time ago, when he got

elected, he was supposed to have been just figurehead. His government

was in trouble not too long ago, because if you look at the municipal

elections, his party was losing a lot, you know, elections. But we put

the ships in and different things start to happen and, you know,

Lieberman said what he had to say, and then all of a sudden we see he's

getting stronger. So my -- my question, maybe I'm not seeing it right,

but do you believe that in Iran that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is gaining

power at the expense of the moderates, simply because we are not

listening and we are saying, "Do as I tell you to do, or it ain't going

to happen"? I throw that question out there.

*_MR. HAMZAWY:_* Yes, well, I couldn't agree more. Ahmadinejad has

gained over the last two years, at least, from the administration's

rhetoric on Iran and from exactly the attitude which you just described

-- pushing them, prescribing to Iranians what they should do. And (Hari

Maged ?) and his propaganda machinery -- and I -- I use this term in a

very conscious way -- have done an excellent job in using and playing

out the nationalistic card and portraying Ahmadinejad and his policies

as the only way to defend Iranian national interests and Iranian

sovereignty against systematic intervention.

(END OF TODAY'S COVERAGE. COVERAGE WILL RESUME TOMORROW.)

END.

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