Higher Education Reform and the Limits of Neoliberal State. The student

movement in Mexico (1999) and Chile (2011)

Alejandro González Ledesma (Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane)

alejandro.gonzalez@sumitalia.it

(very) Draft version. Please do not cite or quote without permission

I. - Chile and Mexico: neoliberalization processes and the evolution of social movements

1.1. – Models of neoliberalization

According to Tickell and Kell (2005:166), the neoliberalization is a process that consists in "the

mobilization of the state power in the sense of an extension and reproduction of market rules."

According to Standing (2002) and Harvey (2007), the main points of neoliberalization are those

derived from the so-called, Washington Consensus:

1.- Trade liberalization;

2.- Financial Market liberalization;

3.- Privatization of production;

4.- "Deregulation";

5.- Foreign Capital Liberalization,

6.- Secure property rights;

7.- Unified and competitive exchange rates;

8.- Diminished public spending (fiscal discipline);

9.- Public expenditure switching (to health, schooling, and infrastructure);

10.- Tax reform (Broadening the tax base, cutting marginal tax rates, less progressive tax);

11.- A 'social safety net' (narrowly targeted, selective transfers for the needy),

12.- Flexible Labour Markets.

Tickell and Kell consider that between 1979 and 2000, the neoliberalization process comprises at

least three key moments: a) proto-neoliberalism (1979-1980), from the first experiments of the free

market in Chile, to the appearance of Margaret Thatcher in England and Ronald Reagan in the

United States, b) roll-back neoliberalism (1980-1990)¸ starts with the first free market reforms of

Reagan and Thatcher and the debt crisis in Latin America, and c) roll-out neoliberalism (1990-

2000), the organized national building process based on the guidelines of the Washington

Consensus.

According with the aims of this paper, we will use the scheme of Kell and Tickell to outline the

differences between models of neoliberalization in Chile and Mexico. It is important to note that

Chile is already an exception, because the social discipline possible under the dictatorship allowed

the early implementation of the guidelines mentioned above. The process in Mexico, on the other

hand, is similar to the rest of the Latin American countries that were forced to implement the

structural adjustments policy, in response to the debt crisis that hit the region in the early eighties.

In Chile, the proto-neoliberalism begins with the coup that overthrew the socialist government of

Salvador Allende, and ends with the economic reforms of 1980.This stage is divided into two parts,

the first one, from 1973 to 1975, is the peak of state terrorism and the dismantling of the social

reforms implemented for Allende's government and his predecessors from the Christian Democrats

(„Democracia Cristiana‟). The second one runs from 1975 to 1980, and is marked by the imposition

of a policy aimed at resolving the high inflation as well as long-term measures to alleviate the crisis

in the balance of payments through a shock treatment (Jinkings and Sader, 2006: 294 and Klein,

2007).

The roll-back neoliberalism stage begins with the announcement of the "seven strategic

modernizations”as a preamble to the adoption of the Constitution of 1980. Through this measures,

Pinochet sought the institutionalization of the economic and political reforms of the dictatorship,

laying the groundwork for a future transition to democracy. Through the Constitution, endorsed by a

fake referendum, Pinochet removed civilian control over the military, cancelled the possibility of the

involvement of the left in the political life of the country and created a Senate where most of its

members were not elected, but appointed by him.

In 1979, General Pinochet presented his seven modernizations, which had as main objective the

liberalization of the economy: 1.- labor reform; 2.- privatization of the pension system; 3.-

administrative Modernization; 4.- decentralization of the education system 5.- privatization of the

health sector; 6.- modernization of the justice system, and 7.- agricultural liberalization (Jiménez,

2008). With the announcement of these “modernizations” and the creation of the Constitution of

1980, Pinochet tried to legitimize his government. The first signs of recognition came from Ronald

Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in England.

According to Winn (2006), the Constitution also ended with the idea of the state of emergency

which had ruled the country until then. But repression of the opponents and systematic violations of

human rights continued until 1990.

The third stage, roll-out neoliberalism, is marked by the end of the dictatorship and the beginning of

the governments of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (Coalición de Partidos por la

Democracia). One of the features that distinguished the Chilean dictatorship from the rest that

emerged in South America, is the continuity of the institutional framework created by the Pinochet

government after the transition to democracy. In fact, for Sader and Jinkings (2006: 294-295), the

governments of the Concertación acted "without questioning the objectives imposed by the

dictatorship": in political terms, accepting the imposition of a semi-representative democracy and,

economically, respecting the "self-regulating" market principle. Anyway, during this period Chile

begins a time of unprecedented economic growth, that was named the "Chilean Miracle" by Milton

Friedman.

The process of neoliberalization in Mexico has been chaotic since the beginning because, as in other

Latin American countries, has its origin in the debt crisis and the subsequent obligation to pursue the

Washington Consensus objectives. During the proto-neoliberalism, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina

increased their debts disproportionately in order to keep the model of industrialization and

infrastructure development to fulfill the growth needs of these "Latin American giants" (Sader and

Jinkings, 2006).

The Mexican government, headed at the time by Jose Lopez Portillo (1975-1982), felt free to

borrow even more after the discovery of huge oil deposits in the states of Chiapas and Tabasco.

Carried away by the illusion of a future boom, Lopez Portillo increased the number of workers

employed by the state, created new institutions, increased subsidies to agricultural production and

implemented new social programs for the care of the needy.

FIGURE 1. The neoliberalization process in Chile and Mexico

Graphical comparison of the models in Chile and Mexico neoliberalization based proposal Tickell and

Kell (2005).

However, from 1979, the Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Paul Volkner, initiated a dramatic

increase in interest rates to combat the stagflation crisis that was strongly affecting the U.S.

economy (Jinkings and Sader, 2006: 429). As a result of this policy, the Latin American countries

who had contracted debts in dollars, were taken to the disaster. In 1982, Mexico was the first

country to declared bankruptcy, followed by Argentina and Brazil.

Between 1980 and 1990 (roll-back neoliberalism), with the exception of Chile, the economic growth

in the region was null. Mexico, now ruled by Miguel de la Madrid, was forced to impose a series of

spending cuts that affected primarily education, health services and state enterprises. During this

period, a new generation of politicians, mostly trained in U.S. universities and favorable to free

market policies, begins to fill key positions in the government. Finally, the “tecnócratas”, as they

were known, reach the power with Carlos Salinas, in 1988.

From 1990 (roll-out neoliberalization), comes into force the so-called Brady Plan after multiple

negotiations that took place in the context of the debt crisis. Along with the strong austerity

measures dictated for this plan, Mexico was forced to reach the objectives of the Washington

Consensus. The government promoted a strong policy of privatization of public enterprises and

strong foreign investment, and prompted several constitutional reforms to prepare the signing of

NAFTA (North American Foreign Trade Area), which took effect in 1994.

However the Brady Plan began to show signs of exhaustion in 1995, during the government of

Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), with the "Tequila Effect" (Ibid: 421). With this new crisis the Mexican

government decided to accelerate and deepen the neoliberalization process promoting more social

spending cuts and more privatizations. Because of the strong cuts in education (961 millions of

pesos), university policy makers took the chance for pushing even more the funding aspects of the

Higher Education reform, specially increasing tuition fees.

1.2. - A new generation of social movements

The real existing neoliberalism depends not only on external factors, but also on the development of

the institutions responsible for carrying it out (Harvey, 2007), and on the resistance that arises

among those directly affected (González, 2010).

This resistance, starring brought about by a new generation of social movements, born out of the

growing inability of the state to mediate across social conflicts, emerged after the last two moments

of neoliberalization outlined above. According to Zibechi (2008:23), also because these processess

“dissolve and break down the forms of production and reproduction (territorial and symbolic), that

shaped their environment and everyday life”. In that sense, the new social movements share a

number of common features that, among other things, suggest the abandonment of state-centric

forms of organization and action, common in the period prior to neoliberalism.

Until the 1970s, at the same time of the beginning of the Pinochet era (Winn, 2006), the Latin

American social movements and organizations presented demands to the states, which consisted in

requiring them to meet their formal obligations. The actions of these movements include alliances

with other social sectors and political parties, with the idea of changing the balance of power at

national level. According to Zibechi:

Los objetivos finales se plasmaban en programas que orientaban la actividad estratégica de movimientos que se habían construído en relación a los roles estructurales de sus seguidores. En consecuencia la acción social perseguía el acceso al Estado para modificar las relaciones de propiedad, y ese objetivo justificaba las formas estadocéntricas de organización, asentadas en el

centralismo, la división entre dirigentes y dirigidos, y la disposición piramidal de la estructura de los

movimientos” (Ibid, 24).

During the nineties (the roll-out neoliberalism period), numerous mobilizations overthrew

governments in Ecuador and Argentina; Paraguay and Peru. Meanwhile, many privatization

processes were slowed down or delayed. In Mexico, this decade marks a breakthrough because of

the emergence of the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional), in 1994. In addition to the

social movement that arise along this particular guerrilla, there are many others whose origin is

directly related to neoliberal reforms. This is the case of the Consejo General de Huelga-CGH

(General Strike Council), a student movement organized against the increase of university fees, in

1999.

Zibechi (2008) notes at least seven common features that may be present in the new generation of

social movements in Latin America: 1) territorial roots; 2) search for autonomy; 3) revaluation of

culture; 4) own‟intellectual formation; 5) new role of women; 6) work organization and relationship

with nature; 7) forms of instrumental action. This characterization include many of the elements of

social movements that emerged from the 1990s in Latin America, but Chile's case remains an

exception. On the other hand, there are many other movements –like the CGH–, that do not fit very

well with the model.

Figure 2. Qualitative change in social movents

An interpretation of Zibechi‟s approach to new social movements. At

left we have the State Centeres Social Movements (SCSM) and at

right the New Generation of Social Movements (NGSM).

During the 90s, Chile was known for its economic success; its political stability and the maturity of

its population. (Lechner, 1997). In fact, since the mid-eighties and throughout the nineties, the rest

of Latin American countries considered Chile as a model, mainly with regard to education reform

(especially in higher education). As discussed below, the context of Structural Reforms enabled to

go beyond the "recipe" because it offered the possibility of creating a true epistemic community,

concentrated on building its own reform of education systems in a neoliberal key.

However, the Chilean “characteristic” social peace begins to show signs of exhaustion starting from

year 2000. After the civil insurrection that led to the resignation of Augusto Pinochet in 1990, Chile

experienced a period of relative stability, ended with high school students protest in 2006 (known as

the movement of the "penguins"), and more recently with the student demonstrations throughout

2011. The main demand of the students in both cases, is the transformation of the education system,

privatized since 1990, in a "public, free and quality" system.

Throughout the last year (and even today), mass media and some researchers have compared the

student demonstrations in Chile with the movement that shook Mexico City in 1999, brought about

by the CGH. The comparison is relevant because it allows to highlight two student movements that

are organized around the idea of a "free public education", but separated in time and logic of their

resistance. While the Consejo General de Huelga was of a conservative nature because it defended

the free education in a context of full dismantling of the public state apparatus, the Confederation of

Chilean Students (CONFECH) aimed at a radical policy change in an education system considered

"virtuous" until recently by the promoters of the HES reform in Latin America (Gonzalez, 2011).

Despite the distance in time and space, both social movements were organized demanding social and

democratic changes to their respective states. This fact is not obvious if we consider that Zibechi‟s

definition of the new generation of social movements has became mainstream in the literature,

leaving out the non-antisystemic movements. However, today there are many movements in Latin

America pushing for a wider and deeper democratization in their respective national contexts. This

movements, like in the case of Chile, are not antisystemic but antineoliberal. A comparative study of

the CGH in Mexico (1999) and the COFECH in Chile (2011), can shed some light on the

relationship between the neoliberalization process and social movements characteristics in Latin

America today.

II. - General aspects of neoliberal reform of Higher Education Systems (HES) in Chile and

Mexico

Since the late eighties, the Higher Education Systems (HES) in Latin America have experienced a

deep reform process, whose orientation corresponds to the guidelines of the Washington Consensus

(G. Casanova, 2001; Aboites, 2000). In general terms, this process has been characterized by a

profound redefinition of the role of the state with respect to HES (and the education system as a

whole), and by a main change in the functions and objectives of Higher Education Institutions

(HEI), in a context increasingly determined by market demands.

One of the most interesting aspect of this process is the homogeneity of educational policies in at

least 17 countries of the Subcontinent, although the reforms were presented as the product of

internal reflection of the ministries of education in each case.1 Another aspect worth noting is that,

invariably, the Chilean experience is a constant reference of educational authorities and specialists

dedicated to education, as a model for the reform process.

According to Gentili (1999), the homogeneity of these policies is the result of the expansion of the

same core of diagnoses and recommendations prepared by experts from, mostly, the World Bank

(WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Working groups formed by

1 Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haití, Honduras, Jamaica,

México, Panamá, República Dominicana, Uruguay y Venezuela (González, 2010)

these experts popularized a common discourse around the origin of what they identified as a crisis of

efficiency, effectiveness and productivity of the Latin American educational system, its culprits and,

of course, the measures to overcome it. The result was the deployment of a common policy, based

on heavy budget cuts, decentralization of the responsibilities of the State, and the centralization of

evaluation and certification (of institutions, curricula and individuals) in public and private

institutions.

With regard to Higher Education, experts and specialists agreed on an alleged discrepancy in the

amount of public resources allocated to this level, in contrast to what was intended at the basic level.

Also they criticized the fact that the HEI had grown "disproportionately" (especially during the

1970s), with respect to the educational quality. Finally, warn that public institutions with autonomy,

as well as those run by the state, have no relations with the world of work, so they reflect very

poorly the current market needs.

Based on this diagnosis, the main aspects of the reform of Higher Education Systems revolve

around three main axes (Gonzalez, 2010):

a) Funding: Replacing the public budget by an annual subsidy conditioned on institutional

quality. Own revenue generation through the sale of specialized services. Payment of the

actual cost of education by the educational service users (students, government and private

sector).

b) Quality of education: Promoting policy engagement with the private sector.Implementation

of evaluation policies of institutions and its curriculum; services and products, and

individuals. Encourage the growth of private provision of higher education. Supply

management of university education according to market needs.

c) Government and Autonomy: Decentralization of the great universities in smaller and

manageable units. Removal of the strong influence of politics in the life of HEI. New

contractual relations with employees of HEI.

Throughout the nineties, HES reform becomes a fundamental part of the agenda of Latin American

education ministers. At the time, there have been a number of agencies involving ministers of

education, university rectors and specialists who, together with experts from the international

banking centers control, analyze and reflect on the process of reform in Latin America.

In this context the Chilean experience is essential. Indeed, the military government led by Augusto

Pinochet (1973-1990), had carried out a thorough reform of Chile's educational system as part of the

broader transformation of the country into a market economy. In 1981, Pinochet almost completely

cut the budget for Higher Education, while the largest universities were divided into small "self-

financing" entities. This would be the beginning of a much more ambitious transformation (which

would include, inter alia, public subsidies to private education), later institutionalized by the

Constitutional Act of Teaching (LOCE), of 1990 (Núñez, 2000).

Regardless of the breakdown of the democratic order which meant the military coup of 1973, and

the serious human rights violations that enabled social discipline necessary to carry out these and

other reforms, experts have promoted the Chilean experience as a "model". However, in formally

democratic countries, governments have not been able to reform HES so easily. This is mainly due

to more or less chaotic development of institutions and authorities responsible for ensuring the

viability of the reform, but also to the social movements arising mainly against those reforms related

to changes in funding policies, like in the cases of Mexico, Colombia and recently Costa Rica

(Gonzalez, 2010: 28).

In Mexico, as we mentioned above, the last student movement of consideration was the Consejo

General de Huelga in the UNAM (National Autonomous University of Mexico), in 1999. The

relevance of this movement is related to the fact that the UNAM is the more important institution of

Higher Education in the country, and any change on it influence the transformation of the rest of the

HEI. It is important to say that a common feature among the successfully examples of reform on this

institution, has to do with the degree of awareness of the potentially affected in each case. Reforms

without significant reactions are also based in strong public promises that justify its implementation.

The private institution that controls the entrance to high school in Mexico (the CENEVAL), for

example, was presented as a mean to manage the quality and preparation of applicants. But the

empirical effects of these reforms are visible with the passage of time and –according with our

example–, the rejection of applicants today is clearly related to the lack of growth of the public

education and not with individual failure. The neoliberal reform to the HES in formal democracies

has at least two clear limits: a) political issues (context of policy making and organized opposition);

b) empirical effects (González, 2010).

In the case of Chile, after the 1981 “Ley General de Universidades” (General Universities Law), the

state get a subsidiary participation in education. In 1990, just months before the transition,

Pinochet‟s government promulgated the above mentioned, Ley General Constitucional de

Enseñanza –LOCE– (Constitutional Teaching Act). Through this law, the military establish certain

“moral” principles for the entire education system (no “militant” education; family centered

formation on elementary, etc.), and ensured the creation and development of a virtually private

Higher Education System. According with Urrua (2012), once the democracy was recovered:

[…] los nuevos gobiernos democráticos carecieron de la voluntad política para modificar el

ordenamiento neoliberal en el sistema educacional. Por el contrario, ahondaron el autofinanciamiento, como el llamado “financiamiento compartido”, en las escuelas públicas. Mientras tanto, en las universidades “estatales”, alrededor del 80% de su presupuesto dependía del autofinanciamiento.

During the 90s, the exponential growth of the enrollment in Higher Education was based

fundamentally on university loans from private banks. However, problems of this system became

apparent with the first graduates of the university, especially because of the high interest rates,

which basically were the profit of the private banking. Discontent among students and their families

began to surface when it became clear that private enrichment was being generated by a supposed

social policy.

III. - The student movements in Mexico (1999) and Chile (2011)

3.1. - The Consejo General de Huelga (General Strike CouncilCGH) in Mexico (1999)

In early 1999, the president of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Francisco

Barnes de Castro, expressed its willingness to reform the “Reglamento General de Pagos” (General

Payments Regulation), imposing fees for university enrollment, tests and services in an institution

until then free. Barnés justified the measure after the cut of 37% of the budget allocated to education

by the government in the same year (G. Ruiz, 2000).

It was not the first time that the university policy makers decided to reform the RGP. In 1986 and

1992, two rectores of the UNAM tried to do so, with disastrous results. The problem in both cases

was that they tried to reform the entire institution through one single decree, in response to the

government expenditure cuts that affected the UNAM in 1986, and with the alleged search for

educational quality improvement in 1992. The demonstrations of the “Consejo Estudiantil

Universitario-CEU” (Student Council), succeeded in suspending both reform processes (Guevara,

2009).

Unlike their predecessors, Barnes successfully became the reform package in his government

program for three years (1997-2000). Then gradually made progress in implementing key reforms in

the UNAM without opposition until 1999, when he decided to address the issue of the increase in

university fees. Assemblies were organized throughout the university after the announcement of

reforms to the RGP. Some weeks later, an emerging student movement held several massive

demonstration to make clear their opposition to the new fees, and require a public dialogue with

Barnés. But neither him nor the rest of the university authorities were willing to compromise and,

finally, on March 20th 1999, the University Council approved amendments to the RGP. A month

later, after the occupation of the entire university, the student movement was established as the

General Strike Council (CGH) of the UNAM. That same day the movement presented their

demands:

1. Repeal of Regulation of Payments

2. Repeal of the reforms approved by the University Council on June 9, 1997

3. A Democratic Congress to discuss the problems of the UNAM

4. End of the linkages between UNAM and CENEVAL

5. Elimination of political surveillance at UNAM. Cancellation of university and legal

sanctions against participants in the movement

6. Recovery of the school calendar

Although the main cause of the strike was the increase in fees, the student movement made further

demands that basically sought the cancellation of the reforms made so far by Barnes, as well as the

creation of one Congress to decide democratically the future of the UNAM (González , 2010:140-

142). This is the reason why during the early months of the conflict, the student movement

generated an unprecedented debate on the reform process to HES in Mexico, involving the main

political actors of the moment.

Since the beginning of the strike, the authorities showed that they were not willing to back down.

During the first two months they closed the possibility to carry out any dialogue with the student

movement, in fact they did not even recognize the CGH as a valid interlocutor for conflict

resolution. After unsuccessful meetings between the committee of the rectory and the student

movement, the university officials presented several versions of RGP that did not satisfy the

students demands.

On October 26, after a seven-month strike, the CGH organized a referendum which asked people

whether they agreed or not with the permanence of Barnes de Castro as head of the UNAM; and if

dialogue remained the only option to resolve the conflict. The issue of public dialogue had become

critical for the movement, because Barnés made clear his intentions of ask the government police

intervention to release the university. The response of the population, according to results presented

by CGH, was favorable to the movement.

On November 12 Barnes de Castro resigns and, five days later is replaced by Juan Ramon de la

Fuente. The new rector seems flexible and more willing to solve the conflict. In fact de la Fuente

speaks repeatedly about the need of "consensus" among members of the university. On December

10, after several meetings, the Commission authorities and the student movement delegates signed

an agreement where, in addition to the recognition of the CGH as the sole interlocutor for the

resolution of the conflict, both parties agreed to discuss one by one all the movement‟s demands.

Until that moment it seemed that the solution was close, in fact, the same day authorities publicly

acknowledged that the only way to resolve the conflict was through dialogue.

However, a day later, after a demonstration outside the U.S. Embassy, 98 students were arrested due

to provocations started by a group of infiltrators. Because of these facts CGH representatives did not

attend the meeting with the Committee, scheduled for the 12th, and three days later, university

officials said that the student movement had suspended talks for no reason.

During the rest of December negotiations were interrupted and the student movement became

involved in an internal discussion about the next move of the CGH. The failure of dialogue

strengthened the position of the strikers who were in favor of devoting CGH efforts only to planning

new demonstration. These actions, they said, would change the balance of power in favor of the

student movement. Around this discussion a rift between students 'ultras' (radical) and 'moderate'

emerged which caused a division of the Consejo General de Huelga.

Taking advantage of this situation, de la Fuente submitted a proposal to resolve the conflict, which

would be submitted to a plebiscite to the entire university community on January 20 2000.

Regardless of the Agreements of December 10, the new proposal of the rector imposed the RGP

suspension, withdrawal of proceedings and sanctions against strike participants (except criminal

sanctions), while the 1997 reforms would remain untouched until the creation of a University

Congress, after the end of the strike (Sotelo, 2000).

For the student movement the plebiscite meant the permanent loss of the initiative in the course of

event. In fact, in response to de la Fuente, the CGH announced a new referendum, this time about

the validity and fairness of the demands of the student movement and the legitimacy of CGH as sole

interlocutor for conflict resolution. The results of both consultations gave rise to a war of numbers in

which both the CGH and the university authorities were self declared winners. But the victory was

not decided through numbers, because the media campaign against the CGH and the division within

the movement weakened the strike.

The rector felt free to request the intervention of government when the CGH refused the results of

the plebiscite. On February 6, 2000, the Federal Police took Ciudad Universitaria (the main campus

of the UNAM), with a "special operation", described as "clean" by the Government and the

university authorities themselves. The UNAM returned to school on February 14 with more than a

thousand of students arrested, and the promise of a University Congress that has not been done get.

3.2.- The Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile (CONFECH)

Since 2006, with the high school students protests (the movimiento de los pingüinos), public

education had become a key issue for the Chilean student movement. After several negotiations with

the government of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010), the pingüinos achieved a constitutional

amendment to the Pinochet‟s LOCE (the Constitutional Teaching Act). With the new law, called

Ley General de Enseñanza (General Teaching Law), were imposed limits to the students

discrimination for economic reasons in all the educational institutions in the country. Additionally,

this law added more requirements for the creation of new private educational institutions.

Initially, this movement demanded the creation of free travel passes and the waiving of the

university admission test fee (called PSU), but with the increasing participation of students around

the country, the pingüinos decided to demand the repeal of the LOCE. This was the very first mass

protest movement after the democratic transition in 1990, and the largest since the Unidad Popular

demonstrations in1972. However, even if Bachelet‟s constitutional reform did not meet the student

demands, mobilizations were reduced to nothing because the movement leaders got stuck in

negotiation with the government.

In 2011, however, after the election of Sebastián Piñeira, the CONFECH (Confederation of Chilean

Students) begins to organize new demonstrations to demand the elected government an education

law that truly woud end the private educational system inherited from the dictatorship. According

with Urra (2012: 25), the first major action of this new university movement, was the occupation of

the Dirección Nacional de la Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y Becas –JUNAEB– (Direction of

the Educational Assistance and Scholarships). Through this occupation, the CONFECH denounced

the failure of the scholarships system. After a massive demonstration on April 29, the Chilean

students presented their demands. Considering the many variations throughout the organization

process, it can be said that the substantial exigencies are grouped in three main guidelines:

1. Funding. Increase state involvement in education funding, until a complete cover of the real

costs of education.

2. Democratization. Ensure the participation of the collegiate bodies in the election of

University Presidents. Freedom of expression; academic freedom and freedom of association

for the students, teachers and workers.

3. Equity and Quality. Ensuring access to Higher Education without discrimination. Ensuring

equal opportunities for all the students.

For Núñez (2012), this demonstration was the key for the future success of the student movement

for three reasons. First, there was a high level of coordination among the students to reach common

agreements, demands, and actions in all over the country. Second, it was the first time that the

College of Professors (Colegio de Profesores) participated in this kind of demonstrations with their

own demands (mainly related to wage but also with academic freedom). Third, with the inclusion of

the educational issue on the national agenda, the CONFECH questioned the Constitution of 1980

and the democratic transition (Urra: 27).

Without any positive reaction from the government, the CONFECH –this time together with the

Colegio de Profesores–, called for a new demonstration on May 12. Given the silence of the mass

media, the student movement developed an important communication strategy through social

networks (mostly Twitter and Facebook), gathering fifty thousand people in the streets only in

Santiago. In all the demonstrations that followed, the students created “a party in the streets” (Urra:

28) with music, dancing, performance and costumes, gaining the sympathy of the population. This

way of protesting constitutes a break with the seriousness of the traditional leftist demonstrations in

Chile.

Days later, the leaders of CONFECH had a meeting with officials of the Ministerio de Educación –

MINEDUC- (Chilean Education Department), with the aim to present their demands and solicit the

students the participation in a national strike organized by the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores

(United Workers Confederation). This was the beginning of a very important process of

convergence between the student movement and other social actors that led, months later, to a more

general struggle for the country‟s democratization.

However, despite the successful organization of the CONFECH and the massive demonstrations,

students began to dissent within the movement after a meeting with the Minister of Education in

early June. The main problem was mainly the absence of the particular demands on regional schools

and universities, unlike the metropolitan institutions.

According with part of the movement heads, national leaders were giving no importance to local

demands in the negotiations. For Urra (Ibid: 30), “[…] esta diferencia se iría diluyendo, dando paso

a una diferencia de orden político, centrada en cómo conducir y hacia dónde llevar el movimiento”.

This conflict led to a division between “ultras” (radicals) –Anarchist, Marxist and Autonomist–; and

“moderados” (moderates), basically from the Chilean Communist Party (PC). Despite having the

media attention, the ultras had no influence on the assemblies and, in general, in the students

decisions, but these differences along with other factors eventually weakened the movement.

During the first months of conflict, the government seemed to have lost the initiative. However,

according to Núñez and Urra, they tried to push the movement toward radical actions, denying

permission to hold demonstrations, and subsequently sending police to face the students. With this

actions the recently elected government of Piñeira won the sympathy of the most radical sectors of

the Chilean right, who had been complaining about the lack of government‟s determination in

maintaining the public order. However the demonstrations, were maintained throughout the month

of June and July this time with a growing participation of the population not directly related with the

students.

The movement begins a defining stage after the government‟s announcement of the “Gran Acuerdo

Nacional por la Educación” (National Agreement for Education), basically based on a four million

dollars increase in the education budget. The government invited the CONFECH to negotiate the

end of the conflict, but the students rejected this initiative because “did not solve the structural

problem of the educational system” (Ibid: 33). The Minister of Education, Joaquín Lavín, resigned

after being declared an “invalid interlocutor” by the CONFECH.

During the following months, the students held several demonstrations that invariably ended up with

clashes against the police. After nearly a year, the movement was worn-out and the internal

differences were increasingly difficult to hide. To regain initiative the CONFECH organized the

“Plesbiscito Nacional por la Educación” (National Plebiscite for Education), in which more than a

million Chileans participated in all over the country. After this display of organizational capacity,

the Confederation decided to suspend movement's actions and initiate a process of internal reflection

that ended in 2012.

The student movement had some successes although they did not achieve a radical reform of the

national education system (Urra, 2012: 36). First, the interest rates of the student loans decreased

significantly. Second, the movement puts education at the center of political debate, although it was

not part on the agenda neither of Concertation governments (left) nor the official right. Finally,

according with Núñez (2012) the students achieved the breaking of the dominant neoliberal

consensus in Chilean society.

3.3.- Similarities and differences between the Chilean and Mexican student movement

For a general comparison between the student movement in Mexico (1999) and Chile (2011), it is

necessary to consider at least two elements: a) the goals and the context; b) the organization forms.

a) The goals and the context. As we mentioned above, recently some journalists have compared the

current Chilean student movement with the Mexican CGH. A common feature in these kind of

comparisons is the alleged radicality of the CONFECH, similar to the Mexican movement in 1999.

However, according with Salazar (2011), the Chilean movement was even more radical than the

CGH because was not asking for changes in a given institution but in the entire educational model.

Actually, even if both movements were organized around the demand of “free and public

education”, the CGH defended the free character of the UNAM, threatened by a particular reform,

while the CONFECH, was pushing to attain a new educational legislation, different from the semi-

private system created by the Pinochet‟s Junta and mantained during the governments of

Concertation.

At this point it is clear that the main difference is related to the HES reform context. The opposition

of the CGH to the tuition fees reform became a fight in order to reverse previous changes, as well as

the “democratic” transformation of the UNAM. However, with the passage of time was difficult to

keep this position before the non-striker students and the public opinion, because the CGH was

worn-out, divided and negatively perceived. This partly explains why people accepted the proposal

of Juan Ramón de la Fuente, that repealed RGP but left intact the rest of the reform.

The case of Chile is paradigmatic for the characteristics of its process of neoliberalization. The

combination of social discipline and economic advice from Chilean and American intellectuals

trained in Chicago School (without mentioning the personal assistance of Milton Friedman to

Pinochet), were necessary to create an unprecedented market based HES system (and an entire

educational system). However, after the transition, the social discipline was removed, leaving room

to a flimsy “neoliberal consensus” (Núñez, 2012: 62), hard to sustain in the appearance of the first

contradictions in the educational system (students debt and educational inequality).

b) The organization forms. The organization of the Consejo General de Huelga was designed

against individual leaderships in order to implement a radical democracy. The CGH was constituted

of 40 assemblies of schools, colleges and research institutes of the UNAM. Each assembly had five

votes that were used in the plenary Council to define numerically the agreements, after discussing

each item on the agenda. To dialogue with the university authorities, the CGH created a committee

made up of 120 delegates (three per assembly), from which 12 were chosen to discuss with

representatives of the rector.

This particular way of organization was not only a response to the decision making tradition in the

UNAM, but also because of the past experience of the “Consejo Estudiantil Universitario” –CEU–

(Student Council), the organization that led the student movement in 1986 and 1992. The leaders of

this organization were responsible for the negotiations with the university authorities and made

fundamental decisions without consulting the rest of the student movement. The student groups who

were not represented in the top leadership of CEU, denounced these negotiations as fraudulent and

become independent since.

With these features the movement succeeded in broadening the discussion and the decision making

process to all the university students. It is worth noting that the core of the assemblies were the

various political organizations that have coexisted for years at the UNAM, and the mechanism of

representation ensured that none of these organizations took the leadership of the CGH. However,

the artificial lengthening of the conflict caused the exit of many students, exacerbating the political

differences between the organizations, seriously compromising the student movement.

In the case of Chile, a main characteristic of the student movement has to do with the permanence

and stability of the CONFECH (Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile). This confederation has 25

years of history, and is heir of the United Federation of Chile University (UFUCH), a political

organization of the sixties, and the National Confederation of University Students (CNEU) in the

forties. At first, the CONFECH was born to organize the participation of the university students in

the struggle for democratization in Chile. But since the mid-nineties was organized to promote

changes in the Higher Education System.

The CONFECH, brings together more than 25 state and private HEI. Unlike the CGH, the Chilean

student movement had a clear leadership, elected and recognized to carry out the agreements and the

negotiations with the government. After the mobilizations of 2006, the CONFECH coordinates with

Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios, the CES (Secondary Student Coordinator). This

coordination has allowed the student movement to demand changes throughout the whole education

system effectively. It is also important to mention that during the last months of 2011, the student

movement was deliberately seeking to "become a social movement, through their participation in the

struggle for the democratization and welfare of the country along with other actors" (Vallejo, 2012).

Table 1. General comparative approach to CGH and the CONFECH.

Both the CGH and the CONFECH were student movements that demanded changes to the state and

had troubled relationships with the political class. In the case of CGH, following Zibechi (2008) it

can be said that this was indeed a student movement in transition between state-centrism and self

organization, but it would be wrong to say that the radicalism prevalent during the last stage of the

movement was only the result of CGH‟s composition. The inflexibility of the university authorities

and the government, the negative media campaign against the CGH, and police infiltration also

played an important role in the development of events. On the other hand, according with Núñez,

despite the deep criticism of the practices of the traditional political class, and the distrust of the

representative institutions of the political system, the Chilean student movement had to question its

way of relating to the state, the institutionality and the political parties.

IV.- Conclusions (work to do)

1.- The adaptation of Tickell and Kell (2005) neoliberalization model for the cases of Chile and

Mexico could be useful for projecting a comparative diagram of the neoliberalization process in

other countries of the region. A scheme of this nature would also be useful to track the reform

process to HES in Latin America.

2.- The new generation of social movements is not only related with antisystemic forms, but also

with struggles for democratization. In fact, as we can see from the Chilean case, anti-neoliberal not

necessary mean antisystemic. According to several researchers (G. Casanova, 2000; Fazio, 2001; G.

Ruíz, 2000), in the case of the Mexican CGH it became clear that the greater demands of the student

movement was the democratization of the UNAM. Ultimately, it is possible to identify two main

streams of social movements in Latin America, one antisystemic, and another that focuses on the

deepening of the current political crisis and the emergence of a democratic and multi-class

movement (Núñez, Ibid: 68). The main coincidence between these two trends is its antineoliberal

nature.

3.- In Mexico the HES reform is showing signs of exhaustion at the level of its public promises.

Many of the reforms that were approved years ago have had unsatisfactory results. This is the case

of the enlargement of coverage of the university through private offer; the objectivity of the external

evaluators agencies; the relevance of the content linked to changing market needs, etc. It is

necessary to conduct a comparative study of HES reform process in other Latin American countries,

to gain a better understanding of the state of reform in the subcontinent. From the Chilean case, we

believe that there are considerable differences between the reform undertaken in formally

democratic countries and those countries which had military governments since the 1970s.

4.- Chile, meanwhile, offers a unique opportunity to study the reform of the HES, “as it should be”,

considering the depth and radical nature of the changes performed in this country. On the one hand,

it is possible to analyze the empirical results of specific policies (for example the “educational

voucher”), that are part of the reform programs of other governments in the region. On the other

hand, it is important to pay attention to the way in which the current educational conflict will be

resolved, because it is likely that this experience will determine the political choices of regional

decision makers in similar situations. The increasing violence during the demonstrations in the last

months is not a good sign.

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