Human Rights - Donelly - International Human Rights_A Regime Analysis

8/11/2019 Human Rights - Donelly - International Human Rights_A Regime Analysis

1/45

International Human Rights: A Regime AnalysisAuthor(s): Jack DonnellySource: International Organization, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer, 1986), pp. 599-642Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706821.

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2/45

International uman rights:

regime nalysis

Jack onnelly

Internationalegimes

s the urrenthot" topic

n the tudy f nternational

relations,speciallynternationalrganizationnd political conomy.'Al-

thoughmost iscussions estrictegime nalysis

o economic ssues,

shall

examine he ssue of

internationaluman ights

n

order o illustrate

he

utilityfthe oncept f nternationalegimes

n noneconomicontexts.2

n

addition, shall urvey

nd present preliminary

nalysis fthecreation,

evolution,nd current

tate f nternationaluman ights egimes.

1. International egimes

"Internationalegimes

re defineds principles,orms, ules nd

decision-

making rocedures

roundwhich ctorexpectations

onverge na given

I

thank raigMurphy,

lenn

Hayslett,

ohn

incent,

ave

Forsythe,

eter

Katzenstein,

and two nonymouseferees or ommentsn earlier

rafts.Work n

portions

f

this

rticle

was partiallyupportedy a grant rom heUniversity

esearch ouncil ftheUniversity

f

North arolina t ChapelHill.

1. This tatuswas attested o and spurred y the

Spring 982 pecial ssueof nternational

Organization36.

2. This s not, owever,he irstublishedpplicationf he oncept f nternationalegimes

to the rea of human ights. hatdistinction,believe,

oes to John erard uggie, Human

Rights

nd

theFuture nternationalommunity,"

aedalus

112

Fall 1983), p. 93-110.See

also

NicholasG. Onuf

nd

V.

SpikePeterson,

HumanRights romn Internationalegimes

Perspective," ournal f nternationalffairs8 Winter984), p. 329-42, or n nteresting,

if

extremelydiosyncratic,iscussion. or perhaps

heearliest pplicationf theconcept f

regimes o human ights, ee David

P.

Forsythe,

A New HumanRightsRegime:What

Significance?"Paper resentedt theAnnual onferencef he nternationaltudies ssocia-

tion,March1981).For a recent nalysis argely omplementary

o theone developed n the

following

wo

sections, hough

without he

explicit

ocus

on

regimes,

ee

Forsythe,The

UnitedNations ndHumanRights, 945-1985," olitical cience Quarterly

00

Summer

1985), p. 249-70.

InternationalOrganization

40,

3, Summer 1986

C 1986 y theMassachusettsnstitutefTechnologynd theWorld eace Foundation

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3/45

600 Internationalrganization

issue-area."3 his

"standard" efinition,fferedy

Stephen

.

Krasner,s

wellgroundedn more stablishedsage.

In politics, ses of regime-"a manner,method r system f rule or

government;system

r

institution

avingwidespread

nfluencer

preva-

lence" (OxfordEnglish Dictionary)-are common

n

English, as

well as

in

French,where heEnglish

word riginated.hey lso preserve

he entral

sense

of

heLatin

root,

egimen,rule,guidance, overnment,

ommand."

The French re'gime"lso refers o a system f egal

rules r regulations

(most ommonly, ut notexclusively, elatingo conjugal

roperty). his

usagehas becomewellestablished

n nternationalaw.For example, n the

Trail melter ase

(3

U.N.R.I.A.A.

1905,1938 1949]), ubmittedor rbi-

tration y Canada andtheUnited tateshalf centurygo,a centralssue

was establishing "regime," system fprinciples,ules,

nd procedures,

for

egulating

he

discharge

f noxious umes y

the

offending

melter.n

the ecentlyoncluded egotiationsver he aw of he ea,

the onceptwas

regularlysed.

And n the

HostagesCase (I.C.J.

3

[1980])

he nternational

Court fJustice eld hat

the

rules f

diplomaticaw,

n

short,

onstitute

self-contained

egime."

he newly opular

dea

of

nternationalegimes

an

be seen as an

extension

f suchuses.4

In contemporarynglish, owever, regime" ends o be used pejora-

tively

nd

to refer o

national especially oreign) overnmentsr social

systems. lthough

he

arityfpejorativeonnotations

n

nternational

ela-

tions as ed at

eastone critico suggest

hat he erm as beenmisapplied,5

such

usage merely eflects ell-known

tructuralifferencesetween

a-

tional nd nternationalolitics.

Because

national olitical

rder sually an be taken

or ranted, oral r

ideological

valuations f particular ational ystems

recommon

nd

per-

haps

even

salutary. Regime"

refers o theentire ocial

and political ys-

3.

Stephen . Krasner,

Structuralauses

nd

Regime onsequences:

egimess Interven-

ing

Variables,"

nternational

rganization

6 (Spring

982),p. 185.

CompareRobert

.

Keohane and Joseph

S. Nye,

Power and Interdependence:

World

Politics in Transition

Bos-

ton:

Little,

rown, 977),

. 19,where

egimesre

defined

s "governing

rrangements

hat

affectelationships

f nterdependence,"

r, more

recisely,

networks

frules,

orms,nd

procedures

hat egularize

ehavior

nd control

tseffects"

n an

issue-area.

4. As a

matterfhistorical

act,

owever,olitical

conomy

eems obe

the rincipal

ource

of

the

ntroduction

f

the concept

nto

American)

olitical

cience.We can also

note

that

"regime"

has become standard

erm neconomics

n

the astfifteen

ears,

specially

n

reference

o foreign-exchange

nd

foreign-trade

olicies.

he first

mportantse

n thefield

f

internationalrganizationas John erard uggie,Internationalesponses oTechnology:

Concepts

and

Trends,"

International

Organization 29

(Summer

1975), pp. 557-84,

while

Keohane nd

Nye,Power

nd ndependence,

re

most esponsible

or

ringinghe erm

nto

the

mainstream

fthe iterature.

n the neglect

f the egal bases

of

theconcept

n recent

discussions,

ompare

riedrichratochwil,

On theRelevance

f nternational

aw,"

Journal

of nternational

Affairs 7

(Winter

1984),p. 344.

5.

Susan Strange, "Cave

hic

dragones:

A Critique

of

Regime

Analysis,"

International

Organization

6

Spring

982), .

486.



4/45

Human

ights egimes

601

tem,whichmakes ts use in such contexts eem natural.

And sincemost

wholesale ppraisals end o be negative-one's own faults,

nd thoseof

friendsnd allies, end o be presenteds subject o ncrementalemedy-

pejorative ses predominate.ven at thenationalevel,however,

regime"

maybe used in positive valuations,

s in praiseof a new"revolutionary

regime."

In

internationalolitics,

y contrast, narchy s the rule.

nternational

regimes-principles,orms,

ules, nddecision-makingrocedures

overn-

ing n issue-area-are oneway to provide lements f "order,"

tructured

regularityespite narchy. uch slands forder n the ea

ofanarchy end

to be relativelyare nd highly alued-whichexplains he

generally eu-

tral, r even positive, onnotationsf "regime" n nternationalettings.

What orms f nternationalrdermerit onsiderations

regimes?

ras-

ner distinguishesmong hree.6

Structuralists"e.g., realists nd some

neo-Marxists)ee power as the only consistentlymportant

undamental

cause of nternationalehavior,making egimes erhaps

eal, butat best

epiphenomenal.tthe ther

xtreme,Grotians" eeregimesverywhere:7

"for very olitical ystem.. there s a correspondingegime";

a

regime

exists

n

every ubstantive

ssue-areawhere here

s discerniblyatterned

behavior."8 "Modified structuralists,"r neorealists,

dopt

an inter-

mediate-butnot compromise-position.9

For neorealists, egimes

re importantspects

of contemporary

nterna-

tional

olitics,

ut

not

all regularitiesrisefrom egimes.

nternational

e-

gimes xist only)when tates,

norder o avoidthe ostsofuncoordinated

national ction, re able to

agree moreor less explicitly)

n norms

r

6. Krasner,

Structuralauses,"

pp. 189-94.

7.

The position rasner

alls

"Grotian"nfact

as ittle

pparentonnection ith hework

of HugoGrotius. s Krasner oes not xplain, r evencite source or, he abel, nemust

assume hat e has adopted

t,with onsiderable

odification,

romMartin

Wight,Western

Values

n nternational

elations"

ndHedley

Bull, The

Grotianonception

f

nternational

Society," n

Herbert

utterfieldnd

MartinWight,

ds., Diplomatic

nvestigationsCam-

bridge: arvard niversity

ress,

1966). ven

Bull,however,ecognizes

he mbiguous

ela-

tionof his much

better

rounded)abel

"Grotian" o

the views

of Grotius. ee Bull,The

Anarchical

ocietyNew

York:

Columbia niversity

ress, 977),

hap.

2, n.3, nd "Grotian

Conception,". 51.

By the ime

we reachKrasner's

sage,

t shard o see much

fGrotius

t

all.

ForGrotius'wn

naturalaw

views f nternational

aw

nd ociety,ee

hisDeJure elli

c

Pacis,

trans.

rancisW. Kelsey

Oxford:

larendon,925),

specially

he Prolegomena."

8. DonaldJ. Puchala

and

Raymond . Hopkins,

Internationalegimes:

essonsfrom

Inductivenalysis,"nternationalrganization6 Spring982), p. 246, 47.Compare ran

R. Young, Regime

Dynamics:

heRise and

Fall of

nternationalegimes,"

nternational

Organization

6 Spring 982),

p. 277-97;

ndOran

R. Young, International

egimes:rob-

lems fConcept

ormation,"

World

olitics 2

April 980), p.

331-56.

9.

See especially

rthur

. Stein, Coordination

ndCollaborationegimes

n

an Anarchic

World,"

nternational

rganization6

Spring

982), p. 299-324,

nd

Robert

.

Keohane,

"The Demand

or nternational

egimes,"

nternational

rganization

6 (Spring

982),

p.

325-55.



5/45

602 International

rganization

procedures o regulateheir nteractions.

uch agreements

re especially

likelyn an environmentfcomplex nterdependence,

haracterized

ymul-

tiple hannels f nteraction,he bsenceof clearhierarchyf ssues, nd

the nfrequentse of force y the trong

n most ssue-areas.

0

The structuralist

ismissal f regimes

aises argely mpiricaluestions

that re well beyond

he

scope of

this rticle, lthough

emonstratinghe

heuristic r explanatorytility

f

regime

nalysis

or

human

ightsand

other oneconomic

ssue-areas)would ount tronglygainst

he tructural-

istperspective.he differencesetween

Grotian" nd neorealist

erspec-

tives,however,re of considerableonceptual

mportance.

Because the

mere xistence f an identifiablessue s

almost ertain o

guarantee discernibly atterned ehavior," "regime" forthe Grotian

means ittlemore

han issue-area"or"political ubsystem."

t best, his

wastes useful ermndpointlesslydds

to our lready verstocked

tore f

jargon. More serious, ince

the "rules" of

a

Grotian regime"

need be

nothing ore han n outside bserver's

escriptionfapparent

ehavioral

regularities,hey

have no necessary xplanatoryalue.

Neorealist egimes,

y contrast,

nvolve

egularities

hat

rise

only

when

actors at east

n

part)

onform

heir onduct o

norms nd

procedureshey

accept as legitimate. estricted o issue-areaswherebehaviors at least

partiallyoverned

yregime ormsndprocedures,egimes

ecome ausal

variables, t minimum,

ntervening

ariables etween tatebehavior

nd

deeper

tructuralorces uch s

power

r

nterest.

Therefore,shall

define internationalegime"

s "norms

nd

decision-

making rocedurescceptedby international

ctorsto regulate

n issue

area.

1

States andother elevantctors)

ccept ertain ormative

r pro-

cedural onstraintss legitimate,hereby artiallyeplacing

original"

a-

tional

overeignty

ith

nternational

uthority. lthoughovereignty

hus

remains he central rdering rinciplef the society f states, egimes e-

quire imited enunciations

f overeignationaluthority

n n ssue-area

n

order o reduce he

costs

of nternational

narchy.

10. Keohane nd

Nye,Power nd ndependence,p.

19-29

nd

passim.

ompare

rnst

.

Haas, "WhyCollaborate?

ssue-Linkage

nd nternational

egimes,"

World

olitics 2 April

1980), p. 357-405,

ndHaas,

"Turbulent

ieldsand the

Theory f Regional

ntegration,"

International

Organization30 (Spring 1976), pp.

173-212.

11. Cf. Haas,

"WhyCollaborate?"

.

358.Thisdefinition

s consistent

ith, ut omewhat

narrower

han,Krasner's,

which ermits

"Grotian"

eading.

should lso

note

that

my

definitionxcludes,mplicitlyor, fnecessary,y tipulation),laimshat regimexistsn he

presence

f "norms"

uch s "outcomes

re the

result fad hoc

bargains

ased onrelative

power."

Such ituations

re

ikely o nvolve elatively

redictable

egularities

ndthus ould

be classified

s regimes y Grotians.)

hus

in the case of

international

uman ights,or

example, here

was no

regimen1914;

no nternationally

ccepted

orms rprocedures

imited

state

overeignty

n this ssue-area.



6/45

Human

ights egimes 603

National

Promotion or Information Policy

International

International

Decisions Assistance

Exchange Coordination Monitoring Decisions

International Strong

Strong Strong Strong

Norms Declaratory Promotional Implementation Enforcement

International

Standards with

National Exemptions

Weak

Implementation

International

Guidelines

Weak

Weak Weak

Declaratory

Promotional

Enforcement

National

Standards

No

Regime

Declaratory Promotional

Implementation

Enforcement

Regime Regime

Regime Regime

FIGURE 1. Types of international egimes

2. Types of nternational egimes

Internationalegimes re not n all or

nothing atter, owever; he ransfer

of

authority ay take

a

variety fforms, nd its significance ay be of

varying egrees. igure1provides rough ypologyf regime ypes.

Regimenorms, tandards, r rules

may runfrom ully nternationalo

entirely ational; here re roughly our

rincipalypes.12

*

Authoritative

nternationalorms:

inding

nternational

tandards,

generallyccepted

s such

by

states.

*

Internationaltandards

ith

elf-selected

ational

xemptions: ener-

allybinding

ules

hat

nonetheless

ermit

ndividualtates o

"opt

out,"

in

part. For example,

tates

may

hoosenot o

ratify treaty

or toratify ith eservations.)

*

Internationaluidelines:nternational

tandards

hat

re not

binding

but re

nonetheless idely ommended y

states.Guidelines

may

12. Althoughuse these ermsmore r ess nterchangeably,rasner,

Structural

auses,"

p. 186,distinguishesprinciples" rom norms"-"beliefs ffact, ausation,nd rectitude"

from standardsfbehavior efinednterms frightsndobligations"-and reats

rules" s

"specific rescriptionsr proscriptionsor ction,"which e considerss more kin

o

proce-

dures han principles" r "norms."Although rasner uts his istinctiono gooduse

n

his

discussion f regime hange, t seems to me rather rbitrary,speciallyn distinguishing

"norms" rom rules" argely y hegreaterpecificityf rules." n ordinarysage, rules"

hasat east s wide range s norms; onsider ot nly ftenoose "rules f he ame"

but

lso

"moral ules"

a

la Kant.

n

the nterestfclarity, owever,

shall t

least npart efer o

Krasner's uthoritynd use therelativelyeutralerm norms" o refer o thefull ange

f

regime's ormativerinciplesin ontrasto tsdecision-makingrocedures).ormy urposes,

however, rasner's istinctionetween rinciples,orms,nd

rules s of

no

nterest

r

mpor-

tance.



7/45

604

International

rganization

range rom

trong,xplicit, etailed ules ovague tatements

f

amorphous

ollective

spirations.

* National tandards:he bsenceof substantiventernational

orms.13

Three

principal

ypes f nternational

ecision-makingctivitiesin

addi-

tion

o normreation) an be

distinguished-enforcingnternational

orms,

implementingnternationalorms,

nd promoting

heir cceptance ren-

forcement-andt eastsix mportant

ypes fregimeecision-making

ro-

cedures hould e

distinguished.

*

Authoritative

nternationalecision

making:

nstitutionalized,

inding

decision

making,ncludingenerally

ffectivenforcement

owers.

*

International

onitoring:

ormal

nternationaleview f

state

ractice

butno

authoritativenforcement

rocedures.

Monitoring

ctivities

can be further

ategorized

n terms

f

the

powers

llowed

o

monitors

to

carry

ut

ndependentnvestigations

nd make

udgments

f

com-

pliancewith

nternational

orms.

*

International

olicy

oordination:

egular

nd

expected

se

of

an

in-

ternationalorum o achieve

greater

oordinationf

national

olicies

but

no

significant

nternationaleview f state

practice.

* Internationalnformationxchange: bligatoryr

stronglyxpected

use of nternationalhannels

o

nform

ther

tates f one's

practice

with

espect o

regime orms.14

*

Internationalromotionr assistance: nstitutionalized

nternational

promotionf or

assistance

n the

nationalmplementationf

nterna-

tional

norms.

*

National ecision

making:

ull

tate overeignty

n

decision

making

for he

ssue-area.

International

nforcementctivities

nvolventernationalecision

making

and the

trongerorms f

nternationalonitoring.

nternationalmplemen-

tation

ctivitiesnclude

weakermonitoringrocedures,

olicy

oordination,

and

someforms f

information

xchange. romotionalctivitiesmay

n-

volve international

nformationxchange, romotion,

r assistance,

nd

perhaps

ven

weak

monitoringf nternational

uidelines.

These

categoriespplyas well to

regimes,which

may be classifieds

13.An nternationalegime ith urely ationaltandardss logicallyonceivable,lthough

rather nlikely;ignificantnternationalecisionmakingould esultn collective ecision

o

permitully ationaltandardetting.uch "proceduralegime,"

n

ts trongestorm, ould

occupy hebottom ight orner f Figure .

14.

Clearly, higher" ypes fdecisionmakingnvolve

nformation

xchange

s well.

n

fact,

each "higher" ype enerallyncompasseshe owers vailable

n

he lower" ypes, lthough

therelative trengthsf policy oordination,romotion,nd nformationxchangemayvary

withssue-area. or similarategorizationf ormsf nternationalecisionmakingee Haas,

"Turbulentields," p. 201, nd Ruggie, Responses o Technology," p. 570-74.



8/45

Human ights egimes 605

promotional,

mplementational,

nd enforcement

each categoryan

be fur-

ther escribed

s relativelystrong"

r

"weak"). Finally, eclaratory

e-

gimes nvolve nternationalormsbut no internationalecisionmaking

(except

n

thecreation

f norms).

A

regime's

strength"an besaidto

ncrease, oughly,

ith tsnormative

andproceduralscope";

that s,as we move

utfrom

hebottom

eft

orner

(no regime)n Figure

1. But paper

formalities

re far ess important

o a

regime'strengthhan

hepractical

ealitiesf ts cceptance

y states

nd

itscoherence,15

hat

s, the xtento which tates

n fact bideby nd

make

use of

thenorms nd

procedureso which

hey

ave committedhemselves

and theextent o

whichthe partsof the

regime perate

ogethers

a

smoothlyunctioninghole.

Although

henotionf cceptance

s

simple

nd

obvious, oherence

as

at

least three

mportant

imensions. ormative

ncoherencemayarise

from

inconsistencies

etween

ndividualormseither

utright

ncompatibilityr

vagueness

hat llowsfor nconsistent

nterpretation)

r from ignificant

"logical"

gaps n

theoverall tructuref

norms, specially

oopholes hat

effectively

ancel other

norms.Procedural

ncoherence

may arisefrom

eithernconsistentr

ncomplete

ecision-makingrocedures

r structures.

Finally,ncoherence,

na somewhatxtended

ense,may

rise rom "mis-

match"

between ormsndprocedures hich llows heuse ofestablished

decision-makingrocedures

o undermine

ubstantiveorms.

Incoherence ay

be inadvertent,ut

t

s much

more

ikely

o be

planned,

a

diplomaticodification

f

unresolvedonflicts.

nd ack

of

acceptance

f

formallygreed-to

orms r

procedures

s

a standard

trategy

f

states

hat

feel a need or desire o participate

n a

regime,

ut

only

weak

regime.

Therefore,

henature

nd

strength

f regime

annot

e understoodrom

n

analysis

f egal exts

ndconstitutionaltructures

lone

but

equires

xam-

ininghow states and otherrelevant ctors)use and operatewithin he

formally

pecified orms

nd

procedures;

he

eal

norms

nd

procedures

f

regimerise rom he

practice f

tsparticipants,

hich arelys unrelated

o

but

often s notexactly

what

s specified

n

the egaltexts.

3. The

international

umanrights egime

Human

ights

re regularlyddressed oday

n

bilateral

oreignolicy

nd n

a varietyf multilateralchemes. n this ection nd thatwhich ollows,

shall onsider

nly

he "universal"

r

UN-centered

egime,

hich or on-

venience shall

refer o as "the"

international

uman

ights egime.

e-

gional nd

single-issueegimes

re discussed

n section . Bilateral

olicy

and human

rights olicy

n nonhumanights

orums

e.g., development

15.

Compare

rnst

B. Haas,

"RegimeDecay:

Conflict anagementnd

nternational

r-

ganizations,

1945-1981,"

International

Organization37 (Spring 1983), p.

193.



9/45

606

International

rganization

General

Assembly

PrNormCrotion

Third

Committee

HumanRightsCommittee

Norm

Creation

Promotion

Promotion/

NormCreation

Monitoring

-'

\ |

ECOSOC

Sessional

Working

Group

Individual . Ad Hoc Concilialion

Promotion/Monitoring

Inter-

Individual

a

d Hoc

ConciliationCovenant on Economic

Communications

Commissions

Articles

1,421

Soal andeCultu Rights)

Prmoio/M niorn

Social and Cultural

Rights)

Promotion/onitoring-

Commission

on Human

Rights

Norm Creation

000


res

1 503,

Ad Hoc Bodies

res.

1 2

3

5)

Norm

Creation

Promotion

I________________________

W

orking

Group

on

Communications

1


A BSub-Commission

(res.

1

503)

Ad

Poc

Boties


res

1503)

Promotioni

I

Norm

Creation

Monitoring Promotion

-o

Working

Group

on

Individual

-

Communications

Communications Promotion/Monitoring

(res 1503)

FIGURE

2.

Major bodies in the nternational

UN) human rights egime

Note.

All the

major odiesreferredo n this ection,nd their rimaryunctions,

re

presented

n

this igure, ominallyrranged

ccordingo "constitutional"elationshipsf

authoritynd subordination.hemost mportantoint o note s the izeoftherectangle

allotted o each body,which epresentsjudgment

f tsoverall mportancen theregime.

Italicized unctionsndicate particularlymportantolefor hebody n that rea.

banks)

re

subjects eyondmy cope

here.

Figure presents schematic

diagram

f

the

UN's

major

human

ights

odiesand their

unctions,sing

the

ypology eveloped

bove.

Regime norms

The

most mportanttatementsf

the

norms f

the

nternational

uman

rights egime

re theUniversal

eclaration

fHuman

Rights,dopted

n

10

December

948

y

the

UN

General

Assembly,

nd

the

nternational

uman

Rights ovenants, hichwereopenedfor ignature

nd ratification

n

1966

and came nto

orce

n

1976.16

The

rights

roclaimed

n the

Universal

ecla-

ration-the

best-known,

ost

eneral,

nd most

widely ccepted

tatement

of

he

regime's

orms-are

usually

ivided nto ivil

nd

political ights

nd

economic, ocial,

and

cultural

ights,

ut

a more useful

and

precise

classifications possible.

16. UN resolutions17A III),

2200 XXI).

They

re

widelyeprinted,or xample,nLouis

B. Sohn and

Thomas Buergentahl, ds., Basic

Documents on International rotection

f Hu-

manRightsIndianapolis:

obbs-Merrill,973);

Walter aquer ndBarry . Rubin,

ds., The

Human Rights

Reader (New

York: New AmericanLibrary,1979);

Human Rights:

A

Compila-

tion of

nternational nstrumentsNew York:

UN, 1978); and

Ian

Brownlie, d.,

Basic

Docu-

ments n

HumanRiahts, d ed.

(New York:Oxford niversity

ress,1981).



10/45

Human

ights

egimes

607

(1) Personal

ights,ncludingightso ife;nationality;ecognition

efore

the aw;

protectiongainst ruel, egrading,r nhumanereatmentr

pun-

ishment;ndprotectiongainst acial, thnic, exual, r religiousiscrimi-

nation.

Articles -7, 15)

(2) Legal

rights, ncluding ccess to remedies or violations

f

basic

rights; he

presumptionf innocence; he

guarantee f fair nd impartial

public rials;

rohibitiongainst x post

facto aws; and protectiongainst

arbitrary

rrest, etention,r exile, andarbitrarynterference

ith

ne's

family, ome, r reputation.Articles

-12)

(3)

Civil

iberties,specially ights

o

freedom

f

hought,onscience,nd

religion;

pinion nd expression;movementnd residence; nd peaceful

assembly ndassociation. Articles 3,18-20)

(4) Subsistence

ights, articularly

he

rights o

food nd a standard f

living dequate

for he health nd

well-beingf oneself nd one's family.

(Article 5)

(5) Economic

rights,ncluding

rincipallyhe rights o work,

est

and

leisure, nd

social security.Articles2-24)

(6)

Social and cultural

ights,specially

ights

o education

nd

to

partici-

pate nthe

culturalife f thecommunity.Articles 6, 27)

(7) Political

ights, rincipallyhe ightso

take

part

n

government

ndto

periodic ndgenuine lections ith niversalndequal suffrageArticle1),

plusthe

political spectsof many ivil iberties.

This ist

s

furtherlaboratedn two nternationalumanRights

ove-

nants nd a

variety f single-issuereaties

nd declarations

n

topics

uch

as

genocide,

olitical ights f women,

acialdiscrimination,

nd

torture.

Although hese

aterdocumentsccasionally eviatefrom he Universal

Declaration-for xample, he Covenants

rominentlydd

a

right

o self-

determinationnddelete he ighto

property-for

hemost

art hey

labo-

rate r extend ights roclaimedntheUniversal eclaration.herefore,e

can

saythat he egime's ormsrequite oherent.

urthermore,

t s

gener-

ally greed hat

heserights orm n interdependentnd

synergistically

n-

teractive ystem

f guarantees, ather

han menufromwhich nemay

freely ick nd

choose.17

17.

Forone ratherimple emonstrationf

hedeeper hilosophicalasis

of

his

oherence,

in theformof n argumenthat nternational

uman ights orms risefrom heprinciples

f

personal utonomynd

equality,

ee RhodaHoward nd JackDonnelly, Human

Rights,

Human ignityndPolitical egimes,American olitical cienceReviewforthcoming).he

only ignificantxceptionso the laim hat llclassesofhuman ightsre nterdependent

re

(1) argumentshat re still ccasionallymade

that conomic nd social rightsre nottruly

human ightsMaurice ranston as made

omething

f

a second areer ut

of

rehashinghis

argumentor wenty ears

now;

forhis atest

ersion,

ee "AreThereAnyHumanRights?"

Daedalus 112 Fall 1983], p.

1-17);

and

2)

a tendencymongmany hirdWorld nd

Soviet-

bloccommentatorso undercutheir

rofessionsfthe nterdependencef ll human ights

y

claims

f

thepriorityfeconomic nd social

rights. examine nd criticizehese wo almost

mirror-image)eviationsn Jack

Donnelly,

he

Concept f HumanRightsLondon:

Croom



11/45

608

International

rganization

The standard ractice f states s to speakof,

nd

thus n a certainense

treat,

he

norms f

the

Universal

eclaration

nd

the

Covenants

s interna-

tional ormswith imited,elf-selectedational xemptions);rofessionsf

adherence o these norms nd

charges

ffailure o live

up

to them re

regular eatures fcontemporary

nternational

olitics.

Although

omestic

practice egularlyalls ar hort f

nternational

rofession,

hese

ights

re

widely iewed s more r ess

bindingnternationaltandards.ach state,

however, etains lmost omplete

utonomy

n

mplementing

hesenorms

t

the

national evel; regime

orms re fully nternationalized,

ut decision

making emainsargely ational.

Decision-making rocedures

The

central rocedural rinciple

f he ontemporarynternational

uman

rights egimes nationalurisdiction

verhuman ightsuestions.

he Uni-

versalDeclaration, hough

widely ccepted s authoritative,

s explicitly

(only)

a

standard f achievement,'"18

nd each

state etains

ull

overeign

authorityo determine

he

dequacy

f ts

chievements.

he

Covenants

o

impose trict egal obligations

ut on onlythose states-currently

bout

one-half-that

oluntarily

ccept

hem

y becoming arties

o

the reaties.

Furthermore,s we shall see, nationalperformances subjectto only

minimalnternationalupervision.

The regime, owever, oesverge n authoritativenternational

tandard

settingr norm reation. tates hownotmerely willingness

uteven a

desireto use the

UnitedNations,

specially

he

Commission

n Human

Rights, o create nd elaborate

uman ights orms, ndtheresultingecla-

rations

nd conventionssually

re widely ccepted. hese norms

o allow

self-selected

ational xemptions-declarations

re not strictly

inding,

while reaty bligations otonlymust e voluntarilyccepted ut lso may

be

acceptedwith eservations-and

onsensual egotiating,

hich llows

Helm, 1985), chap. 6, and

"Recent Trends in UN Human Rights

Activity:Description

and

Polemic," InternationalOrganization 5 (Autumn

1981),pp. 633-55.On

the nterdependence

f

all human rights,

onsidered from more

practical point of view, see Rhoda Howard,

"The

'Full-Belly' Thesis: Should

Economic Rights

Take Priority ver Civil and Political Rights?"

Human RightsQuarterly

(November 1983), nd,morebriefly, ack

Donnelly, Human Rights

and

Development:Complementary r Competing

oncerns?" World olitics

36 (January

984),

pp.

279-82. One reason

that prefer he sevenfolddivision of rights

resented bove-aside

fromts greater ccuracyand specificity-is that he conventional ivision nto civil and polit-

ical

rights nd economic

and social rights oo easily lends itself o

misguided r partisan rgu-

mentsforpriority f one set or the other.

18.

The UniversalDeclaration may plausiblybe

arguedto

have attained he statusofcustom-

ary

nternational

aw.

Any egal force

t

has,

however,

rests

on

state

practice

which

s

discussed

below) and is entirely

ndependent f

the fact that

t

is a UN resolution.

Furthermore,

s

I

illustrate n considerable detail below, this

normative orcehas not been translated nto

strong

procedures.



12/45

Human ightsegimes 609

any majorgroup f states n effective

eto,has limited he

output fnew

instruments.onetheless,

orm reation

as been argelynternationalized,

and the extent, pecificity,nd acceptance f internationaluman ights

norms ontinueo increase.

Therehas evenbeen significantcceptance

y states fan international

role n

promoting

ational mplementationf nternational

orms. or

ex-

ample,

heGeneralAssembly egularlyncourages

tates o ratify

he

Cov-

enants nd adhere o other nternational

nstruments,he

UnitedNations

Center

orHuman

Rights

nd otherbodies

regularly

ndertake

variety

of

nformational,

ducational, nd publicityctivities,

s

well

as

advisory

services, uch

s seminars, ellowships,nd consultations.

s

we

shall

ee

below, muchofthe most mportantorkof the Commissionn Human

Rightss promotionals well. And national

oreign olicies,

othbilateral

and multilateral,

n the First,Second,

and ThirdWorlds like, regularly

involve ffortso

promote henationalmplementationf nternational

u-

manrightstandards.

But widespread,

ociferous,nd usually ffectivelaims

f national ov-

ereignty eet ll

effortso movefrom

eneral xhortations

ven

o observa-

tions nd recommendations

ddressed

o the practice fmostparticular

states, evealingheultimate eakness f heregime. ecause tsnormsre

strong-thats,

both oherentnd widely ccepted-the

overall

trength

f

the

nternationaluman ights egime

ests n its decision-making

roce-

dures.But

procedures eyond

norm reation, romotion,

nd nformation

exchange re largely

bsent.TheUniversal eclaration stablished

rela-

tively trong eclaratory

egime, ut n

the

nearly orty ears

ince

then,

although he regime

as grown

n strength,nlyrudimentary,rincipally

promotionalrocedures

ave been created.

TheHumanRights ommittee.hepartiesothe1966nternationalov-

enanton Civil and PoliticalRights

undertake o submit

eports n the

measures

hey

have

adopted

which

give

effect

o the

rights ecognized

herein

nd on the

progressmade n the

njoymentfthose ights"Article

40

[1]).

These

reports

re

reviewed

y

he

Human

Rights

ommittee,body

of

eighteenndependentxperts.

The

Committee's

ractice n

reviewingeports

eflects

narrow

eading

of ts

powers:

9

t

does not

make

ormal

valuationsfor

even omments

n

the

compliance rnoncompliance

f ndividualtates,

nd its"study"

of

reports as been restrictedo ndividualeview yeach membernd,most

19.

On the general

practice

of

the Committee

ee

Farrokh

Jhabvala,

"The

Practice

of

the

Covenant's

Human

Rights

Committee,

1976-82:

Review of

State

Party Reports,"

Human

Rights

Quarterly

(February

1984),

pp. 81-106;

and Dana

D.

Fischer, "Reporting

under

the

Covenant

on

Civil

and

Political

Rights:

The

FirstFive

Years of

the

Human

Rights

Committee,"

American

Journal

of

International

aw 76 (January

982), pp.

142-53.



13/45

610

International

rganization

important, ublic questioning f state

representatives.

his rather

haphazard rocedure as worked etter hanmight

e

expected

ecauseof

thegenuinendependencefmany fthe xpertsndquestioningased on

informationbtained fromnongovernmental

rganizations

nd

other

unofficial

ources.The Committee's

eports,

owever, avebeen imitedo

factual

nnual eportsplusgeneral romotionalomments

oncerned rin-

cipally

with

mprovinghe

quality

f

reports).

The

resultingcrutinyf state

practice houldnot be excessively eni-

grated.

Questioning,n open

sessions, s often enetrating;heCommittee

is, for a

UN body, remarkablyevoid of ideological

artisanship;tate

representativesften re fairly esponsive; nd the

questioning,y diplo-

matic tandardst least, s neitherxcessively eferentialormerely ro

forma. he

procedure as

even

provoked ccasionalminor

hanges

n na-

tional

aw,

and at

least

a few

parties

have appearedwilling o use their

dealings

with

heCommittees an

occasionfor genuine eview

nd

reex-

aminationf

nationalaws,

policies, nd practices.

The

reportingrocedure,herefore,asprovided

fairly idely ccepted

promotional

echanism.

ut

t nvolves t most nly

nformationxchange

and the

weakestof

monitoring echanisms.

nd even the

information-

exchange roceduresresignificantlylawed.The reports f many ountries re thoroughndrevealing. thers re

farcical:

or

xample,many oviet-bloc ountries

ave

simply eported

hat

all the

numerated

ights

ere

ullymplemented

efore he

Covenants

ere

ratified;

any eports onsist

rincipallyf

extracts

rom ational onstitu-

tions

nd

statutes;

nd a

significantumberre

simply

vasive.20

he

Com-

mittee

as

tried, ometimes

uccessfully,

o obtain etter

nformation,

ut n

the

final

nalysis t s powerlesso compelmore han ro

forma ompliance

with

ven his

eryweak

reportingystem-andnot ven

hat an always e

assured, s thereport f Zaire,duein 1978but tillnot ubmittedn 1985,

despite

evenreminders,llustrates.inally,his eporting

rocedurepplies

only

o the

parties

o

the

Covenant,whichnumbered

ighty

n

mid-1985.

Thus

about half the

countries

f the world re exempt rom ven this

minimalnternational

crutiny.

The

one area where

uarded ptimism

ay

be

appropriates theCommit-

tee's

considerationf ndividual

etitions

nder he

Optional rotocol

f

he

Covenant,

the best

procedure ithinheU.N.

system or he

xamination

of

petitions.",2'

articularecisions f

compliance

r

noncompliance

an

be

20. For

xample,

he eportf

Guinea laimed

hat citizens

fGuinea

elt o

need o nvoke

theCovenantecause

national

egislation

asat a more

dvanced

tage" A/39140,

ara.

139).

Bulgaria eported

hat all

the ights

nd

freedomstipulated

n theCovenant

ere overed

n

the appropriate

ational

aws"

before

atificationA134140,

ara.

112). Andthe

Mongolian

representative,

n responseo

a

question

y member

f heCommittee,roudly

laimed

hat

there ad

never een a

complaintbout

torturercruel r inhuman

reatment

ade n

his

countryA/35/40,

ara.

108).

21. Ton

J.

Zuijdwijk,

etitioning

heUnited ations Aldershot,

ngland: ower, 982),

.



14/45

Human ights egimes

611

made n individualases,

giving heCommittee

t leastmoderatelytrong

international

onitoringowers, lthough

nternational

nforcementtill s

impossible.

In

its first

even years

of operation,hroughmid-1984,

he Committee

received174

communications,ithrespect

o 17 parties

o the Optional

Protocol. lthough5

weredeclared nadmissible,

iscontinued,uspended,

orwithdrawn,nd44 were

till nder

eview,

n

nearly

ne-third

f

ts

cases

the

Committee

ad expressedts

views-that s,

made substantive

eter-

mination

n

the merits f

the case.

Even

though 9

of these55 decisions

involved

single ountry, ruguay,22

heprocedure eems

o berelatively

openand highlyndependent,

nd

relativelytrong

s

well.

The Optional

Protocol rovides genuine,f imited,nstancef nternationalonitoring,

which n at

least a few ases has altered

tatepractice.

Butonly hirty-fiveountries

ad accepted

heOptional rotocol

ymid-

1985; hat

s, only ne-fifthf he ountries

f he

world recovered yeven

this mall

lement f nternationalonitoring

f personal,

egal, ivil, nd

political

ights. ot surprisingly,

lmost

none of thosecovered re

major

humanrights

iolators.As a result, elatively

trong

rocedurespply

primarily

here

hey

re least needed. Unfortunately,

his s

only

to

be

expected, iven hat articipations entirelyoluntary.23

The

Commission

on Human Rights.

The

Commission

n

Human

Rights,

whose entral

ole n norm

reation

e have

already

oted, lso

has mpor-

tantpromotional

nd monitoringunctions.

ts strongest owers

rest on

Economic

nd Social Council

ECOSOC)

resolution

503

XLVIII)

(1970),

which uthorizes he

Commission

o

investigate

ommunications

com-

plaints) hat appear

to reveal

a

consistentattern

f

gross

nd

reliably

361. tshould enoted hat heCovenantlso containsptional rovisionsArticles1-42)for

interstate

omplaints,

ccepted

yeighteen

tates s

of

mid-1985,

ut hesehavenot

been

nd

are not

ikely obe used.

22.

See

annexes o

the nnual

eports

f he

HumanRights ommittee,

980-84,

N docu-

ments

135/40,136/40,

137/40,/38140,

139/40.

ecisions

ave lso

been aken

with

egard

to communications

oncerning anada,

Colombia,Zaire, Finland,

taly,

Madagascar,

Mauritius,

nd Sweden.

23.

The nternational

ovenant

n Economic, ocial

and Cultural ights

lso

requires

e-

riodic

eports,

hich

re reviewed

otby a separate ody

of

experts

ut

by

the

Sessional

Working

roup

n the mplementation

f he

nternational

ovenant

nEconomic,

ocial

nd

Cultural ights

ftheEconomic

ndSocial

Council.

A similar

uestioningrocedure

s

used,

but t

s somewhat

ess

rigorous,

nd

thefact hat

heCovenant

s

explicitly

ntended

o

be

implementedrogressivelyatherhanmmediatelyArticle) effectivelyrecludesny erious

attemptt international

onitoring.

urthermore,

here s no complaint

rocedurearallel

o

that

f he

Optional rotocol

o

theCivil

nd

Political

ovenant.

ittle econdary

iterature

s

available n

the

ctivities

ftheWorking

roup, ut

ee Kamleshwar

as, "United

Nations

Institutions

nd

Procedures

ounded

n Conventions

n

Human

ights

ndFundamental

ree-

doms,"

in

Karel Vasak

and Philip

Alston,

eds.,

The

International

Dimensions of

Human

RightsWestport,

onn.:

Greenwood,

982), p.

333-34,

ndDana

D.

Fischer,

International

Reporting

rocedures,"

in

Hurst

Hannum,

ed.,

Guide

to nternational

uman Rights

Practice

(Philadelphia:

niversity

f Pennsylvania

ress,

1984), p.

173-76.



15/45


attested iolations fhuman ights."24he Commission,owever,

s a

body

of staterepresentatives,ot ndependentxperts; lthoughmostCommis-

sionmembers re relatively onideologicalwhen ompared o, say,their

counterparts

n

the

Third

ommittee

f heGeneral

Assembly),hey

re

still

instructedoliticaldelegates.Stringentriteria f admissibilityimit he

cases

consideredalthoughertain

econdhandnformation

nd

communica-

tions

from ongovernmentalrganizationsNGOs]

are

admissible).25nd

althoughndividualsommunicaterievances,

he1503

rocedure ealsonly

with

ituations

of gross, ystematiciolations; here reno procedures or

investigating,et alone attemptingo remedy, articulariolations.

Anothermajor rawbacks that he ntire roceduresconfidentialntilt

has been oncluded. lthoughonfidentialityay ncourage ooperationy

states,

t

maygreatly elay

he

process

nd

argely recludes

n

activist ole

for heCommissionnthe uncoveringnd spotlightingfviolations. he

Commission as circumventedome of the strictures

f

confidentialityy

publicly nnouncing blacklist f countries eing tudied; hepractices f

some

wenty-eightountries ere

xamined

etween 978

nd

1984.26

lthough

the

resulting

nternational

otoriety,

owever

light,may

not

be entirely

negligible,houldwe commenduch ngenuityr bemoan heneed o resort

to it?

Finally, lthoughheCommission ay,with he onsentndcooperation

of the state

n

question, ppoint

committee

o

investigate situation,

o

such

nvestigation

as everoccurred.

n the

case

of

Equatorial

Guinea

he

Commission

n

1979

nstead hose

to

pursue public nvestigationhrough

specialrapporteur, process

ess restricted

y procedural

onstraints.n

1980

the

Commission

oncluded

ts

consideration

f the treatment

f

Jehovah'sWitnesses

n

Malawi,

which

had

been frustrated

y

official on-

cooperation,

ith resolution

hat

merelyxpressed

he

hope

hat

ll

human

24. For an excellent,horoughiscussion ftheprocedure,ee Howard

olley,

The

Con-

cealed

Crack n theCitadel: heUnitedNations ommissionn HumanRights'

esponse o

Confidentialommunications,"

umanRights uarterly(November 984),

p. 420-62. ol-

ley's forthcoming ook, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, is certain

to

become he tandardource nthat ody. ee also DinahL. Shelton,

Individual omplaint

Machinerynder heUnited

Nations 503 rocedurendtheOptional rotocolothenterna-

tional ovenant n Civil ndPolitical ights,"n Hannum, umanRights

ractice. t should

benoted hat heCommission ad

been uthorizedince1948

o

"receive"communications.

However,

s

they ould not be discussed r acted on, this "power" was of no

practical

significancentil he1503

rocedure as established.

25. See Antonio assese, TheAdmissibilityfCommunicationsn Human

ights," evue

des Droitsde l'HommelHumanRightsJournal5 (1972), pp. 375-93; andZuijdwijk,Petitioning

the

United ations, p. 30-39.

The Secretariatnitiallycreens he ommunications.efore

they ven reachthe Commission,

hosethat re deemedworthy

f substantive

eview

re

examined y workingroup f

he ubcommission,

hen hewhole

ubcommission,

nd

hen

a

workingroup f theCommission.ee

Tolley,

The Concealed

rack,"pp.

432-47.For

a

petitiono reach heCommission,herefore,

t

must resent very trongrimaacie

ase,

and

referral

o theCommissionis often

nterpreted

s

at eastdemonstratinghat

he

llegations

n

a

communicationave somemerit."

helton, Individual omplaint achinery,".

65.

26.

Tolley,

The

Concealed

Crack,"

Table

2.



16/45

Human ights egimes

613

rights ere

being espected

nMalawi. n

1984 public

esolutionalledfor

continued

onsultations

etween he

secretary eneral

nd Haiti. And n

1985, hedocumentationn Uruguaywas,with he greementftheUru-

guayan overnment,

pened opublic crutiny.27

utother han hese

very

limited

chievements,hepublic

ortions

f he1503 rocedure

avehad

no

apparentmpact, lthough

onfidential

ctions lmost

ertainly

ave

had

at

leasta

marginalnfluence

n policyn some

cases.

The 1503

rocedure,

herefore,s npractice

argely

promotionalevice,

involving

omevery

poradic nd imited

monitoring.

iven he ensitivity

ofhuman ights uestions,

venthismay

be of

real

practical

alue.

Never-

theless,

tsweakness

s evident.

Much he ame strue ftheCommission'stherctivities.or example,

annual iscussionsn

publicmeetings

f he ub-Commission

n the

Preven-

tion f

Discrimination

nd Protectionf

Minorities,heCommission's

wn

public iscussions,

nder he uthority

f

ECOSOC resolution235

XLII),

and varietyf d

hocprocedures

ave ncreased eneral

warenessfhuman

rightsssues

and helped o focus

nternational

ublic pinion n

particular

violationse.g., racial

discrimination,

orture)nd

the

ituation

n at east

few

ountries

e.g.,Chile).The

Commission,

longwith he

ecretariat,

lso

undertakes variety f public nformationctivitiesnd coordinatesnd

encourages

heuse of advisory

ervices

n thefield f

human ights.28

ut

virtually

othing as

been chieved

n

the

reasof nternational

mplementa-

tion ndenforcement.

The

Commission's

ne real dvantage

s

that t

may

ook

nto ituations-

insofars

it

s able

to ookanywhere-in

ll countries,

ot

nly

hose arty

to a particular

reaty.

herefore,t s

in manywaystheprocedural

ore of

the nternationaluman

ights

egime.

4. Politicalfoundations f

the nternational

human

rights egime

The

international

uman ights egime s

a relativelytrong romotional

regime, omposed

of widely

cceptedsubstantive

orms,

argely

nter-

nationalizedtandard-setting

rocedures,ome general

romotional

ctiv-

27. For

a

brief

eview

f

the

Equitorial

uinea

ase

see

Randall

egley,

The

UN

Human

Rights ommission:heEquatorial uinea ase,"HumanRights uarterlyFebruary981),

pp.34-47.

An on-site

isit

idtake

place,

butnot

under

he1503

rocedure

ndonly

ecause

theoffending

aciasNguema

egime

ad

beenoverthrown.

Therapporteur's

eport

s

avail-

able

as UN document

/CN.4/1371

f 12

February

980.)On Malawi,

Haiti,

ndUruguay

ee

Commission

ecisions

0(XXXVI),

984/109

nd 1985/107

ndE/1980/13,

/1984/14

ndE/1985/

22.

28. Fora summary

frecent

N

public

nformation

ctivityndadvisory

ervices

ee

UN

documents

/CN.4/1984/23;

/CN.4/1985/9,

6, 30,31, 32, 36;

and

Commission

esolutions

1985/27, 0,

34.



17/45

614

International

rganization

ity, utvery imitednternationalmplementation,hich arely

oesbeyond

informationxchange nd voluntarilyccepted nternationalssistance or

thenationalmplementationf nternationalorms. heresno nternational

enforcement.uch normativetrength

nd

procedural eakness,

owever,

is theresult f conscious olitical ecisions.

Regimes re political reations o overcome erceived

roblems rising

from nadequately egulated r insufficientlyoordinated ational

ction.

Robert

.

Keohane offers useful

market

nalogy: egimes rise when

sufficientnternationaldemand"

is

met

by

a state

or group

f

states)

willing nd able to "supply" nternationalorms nddecision-makingro-

cedures.29

he

shape

and

strength

f

an international

egime

eflect

ho

wants t, who opposes it, and why-and how the conflictingbjectives,

interests,

nd

capabilitiesf

he

parties

ave

beenresolved. s

Krasner uts

it,

n

each issue-area here re makers, reakers, nd takers f potential)

internationalegimes

30

understandinghe structuref

a

regimeor ts ab-

sence)requires hat

we

knowwho has played

which

oles,

when nd

why,

and what

greementshey

eached.

n

this ection

shall xamine he n-

teraction

f

supply

nd

demandwhichhas

led

to

the

nternationaluman

rights egime escribed bove.

Prior o WorldWar , human ights ere lmost niversallyiewed s the

exclusive reserve fthestate;despite ccasional eferenceso minimum

standards

f

ivilized

ehavior,

herewas not ven

weak

declaratory

nter-

nationalhuman

rights egime.

n

the

interwar

eriod,

he International

Labour

OrganizationILO) undertook ome

minor

fforts

n the

area of

workers' ights, ut t was functionallyestrictedo this ne class

ofrights

and

its work was of interest

rimarily

o

developed, apitalist,

iberal-

democratic

tates.

The

League of Nations'

Minorities

ystem,31

he

only

other

ignificant

nternationaluman

ightsctivity

n

this

period,

was not

only estrictedoa single lass ofrightsutfor hemost art overed nly

those

states

defeated

uring r created

n

the aftermathf WorldWar

.

With

hese

very

ew

xceptions,

s

recently

s

fiftyears go

human

ights

were

not

even

considered o be a legitimatenternationaloncern.

World

War I marks decisive reak;32he

defeat f

Germany

sheredn

29. Keohane, Demandfor

nternational

egimes."

30. Stephen

. Krasner,United tatesCommercial

ndMonetaryolicy:Unravelling

he

Paradox fExternal trength

nd nternal

Weakness," n PeterJ. Katzenstein,

d., Beyond

Power nd Plenty

Madison:Universityf Wisconsin

ress,

1978), . 52.

31. See C.

A. Macartney,National States and

National Minorities

London: OxfordUniver-

sity ress, 1934), t. 2; LucyP. Mair,TheProtectionf MinoritiesLondon:Christophers,

1928);

nis

L. Claude, Jr.,National

Minorities:

An International roblem Cambridge:

Harvard

University

ress, 1955); and JuliusStone, International

Guarantees

ofMinority ights Lon-

don: Oxford niversityress,

1932).

32. John . Humphrey, n

his recentmemoir

Human Rights nd

the UnitedNations:

A Great

AdventureDobbs

Ferry, .Y.: Transnational,

984), ppositely

itles is econd hapterThe

Catalyst

f the Second WorldWar." Compare

ouis

Henkin, Introduction,"

he nterna-

tionalBill of Human Rights:

The

Covenant

on Civil and

Political

Rights New

York: Columbia

Universityress,1981), . 3.



18/45

Human

ights egimes

615

the

ontemporarynternational

uman ights egime.

evulsion t the rray

of

human ights buses that

ame to

be

summarized

n

the

term

Nazi"

engenderedbrief eriod f nthusiasticnternationalction, ulminatingn

the

passage n 1948 f the

Universal eclaration.

Although itler'sactionsshocked he conscience

f the nternational

community,hey idnot learlyontravenexplicit

nternationalorms; or

example,

t Nurembergheessential harge f

crimes gainsthumanity

palpably

ackedan authoritative

nternationalegalfoundation.n suchan

environment,t was relativelyasy to reachgeneral

greementn a set of

internationalrinciplesgainst

ross nd persistent

ystematiciolations f

basic

rights-namely,he

Universal eclarationfollowed henextyearby

theConventionn Genocide,whichwas even more learly direct egacy

from itler).

It

is

perhaps urprising

hat

hismoral demand"

shouldhaveproduced

even such declaratoryegime

n a world n whichmorematerial ational

interestssually revail. n the

years mmediately

ollowinghewar,how-

ever, therewere willing nd

able makers,

numerous akers,and no

significantreakers fan

internationaluman ights egime. he

moral

nd

emotionalemands or n

internationaluman ights

egime eemto

have

run

relatively eep, even n

some mportantationaleaders-strong up-

port amefrom everal ountries,ncludinghe United tates, nd none

seriously

pposed

ither

heDeclaration

r, ater,

he

Covenants-while

o

countervailingoncerns r nterestsadyet merged.

A

cynicmight uggest,with

ome basis,

that hese

postwar

achieve-

ments"

imply

eflect

he minimal

nternational

onstraintsnd

very

ow

costs

of

declaratoryegime; ecisionmaking

nder

heUniversal eclara-

tion

emainedntirelyational,

nd twould e more han wenty ears

ntil

resolution 503 nd nearly hirtyears efore venthe

rudimentaryromo-

tion ndmonitoringroceduresf heCovenants ame nto ffect. et prior

to the

wareven a declaratory

egime ad rarely eencontemplated.

n the

late 1940s,human ights

ecame,for he first ime,

recognizednterna-

tionalssue-area.

Moving

much

eyond

declaratoryegime, owever,

as

proved

ifficult.

As we have

seen,proceduralnnovationsavebeenmodest. ven

the

egal

elaborationfsubstantiveorms

as been slow nd aborious: or

xample,

it

tooknine

years

o

movefrom declarationo

a

conventionn

torture;

work nstronger, ore recise

norms n religiousibertys now n tsthird

decade. tis in this elativeonstancy ftheregime-criticsndfrustrated

optimists

re

ikely o saystagnation-that

he

weakness f

thedemand

s

most vident.

To the

extent-probably onsiderable-that

he

international

uman

rightsegimerosefrom ostwar

rustration,uilt,

r

unease,

he

very roc-

lamation"supply")

of

the

Declaration, long

with

he

adoption

f

the

Genocide onvention,eems o have satisfied

he

demand. o

the xtent-



19/45


againprobablyonsiderable-that

t

rested n anemotional eaction

o

the

horrors f

Hitler nd thewar,time

adlybutpredictably

luntedhe mo-

tion.Time lso revealed oth he uperficial, erely erbal ommitmentf

many tates nd substantive

isagreements

verparticularights,

ausing

enthusiasmo wanefurther.

ndwith

he oldwarheating p,not

nlywas

the desire

o move on to other ssues

strong, ut

East-West ivalrytself

soon came to infect

nd

distort he

discussion f

human ights.

The most

mportant

roblem, owever,was and

remains he

fact hat

stronger

nternationaluman

ightsegime oes

notrest n anyperceived

material

nterestf

a

state

r coalitionwilling nd

able

to supply

t. n the

absenceofa power apable

of compellingompliance,

tates articipate

n

or ncreaseheir ommitmento nternationalegimesmore r essvoluntar-

ily. Barring

xtraordinaryircumstances,

tates

participaten an interna-

tionalregime nly to

achieve

national

objectives n an environment

f

perceived

nternational

nterdependence,o address

national

problems

caused

by

the

existing

nternationaltate f

affairs.

Both heorynd practice

uggest hat

tateswillrelinquishuthority

nly

to

obtain significantenefiteyond

he each f eparate ational

ction r

to avoid

bearing major

urden. urthermore,

elinquishingovereign

u-

thority ust ppear "safe"

to states

who are notoriouslyealous

of their

sovereignrerogatives. strongernternationaluman ightsegime im-

ply does not present

safe prospect

f obtainingtherwise

nattainable

national enefits.

Moral nterestsuch

s human ightsmay

be no ess

"real" than

material

interests.

hey re, however,ess

tangible,

nd

policy,

or etter

r

worse,

tends

o

be

made

n

response

orelativelyangible

ational

bjectives.

Moral

interests,

hich refaress ikely o

be a major olitical

oncern

f

powerful

national ctors, lso are

muchmore

asily ost n the hufflef

the

policy-

making rocess.Theyare more ubject opoliticalmanipulation,ecause

they

sually re vaguely

xpressed

nd the

riteria

or etermining

uccess

in

realizing oral nterests

reparticularly

lusive.

Andhuman ights

laims

usually re met,ustifiably

r not,

with he

politicallyotent

harge

fmis-

guidedmoralism.

Furthermore,he

xtreme

ensitivity

fhuman ights ractices

makes he

very ubject

ntensely

hreateningo most states.

National

human

ights

practices ftenwould

be a matter or onsiderable

mbarrassment

hould

they

e

subject o

full

nternational

crutiny,

nd

compliance

ith nterna-

tionalhuman ightstandardsnnumerous ountries ouldmeanthere-

moval f

those

n

power.

In

addition, nd perhapsmost

mportant,

uman

ights

re

ultimately

profoundlyational-not

international-issue.

tates

are the

principal

violators fhuman ights

nd the

principal

ctors

overned y

the

regime's

norms;

nternational

uman ights

re

concerned rimarily

ith

owa

gov-

ernment

reats

nhabitantsf tsown

country.

hissituationrises

rom

he



20/45

Human

ights egimes

617

basic structure

f contemporary

nternational

olitics:

n an international

system here

overnment

s nationalather

han

lobal, uman

ightsreby

definitionrincipallynationalmatter,s reflectedn the purely ational

implementation

fregime

ormsndthus

he bsence f

policy oordination

procedures

nd

evenrudimentary

echanisms

f nternational

nforcement.

Human

ights

re also a national

matter rom

he

perspective

fpractical

political ction.

Respecting

uman ights

s

extremelynconvenient

or

government,

ven

n

thebest

of circumstances.

nd the

ess pure

he

mo-

tives

f those

n power, hemore

rksome

uman ights

ppear.Who s to

prevent

government

rom uccumbing

o the emptations

ndarrogance

f

position

nd power?

Who

can force

a

government

orespect

uman ights?

Theonlyplausible andidatesre thepeoplewhoserightsre at stake.

Foreign ctors

mayoverthrow

repressive

overnment.

ith

uck and

skill,

oreign

ctorsmay venbe

able to

placegoodpeople

ncharge ffinely

craftednstitutions

ased

on thebestof

principles.

heymayprovide

ute-

lage,

supervision,

ndmonitoring;

oral nd

materialupport;

nd protec-

tion

againstenemies.

This

scenario,however,

s extremely

nlikely,

especially

fwe do not mpute

nrealisticallyure

motives

ndunbelievable

skill

nd dedication

oexternal

owers,

orwhom humanitarian

nterven-

tion"usually mounts o littlemore han convenientoverforpartisan

politics.

And n any

case, a

regime's ltimate

uccess-its

persistence

n

respecting,

mplementing,nd

enforcing

uman ights-depends

n

nternal

political

actors.

A

government

hat

espects

uman

ightss almost

lways

he

egacy

f

persistentational

olitical

trugglesgainst

uman ights

iolations.

Most

governments

hat espect

uman

ights

ave been

created otfrom

he

op

down,but

from he

bottom p. Domestically,

aternalisticolutions,

n

whichhuman

ights regiven

ather han

aken, re

likely obe unstable.

Internationally,aternalisms no more ikely obe successful.

But f

nternational

egimesriseprimarily

ecause

of nternational

nter-

dependence-the

nability

o achieve

erceived

ational

bjectives y nde-

pendent

ational ction-how

can

we

account

for he

creation

nd even

modest rowthf he

nternational

uman ights

egime?

irst ndforemost,

the "moral"

concerns hatbrought

he

regimentobeing

n the

first lace

persist.

utchers uch

s Pol Pot and

di

Amin

till hock

he

onscience

f

mankindnd

provoke

desire o reject

hem

s

notmerely eprehensible

ut

prohibited

yclear and

public,

uthoritative

nternational

orms;

ven

re-

gimeswithdismalhuman ights ecords eemto feel mpelled o oin in

condemning

he buses of suchrulers,

nd esser

despots

s

well.

Although

ynics

mightnterpret

uchuses

of

he

anguage

f

human

ights

as

merely

raven buse

oftherhetoric

f

human

ights,

t can

ust

as

easily

be

seen as

an

implicit,

ubmerged,

r

deflected xpression

f a

sense

of

moral

interdependence.lthough

tates-not onlygovernments

utoften

the

public

as well-often

are

unwilling

o translate

his

perceived

moral



21/45

618 International

rganization

interdependencento ction

r

nto

n

nternational

egime

ith

trong eci-

sion-making

owers, hey

lso are

unwillingor

at east

politicallynable)

c

returno treating ational uman ights ractices s properly eyond ll

internationalorms

nd

procedures.

A weak

nternationaluman ights egime lso

may ontribute,

n

a way

acceptable o

states, o mproved ational ractice.

or example,

ew

gov-

ernments

ith

commitment

o

human

ights ay

indt

helpful

o

be

able

tc

draw n andpoint

o the onstraintsf uthoritative

nternationaltandards:

we can

see this,

erhaps,

n

thecase oftheAlfonsinovernment

n

Argen-

tina.

Likewise, stablishedegimesmayfind he dditional

heckprovided

by

an

internationalegime salutary upplement

o national fforts;his

seemstobe thecase formany mallerWestern owers.And most tates,

even f

only or

onsiderationsf mage nd

prestige,re ikely o be willing

to

accept regime orms nd

procedures-especially orms-thatdo not

appear

mmediatelyhreatening.

States

also maymiscalculate

r

get carried

way by

the

moment,

nd

proceduresmay

evolve beyondwhatthe regime's

articipantsriginally

intended. orexample, COSOC resolution 235,

which rovides

he

prin-

cipal basis for heCommissionn

Human

Rights'

ublic tudy

nd discus-

sions of humanrights ituationsn individual ountries,was explicitly

establishedn 1967 o

focusprincipallyn

the

pariah egimes

n

Southern

Africa, ut t has

evolved nto procedure ith

niversalpplicationor at

least,

one

that

may

be

applied o any countryhat majorityf members

decide

o

consider).

lthough rocedureseldom xpand o such

n

extent,

the

possibilityhould

not

be

overlooked.

The

currentnternationaluman ightsegime

hus epresentspolitically

acceptablenternational echanism or he collective

esolution

f

princi-

pally

national

roblems. ecause

perception

f

he

problem

ests

n a

politi-

callyweaksenseof

moral

interdependence,owever,heres nopowerful

demand

or

strongeregime; venpolicy oordinationeems oo demand-

ing,

nd

there s little

eason or tates o accept nternationalonitoring,et

alone

authoritativenternationalecisionmaking.

In

any nternational

egime, ven strongecision-makingrocedures

re

largelyupervisory echanisms;enforcement"

ust

e

theexception

f

institutionalverload nd a corrosive veruse f

oercion

re

to

be avoided.

Even

where

regime

ncludes inding

nternationalecision

making,

he

great

ulk

of the work

f mplementing

nd

enforcing

nternationalorms

lies with tates.

In

conditions f

material

nterdependence,good

faith"

ompliance

an

be

largely educed o

calculations

f

long-run

ational nterest.

Material

interdependencemplies hat ach side has more r

ess unilateralower o

prevent

he

enjoyment

f

mutualor

reciprocal

enefits vailable

only

throughooperation.elf-help etaliation,

herefore,

s

likely

o

be

readily



22/45

Human ights egimes

619

available nd relativelyffective,nd goo