THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE CERTITUDE OF FA ITH

ACCORDING TO

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

by

John R. Connolly, B.S.

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University in

Partial Fulfillment of the Re­quirements for the Degree

of Master of Arts

Milwaukee, Wisconsin June J 1966

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I. AN IN'I'RODUCTION TO THE PROBLBM.............. .••• 1

The certitude of faith in its super­natural and psychological dimensions. Cer­ti tude a.s a complex, reflex, notional assent. and its characteristics. The relation be­tween th.e psychological and supernatural di­mensions of faith. The justification of c~r­titude - how probable evidence leads to the unconditional assent of certitude?

II. 'i'HE ERROR OF RATIONALIS~l....................... 14

The Nineteenth Century: the age of ration­alism. Newman's e,ncounter with rationalism in­fluences the course of his justific.ation of cer­titude. The two forms of rationalism which New­man encountered: Richard \ihately at Oxford and William Froude during his days as a Catholic. The common errOr of both forms of rationalism. and Newman's a pproaoh to the justification of ce,rti tude.

III. THE UNr V'ItRSITY SERMONS IN DEFENSE OF CERTI TUDE •• )0

The University Sermons: Newman's justifi­cation of certi tude in light of his response to the r a tionalism of Whately. Three interpreta .. tive principles of the University Sermons. The relationship between faith am reason. How faith in its certitude goes beyond the ~roba­bility of its evidence .. the moral disposition and love. The University Sermonsa.nd t-lewman' s emphasis ot the moral factors involved in the process of arriVing at certitude.

IV. THE GRAMMAR OF ASSENT IN DEFENSE OF CERTITUDE ••• 49

The Gramma,r ot Assent; Newman's justifica­tion of certitude in reaction to the rationalism of William Froude. The error of Froude: certitude is rational and an i mmoral use of ones intellect ..

Chapter

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ual fa.culties. Froude 's r ationalism led Newman to the heart of his explanation of certitude -the distinction between infe rence and assent. Newman' s analysis of inference - formal, i nfor­mal, and natural. The justification of the mind' s unconditional assent upon probabl~ evi­dence and conditional inference through t he operation of the Illative Sense. The nature a.nd activity of the Illative Sense . The per­sonal aspect of the Illative Sense . The Illa­tive Sense of the r ationality or reasonableness of certitude .

V. CONCLUS I ON : NEytl~1MP S J US TI FICATION OJ!' CERTITUDE AND ITS CONSEqUENCES................ 6.8

The moral disposition and the Illative Sense are two factors developed by Newman in his re­action to rationalism to j~stify how man can make an assent of certitude upon evidence which is merely probable . This is Newman's justification of certitude and it unfolds two consequences -his well-balanced concept of faith and his highly personal notion of faith .

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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

When a man makes the assent of faith, do es he dv so with

a confidence and an assurance that excludes all fe ar of doubt -

in short, does his faith possess certitude? John Henry New­

man was particularly interested in this question, and, from

an investigation of his writings on faith, it appears that he

is of the opinion that faith does possess such a certitude.

But going further than this, Newman claims that this certitude

is perfectly valid and justifiable, and completely in harmony

with the psychological processes of the human person.

Newman begins by accepting the certitude of faith as a

fact of experience; he never attempted to prove or demonstrate

the existence of this certitude. He observed it in others and

saw it within the depths of his own being . In the Apologia

1!2 Vita ~, Newman describes the certitude that came to him

through his conversion to Catholicism.

I have been in perfect peace and contentment; I have never had one doubt. I was not cons cious to myself, on my conversion, of any change, intellectual or moral, wrought in my mind. I was not conscious of firmer faith in the fundamental truths of Revelation, or of more self commRnd; I had not more

fervour, but it was like coming into a port after a rough sea h and my happiness on that s core remains to thfs day without interruption .

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It was the certitude of faith that freed him from doubt and

brought him an enduring peace. Newman never questioned the

. existence of t his reality.

Faith is also a supernatural reality and Newman always

insisted upon the supe rnatural dimension of faith. The vi s­

ion of faith, which relates man to the three divine persons

and is the only way he can come to know God as He is, 2 is

by its very nature absolutely gratuitous , .. a gift of grace.

Faith is not something that man can achieve by himself, but

it i .s freely given by the grace of God who has chosen him

to b'e1ieve.3 As such the ultimate certitude of faith is

supernatural. The certitude of faith, an effect of divine

grace, is primarily based upon the authority of God. 4 Ulti­

mately a man does not believe because he can prove the object

1 John H. Newman, Afo10gia Pro Vita Sua (New York: Long­

mans, Green and Co., 19 8), p. 1"20.- -

2Sy1vester P. Juergens, Newman, Psychology 2f. Faith, pp. 123-26. Juergens cites this passage fro m Newman, "Nature can­not see God •••• grace is the sole means of seeing him." New­man, Discourses to rUxed Congreeations (London: Longmans, Green and Co .~, 1~1) J p. 189.

3phi1ip Flanagan , Newman, Faith and the Believer (West­minster, Md.: Newman Bookshop, i946)~.-r26.

4 ~., p. 127.

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of faith, but solely because God has revealed it.

The absolute and perfect certitude of divine faith does not rest on reason- I ing or human motives, but solely on the fact that God, the Eternal Truth who can-

5 not deceive n0r be deceived, has spoken.

The Word of God is the ultimate certitude of faith.

NO'I1 certitude is not a quality that is restricted to

supernatural faith, for a man can have many natural certi­

tudes. There a.re many truths other than supernatural re­

alities to which a man can give an assent of certitude.

Certitude. then, is a natural phenomenon in harmony with

the psychological structures of the mind. The assent of

certitude can be given to such a concrete proposition as.

"I shall die one day." "Britain is an island ." or "There

is :a war on in Vietnam." Since faith is an aasen t to pro.

positions signifying concrete realities. its certitude has

a counterpart in the ordinary psychological processes of

the mind. This is the psychological dimension of certitude.

Newman's analysis of the na.ture of certitude on the

psychological dimensi on is contained primarily in the

Grammar 2! As sent. Here Newman describes certitude in terms

of assent with certitude being radically an assent without

doubt - an unconditional assent. In order to understand

the nature of certitude as assent, it is first necessary to

understand what Newman means by assent.

Assent is the unconditional acceptance of what has al­

ready been apprehended as true. This apprehension of the

5I bid •• Flanagan cites t his quote of Newman taken from the ThesIS ~ E!2!. Gregorianum, Vol. XVIII. thesis # 10, p. 236.

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truth is the necessary concomitant of assent,6 and the con­I

dition under which assent is given. Assent, being based

upon apprehended truth, like truth itself admits of no de­

grees;7 it is an "either, ort! reality. Either you assent

to a proposition or you do not; there is no in the middle.

Newman never really defined a ssent, but he did give several

desct'iptions of it in the Grammar of Assent such as, "an

adherence to a pro position without reserve or doubt", 8 and,

"the unconditional acceptance of a proposition as true. n9

Assent, although it does not admit of degrees, is fur­

ther diversified and can be classified according to real,

if it is an assent to a proposition repre senting concrete

reaJ-ity, or notional, if assent is given to an abstract

proposition. 10 Viewed from the point of view of conscious­

ness, assent can also be classified as simple and complex

assent. Simple assent is i mplicit and unconscious, given

without direct knowledge or full advertance of the mind. 11

On the other hand, complex assent, being a deliberate assent

to a simple assent, whether notional or real, is a reflex

6John H. Newman, An Esaae in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (London: Longmans, Green an 07; ~7r; pp. 8 and 1;7.

7 Ibid., p. 174. -8 lJ:2.!£., p. 172.

9Ibid., pp. 8, 172, and 259. 10 ~., pp. 9, 35, and 75.

11!2![., pp. 188-89, and 210.

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and conscious assent. 12

The nature of t he certitude of f aith can only be urtder-

stood if it be examined under its aspect as a complex assent.

Newman distinguishea between simple and complex as sent. Sim­

ple assent i~ the non-reflex acceptance of a proposition,13 r \ .

the person assents to a truth, but he J.S not reflectively

aware that what he is doing is assenting to a truth. He

accepts the proposition as true without reflecting upon

vmat he is doing. That simple assent to Newman is not cer-I

titude is quite evident for in the, Grammar of Assent he ...... contrasts the two. 14 Simple assent is called "material

certitude" the matter from which certitude flows, the basis

of certitude. 15 In order to become a certitude simple

ass~nt must be reflec't ed upon and made conscious. 16 Although

it is not certitude, simple assent is the basis and founda­

tion of certitude.

As a conscious reflex assent to a simple a ssent, certi­

tude does not exclude simple assent, but includes it. 17 Cer­

titude is a complex act which is made up of reflex assent and

simple assent. 18 However, it is this conscious reflex a,spect,

12 ~., pp. 190, and 194-95. 1.3 Newman, Oranmar of Assent, p. 189,. 14 ~., p. 210.

15.!!lli!. 16

Ibid., pp,. 211-12. 17 Ibid., pp. 190, and 194-95. -18 lill., p. 216.

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its quality of being a complex assent, that distinguishes (

certitude f rom simple assent and is the essential element I

in certitude. As Newman defined it, certitude is "the per­

ce ption of a t rut h with the perception that it is a truth,

f)r the consciousness of knowing a s expressed in the phra.se

'I know that .I know' .19 Certitude is therefore an assent

to a truth with the awareness that what one is assenting to

is true; it is always a reflex act.

As a reflex assent certitude is an assent to a notion-

a1 proposition. The predicate of a reflex assent is always

the abstract term "true". For example, "that I shall die

one day is true", is a reflex asse'nt, and, since its predi­

cat.e is a general t(l!!rnl, it is a notional assent. 20 Certi­

tude then is also a notional assent with the proposition to

which this as sent is given being either real or notional.

On the psychological dimension, therefore, it is of the na­

ture of t he certitude of faith that it be a complex notional

assent to truth. Certitude combines the keenness of simple

assent am the persistence of reflex assent and it is as such

a very complex act. 21

Certitude is an assent to a truth with the awareness

that what one is assenting to is true. Since the object of

19Ibid ., p. 197. -20Ibid., p. 214. -21 Ibid ., p. 216.

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certitude is truth, it has the quality of being correct; it

is a "right conviction with a consciousness of being right". 22

It is a law of t he mind to seek truth and, when it finds it,

to take possession of it and never let it go. Having found

truth the mind rests in truth and, therefore, "/hen the mind

reaches certitude, it persists in that state. Certitude is

persistent and never fails; this is the cha r acteristic of

certitude which Newman called its indefectibility.~J Newman

affirmed this characteristic to show that the assent of cer­

titude is reasonable, ' not a mere, extravagance of the intellect,24

and that the mind which is mace for truth, "can attain truth,

and, having attained it, can ke ep it, can recognize it, and

pre,serve the recognition. ,,25 It is t his per sistence, the

quality of indefectibility which assures endurance, that in­

dicates the truth of a certitude. If a certitude persists,

it 1s true; if it does not persist, then it is false. New-

man did not mean to say that there are no false or mistaken

convictions or that certitude 15 infallible.

Newman quite clearly held that some certitudes were

false, and that certitude does not posses s nor need 1nfal11-26 bility. Having insisted t hat it was wTong to confuse the

22Ib1d ., p. 221.

2)~.

24Ibid •

25~., p. 222.

26Ibid •

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two, Newman made this distinction between certitude and

infallibility. ( Certitude is a disposition, not a faculty,

of the mind relative to a definite and pa rticula r proposi­

tion, whereas infallibility is a fa culty and rela tes the

mind to "all possible pro positions in a given subject-27 matter." Infallibility is a general gift applicable to

every particular ca se that may arise, but certitude is di­

rected to a definite concrete proposition. 28 To say that a

man possesses cert.itude is not to affirm therefore that he

possesses infallibility.2

That certitude is not infallibility is a lso evident

from the fact that a man's ce~titudes are often f alse and

mistaken and have to be changed.30 Certitudes can be false

and e.s such they are faults, but they a re faults not because

they are supposed certitudes but because they are founded on

faulty reasoning. As an assent certitude is always preceded

by a process of reasoning vmich presents truth to the mind.

If there is any error in certitude it is the reasoning that

27Ibid ., p. 224. 28 Ibid., p. 225. -29Ibid •

30Ibid., p. 223. "It is a fact of daily occurrence that men change their certitudes, that is, what they consider to be such J and are as confident and well-established in their new opinions as they ' were once in their old."

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is at fault and not the assent, for it is a l aw of the mind

to give assent to what reasoning presents as true.31 f Mis-

taken certitudes which result from false reasoning do exist,

but this does not constitute a proof that certitude is it­

self a perversion or extravagance of man's nature.32 To

deny the reasonableness and validity of certitude because of

the existence of mistaken certitudes would be like dispensing

with all clocks just because some of them go wrong from time

to time)3 When it came to distinguishing between true and

false certitude Newman admitted that "there was no interior,

immediate test, although indefectibility, a characteristic

of certitude, served as a kind of negative test - if the cer­

t! ~ude does not persist, then it is false .34 But perhaps

the best safeguard against false certitude is that it be

given only after careful examination and investigation.

In its perfection, then, certitude is quite obviously

a very complex reality. As an indefectible reflex notional

assent based upon examination and investigation, certitude,

in its highest expression, is rather demanding. Because of

its own high demands and the restriction of the limited sub­

ject - matter to which the assent of certitude can be given,

genuine certitude is not as common as one might expect,35

but that certiu~de exists on the psychological level is beyond

31 ,1£!£., p. 229. 32 ~., p. 23.3 •

.33 Ibid • -34 Ibid., pp. 255-56.

35l2!&e, pp. 236-37.

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a shadow of a doubt to Newman . 36

Certi tude, then, a ccording to Newman can be said tel

have two dimensions, one superl19 tural and the other psycho­

logical. However, the two , being distinct but not separate,

exist as two a spe cts of a single reality - that real ity be­

ing the relationship which exists between the three divine

persons and the human person . The supernatural dimension is

not somethi ng added to the ps ychological, rather it is a

transformation of the psychological. That the two dimensions

are inseparable is clear from Newman 's analysis of the rela­

tion between t he s upernatural and the natural. So intimately

are they connected that it would be vain t o attempt a solution

of the problem on the su pe rnatural level without any reference

to the parallel problem on t he l"'.atural plane)? The super­

na tural certitude of faith is a process par allel i n reality

to natural certi tude.

Thus there is an analogy between the two dimensions of

certitude.38 Newman cons idered the solution of the natural

or psychological problem (hotT the mind arrive s a t natura l

certi tude) as an indispensable guide in the solution of the

same problem on the 8uperm tural dimension )9 Therefore, an

analysis of certitude on the psychological dimension is the

36Ibid., p. 239. 3? A.J. 'BoE'!kraad, The Personal con}!uest of Truth Accord-

ing to J.H. Newman (Louvain: Editionsauwelaerts, 1955), pp. j4-!57

38 Np.'::man, Grammar of Assent, pp. 239-40.

39soekraad, Personal Conquest 2£ Truth , p. 35.

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basis for an examinati on of the certitude of fai th in ita

totality ,40 as a psychological and superna. tural reality ";

As an unconditional assent, certitude goes beyond the

probability of the evidence which c ~m be brought in support

of it. 41 This is partially due to the fact that the evidence

provided by the inferential process which precede s the assent

of certitude is always condi tional and probable . Certitude

grows out of probabilities and Newman clearly saw t his.

40Ibid.

l~y argument is in outline as follows: that that absolute cer­titude which we were a·bIe . to possess" ,whether as to the truths of natural theology, or as to the fact of a revelation, was the result of an assemblage of conculTing and con­vergi ng probabilities, and that, both according to the .constitution of the human mind and the will of its Maker, that certitude was a habit of mind, that certainty was a quality of propositions; that

41'0 say that certitude goes beyond the probability of t he evidence which c&n be hl'ought in support of it is not to say that faith is an irrational process. Rather it emphasizes the unique character of the act of faith ... that it is an act of the whole person and not merely an assent to a proposition that 1s logically conclusive and totally demonstrable, Newman, Grammar 2l. Assent, p. 179. Assent for Newman is unconditional; it is an I!either. or" reality - but inference is always con­diti onal and tl).e best inferential process can only provide evidence which is prob5 bl~. The unconditional assent of cer­titude is based upon inference which is conditional and evi­dencewhich is probabl~. The force of the personal assent of certitude is stronger than the probability of the evidence warrants. The assent of certitude seems to rise hi gher than its source and go beyond the probability of its evidence .. This seems to be the point of Newman's argument against Lockets de­grees of assent in the Grammar of Assent, pp. 162-179. Locke holds that it is illogical and immoral to "carry our assent above the evidence that a proposition is true" to have tta sur­plusage of assurance beyond the degrees of that evidence." Newman, Grammar of Assent, p. 163. Newman disagrees with this position and seems to hold that the assent of certitude does go beyond the degrees or probability of the evidence.

probabilities which did not reach to logical certainty, mt~ht create a mental certitude; ••••

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The certitude of faith, like all certitude, is founded upon

evidence Which of itself can only give probability.43

Now how can this unconditional a ssent of certitude which

exceeds the influence of its evidence be validly given' Such

an operation seems more like sentiment, supe rstation, or pre-

judice than valid activity of a rational being. The man

enamored of reason is quick to question the validity of such

an activity a s certitude. Because it does not flow directly

from the evidence it seems to be unjustifiable or at least

based upon very shaky grounds. Newman was very much aware of

tM,.s difficulty and, through his encounter with the rationalism

of his day, he was forced to meet this objection - that the

certitude of f a ith or certitude in any matter was invalid and

unjustifiable.

It is his answer to the rationalism of the nineteenth cen-

tury that led Newman to his justification of certitude, parti­

cula.rly the certitude of faith. In order to justify this cer­

titude, Newman had to show how the mind could go beyond the ·

probability of the evidence to a certain assent. It was ob­

viously not within the capacity of evidence to produce an

42Newman , Apologia, p. 20.

43The certitude of faith for Newman is an assent based upon probable evidence. Newman finds this assent in many concrete ma t ters and believes it to be justifiable. Newman, Grammar of Assent, p. 176. Going further he clearly states that certitude is grounded upon evidence which of itself can only give probability. "I prefer to rely on that of an accu­mulation of various probabilities; but we both hold (that is, I hold with him), that from probabilities we may construct legitimate proof1 sufficient for certitude." Newman, Grammar of ARsflmt. p. 411.

1)

unconditional assent of certitude upon its own power. No

sort of evidence can f orce a man to a s sent with certitude,

in faith or in any matter. There must be some other factor

9r factors that enter into the fo rmation of the assent of

certitude. Since it i s such a unique act involving the

whole person pe rhaps these "other factors" can be found with­

in the }:erson. This is how Newman chose to a pproach the

problem. In order to show how certitude could .go beyond the

probability of the evidence, Newman looked within the person.

It is, then, the pur pose of this thesis to exami ne the

personal el emen ts tha t enter into certitude, showing how New­

man developed them through his encounter with rationalism, in

order to justify how certitude goes beyond the probability of

its evidence~ Because of the close relationship between the

natural and the supernatural, and since the sup~rnatural di­

mension transforms the p-sychological dimension in certitude,

t his thesis shall be limited to an examination of faith in

its psychologica l dimen~ion. As a result it will be seen

how Newman justified the certitude of faith in its totality,

on the psychological and supernatural dimension.

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THE ERROR OF RATIONALISM

One of the predominant spirits of the age in which New­

man lived was that of r ationalism. An unbounded confidence

in the power of human reason is one of the characteristic

notes of the Nineteenth Century. Following in the traditions

of the Eighteenth Century, the Rationalistic Age,l the Nine­

teenth Century produced various forms of rationslism. It was

the age of the philoso phical deists, the historical liberals,

and the scientific naturalists. 2 This was Newman's century,

1 A. J. Boekraad, The Personal Conquest of Truth According

to John Henry Newman, (Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1955), p. 69. Boekraad states that such a label is most appropriate for the Eighteenth Century, In fact, he states, "we may al­most describe ft. religion as 'the cult of reason'". Also confer M'. Pattison, Tendencies O.r Religious Thouf!8t in England, 1688-1750 ., ES25~ and ReViews, (London: Vol. IX, 61-;-pp. 254-)29), see Pi .Also in an article on "Faith" in James Has­tings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, (New York: Char17s Scribner's Sons, Vol. V. pp. 689:'9'4. 1924), the author descrJ.bes the rationalism of the Eighteenth Century in the following words: "Rejecting the traditional doctrines of Christianity, it put in their place the simple and self evident ideas of reason as the one valid content of religious faith." (p~ 69)).

2John F. Cronin, Cardinal Newman: His Theor~ of Knowledge, (Washington: Catholic university of America, 193 ), from pp. 10-16, Cronin traces the development of these three phases of English rationalism and their influence upon Newman. To some extent this threefold division of Rationalism is an over sim­plification" In an article on "Rationalism" in Hastings, Enc1clopedia £! Religion and Ethics, (Vol. X, pp. 580-8) J, it s pointed out how difTICult it is to trace the history of rationalism and to order the rationalists in a strict historical order. "The threads cross too much". (p. 581). However, the article views rationalism as an element of ne gative criticism rooted in a rival religion, or a new school of philosophy or science. (pp. 580-81).

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t he nineteenth; his lif e. f rom 1$01 to 1890, almost apanned

it. Rationalism was t he spirit of the times in which N/w­man lived, and any a t tempt to explain h is t hought without

t ak ing this into co nsideration is bound to be inadequate.

Ne\'mw.n 'ilas a man of hi s time s, but i n no sense could

it be said that he let himself be passively molded by them.

Always keenly sensitive, Newman was especially aware of the

t hought patterns of his own day. He saw the value of human ·

reason; yet he could also see the danger involved in exagger­

a ting its power. Being a controversali st by na ture, Newman

could not remain silent in the face of error. He always felt

it his duty to speak out in the defense of truth even when it

se~med to put him in opposition to his own times.

We are ourselves. necessary parts of the existing system, out of which we have individually grown into being, into our actual position in society. Depending ,therefore, on the times as a condition of existence, in wishing for other tiCle s we are , in fact, \'lish-iug we had never been born. Moreover, it is ungr'ateful to a sta te of society , from wh~ch we daily tmjoy so I'llany bene­fits, to r a il ngainst it. Yet there is nothing unbecoming, unmeaning , or ungrate­ful in pointing

30ut its f aults aT.d y;1sh­

ing them away.

Fashioning the times as well as being formed by them, Newman

was irxieed "one who shaped the spirit of his a ge as much aa

he was shaped by it. ,,4

3John H. Newman , Fifteen Sermons Preached Before The University of Oxford, (London: Longmans, Green and Co.~91e), p. 67. - .

4aoekraad, Personal Conquest 2l Truth, p. 68.

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The spirit of rationalism, therefore, meet with Newman's

opposition. To Newman rationalism was one of the major/err­

ors of his time, and he opposed it whenever he encountered

it. He engaged in this struggle against rationalism through­

out his entire life. He encountered it at Oxford as an Ang­

lican , also in his reading of the phi losophy of John Locke;5

he had to face it in his correspondence with the British

scientist ,\iilliam Froude, and in Paley's Evidences f or Chris­

tianity.6 In its va rious forms rationalism constituted one

of the major problems of Newman's intellectual l i f e.7 Some

authors even go so far as to see the struggle as the unify­

ing theme of Newman's life.8

Wilfrid Wa rd maintains that

5Throughout the Grammar of Assent, Newman points out his differences with Locke on assent and certitude, An Essa~ In Aid of a Grammar of Assent, (London: Longmans , Green an CO., T9T7J; confer pp.-r60-64, 174, 316-17.

6 . Newman's response to Paley's approach to Christianity is

most adequately expre s sed in Newman' 5 own w:>rds: "If 1 am asked to use Paley's ar gument for my own conversion, I say pl a inly I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism ; if I am asked to convert others by it, I say plainly I do not care to overcome their reason without touching t heir hearts . ", Grammar of Assent, p. 425 •

. -7cronin, Newman, Theory of Knowledge, p. 24. "It remained

in the forefront of his thought from the time of his conver­sion from it in 182e until years later when he received the Cardinal's hat."

eBoekraad, Pe rsonal Conquest 0 f Truth , p. 26, "This more­over is precisely that which gives-Such a unity to his life, namely, the struggle against a Liberalism which either con­sidered faith as a necessary conclusion to a chain of logi­cal arguments, or, conversely , put religion back into the realm of pure sentiment."

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this idea was the unifying thought of all his works. 9 New-

man himsel f, i n a discourse on the day on "bieh he received

the Cardinal's hat, swnmed up his Catll ol1c lif e as an en­

deavor to resist the s pirit of rationalism in r eligion. 10

It was his encounter with rationalism that influenced

the course which Newman's justification of certitude took.

Rationalism attacked certitude as being invalid. Newman

encountered this attack in two forms. The first of these

exaggerated the principle of strict l ogical reasoning so

much that it practically excluded }he existence of any other

process in man. This type of rationalism puts the truths of

revelation to the test of pure reason, and only those truths

th~t survive this rigid examination remain credible. In this

system there is real ly no pl ace for the r eality known as

f aith; it is entirely unnecessary. Reason alone: is sufficient.

To Ne\','In8.n these men exer cised a dangerous and false liberty

of thought:

••• subjecting to human judgment t hose revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions ~hich rest for the i r reception simply on the 11 external authority of the Divine \fIord.

9Wilfrid Ward, Last Lectures, The Unity of Ne~man's Works, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1m), pp. ~-48.

10Cronin, Newman, Theory of Knowledge, p. 12, originally from Ward. The Life of John Henry eardinal New:nan, (New York: Vol. II, 19~.-p:-4bU.--,ne date of the address was Ma y 12, 1879.

11 Newman, APolo~1a Pro Vita Sua, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), p. 88.--- -------

18

Subjecting the f acts of reve l ation to the strictest logical

- I i processes, that of f or mal reasoning and logica l demonstrat on,

this approach , if consistently pursued, will lead to the to­

tal destruction of revealed religion. Instead of revealed

mysteries which lead the mind beyond the scope of its strict

logical reasoning powers, the f a cts of revelation are re­

duced to truths v{hich are merely conclusions of a formal

reasoni1"}g proce ss . In such a system fa ith i s reduced to a

conclusion of a l ogical syllogistic r easoning process. 12 The

credibility of th e truths of faith, then , is only as strong

as the evidence which rea son brings to support t hem. Dut, in

reality, the evidence which reas on provides is always probable

anq open to new fi ndings. To subject faith t o such a reason~

ing process places faith i n t he real m of the probable and

makes certitude i mpossible . The only valid app~oach to re­

ality is t hrough reason and demonstration; such a rationalium

leaves no room for any of t he moral or pe rsonal elements in

man .

The second type of rationalism which Newman encountered

, is a f orm of scientific r ationalism. It is ch aracterized by

an extreme devotion to the physical 8c1ences. 13 The influenc~

of science during the Nineteenth Century was overwhelming,

12H• Francis DaVis, Newman on Faith and Personal Certitude, Journal of Theological Studies, \nxtord: vcr. XII, pp. 248-59, . 1 961 ), p • 249.

1Jcronin, Newman, Theory of Knowledge, p . 14.

19

and, Newman, ever conscious of the wo rld in which he lived,

was aware of the good and bad points of this scientific / trend.

Conscious of the unity of truth, Newman realized that the

growth of scientific knowledge was inevitable and good. But,

on the other hand , he was also aware that the scientists had

fallen into some false v1e\'/s concerning the power of reason.

The scientist, approaching reality through experience

and observation, works with evidence that is probable and

c~nc1udes only as the evidence permits. Living in a world

of theories and probabilities the scientist is always open

to new discoveries and hence he can rarely, if ever, assent

to any proposition with absolute certitude. To do so would

be ', going beyond the probability of the evidence and this, for

the scientist, is an irrational procedure. This method is

perfectly valid when applied to scientific matters, but it

is detinitAly invalid when applied to matters , such as faith,

which are beyom t he scientific order. In Newman's day, and

st111 in the moo ern world, there was a tendency for the scien­

tist to extrapolate, to apply his dliscipline to subjects out­

side the realm of science. When the scientific discipline ,

which only concludes to probabilities a nd theories, is applied

to faith, it reduces faith to probability and opinion and

,makes certitude impossible. The reasoning is as follows:

since it is beyond the rational power of scientific reason­

ing to conclude to rertitude, the assent of certitude is

irrational and beyond the intellectual processes of the mind .

20

Not only does this form of rationalism deny the certitude of

fai th, but it denounce s carti tude in any realm of human len­

deavor as being irrational and unintellectual.

This encounter .. :bieh Newman had with rationalism is a

growing and developing experience. Consequently there is a

certain progression in the rationalism which Newman encountered.

In attempting to show this progre ssion, the influence exerted

upon Newman by the thought of two men shall be traced. The

two men arG Richard vfuately and William Froude. Each repre-•.

sents one of the two forms of rationalism which Newman en-

countered, and each represents a different pe riod in his life.

In the Apologia E!2 ~ ~ Newman mentions several pro­

positions subscribed to by Oxford rationalists during his uni­

versity days. Four of them read as follows:

1. No religious tenet is important. unless reason shows it to be so .~

2. No one can believe what he does not understand.

). No theological doctrine is any thing more than an opinion \~ich happens to be held by bodies of

~ men.

4. It is dishonest in a man to make an act of faith in what he has not had br~1,lght home to him by actual proof. 4 '

These four propositions are illustrative of the Oxford ration­

alism which Newman was to enedunterand oppose. This is re­

presentative of the first form of rationalism mentioned

14Newman , Apologia, p. 294.

21

before;1 5 one of its leading exponents was Richard Whately.16

After Whately had captured NeW11l8U'S mind for a bri/f

period, their rela tionship ended wi til the two in disagreement.

The years, from 1825 to 1$28 , in which ~nately was to exert

an influence over Newman are specified by Newman himself.

The years I spea k of as those of my intimacy with him were from 1825 to 1 8~8, during the first of which I was his Vice-Principal at Alban Hall. His influence over me ceased alto­gether in 1828, being superseded bY17 that of Mr. Keble and Mr . Froude •••

This encounter with Whately was one of the first influences to

which Newman was subjected as a Fellow of Oriel. 18

Whately was greatly enamored of the value of reason, es­

pecially the force of formal logic. A few phrases from his

book on logic give an_illustration of his type cjf t hinking,

"The most appropriate intellectual occupation of man, as man,

is evidently reasoning,,,19 and again, "The judgments of com­

mon sense are conjectural.,,20 For Whately the correct way to

15 . See p. 17. 16

Sylvester Juergens, Newman on the PSYChOlO,y of Faith in the Individual, (New York: Macm1!lan Co., 1928 , JUergens points out that Whately was one of the best known spokesmen of the Liberal school at Oxford. Further on he cites two of the four proposi tiona mentioned above in the text as tenets of the Oxford Liberals of Newman's day, pp. 3-4.

17J •H• Newman, A Letter to Monsel, Oct. 10, 1852, (Un­published), quoted by Boekraad, Personal Congue st .2! Truth. p. 19, See also Apologia, p. 8.

18 Juergens, Newman, Psychology.2! Faith, p. 241.

19Richard Whately, Elements of Logfic, (London: Reprinted from ninth edition), p. x. quotedrromoekraad, Personal Conquest of Truth, p. 73.

20 ~., p. xii.

22

true knowledge was through formal reasoning and logical de­

monstration. It wa s upon these lines that he was to ex'r­

cise an influence u~on Newman.

Originally Newman had been attracted to the Evangelical

a pproach to religion, "but soon he was dissatisfied "'lith it

in his heart, because it was too vague, too 'misty' in its

views.,,21 Newman's mind demanded more than a religion of

sentiment and emotion; such a religion was too shallow for

him; he wanted to penetrate the depths of reality and grasp

the real meaning of things. 22 In the logic of Whately, New-

man saw a means of adding clarification and precision to his

religious thought. So from Whately he learned formal logic,

and "to think for himself and to write cautiously and clear­

ly. ,,23 Newman describes this influence in the Apologia ..E!:2

Vita ~."

He, emphatically, opened my mind, and taught me to think and to use my reason •••••• He had done his work towards me or nearly so; when he had taught me to see wi th 2~ own eye s and to walk with my own feet.

As a result of this influence of Whately, Newman was drawn

out of the narrO\,l views of religion in which "Evangelicalism"

21 Boekraad , Personal Conquest 2! Truth, p. 89. 22 Ibid., p. 90. -23 Juergens, Newman, Psychology 21. Faitr., p. 241. 24 Newman, Apol~gia, p. 8.

naturally tended to confine him.25 /

But Newman eventually found that he could not go all

23

the way with Whately. The realization of the excellence of

reason had brought Newman an increase in candor and reality,

but such a ga.in was not wi t hout its dangers. Newman began

to feel that t he prize had been purchased at the price of a

loss of reverence and depth. He was himself drifting into

a rationalism which he did not like.

The truth is, I was beginning to prefer intellectual excellence

. to moral; I was drifting in the direction of liberalism. I was rudely awakened from my dream at the end of 1827 by two g~gat blows­illness and bereavement.

Newman himself realized that he and Whately were too different

to remain on the same line for very long. 27 After 1826, when

Newman resigned as his Vice-Principal at St. Albans, their

paths began to take diffE:rent directions. The formal break

between the two came in 1829 over the matter of Peel's re­

election at Oxford. 28

Newman's break with Whately constituted his definitive

25Juergens, Newman, Psychology of Faith, p. 243. 26 Newman, Apolo&ia. p. 11. 27 .!!?!!.. p • g.

28,Ibid •• p. 11.

24

split with the proponents of rationalism. 29 Once and for all

he broke with the forces of Oxford rationalism. This experi­

ence at Oxford ha.d a profound effect upon Newman, for it

brought him face to face with the conflict between religious

faith and rationalism. It was this crisis that "brought home

to him strongly the opposition between rationalism and the

religious 'ethos,."30 Newman chose the religious "ethos",

and it was a choice that was to determine the course of the

rest of his life. It was this choice that made him a life­

time opponent of rationalism.31 It is hardly possible to

exaggerate the importance of this experience which Newman

had at Oxford.32 It exposed to him the fallacies of ration­

alism and the danger of the unmitigated application of reason,

29It seems that not all agree completely on Whately's position. Douglas Ehninger in an introduction to Whately's Elements of Rhetoric, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, i9OJ), states "Whately himself was by profession a churchman and by dedication a life-long defender of religion against the attacks of rationalists and the scepticism of science", p. ix. Ehninger, in a footnote, goes on to associ­ate Whately with the Tractarian movement, "Through close friendship with Pusey, Keble, Hawkins, and Froude he was associated with the Tractarian movement, although not him-self a Tractarian in the s t rict sense of the term." R.W. Church, however, speaks of Whately as being one of the most prominent of the liberal writers, The Oxford Movement, (Lon­don: Macmillan and Co., 192Z), pp.~6. Boekraad also places Whately in the camp of the rationalists of the Liberal School, Personal Conquest of Tnuth, pp. 73-74. Whatever be the merit of Ehnlngeris appri!sal of Whately, it seems quite clear that Newman considered Whately responsible for a Liberalism in reli­gion which influenced Newman himself for a short period, Apologia, pp. 11-15.

30J •H• Walgrave, Newman The Theolofian trans. by A.V. Littledale, (New York: Sheed and Ward, 957), p. 34.

31~. 32 Ibid., p. 33 -

25

in the form of logical demonstration and formal inference,

to matters of religion and revealed truth. /

This encounter with Whately represents Newman's con­

flict with rationalism while he was in the Anglican Church.

His direct encounter with the next man, William Froude, be­

gins in the period in which Newman seriously was thinking

of becoming a Catholic.)) For the most part they continued

their correspondence until Froude's death in 1879. Froude

was a representative of the second form of rationalism men­

tioned in this chapter)4 Newman's correspondence with this

man is also a very good illustration of his encounter with

rationalism during his days in the Catholic Church.

Unlike Whately, Froude was not a churchman, but a

scientist. In matters of religion he was somewhat of a free­

thinker. His whole approach to reality was through the sci­

entific method. He did not see how the mind could go beyond

probability in its judgments.- The certitude of faith always

was to remain an enigma to him. In their correspondence New-

man attempted to show Froude that the human mind could and

did go beyond probability to certitude. Froude, however, was

)JG• H. Harl'er, Cardinal Newman and William Froude, A Correspondence, (Balti more: John HopkIns Press, 1933), pp: 14-13. Harper cites thnt Newman's correspondence with the Froudes began around 1844-45. Most of the e~rly letters were addressed to Mrs. Froude, but they seem to have been written to William as well.

34navis, Newman, Faith and Certitude, p. 250. The author states that Froude wa"S"""representative of that school of rationalism which applies reason too strictly to matters of faith and religion.

26

not to be shake~ed f rom his strong convictions and he re­

mained a religious sceptic until his death in 1879)5 /

Despite their intellectual differences, t he relation-

ship betl1een NeWman B,nd Froude always remained war m and

friendly. Froude 'fras not a scoffer nor an iconocla st, but

an English gentleman, and "the gentleman counted much with

Newman."36 He was not a tough minded scientist on the war­

path against relig ion, rather, he possessed a sincere desire

to discover whatever truth there was in religion.37 As a

result, Newman and Froude \-le re always open and respectful

of one another's positions. Ever since Newman took the

;roudes into his confidence in his own religious trials

th~re remained a close bond between him and the entire fam­

ily. Newman was largely responsible for Mrs. Froude and

four of the Fraude children's conversion to Catholicism.

This proved to bea great trial for ivilliam, but it never \

caused any real strife between Newman and him. Such was the

relationship of the t .wo men who argued so forcibly about the

evidence for religious faith a'nd the possibility of its cer-

titude.

Their entire correspondence revolves around the question

35Harper states: "In spite of his softness of personal manner, Froude never relinguished his 'tough minded' attitude, and to the end of his life he remained firmly agnostic, scep­tical even of the possibility of absolute certainty in secu­lar a s well as religious matters.", Newman, Froude Correspon­dence, p. 8.

36 Ibid., pp. 10-11. -l7Ibid.

27

of 'the evidence for faith a nd its certitude. As a scientist

Froude first examined the evidence and then concluded c!ccord-

ingly. To hi m t h e credi bility of one's judgments were only

as forceful as the evidence which one could bring in support

of it. Taking a dictum from Faraday, F'roude subscribes to

the following statement:

••• the force of certainty of our conclusions ought to be proportioned to the force of the ~vidence by which they are supported.)8

In effect, this made all our judgments probable, mor. or less

so as the evidence was stronger or weaker. This is the con­

text in which Froude subscribed to Butler's phra.se, "To us,

probability is the guide of life."39 The human mind could

never go beyond probability in its search for truth.

For Froude there was no p08sioilityof any real certi­

tude. In no realm of thought could the human min<i arrive at

a certain conclusion. Such certitude was not only beyond the

domain of Theology for Froude, but it also exceeded the limits

of the knowledge of the .ordinarY facts of experience. He

did admit that some conclusions were more certain than others

but, until the day he died, he insisted that "there is an

element of uncertainty in all."40 The reason for such un­

certainty is due to the fact that the mind judges on evidence,

)albid ., p. 139 • ........... 39I~id., p,. 125,.

40Ibid ., pp. 119 .. 20. -

28

\Im ich i s never absol ut e l y concluol ve , and. theref ore i t s j u,dg-

mente can never be uncondi t iont\l or truly cert8.in . I

ccor ding t o Fr oude a ny at t empt of the man of fait h to

clai m a cert i t ude beyond the probabil i ty of t he evi dence is

not hi ng but pr ejudice and "an i nst.ance of an i mmoral temper

or of a n irunoral use of the f acultie s . ,,41 Fait h al ways r e-

mains in the r ealm of probability . or f r oude the only type

of f a ith that i s ,'lOrthwhile is one that f ul ly r ealizes t he

doubtfulnes s o f its conclus i ons, yl9t "acts neve r theless con­

f idently on the best and wisest conclusion it can form ••• ,,42

f aith and doubt ar e c oncomitant. The best the mind seems to

be able to arrive a t is a f a i rly certain opi nion. To clai m

th Gl t f aith reaches ce r titude i s nonsense. The mi nd " accord­

i ng to Froude, ca n ne ver arrive at certi tude about a nything .

Our conclus ions a l ways must rema i n probabl? and the mind

!'!lust be ever open to a ccopt new evidence.

Both fo rms of r a t i onal ism, What e1.y ' s brand ana t he type

t hat Frouds r epr esents, a ttack cer t i tude he cau se it produce:s

an assent which goes beyond the probability of its evidence.

Assent 15 thus made proporti ona te to the evidence. Evidence

becomes t he all i mportant eleme nt in aSlJentj if the evidence

is there J t hen the mind wi ll be ovorwhel med and a ssent will

automatically follow. But since t he evidence provided

th rough t he i nfer enti al process is a l ways condi tional, more

or l ess credible, subject to modification, and admitting

41Ibid., pp. 121-22.

42Ib1d ., p. 122.

29

degrees, then, t.'1e as sent, proportionate to such a n i nf er ence,

will also be conditional and subject to degrees. r

The possi-

bility of an unconditional assent , and therefore a real cer­

titude in faith , or any matter , is denied.

Newman vehemently opposed t his a spect of rationalism .

He knew that he possessed certitude within his own mind, and .

he knew that the ordinary believer possGs sed a si!nila r certi-

tude. He proposed to show t hat t his certitude was valid .

To do this, he had to show how the mind could go beyond the

probability of the evidence to a certain assent . This ~eant

showing that evidence was riot the all important element in

the assent of certitude, ~nd that other factors, factors

wi~in the person , entered into the process of a.rri ving at

certitude. \,y'hat these factors are shall be seen in the

following chapters.

)0

/

THE UNIVERSITY SERMONS IN DEFENSE OF CERTITUDE

Newman's encounter with rationalism was a progressive and

developing phenomenon; so a lso was his answer to rationalism's

attack upon faith and his defense of ~ertitude. As a result,

the explication of Newman's endeavor to rescue faith and its

certitude from the error of rationalism is a ~ather complex

and burdensome task. Admittedly the devision of Newman's life

into two specific periods, his Anglican days and his life as a

Catholic, greatly oversimplifies the progression of his thought.

However, for the sake of consistency, and in order to show the

develo pment involved in his thought, the same procedure shall

be followed in tracing Newman's justification of certitude.

In answering Whately's brand of rationalis~, which sub­

jected the truths of faith to the test of strict reason, New­

man purposed to show tha t faith, although it is reasonable,

is not a reasoned act directly proportionate to its evidence,

and that other factors enter into the complex act of faith

which enable it to go beyond the probability of its evidence.

The purpose of this chapter shall be to examine Newman's jus­

tification of faith and its certitude which evolved during his

)1

struggles with r a t ionali sm a s a n Angl ica.r. . Newman ' s re pl y to !

this t ype of r at ionalisr£l i s contained prima r i l y in his Oxford

University Sermons . 1

Before going i nto further detail on the notions of fa ith

and certi tude f ound in t he University Sermons, it will be use­

ful to I'::i ve a. f ew interpr et ative principl es . Fi rst of all,

Newman's method i n t he Sermons i s experiment al. 2 The Univer­

si ty Sermons are a l aboratory i n which Newman t ested and worked

out his t hought on faith and it s relatedness to reason. His

thought contained therein was the outcome of accident al 'Nrit­

ings strung out l oosely over a period o f about ten years, from )

1 S) 1 to 1 $41 • Newman does not even start out with a tenta-

tive'. definition of faith. 4 He begins with experience and with

faith and its certitude as fac t s exis ting within hi mself and

others.

A second princi ple flows f rom the fir st. As pointed out,

the University Sermons extend over a pe riod of years. Conse­

quently, the noti on of faith f ound in them i s not a st atic one

1Newman •s answer to Wha t ely' s t ype of r a tional i sm i n t he matter of faith i s contained primar i l y , but not excl us ively, in the Oxford University Sermons (London: Longmans, Green and Co.,1 918 ). Much I s contairifl d In hi s Parochial and Plain Ser­mons (London: Longmans, Green and Co., eight volUiiles, 1920:"24), n1sLectures on Justification (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924) ana In tne t\IC volumes of the Via Media (London: Long-mans, Gree n and Co., 192)). -

2John A. Elbert, Evolution of Newman's Conception of Faith (Philade~phia: DolphIn Press, 1932), p. 79. --

:3 lill., p. J? ..

4.Ibid., "They (University Sermons) a r e an exploring ex­pedition-Into an all but unknown country and do not even ven­ture on a definition of either Faith or Reason on starting ."

32

but progressive and evolutionary. An isolated passage cannot

be taken as Newman's notion of faith in the University se~mons. His thought on faith is definitely progressive,5 and it can­

not be adequately understood if se parated fro m its evolution­

ary framework. In the University Sermons, Newman's notion of

faith grows in accuracy and precision, ye t with the last one

in 1841 the notion is still inco mplete and .unfinished. 6 It

has yet to be polished by the thought of the Grammar £! Assent.?

In light of this evolutionary nature of Newman's thought

on faith in the Sermons, the concrete situation in which this

thought develops becomes most significant. In order to appre­

ciate the full dimensions of his thought, one has to be fully

cognizant of the existential condition which produced it.

Newman was keenly observant and always open to the concrete

situation. His thought can never be completely isolated or

abstracted from concrete realities. At time s it is difficult

to sa y which influenced the other the most, whether the form

5Ibid ., p. )8, Elbert specifies this progression as a graduarTissening or decrease in Newman's opposition to reason. He states tha t in the University Sermons Newman emphasizes the practical aspect of f a ith \<bile neglecting it s explicitly reasoned side, (p. 79). While it is true that Newman empha­sizes the moral aspect of faith, especially in the earlier sermons, it is equally true that in his la ter sermons he speaks of faith as an exercise of reason. Toward the later sermons it i s evident that Newman accepts faith as a reason­able, but not l'easoned, act. P

6Ibid ., !lThat Newman's notion on faith were still incom­plete in1841, is al together evident; it required the ~' Grammar of Assent' to give them the ir final form."

7 Ibid.

))

of his thought was specified by the concrete situation or

vi ce-versa. I

Awareness of the concrete nature of Newman's

thought is the third interpretative principle which must be

kept in mind in order t o understand the notion of faith pre­

sented in the University Sermons.

The problems with which Newman is faced in the Univer­

sity Sermons are rather complex. First of all he is react-

ing against Whately's rationalism, encountered by Newman at

Oxford, which subjected the truths of faith to the proof of

reason. Newman strongly reacted against this type of rat i on­

alism. Faith could never be compl~tely subjected to reason,

to do so would reduce faith to a reasoned act, a conclusion

of a syllogism. Newman saw the error of t his p,osition and

opposed it. In the University Sermons , Newman attempted to

show how faith and reason are distinct and yet very much re­

lated at the same time.S In germ, Newman's thesis was that,

although faith is a reasonable act, an exercise of reason which

can go beyond t~e probability of its evidence to a kind of

certitude, nevertheless it is not a reasoned act. Newman

proposed to Show that faith is reasonable, but not rea~oned.

The affirmation of the distinction between faith and

reason introduced another problem, and,that is, how faith can

be reasonabl e and yet demand less evidence than reason. This

SIbid., p. 40, "In the University Sermons, therefore he proposea-to complete this conception. He does t his principally by comparing faith to reason itself, showing us, in how far it deviates from the reasoning process and how these deviations are to be accounted for without infringing on the reas9nable character of faith."

34

question involves showing how faith can go beyond the pro-/ I

bability of its evidence to an assent of certitude. Newman

attempts to solve this problem in the University Sermons

through the operation of love and what he calls the moral

dispositions. Herein lies the heart of Newman's defense of

certitude in the University Sermons, but before de l ving into

this mat.ter. it will be revelant to examine Newman's analysis

of the relationship and distinc'tion betwe~n faith and reason.

In examining the University Sermons, it is seen that one

of Newman's primary concerns is to ascertain what precisely

is the rela tionship between faith and reason. 9 Newman's con­

cern for this problem grows out of his own encounter with

rationalism. Whately, along with the trend of the times.

overemphasi~ed the value of reason, and Newman reacted by

toning down the role of reason. In the beginning of the ser­

mon !h! Usurpations 2! Reason, Newman plays down the value

of reason in religion and faith. 10 This seems to be Newman's

first reaction to rationalism, and it is quite natural. Ra­

tionalism overemphasized reason; Newman's response was to

deemphasize it. However, Nevmlan did not wish this deemphasis

9John H. Newman, Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the Uni­versity 2! Oxford (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 19~.--Yn an ear y sermon entitled "The Us-urpation of Reason", Newman proposes "to make some remarks upon the place Which Reason holds in relation to Religion •••• (p. 58). From the titles of two lat~r sermons, "Faith !B& Reason, Contrasted ~ Habits ~ Mind" (p. 176) and "The Nature of Faith In Rera tion to Reason" rp:-202; it is evidentthat thfsis a toPIc of specia! concern to Newman in the University Sermons.

10 ~. t , pp. 55-56.

35

to degenerate into a denial of a pl ace for reason in religion !

and .t,'aith. Reason does ha.ve a pl ace in ma t t ers of faith ~ and

it is his intention to find out exactly what is rea son's role 11

in faith.

In r elating faith and reason, it is quite evident that

more than anything else Newman wishes to af firm tha t there is

a definite disti nction between the t ,OI/O . Newman, i n one of his

earlier sermons (1 8J 1 ) ,12 mainta ins that any existing opposi­

tion between faith and reason 1s due to a f ailure to understand

the distinction between the two.

This opposition between Faith and Reason takes pl ace in two ways , when either of the two encro,~hes upon the province of the other. )

When faith is i mposed ullon the realm of reason, and when rea ...

son encroaches upon the province of faith, a warfare between

faith and reason follows. A true and proper distinction has

to be maintained if th e two G. re to exist together in harmony.

The affirmation of the disti.nction between faith and rea­

son is a simple task; the delineation of the distinction is a

more complicated and involved ma t ter. In 1831, Newman 's dis­

tinction between faith and reason is quite Simple and yet

rather impreCise. Faith seems to be relegated to rt'.an 's moral

nature ,14 while reason is located in man's intellectual nature.

11 6 Ibid., p . 3. 12 .ills!., ttl!!.! Usurpations !21. Reason", p . 54.

1J Ibid ., pp. 58-59. -14 Ibid ., p. 59. -

36

But the expression of th is distinction is very i mprecise , a nd

therefore the die t i nction remains r a ther nebulous ill I

With his s er mon Faith and Rea son, Contrasted. a s Habits of .....-. --

Mind (1 839), the distinction seems to become somewhat clearer. -Faith and rea son do not seem to be quite as independent of one

another in NeVillan ' s mind &5 they we re in 1 8J 1. Faith should

not be considered independent o f reason or as a compl etel y new

mode of a.rriving a t truth; the gospel does not alter t he con­

stitution of our nature but elevates a nd adds to it. 15 While

affirming the role of moral d ispositions in faith ,16 l'Je\'.rl1an

denies that faith is but a moral quality .l? He seems to be

less willing to emphasi ze the moral a s pect of f ait h than he

was .1n 1831. More emphasis is given to the intellectual as­

pect of faith, the very factor he seemed to pl ay down 1n 1831.

The expression of t he di s tinction is much clearer than

it was in 18)1. Faith, unlike reason, is not the . conclusion

of a process of rea eouing. 18 "Fai th, then is not t he same

method of proof as Reason .,,19 Because it is supernatural,

faith is. therefore, somet h ing higher than reason.20 The

t ruths of reason are arrived a t through experience j f s.ith

comes t hrough testimony. "As then testimony is distinct from

15 ~., p.H31 . 16 .

lblod., p . 1ge .

17 Tb ' 1 182 ,.. loa ., p . •

18Ib ' d 1'19 ~iII' p . •

19Ibid., p . 180.

20lbid •

37

experience~ so is Faith fro m Reason. n21

In another sermon delivered in 1839~22 Newman again/ in­

sists upon t he distinction between faith and reason. Here he

grants faith a certain autonomy~ maintaining that it is com­

plete in itself a nd not dependent upon any process of reason.

ing previous to it. 23 Although the distinction between faith

and reason is nffirmed, f ait h , in this sermon~ is quite de­

finitely spolen of as an exercise of reason. 24 "Thus Faith

is the reasoning of a religious mind ••• tt25 Newman wishes to

justify the validity of f ait h as an exercise of reason and

takes great pains to defend it against such charges as being

"illogical", "a faulty exercise of Reason", and "the reason­

ing ,of a ';{eak mind. "26 Faith is an exercise of reason, yet

it is "distinct from what are called philosophical inquiries,

intellectual systems, courses of argument, and the 1ike ."27

Although it is a process of reason, faith is not a formal

2~Ibid. -22Ibid ., p . 202 This sermon entitled "The Nature of Faith

In RelatIO'ii to Reason" was delivered just a"Week after--aie ser­mon "Faith ana Reason, Contrasted As Habits of Mind" previous-ly cited. - ---

23 ~., p . 202.

24Ibid., p. 207. 25 Ibid. J p . 203. - .

26Ibid •• P . 208.

27Ibid ., p . 212.

)8

logical reasoning process. 28 Faith is not the reasoning of /

demonstration, and, as a result, "it will ever seem to the

world irrational and despicable ••• ,,29 However, whatever the

objections, faith is a process of reason and is in accord

with the psychilogical constitution of the human mind.JO

Faith, as a principleo! belief, 1s therefore something entirely natural, i.e. perfectly in accord with human nature. It is not something extrava­gant or irrational "as i f it were a mere fancy or feeling, which some per­sons had and others had not" ••• (P.S. I, 190) and it must and does find a legi­timate place among the other mode. of man's pursuit of trut.h.)1

At this point, it is quite evident that Newman holds that

faith is "rational"', i n accord with human reason; faith is

"reasonable". It io equally certain that by "reasonable"

Newman does not mean "reasoned" t that is, proven by a pro­

cess of strict explicit demonstration.J2 For Newman, faith

is "reasonable" but not "reasoned".

So far it is evident that faith is a rational process

distinct from the logical process of demonstrative reason, but

28 Elbert, Evolution of Newman's Faith, p. 40. "Fa,ith stands opposed to a proceSs of explicit reason, that is, neither in its nature nor in its g rounds, does it take on the character or form of a logical process of demonstrative reasoning."

29Newma.n, University Semons, p. 21e.

JOElbert,Evolution g! Newman's Faith, p. 22.

J 1 Ibid.. p. 16. ,2 ' ill!1., p . 22.

.,

39

exactly upon what is this di stinction based? It is the answer (

to this quest i on that introduced the se cond problem whicH New-

man faces in the Unive,rsity Sermons, how faith i s able t o go

beyond the probability of the evld6nce in the a ssent of cer­

t i tude? Newman puts hi s f inger upon this when he describes

what he calls t he popular view of the distinction between

faith and reason)) The reasoning of demonstration requires

strong evidence; i n fact , the evidence of demonstrat i on is

so overwhelming tha t the concl usion arrived at demands accep­

tance as true. Faith seems ready to accept less evidence

than demonstrative reasoning, and it seems to be quite con­

tent to make its assent upon much weaker evidence t hat rea­

son p.emands}4 That fai t h for Newman does require some evi­

dence 1s certain ,35 but it does r.ot require nearly the evi­

dence found in formal demonstration.36

Row can this be? How can faith require less evidence

than reason and still claim to be rational and conformable

to reason? Newman poses t his question himself and gives the

answer. The answer is t hat faith works on what Newman calls

antecedent considerations and, because of this, it requires

33 Newman , Universi ty Sermons, p. 165.

34Ibid •

. 35Sylvester P. Jue rgens, Newman.2!! the psychOlo~~ ot Faith l!l.!:!l!. Individual (New York: Macm1i!in C.o ., 19 ), p. 197.

36N8 '11na,n, University Sermons, pp. 253-54.

lessev1dence t han reason does.

Faith, then, as I have said, does not delrand evidence 80 strong as is necessary for what is commonly co nsid­ered a rational conviction, or belief on the ground of Reason; and why? For t his reason, because it is mainly swayed by antecedent considerations)7

40

l

These antecedent considerations seem to be certain presll.rnp-

ti ons, "previous no tices!! , "prepossessions", and (in a good

sense of the word) "prejudices" ,38wh1ch are present within

the mind of the believer previous to the act of faith ·. The

rational groun:ia of fa1th are in the mind of the indiv1dual)9

Asa result of those antecedent considerations the mind is,

as it were, predisposed to believe even before it receives

the 'evidence, 40 and, for that reason, it can assent upon

evidence which is less conclusive than needed for logical

demonstratiop. The antecedent considerations thus supply

for the deficiency of the evidence and maintain faith as a ,; 'I'M

reasonable act.41

----------~-----------------37Ibid., p. 187. -j8Ibid • -39 6 ;Ibid., p. 2 4.

40Elbert, Evolution of NewmantsFaith , p. 64. Elbert points out that in hfs work TWo Essals on Biblical and .Q.u Ecclesiastical Miracles (London: Longmans, Green anno., 1915},Newman 5~tes that antecedent probabilitl can but recommend the eva.dence to our attention (p. 246), Elbert himself states, "Fredispositionsand presumptions, even when they are in accord wi th a religiously-trained conscience» can gi va nothing more than subjective probability more or les s great (p. 64)."

41 Ibid •• p. 62.

41

These antecedent consider-ations are, in t urn, r ooted in f

(lnd derived from the predisposition of the individual for the

reception of religious truth. 42 Newman refers to t his pre­

dis position asa "presentiment of mind,,4) or a "moral dispo­

sition" .44 Anteceden t coneiderations are t he produots of the

mind of the individual ~lho possesses moral dispositions fa­

vorable to aoce pting rel igious truth. That moral dispositions

are operative in faith seems quite evident to Newman • The

external evidence f or the credibility of revelation is t he

same for all me n, yet why is it that some men believe and

others do not? It can.'1ot merely be due to the evidence, for

it is the same for all: there must be something within the

per~on influencing his acceptance or rejection of religious

truth. 45 This is the work of the moral disposition. The man

with favorable moral dispositions will be predisposed to

accept the evidence for revealed truth; the man of bad moral

dispositions will be equally biased in his rejection of it.

In the judgment of a rightly disposed mind, objects are desirable and attainable which 1rre11g1ous/~n will consider to be but fancies.~

42Ibid ., p. 6) -4) Newman , University Semons. p. 21).

44Ibid ., p. 239.

45Juergens, Ne\1man, P~ChOlogy of Faith, pp. 164-65. "They believe on grounds witfi1nemselves-,-not merely or rr.ainly on the external testi mony on \'tl.ich religion comes to them." Also see Newman, Univers ity Sermons J p. 264, where he states that the rational grounds of faith are in t he mind of the individual.

46Newman, University Sermons, p. 191.

42

Mere evidence alone is not the formative factor i n faith, ra­

ther it 1s the evj.d·ence received with favor abl e moral diipo­

sitions.47

The importance of t he moral d!. s position in t he act of

fait..~ is ~eenby the central pl ace which Newman gives it in

t he University Sermons. Faith 1.8 an act of reason "done in

a moral disposition" . 48 It is an act of reason which i s the

product of a re l igious mind. 49 The moral disposition is the

precise factor which distinguishes faith f rom. a process of

explicit reasoning and l ogical demonstration and z ive s it i ts

specific character. 50 It i s t he moral disposition which

f.i ves "likelihood" to the message. "In fact, it is the crux

of the ques t i on of the nature of f a ith. ,,51

As t he distinguishing factor between faith and explicit

reasoning, it is the presence of t he moral disposition which

. enables f aith to accept less evidence than reason. Little

evidence seems to be required if the right moral dispositions

47Elbert, &volution of Newman's Faith, p. 67. The moral dispositions seem to be rooted In conscience. Conscience as internal uuthority of faith creates the predisposition for faith. A precise analysis of the relationship between con­science and the moral dispositi.on wo uld be very enlightening, but such an endeavor goes beyond the scope of this thesis.

4SNewman, Uni versity Sermons, p. 239.

49Ibid ., p. 20). -50Elbert, Evolution of Newman's Faith , pp . 41 and 4) • ....... .;;,;;;,;=-..- - -51 Ibid., p. 41.

43

are present. 52 A correct moral judgment provides the circum -

stances in which a fai nt proof may be more availing than a £trong

one. 53 In fact, \...rhe n a man is longing for a revelation from the

djpth s of his heart , he requires vtJry feeble evidence -- almost

none a t a1l . 54 Ne"\<'t'l:liBn, in suftPort of this viewpoint, recalls St.

Paul f s definition of faith 8..8 "the substance of t hings hoped for

(Hebr. 11; 1). «'Faith is the realh~ation that what one hopes a nd

wishes to be is true J not "the reali zing of things proved by evi­

dence. n55

Its desire is its main e vidence; or as the Apostle expressly g oes on to say. it makes its own evidence, "be!ng the evidence of things not seen.'"

In such a view of faith the evidence is subordinated to the mind

and not the mind to the evidence, wh ich is s.s it should be. Be­

cause of the moral disposition, the role of evidence in faith is

limited. The person is not limited by the probability of the

evidence; he can go beyond it. In faith, the evidence is sub­

ordinated to the moral disposition.

By pl a cing it in such a secondary position, Newman does

not mean to deny t he value of evidence in faith. For Newman

faith is ahrays grounded in evidenc·e.57 If faith is to remain

52Juer gens, NEHlman . Psychology!2I. Faith. p . 197.

53Netiman. Universitx Sermons, p. 191.

54 Juergens. NeWF..an , Psychology E1. F~i th, p . 16,3.

55Ne\>'man, University Sermons, p . 190.

56Ibid • -57Ibid ., p. 191. -

44

reasona.ble, it must be grounded in evi dence. That Newman. de ...

oands so me evidence f or faith is fairly certain . 58 j

The nature

of t his evidence is not quite so clear, at l east not in the

University Sermons. That it is not the evidence of f ormal

dernonstration~eems r a t her evident. 59 \>ihat it consists of

positivtily speaking is a matter of some confusion , a confu­

sion \'ihlch Newman does not seem to be able to r esol va clearly

in t he University Sermons. 60 Though the precise nature of

t his evidence is somewhat obscure, the necessity of some evi­

dence to maintain the reasonableness of fa i t h i s det~nded by

Newman's notion of fa i t h .

Though the precise na ture of this evidence brought to

bea~ in behalf of faith is obscure, there is one characteris­

tic wh1ch it possesses about which Nevmlan seems to be certain,

58Juergens, Newman, Psychology of Faith, p. 212. "Newmam does not hold that mere internal eviaence alone can practically prove the divinity of Christianity. There must be at least enough external evidence to ascertain the existence of what claims to be a supernatural revelation."

591b1d • -60Contributing to t his confusion is Newman's seemingly

scornful a ttitude towards traditional e.pologetics and miracles. Newman adm1ts that apologetics does have a limited service in creating £~ith (see Juergens, Newman, PSYCholOSI £! Faith, (p. 214); however t he. greatly laments the exaggerat on 0.£ thIs science (see NeHman , Uni versity Sermons, pp . 195-96). As for m1racles, Newman accepts them as evIdence (see .Juergens, li!!­~, P$ICh~ObY of Faith , p . 197 and Newman, University Ser­mons, p. 1 . ); however, he does not grant them the concluslve­'liiS'S that many apologi .sts of h i s day gave to t hem (see Flana­gan, Newmfm, Faith .!ll£ the Believer t Westminster: Newman Bookshop, 1946). Newman's clearest analysis of what he means by the evidences of Christia.nity does not come until his last chapter of the Grammar !at. Assent.

45

and t ha t i s t hat in i tself t he· evi dence of f a it.h is but pro­

babl •• 61 The ground of f aith ii.eams t o be pr obabili t y . Pro­babi lity i s its life . 62 Faith i s "crea t ed in t he mind ; not

so much by facts,. a s b y probabi l ities ••• 1,6) The evidence

upon \"ihich fait h is g r ounded r ert.ains in t he realm of proba­

bility .

How t hen can fa ith , which is gr ounded in evi dence that

cannot go beyond pro babi lity , be certain '? HO\'J can i t be a ny

GlOre t han ~reopinion? Newman t s intention ,.qas to aff irm t hat

f a ith is a oertain kno\d edge, 64 but Wle t he r he a. ct u.e.ll:Y does

this in the UrJiversity Sermons is another ma t ter.65 It is

true that by itsel f probable evidence ca n only produce. opinion.

Of itself pro bability cannot produce stability and certitude.

That safeguard whioh gives stability to faith is love of

61 Elbert, Evolution pi N~wmants r'aith, p . 57. 62 Newman, Univer,sity Sermons, p. 200.

6)Ib1d., p . 19 1.

64r~1d., p . 298. Here Newman denies t hDt faith judges and dec · es "in the way of opinion".

65Elbert, Evolution of NeWlIlan 's Faith, Pit 81. Elbert in­s ists t hat at dire time Newman' snotion of faith dtd not go beyol.ld opinion. "And what Newman, at t his time J calls 'faith t could not be rated hi gher than mere o.pi nion especially since he gr ounds it on probabilities. tf From my o\'tTI i nvostigat1on it does not seem t hat Newman ever rially considered f aith to be merely an opinion. but that, at the time of the University Sermons. Newman f ound i t very di ff icul t tv justify t he certi­t ude he knew faith pos sessed.

4.6

Chri st.66 It gi.ves fait h discipline a nd " protects i t from

bi~otry , credulity , and fanaticism."67 Lov~ seems to cl'ar

the air and remove the chaos t hat usually results from pro-

babt lity. F'ait h gains its

and precision f r om love .6S

sistency, love gives fait

irection , firmness , consistency,

By gr anting f i r mness and con-

a kind of certitude.

This theory of certitude is perha ps the weake st el ement

in Newman 's notion of faith at t h:!.s time . Newman intends to

teach that faith is certain , but does his notion of love ade­

quately explain the. certi t ude of f a ith? That he really res­

cues faith from opinion and probability i s doubtful. His

thought on the notion of certitude is not as developed as it

will be l a t er o,n in his l1fe . 69 At t his period of his lif e,

~ewman's conce ption of fa ith dif: ers littlo from an opinion;

I!whatever certitude is possessed is merely subjective in

character and springs not from evidence, but from 10ve. 1t70

66Newman , University Sermons . This iR Newman 's answer in the Univer~it.z Sexmons. "The safeguard of faith is a right state-of heart. This 1s what protects it from bigotry, cred­ulity, and fanaticism. It is holiness, or dutif ulness, or the new creation, or the s piritual mind, however we word it, which is the quickening and illuminating principle of true faith, giving it eyes, hands, and feet . It is love which forms it out of the rtlrle chaos into an image of Christ; ••• " p. 234 •••• li lt acts , because it is Fait h , but the direction, firmness, consiste!1cy , and preC i sion of its acts, it gains !'rom Love." p.250. According to Elbert, p. S1 , t his is also Newman ts answer in the !!! Media, pp . S7-88.

67Ibid •• p . 23lh -6SIb!d •• p. 250. -69Elbert, Evolut.ion .2f. Newman' 5 Faith, p . 74.

70Ibld. -

4'.

ove does not se em to be <-I satisfactory expla 1'1.ati Qn of t he bi:t-

sis of certitude i n fai th. /

Such basical ly is Ne'."ffl'lan r :.l notion of fa:' t h i n he Univer-

51 t y ~_ . ... ~._ answer to the form of rationali sm Hhich

he encountered a s a n Anglican . His primar Y reaction a ga i nst

r ationalism is to deewphasize r eason affi r ming a ll the '.",hile

t hat f .n ith is rea sonable , althoup;h not rea soned . Fait h i s not

rea soned a ct and, as such , it is di stinct f r om r eason. How-

ever, fai t h is a rational and rea sonable act, f or i t is grounded

in r eason and based upon evidence. Although based upon evi­

dence ., evidence is not the only , nor the pri!!lE. ry, fa ctor upon

which the certitude of fa ith is based. Faith is a certain

kno~'ledge, a n assent W1ich goe s beyond the probabi lit,y of t.he

evi dence which i s brought to support it. I n t he Univer sity

~ermons .• Newman shows how two other factors. the moral dispo­

siticm of the believer and love, influence the process of cer­

ti tude and enable tile mind to give an assent which goes beyond

':.he proo(:J.bllity of the evidence. Both of the.se factors are

rooted within the moral nature of the parson. The explanation

of the operation of the moral disposition and its influence in

the process of arriving at an unconditional assent in faith 1s

one of the most important observations rthich Ne .. ~an makes in

the UnivE!rsity Sermons. III reacting against the Anglican

rationalis m, Newman, in the University Sermons, deemphasized

rea son and stressed the moral factors within the person which

enable faith to go beyond its evidence to an uncondi tional

4e

assent of certitude. How13ver , the Univer sity Sermons do not /

conta in Na v.fman' s final wor-d on the justification of certitude .

s pointed out . his t heory 011 the role t hat love pla.ys in

arriving a t certi tude is very inadequata . No" n!~ mor e ma-

ure thought ('ILl the justificati on of certitude will not come

he Gr ammar .2£ .. n ......... _"' .. "' .... ....... '"

49

/

'l'l1E GRANMAR OF' ASSENT I N DEFENSE OF CERTITUDE

In the University Sermons, Newman faced the errors of

Whately and the Anglican liberals; defending faith against

r ationalism, he a ttempted to show that, besides rational t

there was a highly personal side to faith and its certitude,

namely the moral dispositions. Newman insisted upon the

reasonableness of faith and its certitude 1n the University

Sermops, yet he was force~ to face the issue again in his

controversy with William Froude over the rationality of the

certitude ot faith. The purpose of this chapter shall be to

show how' in the Grammar ~~A~_ s_s_e_n_t, Newman, reacting against

the rationalism of Froude, justified certitude as a valid

intellectual process of the mirx1.

Froude insi sted that real c erti tude, in any realm of

thought was an invalid process of the mind and an immoral use

of one's facul ti e s. In the Un! versi ty Sermons, Newman di d not

sufficiently explain how the certitude of faith wa,s in harmony

with the ordinary reasoning processes of the mind. Rooting

the certitude of faith in love, as he does in the University

Sermons, Newman did not very satii:factorlly maintain the

reasonableness of faith from the point of view of its certitude.

50

The inability of Newman's theory of love as the safeguard of I

faith to justify t he certitude of f Bith was pointed out i n t.he

l ast chapter. Newman did adequately maintain the reasonabl e­

ness of t he a ct of f a ith and af f irmed its certi t ude, but, as

to the explanation how t his certitude squared with t he r ation­

al proce sses of the mind, his thought was clearly inadequate

at the time of the Uni versi ty Sermons. This inadequacy Glore

and more became evident to Newman through his correspondence

~lith the Engl ish scientist, William Froude.

Froude i nsi sted that the mind could not arrive at real

certi tude in any realm of human thought and judgment. Judg­

ments were dependent upon evidence, and Froude maintained

tha t . even evidence which seemed most convincing and most con­

clusive might itself be found wanting.1 According to Froude's

mentality, there was almost a moral obl igation to doubt every

proposi tion am conclusion. 2 His doubts were sacred t.o him,

and he felt that t hey deserved "to be cherished as sacredly

as our be11efs_") It was invalid for the mind to give an

'mconditlonal assent to a ny proposition, and, there f ore, the

achievement of permanent certitude became an impossibility.

It was this teaching of Froude that brought home to New­

man the insuff iciency of his own expl anation of the certitude

1 G • H. Ha r per, Ca rd inal Newman ,a nd William Froude, A. Correspondence (Baltimore: John Hopniis Pres.s, 193)), p . 9.

2Ibid •

j Ibi d., p • 1 21 •

51

of falth. Insisting upon the f allacy of Froude's mode o·f !

thinking, Newman clearly saw that it was erroneous, but he

did not think it such an easy matter to show how it was 50 . 4

In a letter dated January 2, 1860, Newman, quite candidly

admits that he find s it di f ficult to answer Fr oude , and that

he is dissatisfied with anything he has written upon the

matter so far . 5 Froucle's objections to the reasonableness

of certitude has the disconcerting ef fect of pointing out

the weakne saes a nd inadequacies of Newman ' s own explana. tion

of the certitude of faith. The Univers i ty Sermone; did not

produce an adequate explanation of the reasonableness of the

certitude of faith, and neither did Newman 's correspondence

with Froude.

Although NeWIT,sn did not work out a satisfactoryjustif1-

cation of the certitude of faith in his correspondence with

Froucla, these letters did give the inspiration and direction

to his answer which was to come in the Grammar of Assent. As

ear~y as 1860, Froude urged Newman to set down an argument in

behalf of the certitude of religious bellef.6 tfllat Froude was

really urging ttewnan to do was to write the book \\hich ulti­

mately appeared as the Grammar £! Assent . 7 The inspiration

4Ibid ., p. 127. "I think it 1s a fallacy - but I don't think 1t"easy to show it to be so."

5 Ibid., p. 127-28. 6 Ibid.. p. 129. - . 7 Ib ia ., p. 21.

52

for the Grarn.\'lIar 2! Assent grew out of the dialogue on certi­

tude which was carried on in the correspondence between New-

man and Froude .

Th~ direction which the answer was to t ake , no less t han

the inspiration, Can a lso be traced to the Newman, Frouds cor­

respondence. In the light of his correspondence \vith Froude.

Ne~'I1l18.n 69.\01, once and for all, tha't it \18.5 i mpo ssible to at tempt

to justify the rea sonableness of the certitude of faith on

scientific principles . 8 If Froude , being a scientist who

based his whole a pproach to reality upon the prineiples of

science " was a sceptic denying allY type of real certitude,

then, it was quite evident that tho justification of the cer­

titude of fa:f.th was not to be grounded in a rigoristic appli­

cation of scientific principles.

The strict scientific approach depended too much upon

the value of the external evidence and not enough on the in­

ternal aspects of certitude. Newman saw that certitude,. an

unconditional a ssent, was a highly personal act and that. in

addition to evidence , other elements, factors of a more per ...

sonal nature, entered into the process of arriving at certi ..

tude. This is the a pproach that N'e"Vnnanchooses to follow in

the Grammar !21. Assent . He looks within the person to see

what it is that enables the mind to make an unconditional

assent in the face of probable evidence. In this manner he

attempts to show how the resulting certitude is valid,

gIbid., p. 1". -

53

reasonabl e, and perfectly in accord with the processes of the

mind . This is how Newman hopes. to justi f y certitude in the

_Gr:.;a;;,;;;mma_=-r .2! As sent.

The existenoe of the certitude of f ait h , a phenomenon ex­

perienced in himself and t hrough the observation of others, WP S

not questioned by N(lwman In the Grammar g! Assent, but accepted

a s an undeni able fact. 9 It \faS the justifica tion of t hi s oer-

ti t ude , a "manifes to" of i ts valiuity ... mti reDsona.bl eness J that

Newman proposed i n the Grammar of As sent. He tiSS Pll r t i cl\ larly ~ - .. .

int erested in showinG!;. that t he cortitude of t he ord inary uned-

ucated believer, in spi te of his lack of knov<J1edge of saienti-. _ 10

fic proofs, was a val. i d and rea s onabl e certitude . NeVIDlI3.n

saw that the certitude of faith wa s not unlike the certitudes,

themselves not subject to scientific proof. which the mind

possesses in many other concrete matters such a s the certi­

tude with wh 1ch t he mind assents to the propositi on. " I shall

9philip Flanagan, Newma.n, Faith ~ the Believer (West­minster J Md.: Newman Booksfiop J 1946) J p. ~ •

10 . . . Edmond D. Benard, ! Preface !2 Newman's Thl')olo€jY (St.

Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1946) J p. '72. In the Grammar of Assent, Newman is not primarily concerned with the sclenti1Tc proofs of Christianity, nevertheless he does not deny them as Benard points out, "Newman does not deny the traditional proofs fo r the existence of Ood. nor does he depreciate scientific apologetics; he simply maintains that the faith of a man un­versed in these matters is both certain and valid. u It is a question of understanding the main purpose of the Grammar £! Assent.

54

die . " I n epproa,chi nr-. the problom in /

Ne i>-.Jn1an is co ncerned \rlit l1 s hewing the val idity of the m1n~ f

certitu.de in cone rete rna tterB . 11 The certitude of faith. be­

ing Bueh a concrete certitude , a t least from t he psycholo1t.ical

viewpoint , is a VD.lid process of the mind , r a t:l.on;ll and . there­

fore . reasonable . In the Graltlrrl9. r 2l Assent I Na\ .... nl.'lrl proposes

to lea d t he reader through a vp.ry t~d1ous and slow proce sD to

justification of the reasonableness of certi tude.

Froude's type of rat i onalisr.l , \'1h ich gave inspi ration and

direction to the Grammar .2! /\s5ent, in denying certitude made

assent proport ionate to inference. ccordine t o Fr oude the

deEr ee of t he aB~ent was directly proportionate to the rorce

of the evidence provided through the inferenti al process .

Through his o~m scientific Ob~H)rvations, F'roude . ecein!'.. that

evidence was ahmys probable and open to change, came t o be­

lieve that the lnind could arrive at no certain conclusion in

any realm of thought . That Ne\<lrman saw a flaw in this analysis

f the mind's operation is eVident in the Grammar .2! Assent

frdm his attack upon John Locke ~o held a similar pos ition.

Locke maintained that there t;ere degrees of assent and "thf.lt

the st.rength of a ssent given to each propos! tion varies ~lith

thp. ' strength of the infe rence on vmich the as sent f ollows ; ••• n 12

To go beyond the probability of the evidence t o a certain con-

elusion was for Locke, as it was for Proude, an invalid

11Planagan, Faith and Believer, p. 92. . - ==--;;..;..;;,;:.. . 12 John H. Newman, An EaseY ill Aid 2! !. Grammar £! Assent

(London: Longmans, Green ana., 1m). p. 160.

55

process . Accordlng to Locke , it is not only illogica l, but

i mmor al to "car r y ou r assent abo;re the evidence t hat a Pl"'­osition i s true . ,,1; NeNman could not go along wit h t his p.n-

lysis . To h:i.!ti this i nterpretation of the relationshi p be­

tween inference and assent seemed "theoretical and unreal .,,14

Thr ough his own observation of experience, New'IDan re~, ­

lized t ha t in mony concrete mat t ers tho ~:\ ind gave its uncon-

dl t ional as sent Cven "'Then the evidence was not absolutel

canclua! va or l OFl: i cal ly de:nonstrati ve. Such co ncrete pro­

ositions as nBritain is an i sl and," or "I shall die," are

adherGd to by t he mind wi t h cerUtude even t hough only prob­

able arguments can be br ought i n support of them. 15 These

roposi tior.s cormot be proved conclusively or demonstrat ed

lORically, yet the mind assents to them with certitude. Trust­

i ng the oper~tion of t he mind \m ich experience t aught him to

be r eal, Newman , in opposition to Fr oude D,nd Locke,16 believed

t hat t his certitude wh ich went beyond t he probabi lity of the

evidence \'i2 S ju::>tifiable and in accord with the r ational pro­

CG ssea of the human mind. Experience t augh.t t hat an inferen­

tia l process which produced only pr obable evidence could pro­

duce an unconditional assent of certitude. It ws s this t hat

1) lQ.!9. •• p. 163 .

141.bJ:.2.. J p . , 64 •

15 Ibid ., p . 294-301. -16Flanagan. Fa i th a,nd Believer, p . 93. According to Flana­

gan' s interpretation, Newman agrees with Locke and Froude that such certitude goes beyond the evidence, but he differs with

t hem in that he holds it to be justif ied.

56

led Newman t o the heart of his explanati on of carti t ude, the

distinction between inference and assent. I

The distinction between inference and assent was the foun-

dati on upon which Newman built the rest of hi s explanation of

tbe defense of certi tude. That this was a key i nsight can be

seen from Newman' s own evaluat i on of it.

At l ast, When ,.1 was up a Olion over the Lake of Geneva, it struck. me: "You are wrong in beginning with certitude .. certitude is only a kind of assent - you should begin with contrasting assent and inference. t1

On t hat hint I spokef7

find i ng it a key to my own i deas.

The importance which this distinction played in Newman's thought

in the Oran~r £l Assent can be seen in the fi r st chapter where

he outlines the method and purpose of the book . 18 An under­

standing of his analysis of assent and inference is essentiel

to the understanding of Newman's justification of the reason­

ableness of certitude.

From an exami nation of Newman's analysis of inference and

assent, it is evident that he considered the two to be both

related and distinct. They are related in this, that inferenoe

is a necessary condition of assent and precedes it; acts of

assent require previous acts of inference as "sine qua non"

17John H. Newman, Autob1ofiraahical Writin~s, ed. by H. Tristam (New York:Sheed andsr:, 1957), p. ~O taken from an article by J.D. Bastable, The Germination of Belief with­in Probability According to NeWman, PhilosophiCal Studies;­TVol. II, pp. 81-111 ), p.-ro4.

18 Newman, Grammar 2! Assent, p. 7.

5'7

conditione. 19

and effect.20 However, their relationship is not one of cause

A cause should be proportionate to its ef~ct, but, as pOirlted out, in many cases the assent goes beyond t he

inferential proce ss. If the relationship were one of cause

and effect, the eff ect would be greater than the cause in many

cases .. An act of assent requires an act of inference, but

there does not exist a relationship of strict proportionality

between the two.. As sent can go beyond inference and here is

the basis of the distinction between the two. Inference is

always probable and conditional, but assent can go beyond the

probable evidence to an unconditional acceptance of the pro­

position. Assent is unconditional, whereas infere:lce is con­

di ti,onal. 21

Newman's analysis of assent and its relation to certitude

was explained in the first chapter, now it remains to explicate

his notion of inference. Inference is a process of rea,soning,

either implicit or explicit, whereby the mind proceeds from

premises to conclusions and the conditional adherence to that

conclusion. In the Grammar of ... A.-s.-se .. n..,t ... , Newman distinguished

three phases ot inference, natural, informal and formal.

Formal inference is a process of verbal reasoning;22 not

as opposed to mental reasoning, but as attempting to express,

19 . Ibid •• p. 20.

20Ib1d .• -21 . Ibid •• p . 8. -22 lbid. ~ pp" 263-64.

58

as adequately as possible, the reasoning in words . Logic and

syllogistic reasoning are t he scientific expression of t his

type of inferenee.23 The more abstract and notional the pro­

position involved in this type of reasoning process are, the

more effective does this reasoning become . 24 Formal infer­

ence, whose most adequate expression is found probably in

mathematics,25 is more at home in the realm of mental ab-

stractions. But, si nce t he "abstract can only conduct to

abstract,,,26 this rea soni ng process breaks down in the matter

of ascertaining concrete facts. In concrete facts, formal

inference can only conelude probabilities and for two reasons:

"first because its premises are assumed, not proved; and

secondly because its conclusions are abstract and not con­

cret~. 27 Formal inference cannot lead the mind to certitude

in concrete matters. 28

23 ~., p. 264.

24~., p. 265. " ••• , -in oc.her words, the nea,rer the propositrOris concerned in the inf erence app,roach to mental abstractions, and the less they have to do with the concrete reality, lind the more closely they are made to express exact, intelligible, comprehensible, communicable notions, and the le ss they stand for objective things, that is, the more t hey are the subjects, not of real, but of notional apprehension, -SO! much the mora suitable do they become for the ' purposes of inference."

25Ibid ., p. 278. Newman points out that even mathematics can be SUbject to i mperfections in its process of investigation.

26 ' 6~ Ibid., p .• 2 o.

27Ibid., pp. 268-69. 28 l£!£., pp. 278-79.

59

The method by wh ich t he mind is able to become certain

of what is true :i.n the concrete is through that reasonini

process which Newman r eferred to as infor mal inference. In­

f ormal inference is a reasoning process whi ch conve rges t o­

ward :i conclusion , from probabi lities which "arise out of t he /

nature and circumstances of the particular case which is

under review. 29 The premises of this mode of reasoning are

concrete and individual, varying with dirferent minds,3 0 and

t hey cannot be reduced or converted to the abstract premises

upon which formal inference is bHsed.3 1 I n t his reasoning

process, the conclusion is not actually att ained, but, as it

were, foreseen and predicted;)2 its premises do not "touch

it logiCally,")' but "converge to it.,,'4

Though this is the process of inference that reaches

truth in the concrete, it does not supersede formal infer­

ence, but is "one and the same with it.")S Informal infer-

ence, however, is no longer in the realm of abstraction, but

reaches into the realities of the concrete and individual

case)6 Furthermore, informal inference, more or less

29Ibid ., p. 2$8.

30 · 2 Ibid •• p. 93. 31 ~., p . 288.

32 Ib1d.., p .321.

331!?!,g.

34Ibid • -'5 Ibid., p . 292. 36Ibid •

60

implicit.3? consiots of several acts and is recognized by a

pro cess , which di s tingutshes it from natural inference, another

mode of arrivinp; a t truth i n t he concrete.

Iatural inference , which reasons from concrete fa cts to

concr~te facts without any medium between the antecedent and

t he consequent,3S i s an instinct i ve process of rea soning in

the concrete. Contrasting the two, natural i nference seems

to be less conscious t ha.n infor mal inference .39 In fact.

natural inference is almost totally unconscious and non­

reflective,40 therefore, it is difficult to express exactly

its nature. Since inf ormal inference. is the most proper way

to truth i n the concrete, little more will be said of natural

inference.

Returning to infor ma.l inference, it, like all inference.

is conditional t o the extent that its conclusions are depen­

dent upon. its premises. 41 Informal inference is the most

adequate process of arriving at truth in the concrete, how-

ever, since it remains conditiona~. it is not a ssent, for

assent 1s always unconditional. This being the relationship

between in£erence and assent, how then does the mind , in con­

crete ~~tters. move through informal inference which 1s

3?Ibid. -.38Ibid ., p . 330.

19Francis Bacchus, l:!2!! to Read ~ "Grammar 91. Assent t tf

!h! Month (CXLI!I. February,-r9~ p. 11).

40Newrnan , Grammar aL .-A;,;;os .. s.-e ... nt ... , p. 332.

41 Ibid .• , p . 293 .

61

condi t.ional to an assent whi ch is unconditional and certain? /

This basically is t he ques tion, how does the mi nd arrive

at truth in the concrete, \n t h which .Newman began the Gl~ammar

of Assent. Up 'to thi s point he has mere,ly expressed the prob-

l am i,n: terms of inference and assent . As sent t i n concrete

ma t ters, i s preceded by informal i nfe rence whose conclusions

are conditional to the extent t.hat they are probabiliti es

converging toward a tl""uth. In making a j udgment of truth in

t he concrete, the mind moves f rom the evidence of converging

probabilit1e s to a.n assent rdhich is unconditional and certai n .

Obviously the evidence , which is only conditional., cannot of

itself produce a certain assent, t he connect i on between con­

di tional i nference and. unconditional a .seent mus t be f ound

elsewhere.

For Newman the answer was found i n the activity of the

living .mind which can read the evidence, and then look beyond

to a point which t he evidence can indicate , but wh.i ch it can­

not quite l"ec1ch. 42 I t is not t he argument t hat reasons ; rather,

it is the mind - the whole man . 4.3 Although the evidence it-

self ca.nnot demand certitude. t he mind can interpret the evi­

dence and see the true a nawer. 44 Therefore , certitude is not

generated by t he evidence, but by the activity of the living

42Flanagan, Faith and Believer, p. 95.

43 Ne WIl".an, Grammar.2!. ltssent, pp. 31 8 and 353.

44Fl an&gan, Faith !!lS! Believer. p . 10,3.

62

raindwhich can recognize the nece ssar y connection between the (

accumula tion and convergence of the evidliHlce and tha truth of

the conclusion .l~5

'l.'his fac ulty by which the living mind arr'ivee at certi­

tude in concrete matters Ne\'ilP.an calls the Illative Sense.

I have already said that the sole a.oo final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matters is committed to the personal action of the r atiocinative faculty , the perf ection or virtu.e of which, ~ have called the Illative Sense •••• +

The Illative Sense is the sole !1'criterion1! for discerning

truth in the concrete. 47 It is the Illative Sense which accum­

ulates the probable evidence. perceives the probabi lities a s

a vth,ole, 48 recognizes that the conclusion toward. which they

converge cannot be other t han true,49 and then judges the con­

clusion to be true . Through the operation of the Illative

ansa the mind pa5SGS from probable evidence to a jud~ment of

-ruth in the concrete. 50

Going beyond the premises, the Illative Sense leads the

mind beyond the probability of t he evidence to the conclusion

45 Ib id ., p. 101. -46.Ne \"JOan , Qrammar $1!. Assent, p. 345.

47Ibid •

48Ib:\d. , pp . 301 and 321.

49Flanagan, Faith and Be l iever, p . 101. - --------50Newman, Grammar E.! Assen~, p. ;21.

63

of a truth . , i s is not to sa y t ha t t he Illative Sense needs

no evidence. 51 o\<-l€ver, the evidence, which is pr ovirl l through

i nfol' lual i nf erence, i s a l wa ys proba ble and can ne ver of i tself

conclude t o a t .rutb . Pr obable evidence can onl y tend to~~ard

a conclusion. s the polygon , \,fh ich i s inscribed i n a circle

t ends to beco me tha t circ le etS its sid~s a r e diminished , but

va nishes before it coincides 'l'1ith the circle, neve r gets be-

~nd a tendency to be come a circle s o a lso probable evidence

neve r gets beyond t he tendency to co nclude to a truth . 52 But

th e Illative Sense can l ead the mind beyond this tendency ~o

a conclusion t o a truth. In comprehending the premises, the

Illative Sense perceives t he l egi t imate conclusion in a nd

th roueh t he premises;53 it retlohes a conclu.sion abov~ and be­

yond the probable evidence. 54 Through the Illative Se nse the

mind can arrive a t truth in the concre,te. It can do thie be-

51 Fl anagan , Falth and Believer. p. 105. Newman never de­nied that the IllatIve ~ense needed evidence to function. Fla­nagan speaking of the lllative Sense haa this to 58.Y . "It acts under the influence of the evidence. and judge s \'ihether or not the truth of the c onclusion is demand.d by the presence of that evidence. which it grasps not in its d.istinct parts but t aken as a ~rhole." (p. 105). However, t he evidence \'1ith which it functions 1s probable ,and for that rea son Newman insists that the chief external evidences for Christia.nity are not mir a cles, but the cumulation of converging probabilities. Juergens, Newman, PSlchology 2! Faith, p. 217.

52wewman . Grammar ~ Assent, pp. 320-21. 53 Ibid., p . 301. -t:4 "I Ibid ., p. 316.

64

cause it has the poweL' to l ead t he Hlind beyond t h e probability

of the evidence and to rele~ se it from a sl s.vish depende.,£c

upon its premises . In concrete matters t he mind can go f ro

conditional inf erence t o unconditionol a ssent , it can g O bo-

ond probability to cer·ti t ude and the re • it can is due

to that intellectual power known as t he Illative 8 6113 e .

That Newman conside:red the Illative 3ens6 an intellectual

unction 1s qulte clear for he refers to it os the po~,;er of

judging and c oncluding in its perfection . 55 It is not just a

feel ing or moral quality , but a rationcimtive fa culty ,56

valid function of the mind . he Illative Sense , as an oper~-

tion of the i ntellect. is a faculty of knowing ; a cap3 city for

knowledge .57 Being an intellectual function and a power of

knowing , the conclus iOfl.S of the Illative Sense are not merely

practical, but judgments of ~ruth . Therefore, the Illative

is a rational operation , perfectly in accord wit h the

reasoning pI'ocess es of t he mind . whereby the mind concludes

to a truth in concrete matt e r s . 'rhe Ill a.ti va Sense i s the

justification of the m.ind 's Qrrival a t truth in the Concrete.

Not only 10 the Illative Sense an intellectual proces",.

but it is a highly personal j udgment. Newman himself describes

55 . ~ I hi d ., p .. 3 53 ..

56 "'1" -lM '145 ~ •• p. '" ..

57 J . J\rtz, Newman Contr i.bution To Theory .2! KnowledSje, PhilosophY 'roday, Vol. IV, (pp. 12-2;; 1960), p. 19.

65

the activity of the Illative Sense aa c:

pe.csonal acti o .. ! . J

I To act like a pel' SOH ~nat one's act i ons express t he

innermost uniquene~s of h.is inciividual c oncre te existence.

s a person one 1.5 unlque ; ere is no other like h i m - no

one to re pl a ce hi/J . o personal is the judgoent of the

Ill a tive Sense that it is i nd ividual to each man .

t i .8 seated in t he mind of t he individual f who 1s thus his own law t his own teacher, and his own judgo in those special ca~~s of duty which are )er60na1 to him .

'1'he judgrnent of the Illa tive Sensa is some ~/ha t unique wi t h

84lc h man , reflect-i llg hil;) own ind iv iduality aa

ud f or t hi s reason Boekraacl de scribes t. he Illative :::lanse as

L eing ealPflatica.l1y porsonal . 60

As a highly p~r8onal act ivity, ano~le r aspect of the

I lla tive Sense can be ltleertecl here. a m , tha t is , t hat the

jud~~ent of the Illative Sense is always free. This , i n turn,

leads to 11 second functlon of the Illative Sense , its role as

the sanction of assent . To say tha.t t he Ill ative Sense is the

sanction of assent is not t o say that it provides r eward and

punishment , but t hat it pr ovides ~~e motive for the free

58r:e tlll1an , GI'ammar of Assent, ' p. 355. !" lanagan also gives evidence to the fact that Newman considered the I llative Sense to be an operaticn of a personal nature, Flanagan, Faith !!!S! Believer, p. 105.

59 d lB.!...., p. 254.

60A•J • Boekraad, .It!..! Personal Conquest £! Truth According 12 ~ Newman (Louvaln : EdItIons Nauv/elaerts, 1955), p . 302.

66

assent of the person . The Ill~tive SensCI can f unction s s a /

sanction pr ec i s el y because it l eads the mind to truth and t o

r efuse a ssent :'n the f a ce of obvious and e vident t 1'ut h is a

vio1at~_on of t he fa culti e s of th0 mind . Uhon confronted \.'l i th

truth a !'!lan has u duty to asscIlt ;61 i n f.:let , NQ'l'mall considered

it a fundamental I t.HI of ti~ e mind to a8 s ent in the face of

truth . 62 This is not a destruction of man ' s freedom , but i ts

h i~~e st expre SSion , for a man i ost f ree ,,{hen he chooses

the t r uth . By l eadi.ng the mi nd to t ruth and the n illduc in

its a ssent » t he :::llativc Sense become s the b r idge by ~.,hich

the mind P.!l 5S6S f r om ccnditional inference to an unc.:onditio"-

a l assent to t r ut h in the concrete .

Unconditional as~ent i n the concre t e is t hus a valid

operatlon of the mind ; it i s r ooted in t he mind , in the 1n-

tel lectual pow~r of the I lla tive Sense , and i s t.here f'oJ."'$ per­

fectly in har mony Ylith t he r ational a ctivity of the human mind .

r om t he p sycholog ical point of' view , faith is also a n assent

to truth in the conet'ste , and. from th.is poi nt of vie". i ts

r ationa.lity i s also rooted in the Illative Sense . Therefo re ,

t he assent, of f aith is r a t i onal and i n a ccord vd ,t h the r eason-

i ng proce ~ses of t he mind , but a r ational procElse that i s

hi ghl y personal .

The mind t the,n, can go be yond the probability of the e vi­

dence to a ce r tai n conclusion , because of the a ctivity of the

1Ne'lJl!'£:n t Gr a.mmar of As sent, p . 41 2 . - - ..... ..;;;..;;;.= 62l bi d .t p . 347.

67

Illative Sens.e , 1 i,a a personal Udg:m€ il v . Certitt:.de .

thu s j"1lB tified on the b(",sis of the jud.t: ... ne nt I f t he Il l .s: t ..l. ve

Sense t.(aich is inter ':'or and in the person . In t he Ill a -

tive Sense Ne .. IIMtn s a p~H~ tellectual [ector which

j ustifie s the rat.ionelHy of certitude and aIlS,'lers the ra -

tiona11stic obj ections of Froude and others t Lat certitude

is irrational - an invalid pr ocess of the mind . Such basic-

ally is New1llan's jusi.,ificatio

.9i J\ ssent •

CONCLUSION ! NE\'l1\1J\N ' S JUSTIFICATION OF CERTITUDE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

68

I

The purpose of this thesis has been to show how Newman

justified the certitude of faith. Approaching the problem

from 'the point of view of the analogy between the psycholo­

logj,cal and supe rnatural, t he psychologica l aspect of certi­

tude was vie\1ed as the analogue and basis of the supernatural

reality of the certitude of f aith. The justification of the

certitude of faith has, then, been limited to a justification

of t he psychological process 'by which man arrives at certi­

tude, in faith and any other realms of thought. But a justi­

fication of the psychological a spect of certitude is indeed

a justification of the certitude of faith in its totality.

By justifying the assent of certitude to truth as a natural

process, one provides the basis for t he justification of the

assent of certitude to supernatural realities.

In order to justify the assent of certitude on the psy­

chological dimension, Newman had to show how man could go

beyond the probability of the evidence to an assent of certi-

69

tude - how conditional inference could produce an uncondi­

tional assent : Since the evidence which inference produ£ed

was only probable and could not e f fect the unconditional

assent of cert i tude of itself, there must be other factors

involved in the process of arriving at certitude. In attempt­

ing to show how man could go beyond the probability of the

evidence to a certain assent, Newman looked for other factors

vmich were involved in certitude. By j ust i fying the process

whereby man could g ive unconditional assent upon conditional

inference and probable evi dence, he would thereby be justi­

f ying certitude in it s psychological di mension . Therefore,

t he discovery and explication of t hese other f ac t ors were

essential to Newman' s jus tification of the certitude of faith.

In his writings in defen se of the assent of f a ith against

r~tionali~m , Ne\;.m.an came up with two such f a ctors which enabled

man to go beyond the probnbility of the evidence t o an assent

of certitUde. These two factors, already explained in the

text, are the moral disposition and the Illative Sense. Both

factors are reali tie s that are internal and wi thin the person

making the assent of certitude, and both are presented by

Newman as elements wh ich enable a ma n to go beyond the pro­

bability of the evidence to an assent of certitude. The moral

disposition is a personal state or frame of mind which pre­

disposes a person to believe and enables him to assent on pro­

bable evidence - to accept les s 0 evid~nce than reason does. 1

1See Chapter III, p. 42.

70

On the other hand,the Illative Sense is that personal in­

tellectual judgment wh ich leads one from probable eVide/ce

to an unconditional assent of certitude. Both the moral

disposition and the Illative Sense are elements which are

internal and personal. In its psychological dime ns i on , then,

certitude is not justified primarily by the weight of the ex­

ternal evidence, but by the internal personal f actors that

are involved in the process of arriving a t certitude. As the

justification of certitude in its psychological dimenSion ,

the moral disposition and t he Ill ative Sense are, therefor e,

the justification of the certitude of faith i n its total di-

men.s10n.

: From the development of t he moral disP03ition and the

Illative Sense in his de f ense of certitude, two other i mpor­

tant consequences are observable. 'rhe first is that Newman

in his defense of certitude always tried to mainta in a balance

between the intellectual and moral aspects of faith. It is

true that at time s, in order to meet the demands of the con­

crete existential situation, he emphasized one aspe ct more

than the other; but never to t he extent of de.nyin~ the other.

In the University Sermons \<Ji. t h the elements of love and,

especially J the moral d1 sposition, Newman emphasized the

oral aspects of faith. The reason for this 1s qllite clear.

Whately and the Oxford rationalists had exaggerated the in ...

tellectual and. rational aspect s of f a ith (so much so t hat

71

they actually destroyed faith ), Newman, the refor e .; in ans\"Jer­

ing this error had to ploy down the intellectual or r ati{nal

aspect of faith and emphasize the moral. The existential

situation demanded such an answer. But even in the Univer-

sity Sermons, Newman also insists upon the rational and in­

tellectual aspect of faith. Maintaining that faith is truly

an exercise of reason;2 Newman describes it as the "reasoning

of the religious mind . ,,3 He takes great pains to defend

faith against charge s of being irrationa l and unintellectual. 4

Although Newman emphasizes the moral a spects of f31th in t he

University Sermons, it is evident from his insistence upon

the r-easonableness of fait~. that, in his notion of fait h , he

is ~eeking a balanced conce pt involving a n interpl ay between

the moral and intellectual aspects of man .

In the Grammar £! Assent with ~~e explication of that

personal intellectual pOl'ler of judging and concluding truth

v/hich he calls the Illative Sense, Newman tends to emphasize

the rational and intellectual aspects of faith. Aga in the

background or environment in \\tJ.ich he is ""riting specifies

the emphasis of his response. Here Newman is defending C'9r­

ti tude against the rationalism of F'roude who maintained that

certitude, in fai t h or any other realm of thought, ~1as ir-

rational and an i mmoral use of man's intellectual powers. In

2 John H. Newman , Fifteen Sermons Prea ched Before the University £! Oxford (London: Longmans, Green and Co.,~1g), p. 207.

3ill!., p. 203.

4See Chapter III, p. 37.

72

answering this type of objection, Newman quite naturally em­

phasized the intellectual aspect of faith; he wa s trying/ to

show that its certitude was i ntellectual and rational. How-

ever, in emphasizing the intellectual aspect of faith, NeMnan,

attempting to maintain a balanced notion of faith , does not

fail to mention the moral aspects of faith. The Illative

Sense is itself uniquely pe rsonal ~md individual involving

man totall y, in his moral as well as intellectual p Ol .... ers .

Toward the end of the Grammar of Assent , Newman restates the ......

importa.nce of the predi spositions of the mind, the ral dis-

position, when he sets do wn specimens of the state of mind

which he demands of t hose who would seriously inquire into

t he .. truth of Chris tiani t y . 5

Therefore, neither in the Uni,versi ty Sermons , nor in the

Grammar £1. Assent, did Ne~.,rr.an sepa rate t he moral and intellectual

aspects of faith . Because of t he concrete situation he mi gh t

have emphasized one more than the other, but he al.oJays sought

a balance, affirming that faith was both an intellectual and

moral act - an activity that involved the tot al man, a response

of the whole person.

This leads to the second consequence which can be drawn

from Newman 's development of the moral dispOSition and the

Illative Sense in his justification of certitude, and, that

1s, that Newman's notion of faith , from the point of view of

the beli~ver, is a co mmitment of response involving the whole

5 Ibid", pp. 417-18.

73

person - all t he phas es of his being . Certitude engages man l

in his intellectual a nd moral powe rs; for Newman this means

that the whole pe rson is involved in thE:: assent of certitude.

Newman, never defined f aith in terms of a personal cO lil.mittment,

but t hr oughout hi s writings in the de f ense of f ait h and its

cer titude, he describes faith in personal terms . The moral

disposition and the Illative Sense are both factors that i

illustrate Newman 's consciousness of the personal na ture of

f a ith and i ts certitude. There is little doubt that for New-

man faith and its certitude were deeply personal act i vities.

I ndeed, it was t hr ough the }.Iersonal qualities of t he

moral disposition and the Illative Sense t hat Newman justified

the " cer ti tude of fa~ t h on t he psychologi cal dimension . This

justification of certitude on the psychologi cal dimension

showed t hat certitude involved man in the tota l dimension of

his being - hi s moral and intellectual capacities, in order

that man might go beyond the probability of the evidence to

an assent of certitude. As the foundation and basis of the

supernatural reality of faith , whose ultimate certitude is

the Word of God, the justification of the psychological di­

mension is indeed a justification of the certitude of faith

in its totality, the psychological and supernatural dimensions.

Such, in sumcr.a tion, is the manner in which Newman justified

the certitude of faith and defended faith and its certitude

against t.he errors of rationalism.

74

l

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