IIRI-GGGI Workshop Final Report

7/30/2019 IIRI-GGGI Workshop Final Report

1/62


2/62


3/62


4/62


5/62

I. Executive Summary 4

II. Opening Session 6

III. Security Aspects of Climate Change 11

IV

.Current Responses to Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific 22

V. Increasing Accountability of Regional Organizations to 36

Address Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific

VI.AnnexProgram 48

List of Participants 50

Biography of Participants 52

This report summarizes the proceedings of the workshop as interpreted by the editors,

Dr. KIM Sung-han and Dr. CHUNG Suh-Yong. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.


6/62

4

SecurityImplicationsofClimateChangeintheAsia-

Pacific

The Asia Pacific region is regarded as one of the

most vulnerable regions to climate change. A large

number of the population is located in the coastal

region which is being threatened by the sea level

rise. The melting Himalayan glacier has raised

concerns over the vast change of ecological

environment as well as the loss of human habitat.

Without appropriate climate change tackling

measures, the Asia-Pacific region will face various

problems including emergence of climate

refugees, lack of drinking water, increased poverty,

and more gravely, regional conflicts over limited

resources.

In fact, on the national level, several efforts have

been made in order to tackle climate insecurities.

For example, in Indonesia, various regulatory

measures and mitigation action plans have been

introduced to reduce the negative impact of

climate change. Yet, in order to achieve more

effective results in addressing climate change

and to secure more resources, it is necessary for

Indonesia to ensure the wider participation of all

stakeholders. In China, on the other hand, it

seems that there is not enough consensus

among the different fields regarding the security

implications of climate change as a threat to its

national security. While environmental groups

have been constantly emphasized on the

necessity of addressing climate insecurities, there

are other groups of people who have continuously

raised questions on whether perceiving climate

change issue as a threat to national security is

credible or not. At the sub-regional level in

Southeast Asia, ASEAN has developed several

policy initiatives on mitigation, adaptation and

disaster alleviation, and their effort has become

evident at 2007 ASEAN declaration on climate

change, energy and environment. However,

implementation of regional initiatives in ASEAN

remains weak because of insufficient capabilities

of member countries, incomparability of climate

change policies with other policies, and lack of

clarity on the security implications of climate

change at the sub-regional level. On the other

hand, Korea has developed adequate policy

measures to deal with climate change issues by

introducing Low Carbon Green Growth policy.

Different from other countries and the sub-

regions, strong political will from the head of the

government has made the Korean case

distinctive from other ones.

Except the Korean case, all of the cases discussed

above have demonstrated that there are common

problems on current efforts in tackling climate

change in both country and sub-regional levels.

The common problems are:

Lack of full participation of relevant stakeholders,

Lack of understanding on climate change as a

possible threat to national and/or regional

stability, and

Limited resources to implement policies to tackle

climate change.

Therefore, an innovative approach needs to be

introduced in building adequate climate change

Executive Summary

I


7/62

Executive Summary 5

governance in the Asia-Pacific region. Adequate

utilization of existing regional organizations, such

as Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Global

Green Growth Institute (GGGI), may be an

immediately available option since they may

secure more resources through the bottom-up

approach based on the Public-Private Partnership

(PPP). In order to ensure the economic growth

while implementing climate change policies, such

as low carbon green growth policy, the

development of policy measures is necessary to

mobilize more political will and resources

throughout the sectors. Developing countries

need to build their capacities in tackling climate

change, and prudent efforts also need to be

developed through the effective Official

Development Assistance (ODA) policy

coordination. This policy coordination would

secure financial resources from the private

sectors and also link policies on climate change

adaptation to their economic development

policies. During this process, it is equally

important to consider the social dimension of the

issues.


8/62

6


Pacific

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

On behalf of Ilmin International Relations Institute, I

would like to say we are delighted to host this

workshop together with Global Green Growth

Institute. GGGI is a globally represented institute

dedicated to promoting compatibility between

economic growth and environmental sustainability.

Ilmin International Relations Institute is a member

of the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security

Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia) which is funded by the

Ford Foundation and directed by the S.

Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)

in Nanyang Technological University of Singapore.

NTS-Asia has been providing an avenue for

scholars and policy-makers in Asia to discuss and

analyze NTS issues in the region such as climate

change, organized crime, human smuggling,

infectious disease, terrorism, etc.

As you may agree, those non-traditional security

problems cannot be effectively solved with

traditional forms of readiness and deterrence.

Thus, we need more constructive and

sophisticated forms of influence and intervention.

This constitutes the raison detre of cooperative

security in the post-Cold War era.

I believe this workshop is aimed at identifying the

nexus point between climate change and security

in the Asia Pacific region. There are several

emerging challenges for regional environmental

protection efforts: (1) a lack of multilateral

organizations to formulate and implement an

overarching environmental strategy; (2) the

insufficient resources of environmental protection

agencies; (3) unstable economic and social

circumstances in the majority of the countries in

this region and the relative lack of attention to

environmental problems; (4) the weak NGOs in

this region; and (5) the issue of sovereignty as a

stumbling block for regional cooperation.

The underlying cause of these challenges is the

lack of sensitivity and vulnerability towards

environmental problems in this region. Like the

d igita l divide,we are experiencing an

environment dividein this region. Some

countries are more sensitive and vulnerable than

Opening Session

II

Dr. KIM Sung-hanDirector,

Ilmin International Relations Institute,

Korea University, KoreaProfessor & Associate Dean,

Graduate School of International Studies,

Korea University, Korea

OPENING REMARKS


9/62

Opening Session 7

others. The different level of sensitivity and

vulnerability cause a potential source of inter-state

conflict. Regional efforts to encounter this

problem, however, are minimal. The regional

environmental security complex in East Asia is

at best at the stage of a latent regional

environmental security complex,where the threats

are perceived only at the level of the regional

ecosystems alone (in other words, in the world of

science or social science only). At this stage, we

can say environmental threats are not socially

constructed in the region.

Against this backdrop, we, most of all, need to

prevent environmental threats from leading to

inter-state conflicts, and prepare appropriate

responses in case such conflicts do occur.

Environmental regime-building or regional

cooperation should thus be based on durable

research and a practical understanding that comes

from anempoweredepistemic community on

the environment. As you know, an epistemic

community is a network of professionals with

recognized expertise and competence in a

particular domain. An authoritative claim to an

epistemic community may consist of professionals

from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds.

Thus, an international epistemic community needs

to be empowered to deal with emerging

environmental security issues in East Asia as well

as in the Asia Pacific as a whole.

I hope this workshop will be successful in

recognizing the security implications of climate

change in the Asia Pacific. This workshop will

contribute to empowering the epistemic

community on climate change, thereby making it

possible for us to discover and implement effective

ways and strategies to deal with climate change on

a regional and global scale.

First of all, our Executive Director, Richard Samans

who was supposed to be here to deliver this

welcoming remark had another urgent mission to

attend to, so I will be delivering the welcoming

remarks on behalf of Mr. Samans.

Thank you all for coming to this new Global Green

Growth Institute. I would like to especially thank Dr.

Soogil Young, Chairman for the Presidential

Committee on Green Growth, and greatly

appreciate his participation and sharing his

precious time to join us for this workshop between

his busy schedules.

As Professor Sung-han Kim mentioned, the issue

of security and climate change is rather new to

us. If I remember correctly, the UK raised this

issue at the UN Security Council several years ago

in 2007. Today, climate change has been

recognized as an issue that involves not only

national but regional security aspects, and has

thus emerged as an issue which can be

considered to be in the scope of the UN Security

Councils work. I myself came back from the

UNFCCC negotiations currently taking place in

Bangkok, Thailand, just yesterday. At the

conference, GGGI had the chance to introduce

Dr. JUNG Tae YongDeputy Executive Director,

Global Green Growth Institute, Korea

WELCOMING REMARKS


10/62

8

our activities through a press release. The

response from the international community was

evident, especially so among the Micronesia and

South Pacific Island countries, as they raised

security and climate change issues as a matter

closely related to their survival. We all know the

importance of this issue.

As you know, the Global Green Growth Institute

is a new born baby, just 9 months old, launched

last June. Earlier this year in January, GGGI held

its first international workshop calledGreen

Growth Expert Meetingwith the aim to produce

a report for the UN Security-Generals High

Level Panel on Global Sustainability, here in this

room. Todays workshop is the second of its

kind for GGGI, and GGGI is most happy to host

this event together with the famous Ilmin

International Relations Institute. I wish to have

very constructive and fruitful discussions today

on this very important issue of security and

climate change, with a special focus on the

Asia-pacific region.

In particular, I believe we can link the issue of

climate change security with GGGIs agenda. For

example, climate change security can be coupled

with sustainable development for developing

countries. Green growth, as GGGIs key agenda

and mandate, can also have profound

connections with the issue at hand. I hope we

can deliver such linkages on global green growth

issues through this workshop and further develop

the discussions hereon in. I am sure Professor

Suh-Yong Chung will lead this workshop with

expertise and also smoothly. GGGI hopes to

continue this kind of gathering and develop

meaningful messages to the global community.

Thank you.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen:

I would like to begin by thanking the two co-hosts,

Professor Sung-han Kim and Mr. Richard

Samans. I thank them for inviting me to this

conference to offer congratulatory remarks for its

opening.

However, in my capacity as Chairman of the

Presidential Committee on Green Growth, I should

thank them more for having gathered leading

thinkers from around the Asia-Pacific to this

conference to exchange views on the very

important topic of Security Implications of Climate

Change in Asia-Pacific.

We, in Korea, or elsewhere in the world, have given

much thought to environmental, energy and

resource policy, economic growth and the

developmental implications of climate change in

recent years. The Korean governments proposal

of green growth, as well as its launching of the

Global Green Growth Institute have been an

outgrowth of President Lee Myung-baks own

deliberation on those dimensions of climate

change, as well as far-sighted prescriptions on

how to respond to climate change in addressing


Pacific

Dr. YOUNG SoogilChairman,

The Presidential Committee on Green Growth, Korea

KEYNOTE SPEECH


11/62

Opening Session 9

the concerns such analysis gives rise to.

It is obvious, however, that if we add up all of the

environmental, energy and resource policy, and

the economic growth and developmental

implications of climate change, we would end up

with a Pandoras box of security issues. And these

are very important and serious issues, not just to

Korea, but to every country in the world; a world

which Thomas Freedman very aptly describes as

hot, flat and crowded.

I would like to thank the organizers of this

conference for bringing this discussion to Seoul, in

particular.

The thought-leaders around the world and in the

Asia-Pacific region have already begun discussing

these issues. But as far as I know, this is the first

such discussion taking place in Korea. I welcome

this very much because I expect this conference to

help Korean thought-leaders begin thinking of

climate change and green growth from the security

perspective, and more fully recognize the

seriousness of climate change and the importance

of green growth as a remedy.

And, of course, adding on to the discussions of

the security implications of climate change in Asia

Pacific, this conference will further enrich the stock

of such analysis and hopefully make an impression

on political leaders in the region of the importance

of cooperating to launch an effective post-Kyoto

climate change regime in 2012, the final year of the

Kyoto regime.

In reality, the UN-sponsored negotiations on the

post-Kyoto regime has been fraught with

difficulties and obstacles. The situation is already

bad, and I am afraid that it may be made even

worse by the nuclear crisis that is still unfolding in

Japan. Japans nuclear crisis may greatly diminish

its nuclear power generation capacity for decades

to come and may deprive the Japanese

government of the will to contribute to a successful

climate change negotiation for some time.

What would be the consequences, and especially

the security implications, of an indefinite

stalemate of negotiations for the Asia-Pacific

region, and Northeast Asia, in particular? Is there

any way out of, or around this undesirable

eventuality? What could be the future of nuclear

power generation? Can alternative clean energy

sources be effectively and sufficiently produced to

make up for the energy gap due to diminished

nuclear generation?

While the global community is trying to moderate

this through such negotiations, climate change will

continue irregardless whether it be to a small

degree or a large one. Consequent stresses and

conflicts over energy resources, food, extreme

weather patterns, consequent natural disasters,

water stresses, health problems, and trans-border

migration would certainly bring serious security and

geopolitical challenges, both globally and

regionally. How should political leaders in the

region, especially those in Asia-Pacific countries

and those of Northeast Asia cope with these

challenges?

As Chairman of Koreas Presidential Committee

on Green Growth, I particularly welcome this

conference, and look forward to learning the

outcomes of the conference. This is because

todays discussion is expected to highlight the

potential role of green growth, seen both as

Koreas national strategy and a global strategy,

and as a remedy to address some of the

challenges of climate change. If so, in what way

can Koreas green growth strategy best be

exploited?


12/62

10

The Global Green Growth Institute was established

to internationalize green growth for the benefit of

developing countries. It embodies an international

strategic response to the security challenges posed

by climate change. As such, what should be the

modus operandi of GGGI?

The Korean government is bidding to host COP 18

later next year. It is competing with Qatar, and the

winner of this bidding will be decided in June this

year. Assuming that Korea wins this bid, what

should Koreas ambition be on the outcome of

COP18? Korea achieved a success at the Seoul

G20 Summit in bridging the gap between

developing and developed countries in regards to

facilitating global cooperation. Will the Korean

government be able to repeat this success as a

bridge-builder on climate change cooperation at

COP18 if it hosts and chairs this? What should be

Koreas strategy as the chair country in steering

the negotiation process?

I have stressed this repeatedly, and highlighted

some specific issues which are on my mind,

hoping that they will be dealt with at this

conference.

I also did so in order to underline the timeliness

and relevance of this conference and its theme.

I would like to congratulate the organizers on this

conference. I also congratulate the speakers and

the participants of the conference for having

gathered to discuss all of these issues of absolute

importance.

I also would like to congratulate Mr. Richard

Samans for having joined the GGGI as its

Executive Director. I think that Chairman Seung-soo

Han of GGGI was lucky to have spotted Mr.

Samans and have successfully persuaded Mr.

Samans with his illustrious career in Washington

and at the World Economic Forum in Davos to take

up this role of critical strategic importance for such

a new international institution of a vital global

importance.

I also hope that you will soon begin to enjoy your

stay here in Korea. I am sure that all the

participants, from Korea and from around the

Asia-Pacific region, certainly including myself, will

enjoy working with you and help you enjoy your

new life in Korea and the Asia Pacific.

In closing, I hope that you will enjoy the

discussions, and that this will be a very successful

conference.

Thank you very much for your attention.


Pacific


13/62

III

Security Aspects of Climate Change 11


Pacific

Security Aspects of

Climate Change

Session I

was chaired by Dr. KIM Sung-han, Director, Ilmin

International Relations Institute, Korea University and

the topic of this session wasSecurity Aspects ofClimate Change.

Global warming is a manifest and inevitable trend in the world of the 21st century. Much of this is

attributed to the accumulation of greenhouse gas emitted into the atmosphere since the industrial

revolution. Regardless of blame, however, the unchanging reality is that climate change will be an

ongoing challenge for decades to come. As changes in climate have generated unprecedented threats

to human society, it is time to look at this issue in terms of security. Below are the main points

discussed in the session:

Climate change has brought about significant changes in the Asia Pacific region, whether positiveor negative, some of which may have posed threats to regional stability.

Governments in the Asia Pacific region should to adapt to climactic changes, prepare for potential

threats within/out of their boundaries, and engage in regional cooperation to avert the

detrimental impacts of climate change and to prevent possible conflicts in the region.

Introduction

In its simplest form,national securityis the ability

of a state to protect its government and it people

from harm. Threats to national security can come

in many different forms, including foreign nations,

internal threats, or environmental changes.

Traditional threats generally arise from other

nations exercising physical force, while non-state

actors can also play a similar role. Natural events,

such as weather, earthquakes, or droughts also

cause harm to a nations stability and security.

Unlike traditional security threats, these can be

THREATS TO SECURITY FROM CLIMATECHANGE IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

Mr. Andrew HOLLANDResearcher,

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C


14/62

12

even more dangerous because one cannot

negotiate with nature nor anticipate its moves.

Considerations of national security must also

include the stability arising from a peaceful

international system. National security and

international stability, therefore, are closely linked

for any country that relies on global trade and

investment.

Man-made climate change is the driving cause of

environmental changes that will ultimately lead to

changes in human society. Climate change

presents a comprehensive threat because it affects

many different areaswater supplies, food

production, energy use, migration, governance,

and others. These changes present threats to both

individual and national security by directly harming

human life and property, and to international

stability by causing migrations and shifts in

resource allocation, all of which can destabilize

fragile governments and incite conflict. The

security threats posed by climate change have

become a priority for policy planners, making it

necessary to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to

avert this trend.

The Asia Pacific Region

For this report, three Asian sub-regions were

examinedthe Tibetan Plateau, East Asia, and

South East Asia. These three regions are

undeniably linked, politically and geographically,

by the most important regional political actor,

China. This report also includes the Small Island

States on the Pacific Ocean, as they are uniquely

vulnerable to climate change, especially rising sea

levels and the bleaching of coral reefs. Their fate

is disregarded in the major powersinternational

security calculations, but they present an

important moral argument for action on climate

change.

The Science of Climate Change

Greenhouse gas emissions have grown

significantly since the 20th century. Evidence that

man-made emissions are responsible for recent

warming trends is robust, while predicting the

evolution and outcomes of climate change remain

difficult and ambiguous. Variability and uncertainty

are features of the climate system; no one knows

how quickly climate change will happen, or what its

specific effects will be. At the long-term global

level, the picture is becoming clearer as climate

scientists update their computer models with more

accurate measurements and a greater

understanding of the climate system. However,

security planners do not operate over century-long

periods, and cannot rely exclusively on computer

models as this can create a false sense of security.

International efforts to reduce emissions over the

next decade will determine the climate of the

second half of the 21st Century, but most of the

warming until 2050 islocked inby the cumulative

emissions of the past two centuries. Therefore, the

world should prepare for a consistent warming of

at least 0.2Celsius per decade. In addition, there

is a dangerous possibility ofpositive feedback

where the ecological system, itself, intensifies

global warming. Variability over the short term and

uncertainty over the long term will continue to be

features of the climate system. Instead of relying

on models to erase that uncertainty, planners and

policymakers will have to embrace it, noting that

long-term predictions can be wrong.

The Physical Effects of Warming in the

Asia Pacific

Global climate change has already had definite

and observable effects on the environment in the

Asia Pacific region. Most glaciers have shrunk,

plant and animal ranges have shifted, ice on rivers


Pacific


15/62


and lakes break up earlier in the year, and trees are

flowering earlier as well. Climate change may

already be changing weather and precipitation

patterns. While individual events cannot be

definitively attributed to climate change, some

scientists claim that these events were so far

outside the historical norm that they could only be

explained by man-made climate change. The

impacts of global warming will vary in their severity,

duration, and extent across the region.

Increased temperatures will speed up evaporation,

increasing the total amount of rainfall across Asia.

This will be far from universal, however, and we

should also expect increased seasonal variability.

Warming is likely to be most pronounced on the

Tibetan Plateau. This region is warming almost

twice as fast as the rest of the world. Sometimes

calledthe Third Pole,the Himalayas and the vast

Tibetan Plateau are the source for at least 10 of

Asias major rivers. Thus, climate change in East

Asia will manifest itself primarily though changes in

water supplies. Scientists predict that the

Southeast Asian region will experience temperature

increases below the global average, but remain

highly vulnerable to increases in sea levels. In

addition, calculated effects of warming on tropical

monsoon rains are highly uncertain. Some

scenarios predict a stronger monsoon with heavier

seasonal rain, while others see the annual cycle

being cut-off completely. This region should

expect climate change to cause greater annual

volatility in seasonal rains.

Climate Change and Security in the

Asia Pacific

The effects of climate change listed above are not

occurring in a vacuum: across the Asia Pacific

region, warming temperatures will be

accompanied by rapid population growth,

pollution, urbanization, resource shortages, and

energy price increases. Analytically, it is difficult to

separate the effects of climate change from these

and other factorsincluding food shortages,

migration, and ethnic tensionsthat could drive

violence. However, the regional impact of climate

change on water, energy, and agriculture will

make it athreat multiplierthat is likely insufficient

to cause conflict on its own, but could be one of

several drivers of conflict over the next few

decades. There are three particular scenarios that

are most likely to drive instability: acute natural

disasters, conflicts over scarce resources, and

climate-induced migration.

Regarding acute natural disasters, climate change

is expected to increase the severity, duration, and

frequency of extreme weather events. Typhoons,

floods, and droughts can damage private

property, public infrastructure, and cause

casualties. Due to these threats, governments

have increasingly called upon their militaries to

respond to natural disasters. Although not a

climate-related disaster, the unprecedented,

wide-scale deployment of the Japanese Self-

Defense Forces in response to Marchs

earthquake and tsunami should be seen as a

model for how nations will call upon their armed

forces amid widespread devastation. Militaries are

not generally trained for such humanitarian

missions, but their organizational ability and lift

capacity give them a unique ability to rapidly

respond. Single events, no matter how

overwhelming, are unlikely to harm the stability of

a state, but repeated events will eventually wear

down the capacity and will to respond. In addition,

the American military is currently the only military

that has the sea and air lift capacity along with

forward deployed troops to be able to respond to

mass casualty humanitarian events around the

world. The US Navy is always deployed in both the

Indian and Pacific Oceans, and can be a

humanitarian stabilizing force for its allies.


16/62

14

Being central to almost all economic activity,

changes in water resources will be the most visible

impact of climate change on human society

across the Asia Pacific. Predicted rainfall changes

and droughts could turn inland marginal farming

and grazing lands into deserts, while annual

reductions and seasonal variability in river flows will

cause water shortages in areas that lack consistent

rains. This means that while some places are

parched, others will be cursed with an

overabundance of rain. In East Asia, competition

and disputes over trans-boundary water flows

along the Mekong River are already a realitywith

those in downstream countries blaming Chinas

aggressive dam-building for abnormally low flows

in 2010. Water shortages or imbalances of water

distribution can also lead to civil conflict in

marginalized societies, such as low-levelwater

riotssome leading to deathsthat were seen

last year in Indonesia and the Philippines. A

second resource that could be made scarce by

climate change is food. Like water resources,

history shows little record of food shortages

causing interstate wars, but there is a long history

of domestic disturbances that are at least partially

catalyzed by price increases of staple foodsfrom

Revolutionary France to todays revolutions in the

Middle East.

The number of climate migrants is potentially as

large as it is uncertain. The accounting will be

nearly impossible, as the decision to migrate is a

complex one, affected by many factors. When

climactic changes, resource shortages, and

conflict make the local environment to inhospitable

to live, migration will be a rational response.

Temporary migration as an adaptive response to

climate stress is already apparent in many areas.

Most migrants stay within their home country,

where they move from the countryside to the city,

where economic potential is often higher. Conflict

between migratory herders and stationary farmers

over well waterexacerbated by tribal, ethnic, and

religious differencesis widely cited as the spark

that began the Darfur crisis.

Recommendations

We can expect the climate to continue warming for

at least the next 30 years. Adapting to the effects

of climate change will therefore be necessary,

especially in the formation of long-term plans.

However, in many countries around the Asia

Pacific region, there is a tendency to think that

heavy infrastructure investments, like dams and

sea walls will be enough to protect the population.

We must be careful that such investments do not

merely provide a sense of security similar to the

sea walls in Fukushima Prefecture. Instead, such

adaptation measures need to address the

following:

Water:To reduce the threat of social conflict,

water should be at the center of climate

adaptation efforts. Water supplies will be heavily

reduced by climate change in drought-prone

areas, and water shortages are a likely cause

of conflict around the world. Therefore,

infrastructure investments and policy changes

that can more efficiently deliver, store, and

distribute water should be prioritized. In addition,

where water supplies cross borders, negotiating

water sharing agreements should be a priority.

Food:Food production in Asias major rice and

wheat producing regions will be adversely

affected by climate change. Positive benefits of

warming such as a longer growing season in

northern regions are possible. However, the result

will be declines in yields for the two most

important crops in this region. Achieving a secure

food supply will become a challenge for more

countries because of a combination of increased

prices and shifting areas for viable food

production.


Pacific


17/62


Migration:One solution would be to classify

migrants asrefugees,granting them officially

protected status. However, there is significant

resistance to this idea because it could

overwhelm the already stressed international

refugee system. For this to work, certain areas

would have to be designated as official sources

of climate migrants, otherwise any migrant would

seek to proclaim himself as a protectedclimate

refugee.On the other hand, planned migration

is a rational adaptation to climate change. Within

some large East Asian countries, planned

migrations away from low-lying shorelines and to

newly productive land could be beneficial over

the long-term, but would require significant

dislocation in the short-term.

Conclusion

One of the most pressing concerns will be to

discourage counterproductive solutions. Countries

are tempted to isolate themselves from problems

beyond its borders. However, resilience is built

through strong international cooperation. Planners

should adapt their thinking to meet the modern

threats posed by climate change. This will require

new doctrines, mindsets, and equipment. The

challenges will be significant, and will include the

protection of infrastructure, humanitarian

assistance, resource wars, and the protection of

the global commons. Notably, many of these

missions are best addressed by civilian

departments of government rather than by the

military. Addressing climate change will require a

whole of governmentfocus. Instead of isolating

climate efforts intosecurity missionsand non-

security missions, adaptation, mitigation,

international aid, and crisis response should all be

planned jointly across governments.

Introduction

Natural disasters, in particular hydro-

meteorological disasters, have increased in

frequency. It is debated whether this increase in

extreme weather events is the result of climate

change, but it has been shown to be a strong

accelerator.Climate change is expected to

increase the frequency, intensity, and duration of

many types of extreme events such as floods,

droughts, and tropical cyclones, which will have

implications for human security. Unmitigated

climate change beyond 2 C will lead to un-

precedented security scenarios and is likely to

trigger a number of tipping points leading to further

accelerated, irreversible, and unpredictable climate

changes.

The newly recognized socio-economic aspects of

climate change and the implication for sustainable

development will include greater detail on regional

effects of climate change as well as risk

management within the framing of a response.

The wordsecuritizationdescribes the process by

which issues are incorporated into the security

agenda, which is increasingly the case with

SECURITY ASPECTS OF CLIMATECHANGE

Ms. Wan Portia HAMZAHSenior Fellow,

Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS),

Malaysia


18/62

16

climate change. Current approaches to security

range from traditional concepts to broader

understandings of human security. However, there

are concerns that environmental challenges will

become militarized if traditional security institutions

take up the issue. This will depend on how climate

change will come to be framed. Because the Asia

Pacific region is one of four regional hotspots to

be increasingly affected by climate change, how

governments will address theclimate security

issue remains a question. It will be necessary to

trace the linkage between climate change and

security, identifying regional impacts (focus on the

ASEAN region), and outlining some strategic

responses to the security aspects of climate

change.

Climate Change: A Security Threat?

Stability within and among nations is often a

means to avoid full-scale military conflict and

ensure national security. As such, priority is given

to protecting stability and creating it where it does

not exist. Too often, however, threats to national

security are no longer linked to military conflict but

emerge from other sources including economic

instability, social inequality, out-break of infectious

diseases, refugee movements, transnational

organized crime, climate change, and degradation

of the natural environment. Likewise, climate

change is not just an environmental issue, but a

multidimensional challenge. Climate change will

impact countries differently, presenting diverse

security challenges such as mounting potential for

conflict and an increase in social tensions. Climate

change can also act as a threat multiplier in some

of the most volatile regions of the world, adversely

affecting all levels of social life and the entire

spectrum of human security and regional stability.

Three fundamental levels of security can be

identified:

Level 1:Climate change poses a threat to

human security particularly in societies that are

already marginalized. For the millions of poor in

the region, they will be the least resilient and least

able to adapt. Poverty will exacerbate climate

insecurities. Climate change will therefore

undermine the achievement of the Millennium

Development Goals, including those on reducing

poverty and achieving sustainable development.

Level 2:Internal security concerns the extent to

which climate change will influence violent intra-

state conflict, either between different population

groups or social groups within a state. There have

been a number of studies, but to date,

environmental factors have rarely led directly to

violent conflicts or problems of internal security.

Level 3:International security relates to potential

conflict between states. Issues of international

security that are influenced substantially by climate

change include potential conflicts of interest over

the use of water as well as regional destabilizing

events that may result from the collapse of states

or violent conflicts within states.

Assessments of the linkage between climate

change and potential conflict are complex, but

climate change is considered to be a potential

factor in destabilization and conflict. Climate

change functions as an additional stress factor on

societies that are already fragile as a result of

geographical location, dependence on natural

resources, and lack of financial or institutional

support. In other words, in weak and fragile states

with poorly performing institutions and systems of

government, climate change is likely to overwhelm

local capacities to adapt to changing

environmental conditions and will reinforce trends

towards general instability that already exists in

such societies and regions. States can and do play

a critical role in creating stable conditions and

providing people with the means to respond to

adversity. But, in general, wealthier countries and


Pacific


19/62


individuals will be better able to adapt to the

impacts of climate change; whereas societies with

weak adaptive capacity will be most severely

affected. It is the poorest countries, in particular,

that are the most vulnerable, meaning that climate

protection measures must be integrated into their

development policies.

Projected Regional Climate Change

The 2009 Asian Development Bank study estimates

temperature increases throughout the Southeast Asia

region and water resources to become increasingly

unstable. Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam are

particularly vulnerable, and while no measures have

been taken to control climate change, rice

production in these countries could fall by 50

percent. There is a great deal of natural climate

variability in Southeast Asianatural variations in

monsoon frequency and intensity are tied to the El

Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO), but future

changes to ENSO remain uncertain. Variations in the

intensity and occurrence of tropical cyclones due to

climate change will impact precipitation changes in

affected areas, but again there is significant

uncertainty to potential changes in tropical cyclone

occurrence and intensity. Sea levels also rose in

Southeast Asia at rates of up to 3cm per year

between 1993 and 2001, and sea levels are

projected to rise up to 40 cm in the 21st century.

Climate change induced increases in sea level are

problematic for Southeast Asia as highlighted

earliersince the region is comprised largely of low

lying coastal and island nations. Increases in sea

level will also impact river deltas, increasing flooding,

coastal erosion, and salt intrusion.

Impacts of Climate Change

Southeast Asia is reported to be one of the worlds

most vulnerable regions to climate change due to

several geographical factors. These include long

coastlines, concentration of people and economic

activities near coastal areas, and heavy reliance on

climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture,

fishing, forestry, tourism, and natural resources.

Climate change impacts on natural and human

systems are interrelatedfor instance rising sea

levels cause salt intrusion into river deltas, which

adversely affect agricultural activities, drinking

water availability, and population patterns. The

socio-economic consequences at macro and

micro levels will, in turn, affect human livelihoods.

The economic implicationssuch as loss of

agricultural land and the need to re-engineer port

facilities, energy infrastructure, and transportation

systemsare enormous.

The 2009 Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for

Southeast Asia identified the most vulnerable areas

to climate change: all regions of the Philippines;

the Mekong Delta region of Vietnam; almost all of

Cambodia; North and East Lao PDR; the Bangkok

region due to exposure to sea level rise; and west

and south Sumatra, as well as western and eastern

Java in Indonesia. The Philippines is uniqueit is

exposed to many elements including tropical

cyclones in the northern and eastern parts of the

country, floods in central Luzon and Southern

Mindanao, and landslides due to the terrain as well

as droughts. Although Cambodia is relatively less

exposed to direct climate hazards, except for areas

bordering the Mekong Delta, the study finds that all

provinces in Cambodia are vulnerable because of

their low adaptive capacity. Central Jakarta, despite

having the highest adaptive capacity, ranks first in

overall vulnerability because it is at the intersection

of virtually all the climate-related hazards, and is

among the most densely-populated. Vietnam is

susceptible to cyclones, but because of its high

adaptive capacity is not listed. Adaptive capacity

certainly has an important role in changing the

spatial pattern of vulnerability, but that ways in

which countries respond will be important.


20/62

18

Focus on the Energy-Food-Water

Security Nexus

In terms of energy security, it is often said that

nuclear is the only option because of its proven

power production. Serious complications cannot be

denied, however, ranging from increasing costs to

security against nuclear terrorism and illegal trade of

nuclear materials. Within ASEAN alone, Indonesia,

Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and

Vietnam have all declared plans to develop nuclear

power. Following the recent nuclear incident in

Japan, however, several countries have begun

reviewing such plans. Vietnam, considered the

advancerwith eight reactors planned, has

indicated that it will go forward with its nuclear

plans. Indonesia, which has four nuclear reactors

planned, has done likewise. China has suspended

approval for new nuclear power stations and is

carrying out checks at existing reactors under

construction. China is reported to be currently

building 27 new reactorsabout 40% of the total

number being built around the world. Within

ASEAN, Agreement on Southeast Asian Nuclear

Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) needs to be better

enforced, along with work on an early warning

system for nuclear accidents, and regional

emergency preparedness and response plan.

Food insecurity has strong implications on the

political stability and security of states, both as a

cause and effect. A lack of political or social

stability can jeopardize long-term food security.

Likewise, food insecurity can lead to political and

social instability and, in turn, threaten a regimes

survival. The food riots in Indonesia and the

Philippines are prime examples. It is important to

highlight that food security embodies a complex

set of intertwined concerns and issues. Climate

change has the potential to exacerbate competing

demands for water and land for agriculture. In

addition, there is a disturbing trend of increased

rural-urban migration creating wider disparities

between urban and rural populations, especially

within the Southeast Asian region. It has also been

observed that many households are small farmers

who have become net food consumers rather of

producers. Climate change and weather variability

would also impose significant stress on and

exacerbate vulnerabilities to water supply

throughout the region.

Strategic Response to Security Aspects

of Climate Change

As a first step, it is necessary to shift our thinking

on the relationship between climate change and

security, and reassess priorities and hotspots

regarding security impacts of climate change on a

regional level, such as the followings: (1) Climate-

induced degradation of freshwater resources (2)

Climate-induced decline in food production (3)

Climate-induced increase in storm and flood

disasters and (4) Notable rise in environmentally-

induced migration. The next step is to identifyno-

regretspolicies, i.e. those we would not regret

having pursued even if the consequences of

climate change prove less severe than predicted.

This translates into planning for adaptation, but

therein remains a critical dilemmait is impossible

to prepare for all potential threats and warn about

all potential catastrophic impacts. How will security

concerns address the issue? It is important that

support for adaptation measures related to

hotspots and vulnerabilities be provided in key

areas. A sensible adaptation strategy is to develop

capacity to cope with change. Some adjustments

are therefore necessary and depend not only on

the physical or geographical location, but even

more so on the level of social and economic

development, existing capabilities, institutional

support, and social organization. In order to

respond appropriately, systematic assessment of

possible risksin terms of time frame, scale, and


Pacific


21/62


frequency of threats, as well as the degree of

vulnerability must be carried out.

The threat of climate change creates opportunities

for constructive engagement for capacity building

and stability operations. There is a need to build

the nations militarys capabilities to support

civilian government agencies and enhance good

governance. As observed in the recent disaster in

Japan, providing aid in the aftermath of such a

disaster can help preserve stability in the nation

and region. Hence, deployments of the military to

provide disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and

stability operations would mean that the military

must be prepared. At the same time there must be

arrangements for policymakers and intelligence

analysts to use informational systems to gather

environmental data. Increasing the knowledge

base will help to create a better understanding of

the security concerns. Adaptation initiatives overlap

considerably with disaster risk reduction by

employing similar tools to analyze and address

climate-related impacts.

The challenge posed by climate change is beyond

what any one country can address on its own,

requiring cooperation at all levels. Countries within

the region are also very diverse in terms of

development, governance, administrative capacity,

expertise, and know-how. At the same time,

countries are facing challenges of sustainable

development, poverty reduction, management of

water and energy resources, and so forth.

Commitment and cooperation through multilateral

climate diplomacy must be pursued, including

regional dialogue on climate change scenarios and

strategies. Engagement in preventive diplomacy

and taking proactive measures will be important in

dealing with mutual threats. The way climate

change policies are framed is also important. South

Korea has successfully framed climate change in

terms of opportunities forgreen growthand

winning public support as well as international

prestige. Thelow carbon, green growthstrategy

of creating new jobs and promoting technology is

the basic recipe for addressing the root cause of

climate change. The launching of theGreen New

Dealstimulus package aimed at promoting low

carbon green growth has caused a ripple effect

around the region.

Concluding Remarks

The challenge for the region and for those with

interests or stakes in the region is to build greater

collaboration among nations. Many of the

problems will not be solved unless there is

coordinated action at the regional level, as well as

an exchange of information and joint-capacity

building initiatives. The security implications of

climate change cannot be tackled unless security

discourses which outline the problems,

information, and means to deal with the issues are

addressed. In the West, more traditional security

actors are involved in discussions on the issue but

this is not the case in Southeast Asia. The framing

of climate security issues must also be judiciously

carried out to encourage the region to respond to

future challenges.

Id like to express my gratitude for participating as

a discussant in this session. I have read the two

papers and they were very well-written and very

well updated on the nexus between climate

change and security threats. I agree with multiple

points they have made; I agree that we need a

whole government approach, and agree that we

Dr. LEE GeunProfessor,

Seoul National University, Korea

SESSION DISCUSSION


22/62

20

need greater international cooperation,

enhancement of mitigating and adaptive

strategies, government capacity, more

infrastructure investment, a well-functioning robust

global market, development of technologies, and

all the challenges we have discussed. However, I

studied this issue until about 4-5 years ago, and

for the past decade, have unfortunately not found

any new findings to be particularly theoretical.

Security threat analysis related to climate change

has been discussed for many years and here lies

the problem; there has been no further

advancement of the discussion. Before I go on

about this issue, I have two questions.

First, there is the issue of nuclear energy. Climate

change will bring about more natural disasters,

while economic change will demand more energy

and nuclear plants. It is therefore problematic that

nuclear disasters could occur due to nuclear

energy. Nuclear energy is not compatible with

natural disaster, as we have experienced with

Japanese case, and this exposes the

contradiction. I see this is in the context of a policy

problem, and would like to ask how we can solve

this problem.

Second issue is the contradiction of the security

implication in military preparedness. As we are

discussing both traditional and non-traditional

security, I would like to make the connection

between the two. A military consumes a lot of

energy, as well as an enormous amount of fossil

fuels. It also destroys the environment through

training, drills, bombings, and such. They not only

create natural disasters but artificial disasters as

well. Can we expect the military to quickly shift

from fossil fuels to alternative energy resources?

How can we catch both rabbitsmilitary

preparedness and climate changeat the same

time?

I also have two comments. One is a very

interesting observation related to the earthquake in

Japan. Many people are saying that Northeast Asia

is the most uncertain area in terms of security

threats. Japan was almost paralyzed by the

earthquake. Its government was not well

functioning. Japan is surrounded by many hostile

nations; North Korea and China. However, North

Korea gave aid to Japan and China also

cooperated with Japan. As such, the natural

disaster in Japan and its malfunctioning

government did not create any new security threat

in the region. Perhaps the Northeast Asia may not

be that unstable as we believe, because one

nation was hit by a natural disaster, yet every

nation around that particular country helped.

Secondly, security threats of climate change are

particularly intertwined with both risks and

opportunities. We see many opportunities for

construction companies, insurance companies,

environmental industries, related technology, and

so forth. Therefore, I am quite optimistic that

market forces, its actors and activities, will adapt to

these changes.

Finally, I would like to suggest not using security

terminology, but to use safety terminology. Rather

than to have security discourses, policy makers

should engage the issue of climate change as a

safety discourse. First, this is due to mismatch of

time frames, as Andrew Holland stated. Climate

change issue should be treated in the long-term,

in other words, as safety discourses. Secondly,

people do not have the same sense of reality when

climate change issue is handled as a security

issue. Therefore, for government operations be

more compatible with the reality, safety terminology

seems more appropriate.


Pacific


23/62


I assume unanimous consent that we will have to

pay attention to and cooperate for the growing

challenges from climate change, the environment,

and energy as a combined issue. I would like to

discuss this non-security agenda from the

perspective of a traditional security researcher. It is

necessary to discuss ways to utilize traditional

security methods to respond to non-traditional

security issues.

Our approach has to begin from the fact that

traditional and non-traditional securities are highly

interconnected. Climate change has influenced the

military and national security to a great extent. The

United States has claimed this issue as important

to its security through Quadrennial Defense Review

(QDR) and National Security Strategy (NSS), and

the Korean military has taken a similar approach.

Climate change also affects the customs and

traditions that were commonly practiced in the field

of traditional security. In a military operation, the

most decisive factors are preparation for battle,

weather (climate), and geography. Considering

that climate change has modified two of these

factors, I estimate that militaries will come up with

new measures and tactics to cope with the effects

of climate change.

The second problem concerns the roles military

forces can take in natural disasters and ways to

pursue cooperation among countries. Historical

examples have shown that a military force can play

a crucial role in case of a natural disaster. Although

the primary mission of the military is military

operation, it has recently been extended to

humanitarian affairs. It is necessary, therefore, to

extend the role of the military into non-traditional

areas and to seek cooperation between states.

Militaries also should practice joint-operations to

build not only operational capacity but also trust

between states. The Korean military has

participated in a number of humanitarian

operations and is planning to increase its own

contribution.

The third point is that the very concept of security

has to change. Traditional security emphasizes

military threats; but now is the time to expand this

scope to a more cooperative and comprehensive

one. Unfortunately, I do not see much cooperation

being made, likely because of differing

circumstances that countries face. It is crucial,

however, to overcome these differences, and I

expect that cooperation can be built once

countries reach a consensus based upon shared

experiences. Governments also need to seek

cooperation with non-governmental sectors so

that responses can be more multi-dimensional

and effective.

Fourth, I get the impression that climate change is

something inevitable. If so, potential measures will

be narrowly confined to reducing the pace and

impact of climate change. I would like to hear

expertsopinions regarding this idea. Lastly, it is

inappropriate to deal with climate change from a

regional perspective because it is indeed an

international concern. It is necessary to find the

best approach for international and regional

societies to maximize cooperation and adjust to

climate change.

Dr. CHOI KangProfessor,

Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea


24/62

22


Pacific

Introduction

Indonesia is perhaps one of the most vulnerable

countries to climate change in the Asia Pacific

region. It is the biggest archipelagic country with an

expansive coastline stretching 81,000 km, a total

area of 790 Ha of which only one-third is land; a

total population of 237 million people, and large

metropolitan cities located mostly in the coastal

areas. Indonesias tropical climate conducive to

monsoons, and geographic location extending

across the Inter-tropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ)

results in strong squalls, frequent and heavy rainfall,

Current Responses to Climate Change

in the Asia-Pacific

V

Session II

was chaired by Ms. Wan Portia HAMZAH, Senior Fellow,

Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS)

Malaysia and the topic of this session wasCurrentResponses to Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific.

Climate change in the Asia-Pacific region has vast security implications on its social and economic

infrastructure. The influx of recent natural disasters and their accompanying side effects has caused

countries in this region such as Indonesia, China, and Singapore to begin implementing domestic and

transnational strategies to counter climate change. Efforts in the Asia-Pacific thus far have proven

successful in limited spheres, but a consensus among all parties involved is yet to be seen. Key topics

in this session include the following:

Efforts related to climate change need to be multifaceted, including both policies for mitigation

and adaptation.

Climate change policy needs to address all affected parties, particularly the marginalized

populations most vulnerable to climate changes negative impacts.

A consensus on the actual nature and influence of climate change must be reached before any

major policy measures can be pursued.

INDONESIAS RESPONSES TO CLIMATECHANGE

Ms. Emma RACHMAWATYAssistant Deputy Minister,

Ministry of Environment, Indonesia


25/62

Current Responses to Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific 23

and severe thunderstorms. In addition to these

factors, Indonesia also lies in one of the most

active regions in the Pacific Ring of Fire, where

many active and mordant volcanoes exacerbate the

risks of any natural disaster. The following section

will address the nature of climate change in

Indonesia by examining three critical areas:

Impacts of climate change in Indonesia

Indonesias response to climate change through

regulation policies and mitigation plans of action

Challenges in implementing climate change

measures in Indonesia

Impacts of Climate Change in Indonesia

According to the 2010 Second National

Communication (SNC) report, the number of

climate-related hazards in Indonesia has steadily

increased from 1955 to 2005. Climate-related

hazards described in the report include higher

intensity and frequent floods, land slides, water and

vector borne diseases, wind storms/cyclones,

forest fires, droughts, and higher tides/surges. The

city of Semarang, for example, has lost 584 Ha of

its coastal area as a result of rising sea levels and

floods, and is expected to lose another 266 Ha due

to land subsidence. On top of environmental

damages incurred, flooding across Indonesias

islands and high tides in fishing zones has resulted

in massive economic losses which threaten the

livelihoods of Indonesias people. The marginalized

population suffering from poverty and poor living

conditions have very limited access to clean water

and sanitation, and are the most vulnerable to the

environmental and economic impacts of climate

change. In this regard, the security implications of

climate change in Indonesia are both social and

economic as food and water scarcity, health risks,

and large-scale migration are all likely to occur in a

natural disaster. These impacts have already been

experienced with lower production levels of rice,

decreasing domestic water resources, erosion in

major cities, increased cases of diseases such as

dengue fever, and deteriorating infrastructure in

roads and bridges.

Indonesias Response to Climate

Change

Indonesia has developed several measures to

combat, mitigate, and adapt to the negative

impacts of climate change. As natural disasters

have plagued Indonesias urban centers and

agricultural heartlands over the past decade, the

Government has felt an increasing pressure to

address both the causes and results of erratic

environmental circumstances. Within this context,

Indonesias government is currently pursuing

counter measures towards climate change through

policies for regulation, mitigation, and adaptation.

In response to the imminent threats of climate

change, Indonesias government has begun

implementing regulations and policies to minimize

negative environmental and social impacts. For

example, during the past two years Law No. 32

Year 2009 on the Protection and Management of

Environment, and Medium-term Development

Plan 2010~2014a policy which integrates climate

change into the development agenda and

planning processes at the local and national

levelshave been pushed through legislation. The

Law of No. 32 Year 2009 mandates that the local

and national government provide, among others,

strategic environmental assessment, an

environmental protection and management plan,

and a GHG inventory. Additionally, in 2007 the

Government established a National Action Plan on

Climate Change followed up by the Indonesia

Climate Change Sectoral Road Map in 2010. Both

of these were indented to provide a comprehensive

response to counteract climate change through

means of integrated and sectoral action.


26/62

24

Mitigation has become another important area of

focus for handling the effects of climate change in

Indonesia. For example, the Government has

engaged in a multifaceted approach which seeks

to address mitigation issues based on the

reduction of carbon emissions. The measure

includes monitoring GHG emissions, reducing

emissions from a number of economic sectors

(energy, forestry, industry, waste, transportation),

the implementation of Clean Development

Mechanism (CDM), and controlling Ozone-

Depleting Substances (ODS). In order to boost

implementation on a macro level, Indonesia

decided to implement Reducing Emissions from

Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)

and to provide a voluntary commitment to reduce

GHG emissions by 26% by 2020 through the use

of domestic resources, and to cut an additional

15% with international support.

Although mitigation efforts are important to ensure

a fundamental shift towards cleaner and more

efficient means of energy consumption, it is

impossible to reverse all the damage that has

occurred. Accordingly, Indonesias people also

need to be fitted with a method for adapting to the

current situation, and possible climate change

impacts for the future. Adaptation action that has

been developed to date is divided into priority

sectors; namely water resources, food, coastal

and fisheries, human health, and infrastructure. In

addition, several vulnerability studies have been

conducted in certain areas of Indonesia to gauge

the level of vulnerability, and to prepare

recommendations for appropriate action. As

climate change most directly affectscommon

peoplesuch as fishermen, farmers, and those

residing in marginalized urban areas, initiatives for

adaptation at the local level have also been

developed. To encourage and acknowledge these

local movements, Ministry of Environment (MOE)

launched the Program Kampung Iklim (PROKLIM)

or, Climate Village, which is designed to replicate

the best practices and lessons that can be

integrated in other areas in need of adaptive

measures.

Challenges of Implementing Measures

for Climate Change

Indonesia has made great strides in its efforts to

manage climate change issues; however, there

remain shortfalls in current policy, and challenges

that need to be overcome for more effective action

planning. First, climate change counter action

ultimately must begin at the individual level. Thus

far, climate change in Indonesia has been treated

primarily as a issue to be managed by the

government or other large scale organizations.

Climate change, as far as the ordinary population

is concerned, is a problem incomprehensible and

unmanageable by individual efforts alone. To

involve wider participation and a change of

behavior from the wider population, it is important

to define climate change in simple and culturally

appropriate terms. Both mitigation and adaptation

action can be initiated at the individual level and

progress toward collective action.

Taking into account the laborious negotiation

process in the UNFCCC when it comes to issues

of adaptation, although climate change is already

an existing problem, it is vital to encourage

alternative approaches and develop breakthroughs

for increased capacity. A heightened awareness

among the general public must also be formed,

and options for funding sources must be widened.

Lastly, a lack of regional cooperation is limiting

Indonesias climate change efforts to domestic

resources alone. Any degree of regional

cooperation will greatly supplement a stronger

institutional framework, as well as expand policy,

capacity, and funding options.


Pacific


27/62


Introduction

Over the past decade, climate change in China has

become an important, political, economic, and

security issue as its carbon emissions reached the

highest level among industrialized countries. The

following poses three questions concerning the

nature and domestic impact of climate change in

China: (1) Is climate change an issue of national

security in China? (2) In what ways and to what

extent does climate change threaten Chinas

national security? (3) How can the threat to Chinas

national security posed by climate changed be

addressed?

Climate Change: An issue of Chinas

national security?

No singular consensus exists in China on whether

climate change is a threat to the countrys national

security. Proponents of the idea that climate

change is a legitimate threat to Chinas security

come primarily from environmental and climate

community circles. Elite members of Chinas

military have also voiced concerns about the

security implications of climate change, but without

elucidating what shape such threats may take.

Opponents from the economic and international

relations sector, however, remain skeptical of the

correlation between climate change and security

risks. They point to two criticism in this debate: (1)

there is a lack of substantive data on GDP losses

incurred by climate change, and (2) the concept of

climate change risks in China was manufactured in

the west to postpone Chinas economic

development.

While the Chinese government has exhibited a

somewhat tepid response to climate change as a

security risk, leading states in the international

community have taken a more proactive stance on

this issue. In the past decade countries such as the

U.S., Germany, India, Australia, and the U.K. have

all conducted major studies which explore

correlations between national security and the risks

associated with climate change. Although no linear

conclusion was formulated between the countries,

they at least recognized climate changes potential

risk factors and its necessity as a field of serious

research.

Chinese government maintains that climate

change may have certain security implications, but

generally should be regarded as is an issue of

sustainable development. It argues that addressing

climate change through the Security Council would

undermine the collective efforts of the international

community, and be an ineffective means of

assisting developing countries in the creation of

adaptive measures. Its statement on National

Defense, however, designates sustainable

development for the safeguarding of national

interests as a basic goal for maintaining national

security. This contradictory stance contributes to a

lack of consensus building, and hinders productive

dialogue on necessary countermeasures and

pragmatic ways forward.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND CHINASNATIONAL SECURITY

Dr. ZHANG HaibinProfessor,

School of International Studies,Peking University, China


28/62

26

How does Climate Change Affect

Chinas National Security?

In spite of internal conflicting positions on climate

security, China has already begun to experience

the destructive environmental impacts of

climate change. Rising sea levels, expanding

desertification, and frequent extreme weather

events have exacerbated Chinas water shortage

and food security problems, threatening the life

and living standards of the Chinese people. One

study, for example, projects that if trends in climate

change continue at the current rate, food

production in China will decrease by 5~10% by

2030. Other studies on current trends show a

quarter reduction in Chinas glaciers, the

displacement of 20,000 residents of Minqin due to

desertification, and 6,000 total deaths in the past

20 years from storm tides. Without any mitigation

efforts these patterns are expected to continue and

grow in severity along with their associated social

and environmental implications.

The current impacts of climate change in China

outline a number of likely traditional and non-

traditional security outcomes for the near future.

Studies predict an increase in extreme weather

patterns will lead to environmental catastrophes

and a rising scarcity in food and water. The rural

population will be most affected by these changes

as ethnic tensions, poverty, and social

disadvantages grow. This will have a destabilizing

effect on the entire country, and will likely spread to

neighboring states as environmental degradation

incites an exodus of rural areasa phenomenon

already being observed especially in southern

Chinese provinces.

Chinas densely populated cities will suffer equally

adverse circumstances from flood disasters that

will compromise economic activity and displace

millions living in urban residential areas. The

potential for conflict increases exponentially with

the combination of food and water shortages and

large scale loss in infrastructure. Border skirmishes

with India, Bangladesh, and China over mass

migration movements can be expected in the near

future, and persistent internal conflicts leading to a

civil war as a worst case scenario. Given Chinas

role as a key player in matters of international

climate policy, these anticipated problems will

present insurmountable challenges to the political

structure and legitimacy of the Chinese

government both internally and externally.

How to Address Climate Security

Threats

Apart from the issues mentioned above, there are

two major deficiencies in China and the

international communitys research. These include

(1) the lack of an analytic framework which can

address the major concerns of traditional and non-

traditional security perspectives, and (2) a lack of

systematic assessment of how and to what degree

climate change threatens Chinas national security.

The traditional security approach is anachronistic

and incapable of addressing new nonmilitary

threats. It was constructed on conventional realist

approaches to security studies, and confines the

range of security to military related threats alone.

As such human security within this framework,

which also encompasses environmental and

economic threats to the survival of a society,

remains all but unaccounted for.

In the post Cold War era national security needs to

be redefined within the context of modern day

threats and circumstances. Because Chinas

national security issues are not inherently military,

economic, or environmental, any problem that

meets one of the following criteria should be treated

as a matter of Chinas national security agenda:


Pacific


29/62


Threats to the territorial integrity of the state

Threatens to drastically degrade the quality of life

for inhabitants of the state

Threatens to significantly narrow the range of

policy choices available to the government of the

state

Threatens to cause serious political and social

instability

Threatens the functioning of key national defense

projects or key national projects of strategic

importance

The extensive studies on the impacts of climate

change to Chinas security have clearly demon-

strated that risks for each of these criteria are highly

plausible, and as shown above, are already being

observed throughout Chinas rural and urban

populations. Chinas government needs to reorient

its approach towards security to include climate

change variables, and develop a framework which

accounts for both traditional and non-traditional

threats.

In 2007 Chinas National Climate Change

Programme devised a list of policies and measures

to address the tangible threats posed by climate

change. Composed of five areas this list includes

key areas for GHG mitigation, key areas for

adaptation to climate change, climate change

science and technology, public awareness on

climate change, and institutions and mechanisms.

These measures, however, are merely the

beginning of a movement that needs to be

implemented into Chinas national security

framework. This, of course, cannot be accom-

plished without first arriving at a consensus among

Chinas major constituents regarding climate

changes actual implications.

First and foremost China needs to abandon the

notion that climate change is a conspiracy

manufactured by the west. Chinese citizens have

already experienced firsthand the detrimental

effects of climate change, and scientists are in

near universal agreement that its influences are

indeed real. Once a domestic consensus is built

the government should give strategic priority to

Chinas international climate cooperation efforts.

Chinas role in forming international climate

change policy is vital, and without government

consent, it will be difficult to effectuate any

comprehensive measures. Also, Chinas national

leading group on climate change needs to include

representatives from the military, and in turn the

military needs to establish its own leading group on

climate change issues.

Introduction

Climate change is said to be one of the greatest

challenges facing the international community. As

athreat multiplier,it serves to exacerbate existing

socio-economic problems faced by states and

communitiesespecially those in least developed

regions. Southeast Asia is a case in point, where

several studies have noted the regions vulnerability

ASEANS RESPONSES TO CLIMATECHANGE

Ms. Sofiah JAMILAssociate Research Fellow,

Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S.

Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang

Technological University, Singapore


30/62

28

to climate change, and increasing pressures on

water, food, and energy. Given the transnational

nature of the impacts of climate change and the

strong interdependence amongst Southeast Asian

economies, regional cooperation amongst ASEAN

countries is necessary to instil proactive and

coordinated responses across different sectors in

ASEAN member states. The following will address

the methods and challenges in building this

cooperative network in three sections.

What are the existing ASEAN frameworks that can

be built upon and integrated to address climate

change?

What is the viability of these policies in

addressing mitigation, adaptation and disaster

reduction risk mechanisms?

Other challenges in implementing these regional

frameworks.

ASEAN Frameworks for Climate Change

Environmental and energy issues have long been

brought to the table for negotiations by ASEAN

member states. Climate change is not mutually

exclusive from these issues and only stresses the

importance of catalysing existing ASEAN

environmental and energy related initiatives that

have lacked in progress. ASEAN leaders made this

point apparent in their ASEANs 2007 Singapore

Declaration on climate change, energy and the

environment, where they noted the need to

address climate change as a corollary of

sustainable development and energy security.

Since 1977 ASEAN has been creating initiatives to

address Southeast Asias vast environmental

issues. The protection of national parks and

biodiversity was the first of such efforts which led

to the inception of the ASEAN Ministerial Center for

Biodiversity. In 1981, the ASEAN Ministerial

Meetings on the Environment was established to

push environmental issues forward, and became

an important component in ASEANs blueprints for

future planning. ASEAN Vision 2020, which was

devised in 1997 outlines several goals for

sustainable development and regional

environmental protection measures for Southeast

Asian nations to carry out by the year 2020.

Efforts for sustainable development have also

been a core issue for ASEANs environmental

agenda. Since November of 2002 ASEAN

Environment Ministers have agreed to further

synergize regional environmental cooperation by

identifying ten priority areas based on the World

Summit on Sustainable Developments Plan of

Implementation. These include (1) global

environmental issues, (2) land and forest fires and

transboundary haze pollution, (3) coastal and

marine environment, (4) sustainable forest

management, (5) sustainable management of

natural parks and protected areas, (6) freshwater

resources, (7) public awareness and environmental

education, (8) promotion of environmentally sound

technologies and cleaner production, (9) urban

environmental management and governance, and

(10) sustainable development, monitoring and

reporting/database harmonisation.

With regards to energy security, ASEAN member

states have acknowledged the need to p

Documents

IIRI-GGGI Workshop Final Report