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TEIMUN 11 th July - 17 th July 2011 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) Topic I: Ethiopia v. Eritrea TEIMUN 2011

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Page 1: ICJ I

TEIMUN

11th July - 17th July 2011

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ)

Topic I:

Ethiopia v. Eritrea

 

TEIMUN 2011

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The international court of justice

Though this case is inspired by true events, it is mostly fictional

1. Ethiopia and Eritrea are both located in north-eastern Africa, in an area called the

"Horn of Africa". While Ethiopia has been an independent state for many years, Eritrea was,

until 1952, an Italian colony. It was annexed by Ethiopia between 1962 and 1993, when it was

granted its independence, following a monitored referendum.

2. In the early 1990's, relations between the countries were rather peaceful, but after

Eritrea introduced its own currency in 1997, relations deteriorated. The animosity was

augmented by many border disputes, Ethiopia's frustration over having no sea access (hence

making its trade passage dependant on other states) and the states' differing attitudes on

economic development and ethnicity.

3. In May 1998, hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea led to a large scale war that

began when Eritrean forces occupied the border town of Badme, which was then administered

by Ethiopia. The war continued from May 1998 until June 2000, causing the death of more

than 70,000 people and leaving more than 750,000 people displaced. Evidence indicates that

during the war both sides violated International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law.

4. The two states agreed on a cease-fire in June 2000 and signed a peace treaty in Algiers

in December 2000. According to this agreement, a Claims Commission for resolving all

claims for losses and damages during the war will be established, under the auspices of the

Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Moreover, an International Border

Commission that will rule and demarcate the border line between the states is to be

established. Both states agreed to comply with the commission's ruling, whatever it may be.

5. Despite the Algiers agreement, relations between the countries remained cold and

rather volatile as disputes continued. In April 2002 the International Border Commission

ruled that the disputed border town Badme belonged to Eritrea. Ethiopia rejected the ruling

and refused to withdraw to the new border-line. To date, Ethiopia continues to hold the town.

In November 2007 the commission demarcated the whole 1000 km border between the states.

Eritrea accepted and complied with the ruling while Ethiopia rejected it.

6. In addition, in July 2008 the UN peace-keeping forces were compelled to withdraw

from the Eritrean-Ethiopian border in wake of obstacles and restraints posed by Eritrea, which

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limited food and fuel passage to the forces, forbade flights above its territory and even

expelled some of the troops from its soil. The UN Secretary General threatened that a new

war could occur between the states if and when the UN forces would leave the area.

Moreover, in December 2009 the UN cast sanctions on Eritrea for allegedly supporting

radical Islamist dissidents in Somalia. This too is another point of conflict as Ethiopia is

known to be a supporter of The Transitional Federal Government ("TFG") of Somalia.

7. Throughout the years, the Eritrean government has maintained close ties with the

extremist Somali rebel organization, "Somali Islamist Freedom Fighters" or as it is better

known “SIFF”. The organization was founded in 1991, in the aftermath of a civil war in

Somalia and the toppling of Somali ruler Siad Barre, by Ethiopia.

8. SIFF’s stated objectives were to return Somalia to its native people, banish all foreign

powers from within the country and strengthen the country itself by solving its many

economical issues. The organization, which began as a local political grassroots movement

drew many young supporters and very quickly began to take a more militant approach

towards achieving its objectives.

9. In 1993, as part of its transformation and armament, SIFF held secret contacts with

officials in the Eritrean government, which supported the goal of banishing the foreign

presence from Somalia as well as the general stabilization of the area.

10. With the establishment of the TFG in Somalia, in 2004, contacts between SIFF and

Eritrea grew stronger. Commanders of the SIFF organization visited colleagues in the Eritrean

military and vice versa. Due to shared values, history, religion and tradition, many close

friendships were forged and even several matrimonial bonds. Additionally, as part of Eritrean

support of SIFF, the Eritrean government transferred considerable funds for recruitment of

young adults into the SIFF’s ranks along with military equipment, such as bulletproof vests,

communication equipment, helmets, military rations etc.

11. In recent years SIFF’s power and influence in Somalia has risen and, in turn, its many

actions were considered infamous in the entire area and often reported worldwide. Some of its

more successful actions included taking control of several townships in Somalia while

banishing foreign forces from the area, several terror attacks in major commercial markets

and the successful raiding of foreign ships in the Gulf of Aden. Their actions have terrified

the region’s people and exacted a high toll in human life.

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12. On July 1st 2010 Eritrea engaged in a weapons deal with the government of Belarus

for the purchase of 50 modernized t-72 tanks, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles,

large quantities of various light weaponry and a wide assortment of ammunition. Through this

deal the Eritrean government had hoped to compensate for the fact that its air force

capabilities were practically non-existent.

13. Upon arrival of the purchased arms and equipment on August 15th, the Eritrean

Defense Force began positioning the newly acquired missiles, carrying out advanced training

for all its forces while employing the new weapons and gearing up the new tanks.

14. On the 29th of August the Eritrean army began transporting the new tanks to its south-

west bases near the Ethiopian border. At the same time, in a televised press conference, the

Minister of Trade and Industry of the Eritrean Government stated that Eritrea was stronger

than ever and is prepared for all possible scenarios.

15. That same afternoon, the Ethiopian Minister of Defense called an emergency cabinet

meeting in order to address the new regional security issues. In this meeting it was decided

that it was imperative that all means be taken to halt Eritrea’s aggressive actions. In

accordance with this decision, at 17:00 of that day two combat squadrons of the Ethiopian Air

Force crossed the border into Eritrea and bombed the major military bases in south-west

Eritrea as well as the Eritrean military’s munitions’ stockpiles throughout the country. The

fighter jets then proceeded to blockade the air space of the central airport in Asmara, the

capital of Eritrea.

16. The Ethiopian attack did not go unrequited. The president of Eritrea Manoolu Blanick

immediately convened his cabinet, which decided unanimously to call a general draft and take

military steps to restore national security and to assure that Ethiopia’s attacks were not

repeated.

17. In an address to the nation that same evening Manoolu said that his country had no

choice but to enter into the war Ethiopia had started by attacking Eritrea, a war that Eritrea

had not provoked and which had been launched without warning. Manoolu continued, saying

“the Eritrean people will not rest until its borders and citizens are safe and secure".

18. The next morning, on August 30st 2010, the war entered full scale. Eritrea’s new tanks

began moving towards the Ethiopian border, anti-air missiles were fired at the blockading

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aircraft in Asmara and infantry, armor and artillery troops began crossing into Ethiopia. The

Ethiopian Air Force, for its part, bombed Eritrea’s main ports and brought their activity to a

complete halt. The Ethiopian ground forces clashed with their Eritrean counterparts who had

crossed the border into Ethiopia and intense hand-to-hand fighting ensued, bringing about

ruin and devastation to the villages in the area.

19. The Prime Minister of Ethiopia Girma Nagesh stated, in a televised announcement,

that her country would not hesitate to use all means necessary to protect its borders and

territory. She also called upon the world to condemn Eritrea’s aggression. The UN Security

Council, in turn, condemned the war and called on both sides to act with restraint.

20. Despite all condemnations the war raged on at all fronts. At the shared border the

fighting took on a form of a war of attrition, of face to face trench warfare, under cover of

armored troops and artillery fire. Inside Ethiopia, Eritrean commando units targeted and

destroyed bridges and main access routes. The Red Sea too became part of the battlefield:

Ethiopian warships patrolled the waters and prevented, whether by threat or explicit force,

ships intended for Eritrea or carrying an Eritrean flag, from reaching their destination.

21. The fighting continued for many months with no sign of any discernible resolution.

The economies of both countries were harmed to the point of destruction, especially that of

Eritrea, due to having its ports and airport completely shut down. Additionally, the area

suffered from an extreme drought which worsened the general wellbeing of the belligerents

and civilians of both sides. On the battlefield, the death toll rose and reached 50,000 along

with hundreds of thousands of wounded soldiers from both nationalities.

22. On December 20th 2010, while the war still raged on, one of SIFF’s boats called the

"Sumanga" left its berth in Berbera, Somalia, and sailed into the Gulf of Aden as part of the

organization's attempt to raise funds for its activity. On the second day of sailing, the ship was

fortunate, as the lookout spotted the Ethiopian container ship “The Andinet” which was loaded

with food, cement, fuel and other supplies. The rebels immediately proceeded at full speed

towards the ship and feverish preparation was made for the raiding of the ship. When The

Andinet was within firing range of The Sumanga, the rebels opened fire at the container and,

under the cover of the gunfire, two rebel teams advanced in dinghies towards the stern of the

ship. The teams boarded the ship, killed all 12 Ethiopian crew members on board and sailed

the ship into their home port in Somalia.

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23. The cruel and merciless attack reverberated worldwide. The Prime Minister of

Ethiopia Girma Nagesh was quoted saying “the barbaric actions of the Somali rebels must

stop. It cannot stand that countries claiming to be civilized will continue to lend their hand to

such atrocious actions. The Ethiopian government condemns the murder of its citizens and

calls on all international forums to take decisive steps towards preventing such events from

occurring again”.

24. The attack was reported in great detail in the Eritrean media which praised and

approved of the rebels actions as an important event which would go a long way towards

aiding Eritrea in its justified war against Ethiopia. When the president of Eritrea was asked for

his comments on the matter he declined to make a statement.

25. On January 24th 2011 the Eritrean government convened to discuss the difficult

situation facing its country, due to the long and drawn out war of attrition. In accordance with

the Chief of Staff’s recommendations, it was decided that it was necessary to take immediate

and decisive steps in order to break the stalemate which had ensued.

26. In this meeting, many different views were contemplated, most of which involved the

deployment of advanced weapons as well as tactics aimed at giving Eritrean forces superiority

in the battle field. At the meeting’s close, it was decided that the Eritrean Defense Forces

must use all means and measures in its possession in order to produce, through one final and

all-out attack, a satisfactory conclusion to the fighting.

27. In the course of this final effort, the Head of the Eritrean artillery forces Sheva Boom,

decided to employ Eritrea’s stock of cluster bombs against Ethiopian targets. During the

shelling, roughly one hundred DPICM cluster shells were fired at a broad and forested land in

northern Ethiopia, a known grazing area where a few strategic Ethiopian bases were located.

28. This attack, while failing to produce the victorious outcome the Eritrean leadership had

hoped for, brought both sides to the realization that the war of attrition they were engaged in

was destroying their economies and infrastructures and had to be brought to a conclusion.

Therefore, on January 30th 2011 both sides signed on a cease-fire that was internationally

recognized. Under the terms of the cease-fire all hostilities would cease and the troops would

remain at the battle lines of that day.

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29. With the cessation of hostilities a situation developed on the ground, in which the

province of Erithiopia, a province which had been part of Eritrea at the beginning of the

hostilities, was now within the Ethiopian side of the cease-fire borders. The province, which

included three towns and a few small villages, was surrounded by Ethiopian troops, which

completely controlled the province's borders and they alone decided who could enter and

leave the area. In addition, the Ethiopian military did not allow any aircraft passage above the

province.

29. Nevertheless, the Eritrean Governor of the province remained at his post, and the

municipal day to day life did not change as far as governance and taxation were concerned:

the people of the region’s votes were counted in the general elections that took place in

Eritrea during this time and its residents were included in the Eritrean Civil Registry.

30. Due to the war damages and the terrible drought prevailing in the region, food was

scarce and water sources began drying up. Erithiopia, which was disconnected from the

general Eritrean infrastructure, suffered more than any other province the region. The

situation in the province deteriorated and a severe humanitarian crisis developed, as the waste

piled up and sewer ran through the streets. As a result, the inherently weaker segments of

society, such as children and the elderly began to die of disease and malnourishment. The

people of the region frequently protested against Ethiopian limitations and demanded that

they allow free access of people and supplies between the province and Eritrea.

32. Due to the terrible situation, on April 1st 2011 the President of Eritrea Manoolu

Blanick sent a formal letter to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia Girma Nagesh in which he

stated:

“Excellency: our government sees the situation in Erithiopia as

very troubling. We expect that the Government of Ethiopia, as

the direct bearer of responsibility for the situation, take charge

and fulfill its international obligations towards the people of

Eritiopia and thus prevent deterioration of the crisis. In the

absence of such steps we will have no choice but to take legal

steps against your government in the International Court of

Justice.”

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33. The next day the Prime Minister of Ethiopia replied in a formal letter in which she

stated the following:

“Excellency: My government and I regret the humanitarian

crisis in the province. However, the blame and responsibility

lies firmly on your shoulders. Ethiopia has no obligations

towards the people of the province since it is not in its direct

and affective control. Moreover, the situation in the area is a

direct result of the war which your country illegally started.

Therefore I am pleased with your suggestion that we refer this

dispute to the International Court of Justice.”

34. After bilateral negotiations, Ethiopia and Eritrea submitted a written application to the

Registrar of the Court on June 1st 2011. The parties have undertaken to abide by the results of

this proceeding.

35. Eritrea, the Applicant for the purposes of the application, requests that the court:

a. Declare that the Ethiopian attack was a breach of the prohibition on the use of

force in §2(4) of the UN Charter.

b. Declare that SIFF’s actions are not attributable to Eritrea.

c. Declare that the use of cluster bombs was not in violation of international law.

d. Declare that Ethiopia is occupying Erithiopia and therefore bears humanitarian

obligations towards the civilian population.

36. Ethiopia, the Respondent for the purposes of the application, requests that the court:

a. Declare the Eritrea is the one to have violated the prohibition on the use of

force, an act which justified Ethiopia’s response or, alternatively, declare that

Ethiopia was acting in self-defense when it attacked Eritrea.

b. Declare the Eritrea is internationally responsible for the Somali pirate’s

actions.

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c. Declare that Eritrea violated international law when it made use of cluster

bombs.

d. Declare that Ethiopia in not occupying Erithiopia and therefore is not

responsible for the humanitarian needs of the province's people.

37. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia are members of the United Nations, and ratified the UN Charter

and the International Court of Justice Statute. Furthermore, both countries are members of the

Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the First

Optional Protocol of 1977.

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Initial Suggested Bibliography

1. The United Nations Charter (1947).

2. Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United

States), judgment, ICJ (1986).

3. Shaw, Malcolm N. International law, 6th edition, pp.1131 and so forth (2008).

4. ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility with Commentaries, Available at:

http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf

5. G.A Res. 2625, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 2625 (1970).

6. S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (2008).

7. Ruzza, Tommaso D., "The Convention on Cluster Munitions: Towards a Balance

between Humanitarian and Military Considerations?", Military Law and the Law of

War Review 47/3-4 (2008).

8. Treves, Tullio, "Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast

of Somalia", EJIL (2009), Vol. 20 No. 2 , 399 – 414.

9. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.

Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 168, para 173-177.