Ideas, Interests and Infrastructure · 2018-06-07 · Indo-Pacific by establishing strategic linkages between the continents of ... Summit Meeting of the African Development Bank

China-India-Japanin the Indo-Pacific

Ideas, Interests and Infrastructure

China-India-Japanin the Indo-Pacific

Ideas, Interests and Infrastructure

Editors

Jagannath P. Panda

Titli Basu

PENTAGON PRESSPENTAGON PRESSPENTAGON PRESSPENTAGON PRESSPENTAGON PRESS

China-India-Japan in the Indo-PacificIdeas, Interests and Infrastructure

Editors: Jagannath P. Panda and Titli Basu

First Published in 2018

Copyright © Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

ISBN 978-93-86618-42-9

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrievalsystem, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without first obtaining written permission ofthe copyright owner.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do notnecessarily reflect those of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, or theGovernment of India.

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15Soft Balancing: Asia-Africa Growth

Corridor (AAGC), India-Japan Arch incontrast to the Belt and Road Initiative

(BRI) and China’s Rising Influence

Jagannath P. Panda

Soft balancing is an integral aspect of balance of power strategy ininternational politics. State(s) rely on soft balancing to not only maximisetheir national interests but also enhance domestic capabilities in bringingout growth and development.1 States engaging in this form of balancingprimarily aim to protect their respective national security interests aheadof other competing powers while adapting to the rapidly changinginternational distribution of power system.2 Balancing comes as a protectivemeasure for less competent entities by forming an “alliance against theprincipal threat(s) or concern(s)”.3 The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor(AAGC), co-envisioned by India and Japan in consultation with Africa,replicates a fine interface of soft balancing and balance of power that aimsto not only enhance the Indian and Japanese domestic growth anddevelopment but also protect and enrich their national interests andpresence in Africa and Asia, factoring the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as acore interest and balancing China’s rising influence in the region.

The AAGC is aimed more at enhancing India’s and Japan’s nationalinterests while promoting a “liberal and value-based order” in the Indo-Pacific that would possibly challenge emerging unilateral and non-

China-India-Japan in the Indo-Pacific6

democratic measures. As K.S. Bajpai has rightly argued: “India and Japancan honestly say that they are not building relations in hostility againstChina; but it is right for them to plan for the eventuality of Chinesehostility.”4 The AAGC proposition draws from the two countries’ increasinggeopolitical convergence of economic and strategic interests, whereinconcerns over China’s growing strategic influence in the Indian Ocean,Africa and the Indo-Pacific in general remain a strong factor.

This chapter examines how the AAGC is the genesis of growing India-Japan strategic convergence to promote a “liberal value-based order” anda strategic response to the growing Chinese influence in Asia, Africa andthe IOR. It contends that the AAGC proposition combines both overt andcovert strategic interests to promote a liberal and value-based order in theIndo-Pacific by establishing strategic linkages between the continents ofAsia and Africa while balancing the rapid growth of Chinese influence inthese two continents.5 The AAGC overlaps China’s Belt and Road Initiative(BRI) in terms of its core objectives, particularly in focusing oninfrastructural investments, connectivity and growth corridors, amongother things. In a comparative perspective, the BRI through its geographicalcoverage of Asia, Africa and Europe surpasses the AAGC in terms of itscontinental outreach. But the AAGC transcends the scope and scale of theBRI in terms of its universal approach of addressing human resourcedevelopment in Asia and Africa. Unlike a single-country initiative that isbased more on unilateral interests, the AAGC brings an intercontinentalconsultative mechanism to the core while aiming to promote infrastructuralinvestments, connectivity and growth corridors, including human resourcedevelopment that is based on universal values and norms. The AAGC istherefore more of a soft-balancing strategy of India and Japan to contestthe rising Chinese influence, both within and outside the purview of theBRI, in Asia, Africa and the IOR.

AAGC’s Genesis: Between Concept and Conception

Many in India and Japan contend that the AAGC is an old proposition inthe making, much before China’s BRI was proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013.6

A credible reference, including an official one, to this contention is howevermissing.7 The AAGC proposition was formally discussed between PrimeMinisters Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe at the India-Japan AnnualSummit Meeting held in Tokyo in 2016.8 The main thrust of this meetingwas that both India and Japan must take advantage of their growingstrategic convergence in the Indo-Pacific region by establishing a chain ofindustrial corridors and industrial networks in and between Asia and

Soft Balancing 7

Africa. The joint statement, released on November 11, 2016, emphasisedthe need to “promote cooperation and collaboration in Africa” by focusingon joint projects in areas such as training and capacity building,infrastructure, connectivity and health.9 Aiming to improve connectivitybetween the two continents, the two leaders stressed the need to promotea “free and open Indo-Pacific region” where a strategic synergy betweenIndia’s “Act East” and Japan’s “Expanded Partnership for QualityInfrastructure” (EPQI; earlier known as PQI) was made clear.10

Formally, the idea of the AAGC was announced at the 52nd AnnualSummit Meeting of the African Development Bank (AfDB) in Gandhinagar,India, during May 22-26, 2017, where Prime Minister Narendra Modiemphatically stated that both India and Japan would aim to achieve closerdevelopmental cooperation in Africa.11 The announcement came againstthe backdrop of China’s much-highlighted BRI meeting that was held fromMay 14-15, 2017 in Beijing. The Chinese strategic circles commented thatthe AAGC was a “duplication of the freedom corridor” that was originallyproposed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016 in Tokyo while meetingwith Prime Minister Modi.12 Many comparisons are being drawn betweenthe AAGC and BRI since the compass of both the initiatives overlaps tosome degree, particularly in factoring connectivity and infrastructure astwo main constituents in the Indo-Pacific/Asia-Pacific region.13

Since its official conception in 2016, premier think tanks in India, Japanand Indonesia have worked together to enrich the AAGC’s vision. A visiondocument was released in May 2017 at the AfDB Summit in Gandhinagarwhich was jointly prepared by the Research and Information System forDeveloping Countries (RIS) in India, the Economic Research Institute forASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) in Jakarta, and the Institute of DevelopingEconomies-Japan External Trade Organisation (IDE-JETRO), in consultationwith their respective governments.14 Focusing on Africa and the IndianOcean, the vision document stresses on building capacity in the Indo-Pacificregion with four target areas: (a) development and cooperation; (b) “qualityinfrastructure” and digital and institutional connectivity; (c) enhancingcapabilities and skills; and (d) establishing people-to-people partnerships.The AAGC promotes an intercontinental framework of cooperation basedon a “people-centric” proposition with the goal to enhance “growth andinterconnectedness between and within Asia and Africa”.15 Based on aconsultative mechanism, it aims to promote quality infrastructure anddigital and regulatory connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region with thecollaboration of Asia and Africa. In this strategic formulation, Africa remainthe focal point.16


The target is to integrate Africa by establishing strategic linkages withother regions South Asia, including India, Southeast Asia, East Asia andOceania (see Map 1). Though an official map of the AAGC is as yetunavailable, depicting the AAGC’s geographical parameters points to theglobal ambitions that both India and Japan hold in the Indo-Pacific (seeMap I). The AAGC Vision Document lists a number of objectives: First, anintercontinental framework where India and Japan can play leadershiproles in attaining the infrastructural investment needs of both Asia andAfrica. Asia’s total infrastructural investment needs are themselves morethan half of the world requirement, with China, India and Japan havingthe greatest infrastructural needs in Asia.17 Likewise, Africa needs aroundUS$100 billion in new infrastructure every year to remain competitive inthe developing world.18 The AAGC aims to address these infrastructuralneeds through various multilateral banks, wherein India and Japan couldpossibly play a leading role. Though a concrete charter and work plan onhow to generate funds to meet these infrastructural needs is missing atpresent in the AAGC Vision Document, still, it is expected that the AAGCmaybe able to address these current infrastructural needs of both Asia andAfrica by taking advantage of Japan’s influencing position in the Asian

Map 1: Asia-Africa Growth Corridor

Soft Balancing 9

Development Bank (ADB) and in the AfDB where both India and Japancan cooperate.

Second, promoting quality infrastructure and establishing digital andinstitutional connectivity in and between Asia and Africa are AAGC’s twomain targets. These two issues are complementary in many respects. TheUnited Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) states that“quality infrastructure” brings together different “initiatives, institutions,organisations, activities and people” to promote or implement a particularpolicy or a combination of different national-quality policies within aregulatory framework.19 Quality infrastructure is generally promotedthrough a public-private mode of participation involving a consultativeprocess between local, national and regional or international actors. TheAAGC aims to promote it by focusing on digital and institutionalconnectivity. Though these objectives look quite ambitious at present, theyare the prime national policy focus of India and Japan currently and linkedto their foreign policy outreach. Japan has long been aiming to promotequality infrastructure, in order to position its own influence in the worldby highlighting the deficiencies in the Chinese non-qualitativeinfrastructural investment across the world, mainly in Africa.

Third, the AAGC aims to promote a liberal and value-based Indo-Pacificorder, coinciding with the co-envisioned India-Japan Vision 2025.20

Conceptualised between India and Japan in 2015 as part of their “SpecialStrategic and Global Partnership”, Vision 2025 has the thrust to develop a“deep, broad-based and action-oriented partnership” in the Indo-Pacific.The demand is more for principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity,where the emphasis is on promoting an “open global trade regime” alongwith “freedom of navigation and overflight”, among other things. It stressesthe focus on “reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures” aimed atenhancing connectivity in the IOR, which not only complements India’sAct East policy and Japan’s EPQI initiative but also forms a strategicconvergence between India’s and Japan’s security interests in the Indo-Pacific. Most importantly, the AAGC facilitates the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” that Japan aims to promote in the IOR in order to dealwith the rising unilateral Chinese presence and influence in the region.The idea is to establish a strategic synergy between the “two oceans” –Indian and Pacific– and two continents – Asia and Africa21 – where bothIndia and Japan can cooperate to balance China’s influence in the region.

These objectives indicate that the AAGC proposition is moreaspirational. Indeed, a further reading of the AAGC Vision Documentindicates that the India-Japan soft-balancing strategy is an effective and


advanced tool to balance China’s rising influence. It exhibits elements ofsoft balancing while involving a tactical, informal and adhoc securityunderstanding between India and Japan in the Indo-Pacific. Besides, itcomplements the spirit of the US-India-Japan trilateralism that supportsthe idea of strengthening “regional connectivity” in the Indo-Pacific.22 Inother words, the AAGC concept is based on foreign policy strategicconsonance between India and Japan by taking a panoramic view of theevolving Indo-Pacific security order to prepare to meet the challengesemanating from a futuristic China. The US’ retreat from Asia underPresident Donald Trump would make the AAGC proposition even morerelevant in the times to come for both India and Japan, and importantly, tothink for an alternative futuristic security calculus even though bothembrace the idea of a “quadrilateral” initiative along with the US andAustralia. Besides, the AAGC exhibits the changing calculus of both Indianand Japanese strategic thinking on the Indo-Pacific, which is set to emergestronger than earlier, showing that both India and Japan are no longerreluctant to show leadership visions in Asia. The intent to establish a liberalorder, in an envisioned “free and open” Indo-Pacific, explains the strategicnuances that India and Japan attach to the AAGC.

AAGC: Competing with China’s BRI?

Fundamentally, the AAGC and BRI have some overlap in their objectives.The BRI’s major goals, as per China’s vision and action plan documentreleased in March 2015, are to promote policy coordination, facilitateconnectivity, enhance trade and investment cooperation, achieve financialintegration and enhance people-to-people contacts.23 Its main focus hasbeen more on connectivity and infrastructural investment, which have beenthe two main aspects of China’s external engagement strategy. That drawsa parallel to the AAGC, which equally emphasises on connectivity andpromotion of infrastructural investment, among other issues, includingthe promotion of people-to-people contacts. Nevertheless, the AAGC isnot really a direct response to the BRI since the policy character andconnotations of both these initiatives differ, which make the AAGC morea soft initiative to balance China’s presence and influence in Africa andAsia than completely negating the BRI itself.

In particular, the AAGC embraces universal values concerning humanresource development while prioritising infrastructure investments,connectivity and growth corridors. On the other hand, the BRI prioritisesChina’s national interests in promoting infrastructure investments andconnectivity across different continents. The funding for BRI projects comes

Soft Balancing 11

essentially from Chinese banks, or from Chinese Government sources likethe Silk Road Fund (SRF) or through collaborative international measureswhere Beijing holds a dominant say in project financing. The scope of theBRI is promoted within Beijing’s national perspective to position China asthe centre of regional and global development. In fact, the BRI complimentsgreatly China’s international vision of emerging as a “leader ofglobalisation”. In his speech at the 19th National Congress of the CommunistParty of China (CPC), the Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed thepromotion of economic globalisation to increase “China’s economic powerand composite strength”.24 The AAGC, on the other hand, intends togenerate private, government and also international funding, possibly fromthe AfDB and ADB.

By stressing on the Sustainable Developmental Goals (SDGs), theAAGC aims to priorities areas such as health, agriculture, agro-processing,skill development, pharmaceuticals and tackling disaster managementissues, apart from infrastructure development and connectivity. Thoughthe BRI equally stresses on some of these issues, still, a more ‘people-friendly’ approach is envisioned in the AAGC proposed framework, whichis based on a universal consultative approach that China’s BRI does notemploy. Essentially, the AAGC embraces more the international democraticnorms and values that the BRI essentially overlooks. Differencesnotwithstanding, both the initiatives exhibit a certain degree of overlapand competing intentions. The BRI’s success depends upon Chinesediplomacy, whereas the AAGC’s success depends on the extent to whichIndia and Japan push forward this idea with Africa. The success of theAAGC will depend upon the consultative execution of policies that India,Japan and Africa undertake collectively. If anything, the AAGC’s primaryvision is not to compete with any other propositions per se, but to engagein more meaningful developmental partnerships, both within and outsideof Africa, within an intercontinental framework with Asia.

A Shared Perspective on BRI

New Delhi’s and Tokyo’s stances on the BRI are both state-centric andgovernance-centric, linked to China’s rise and influence in the world. Theirproblematic relationship with China comes as an additional factor. Thisshared perspective might encourage them further to promote the AAGCmore prudently. India’s primary reservation over the BRI is attached tothe connectivity issues, which is aptly reflected in India’s official positionon the BRI.25

Three things are clearly reflected in India’s stance on the BRI. First, in


principle, India does not concede the grandeur to China on being theleading regional connectivity promoter. New Delhi firmly argues that theBRI is a unilateral initiative of China that ignores “universally recognizedinternational norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparencyand equality”.26 This is a strong stance even though India is linked withChina in the sub-regional Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM)Economic Corridor. India’s growing seriousness to pursue the India-Thailand-Myanmar Trilateral Highway and Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) initiative, promote the North-South Transport Corridor(NSTC) and accede to the Convention on International Transport of Goodsunder Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention)27 explains that New Delhihas its own regional ambition of emerging as a leading connectivitypromoter. New Delhi’s “Act East”, “Link West” and “neighbourhood first”policies also figure connectivity as a core agenda.

Second, New Delhi emphasises how India aims to enhance connectivitybased on universal values and norms, contrary to China’s unilateral andauthoritarian approach. India places equal importance on physical anddigital connectivity, whereas China gives prime importance to promotingphysical connectivity and economic corridors that will benefit primarilythe Chinese economy.

Third, in opposing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Indiabrings the question of sovereignty and territorial integrity to the forefront,which the BRI undermines. In Beijing’s strategic foreign policy setting, thelogic of sovereignty and history are employed selectively. This is clear inthe context of China’s reservation on India’s oil exploration in the SouthChina Sea vis-à-vis its unilateral engagement with Pakistan to implementthe CPEC project in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).28 The Chinese andIndian approaches, reactions and pursuit of national interests in thesematters highlight their different state-centric approaches.

Japan’s stance on the BRI is not identical to that of India. Japan sentpolitical representation to attend the May 2017 BRI Summit in Beijing. Abehas even publicly acknowledged the BRI as a grand initiative that offersscope for connecting the East and the West.29 Taro Kono, Japan’s ForeignMinister, has even stated that the BRI “will be highly conducive to globaleconomy” if pursued in an open and transparent manner.30 Hiroshige Seko,Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, has expressed supportto Beijing’s Silk Road projects and has signed a few cooperative projectswhich are seen as part of the BRI.31 Still, Japan shares a state-centric andgovernance-centric opposition to the BRI, regionally and globally, that issimilar to the Indian stance. Abe had earlier stated that “it is necessary for

Soft Balancing 13

infrastructure to be open to use by all, and to be developed throughprocurement that should be transparent and fair”.32 Calling for the BRI toadhere to a “common frame of thinking” in the region, Japan hasmaintained that projects must be “economically viable” and must take intoaccount the interests of parties holding debts to return.33 A similar concernis also noticeable on Japan’s part where Tokyo decided not to join theChinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), noting that theAIIB falls short on “fair governance”, “mainly relating to offering clarityon debt repayment and loan sanctions”.34 The principal Japanese positionhas been not only to highlight the flaws in the BRI but also equally to drawthe attention of the global community towards how the Chinese stateapproach on infrastructure investment overlooks transparency andinternational norms.

The Japanese opposition to the BRI is more infrastructure investmentoriented while India’s prime opposition is based on connectivity thatinvolves sovereignty and territorial integrity. Given India’s neighbourhoodproximity to China, New Delhi perceives the BRI as a strategy in expandingChina’s neighbourhood connectivity projects and sees it in terms of asecurity concern regionally, while Japan views the BRI more in the contextof competition, for its own regional and global investment plan. The AAGC,that boards connectivity and infrastructure as two core objectives, combinesthese Indian and Japanese perspectives together, both regionally andglobally. From a holistic perspective, the AAGC objectives – intercontinentalcooperation, quality infrastructural promotion, connectivity and Indo-Pacific liberal order – are important strategic necessities for India and Japanin a rapidly evolving security order where China’s rising influence andunilateral initiatives are common concerns for both.

Soft Balancing the Chinese Presence in Africa and IndianOcean

Africa as a strategic geographic location has attracted many countries whichhave prioritised the continent in their foreign policies. Accessing rawmaterials and energy resources and undertaking investments in thecontinent top many countries’ policy agendas. Sectors such asmanufacturing, services, infrastructure and telecommunications are equallyattractive ends that offer massive opportunities. Aiming to have a longer-term impact in creating human development conditionality and forgingahead institutional capabilities are also among the foreign policy prioritiesfor many countries, particularly India and China,35 and including Japantoday. At present, the West is less concerned about Africa politically. Earlier,


(in US$ bn)

the Western presence in Africa was more focused on checking thecommunist expansion.36 Since, in its view, the threat of communism hasevaporated in Africa, the West currently prefers to engage with the continentby means of trade, aid, assistance and economic contacts.37 Asian powerssuch as China, India and Japan equally see the African continent not onlyas an opportunity but also as an effective international continental partnerfor global partnership and for advancing their respective foreign policyobjectives. Over the last one decade, the Chinese economic andinfrastructural investment initiatives have emerged as an attractive modelfor many African countries ahead of the Indian and Japanese economicoutreach programmes. China’s trade and economic contact with Africa isstill higher in order than other major countries, making it the mostinfluential power in the making in this strategic continent (see Figure 1).The relationship between China and the rest of the developing world,including the Sino-African engagement, is becoming increasinglypragmatic, secularised and commercialised.38 The African response to thisChinese developmental discourse initially was somewhat welcoming.39 Asubtle change has however been noticed in this African approach, with anumber of Chinese projects and initiatives being questioned for their non-qualitative measures and low-cost offers. Many African countries areincreasingly searching for alternative modes of cooperation withoutcompletely abandoning the option to cooperate with China. Both India

Figure 1: Bilateral Trade with Africa, 2015

Source: Data collected from various open sources: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0013.html; http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/03/15/india-africa-bilateral-trade-hits-72-billion/; http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/28/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-pledges-japan-will-invest-30-billion-in-africa-by-2018/#.WUbHSd6FUux.

Soft Balancing 15

and Japan aim to capitalise on this critical change of mood in Africa. Thisserves Africa’s interests, too, since the continent has been searching foralternative modes of interactions and networking for long.40

The year 1993 witnessed a new and meaningful attention in Japan’sAfrica outreach through the introduction of the Tokyo InternationalConference on African Development (TICAD). With the gradual declineof the official assistance from the developed countries to Africa, Tokyo sawan opportunity for itself in the early 1990s by offering more assistancethrough a more serious policy focus. The introduction of the TICAD (seeTable 1), aiming to focus more on improving the socio-economic conditions,was a fine effort in this context.41 Since then, Japan’s economic interests inAfrica have been growing continuously, with TICAD playing aninstrumental role. The recent visits of Japanese Prime Ministers to Africatestify to this phenomenon (see Table 2). But though Tokyo’s overallpresence has increased in Africa and the relationship has become moreinstitutionalised, Japan’s engagement with Africa also faces a number oflimitations. Through TICAD, Japan might have emerged as a key investorin Africa, but the Japanese official development assistance (ODA) to Africahas not increased significantly42 (see Figures 2 and 3). Africa has hithertonot been a pivotal focus in Japanese policymaking. Nor has Japan tried toimplement a “comprehensive” strategy towards Africa which would haveallowed it to allocate more ODA. Rather, Japan’s approach has been toconcentrate on key countries in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.Meanwhile, the Chinese presence has expanded in Africa through a“continental” strategy. The rapid emergence of China as a strong economicactor in Africa has discouraged Japan from offering higher amounts ofODA to the continent as it previously did in 2006-07.43

Shinzo Abe has shown a renewed commitment to Africa in the recentpast (Table 2), and has tried to further institutionalise and strengthen Japan’soutreach in Africa by attending the 6th TICAD in August, 2016, in Nairobi.This was the first time when TICAD was held outside Japan. With thetheme “Quality and Empowerment”, the 6th TICAD focused on qualityinfrastructure and development. Abe stressed on building “quality Africa”centred on infrastructure, human resources, and “Kaizen” (businessefficiency).44 Building on grass-roots governance outreach, Japan outlinedan Africa policy, stressing on “resilient Africa”, emphasising on health andsocial stability.45 Tokyo’s main intent is to promote investment-orientedhigh-quality infrastructure-specific outreach that will subdue the Chinesesubstandard and quantitative infrastructural development initiative inAfrica. Japan has always alleged that Beijing’s outreach in Africa is


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unethical, where China floods cheap goods and offers attractive ODA thatis unaccountable to take advantage of the African resources.46

Japan’s rising international ambition to gather Africa’s support onmultilateral forums, especially for the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) permanent berth, is an additional factor which the AAGC mayfacilitate. Japan’s strong advocacy to reform the UN and UNSC factorsAfrican support as a crucial component. Germany, India, Japan and Brazil,clubbed as G-4 countries, have a credible case for demanding a permanentberth at the UNSC. To side-line the G-4 demand, China advocates for Africanrepresentation in the UNSC, bringing the logic of continental representationto the UNSC reform debate. Keeping this background in perspective, Japanequally advocates African representation in the UNSC. Offering “completesupport” to Africa and its “Agenda 2063”,47 Shinzo Abe in his TICAD VIspeech stated that Japan supports the idea of Africa having a representationin the permanent membership at the UNSC by 2023.48

This Japanese perspective conveniently establishes a strategiccongruence with India’s Africa policy. Stressing the need to establish a“model of cooperation” between India and Africa that will be “demand-driven and free of conditions”, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has labelledengagement with Africa as a “top priority” in Indian foreign and economicengagement policy.49 While announcing the AAGC, Modi had announcedboth the US and Japan as India’s partners for developmental work in Africa.The year 2000 witnessed India introducing a “Focus Africa” programme,50

aiming to design a “developmental partnership”. Gradually, over the lasttwo decades, India-Africa relations have become more institutionalisedthrough a range of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Prime MinisterNarendra Modi seems to be offering a newness to this engagement, showinga greater level of engagement in the field of energy security, greater marketaccess, co-development of infrastructure and maritime securitycooperation.51 The third India-Africa Summit held in New Delhi in October2015 renewed India’s outreach in Africa and strengthened India-Africarelations.

Newness has certainly been noticed in India’s current Africa outreach.First, in contrast to India’s earlier “Focus Africa” programme, India’s currentapproach towards Africa is based on a continental framework. For example,almost 40 African representatives attended the Third India-Africa Summit.India earlier used to invite only 15 countries under the Banjul formula,where the choice of countries was always decided by the African Union.52

Second, Africa is seen as a multilateral partner in a range of areas suchas climate change, trade regimes and UN/UNSC reforms. For instance,

Soft Balancing 21

centred on a “common, but differentiated, negotiation framework” inmultilateral forums, India advocates for a unified policy position with Africaon a range of issues including climate change.53 India has invited Africa tojoin hands not only in dealing with the global climate change, but also in acollaborative effort to forge an “alliance of solar-rich countries”. Focusingon the Doha Development agenda, India foresees Africa as a partner inglobal trading regimes in the field of agriculture and food security.

Third, rejecting a “donor-recipient” archetype of engagement, India hasadvocated developmental challenges as an “international responsibility”and has tried to forge a more credible India-Africa partnership. Threeprinciples – no conditionality, no policy prescriptions and no questioningof the sovereignty of the partnering country – have been the basis of theIndia-Africa partnership.54

Fourth, India sees the African littoral countries as strategically importantto its Indian Ocean policy. Aiming to have stronger India-Africa maritimerelations, India has been trying to solidify its maritime linkages with manyAfrican littoral and inland countries. Prime Minister Modi’s visits toMozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya in 2016 and to Mauritiusand Seychelles in 2015 strengthen this assertion. Offering greater militaryaid, training assistance and capacity-building exercises has been the mainthrust of India’s maritime diplomacy especially with regard to the Africanlittoral countries. Crafting stronger maritime and shipping contacts hasbeen one of the focuses in India’s Africa policy. Prime Minister Modistressed the same in his second Raisina Dialogue speech in New Delhi onJanuary 17, 2017, where he stated that India wants to build its owndevelopmental partnership that “... extends from the islands of the IndianOcean and Pacific to the islands of the Caribbean and from the greatcontinent of Africa to the Americas”.55

These efforts, complementing the AAGC, certainly explain India’sincreasing seriousness towards Africa. In recent years, Beijing has investedheavily in diplomatic, economic and political ties with Africa, resulting insubstantial China-Africa engagement. Beijing’s naval outreach has increasedin the East African coast where China focuses on key maritime zones,capacity-building exercises, building infrastructure and promotinginvestment for the protection of maritime zones in the IOR. Specifically, theEast African countries are factored importantly in China’s 21st centuryMaritime Silk Road (MSR). The Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Beltand Road Initiative, an official document released by China on June 20, 2017,stresses on ocean cooperation and highlights how China aims to build onthe China-Indian Ocean-Africa-Mediterranean Sea blue economic passage.56


The Chinese intent is to establish new initiatives and maritime routes topromote maritime connectivity in the IOR, stressing on the Indian Ocean.

In fact, China’s aim to emerge as a stronger maritime power is gainingmomentum. In his speech at the 19th National Congress of the CPC, XiJinping stated that “China will pursue a coordinated land and marinedevelopment, and step up efforts to build China into a strong maritimecountry”.57 Hu Jintao, too, in his 18th National Congress report hademphasised on the Chinese intent to enhance capacity for exploring marineresources, increase marine economy and safeguard China’s marine interestsand rights to eventually establish China as a maritime power.58 A reflectionof this Chinese interest has been clearly visible in the last few years whenthe Chinese focus has been on the IOR to invest in strategic ports, constructmarine commercial points and naval bases. Given this rising Chinesepresence, many countries’ foreign policies have witnessed changes, if notin reaction, then in retrospection, including that of India and Japan. Thearrival of the AAGC is a clear reflection of this India-Japanese retrospection.

Summing Up:AAGC is a Product of India-Japan Globalism

In response to China’s growing ambitions in the Indian Ocean and Africa,Japan and India agreed in 2015 to increase industrial networks and regionalvalue chains with an “open, fair and transparent” business environmentin the Indo-Pacific. Both countries enhanced this idea further in 2016 byidentifying strategic convergence and synergy between India’s Act Eastpolicy and Japan’s EPQI. Japan’s EPQI is a foreign policy initiative thatfocuses on greater connectivity between Asia and the rest of the world,including Africa,59 whereas India’s Act East policy emphasises onconnectivity in the Indo-Pacific region, including a special focus on theneighbouring Southeast Asia. The AAGC contextualises how both Japanand India prime each other as global partners in a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific environment. India’s Act East policy factors Japan as a “special”partner, while Japan’s EPQI factors India as a key economic and strategicpartner in its regional and global outreach. Partnership on infrastructurebuilding and connectivity are accorded two important objectives in thisstrategic congruence.

Japan has been concerned about China’s rising profile in Africa andmaritime outreach in the Indian Ocean. Beijing’s growing counter-piracyoperations along the African coasts and participation in the UNPeacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) and capacity-building exercises havebeen a serious cause of concern for Japan for some time. As a result, Japan

Soft Balancing 23

has begun to show greater interest in Africa, primarily through securityundertakings where Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDFs) have played a keyrole in various counter-piracy operations, e.g. the UNPKO in South Sudan,and in expanding its first overseas base, from just an airfield to a militarybase, in Djibouti. In other words, Tokyo is aiming to pursue a more security-oriented partnership with Africa. Eclipsing the Chinese presence in Africa,mainly China’s maritime reach with the African littoral states, is a crucialfactor that Japan finds difficult to handle singularly. Tokyo’s limitedmaritime outreach on the African coast has restricted its ability to emergeas a security provider in Africa. India has emerged as a natural partner inthis Japanese endeavour.60 This equally benefits India’s strategic positioningin the region. Therefore, the AAGC signifies a growing strategicconvergence between Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific.

On Tokyo’s part, the attempt to establish a strategic connection betweenAsia and Africa, factoring India as a global partner, has a sequential routewhich was articulated by Shinzo Abe in his influential speech entitled“Confluence of the Two Seas” as far back as August 22, 2007, in the IndianParliament. Abe had forcefully articulated that Japan and India along withcountries like Australia and the US must establish strategic networkingspanning the Pacific and Indian Oceans.61 Thrusting on Japan’s and India’sability to take greater “responsibility” in international affairs, he hadstressed that the aim should be to nurture and enrich the Pacific and IndianOceans as “Seas of clearest transparency”.62

In the larger context of the AAGC, China’s growing influence and theIndia-Japan growing global partnership, three points can be noted: First,the AAGC is at present an abstract idea that is based on an intercontinentalframework, making it really an ambitious proposition. The AAGC arrivesat a post-US “pivot to Asia” strategy, encouraging India and Japan to takea lead in regional affairs, factoring Asia and Africa. Second, the AAGC’sstrategic foundation is based on the power struggle over infrastructure,investment and connectivity, both in Asia and Africa. In this power struggle,an India-Japan strategic congruence is clearly emerging, to balance out theChinese influence, including the flagship BRI. Third, the AAGC is a resultof the Indo-Pacific security coalition led by India and Japan. Barring Africaas a continent, though the AAGC proposition is yet to directly involve athird country, the AAGC framework complements the changing securityorder in the Indo-Pacific region against unilateralism and authoritarianism.Importantly, the AAGC backs a rule-based order that is democratic andtransparent.


NOTES

1. Aristotle Tziampiris, “Chapter 2: Balance of Power and Soft Balancing”, TheEmergence of Israeli-Greek Cooperation, Springer, Switzerland, 2015, pp. 21-30.

2. K. S. Bajpai, “Japan, India and the Balance of Power”, The Hindu, January 27,2014, at http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/japan-india-and-the-balance-of-power/article5620518.ece (Accessed January 14, 2018).

3. Stephen Waltz, The Origin of Alliances, Cornell University Press, Cornell, 1987, p.17.

4. K. S. Bajpai, No. 2.5. This chapter is a revised and updated version of the author’s earlier paper

published in Focus Asia, a publication of the Stockholm-based Institute for Securityand Development Policy (ISDP): Jagannath Panda, “The Asia-Africa GrowthCorridor: An India-Japan Arch in the Making?”, Focus Asia: Perspective & Analysis,No. 21, August 2017, pp. 1-11. Some section in this chapter are reprinted withpermission.

6. The Silk Route is an ancient phenomenon. President Xi Jinping formallyannounced the two important components of the newly activated concept, i.e.Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) under the flagship“One Belt, One Road” in 2013. He announced the MSR in his speech to theIndonesian Parliament in October 2013 and SREB at the Nazarbayev Universityin Kazakhstan. See “Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to IndonesianParliament”, ASEAN-China Centre, October 3, 2013, at http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm (Accessed January 20, 2018);“President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a SilkRoad Economic Belt with Central Asian countries”, Ministry of Foreign Affairsof the People’s Republic of China, September 7, 2013, at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml(Accessed January 20, 2018).

7. This is based on the author’s interaction with many experts in Japan, mainlyfrom the National Institute for Defence studies (NIDS), Tokyo; Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo; Sofia University, Japan; National GraduateInstitute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo; and other think tanks and universities.In India, the author had interactions with officials from the Ministry of ExternalAffairs (MEA), Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations(ICRIER), Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), etc.

8. “India-Japan Joint Statement during the Visit of Prime Minister to Japan”,Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 11, 2016, at http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27599/IndiaJapan+Joint+ Statement+ during+the+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Japan (Accessed January 14, 2018).

9. Ibid.10. Ibid.11. “Prime Minister’s Speech at the inauguration of the Annual Meeting of the

African Development Bank (AfDB), Gandhinagar”, Ministry of External Affairs,Government of India, May 23, 2017, at http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28478/Prime+Ministers+Speech+at+ the+ inauguration+of+the+Annual+Meeting+of+the+African+Development+Bank+AfDB+Gandhinagar+May+23+2017 (Accessed January 14, 2018).

12. Liu Zongyi has noted that “the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor is a duplication ofthe ‘Freedom Corridor’ designed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe”; and

Soft Balancing 25

that “Indian media foresee this as a ‘counter’ initiative to China’s Belt and Roadinitiative”. See Liu Zongyi, “Belt and Road Remains Open to India despiteAbsence at Recent Forum”, Global Times, June 1,2017, at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1049599.shtml (Accessed 20 June 2017).

13. See, for instance, Avinash Nair, “To Counter OBOR, India and Japan ProposeAsia-Africa Sea Corridor”, The Indian Express, May 31, 2017, at http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/to-counter-obor-india-and-japan-propose-asia-africa-sea-corridor-4681749/ (Accessed January 15, 2018); “India, JapanForge Ahead with Connectivity Project to Counter China’s OBOR”, BusinessStandard, July 30, 2017, at http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-japan-forge-ahead-with-connectivity-project-to-counter-china-s-obor-117073000073_1.html (Accessed January 15, 2018).

14. Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development:A Vision Document, Africa Development Bank Meeting, Ahmedabad, India, May22-26,2017.

15. Ibid., p. 1.16. Titli Basu, “Thinking Africa: India, Japan, and the Asia Africa Growth Corridor”,

The Diplomat, June 3, 2017, at http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/thinking-africa-india-japan-and-the-asia-africa-growth-corridor/ (Accessed July 23, 2017)

17. Chris Heathcote, “Forecasting Infrastructure Investment Needs for 50 countries,7 Sectors through 2040”, World Bank Group: Infrastructure & Public-PrivatePartnerships Blog, August 10, 2017, at http://blogs.worldbank.org/ppps/forecasting-infrastructure-investment-needs-50-countries-7-sectors-through-2040(Accessed January 16, 2018).

18. Morten Lauridsen, “Africa Needs More Private Investment. Here’s How to MakeIt Happen”, World Economic Forum, October 23, 2017, at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/10/how-to-boost-investment-in-africa/(Accessed January 16, 2018).

19. “Quality Infrastructure: Building Trust for Trade”, United Nations IndustrialDevelopment Organisation (UNIDO), May 2016, at https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2016-05/UNIDO_Quality_system_0.pdf (Accessed January17, 2018).

20. India and Japan officially called their relationship a “special strategic and globalpartnership” under the Vision 2025 plan in the Indo-Pacific region during PrimeMinister Abe’s visit to India from December 11-13, 2015. Vision 2025 aims touphold the “principles of sovereignty”, “territorial integrity” and “peacefulsettlement of disputes”, among other issues. See Joint Statement on India and JapanVision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace andProsperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World, Ministry of External Affairs:Government of India, December 12, 2015, at http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Vision_2025_Special_ Strategic_ and_ Global_Partnership_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity_of_the_IndoPacific_R (Accessed January 17, 2018).

21. Priority Policy for Development Cooperation: FY 2017, International CooperationBureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, April 2017, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf (Accessed January 17, 2018).

22. Inaugural U.S.-India-Japan Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue in New York, Media Centre,Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, September 30, 2015, at http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/25868 (Accessed February 23, 2018)


23. Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-CenturyMaritime Silk Road, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry ofForeign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China,with State Council Authorisation, March 2015.

24. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately ProsperousSociety in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with ChineseCharacteristics for a New Era”, Delivered at the 19th National Congress of theCommunist Party of China, October 18, 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf(Accessed February 23, 2018).

25. “Official Spokesperson’s Response to a Query on Participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, May 13, 2017, athttp://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official_Spokespersons_response_to_a_query_on_participation_of_India_in_ OBORBRI_ Forum (Accessed January 20, 2018).

26. Ibid.27. “Cabinet Approves India’s Accession to the Customs Convention on International

Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention)”, PressInformation Bureau, Government of India Cabinet, March 6, 2017, at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=158890 (Accessed January 20, 2018).

28. Jagannath P. Panda, “Beijing’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Diplomacy and India”, India-China Relations: Politics of resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar WorldOrder, Routledge, London and New York, 2017, p. 86.

29. “Asia’s Dream: Linking the Pacific and Eurasia – Speech by Prime Minister ShinzoAbe at the Banquet of the 23rd International Conference on The Future of Asia”,Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, June 5, 2017, at http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201706/1222768_11579.html (AccessedJanuary 20, 2018).

30. Charlotte Gao, “‘Aimai’: Japan’s Ambiguous Approach to China’s ‘Belt andRoad’”, The Diplomat, November 22, 2017, at https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/aimai-japans-ambiguous-approach-to-chinas-belt-and-road/ (AccessedJanuary 20, 2018).

31. “Japan and China Sign 23 Energy-saving, Environmental Cooperation Projectsat Tokyo Meet”, The Japan Times, December 24, 2017, at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/12/24/national/japan-china-sign-23-energy-saving-environmental -cooperat ion-projects- tokyo-meet/#.WmMn7STlfFI (Accessed January 20, 2018).

32. “Asia’s Dream: Linking the Pacific and Eurasia”, No. 29.33. Ibid.34. “Japan-China Summit Meeting”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 23,

2015, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page1e_000041.html (AccessedJune 26, 2017).

35. Jagannath P. Panda, “Institutionalizing the African Reach: Reviewing China’sand India’s Multilateral Drive”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 52(6), 2017,p. 857.

36. Occasionally, the West has been warning Africa to be cautious about the “newcolonialism” from China and India that is designed to enhance their trade andeconomic contacts in the continent, conveniently oblivious of its own overarchingreach and exploitation of African resources over centuries. See D.H. Shinn,“Emerging Powers Expand Ties with Africa”, International Policy Digest,

Soft Balancing 27

September 17, 2012, at https://intpolicydigest.org/2012/09/17/emerging-powers-expand-ties-with-africa/ (Accessed January 24, 2018).

37. Ibid.38. L. Dittmer, “China and the Developing World”, in L. Dittmer and G.T. Yu (eds.),

China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, Lynne Reiner, Boulder,pp.1-12.

39. H. Wasserman, “China in South Africa: Media Responses to a DevelopingRelationship”, Chinese Journal of Communication, 5(3), 2012, pp. 336-354.

40. Maguemati Wagbou, “Africa: a Bridge between Latin America and Asia”, South-South Collaborative Programme, Occasional Paper Series, COD 11, 2008, pp. 5-10.

41. “Uniqueness of TICAD”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, April 13, 2016, athttp://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af1/page22e_000767.html (Accessed January 24,2018).

42. This is in contrast with the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC)countries’ overall net ODA percentage, which has increased in the same period(see Figure 2). The DAC currently has a total of 30 members, including Japan.China is not a member. See “DAC Members”, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), at http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm(Accessed June 26, 2017).

43. For example, see Ayako Mie, “With TICAD, Japan Pursues African Growth andExport Markets”, The Japan Times, August 9, 2016, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/08/09/reference/ticad-africa-initiative-sees-japan-pursue-bigger-slice-economic-pie/ (Accessed June 26, 2017).

44. “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth TokyoInternational Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)”, August 27, 2016,Kenyatta International Convention Centre (KICC), Nairobi, Kenya, August 27,2016, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html (Accessed June22, 2017).

45. “Japan’s Measures for Africa at TICAD VI: ‘Quality and Empowerment’”,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000183835.pdf (Accessed June 22, 2017).

46. John Aglionby, “Tokyo Takes on Beijing in Africa, Claiming Quality over Speed”,Financial Times, January 16, 2016, at https://www.ft.com/content/564df09e-824a-11e5-a01c-8650859a4767?mhq5j=e2 (Accessed June 22, 2017); “Database RevealsExtent of China’s Aid to Africa”, The Japan Times, May 1, 2013, at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/05/01/asia-pacific/database-reveals-extent-of-chinas-aid-to-africa/#.WUvwCyTldlI (Accessed June 22, 2017); Ayako Mie,No. 43.

47. “Agenda 2063” is a strategic continental framework to bring socio-economictransformation across Africa over the next 50 years. Its primary objective is toemphasise on growth and development. See “Agenda 2063”, African Union, athttps://au.int/en/agenda2063/about (Accessed February 10, 2018).

48. See “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the SixthTokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI)”, No. 44.

49. “PM’s Address at the Inauguration of the Annual Meeting of the AfricanDevelopment Bank”, PMINDIA, May 23, 2017, at http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-address-at-the-inauguration-of-the-annual-meeting-of-the-african-development-bank/ (Accessed February 10, 2018).


50. This was a programme through which India aimed to expedite trade andeconomic cooperation with seven sub-Saharan African countries, namely SouthAfrica, Nigeria, Mauritius, Tanzania, Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia. See “FocusAfrica Programme”, Government of India, at http://focusafrica.gov.in/focus_africa_programme.html (Accessed February 10, 2018).

51. Rajrishi Singhal, “Modi Resets India’s Africa Strategy”, The Hindu Business Line,November 17, 2015, at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/modi-resets-indias-africa-strategy/article7888689.ece (Accessed August 2, 2017).

52. “Briefing by Secretary (West) on PM’s Visit to Ethiopia and Tanzania”, Ministryof External Affairs, Government of India, May 17, 2011, at http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?3195/Briefing+by+Secretary+West+on+PMs+visit+to+Ethiopia+ and+Tanzania (Accessed March 6, 2016).

53. Rajrishi Singhal, No. 51.54. H.H.S. Vishwanathan, “India-Africa Relations: Nurturing an Enduring

Partnership”, in Abhijnan Rej and Tanoubi Ngangom (eds.), Common Futures:India and Africa in Partnership, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, 2015,p. 12.

55. “Inaugural Address by Prime Minister at Second Raisina Dialogue”, New Delhi,January 17, 2017, at http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/27948/Inaugural_Address_by_Prime_Minister_at_Second_Raisina_Dialogue_New_Delhi_January _17_2017 (Accessed 10 February 2018).

56. “Full text: Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative”,Xinhuanet, June 20, 2017, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/20/c_136380414.htm (Accessed February 11, 2018).

57. Xi Jinping, No. 24.58. “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress”, Embassy of the People’s

Republic of China in the US, November 27, 2012, at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm(Accessed February 12, 2018).

59. EPQI is an expanded version of the earlier designed PQI, which centres on“quality infrastructure investment”, extending Japan’s targeted area ofinfrastructure investment from Asia to the rest of the world, with particularemphasis on Africa. “The ‘Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure’Initiative Directed toward the G7 Ise-Shima Summit Meeting Announced”,Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, May 23, 2016, at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2016/0523_01.html (Accessed February 11,2018).

60. Subhomoyo Bhattacharya, “Race for Supremacy: India, Japan Plan Alternativeto Counter China’s OBOR”, Business Standard, May 16, 2017, at http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/race-for-supremacy-india-japan-plan-alternative-to-china-s-obor-117051501273_1.html (AccessedFebruary 14, 2018).

61. “‘Confluence of the Two Seas’: Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Ministerof Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India”, Ministry of Foreign Affairsof Japan, August 22, 2007, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html (Accessed February 14, 2018).

62. Ibid.

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Ideas, Interests and Infrastructure · 2018-06-07 · Indo-Pacific by establishing strategic linkages between the continents of ... Summit Meeting of the African Development Bank