Implicit Theories of Intelligence, Creativity, and Wisdom Groups... · 608 ROBERT J.STERNBERG as Sternberg's (1981, 1983) componential the-ory or Hunt's (1980) distributed-memory

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology1985, Vol. 49, No. 3, 607-627

Copyright 198S by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0022-3514/85/S00.75

Implicit Theories of Intelligence, Creativity, and Wisdom

Robert 3. SternbergYale University

A prestudy and four experiments were conducted in order to understand the natureand use of people's implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. In theprestudy, a brief questionnaire was sent out to professors in each of the fields ofart, business, philosophy, and physics, and was also given to laypersons. The ques-tionnaire asked subjects to list behaviors characteristic of an ideally intelligent,creative, or wise person in one's field of endeavor, or in general, for laypersons. InExperiment 1, individuals from the same populations rated, on a 9-point scale, theextent to which each of the behaviors listed at least twice in the Prestudy was char-acteristic of an ideally intelligent, creative, or wise individual. In Experiment 2, asubset of the behaviors from the prestudy was sorted by subjects in order to yielda multidimensional space characterizing the subjects' implicit theories for each ofintelligence, creativity, and wisdom. In Experiment 3, subjects rated themselves ona subset of the behaviors from the prestudy, and these ratings were correlated with"ideal prototype" ratings to yield a measure of resemblance to the prototype. Re-semblance scores were then correlated with scores on standardized ability tests. InExperiment 4, subjects rated hypothetical individuals described in simulated lettersof recommendation in terms of their intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. The resultsrevealed that people have systematic implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, andwisdom, and that they use these implicit theories accurately both in evaluatingthemselves and in evaluating hypothetical others. Moreover, the implicit theoriesfor each of the constructs show at least some convergent-discriminant validity withrespect to each other.

That Solomon was wise, or Picasso, creative,no one doubts. Perhaps it would be unwise todo so, no matter how creative the reasons fordoubt might be. But if one were to ask justwhat psychological attributes made Solomonwise, or Picasso, creative, most psychologistswould either shrug their shoulders, or throwup their hands in despair. In any event, Solo-monic pronouncements probably would notbe forthcoming.

Theories of psychological constructs suchas wisdom, creativity, and intelligence can be

Preparation of this article was supported in part byContract NOOOI478C0025 from the Office of Naval Re-search and Contract N0001483K0013 from the Office ofNaval Research and the Army Research Institute to Robert}. Sternberg.

1 am grateful to Barbara Conway, Janet Davidson, andElizabeth Neuse for assistance at various stages of the re-search for and production of this article. A listing of be-haviors with high characteristicness ratings (greater than7.50) in Experiment 2, by trait and subject population, isavailable on request from the author.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Robert J. Stern-berg, Department of Psychology, Yale University, Box 11AYale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.

partitioned in any of a number of ways, butone partitioning is particularly useful for un-derstanding these three constructs and howthey interrelate—the partitioning between ex-plicit and implicit theories of psychologicalconstructs.

Explicit theories are constructions of psy-chologists or other scientists that are based onor at least tested on data collected from peopleperforming tasks presumed to measure psy-chological functioning. Although investigatorsworking with explicit theories of psychologicalconstructs might disagree as to the nature ofthe constructs, using, for example, factors,components, schemata, or some other kind ofpsychological construct, they would agree thatthe data base from which the proposed con-structs should be isolated should consist (di-rectly or indirectly) of performance on tasksrequiring intelligent functioning.

Explicit theories have dominated the liter-ature on intelligence. For example, psycho-metric theories such as Spearman's (1927) two-factor theory or Guilford's (1967, 1982) struc-ture-of-intellect model; cognitive theories such

607

608 ROBERT J. STERNBERG

as Sternberg's (1981, 1983) componential the-ory or Hunt's (1980) distributed-memory the-ory; and genetic-epistemological theories suchas Piaget's (1972) theory of equilibration, areall explicit theories of intelligence. Explicittheories have also played the major role inconceptualizing creativity. These theories, too,have been of different kinds. Guilford's (1950)theory is psychometric, Getzels's (1975) theoryis cognitive (see also Getzels & Csikszentmi-halyi, 1976), Barren's (1965, 1968) theory isclinical, and Amabile's (1983) theory is social-psychological. The theories have in common,however, their drawing on data based on theexercise of what the theorists allege is creativepsychological process. The literature on wis-dom is much sparser, and much of it is outsidethe psychological tradition (see review of lit-erature in Clayton & Birren, 1980). There arescattered psychological attempts to deal withwisdom within an explicit-theoretical frame-work (e.g., Erikson, 1959), but such attemptsappear to be rare.

Even a cursory review of the literature willreveal a monotonic decreasing trend in theamount of explicit-psychological theorizingregarding intelligence, creativity, and wisdom,respectively. There might be any number ofreasons for this trend, but one of these reasonsis almost certainly the ability of psychologiststo generate either a conceptual or an opera-tional definition of the construct under inves-tigation. There have existed, for many years,and continue to exist to this day, serious dif-ferences among psychologists in their views onthe nature of intelligence (see "Intelligence andits Measurement," 1921; Sternberg, 1982), butthese differences seem to be systematic (Stern-berg, 1985). Moreover, despite these differ-ences, the psychometric intelligence test hasreceived a great deal of acceptance, if grudging,as an operational definition of intelligence, al-beit a highly limited one.

The disagreements over what an intelligencetest should test are minor compared with thoseover what a creativity test should test (Amabile,1982). Whereas most investigators of intelli-gence would agree that intelligence tests mea-sure at least some limited aspect of intellectualfunctioning (Cronbach, 1984), many investi-gators of creativity would question whethercreativity tests such as those of Torrance (1966)and Guilford (1967) measure anything even

coming close to creativity (Amabile, 1982;Gruber, in press; Sternberg & Davidson, inpress). In the domain of wisdom, there do noteven exist any tests with sufficient acceptanceto generate disagreement.

When fields of psychological endeavor, suchas those of intelligence and especially of cre-ativity and wisdom, are at a loss for even def-initions of constructs on which to base explicittheories, implicit theories can be useful forproviding a conceptual framework for the de-velopment of explicit theories.

Implicit theories are constructions by people(whether psychologists or laypersons) that re-side in the minds of these individuals. Suchtheories need to be discovered rather than in-vented because they already exist, in someform, in people's heads. Discovering such the-ories can be useful in helping to formulate thecommon-cultural views that dominate think-ing about a given psychological construct,whether the culture be one of people, in gen-eral, or of psychologists, in particular. Under-standing implicit theories can also help us un-derstand or provide bases for explicit theories,because explicit theories derive, in part, fromscientists' implicit theories of the constructunder investigation. The data of interest in thediscovery of people's implicit theories are peo-ple's communications, in whatever form, re-garding their notions as to the nature of thepsychological construct under investigation.

Intelligence, creativity, and wisdom have allbeen subject to at least some study through thevehicle of understanding people's implicit the-ories. Consider each of these constructs in turn.

By far, the largest number of studies of im-plicit theories has been done for intelligence.Perhaps the most direct way of discoveringsuch theories is simply to ask people what theyare. For example, the editors of the Journal ofEducational Psychology asked experts in thefield of intelligence their views of intelligence("Intelligence and its Measurement," 1921),and received 14 responses, such as "the abilityto carry on abstract thinking" (Terman) and"ability to adapt oneself adequately to rela-tively new situations in life" (Pintner). Stern-berg, Conway, Ketron, and Bernstein (1981)did a rather more elaborate study involvingboth experts and laypersons. Lists of intelligentand unintelligent behaviors were collected, andthen these behaviors were rated for their char-

INTELLIGENCE, CREATIVITY, AND WISDOM 609

acteristicness in an ideally intelligent person,and for their importance in denning the con-cept of intelligence. The results of experts andlaypersons were surprisingly similar. Factoranalyses of their ratings revealed three basicfactors for the laypersons (and similar factorsfor the experts): Practical Problem-SolvingAbility (e.g., reasons logically and well, iden-tifies connections among ideas, sees all aspectsof a problem); Verbal Ability (e.g., speaksclearly and articulately, is verbally fluent, con-verses well); and Social Competence (e.g., ac-cepts others for what they are, admits mistakes,displays interest in the world at large). Subjectsnot only used these three factors to form ab-stract characterizations, but also appeared touse them to rate their own intelligence, as wellas to evaluate the intelligence of others. Relatedstudies have been carried out by Siegler andRichards (1982), Yussen and Kane (1985),Cornelius (1984), and Berg and Sternberg (inpress), looking at developmental aspects of thenature of intelligence over the life span.

The consensus obtained in all these studiesgives credence to Neisser's (1979) view that theconcept, intelligent person, is a prototypicallyorganized concept according to which a personis viewed as intelligent to the extent he or sheresembles some implicit prototype of whatpeople imagine an intelligent person to be. Al-though a consensus seems to exist for the con-cept of intelligence, it is important to pointout that this consensus is culturally limited andthat quite different prototypes for intelligenceexist in other cultures (Wober, 1974).

The implicit-theories approach has alsobeen applied to the study of creativity. For ex-ample, MacKinnon (1964) had architects ofthree levels of estimated creativity rate boththemselves and an ideal self on the Gough(1961) Adjective Check List. The results sug-gested those attributes most characteristic ofhighly creative and less creative individuals.Adjectives that best distinguished the top frombottom groups of architects (high scores formore creative architects) were: inventive, de-termined, independent, individualistic, enthu-siastic, industrious, artistic, progressive, andappreciative. Adjectives that best distinguishedthe bottom from the top group (higher scoresfor less creative architects) were: responsible,sincere, reliable, dependable, clear-thinking,tolerant, understanding, peaceable, good-na-

tured, moderate, steady, practical, logical.Barren (1968) used a Q-sort technique to dis-tinguish attributes of creative writers, and ob-tained five items that were particularly dis-tinctive of the highly creative writers: appearsto have a high degree of intellectual capacity,genuinely values intellectual and cognitivematters, values own independence and auton-omy, is verbally fluent—can express ideas well,enjoys aesthetic impressions—is aestheticallyreactive. Similar studies have been done forcreative mathematicians by Helson (1980).

Very little systematic psychological work ofany kind has been done on wisdom, with thenotable exception of the work of Clayton(1982; Clayton & Birren, 1980). Clayton mul-tidimensionally scaled words potentially re-lated to wisdom for three samples of adultsdiffering in age (younger, middle-aged, older).In her earliest study (Clayton, 1975), the termsthat were scaled were: experienced, intuitive,introspective, pragmatic, understanding, gentle,empathetic, intelligent, peaceful, knowledge-able, sense of humor, observant. In a later study,she added three more terms: wise, aged, my-self. In each study, subjects were asked to ratesimilarities between all possible pairs of words.The main similarity in the results for the agecohorts for whom the scalings were done wasthe elicitation of two consistent dimensions ofwisdom, which Clayton referred to as an "af-fective" dimension and a "reflective" dimen-sion. There was also a suggestion of a dimen-sion relating to age. The greatest differenceamong the age cohorts is that mental repre-sentations of wisdom seemed to become moredifferentiated with increases in the age of thesubjects. Further developments of this line ofwork are currently being conducted by Ditt-mann-Kohli and Baltes (in press).

The present study seeks to understand (a)implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, andwisdom in different subpopulations, (b) howpeople use these implicit theories in makingjudgments of themselves and others, (c) howpeople's judgments of the resemblance be-tween themselves and a prototype relate toscores on psychometric tests, and (d) how peo-ple view these three constructs as interrelated.Four experiments were carried out for thesepurposes, each of which used a different meth-odology to help illuminate people's implicittheories. A prestudy involved professors of art,


business, philosophy, and physics, and layper-sons, specifying behaviors characteristic of in-telligence, creativity, and wisdom. The first ex-periment involved analysis of ratings of theimportance of various behaviors for denningintelligence, creativity, and wisdom, as per-ceived by professors in the four fields notedand by laypersons. The second experimentused multidimensional scaling to obtain per-ceived dimensions of intelligence, creativity,and wisdom as perceived by laypersons. Thethird experiment involved people rating them-selves on questionnaires assessing behaviorsderived from laypersons' implicit theories ofintelligence, creativity, and wisdom, and thenour correlating the people's prototype-resem-blance scores (r) on the questionnaires withscores on psychometric tests that might plau-sibly relate to the prototype-based scores de-rived from the self-ratings. The fourth exper-iment involved people's rating the intelligence,creativity, and wisdom of hypothetical peoplefor whom "letters of recommendation" wereprovided, with the behaviors listed in the lettersderived from the implicit theories. Subjectswere never given prior definitions of intelli-gence, creativity, or wisdom in any of the ex-periments.

Prestudy

A brief questionnaire was filled out by 25,26, 20, and 26 professors in the fields of art,business, philosophy, and physics, respectively,at a variety of U.S. universities (representinga return rate of 17% on questionnaires sentout). The questionnaire was also given to 17laypersons (nonstudent adult residents of NewHaven who answered a newspaper advertise-ment). The questionnaire asked respondentsto spend a few minutes listing whatever be-haviors they could think of that were charac-teristic of an ideally intelligent, creative, or wiseperson in their respective fields of endeavor(or, in the case of laypersons, in general). Theresponse rate for the mailed questionnaires was17%, and was practically the same across fields.Those behaviors listed at least twice served asa basis for the subsequent investigations. Thetotal numbers of behaviors obtained were 119for art, 131 for business, 107 for philosophy,138 for physics, and 156 for laypersons.

Although the response rate for the profes-

sionals was low, it appears to have been quiteenough to generate large numbers of behaviors.Indeed, the perfect response rate for the lay-persons yielded only a small number of addi-tional unique behaviors over those generatedby the professionals. The reason for this smalldifference is that the large majority of respon-ses obtained were redundant across subjects.Thus, the returns appear to have been adequateto generate a large pool of behaviors (over 100for each population) to serve as bases for rat-ings in the subsequent experiments.

Experiment 1

Method

Two hundred professors in art, business, philosophy, andphysics were asked to rate the characteristicness of eachof the behaviors obtained in the prestudy from the cor-responding population with respect to their ideal conceptionof each of an ideally intelligent, creative, or wise individualin their occupation. The wording was that of the prestudysubjects, with slight editing to provide some uniformity ofstyle. Laypersons (nonstudent adult residents of NewHaven) also provided these ratings, but for a hypotheticalideal individual without regard to occupation. Ratings wereon a 1 (low) to 9 (high) scale, with a rating of 1 meaning"behavior extremely uncharacteristic" and a rating of 9meaning "behavior extremely characteristic." There were65 respondents for the art questionnaire, 70 respondentsfor the business questionnaire, 65 respondents for the phi-losophy questionnaire, 85 respondents for the physicsquestionnaire, and 30 subjects for the laypersons' ques-tionnaire. These numbers of respondents represented re-turn rates of 32.5% for art, 35% for business, 32.5% forphilosophy, and 42.5% for physics. These return rates arequite respectable for a mailed questionnaire. Apparently,the use of a structured questionnaire generated more re-spondents than the use of the unstructured questionnairein the Prestudy. The return rates are comparable acrossprofessions, but the fact that they are all well less than100% does raise the possibility that there may have beensome unknown sampling bias as a function of who chose

to return the questionnaire.Each participant provided all three ratings (of intelli-

gence, creativity, and wisdom). However, order of ratingswas counterbalanced in a Latin square arrangement inquestionnaires sent out, so that the ratings of each attributeoccurred approximately equally often in the first, second,and third positions.

Results

Table 1 presents the basic statistics for theratings. Means are for individual items, aver-aged over subjects within each population. Ascan be seen, ratings were approximately equalin mean values across occupations, with nomeans differing significantly across groups.


Table 1Basic Statistics

n

Group M SD (items)Subject

reliability

Itemreliability

Intelligence

ArtBusinessPhilosophyPhysics

Laypersons: Ideal

6.36.36.66.46.3

1.1.8

1.11.01.2

119131107138156

.84

.88

.94

.92

.93

.93

.96

.88

.90

.88

Creativity

ArtBusinessPhilosophyPhysicsLaypersons: Ideal

6.35.86.46.45.9

.3 119

.2 131

.1 107

.1 138

.1 156

.88

.81

.93

.93

.90

90.96.91.95.94

Wisdom

ArtBusinessPhilosophy

PhysicsLaypersons: Ideal

6.36.47.16.66.4

1.21.01.21.11.5

119131107138156

.86

.92

.95

.94

.96

.89

.97

.89

.95

.92

Ratings were highly reliable, both from thestandpoint of split halves of subjects (subjectreliability) and of split halves of items (itemreliability).

Table 2 presents the intercorrelations be-tween the three ratings for each of the separategroups for the master list of behaviors for eachoccupation. Correlations are for parrs of ratingsof attributes for each set of behavioral items,averaged over subjects. Thus, the number ofobservations contributing to each correlationis equal to the number of behavioral items (notthe number of subjects'). Because each groupreceived a different set of behaviors, based onthe sets of behaviors generated in the Prestudy,correlations could not be computed acrossgroups. In all cases except for the philosophers,intelligence is seen as more highly related towisdom than either of intelligence or wisdomare seen as related to creativity. All correlationsare significantly positive, except for the cor-relation between creativity and wisdom for thebusiness professors, which was significantlynegative! In all cases, the relation between cre-ativity and wisdom is the weakest one of thethree. Thus, intelligence and wisdom are per-ceived as more similar to each other than eitheris perceived as similar to creativity.

Discussion

Several aspects of the results are worthy ofnote. First, the behavioral listing procedure ofthe Prestudy seems to have worked aboutequally well for each group: There is relativelylittle range among the mean ratings of behav-iors for intelligence, creativity, and wisdom,respectively, across occupational groups. Thefact that all 15 means are above 5—the middleof the 9-point scale—indicates that for themost part, the behaviors that were listed wereones that were quite characteristic of intelli-gent, creative, or wise individuals in each ofthe groups.

Second, the ratings are highly reliable acrossboth subjects and items: The range of subjectreliabilities was from .81 to .96 with a medianof .92; the range of item reliabilities was from.88 to .97 with a median of .92. The high de-gree of internal consistency across subjects(subject reliability) indicates that there is con-siderable agreement within each population asto what constitutes behaviors that are more orless characteristic of a particular attribute (in-telligence, creativity, or wisdom). The high de-gree of internal consistency across items (itemreliability) indicates that the set of items within


each attribute constitutes a coherent set of be-haviors, rather than a grab-bag of unrelatedbehaviors. Thus, at least within population,intelligence, creativity, and wisdom constitutefairly tightly organized prototypes.

Third, it is clear that without regard to pop-ulation, intelligence and wisdom are believedto be most similar to each other and creativityand wisdom least similar to each other, amongthe three possible pairs of attributes. Theseimplicit theories are clearly inconsistent withviews such as Guilford's (1967), according towhich creativity is an aspect of intelligence.Rather, they are consistent with views synthe-sized by Cronbach (1984), according to whichat least in the higher ranges of ability, intelli-gence and creativity are distinct entities.

The design of this experiment does not allowdirect comparisons of implicit theories amongoccupational groups. There are both theoret-ical and practical reasons for such a design instudies of this kind.

At a theoretical level, it is important to rec-ognize the domain-specificity of abilities, andespecially creative abilities, in various domains

of adult endeavor (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982;Cronbach, 1984; Keil, 1984; Larkin, Mc-Dermott, J. Simon, & D. P. Simon, 1980).Performance in various occupational groups,like performance in various cultural groups,requires emic rather than etic measurement—that is, measurement that is appropriate forthe group in which it is being conducted. Asin cross-cultural studies, presenting each groupwith the same items often does not make sense.For example, art professors would probablyfind it meaningless to rate a behavior such as"comes up with novel business services orproducts" for its relevance to creativity in art;similarly, business professors would probablyfind it meaningless to rate a behavior such as"recognizes the aspects of physical phenomenathat are the underlying concepts of physics"for creativity in business. To be interpretable,characteristicness ratings require relevance ofthe behavior to the domain under considera-tion. With behaviors such as those noted here,characteristicness ratings would not makesense, because the behaviors are simply irrel-evant to the given field of endeavor.

Table 2Jntercorre/ations of Ratings of Behaviors on Master List for Each Occupation

Measures

IntelligenceCreativityWisdom

Intelligence

CreativityWisdom

Intelligence Creativity

Art

1.00 .551.00

Business

1 .00 .291.00

Wisdom

.78.48

1.00

.51-.241.00


Philosophy

1.00 .561.00

.42

.371.00


Physics

1.00 .641.00

.68

.141.00

Intelligence

CreativityWisdom

Laypersons: Ideal

1.00 .331.00

.75

.271.00


At a practical level, it would have been dif-ficult to convince busy college professors tospend the close to 4 hrs that would be neededto rate behaviors from all fields. Using alternateforms so that professors would have had torate only half the behaviors would have stillrequired 2 hrs, and an extremely large numberof subjects. Thus, it seemed practically as wellas theoretically preferable to employ emic(within-occupation) rather than etic (between-occupation) questionnaires.

Experiment 2

Method

In this experiment, 40 Yale College students were askedto sort three sets of 40 behaviors into as many or as fewpiles as they wished on the basis of which behaviors are"likely to be found together" in a person. These behaviorswere from the listings for intelligence, creativity, and wis-

dom, respectively, from Experiment 1. Only the top 40behaviors (in terms of laypersons' characteristicness ratingsfrom Experiment I ) were used in each sorting task. Orderof sortings for behaviors from the intelligence, creativity,

and wisdom lists was counterbalanced in a Latin squarearrangement. Subjects were not told in advance what thebehaviors had in common (i.e., considered characteristicof intelligence, creativity, or wisdom).

Results

Results of the scalings of intelligence, cre-ativity, and wisdom are shown in Tables 3-5,respectively. All scalings were nonmetric anddone with ALSCAL using Stress Formula 1 andthe primary method of resolving ties. All scal-ings are principal-axis solutions. Hence, eachdimension accounted for the maximum pos-sible variance, controlling for earlier dimen-sions, if any. Dimensions are extracted in orderof strength (variance accounted for in the data).

Table 3 shows the multidimensional scalingfor intelligence. Three dimensions accountedfor 82% of the variance in the data, with aStress of .15. Because the scaling was a prin-cipal-axis solution, it tended to yield bipolardimensions in which the positive and negativepolarities lent themselves to separate but re-lated interpretations.

The first dimension yielded two interpre-tations: practical problem-solving ability for thepositive polarity (e.g., tends to see attainablegoals and accomplish them; has ability tochange directions and use another procedure;is able to apply knowledge to particular prob-

lems) and verbal ability for the negative po-larity (e.g., can converse on almost any topic;has demonstrated a good vocabulary; has agood command of language).

The second dimension also lent itself to twointerpretations. The positive polarity of thisdimension was labeled intellectual balance andintegration (e.g., has the ability to recognizesimilarities and differences; listens to all sidesof an issue; is able to grasp abstract ideas andfocus his or her attention on those ideas), andthe negative polarity was labeled goal orien-tation and attainment (e.g., tends to obtain anduse information for specific purposes; possessesability for high achievement; is motivated bygoals).

The third dimension yielded two interpre-tations, contextual intelligence for the positivepolarity (e.g., learns and remembers and gainsinformation from past mistakes or successes;has the ability to understand and interpret hisor her environment; knows what's going on inthe world), and. fluid thought for the negativepolarity (e.g., has a thorough grasp of mathe-matics, good spatial ability, or both; has a highIQ level; thinks quickly).

Table 4 displays the results of the nonmetricmultidimensional scalings for the sortings ofthe creativity behaviors. Four dimensions ac-counted for 93% of the variance in the datawith a stress of .08.

The first dimension yielded two interpre-tations, nonenlrenchmenl for the positive po-larity (e.g., makes up rules as he or she goesalong; has a free spirit; is unorthodox), andintegration and intellectuality for the negativepolarity (e.g., makes connections and distinc-tions between ideas and things; has the abilityto recognize similarities and differences; is ableto put old information, theories, and so forthtogether in a new way).

The second dimension was also interpretedin terms of two polarities: Aesthetic taste andimagination for the positive polarity (e.g., hasan appreciation of art, music, and so forth;can write, draw, compose music; has goodtaste) and decisional skill and flexibility for thenegative polarity (e.g., follows his or her gutfeelings in making decisions after weighing thepros and cons; has ability to change directionsand use another procedure).

The third dimension was interpreted interms of perspicacity for its positive polarity


(e.g., questions societal norms, truisms, as-sumptions; is willing to take a stand) and ofdrive for accomplishment and recognition for

its negative polarity (e.g., is motivated by goals;likes to be complimented on his or her work;is energetic).

Table 3Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling Solutions for Behaviors: Intelligence

Scaling solutions Weight

Dimension 1

Positive polarity: Practical problem-solving abilityTends to see attainable goals and accomplish themActs within own physical and intellectual limitations and knows themIs good at distinguishing between correct and incorrect answersHas good problem-solving abilityHas ability to change directions and use another procedureHas rationality: ability to reason clearlyAble to apply knowledge to particular problems

Has the unique ability to look at a problem or situation and solve itHas a logical mind

Negative polarity: Verbal abilityCan converse on almost any topic

Attaches importance to ideasIs inquisitiveStudies and reads quite a lotHas demonstrated a good vocabulary

Expresses broad concepts conciselyHas a good command of languageHas a huge store of informationAttaches importance to well-presented ideas

.72

.68

.56

.55

.54

.53

.36

.26

.18

.66

.62

.61

.59

.58

.40

.25

.221.07

Dimension 2

Positive polarity: Intellectual balance and integrationHas the ability to recognize similarities and differences 1.64

Makes connections and distinctions between ideas and things 1.53Listens to all sides of an issue 1.42Is able to grasp abstract ideas and focus his or her attention on those ideas 1.37Is able to see through things—read between the lines 1.32

Is perceptive 1.23Has the ability to integrate information 1.17Has the ability to grasp complex situations 1.12

Negative polarity: Goal orientation and attainmentTends to obtain and use information for specific purposes -1.71Possesses ability for high achievement "1.64Seeks out information, especially details -1.48

Is motivated by goals -1.47Is inquisitive at an early age — 1.42Sees opportunities and knows when to take them — 1.27

Dimension 3

Positive polarity: Contextual intelligenceLearns and remembers and gains information from past mistakes or successes 1.36Has the ability to understand and interpret his or her environment 1.18Knows what's going on in the world 1.14

Negative polarity: Fluid thoughtHas a thorough grasp of mathematics, or good spatial ability, or both -1.40Has a high IQ level -1.25Thinks quickly -1.24

Note. Stress (Formula 1) = .15, R* = .82.


Table 4Nonmelric Multidimensional Scaling Solutions for Behaviors: Creativity


Dimension I

Positive polarity: NonentrenchmentMakes up rules as he or she goes along 2.34Is impulsive 2.13Takes chances 2.02Tends not to know own limitations and tries to do what others think is impossible 1.92Is emotional 1.89Has a free spirit 1.69Builds castles in the sky 1.51Is a nonconformist 1.49Is unorthodox 1.47

Negative polarity: Integration and intellectualityMakes connections and distinctions between ideas and things -2.10Has the ability to understand and interpret his or her environment —2.05Has the ability to recognize similarities and differences -1.96Is able to grasp abstract ideas and focus his or her attention on those ideas —1.82Is productive -1.80Has a high IQ level -1.58Attaches importance to ideas -1.56Possesses ability for high achievement -1.52Is always thinking -1.49Is able to put old information, theories, and so forth together in a new way —1.16

Dimension 2

Positive polarity: Aesthetic taste and imaginationHas an appreciation of art, music, and so forth 1.90Likes to be alone when creating something new 1.82Can write, draw, compose music 1.82Has good taste 1.80Uses the materials around him or her and makes something unique out of them 1.58Is in harmony with the materials or processes of expression 1.40Is imaginative 1.24

Negative polarity: Decisional skill and flexibilityFollows his or her gut feelings in making decisions after weighing the pros and cons — 1.94Has ability to change directions and use another procedure —1.13

Dimension 3

Positive polarity: PerspicacityQuestions societal norms, truisms, assumptionsIs perceptiveIs willing to take a stand

Negative polarity: Drive for accomplishment and recognitionIs motivated by goalsLikes to be complimented on his or her workIs energeticHas a sense of humor

Positive polarity: InquisitivenessIs inquisitive at an early ageIs inquisitive

Negative polarity: IntuitionHas intuition

Dimension 4

1.211.19

-1.04

Note. Stress (Formula I) = .08,


The fourth and weakest dimension was in- dimension was weak, and did not have manyterpreted in terms of inquisitiveness (positive salient weights on either polarity,polarity) and intuition (negative polarity). This Table 5 presents the scaling results for the

Table 5

Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling Solutions for Behaviors: Wisdom


Dimension 1

Positive polarity: Reasoning abilityHas the unique ability to look at a problem or situation and solve it 2.77Has good problem-solving ability 2.42Has a logical mind 2.09Is good at distinguishing between correct and incorrect answers 2.00Is able to apply knowledge to particular problems 1.84Is able to put old information, theories, and so forth, together in a new way 1.73Has a huge store of information 1.58Has the ability to recognize similarities and differences 1.30Has rationality: ability to reason clearly 1.20Makes connections and distinctions between ideas and things 1.04

Negative polarity: SagacityDisplays concern for others -1.95Considers advice -1.67Understands people through dealing with a variety of people -1.67Feels he or she can always learn from other people -1.57Knows self best -1.44Is thoughtful -1.40Is fair -1.32Is a good listener -1.27Is not afraid to admit making a mistake, will correct the mistake, learn, and go on -1.17Listens to all sides of an issue -1.12

Dimension 2

Positive polarity: Learning from ideas and environmentAttaches importance to ideas 1.78Is perceptive 0.94Learns from other people's mistakes 0.88

Negative polarity: JudgmentActs within own physical and intellectual limitations —1.62Is sensible —1.61Has good judgment at all times -1.54Thinks before acting or making decisions — 1.43Is able to take the long view (as opposed to considering only short-term outcomes) -1.34Thinks before speaking -1.27Is a clear thinker -0.97

Dimension 3

Positive polarity: Expeditious use of informationIs experienced 1.60Seeks out information, especially details 1.38Has age, maturity, or long experience 1.35Leams and remembers and gains information from past mistakes or successes 0.96Changes mind on basis of experience 0.78

Negative polarity: PerspicacityHas intuition — 1.63Can offer solutions that are on the side of right and truth -1.13Is able to see through things—read between the lines -0.86Has the ability to understand and interpret his or her environment —0.81

Note. Stress (Formula 1) = .14, R2 = .87.


sortings of the behaviors pertaining to wisdom.Three dimensions accounted for 87% of thevariance in the data, with a Stress of .14.

The first dimension yielded two interpre-tations, reasoning ability for the positive po-larity (e.g., has the unique ability to look at aproblem or situation and solve it; has goodproblem solving ability; has a logical mind)and sagacity for the negative polarity (e.g.,considers advice; understands people throughdealing with a variety of people; feels he or shecan always learn from other people; is fair).

The second dimension also yielded two in-terpretations, learning from ideas and envi-ronment for the positive polarity (e.g., attachesimportance to ideas; is perceptive; learns fromother people's mistakes) and judgment for thenegative polarity (e.g., acts within own physicaland intellectual limitations; is sensible; hasgood judgment at all times; thinks before act-ing or making decisions).

Finally, the third dimension also yielded twointerpretations, expeditious use of informationfor the positive polarity (e.g., is experienced;seeks out information, especially details; learnsand remembers and gains information frompast mistakes or successes) and perspicacity forthe negative polarity (e.g., can offer solutionsthat are on the side of right and truth; is ableto see through things—read between the lines;has the ability to understand and interpret hisor her environment).

Discussion

Several aspects of these data are worthy ofnote. First, the fits of the multidimensionalscaling model to the data, with proportions ofvariance accounted for equaling .82, .93, and.87 for intelligence, creativity, and wisdom, re-spectively, are quite respectable, indicating thatthe scaling data were reliable and that themodel extracted most of the variance from theproximity data with only small numbers of di-mensions. Thus, one can have a reasonablyhigh degree of confidence that the dimensionsobtained reflect something other than randomfluctuations of the data.

Second, the dimensions obtained for intel-ligence replicate, but also expand on, thoseobtained by Sternberg et al. (1981) using a dif-ferent methodology (factor analysis of thecharacteristicness ratings), a different set ofsubjects, and a different (but related) set of be-

haviors. The two polarities of the first dimen-sion replicate the first two factors for laypersonsof Sternberg et al. (Practical Problem-SolvingAbility and Verbal Ability) and the positivepolarity of the second dimension is close tothe Social Competence dimension obtained asa third factor by Sternberg et al. For example,some of the behaviors in the Sternberg et al.study that showed high loadings on the VerbalAbility factor—converses well, displays a goodvocabulary, is verbally fluent, is knowledgeableabout a particular field—are very similar tobehaviors from the present study. The same istrue for the other factors. Thus, to the extentthat there are past precedents for any of thedata sets, the present data are consistent withthe previous ones.

Third, the substantive dimensions are con-sistent with the earlier statistical data (fromExperiment 1) indicating that of the implicittheories for the three possible pairs of attri-butes, the greatest similarity is between theimplicit theories for intelligence and wisdom,whereas the least similarity is between the im-plicit theories for creativity and wisdom. Con-sider, for example, the positive polarity of thefirst (and hence strongest) dimension in eachof the principal-components scaling solutions.The positive polarities of the first dimensionsfor intelligence and wisdom—practical prob-lem-solving ability and reasoning ability, re-spectively—are quite similar. Indeed, 5 of the9 behaviors with the highest positive loadingson the first dimension for intelligence also areamong the 10 behaviors with the highest pos-itive loadings on the first dimension for wis-dom. In contrast, the positive polarity of thefirst dimension for creativity—nonentrench-ment—is wholly different in its behavioralcomposition from the comparable polaritiesfor intelligence and wisdom. Looking at thesets of dimensions as a whole reveals that wis-dom is indeed more similar to intelligence thanit is to creativity, whereas the relation betweenintelligence and creativity is intermediate be-tween that of intelligence and wisdom, on theone hand, and that of creativity and wisdom,on the other.

Fourth and perhaps most important, the di-mensions do seem to capture quite well peo-ple's intuitions about the nature of intelligence,creativity, and wisdom. The purpose of a mul-tidimensional scaling procedure such as thatused here is not to go beyond "what we all


Table 6

Correlations of Prototype Scores With Ability Tests

Test Intelligence Creativity Wisdom

* p < .10; .05; "** p < .01.

M SD

Cattell and Cattell Test offEmbedded FiguresGeorge Washington Social

Intelligence TestChapin Social Insight Test

.48"

.54***

-.06.43"

.17

.04

-.06.19

-.01-.14

.38*

.46*"

21.318.78

97.92

21.03

7.996.35

20.27

5.15

know," but rather to bring what we all knowinto the open for scientific inspection. Often,when we characterize someone as "intelligent,"or "creative," or "wise," we are asked what wemean by the use of these terms. The data pre-sented here give a fairly clear picture of whatit is that we do, in fact, mean.

Experiment 3

Method

Some New Haven area adults were administered fourpsychometric tests (« = 30): the Cattell and Cattell (1963)

Test of g, the Group Embedded Figures Test (Oilman,Raskin, & Witkin, 1971), the George Washington SocialIntelligence Test (Moss, Hunt, Omwake, & Woodward,1949), and the Social Insight Test (Chapin, 1967). Thesetests have been widely used in psychometric investigationsof cognitive and social intelligence and have been shownto have reasonable construct validity (see Stemberg, 1985).The cognitive intelligence tests were included because oftheir expected overlap with implicit theories of intelligence;the social intelligence tests were included because of lit-erature, going back to the Book of Solomon, suggestingthat wisdom derives, at least in part, from the consideredapplication of intelligence in social contexts. Paper-and-pencil creativity tests were not used because of the viewof the investigator, as well as of many other investigatorsin the field (e.g., Amabile, 1983; Cronbach, 1984; Feldman,1980; Simonton, 1984) that such tests capture, at best,only the most trivial aspects of creativity. In addition, sub-jects were asked to fill out all three of the questionnairesfrom Experiment 1—those for intelligence, creativity, andwisdom—as they pertained to themselves (rather than as

they pertained to an ideal individual, as in Experiment 1).The same subjects filled out all three questionnaires incounterbalanced order. Only those questionnaire items wereretained that had received first principal-component load-ings of .50 or greater in Experiment 1. These items werethe ones that best measured what each scale as a wholemeasured. Subjects used a 1-9 rating scale, where 1 in-dicated a behavior that was extremely uncharacteristic ofthe individual, and 9 indicated a behavior that was ex-tremely characteristic of the individual. Subjects were givenas long as they needed to complete the questionnaires.

Results

Questionnaires were scored by correlatingeach subject's response pattern on the givenquestionnaire he or she completed (intelli-gence, wisdom, or creativity) with the proto-type questionnaire obtained from the layper-sons in Experiment 1. The prototype con-tained the set of ratings for the hypotheticalideal individual, with respect to either intelli-gence, creativity, or wisdom. Thus, the corre-lation measured the degree of resemblance be-tween the actual individual in this experimentand the hypothetical ideal individual emergingfrom Experiment 1. A higher correlation thusindicated greater correspondence to the hy-pothetical ideal, whereas a lower correlationindicated lesser correspondence to the ideal.A negative correlation would indicate an in-verse relation to the ideal.

Table 6 presents correlations between thepsychometric measures derived from explicittheories and the questionnaire measures de-rived from implicit theories. The strongestcorrelations were obtained for intelligence. Acorrelation of .48 was obtained with the Cattelland Cattell Test of g, which is a nonverbal in-telligence test. This result replicates the cor-relation with the verbal Henmon-NelsonMental Ability Test obtained by Sternberg etal. (1981), which was just slightly higher (.52).The intelligence prototype-correlation mea-sure thus measures characteristics that overlapwith intelligence tests, although the prototypealso measures social-competence aspects ofintelligence that are not measured by mosttraditional psychometric tests of intelligence.Significant correlations were also obtainedwith the Embedded Figures test (a measure offield independence that tends to correlate withspatial ability) and with the Chapin Social In-


sight test (a measure of social intelligence/competence). No significant correlations wereobtained for creativity, but then, there were nocreativity tests included in the battery becauseof the lack of adequate available batteries.Meaningful correlations were obtained for thewisdom prototype scores with the GeorgeWashington and Chapin tests. Thus, the wis-dom scale seems to come closest to measuringskills that are traditionally measured by testsof social intelligence (or social competence).

Discussion

A question that inevitably arises in studiesof implicit theories of psychological constructsis whether such theories have any external va-lidity. Put simply, what if people's conceptionsare wrong? The external-validation proceduresin this experiment specifically address this is-sue. Correlations of scores from implicit-the-ory-based measures with scores from explicit-theory-based measures showed both conver-gent and discriminant validity: The prototypescores correlated with the psychometric testswith which they were supposed to correlate,and did not correlate with the psychometrictests with which they were not supposed tocorrelate. Thus, implicit theories of intelli-gence and wisdom do correspond substantiallyto explicit theories. (There was no basis formaking a similar determination for creativity.)If the implicit theories are off-base, then so arethe explicit theories that constitute the basisfor current psychological research and mea-surement on intelligence and wisdom. Thecorrespondence makes sense: After all, explicittheories derive largely from implicit theoriesof the psychological theorist! Of course, it isquite possible that both explicit theories andimplicit theories are wrong. But if this is thecase, the problem is not one that appliesuniquely to this particular study, but rather toall studies in the field of human abilities.

Experiment 4

Method

In this experiment, 40 subjects, all of whom were NewHaven area adults, were presented with 54 simulated lettersof recommendation. Examples of two typical letters are asfollows:

Gerald:

He possesses ability for high achievement.

He has the ability to grasp complex situations.He has good problem-solving ability.

He attaches importance to well-presented ideas.

Doris:

She is motivated by goals.She questions societal norms, truisms, and assumptions.She thinks quickly.She is not materialistic.She is totally absorbed in study.

Descriptions were generated so as to vary predicted levelsof intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. Each descriptionwas either four, five, or six sentences in length, and waspaired equally often with names of males and with namesof females. A given subject saw a given description onlyonce—either with a male name or with a female name.

The subjects' task was to rate the intelligence, creativity,and wisdom of each of the described subjects. The ratings

were made in a Latin-square order across subjects, so thateach rating occurred equally often in each ordinal position.

Ratings were made on a 9-point scale, where 1 indicatedthat the individual to be rated was not at all (intelligent,

creative, wise), and 9 indicated that the individual was ex-tremely (intelligent, creative, wise). It was possible to obtainpredicted ratings for intelligence, creativity, and wisdomby summing up the ratings of laypersons from Experiment1 on each attribute for each subject, and then dividing by

the number of attributes given for the hypothetical indi-vidual. Averages rather than sums of ratings were used be-

cause the number of behaviors was not the same for eachof the descriptions.

Suppose, for example, that five behaviors were given forSusan. The predicted intelligence rating would be the meanof the characteristicness ratings for intelligence in Exper-iment I (plus a constant). The predicted creativity rating

would be the mean of the first experiment's ratings forcreativity (plus a constant). The predicted wisdom ratingwould be the mean of the first experiment's ratings forwisdom (plus a constant). Thus, the more closely the de-scription of the hypothetical individual resembles the ideal

(of Experiment I) on each of the three attributes (intelli-gence, creativity, wisdom), the higher should be the rating

that hypothetical individual receives in the present exper-iment.

Results

Table 7 presents the results for this experi-ment. The main results are presented in threesuccessive panels of data.

As can be seen in the first panel, the meanrating for intelligence was the highest, and themean for creativity was the lowest. Ratingswere highly reliable, across split halves of bothsubjects and items.

Consider next the correlational pattern pre-sented in the second panel. As would be ex-pected from Experiment 1, involving ratingsof abstract ideals, the highest correlation be-


tween pairs of ratings was that between intel-ligence and wisdom. Correlations with cre-ativity were lower. Also as would be expectedfrom the first experiment, the lowest correla-tion was between the ratings of creativity andwisdom. Thus, the ratings of hypothetical-de-scribed individuals in this experiment showedthe same pattern as the ratings of hypotheticalideal individuals in Experiment 1. Note thatthe correlations between items across gendersfor names were all in the mid- to high- 90s.Thus, the pattern of ratings was very similar,regardless of the sex of the hypothetical indi-vidual being rated. Moreover, mean ratingswere the same for the two genders to the nearesttenth of a point. Hence, levels of ratings aswell as patterns were the same across the gen-ders of the hypothetical individuals.

If the implicit theories are functioning asthey ought to, then the correlations of the pre-dicted and observed ratings for the hypothet-ical individuals should show convergent anddiscriminant validity. Such validity would beshown if the correlation between predicted andobserved values was higher within-attributethan between-attributes. In other words, thebest predictor of the observed intelligence rat-ings should be the predicted intelligence rat-ings. The best predictor of the observed cre-ativity ratings should be the predicted creativ-ity ratings. And the best predictor of theobserved wisdom ratings should be the pre-dicted wisdom ratings. Lack of convergent-discriminant validity would be shown if, forexample, predictions for the creativity scorecorrelated higher with the observed intelligence

Table 7

Results for "Letters of Recommendation" Study

Measure M SDSubject

reliabilityItem

reliability

Basic statistics


5.85.05.3

1.7

1.71.8

.98

.97

.98

.84

.93

.85

Intelligence Creativity Wisdom Male-Female names

Intercorrelations of ratings


1. 00 .691.00

.94

.621.00

.97

.94

.95

Predicted

Observed Intelligence Creativity Wisdom

Simple correlations between predicted and observed ratings


.89"*

.48***

.87***

.46*"

.89"*

.40".54*".96"*

Standardized regression coefficients

Dependent variable Intelligence Creativity Wisdom

Multiple regression of observed ratings on predicted ratings


.85***

.87*"

.92***

.64***-.20

.06

.27"

1.24***.16*

.42"

.42*"

.98*"

5. »p<.01.*** p<.001.


score than did the predictions for the intelli-gence score. If the results do indeed show bothconvergent and discriminant validity, then onewould expect correlations between predictedand observed values to be highest in the maindiagonal of the third panel. In other words, theratings of Experiment 1 for, say, intelligence,should best predict the ratings of Experiment3 for intelligence, as opposed to creativity orwisdom. The corresponding pattern shouldhold for the ratings of creativity and wisdom.As can be seen in the third panel, the corre-.lation in the main diagonal is, in every case,the highest correlation in each row and col-umn. However, the ratings of intelligence andwisdom were close, and not clearly distin-guishable, especially for the predictions of wis-dom and intelligence with respect to the actualratings of the intelligence of the described hy-pothetical individuals. These results are con-sistent with the earlier results suggesting thatintelligence and wisdom are perceived to bemore closely related to each other than is eitherin relation to creativity.

Finally, multiple regression was used to pre-dict the ratings of Experiment 4 via the pre-dictions for intelligence, creativity, and wisdomderiving from Experiment 1. In these regres-sions, one would expect the highest standard-ized regression coefficient for that behavior inthe prediction that corresponds to the observedbehavior. Thus, the regression weight in pre-dicting the intelligence ratings should be higherfor the intelligence prediction than for eitherof the creativity or wisdom predictions, andsimilarly for the other sets of weights. Again,as above, the values in the main diagonal arethe highest ones in each row and column, sup-porting this prediction. The implicit theoriesthus show both convergent and discriminantvalidity.

Discussion

Implicit theories would not be of much in-terest if they merely resided statically in peo-ple's heads, or if they were merely created attime of test to suit the needs of experimentersdoing studies on such theories. The results ofthe present study show not only that peoplehave such theories, but that they use such the-ories in their evaluations of others. Despite theseeming omnipresence of standardized tests in

our society, by far the largest proportion ofevaluations of people's abilities are informaland observational rather than formal and psy-chometric: Most judgments of people's intel-ligence, creativity, and wisdom result from in-terpretations of face-to-face interactions, lettersof recommendation, comments received sec-ond-hand from third parties, and the like. Psy-chometric tests tell us nothing about how theseinformal evaluations are made. The results ofthis experiment show that the implicit-theo-retical tests do. People use their implicit the-ories to make these judgments, and thus thejudgments can be predicted from such theo-ries, as was done here.

As would be expected on the basis of theresults of the previous experiments, peoplehave the most difficulty in distinguishing in-telligence and wisdom in such judgments. Butthey are able to distinguish intelligence fromcreativity, and creativity from wisdom, quitewell in these judgments. To the extent we areconcerned, therefore, with how judgments ofabilities are actually made in the everydayworld, the study of implicit theories has at leastas much relevance as does the study of explicittheories, and perhaps even more relevance.

General Discussion

This study sought to discover the nature anduse of people's implicit theories of intelligence,creativity, and wisdom. A prestudy and fourexperiments were conducted in order to fulfillthis goal. The prestudy served merely to pro-vide a comprehensive list of behaviors asso-ciated with intelligence, creativity, and wisdomin each of four fields, as well as in general.

Principal Experimental Outcomes

Experiment 1 showed that, in general, in-telligence, creativity, and wisdom are perceivedas positively correlated attributes in people,although intelligence and wisdom are moreclosely related than is either of these two con-structs to creativity. Ratings did not differ sig-nificantly across groups in terms of mean levelsof particular attributes.

Experiment 2 revealed dimensions of im-plicit theories of intelligence, creativity, andwisdom in nonspecialists. Because principal-axis solutions were used in nonmetricmultidimensional scaling, bipolar dimensions


emerged. Separate interpretations were givento the positive and negative polarity of eachdimension. For intelligence, these interpreta-tions were: practical problem-solving ability,verbal ability (Dimension 1); intellectual bal-ance and integration, goal orientation andattainment (Dimension 2); contextual intel-ligence, fluid thought (Dimension 3). Forcreativity, the interpretations were: non-entrenchment, integration and intellectuality(Dimension 1); aesthetic taste and imagination,decisional skill and flexibility (Dimension 2);perspicacity, drive for accomplishment andrecognition (Dimension 3); inquisitiveness,intuition (Dimension 4). For wisdom, the in-terpretations were: reasoning ability, sagacity(Dimension 1); learning from ideas and envi-ronment, judgment (Dimension 2); expedi-tious use of information, perspicacity (Di-mension 3). On the whole, the dimensionsseem to be plausible, and to fit intuitively withcommonsense notions of intelligence, creativ-ity, and wisdom, respectively.

In Experiment 3, subjects rated themselveson a subset of the entire list of behaviors gen-erated in the Prestudy. These ratings were cor-related with the ideal-prototype ratings fromExperiment 1 to yield a measure of resem-blance (r) between the actual individual andthe ideal prototype. These correlations werethen correlated with scores on psychometrictests of ability. The prototype measure for in-telligence showed its greatest correlations withpsychometric tests of cognitive intelligence,whereas the prototype measure for wisdomshowed its greatest correlations with psycho-metric tests of social intelligence. The creativityprototype measure did not correlate with ei-ther kind of test, but because of doubts abouttheir appropriateness as measures of creativity,psychometric tests of creativity were not used.The correlations for intelligence and wisdom,at least, showed convergent-discriminant val-idation with respect to the psychometric mea-sures used.

In Experiment 4, subjects were presentedwith simulated letters of recommendation forhypothetical individuals. Subjects had to ratethe intelligence, creativity, and wisdom of eachhypothetical individual. Results were of thesame pattern and at the same level, regardlessof whether a given description was paired witha male name or a female name. Predictions

based on ratings from Experiment 2 showedhigh correlations with observed ratings in thisexperiment. Moreover, the results againshowed convergent and discriminant validity,with the predictions for intelligence better pre-dicting observed ratings of intelligence than ofcreativity or wisdom, and with comparable re-sults for the other two constructs.

Contents of and Comparisons amongImplicit Theories

Laypersons. A maj or goal of this study wasto attain some sense of just how laypersons'implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, andwisdom are similar to and different from eachother. The results of the experiments, andespecially of Experiment 2, were useful in at-taining a sense of the similarities and differ-ences.

People's conceptions of intelligence overlapwith, but go beyond, the skills measured byconventional intelligence tests. Thus, theproblem-solving (fluid ability) and verbalcomprehension (crystallized ability) skillsmeasured by intelligence tests appear mostprominently in the dimensions of the derivedimplicit theory of intelligence. Thus, the in-telligent individual is perceived to solve prob-lems well, reason clearly, think logically, showa good vocabulary, and draw on a large storeof information—just the kinds of things con-ventional intelligence tests measure. But alsoembedded within people's conceptions of in-telligence are a person's ability to balance in-formation, to be goal-oriented and to aim forachievement of one's goals, and to show one'sintelligence in worldly, as opposed to strictlyacademic, contexts. People thus seem to bemore concerned with the practical and worldlyside of intelligence than are intelligence testers.

Conceptions of creativity overlap with thoseof intelligence, but there is much less emphasisin implicit theories of creativity on analyticalabilities, whether they be directed toward ab-stract problems or toward verbal materials. Forexample, the very first dimension shows agreater emphasis on nonentrenchment, or theability and willingness to go beyond ordinarylimitations of self and environment and tothink and act in unconventional and evendreamlike ways. The creative individual has acertain freedom of spirit and unwillingness to


be bound by the unwritten canons of society,characteristics not necessarily found in thehighly intelligent individual. Implicit theoriesof creativity encompass a dimension of aes-thetic taste and imagination that is absent inimplicit theories of intelligence, and also en-compass aspects of inquisitiveness and intu-itiveness that do not seem to enter into theimplicit theories of intelligence. Implicit the-ories of creativity go far beyond conventionalpsychometric creativity tests. A person's abilityto think of unusual uses of a brick, or to forma picture based on a geometric outline, scarcelydoes justice to the kind of freedom of spiritand intellect captured in people's implicit the-ories of creativity.

Finally, the wise individual is perceived tohave much the same analytical reasoning abil-ity that is found in the intelligent individual.But the wise person has a certain sagacity notnecessarily found in the intelligent person: Heor she listens to others, knows how to weighadvice, and can deal with a variety of differentkinds of people. In seeking as much infor-mation as possible for decision making, thewise individual reads between the lines as wellas makes use of the obviously available infor-mation. The wise individual is especially ableto make clear, sensible, and fair judgments, andin doing so, takes a long-term as well as a short-term view of the consequences of the judg-ments made. The wise individual is perceivedto profit from the experience of others, and tolearn from others' mistakes, as well as fromhis or her own. This individual is not afraidto change his or her mind as experience dic-tates, and the solutions that are offered tocomplex problems tend to be the right ones.It is not surprising that the correlations be-tween creativity and wisdom are the lowest ofthe three possible pairs (intelligence-creativity,intelligence-wisdom, creativity-wisdom), andin one case, the correlation is even negative:Whereas the wise person is perceived to be aconserver of worldly experience, the creativeperson is perceived to be a defier of such ex-perience.

Specialists. Implicit theories of intelligence,creativity, and wisdom differ as a function ofthe field of endeavor by whom and for whomthe implicit theory is being assessed. (Therewas no separation in the relevant experiment—Experiment 1—between who was making the

ratings and for whom they were made. Thus,physicists, for example, were not asked theirconceptions of intelligence or creativity as theyapply to philosophers, or vice versa. Measure-ment of cross-field conceptions would morelikely tap conceptions created on the spot thanto tap conceptions previously present in in-dividuals' thinking, and would probably be ofdoubtful validity. Moreover, such assessmentwould have resulted in the need for data col-lection on a scale that exceeded our capabili-ties!) Consider each of intelligence, creativity,and wisdom in turn.

Whereas the professors of art emphasizeknowledge and the ability to use that knowl-edge in weighing alternative possibilities andin seeing analogies, the business professorsemphasize the ability to think logically, to fo-cus on essential aspects of a problem, and bothto follow others' arguments easily and to seewhere these arguments lead. The emphasis onassessment of argumentation in the businessprofessors' implicit theories is far weaker inthe artists' implicit theories. The philosophyprofessors emphasize critical and logical abil-ities very heavily, and especially the ability tofollow complex arguments, to find subtle mis-takes in these arguments, and to generatecounterexamples to invalid arguments. Thephilosophers' view very clearly emphasizesthose aspects of logic and rationality that areessential in analyzing and creating philosoph-ical arguments. The physicist, in contrast,places more emphasis on precise mathematicalthinking, the ability to relate physical phe-nomena to the concepts of physics, and tograsp quickly the laws of nature. In sum, al-though there is considerable agreement acrossfields, there are also emphases in each field onthe kinds of intelligent thought that are neededparticularly for success in the given discipline.This specialization in parts of the implicit the-ories of intelligence is absent from the implicittheories of the laypersons.

Implicit theories of creativity in the spe-cialized fields were highly overlapping acrossfields and also overlapped highly with the im-plicit theories of laypersons; nevertheless, therewere some differences worthy of note. Profes-sors of art placed heavy emphasis on imagi-nation and originality, as well as upon anabundance of and willingness to try out newideas. The creative artist is a risk-taker, and


persists in following through on the conse-quences of risks. Such a person thinks meta-phorically, and prefers forms of communica-tion other than strictly verbal ones. Businessprofessors also emphasize the ability of thecreative individual to come up with new ideasand to explore these ideas, especially as theyrelate to novel business services or products.The creative individual escapes traps of con-ventional thinking, and can imagine a possiblestate that is quite different from what exists.Philosophy professors emphasize the ability totoy imaginatively with notions and combina-tions of ideas, and to create classifications andsystematizations of knowledge that differ fromthe conventional ones. Creative individualsnever automatically accept the "accepted," andwhen they have novel hunches, these hunchespay off. The creative person is particularly wellable to generate insights regarding connectionsbetween seemingly unrelated issues, and toform useful analogies and explanations. Thephysics professors share many of these sameideas about the creative individual, but showa particular concern with inventiveness, theability to find order in chaos, and the abilityto question basic principles. The physicistsemphasize creative aspects of problem solving,such as the ability to approximate solutions,the ability to find shortcuts in problem solving,and the ability to go beyond standard methodsof problem solving. Finally, the physicist looksin a creative person for the ability to makediscoveries by looking for reasons why thingshappen the way they do. Such discoveries mayresult from the perception of physical andother patterns that most others simply over-look. As was the case for intelligence, the im-plicit theories of the laypersons seem to be anamalgamation of these different views withoutthe specializations that appear in the implicittheories of individuals from particular fieldsof endeavor.

Implicit theories of wisdom show consid-erable overlap across fields of specialization.Nevertheless, there are some differences in im-plicit theories. Art professors emphasize in-sight, knowing how to balance logic and in-stinct, knowing how to transform creativityinto concepts, and sensitivity. These aspects ofwisdom would seem quite relevant in the ma-ture appreciation and evaluation of art. Busi-

ness professors emphasize maturity of judg-ment, understanding of the limitations of one'sactions and recommendations, knowing whatone does and does not know, possession of along-term perspective on things, knowing whennot to act as well as when one should act, ac-ceptance of reality, good decision making, theability to distinguish substance from style, andappreciation of the ideologies of others. Theseaspects of wisdom would seem particularlyrelevant in making and evaluating businessdecisions. Philosophy professors emphasizebalanced judgment, nonautomatic acceptanceof the "accepted" wisdom, concentration onfundamental questions, resistance to fads,looking for fundamental-principles or intu-itions behind a viewpoint, concern with largerpurposes, openness to ideas, ability to use factscorrectly, avoidance of jargon, possession of asense of where future progress is possible, un-willingness to become obsessed with a singletheory, attention to both detail and scope, anda sense of justice. All of these talents wouldseem relevant to the construction and evalu-ation of philosophical arguments. Finally,physicists emphasize appreciation of the var-ious factors that contribute to a situation, fa-miliarization with previous work and tech-niques in the field, knowing if solving a prob-lem is likely to produce important results,awareness of the important problems in thefield, knowledge of the human and politicalelements of scientific work, contemplation,and recognition of the aspects of physical phe-nomena that underlie the concepts of physics.These skills would seem to be helpful in at-taining a deep understanding of the nature ofphysics and its place both in science and inthe world.

The Role of Implicit Theories inPsychological Research

The present study suggests that implicittheories can provide a useful way of gaining a"lay of the land" in the search for understand-ing of the constructs of intelligence, creativity,and wisdom. The results were construct-validin terms of convergent and discriminant va-lidity, and also were consistent with but moredetailed than previous results from studies ofimplicit theories. For example, the nonmetric


multidimensional scaling results for intelli-gence were an elaboration of the factor-analyticresults of Sternberg et al. (1981). The resultsare also in good agreement with many explicittheories of intelligence (e.g., Guilford, 1967;Sternberg, 1985), especially those that expandthe notion of intelligence to include social andpractical competencies as well as academicones. The scaling results for wisdom also con-firmed and elaborated on those of Clayton andBirren (1980), using the same technique but avery different method for generating behaviors.Our reasoning polarity closely resemblesClayton and Birren's reflective dimension, andour sagacity polarity closely resembles theiraffective one. Although there have been nocomparable multivariate studies of creativity,per se, our results are in accord with those ofMacKinnon (1964) and others who have usedQ-sorts and self-ratings for creative individuals.Indeed, all of the adjectives that characterizedMacKinnon's highly creative sample seemclassifiable in terms of our multidimensionalspace.

Although I have emphasized the role of im-plicit theories as precursors to explicit theoriesand as useful in setting the groundwork forexplicit theories, I believe that implicit theoriesare also of interest in their own right. Implicittheories of intelligence, creativity, and wisdomare of interest in their own right because (a)the terms—intelligence, creativity, wisdom—are frequently used in everyday discourse aswell as in psychological discourse with no orminimal definition, and it is useful to knowwhat people mean when they use these terms;(b) people evaluate the intelligence, creativity,and wisdom of themselves and others withsome regularity, and it is worthwhile to knowthe psychological bases on which these evalu-ations are made; (c) as people make thesejudgments, it is helpful to know to what extentthey correlate with measures derived from ex-plicit theories, such as psychometric tests; and(d) the implicit theories may eventually helpus broaden and change our explicit theories,as we come to realize those aspects of cognitionor affect that the current explicit theories ofintelligence, creativity, and wisdom do not en-compass, but possibly, should encompass.Thus, the study of implicit theories is notmerely an easy substitute for the formation and

study of explicit theories of psychological con-structs. Implicit theories deserve to be studiedin their own right, and such study is comple-mentary to the study of explicit theories.

Although understanding of implicit theoriesis important, both for its own sake and for thesake of developing better explicit theories, it isimportant not to confuse implicit theories withexplicit ones. The test of an account of implicittheories, such as this account, is whether it ac-curately and fully reflects the notions peoplehave in their heads, and the ways in which thesenotions are systematized. The test of an explicittheory is whether it can account for observableperformance generated by the psychologicalconstruct under investigation. People could bewrong, underinclusive, or overinclusive in theirnotions of psychological constructs. Hence,investigations of implicit theories must besupplemented and related to investigationsmotivated by explicit theories.

Although any study such as this has nu-merous limitations, it is worth pointing outthree particularly important ones. First, thestudy is not developmental in its study of im-plicit theories. Yet, the work of Yussen andKane (1985), Berg and Sternberg (in press),Cornelius (1984), and others shows that im-plicit theories of intelligence change over thelife span. The work of Csikszentmihalyi andRobinson (in press), Gruber (in press), andothers shows changes over the life span in thenature of creativity, and the work of Claytonand Birren (1980) and of Dittmann-Kohli andBaltes (in press) shows changes in the natureof wisdom. Hence, the present results may ap-ply readily only to early and middle adulthood.Second, the study is fixed at a moment in time.Conceptions of constructs such as intelligence,creativity, and wisdom may change over theyears, so that a study done at one time can beconfidently interpreted as accurately reflectingimplicit theories only for the time period inwhich it was done. Finally, the study is limitedto one particular culture, rather than beingcross-cultural. Although the present resultsmay apply fairly broadly within our ownmainstream culture, there is good evidence tosuggest that conceptions of constructs such asintelligence, creativity, and wisdom differ cross-culturally (Sternberg, in press).

In conclusion, people have implicit theories


of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom, andthey use these theories both in judging them-selves and in judging others. They seem to usethese theories quite well and systematically. Atleast in the domains of creativity and wisdom,and possibly in that of intelligence as well, itremains to be seen whether we can obtain asgood measurement through measures basedon explicit theories as we can obtain frommeasurements based on implicit ones.

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Implicit Theories of Intelligence, Creativity, and Wisdom Groups... · 608 ROBERT J.STERNBERG as Sternberg's (1981, 1983) componential the-ory or Hunt's (1980) distributed-memory