ICAO State Safety Programme(SSP) and Management (SMS ... · strategies Hazards Trend analysis Hazards Feedback Develop control and mitigation strategies Assign responsibilities Implement

International Civil Aviation Organization

Eduardo Chacin Regional Officer Flight Safety

ICAO

ICAO State Safety Programme (SSP) and Safety Management Systems (SMS) perspective

CAR/SAM Regional Workshop on the use of Aeronautical Studies in the Aerodrome Certification Process

Mexico City, Mexico, 21 ‐24 August 2012

Programme1. Objective2. Background3. Introduction4. Definitions and concepts5. SSP and ICAO SARPs6. The ICAO SSP framework7. SSP implementation8. The role of SSP in supporting SMS implementation9. Summary10.Conclusion of SSP/SMS Implementation Workshop

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1. Objective

Objective

Introduce the framework for development and implementation of:– SSP– SMS

Introduce the combination of both elements: – Prescriptive – Performance‐based

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2. Background

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ICAO Role

Promoting a safety and efficient industryTo meet the needs of the peoples of the world for a safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport (Chicago Convention, Article 44)

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ICAO Strategic Objectives

2011 – 2013:SafetySecuritySustainability

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Strategic Approach

Goal– Reduce the risk of loss of human life through continuously enhancing aviation safety

Safety Targets– Safety targets will be defined according to risk criteria

– Continually measured for significant change

Global Safety Initiatives– Linked to global safety targets– Specific metrics will monitor GSIeffectiveness

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Goal

Safety Targets

Global Safety Initiatives

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ICAO Safety Framework

Safety Data Policy & Standardization

– GASP Update– Safety Annex

Safety Analysis– Evolving to a risk‐based process

Safety Monitoring– Continuous Monitoring Approach

Implementation– Runway Safety

Collaboration– States, Regional and International

Organizations, Learning Institutions, etc.2012 ICAO

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ICAO GASP & ISSG GASR

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GASP: Global Aviation Safety PlanISSG: Industry Safety Strategy GroupGASR: Global Aviation Safety Roadmap

Visit: www.icao.int/fsix/

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Global Aviation Safety Plan ‐ GASP

High‐level policy document– Guiding efforts of the States, industry andinternational organizations

Update scheduled for 2012– Introduce safety management principles to createa strategic approach to implementation of GlobalSafety Initiatives (GSIs)

– In parallel and harmony with the update of theGlobal Aviation Safety Roadmap (GASR)

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Current Global Safety Initiatives (GSIs)

(GSI‐1) CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND INDUSTRY BEST PRACTICES

(GSI‐2) CONSISTENT REGULATORY OVERSIGHT (GSI‐3) EFFECTIVE ERRORS AND INCIDENTS REPORTING (GSI‐4) EFFECTIVE INCIDENT AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION (GSI‐5) CONSISTENT COORDINATION OF REGIONAL PROGRAMMES (GSI‐6) EFFECTIVE ERRORS AND INCIDENTS REPORTING AND

ANALYSIS IN THE INDUSTRY (GSI‐7) CONSISTENT USE OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (SMS) (GSI‐8) CONSISTENT COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY

REQUIREMENTS (GSI‐9) CONSISTENT ADOPTION OF INDUSTRY BEST PRACTICES (GSI‐10) ALIGNMENT OF INDUSTRY SAFETY STRATEGIES (GSI‐11) SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL (GSI‐12) USE OF TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE SAFETY

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Objective of Updated GASP

Strategic coordination of global safetyactivities

Guide the prioritization and allocation ofaviation safety resources

Measureable achievement of global safetytargets

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GASP

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Proposed Global Safety Initiatives (GSIs)

GSI 1: Implementation of International Standards and Recommended Practices

GSI 2 ‐ Establishment and Management of a Regulatory Oversight System

GSI 3 ‐Maintaining Sufficient Number of Qualified Personnel GSI 4 ‐ Establishment and Management of Accident and

Incident Investigation Capabilities GSI 5 ‐ Establishment and Management of a Safety Reporting

System GSI 6 ‐ Alignment and Coordination of Regional Programmes GSI 7 ‐ Implementation of State Safety Programme (SSP) GSI 8 ‐ Use of Technology to Enhance Safety GSI 9 ‐ Continuous Monitoring and Improvement of State’s

Aviation Safety System

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ICAO High‐level Safety Conference 2010Recommendation 2/5 ICAO should develop, in close collaboration

with States, international and nationalorganizations, a new Annex dedicated tosafety management responsibilities andprocesses which would address the safetymanagement responsibilities of Statesframed under the State Safety Programme(SSP)

The new Safety Management Annex shouldfacilitate the provision of State and aircarrier safety information to the travellingpublic, in addition to specifying the highlevel safety responsibilities of States

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New Safety Annex 19 (Draft Version)

Safety Management

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Two phased process:– Reorganization of existing

SARPs and supporting guidance material

– In‐depth review of SARPs to assess whether they need to be amended or expanded

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Safety Management Manual ‐ Doc 9859

Third Edition – 2012 (Unedited advance version)

Detailed guidance for SMS / SSP implementation

ICAO Safety Management website– http://legacy.icao.int/fsix/– http://www2.icao.int/en/ism/Pages/Guida

nceMaterials.aspx

Safety Management Guidance Material

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3. Introduction

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Evolution of Safety Thinking

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Workplace interaction

Aviation workplaces involve complex interrelationships among componentsTo understand operational performance, we must understand the interrelationship among components of the work place

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SHEL MODELSoftware (S) (procedures, training, support,etc.); Hardware (H) (machines andequipment); Environment (E) (theoperating circumstances in which the restof the L‐H‐S system must function); andLiveware (L) (humans in the workplace)

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Prescription & Performance

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SafetyManagement

principles ICAOSARPS

Performance

PrescriptionRealisticimplementation

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Prescription & Performance cont.

Prescriptive regulations– Prescribe what the safety requirements are andhow they are to be met

Performance based regulations– Specify the safety requirements to be met, butprovide flexibility in terms of how safetyrequirements are met

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Prescriptive & Performance based environment

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Prescriptive based environment

Regulations as administrative controls

Rigid regulatory framework

Inspections

Audits

Regulatory compliance

Prescriptive basedenvironment

Prescriptive based environment

Regulations as safety risk controls

Dynamic regulatory framework

Data based identification

Prioritization of safety risks

Effective safety performance

Performance basedenvironment

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21‐22/06/2012

ICAO safety management SARPs(Standard and Recommended Practices)

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Two audience groups– States– Service providers

Three distinct Standards– State safety programme (SSP)

• Acceptable level of safety (ALoS)

– Safety management system (SMS)• Safety performance of the SMS

– Management accountability

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ICAO requirement

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States shall establish a State SafetyProgramme (SSP), in order to achieve anacceptable level of safety (ALoS) in civilaviation

Current SARPs for SSP / SMS

Safety Management SARPs for Service Providers

Date Denomination Annex

Nov 2001 Safety Management Programme 11,14

Jan 2009 SMS 6, 11,14

Nov 2010 SMS 1

Nov 2010 SMS Framework (Appendix) 1, 6, 11,14

Nov 2013 SMS 8

Safety Management SARPs for States

Date Denomination Annex

Nov 2006 Safety Programme 6, 11,14

Nov 2010 SSP 1, 8,13

Nov 2010 SSP Framework (Attachment) 1, 6, 8,11,13,14

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SARPs: Standards and Recommended Practices

ICAO State Safety Programme ‐ SSP

SSP provides the means to combineprescriptive and performance‐basedapproaches to:

1. Safety rulemaking2. Safety policy development3. Safety oversight

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SSP

SSP is a consequence of the growingawareness that safety management principlesaffect most activities of a civil aviationauthority (CAA):1. Safety rulemaking2. Safety policy development3. Safety oversight

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CAA activities

1. Safety rulemaking: is based oncomprehensive analyses of the State’saviation system

2. Safety policies: are developed based onhazard identification and safety riskmanagement

3. Safety oversight: is focused towards theareas of significant safety concerns or highersafety risks

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SRM & SA

SSP development is based upon twomanagement principles:– Safety Risk Management (SRM)– Safety Assurance (SA)

SSP is the bridge that closes the gap between:– Internal and external safety processes of a State– Internal safety processes of service providers

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4. Definitions and concepts

What is the objective of a business organization?

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Safety management – Rationale

In order to achieve its production objectives,the management of any aviationorganization requires the management ofmany business processes

Managing safety is one such businessprocesses

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Safety management – Rationale cont.

Safety management is a core businessfunction (financial management, HRmanagement, etc.)

There is no aviation organization that hasbeen created to deliver only safety

This brings a potential dilemma formanagement

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Management levels

Protection Production

ResourcesResources

The management dilemma

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Protection

Production

Catastrophe

Resources +

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Protection

Production

Bankruptcy

+ Resources

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Safety management – The response to the dilemma

Safety issues are a by‐product of activitiesrelated to production/services delivery

An analysis of an organization's resources andgoals allows for a balanced and realisticallocation of resources between protection andproduction goals

The product/service provided by an aviationorganization must be delivered safely

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Concept of safety

ICAO Doc 9859:Safety is the state in whichthe possibility of harm topersons or propertydamage is reduced to, andmaintained at or below, anacceptable level through acontinuing process ofhazard identification andrisk management

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Safety facts

The elimination of accidents (and seriousincidents) is unachievable

Failures will occur, in spite of the mostaccomplished prevention efforts

No human activity or human‐made systemcan be guaranteed to be absolutely free fromhazard and operational errors

Controlled safety risk and controlled error areacceptable in an inherently safe system

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Safety approach

The traditional approach: preventing accidentsFocus on outcomes (causes)Unsafe acts by operational personnelAttach blame/punish for failures to “performsafely”Address identified safety concern exclusivelyRegulatory compliance

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Safety

The traditional approach:Identifies:

– What– Who– When

But not always discloses:– Why– How

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Key definitions

Hazard: condition or object with the potential ofcausing injuries to personnel, damage toequipment or structures, loss of material, orreduction of ability to perform a prescribedfunction

Consequence: potential outcome(s) of the hazardSafety Risk: the assessment, expressed in terms ofpredicted probability and severity, of theconsequence(s) of a hazard taking as reference theworst foreseeable situation

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Other important definitions

Probability: the likelihoodthat an unsafe event orcondition might occur

Severity: the possibleeffects of an unsafe eventor condition, taking asreference the worstforeseeable situation

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Hazard analysis

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State the generic hazard

(Hazard statement) Airport construction

Identify specific components of

the hazard Construction

equipment Closed taxiways Etc.

Naturally leading to specific

consequence(s) Aircraft colliding

with construction equipment

Aircraft taking wrong taxiway

Etc.

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Documentation of hazards

Reactive method• ASR• MOR• Incident reports• Accident reports

Proactive method• ASR• Surveys• Audits

Predictive method• FDA• Direct

observation systems

Method Identification Management Documentation Information

Inform person(s)

responsible for implementing

strategies

Trend analysis

Haza

rds

Haza

rds

Feedback

Develop control and mitigation

strategies

Assignresponsibilities

Implement strategies

Safety bulletins

Report distribution

Seminars and workshops

Assess the consequences and prioritize

the safety risks

Safety managementinformation

Re-evaluate strategies

and processes

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Safety risk management (SRM)

Definition:– The analysis and elimination, and/or mitigation to anacceptable level of the safety risks of theconsequences of identified hazards

Objective:– A balanced allocation of resources to address allsafety risks and viable safety risks control andmitigation

Importance:– Data‐driven approach to safety resources allocation,thus defensible and easier to explain

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SRM

Intolerable region

Tolerable region

Acceptableregion

The safety risk is unacceptable as

it currently stands

The safety risk is acceptable based on

mitigation.Cost benefit

analysis is required.

The safety risk is acceptable as it currently stands

AsLowAsReasonablyPracticable

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Safety risk index/tolerability

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Safety risk severitySafety risk probability Catastrophic

AMajor

CMinor

DNegligible

EHazardous

BB

Frequent 5

Occasional 4

Remote 3

Improbable 2

Extremelyimprobable 1

5A 5B 5C 5D 5E

4A 4B 4C 4D 4E

3A 3B 3C 3D 3E

2A 2B 2C 2D 2E

1A 1B 1C 1D 1E

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Safety risk mitigation at a glance

Feedback (Safety assurance)

Hazard/consequence identification

and safety risk assessment

Assessment of the defences within the

safety system

Control and mitigation of the

safety risk(s)

Accepting the mitigation of the

safety risk(s)

Does it address the safety risk(s)? Is it effective? Is it appropriate? Is additional or

different mitigation warranted?Do the mitigation

strategies generates additional safety risk(s)

H H H H

R R R R

Each consequence

Each safety risk

Intolerable region

Tolerable region

Acceptableregion

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System performance in the real world

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Systemdesign

Baseline performance Practical

driftOperational deployment

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Baseline performance Practical

drift

Organization

Navigational aids for managing safety

Reactive Proactive Predictive

Managing safety – “Navigating the drift”

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Navigational aids

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Reactive methodThe reactive method responds to the events that already happened, such as incidents and accidents

Proactive methodThe proactive method looks actively for the identification ofsafety risks through the analysis of the organization’s activities

Predictive methodThe predictive method captures system performance as it happens in real-time normal operations to identify potential future problems

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Strategies – Levels of intervention & tools

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HAZA

RDS

Predictive

Highly efficient Very efficient Efficient Insufficient

Proactive Reactive Reactive

FDADirect

observationsystem

ASRSurveysAudits

ASRMOR

Accidentand incident

reports

Safety management levels

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Acceptable Level of Safety (ALoS)

It is the minimum degree of safety that must be assured by a system in actual practice

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Another key concepts

Level of safety: degree of safety of a system,representing the quality of the system, safety‐wise,expressed through safety indicators

Safety indicators: parameters that characterizeand/or typify the level of safety of the system

Value of safety indicators: quantification of a safetyindicator

Safety targets: concrete objectives to be achievedValue of safety targets: quantification of a safetytarget

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Selection of safety indicators

The selection of appropriate safety indicators is:– An essential foundation for the development andimplementation of ALoS

– A function of the detail to which the level of safetyof the system is to be represented

Meaningful safety indicators must berepresentative of the elements that characterizesystem safety

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A fundamental differentiation

Safety measurement– Not a continuous process– A spot check– Conducted following pre‐specified timeframes

Safety performance measurement– Continuous process– Monitoring and measurement of selectedoperational activities necessary for the provisionof services

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Safety measurement

Strategic and generally associated to the SSPQuantification of outcomes of selected high‐level or high‐consequence events– Accident rates– Serious incident rates

Quantification of selected high‐level State functions– Development/absence of primary aviation legislation– Development/absence of operating regulations– Level of regulatory compliance

A measure of achievement of high‐level safety objectivesof safety interventions and/or mitigations strategies

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Safety performance measurement

Tactical and generally associated to an SMSQuantification of the outcomes of selectedlow‐level, low‐ consequence processesA measure of the actual performance ofsafety interventions and/or mitigationstrategies, beyond accident rates andregulatory compliance

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Basic safety management SARPs

ALoS to be achieved shall be established bythe StateWhen establishing ALoS, consideration mustbe given to:– The level of safety risk that applies– The safety risk tolerance– The cost/benefits of improvements to the aviationsystem

– The public expectations in civil aviation system

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Expressing the ALoS

Values of safety indicators and safety targets– Initial ALoS: quantitative action statements on

• High level/high consequence outcomes (safetymeasurement)

– Mature ALoS: quantitative action statements on• High level/high consequence events (safetymeasurement)

• Low level/low consequence outcomes (safetyperformance measurement)

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ALoS – Mature SSP

Once States develop safety data collection and analysis capabilities under the Safety Assurance component of the SSP, ALoS should reflect a combination of:– Safety measurement – Safety performance measurement

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ALoS – Legal considerations

Establishing ALoS related to the SSP:– Does not replace legal, regulatory, or otheralready established requirements, but it mustsupport compliance with them

– Leaves unaffected the obligations of States, anddoes not relieve States from compliance withSARPs

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Transition from initial to mature ALoS

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Initial ALoS(Safety measurement)

Quantification of outcomes of selected high-level/high-consequence events

Quantification of selected high-level State functions

State safety assurance Safety oversight

Safety data collection, analysis and exchange

Safety data driven targeting of oversight on areas of greater concern or need

Mature ALoS(Safety measurement and

safety performance measurement)

Quantification of outcomes of selected high-level/high-consequence events

Quantification of selected high-level State functions

Quantification of outcomes of selected low-level/low-consequence events

Timeline

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Delivering ALoS – Safety action plans

Tools and means todeliver the safetytargets of an SSP:– Regulations– Training– Technology

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System today

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State Civil Aviation AuthorityState Civil Aviation

Authority

Safety

measurement

Capture

Storage

Service providers

Airport N° 1

Airport N° 2

Airport N° 3

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Initial ALoS

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Authority

Safety

measurement

Capture

Storage

Service providers

Airport N° 1

Airport N° 2

Airport N° 3

Initial ALoS

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Initial ALoS

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Authority

Protected safety

data

Capture

Storage

Process

Analysis

Service providers

Airport N° 1

Airport N° 2

Airport N° 3

Initial ALoS

Exchange of protected safety data

Safety data collection & processing system

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Mature ALoS

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Authority

Protected safety

data

Capture

Storage

Process

Analysis

Service providers

Airport N° 1

Airport N° 2

Airport N° 3

Initial ALoS

Exchange of protected safety data

Safety data collection & processing system

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Summary

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Set o

f act

ivitie

sSe

t of a

ctivi

ties

ATS Service provider

Aerodrome operator AMOAircraft

operator N° 1

SSP(ALoS)

ATS Service provider

Aerodrome operator AMO

Aircraft operator N° 2

Training organization

SMSSMS SMSSMS SMS

State accepts and oversees individual service providers’ SMS

Safety performance

State accepts and oversees individual service providers’ SMS

State agrees and supervises individual service provider’s SMS safety performance

Safety performance Safety performance Safety performance Safety performance

Safety performance Safety performance Safety performance Safety performance Safety performance

Trainingorganization

SMS SMS SMSSMS SMS

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5. SSP and ICAO SARPs

SSP definition

SSP is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety

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SSP

States shall establish the SSP in order toachieve an acceptable level of safety (ALoS)ALoS will be set by the StateSSP is a management system for themanagement of safety by the State

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SSP in context

The implementation of an SSP must becommensurate with the size and complexity ofthe State’s aviation system

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SSP in context

Requires coordinationamong multipleauthorities responsiblefor individual elementsof civil aviationfunctions in the State

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Responsibilities and accountabilities in an SSP

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Responsibilities: are functions and duties whichdescribe the safety purpose of what an individualis required to do, with regard to the operation ofthe SSP

Accountabilities: are statements of what anindividual is required to deliver, either directly orthrough supervision and management of others,including those to whom the individual hasdelegated responsibility, with regard to theoperation of the SSP

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Accountable person in an SSPShall have administrative responsibility andaccountability for the implementation,coordination and maintenance of the SSP, and:– Final authority on issues related to the allocation ofresources within the State aviation organization thathas been designated as the placeholder for the SSP

– Authority over service provider’s certificatemanagement aspects

– Responsibility for the coordination of the resolutionof State’s aviation safety issues under the SSP

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SMS State requirement

That a service provider implement the SMSacceptable to the State that:– Identifies safety hazards– Ensures the implementation of remedial actionnecessary to maintain agreed safety performance

– Provides for continuous monitoring and regularassessment of the safety performance

– Aims at a continuous improvement of the overallperformance of the safety management system

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Safety Management Systems ‐ SMS

The SMS is a systematic approach to managingsafety, including the organizational structures,accountabilities, policies and procedures

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SMS

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Service providers are responsible for establishing the SMS

States are responsible for the acceptance and oversight of service providers’ SMS

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Service providers and SMS

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Organizations that are required to implement the SMS:– Approved training organizations that are exposed tosafety risks during the provision of their services

– Aircraft operators– Approved maintenance organizations– Organizations responsible for design and/ormanufacture of aircraft

– Air traffic services providers– Certified aerodromes

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The SMS shall clearly define lines of safetyaccountability throughout a service providerorganization, including a direct accountabilityfor safety on the part of senior management

(Accountability: Obligation or willingness toaccount for one’s actions)

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SSP – SMS relationshipProtection Production

Services providerState

StateSafety

Programme (SSP)

Organization’sSafety

Management system (SMS)

Service delivery

Objective:Support safety objectives

Objective:Supportsafety objectives

Objective:Support productionobjectives

Safety assurance

AcceptancePrescriptivesurveillance

Performance-basedsurveillance

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SummaryStates: States shall establish a

State safety programme(SSP), in order to achievean acceptable level of safety(ALoS) in civil aviation

ALoS to be achieved shallbe established by the State

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Service providers: States shall require, as part of their

SSP, that a service providerimplement an SMS acceptable to theState that: Identifies safety hazards Ensures the implementation of remedial

action necessary to maintain agreedsafety performance

Provides for continuous monitoring andregular assessment of the safetyperformance

Aims at a continuous improvement ofthe overall performance of the safetymanagement system

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6. The ICAO SSP framework

Core operational activities of an SSP

State safety risk management (SRM)State safety assurance (SA)

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Core operational activities of an SSP cont.

Take place under theumbrella provided by:– State safety policy andobjectives

– Supported by the Statesafety promotion

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The ICAO SSP framework1. State safety policy and objectives

1.1 State safety legislative framework1.2 State safety responsibilities and accountabilities1.3 Accident and incident investigation1.4 Enforcement policy

2. State safety risk management2.1 Safety requirements for service providers SMS2.2 Agreement on service providers safety performance

3. State safety assurance3.1 Safety oversight3.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange3.3 Safety data driven targeting of oversight on areas of greater concern or need

4. State safety promotion4.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information4.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information

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The components and elements of the SSP

Four components:1. State safety policy and objectives2. State safety risk management3. State safety assurance4. State safety promotion

Every component is composed of elements:– Eleven elements in total

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1. The State safety policy and objectivescomponent is composed of four elements:1. State safety legislative framework2. State safety responsibilities and accountabilities3. Accident and incident investigation4. Enforcement policy

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State responsibility on safety policy and objectives

SSP can only be effectively implemented as partof an overall framework of accountabilities andresponsibilities within the State

SSP must include:– Explicit policies– Procedures– Management controls– Documentation– Corrective action processes to keep the State safetymanagement efforts on track

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2.The State safety risk management componentis composed of two elements:1. Safety requirements for the service provider’s

SMS2. Agreement on the service provider’s safety

performance

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State responsibility on safety risk management

Rulemaking and policy development is basedon hazard identification and analysis of thesafety risks of the consequences of hazards– Regulations become safety risk controls whenadopted by service providers’ SMS

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3. The State safety assurance component iscomposed of three elements:1. Safety oversight2. Safety data collection, analysis and exchange3. Safety‐data‐driven targeting of oversight of areas

of greater concern or need

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State responsibility on safety assurance

Surveillance activities under SSP aresupported by hazard identification and safetyrisk analyses– Surveillance of service providers is based oncompliance monitoring as well as the assessmentof safety performance of service providers’ SMS

• It is based on periodic audits and inspections• Assessment of safety performance of SMS leads toprioritized surveillance based upon the severity of thesafety risks of the consequences of the hazardsidentified by the SMS

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4.The State safety promotion component iscomposed of two elements:1. Internal training, communication and

dissemination of safety information2. External training, communication and

dissemination of safety information

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State responsibility on safety promotion

State must provide its staff– Competence and technical knowledge on subjectmatter

– Additional knowledge regarding hazardidentification and safety risk analysis

State must communicate its SSP internally andexternally

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State Safety Assurance (SA) Today: Prescriptive Surveillance

100

State’ssafety

surveillance

Service providers


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State Safety Assurance (SA) under SSP

Protection Production

Services providerState

StateSafety

Programme (SSP)

Organization’sSafety

Management system (SMS)

Service delivery

Objective:Support safety objectives

Objective:Supportsafety objectives

Objective:Support productionobjectives

Safety assurance


Performance-basedsurveillance

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1. State safety policy and objectives1.1 State safety legislative framework1.2 State safety responsibilities and accountabilities1.3 Accident and incident investigation1.4 Enforcement policy

2. State safety risk management2.1 Safety requirements for service providers SMS2.2 Agreement on service providers safety performance

3. State safety assurance3.1 Safety oversight3.2 Safety data collection, analysis and exchange3.3 Safety data driven targeting of oversight on areas of greater concern or need

4. State safety promotion4.1 Internal training, communication and dissemination of safety information4.2 External training, communication and dissemination of safety information

ICAO SSP Framework

102

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Summary

There are four elements of the SSPThere are eleven components of the SSPThe ICAO framework is intended as aprincipled guide for an SSP:– Development– Implementation– Maintenance

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Summary cont.

Safety management principlesprovides a plattform for paralleldevelopment of:– SSP by the State– SMS by the service providers

It allows that both to get aheadof safety risks

It allows to interact moreeffectively in the resolution ofsafety concerns

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7. SSP implementation

SSP ImplementationThe availability of a framework provides a principled guide for SSP implementation ICAO has developed guidance for the development of an SSP framework in order to facilitate SSP implementation

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SSP – Two considerations

The implementation of the SSP is commensurate with the size and complexity of the State’s aviation system

It may require coordination among multiple authorities responsible for individual element functions in the State

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State – Wearing two hats?

When the State is responsible for the provision of specific services (e.g. aerodromes, air navigation services, etc.) the organization providing the service should develop and implement its SMS

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SSP gap analysis

Allows to assess the existence and maturitywithin the State of the elements of an SSP– Guidance in Appendix 3 to Chapter 11 of the SMSManual

The components/elements identified asmissing or deficient will form, together withthose already existing or effective, the basis ofthe SSP implementation plan

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SSP implementation planA “flight plan” that guidesthe development of the SSP

Allows States to:– Identify those tasks underlyingthe strategy leading to theimplementation of the SSP

– Coordinate the activities bythe various State aviationorganizations under the SSP insupport of the implementationplan

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Why a phased approach to SSP?To manage the workloadassociated with theimplementation of the SSP

To prevent the “compliance byticking boxes”

Three implementation phasesare proposed based on:– The results of the gap analysis– The sequential application ofthe different components andelements of the SSP framework

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SSP implementation plan – Phase I

Plan and draft State Safety Policy

SSP implementation team

Assign responsibilities

Coordination with other

Initial SSP

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SSP implementation plan – Phase II

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Collect and evaluate Selection of safety indicators (initial ALoS) Confidential reporting systems Acceptance on service providers ‘SMS Inspections, audits, surveys

Initial SSP

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SSP implementation plan – Phase III

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Collect and evaluate (Cont.) State safety data collection and analysis capabilities Agreement on safety performance indicators ALoS with safety measurement +safety performance

measurement

Mature SSP

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SSP implementation plan

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Additional requirements During all the implementation phases, the State must

determine if additional safety arrangements are required to implement and maintain the organization’s SSP

SSP

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SSP implementation plan – Summary Timeline

Develop SSP documentation – Element 3.2

Establish means for safety communication – Elements 4.1 and 4.2

Develop and deliver training – Elements 4.1 and 4.2

Initial SSPPlan and Draft

Elements:1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.1,

3.2 and 4.1

Initial SSP Collect and evaluate

Elements:2.1, 3.1, 3.2; 4.1 and

4.2

Mature SSPCollect and evaluate

Elements:2.2, 3.2, 3.3 and 4.1

PHASE I PHASE IIPHASE III

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8. The role of the SSP supporting the SMS implementation

The elements of SMS

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Safety policy and objectives1.1 – Management commitment and responsibility1.2 – Safety accountabilities1.3 – Appointment of key safety personnel1.4 – Coordination of emergency response planning1.5 – SMS documentation

Safety risk management2.1 – Hazard identification2.2 – Safety risk assessment and mitigation

Safety assurance3.1 – Safety performance monitoring and measurement3.2 – The management of change3.3 – Continuous improvement of the SMS

Safety promotion4.1 – Training and education4.2 – Safety communication

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Safety Risk Management (SRM) and Safety Assurance (SA) – Summary

System description/gap analysis

SRM

Hazard identification

Safety risk assessment

Safety risk mitigation

Design

Actual operations

SA

Safety performance monitoring

Management of change

Corrective action

Operation

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The role of the SSP in supporting SMS implementation

Generate a context that supports theimplementation of an SMS by serviceprovidersSMS cannot perform effectively either in aregulatory vacuum or in an exclusivelycompliance‐oriented environment

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SMS can flourish only under the enabling umbrella provided by an SSP SSP is a fundamental enabler of the implementation of an effective SMS

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SSP and SMS components

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Safety policy and objectives

Safety risk management

Safety assuranceSafety promotion

SMS components

State safety policy and objectives

State safety risk management

State safety assurance

State safety promotion

SSP components

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To provide a manageable series of steps tofollow in implementing an SMS

To effectively manage the workload associatedwith SMS implementation

To pre‐empt a “ticking boxes” exercise

Four implementation phases are proposed

Each phase is based upon the introduction ofspecific SMS elements

Why a phased approach to SMS?

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Summary of the role of the SSP in supporting SMS implementation

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SMS implementation phases –Summary

PHASE I

Planning SMSElements:

1.1; 1.2; 1.3 and 1.5 ; [and 1.4]

PHASE II

Implementation of reactive safety management

processesElements: 2.1 and 2.2

PHASE III

Implementation of proactive and

predictive safety management

processesElements: 2.1 and 2.2

PHASE IV

Implementation of operational safety

assuranceElements:

1.1; 3.1; 3.2 ;3.3 4.1 and 4.5

Timeline

Develop documentation – Element 1.5

Develop and establish means for safety communication – Element 4.2

Develop and deliver training – Element 4.1

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9. Summary

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Summary Aviation is the safest mode of transportationThere is no perfect safety systemSuccessful safety management requires theactive participation of all levels of managementand supervisionA clear understanding of the relationshipbetween an SSP and an SMS is essential forconcerted safety management action withinStates

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Summary cont.States and service providers have safetyresponsibilitiesICAO standards requiere States to establish aSSPSSP is an integrated set of regulations andactivities aimed at improving safetyStates are required to establish an ALoS to beachievedServices providers are required to establishSMS

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Summary cont.The basic objective of a State, through its SSP, isto ensure public safety during service delivery byservice providersIt is achieved by defining the ALoS for the SSPand through the control of safety risks within theState by the two “operational components” ofthe SSP: Safety Risk Management (SRM) andSafety Assurance (SA)ICAO is supporting the implementation of SSPand SMS

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10. Conclusions of SSP/SMS Implementation WS

ICAO NACC Regional Office, December 2011

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Metodología

Siguiendo la metodología propuesta por elfacilitador de la OACI, los participantesidentificaron dichas problemáticas

Los participantes trabajaron en 3 grupos y sedividieron la tarea de analizar y proponeracciones recomendadas las cuales se presentanen las tablas siguientes

Los participantes debatieron sobre las accionesrecomendadas presentadas por los grupos

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Introducción

Participaron en el Taller: autoridades deaviación civil, proveedores de servicio: tránsitoaéreo, líneas aéreas, aeródromos,organizaciones de mantenimiento aeronáuticoy la OACIA lo largo de las presentaciones losparticipantes identificaron diferentes barreraspara la implementación exitosa tanto del SSPcomo del SMS

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Grupo I

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Grupo II

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Grupo II cont.

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Grupo III

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Grupo III cont.

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Conclusiones

Los participantes al término del eventomanifestaron su conformidad con dicho taller,considerando que se cumplió el objetivo fijadoAsimismo, consideraron que el mismo les seráde mucha utilidad para la implementaciónexitosa del SSP/SMS en sus respectivasorganizacionesLos participantes instaron a la OACI acontinuar impartiendo este tipo de talleres

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Questions?

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For additional información:

Contact: [email protected]

Visit: www.mexico.icao.int

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Thank You!

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Documents

ICAO State Safety Programme(SSP) and Management (SMS ... · strategies Hazards Trend analysis Hazards Feedback Develop control and mitigation strategies Assign responsibilities Implement