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Research to Establish the Partnership between Practice and Education/Research in Peacebuilding and Capacity Development
平和構築の能力開発における実務と教育研究の連携を確立するための研究
Hiroshima University Partnership Projectfor Peacebuilding and Capacity Development
(HiPeCⅡ)
広島大学平和構築連携融合事業
HiPeC Discussion Paper Series Vol.9
Reflection on Muslim Minority’ s Demands in “New Nepal”Humayun Kabir
Postdoctoral Research FellowHiPeC, Hiroshima University
Email: [email protected]
March 31, 2011
HiPeC Discussion Paper Series Vol.9
Reflection on Muslim Minority’s Demands in “New Nepal”
Humayun Kabir
Postdoctoral Research Fellow
HiPeC, Hiroshima University
Email: [email protected]
March 31, 2011
No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form or any means without written
permission from author.
2
HiPeC Discussion Paper
Reflection on Muslim Minority’s Demands in “New Nepal”
Humayun Kabir
Postdoctoral Research Fellow
HiPeC, Hiroshima University
Introduction
After the end of decade long violent Maoist movement in Nepal1, the discourse of “naya Nepal”
or “new Nepal” become popular among academic intelligentsia, politicians, civil society
members and common peoples as well. The drastic political changes in recent years such as
abolition of century-long autocratic monarchism, proclamation of secularism and democracy in
state ideology and restructuring the state from unitary to federal system are the expressions of a
new state in Nepal, which is expected to be equal and neutral for all citizens irrespective of their
social, cultural, religious and regional divisions. The political stability and peace in the country,
therefore, much depends on to what extent the new state of Nepal would be able to address and to
implicate these changes, which eventually would affect 28 million population of the country who
are extremely diversified in terms of their ethnicity, language and religion. The political changes
in recent years have given opportunity to many socially underprivileged communities and
minority groups, who were historically suppressed by the dominant Hindu caste groups for long,
to be more vocal in demanding their equal citizenship rights and recognition. On this backdrop,
the process of the formation of a new state become more complicated and challenging primarily
due to different political agendas and demands place by different communities and ethnic groups.
This paper attempts to shed light on the Muslim community in Nepal, who constitute 4.2 percent
of the total population. It explicates the issues the Muslims put forward for gaining more equal
Acknowledgment: This paper would have been impossible without the generous funding support from the
Hiroshima University Partnership Project for Peacebuilding and Capacity Building (HiPeC). I would like to
thank all the members of HiPeC, especially Prof. Osamu Yoshida, Chair, HiPeC and Prof. Masahiko
Togawa, Hiroshima University. I would like to thank Prof. Pancha N. Maharjan, CNAS, Tribhuvan
University (TU), Mr. Zahid Parwez, Lecturer, CERID, TU for their kind cooperations.
1 The Maoist insurgency lasted for a decade, from 1996 to 2006, and led to the death of more than 13,000
peoples. There are many literatures about the causes and consequences of the movement. As for the latest,
see Lawoti and Pahari (2010)
3
rights of citizenship. The paper contends that if the socially underprivileged and minority groups’
demands and rights are not addressed in the present state building process, new form of conflict
may arise or the prevailing conflict (such as identity and region-based movement) may gain
momentum. The aim of the paper, therefore, is to generate policy level discussion about the rights
and demands of those communities and groups who are socially underprivileged. The discussion
generated here is based on several field-trips in Kathmandu valley during which I have visited
several socio-religious and political organizations of the Muslims, interviewed a number of
Muslim community leaders and collected textual documents.
Discrimination theories and challenges of state building in Nepal
Various challenges needs to be resolved in the process of formation of stable and accepted Nepali
state. One of the most challenging issues is Nepali state must be socially and politically inclusive.
The demand for inclusive nature of the state is largely derived from the continued discrimination
policies of the state towards a large number of caste, ethnic and minority groups. There are three
dominant theories, which are equally important and closely interlinked each other in Nepal: 1)
theory on caste and ethnic discriminations, 2) theory on social and cultural exclusions and 3)
theory on regional discrimination. Ethnic movements, region-based political movements, identity
politics and small scale arms movements (even after the peace accord)2 are considered to be
caused by such discrimination persistence in Nepali society. These theories are to be seriously
considered in order to achieve a durable, stable and peaceful state and political environment in
Nepal. The contribution of Muslim community as well as other ethnic and religious communities’
movement needs to be examined in light with these theories. Nevertheless, there are many other
issues for peace and state building process such as integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist’s
combatants, promulgation of a new statute that needs to be accepted equally to all groups and
communities, transformation of the Maoist party as a mainstream political party and formation of
the nature of federal states. Even though many political issues as such could be resolved, conflict
in Nepal may return in different forms or in existing forms with further strength if the
discrimination and exclusion theories are not addressed properly. Muslims as well as other ethnic
and indigenous nationalities (adibasi janajatis) and low-caste communities (such as Dalit) have
2 Bhatt and Murshed (2009:121) mentioned that more than two dozens new armed groups particularly in
the Tarai/Madhes (Southern plain regions of the country) area have been emerged after signing of the peace
accord with the Maoist.
4
historically been limited access to state, resources and powers. Thereby, political, social and
cultural demands of the Muslims are to be considered equally with other ethnic and social groups.
Muslim community in Nepal and their geographic spread
Muslims in Nepal are historically originated from Indian subcontinent, mainly from India, and
from Tibet. The later group of Muslims migrated from Tibet, especially after Chinese takeover in
1959, along with their Tibetan Buddhist counterpart (Sharma 2004:110). Among the Indian
originated Muslims, Muslims from Kashmir, of who most were merchant dealers, are believed to
be the first settlers who began to settle in Kathmandu valley from fifteenth century, long before
the establishment of unification of Nepal. The Kashmiri Muslims claimed themselves as the
descendents of the Prophet and his Companions and thereby, prefer to place themselves in the
upper fold of Muslim hierarchy. They claimed themselves as asraf (noble or great, refer to those
who claim themselves as descendents of Arab origin) as compared to converted Muslims or
Muslims from different ethnic origins such as Tibetan Muslims. Other Muslims, who migrated
from the northern part of India, are known as ‘Hindustani Muslims’. The bipolar division between
asraf and non-asraf or between Kashmiri and Hindustani Muslims has social, cultural and
religious implications. For instance, during my fieldwork I found that there are two separate
mosques in the Kathmandu valley within a few meter distances: the Kashmiri mosque and the
Nepal Jame Masjid, in which Hindustani Muslims attend. The Kashmiri mosque was the oldest
one and the Hindustani mosque was established in later period when the split between asraf and
non-asraf Muslims or Kashmiri and Hindustani Muslims began to increase. However, the social
cleavage between the Kashmiri and Hindustani Muslims has been furthered due to difference
religious and denominational orientations. The Kashmiris are the followers of Barelwi tradition3,
which practice Sufi cult and veneration of Muslim mausoleum. On the other hand, the Hindustani
Muslims, who constitute the local converts and migrants of northern India, are against the
Barelwi tradition. Many of them are in favor of orthodox tenets of Islam such as Deobandi4 and
3 Barelwi followers are associated with the nineteenth century’s Sufi Ahmad Riza Khan of India. The
followers of Riza Khan are also known as Ahle-Sunnat wal Jamaat (the group of followers of the tradition
of the prophet).
4 Unlike the Barelwi the Deobandi denominational group, which is founded on Darul Uloom Deoband’s (a
Islamic religious founded in 1866 in northern India) thought of school, claim the veneration of Sufi cult as
“unauthentic” in Islam.
5
Ahl-i-Hadith5. Some of them are engaged in mobilizing Islam as a tool of breaking the social
hierarchy within Muslims. As Gaborieau (1996: 44) also observed that lower caste Muslim
people in Nepal competes for to be better Muslim in order to reduce the hierarchal distance with
the asraf Muslims who claim themselves better Muslim. I have also found that Muslims from
different ethnic origins including the converted Muslims from the lower fold of Hindu caste
hierarchy are strong follower of orthodox tenets of Islam. One of the reasons is the migration
phenomenon of many low caste Hindu community peoples in the Middle Eastern countries. Of
them, some converted to Islam and became strict follower of Islam. The Islami Sangh, which is
often accused as the ‘fundamentalist’ Muslim organization, in reality, engage in mobilizing Islam
through religious training and preaching and social development works with a view to reduce the
hierarchal distance within the Nepali Muslim community. For instance, they provide shelter for
those converted Muslims who lost their familial, social and cultural ties as well as economic
support from their ethnic and religious origin. Islami Sangh has close association with the
Hindustani mosque or Nepali Jame Masjid in which their follower often organizes religious
sermons and preaching. Therefore, Islamization functions as an important tool for asserting
religious identity for many Muslims. It can be seen as a collective assertion of some Muslims
against the cultural dominance of upper caste Hindu peoples, which represent national culture.
However, religious identity cannot take precedence against the regional identity such as Madhesi
peoples in which all socially underprivileged communities and groups irrespective of their
religions and ethnicity rally against the dominant pahadi (hill) peoples.
Table-1: Population distribution in Nepal by religion and development regions, 2001.
Area Religions
Total Hindu Buddhist Islam Kirat Jain Christian Sikh Bahai Others
Nepal 22736934 18330121 2442520 954023 818106 4108 101976 5890 1211 78994
Eastern 5286890 3778026 420285 216514 792374 2146 29280 3038 537 44690
Central 7988612 6100467 1339440 455714 25020 1440 46181 1090 278 18982
Western 4571013 3823669 533468 186180 433 287 13662 1262 67 11985
Mid
West
2707244 2475898 130712 91339 96 120 6763 353 102 1876
Far
West
2183175 2152061 18615 4276 183 115 6090 147 227 1461
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (2009)
5 Ahl-i Hadith (followers of prophetic tradition) is considered to be more orthodox version, which prefers
the Koran and Prophetic tradition and denied all other sources as authentic guide for Muslims.
6
Besides the Kashmiri Muslims, who constitute a very small part, Muslims in Nepal can be
classified in two groups on the basis of their regional distribution: 1) Hill Muslims and 2) Tarai
Muslims. Hill Muslims who are living for century after century in the hill districts are
indistinguishable with their Hindu neighborhood. Out of 55 hill district, their presence can be
found in 48 districts, though their presence is prominent only in some Western and Central hill
district. These Muslims are traditionally engaged with bangle making (churi) and known as
Churaote (Bangle maker). They are not recognized as Muslims in state’s census and are placed as
a separate caste group (Dastider 2007:96-7). On the other hand, the Tarai Muslims represent 96
percent of the total Muslim population in Nepal who are more akin to their religious identity than
any other group of Muslims living in Kathmandu and hill districts.
Social and cultural discrimination against Muslims
According to the caste hierarchy in Nepal, Muslims are placed in the low-caste group as impure
(mlechha). However, they are placed in the upper fold at the bottom of the caste hierarchy in
which Dalits are placed as acchhut (untouchable). Muslims including all other foreigners and
communities of different religions are considered as the pani na chalne or ‘water-unacceptable
peoples’ (DFID & World Bank 2006:6). The impure status “in the caste hierarchy made the
Muslims acquire an insignificant minority character, who remained alienated from the national
mainstream for the most part of the time.” Only in the post-1990s, when the multi-party
democracy was introduced and multi-cultural identity has been recognized, Muslims in Nepal
began to “assert their distinctive religious identity as enfranchised and equal citizens” (Dastider
2007:88). The Muslim community in Nepal is also influenced by the hierarchy of Hindu caste
system, though the hierarchy is not based on ritual pollution and purity. Rather, the hierarchy is
based on social occupation. Within Muslims there are several occupational groups, which are
considered as lower social groups. For instance, the Mochi, Dafaali, Natuwa, Dharkar, Pattharkat
and Halalkhor are considered the low caste groups within the Nepali Muslim community.
However, in many cases, Muslims are also endogamous (Thapa 1995:79).
7
Table-2: Educational attainment (percent) by caste and ethnicity in Nepal
Never attended Grades 1-4 Grades 5-10 SLC and above
Hill Brahman/Chhetri 31.6 24.6 33.7 10.1
Tarai Brahman/Chhetri 26.6 25.6 29.6 18.2
Tarai middle castes 56.8 22.0 17.4 3.8
Hill Dalits 43.3 31.9 23.1 1.7
Tarai Dalits 76.4 14.9 7.5 1.2
Newars 28.5 20.8 27.6 23.0
Hill Janajatis 44.6 27.2 25.2 3.0
Tarai Janajatis 47.2 24.1 24.2 4.5
Muslims 62.4 24.9 11.0 1.7
Nepal 44.0 24.7 24.6 6.7
Source: Nepal Living Standard Survey II (cited in DFID & World Bank 2006: 28)
Note: SLC-School Leaving Certificate
The impure status of Muslims in Nepali caste hierarchy contributed them to be remained as a
socially underprivileged community. State’s policies were historically in favor of upper castes of
hill areas, and consequently Muslims like other lower caste and ethnic groups were deliberately
discriminated, suppressed and excluded from social and political participation. The situation has
not been changed significantly till today. Educational attainment among Muslims, the important
indicator for upward social mobility, is still far behind than the average national attainment. As
shown in table-2, more than 62 percent Muslims have never attended any form of schooling,
higher than the Dalits from hill area (43.3 percent). Limited educational attainment continues to
strengthen the marginalization process among Muslims in Nepal.
Emergence of Political Consciousness and Identity Politics
Like other ethnic and minority groups in Nepal, Muslims gradually become conscious about their
collective identity, minority status, social and political rights. They also contributed to change the
dominant political discourse in Nepal. They also showed solidarity to those movements that
aimed to democratize Nepal. However, the emergence of their identity and political
consciousness should be considered in terms of three major political and historical backdrops
through which the Nepali state has been transformed over the course of history: 1) the party-less
Panchayat era (1960-1990) 2) post-1990 multi-party era and 3) the aftermath of peace accord
(2006).
Muslims’ political consciousness began to emerge from 1950s. They also showed their solidarity
against anti-Rana regime’s movements in 1950-51. After Rana regime, one of the earliest
8
organizations of Muslims, All Nepal Anjuman Islah, was formed with a view to uplift the overall
social status of the Muslims. In the short-lived democratic period in late 1950s, Muslims also
contested in the general election of 1959, though none of them had won. However, it was the first
political engagement of the Muslims in modern Nepal. When Panchayat system, the party-less
autocratic regime was introduced by King Mahendra (r. 1954-1973), Muslims in Nepal was in a
dilemma. The legal code of 1963 introduced by the King prohibited the century old cast based
discrimination and the Muslims gained an equal citizen status; however, they maintained a low
social, cultural, political and economic status. In this period, many Muslims entered to the village
level leadership in the Panchayat era. The Muslims who were closely associated with King and
his party-less Panchayat system began to affirm their identity as Nepali, insisting on wearing the
Nepali dress and speaking Nepali (Gaborieau1996: 44). In that sense, the political engagement
of the Muslims and their affirmation towards national identity in Nepal (promoted in Panchayat
regime) began to emerge from 1960s. In later period, in the context of growing resentment
against Panchayat system, many Muslims began to oppose the party-less regime. For instance,
Muslim Seva Samiti (Organization for Muslim Service), an organization for disseminating
religious preaching formed in 1974, had ‘openly mobilised Muslim public opinion in favour of
continuing with the partyless Panchayat system as against the popular movement for restoring
multiparty democracy’ (Dastider 2007: 104-5).
Nepalization was promoted by the state during Panchayat era. Although Nepalization influenced
many Muslims to assert their identity as being Nepali, it also paradoxically influenced
Islamization process among them. Since the Nepali identity that is built upon one language, one
nation, one culture and one religion, ignored all other minority and ethnic identity, Islamization
played an important role to make many Muslims conscious about their own culture, identity,
language and religion. The emergence of such consciousness continued to rise through which
Muslims in Nepal began to seek their own cultural and religious identity in parallel with their
Nepali identity. In the post-1990 multi-party democratic era, such issues have been transformed
to political agendas along with other ethnic and minority communities in Nepal.
The “explosion of ethnicity” emerged in the post-1990 era6. In this period, political movement of
the marginalized and minority groups was gaining grounds, which seeks to resist the
homogenization process of the Panchayat era. The violent movement of the Maoist, which began
to proliferate in this period, had captured well all the issues raised by ethnic minorities and
6 For a greater details on the rise of ethnic politics in Nepal, see Hangen (2010)
9
socially underprivileged communities. Some Muslims, though not substantial in number,
associated with the Maoist insurgency. Although multi-party democracy was reinstalled in this
period, but the Nepali state remained ‘Hindu state’ and could not meet the demands of many
ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups. The dominance of pahadi (hill) Hindus remained
unchanged. The identity politics began to emerge from different marginalized communities.
Muslims also began to unite in order to promote their agendas and issues. For instance, Nepal
Muslim Ettehad Organization (NMEO) was formed in the year of 1990 in order to unite Muslims
from all over the country and to make them politically conscious about their rights. According to
the current President of the organization, who is also a central member of CPN-UML, NMEO
was formed in such a context when many other marginalized community peoples began to start
movement for their own rights and recognition, just after the introduction of multi-party
democracy system in Nepal. Over the course, NMEO began to demand for the abolition of Hindu
monarchy and argued for the establishment of secularism in different forms of public agitation
and protests. At present the organization is operating as a Muslim political wing of CPN-UML,
which has branches and committees in almost all over the country.7 What is significant that post-
1990 era gave the Muslims to be conscious not only about their political rights but also about
their religious freedom and cultural practices. In addition to the assertion of their religious
identity, they began to conscious about their equal citizenship and thereby, put forward their
issues with an aim to change the dominant political and social structure in Nepal.
In post-peace accord era (after 2006), when the Maoist was brought to mainstream political arena,
many Muslims began to associate with different political groups. Formation of Muslim Sangh
Nepal (Muslim Association Nepal), the Muslim political wing of National Congress, Muslim
Mukti Morcha (Muslim Liberation Front), the Maoist wing for Muslims, Rastriya Muslim Manch
(National Muslim Organization), which does not belong to any political group, are the examples
of increasing social and political consciousness of the Muslims. These organizations, in one way
or other, contributed to bring forth Muslim demands in negotiation table of the formation of new
Nepali state.
7 Interview with Mahmud Alam, President, Nepal Muslim Ettehad Organization, Central Committee
Member, CPN-UML and Former Parliament Member, November 21, 2010, Kathmandu.
10
Muslims’ demands in future Nepali state
Many Muslims hold the belief that at present Nepal is in a transition situation to attain peace and
stability. For them, it is the best time to pursue for their rights and demands and they are
constantly putting forward their agendas through different forums and organizations. Their
demands and rights can be thematized as in the following.8
Recognition of identity and equal citizenship
Muslims who were considered as “secondary citizen” and “Indian origin” peoples by the
dominant Hindu ruling class are now united for their identity recognition as being “Nepali
Muslim”. They demand the constitutional recognition of their identity. Earlier constitution of
Nepal did not proclaim that the Muslims living in Nepal are part of Nepalese population. As one
Muslim community leader assert that:
The Muslim community demands that they should be constitutionally recognized as
‘Nepalese Muslim community’…the fundamental demand is Muslims should be included
in the constitution. They should be recognized as part of Nepali people. Indeed, we are
Nepalese. It is a secondary matter that whether we are Muslims or not, or whether we
belong to any other religious community. In the past, there had no single word in the
constitution about the Muslims of Nepal.9
Moreover, many Muslims, especially from Tarai/Madhes region have been facing citizenship
problem. The constitution of 1990 significantly restricted citizenship for many peoples, especially
for those who failed to produce proper document about their land ownership. Many landless
peoples including Muslims were not able to acquire citizenship certificate due to legal barriers.
According to estimation in 1995, a total number of 3.4 million people, of whom many were
Muslim, did not have their citizenship paper. The discourse of “Indian origins” also affected the
right to gain citizenship (DFID & World Bank 2006:5). Muslims demands the abolition of such
discriminatory policies about citizenship.
8 The thematic categorization of the discussion in this part is made on the basis of the written petitions
submitted to the government of Nepal by different Muslim socio-political organizations. These documents
were translated from Nepali to English.
9 Interview with Abdul Sattar, President, Muslim Sangh Nepal, Nov 14, 2010.
11
Social upliftment
Many Muslims are increasingly in opinion that their social and economic underprivileged
conditions are caused by the state’s oppressive policy towards them. In the process of redefining
the role of the state, Muslims are demanding that their social upliftment should be promoted by
the new state. They demand for special provision for social advancement such as special quota
system for Muslim students in higher education. They demand that state should form a Muslim
Commission to supervise the state promoted social advancement programs for them. They argue
that Dalit Commission and Women Commission have already been formed by the state. Since
Muslims are equal to Dalit in terms of many social indicators, a Commission should be formed
for them also. Moreover, most of the Muslims prefer to study in madrasa (Islamic religious
schools/seminaries) system of education, which is not recognized by the state. They want
government be recognized madrasa system of education so that many madrasa graduate Muslim
can have more employment opportunity in public sectors. They contend that most of the state
bodies are dominated by upper Hindu castes, although they represent a partial portion of Nepali
population. They insist that their representation in state bodies and other public sectors should be
determined on the basis of proportion of their population.
Recognition & granting religious rights
After relinquish of Hindu state and Hindu monarchism, Muslims began to demand for their
religious rights and freedom with stronger voice. The present secular state of Nepal gives them to
be more vocal for their religious rights. They argue that most of the public holidays were given on
the occasion of Hindu religious festivals and holidays for other religious groups were not given.
They demand public holidays for their religious festivals. For instance, Nepal Muslim Ettehad
Organization (NMEO) organized country wide protest for demanding public holidays on the
occasion of religious festivals. Muslims also demand for the establishment of Hajj (annual
pilgrimage to Mecca) Committee in order to facilitating logistic support for those who are willing
to go to Mecca for annual pilgrimage. They argue that due to lack of logistic support by the state,
Muslims have been facing difficulties while making pilgrimage. In many countries, state bodies
provide logistic support for their nationals who go to pilgrimage and therefore, the Nepali
Muslims also want such support from the state. Moreover, many Muslims deem that they should
have Muslim family law and state should allow the Muslims to maintain some family matters
(such as marriage, divorce, inheritance etc.) according to their religious principles and ethos.
12
Rights to proportional political representation
Muslims are politically underrepresented. They demand proportional representation in political
parties. For instance, Nepal Muslim Sangh, which is a sister organization of Nepali National
Congress, put forward a petition to the party demanding an amendment in the party constitution
in order to allow all castes, communities, ethnic and religious groups including Muslims to have
their representation on the basis of inclusive democracy.10
Such demand aims to reduce the
dominance of the high caste Hindu peoples’ representation in major political parties. Besides the
proportional inclusion in political parties, Muslims also demand their rightful political
representation in the state. Many believe that state policies towards Muslims were discriminatory
due to lack of political representation of Muslims in state.
State’s restructure for development
Although lay Muslims are not much inform about the expected transformation and restructure of
the state, many educated and politically concern Muslims are well informed about it. However,
their view differs on their political polarization and regional association. The Muslims from Tarai
region, especially those who are associated with Tarai-based political parties, are all united in
demanding federal states in Nepal. Many other do not understand the consequences of
restructuring the political state. What is important to many of them is that any changes in the state
should be aimed at social and regional development. Muslims are not in favor of ethnic
federalism. They consider that federalism on the basis of ethnic majority would further
minoritized them. Others assert that ‘federalism for development’ should be the basis of the
states.11
Many Muslims view that if federalism is drawn on the basis of ethnic majority, dominant
castes and ethnic groups will rule again the groups and community who have been marginalized
for long in Nepali history. Moreover, they consider that a new constitution, which would be
inclusive in nature, is necessary for meeting their rights, freedom and recognition of identity, as
asserted by a Muslim political leader in the following.
Who does need the constitution here? The constitution is needed for those people who
have been exploited, oppressed, suppressed and neglected for long. We [Muslims] need
the constitution. It is needed for the Muslim community, Madhesi peoples, Dalit
10
According to the written petition submitted to the Chairman of NC.
11 Interview with Abdul Sattar, President, Nepal Muslim Sangh, Nov 14, 2010.
13
community, Indigenous nationalities (janajatis, adibasi) etc. The ruling peoples do not
need the constitution.12
Such discourse reflects that proclamation of new constitution is expected to provide greater
opportunity for all socially discriminated and underprivileged peoples including Muslims, in
redefining the role of dominant ruling class in Nepali society.
Conclusion: Policy Implication
Nepal as a nation-state stands in critical juncture of history that will determine political
stability and peace in future. Since the multi-party era, Nepali Muslims have increasingly
being concerned politically, which got further momentum after the peace accord in 2006. The
Maoist movement popularized many facets of minority and ethnic discrimination, of which
many issues are gradually put forward by different communities including Muslims. Muslims
gain relative freedom in the context of recent political changes, which give them more
opportunity to raise their voices in favor of their equal citizenship and rights. The increasing
politicized context of Muslims divided them in different groups and platforms, though they
become more united and active in defying state’s unequal treatment towards them. The
significant impact of this is that it demands the redefinition of the Nepali state in which they
can be integrated as “Nepali Muslims”. In this sense, the demands of the Muslims are
integrative towards a broader national integration of the country. If the new state of Nepal
fails to be inclusive for all communities and citizens, further form of conflict may arise since
many ethnic, marginalized and minority groups including Muslims have already been
extremely politicized in recent years. If Muslims demands are not be reasonably met by the
state, it is unlikely that they would be silent in Nepali politics. Since it is not much clear in
present context that there will be durable peace and stability in Nepal, addressing the demands
and rights of different ethnic and minority peoples with democratic efforts would probably be
a productive strategy to avoid further political instability and conflict in coming days in Nepal.
-------------
12
Interview with Mahmud Alam, President, Muslim Ettehad Organization, November 21, 2010,
Kathmandu
14
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