III. European Integration III. European Integration and international trade and international trade

law law

1.1. Regional Integration and the Regional Integration and the GATT/WTO-SystemGATT/WTO-System

2.2. The European Integration and The European Integration and Art. XXIV GATT (Art. 5 GATS)Art. XXIV GATT (Art. 5 GATS)

3.3. Interfaces EU-WTOInterfaces EU-WTO

1.1. Importance of regional trade 1.1. Importance of regional trade agreementsagreements

Since 1990’s proliferation of regional trade agreements: over Since 1990’s proliferation of regional trade agreements: over 380 RTA’s notified, 205 agreements are in force380 RTA’s notified, 205 agreements are in force

E.g.: E.g.: NAFTANAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement between (North American Free Trade Agreement between Canada, Mexico, USA; largest trade bloc concerning GDP); Canada, Mexico, USA; largest trade bloc concerning GDP); MERCOSURMERCOSUR ( (Mercado Común del SurMercado Común del Sur, , custom union with custom union with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), AFTAAFTA (ASEAN Free (ASEAN Free Trade Area), Trade Area), COMESACOMESA (Common Market of Eastern and (Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa), Southern Africa), CARICOMCARICOM (Common Market of the (Common Market of the Carribean), etcCarribean), etc

2004 all but two members of the WTO were party one or more 2004 all but two members of the WTO were party one or more regional agreements – a significant part of world trade takes regional agreements – a significant part of world trade takes place under the terms of regional trade agreementsplace under the terms of regional trade agreements

1. Regional Integration 1. Regional Integration and the GATT/WTO-and the GATT/WTO-SystemSystem

1.2. RTA and the WTO1.2. RTA and the WTO WTO recognises the advantages of economic integration and WTO recognises the advantages of economic integration and

trade liberalisation (even if only some members are involved): trade liberalisation (even if only some members are involved): 1.1. Possible to reach a Possible to reach a degree of liberalisation degree of liberalisation which would be which would be

out of reach at the global level.out of reach at the global level.2.2. Regional integration can Regional integration can create significant economic create significant economic

growth growth and can achieve non-economic goals.and can achieve non-economic goals.3.3. But it is not clear, whether a But it is not clear, whether a RTA diverts rather than RTA diverts rather than

creates tradecreates trade.. WTO-law must struck a WTO-law must struck a balancebalance between interests of between interests of

countries pursuing closer economic integration and other countries pursuing closer economic integration and other members. WTO rules shall ensure that RTA create trade more members. WTO rules shall ensure that RTA create trade more than they divert (than they divert (trade creating effects must be greater trade creating effects must be greater than its trade diverting effectsthan its trade diverting effects). WTO therefore shapes ). WTO therefore shapes RTA’s.RTA’s.

WTO regulations:WTO regulations:1.1. Art. XXIV GATT’ 94 + Understanding on Article XXIV Art. XXIV GATT’ 94 + Understanding on Article XXIV 2.2. Art. 5 GATSArt. 5 GATS3.3. ““Enabling clause” for developing countriesEnabling clause” for developing countries

2. European Integration and 2. European Integration and Art. XXIV GATT (Art. 5 GATS)Art. XXIV GATT (Art. 5 GATS)2.1. Overview2.1. Overview Second World War had put a definitive end to the traditional Second World War had put a definitive end to the traditional

European hegemony in the world. European hegemony in the world. Avoid, by all possible means, coming back to a confrontation among Avoid, by all possible means, coming back to a confrontation among

European States. Searching an European States. Searching an accommodation between France accommodation between France and Germanyand Germany. A compromise that would be endorsed by the USA. . A compromise that would be endorsed by the USA.

Conclusion: Create a freer, fairer and more prosperous continent and Conclusion: Create a freer, fairer and more prosperous continent and that international relationships were developed in a that international relationships were developed in a legal legal frameworkframework of concord. Implementation of a free trade policy of concord. Implementation of a free trade policy became a became a basic condition for ERP-help basic condition for ERP-help (curb the expansion of (curb the expansion of communism) – foundation of the communism) – foundation of the OEECOEEC (liberalize trade, monetary (liberalize trade, monetary agreements and enhanced economic cooperation); furthermore agreements and enhanced economic cooperation); furthermore 1948 Benelux 1948 Benelux (customs union between Belgium, Netherlands and (customs union between Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) worked on external tariff; Luxembourg) worked on external tariff; Council of Europe 1949Council of Europe 1949: : political cooperation among European countries (no surrender of political cooperation among European countries (no surrender of souvereignitysouvereignity from the member states); ECSC 1951; Treaties of from the member states); ECSC 1951; Treaties of Rome 1957: EEC, European Atomic Energy CommunityRome 1957: EEC, European Atomic Energy Community

2.2. The EEC/EC and Art. XXIV 2.2. The EEC/EC and Art. XXIV GATTGATT

European RTA have to meet the requirements set out in European RTA have to meet the requirements set out in GATT/WTO law.GATT/WTO law.

Requirements of GATT/WTO-law Requirements of GATT/WTO-law ((two-tier testtwo-tier test): ): A measure, otherwise inconsistent with GATT is justifiedA measure, otherwise inconsistent with GATT is justified1.1. If the measure is introduced upon the formation of a customs If the measure is introduced upon the formation of a customs

union, a free trade area or an interim agreement, that meet union, a free trade area or an interim agreement, that meet the requirements set out in GATT/WTO-law (Art. XXIV:8 and Art. the requirements set out in GATT/WTO-law (Art. XXIV:8 and Art. XXIV:5).XXIV:5).

2.2. If the formation of the customs union or free trade area would If the formation of the customs union or free trade area would be prevented, i.e. made impossible, if the introduction of the be prevented, i.e. made impossible, if the introduction of the measure concerned was not allowed.measure concerned was not allowed.

Question:Question: Does the EEC/EC (at a first glance) meet the Does the EEC/EC (at a first glance) meet the requirements of the two-tier-test (give reasons)? requirements of the two-tier-test (give reasons)?

Example 2: Example 2: Turkey – Textiles:Turkey – Textiles:

In In Turkey –Textiles Turkey –Textiles the measures at issue were quantitative the measures at issue were quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing from India. According to restrictions on textiles and clothing from India. According to Turkey this quantitative restrictionsTurkey this quantitative restrictions Art. XI Art. XI [[General General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions] Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions] and XIII and XIII [[Non-Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions]discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions]) ) were justified under Art. XXIV GATT. Turkey argued that, were justified under Art. XXIV GATT. Turkey argued that, unless it was allowed to introduce quantitative restrictions on unless it was allowed to introduce quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing from India, it would be prevented from textiles and clothing from India, it would be prevented from forming a customs union with EC. The EC would have forming a customs union with EC. The EC would have excluded these products from free trade within the EC-Turkey excluded these products from free trade within the EC-Turkey customs union in order to prevent the circumvention of the customs union in order to prevent the circumvention of the EC’s quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing from EC’s quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing from India by importing them via Turkey. Turkeys exports of these India by importing them via Turkey. Turkeys exports of these products accounted for 40 per cent of Turkeys total exports to products accounted for 40 per cent of Turkeys total exports to the EC and therefore Turkey expressed strong doubts as to the EC and therefore Turkey expressed strong doubts as to whether the requirements of Art. XXIV can be met. whether the requirements of Art. XXIV can be met.

Report of the Appellate Body: Report of the Appellate Body: TURKEY – RESTRICTIONS ON TURKEY – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF TEXTILE IMPORTS OF TEXTILE AND CLOTHING PRODUCTS, AB-1999-5, AND CLOTHING PRODUCTS, AB-1999-5, para 62para 62

““We agree with the Panel that had Turkey not adopted the same We agree with the Panel that had Turkey not adopted the same quantitative restrictions that are applied by the European quantitative restrictions that are applied by the European Communities, this would not have prevented Turkey and the European Communities, this would not have prevented Turkey and the European Communities from meeting the requirements of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) Communities from meeting the requirements of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) of Article XXIV, and consequently from forming a customs union. We of Article XXIV, and consequently from forming a customs union. We recall our conclusion that the terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) offer recall our conclusion that the terms of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i) offer some – though limited – flexibility to the constituent members of a some – though limited – flexibility to the constituent members of a customs union when liberalizing their internal trade. As the Panel customs union when liberalizing their internal trade. As the Panel observed, there are observed, there are other alternatives available to Turkey and other alternatives available to Turkey and the European Communities to prevent any possible the European Communities to prevent any possible diversion diversion of tradeof trade, while at the same time meeting the requirements of sub-, while at the same time meeting the requirements of sub-paragraph 8(a)(i). For example, Turkey could adopt paragraph 8(a)(i). For example, Turkey could adopt rules of origin rules of origin for textile and clothing products that would allow the European for textile and clothing products that would allow the European Communities to distinguish between those textile and clothing Communities to distinguish between those textile and clothing products originating in Turkey, which would enjoy free access to the products originating in Turkey, which would enjoy free access to the European Communities under the terms of the customs union, European Communities under the terms of the customs union, andand those textile and clothing products originating in third countries, those textile and clothing products originating in third countries, including India.”including India.”

3.1. Overview3.1. Overview European Integration is based on the European Integration is based on the exception of Art. XXIV exception of Art. XXIV

GATTGATT. The latter shaped the customs union and the Common . The latter shaped the customs union and the Common Market.Market.

The EC is The EC is member of the WTO member of the WTO since 1 January 1995 since 1 January 1995 (t(the he 27 member States of the EU are WTO members in their own 27 member States of the EU are WTO members in their own right, s right, s mixed agreementmixed agreement). The EC is therefore bound by the ). The EC is therefore bound by the obligations of the WTO and the European Commission speaks obligations of the WTO and the European Commission speaks for all EU member States at almost all WTO meetings. Before for all EU member States at almost all WTO meetings. Before 1995 the EC were 1995 the EC were de facto members of the GATTde facto members of the GATT. S ECJ, C-. S ECJ, C-21/72 21/72 International Fruit CompanyInternational Fruit Company, Rec.1972,p.1219, s next , Rec.1972,p.1219, s next slide).slide).

The The Common Commercial Policy Common Commercial Policy connects the EC to the connects the EC to the WTO-law system (s Pt 3.3.).WTO-law system (s Pt 3.3.).

3. Interfaces EU - WTO3. Interfaces EU - WTO

ECJ, C-21/72 ECJ, C-21/72 International Fruit CompanyInternational Fruit Company, Rec.1972,p.1219: , Rec.1972,p.1219: 14 THE COMMUNITY HAS ASSUMED THE FUNCTIONS INHERENT IN THE TARIFF AND TRADE 14 THE COMMUNITY HAS ASSUMED THE FUNCTIONS INHERENT IN THE TARIFF AND TRADE

POLICY, PROGRESSIVELY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND IN THEIR ENTIRETY ON POLICY, PROGRESSIVELY DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND IN THEIR ENTIRETY ON THE EXPIRY OF THAT PERIOD, BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLES 111 AND 113 OF THE TREATY . THE EXPIRY OF THAT PERIOD, BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLES 111 AND 113 OF THE TREATY .

15 BY CONFERRING THOSE POWERS ON THE COMMUNITY, THE MEMBER STATES SHOWED THEIR 15 BY CONFERRING THOSE POWERS ON THE COMMUNITY, THE MEMBER STATES SHOWED THEIR WISH TO BIND IT BY THE OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT . WISH TO BIND IT BY THE OBLIGATIONS ENTERED INTO UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT .

16 SINCE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE EEC TREATY AND MORE PARTICULARLY, SINCE THE 16 SINCE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE EEC TREATY AND MORE PARTICULARLY, SINCE THE SETTING UP OF THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF, THE TRANSFER OF POWERS WHICH HAS SETTING UP OF THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF, THE TRANSFER OF POWERS WHICH HAS OCCURRED IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THE COMMUNITY HAS BEEN OCCURRED IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND THE COMMUNITY HAS BEEN PUT INTO CONCRETE FORM IN DIFFERENT WAYS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENERAL PUT INTO CONCRETE FORM IN DIFFERENT WAYS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT AND HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE OTHER CONTRACTING PARTIES . AGREEMENT AND HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY THE OTHER CONTRACTING PARTIES .

17 IN PARTICULAR, SINCE THAT TIME, THE COMMUNITY, ACTING THROUGH ITS OWN 17 IN PARTICULAR, SINCE THAT TIME, THE COMMUNITY, ACTING THROUGH ITS OWN INSTITUTIONS, HAS APPEARED AS A PARTNER IN THE TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS AND AS A PARTY INSTITUTIONS, HAS APPEARED AS A PARTNER IN THE TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS AND AS A PARTY TO THE AGREEMENTS OF ALL TYPES CONCLUDED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENERAL TO THE AGREEMENTS OF ALL TYPES CONCLUDED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 114 OF THE EEC TREATY AGREEMENT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 114 OF THE EEC TREATY WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE TARIFF AND TRADE AGREEMENTS " SHALL BE CONCLUDED ... WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE TARIFF AND TRADE AGREEMENTS " SHALL BE CONCLUDED ... ON BEHALF OF THE COMMUNITY ". ON BEHALF OF THE COMMUNITY ".

18 IT THEREFORE APPEARS THAT, IN SO FAR AS UNDER THE EEC TREATY THE COMMUNITY HAS 18 IT THEREFORE APPEARS THAT, IN SO FAR AS UNDER THE EEC TREATY THE COMMUNITY HAS ASSUMED THE POWERS PREVIOUSLY EXERCISED BY MEMBER STATES IN THE AREA ASSUMED THE POWERS PREVIOUSLY EXERCISED BY MEMBER STATES IN THE AREA GOVERNED BY THE GENERAL AGREEMENTGOVERNED BY THE GENERAL AGREEMENT, THE PROVISIONS OF THAT AGREEMENT HAVE , THE PROVISIONS OF THAT AGREEMENT HAVE THE EFFECT OF BINDING THE COMMUNITYTHE EFFECT OF BINDING THE COMMUNITY . .

3.2. “Effect of binding the 3.2. “Effect of binding the community”community”

How to How to deal with possible collisions between EC and deal with possible collisions between EC and WTO-lawWTO-law??

The ECJ developed concepts of direct applicability and The ECJ developed concepts of direct applicability and supremacy of Community law (supremacy of Community law (van Gend & Loosvan Gend & Loos, , Costa v. ENELCosta v. ENEL) ) – – the WTO DSB notthe WTO DSB not. .

Such a decision is probably excluded by Such a decision is probably excluded by Art 3 (2) DSUArt 3 (2) DSU: “The : “The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. interpretation of public international law. Recommendations Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered rights and obligations provided in the covered agreementsagreements.” .”

Therefore the decision is Therefore the decision is up to MS-legal orderup to MS-legal order..

ECJ: ECJ: no direct applicability/direct effect of WTO-law no direct applicability/direct effect of WTO-law –– espesp since since it’s considerable importance of the negotiations between the parties it’s considerable importance of the negotiations between the parties and moreover since "the most important commercial partners of the and moreover since "the most important commercial partners of the Community" have concluded from the subject-matter and purpose of Community" have concluded from the subject-matter and purpose of the WTO Agreements that they are not among the rules applicable by the WTO Agreements that they are not among the rules applicable by their judicial organs when reviewing the legality of their rules of their judicial organs when reviewing the legality of their rules of domestic law. This also concernsdomestic law. This also concerns decisions of DSB decisions of DSB.. EC measure can EC measure can not be challenged on the basis of WTO law (by market citizens and not be challenged on the basis of WTO law (by market citizens and even by Member States, ECJ even by Member States, ECJ Portugal v. CouncilPortugal v. Council), but:), but:

1.1. Indirect applicability Indirect applicability (interpretation of national/supranational law (interpretation of national/supranational law in conformity with international law; precondition: interpretative in conformity with international law; precondition: interpretative margin or discretion)margin or discretion)

2.2. FediolFediol and and Nakajima-Nakajima- Cases Cases (C-70/87 and C-69/89)(C-70/87 and C-69/89): : The ECJ will The ECJ will review the legality of a Community measure in the light of WTO-rules:review the legality of a Community measure in the light of WTO-rules: Where the Community intended to implement a particular Where the Community intended to implement a particular

obligationobligation Where the Community refers expressly to the precise provisions Where the Community refers expressly to the precise provisions

of the WTO-agreementsof the WTO-agreements WTO law is of greater significance for the control of member state WTO law is of greater significance for the control of member state

measures (ECJ C-53/96, measures (ECJ C-53/96, HermèsHermès, concerning TRIPS) – in terms of intra-, concerning TRIPS) – in terms of intra-Union-control WTO-Law is yardstick for MS-measuresUnion-control WTO-Law is yardstick for MS-measures

Example: Example: Leon van Parys Leon van Parys (ECJ, C-377/02) – The Banana-Case(ECJ, C-377/02) – The Banana-Case

Leon van Parys, a private banana importer from Belgium, has Leon van Parys, a private banana importer from Belgium, has imported bananas into the EC from Ecuador more than 20 imported bananas into the EC from Ecuador more than 20 years. 1998 he applied again for import licences, but the years. 1998 he applied again for import licences, but the Belgian authority refused to issue the former with import Belgian authority refused to issue the former with import licences for certain quantities of bananas originating in licences for certain quantities of bananas originating in Ecuador and Panama under reference to the EC legislation Ecuador and Panama under reference to the EC legislation on a common market for bananas. on a common market for bananas.

Leon van Parys – in an action before the Raad van State Leon van Parys – in an action before the Raad van State (second instance) - challenged the legality of this EC (second instance) - challenged the legality of this EC legislation since the DSB of the WTO had adopted reports legislation since the DSB of the WTO had adopted reports holding this legislation to be an violation of various holding this legislation to be an violation of various provisions of GATT 1994. The Raad van State decided to provisions of GATT 1994. The Raad van State decided to stay the proceedings and refer to the ECJ the question stay the proceedings and refer to the ECJ the question “Does this EC-legislation infringe the GATT’ 94” for a “Does this EC-legislation infringe the GATT’ 94” for a preliminary ruling. The ECJ found it necessary to answer the preliminary ruling. The ECJ found it necessary to answer the question whether, under EC law, nationals may challenge question whether, under EC law, nationals may challenge the validity of EC legislation on the basis of WTO the validity of EC legislation on the basis of WTO Agreements.Agreements.

Example: Example: Leon van Parys Leon van Parys (ECJ, C-377/02) – The Banana-Case(ECJ, C-377/02) – The Banana-Case

““Given their nature and structure, the WTO agreements are not in principle among the rules in the Given their nature and structure, the WTO agreements are not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community light of which the Court is to review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions. It is only where the institutions. It is only where the Community has intended to implement Community has intended to implement a particular a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community measure refers measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the WTO agreementsexpressly to the precise provisions of the WTO agreements, that it is for the Court to , that it is for the Court to review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules.review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules.

[…] the Community […] the Community did not intend to assume a particular obligation did not intend to assume a particular obligation in the context of the in the context of the WTO, capable of justifying an exception to the impossibility of relying on WTO rules before the WTO, capable of justifying an exception to the impossibility of relying on WTO rules before the Community Courts and enabling the latter to exercise judicial review of the relevant Community Community Courts and enabling the latter to exercise judicial review of the relevant Community provisions in the light of those rules.provisions in the light of those rules.

First, even where there is a decision of the DSB holding that the measures adopted by a member First, even where there is a decision of the DSB holding that the measures adopted by a member are incompatible with the WTO rules, the WTO dispute settlement system nevertheless accords are incompatible with the WTO rules, the WTO dispute settlement system nevertheless accords considerable importance to negotiation between the partiesconsiderable importance to negotiation between the parties. In those circumstances, to . In those circumstances, to require courts to refrain from applying rules of domestic law which are inconsistent with the require courts to refrain from applying rules of domestic law which are inconsistent with the WTO agreements would have the consequence of depriving the legislative or executive organs WTO agreements would have the consequence of depriving the legislative or executive organs of the contracting parties of the possibility afforded in particular by Article 22 of the of the contracting parties of the possibility afforded in particular by Article 22 of the Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes of reaching a Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes of reaching a negotiated settlement, even on a temporary basis.negotiated settlement, even on a temporary basis.

Secondly, to accept that the Community Courts have the direct responsibility for ensuring that Secondly, to accept that the Community Courts have the direct responsibility for ensuring that Community law complies with the WTO rules would deprive the Community’s legislative or Community law complies with the WTO rules would deprive the Community’s legislative or executive bodies of the discretion which the equivalent bodies of the Community’s commercial executive bodies of the discretion which the equivalent bodies of the Community’s commercial partners enjoy.partners enjoy.

Therefore, an economic operator cannot plead before a court of a Member State that Community Therefore, an economic operator cannot plead before a court of a Member State that Community legislation is incompatible with certain WTO rules, even if the DSB has stated that that legislation is incompatible with certain WTO rules, even if the DSB has stated that that legislation is incompatible with those rules.legislation is incompatible with those rules.

(see paras 39-42, 48, 53-54, operative part)(see paras 39-42, 48, 53-54, operative part)

3.3. Common Commercial Policy 3.3. Common Commercial Policy (in (in short)short)

Most developed external policy since E(E)C is based on a Most developed external policy since E(E)C is based on a customs union (Art 23 EC) – GATT definition requires not only customs union (Art 23 EC) – GATT definition requires not only common customs tariffs but also common policy on trade common customs tariffs but also common policy on trade matters (uniform conduct of trade relations with third countries). matters (uniform conduct of trade relations with third countries). General awkwardness of dichotomy between trade policy and General awkwardness of dichotomy between trade policy and foreign and security policy (CFSP) foreign and security policy (CFSP)

CCP is in general an exclusive power CCP is in general an exclusive power – BUT: services and – BUT: services and intellectual property is a joint competence (s ECJ Opinion 1/94 intellectual property is a joint competence (s ECJ Opinion 1/94 concerning Art. 133 EC)concerning Art. 133 EC)

Common Common import and export regimes import and export regimes established besides established besides common costums tariffcommon costums tariff

Common rules for exports Common rules for exports (principle of freedom of exports, s (principle of freedom of exports, s Council Regulation 2603/69)Council Regulation 2603/69)

Common rules for imports Common rules for imports (principle of freedom to import (principle of freedom to import products originating in third countries, subject to possible products originating in third countries, subject to possible safeguard measures, Council Regulation 3285/94)safeguard measures, Council Regulation 3285/94)

Commercial Defence Commercial Defence (Anti-dumping measures, Anti-subsidy (Anti-dumping measures, Anti-subsidy measures, Defence against trade barriers) measures, Defence against trade barriers)