';IN THE CONFIDENT HOPE OF A MIRACLE":THE SPANISH ARMADA AND RELIGIOUS MENTALITIES

IN THE LATE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

BY

RoBERT E. ScumY, SJ.

Within national and religious groups, as with individuals? ambivalentmentalities sometimnes exist, which can threaten a sense of wholenessand lead to shifting alliances-and strange bedfellows-in terms of po-litical and religious affinities. This can clearly be seen by analyzing themultifaceted movement known as the Reformation, both in its broadsweep and in particular aspects such as the Armada campaign. The his-toriography of the Reformation has focused over time on theological,intellectual, political, and social aspects of this complex phenomenon.Debates have raged over definitions, periodization, terminology, and ahost of related issues.

Yet, not enough attention has been paid to the reality of the conflict-ing and often ambivalent loyalties and mentalities of the Reformationera, A particularly interesting area of inquiry is the Spanish Empire inEurope-in terms of its constituent members, its allies, and its ene-mies-especially in the context of the titanic struggle of the SpanishArmada. More specifically, the strorgly Catholic convictions of the Por-tuguese, Italians, and Fklemings who lived under Spanish rule, at times se-riously conflicted with desires for greater autonomy or independence.This ambivalence can be seen in the range of attitudes and perceptionssurroundirng the Armada and its aftermath. The Spanish defeat couldhave set in motion a vigorous reaction against Spanish hegemony in Eu-rope. A major reason that this did not happen was the religious factor.The Armada, although laumched for a combination of reasons, sailed un-der the aura of a religious crusade The religious mentalities of the pe-riod come into sharp and fascinating focus when viewed through thislens. This is true not only of Catholics, both within and outside of the

Father Scully is an associate professor of history in Le Moyne College, Syracuse, NewYork. He wishes to thank Dr. Frederick Russell of Rutgers tiniversity andl the anonvmousreferee of this article for their very helpful suggestions.

643

IN VHF. CONEIDEPNT HOPE OF A MIRA( IEFE

Spanish Empire, but of Protestants as well Not only the "facts" of the Ar-mada camnpaign, but, perhaps even more so, the rumors, hopes, andfears of Catholic and Protestant Europe con-icerning its outcotmle, tell usa great deal about the depth of religious feelings in the late sixteenthcentury.

For many on the Catholic side, a political desire to see Spain defeated,or at least weakened, was often sudperseded by a religious desire to seethe Catholic cause triumplh. Realpolitlk often gave way to religious fer-vor. Amonig many Protestants, as well, when religious and political goalsclashed, religious conovictions often took precedence.

By examiniing a wide range of sources-CathEolic, Protestant, andMusihm-we can gain valuable insights into the complexity of cultural,national, and religious motivations in the early modern European anrdMediterranean worlds. Thus, for example, why was Catholic support forthe Armada generaUly so strong, support that, outside of Spain at least,was bv no means a given, based on a host of political and economic ri-valries? And, among the Protestants and Turks, how and why did relwiousconvictions sometimes reinforce and somnetimes tanscenid traditional al-liances? This essay suggests tat by looking at an "old" evenit-the Span-ish Armada-in a new light, by analying not only the realities, but alsothe rumnors anid hopes for divine intervention surrounding it, an in-triguing portrait emerges of both the complexity and vitalitv of earlymodern religious mentalities. In particular, as we shal see, many peoplein both Catholic anid Protestant Europe awaited news of the Arm-adacampaign "in the confident hope of a miracle.''

In the 1580's there were a number of problems facing Philip 11 ofSpain, especialy the ongoing revolt in the Netherlands. But the seem-ingly vast resources at Philip's disposal, together witth a conviction thathe was God's special agent in the protection and propagation of thleCatholic fith, suggested that time and Providence were on his side. Atthe same time, a principal iffitant to Philip and Spain was, increasingly,England, and its pragmatic Protestant r uler, Elizabeth I.

On several fronts, tensions that had beent developing between Eng-

iand and Spain were heating ip by the 1 580's. This included the grow-ing intensity of the persecution of the English Catholic recusan1ts, tornas they were between devotion to their faith and loyalty to their coun-try-a divide that many tried desperately to bridge. Ont the intterna-

'See Garrett Mattingly. The.Arnada (Bostonr 1959),pp. 216-217.

6k44

BY ROBERT t. SCL ILLY, SJ.

tional front, the English 'privateers" were growing increasingly bold intheir attacks on Spanish shipping it} the West Indies and elsewhere, pri-marily seeking economic gain, but also making inroads for Protes-tantism. Thus, for example, in an account of the plundering of SantoDomingo by Francis Drake and company in 1586 it was stated:"The en-emy brought with them a parson of the Lutheran Faith in order that heshotuld proselytize. When two preaching monks opposed this, theywere imprisoned, hanged and died martyrs." Elizabeth's protestations ofnon0-collusion in the wide-ranging raids on Spanish commerce and

lands, as well as in the broader political and religious struggles of theReformation, were ever less believable.2

Moreover, England was giving support to Dom Antonio, the pre-tender to the crown of Portugal, after Philip had made good his claim tothe Portuguese inheritance in 1580. Most troubling of all, however, wasthe tacit and then overt support from 1585 on that Elizabeth gave to the

Dutch Revolt. Any hope for a negotiated settlement foundered not onlyon the issue of the withdrawal of all foreign troops, but also because of

the demand for religious freedom of conscience. According to one re-port, peace talks broke down because "the Queen of England throughher conmmissioners insists on the removal from these countries of allforeign soldiery. .. and on freedom being granted to the Reformed re-ligion in Holland and Zealand." 3 England increasingly appeared to bethe champion and defender of Protestant Europe, and Philip decided

that the best way to ensure a victory for God and Spain would be tobring the English to heel by means of a great Armada.

'Victor von Klarwill (ed.), The Fugger News-letters (2 vols.; Freeport, New York, 1924,1926, reprinted 1970),1,89-93, Report to ihe Royal Council for India, January li, 1586;

see also ibke., 1, 8-9,51,93-94. For the range of interpretations of Drake, see John Cufr-mins, Francis Drake: The Lives of a Hero (New York, 1995); Harry Kelsey, Sir FrancisDrake: 7Te Queens Pirate (New Haven. 2000).

3Von Klarwill, op. cit., II, 161, Antwerp, May 21. 1588; see also ibid. It, 157-158, 176-

178.The classic account of the Spanish Armada remains Mattingly, op. cit. An account that

provides more of a Spanish viewpoint is David Howarth, The Voyage of the Atnada: The

Spanisb Story (New York, 1981). The four hundredth anniversary of the Armacda (1988)witnessed a flood of publications, among the most interesting of which are: Colin Martinand Geoffrey Parker, Yhe Spanish Armada (New York, 1988); Felipe Fernandez-Armesto,The Spanish Annada: T7he Experietne of lWar in 1588 (New York, 1988); and De lamar

Jensen, "The Spanish Armada: The Worst-Kept Secret in Europe, Sixteenth Century jour-

nal, 19 (1988), 621-641, which argues tha: the real secret of the Armada was its limitedpurpose, i.e., religious liberty for English C"atholics and EnglLsh non-interference in theSpanish Empire, especially the Netherlands. A helpful historiographical review is pre-sented in Douglasi Knerr, "Through the 'Goiden Mist': A Brief Overview of Arnada Ilisto-riography, American Neptune, 49 (1989), 5-13. F'or an account of the Anglo-Spanish

64s

' IN T'HiE C ONFIDF'NT -OPEf (OF A I.RAMLE

'T'here was clearly cause to be confidetnt due to a previous great vic-tory at sea: the triumph over the turks at Lepanto in 1571. it -was a jointChristian (Cathtiolic) efftrt in the Mediterranean. vith the expenses padone-sixth by the papacy, one-third by Venice: atnd one-half by Spain Yet,due to the Spanish Emipire s heavy reliance on its Italian possessions,two-thirds of the ships atnd mien of the combined fleet came from Italy'As a contemporary account proclaimed, "the Christian Armada' foughtvaliantly "against the arch-enemyv of the Christian Faith'." The courage ofboth: the "Spaniards and Italians" was augmented by the fa6ct that there"sprang up a wind to our assistance Thus, against the larger (if less wellarmed) Turkish tieet,"the Christians had achieved victory with thie helpof the Lord. As Christian-and especially Catholic-Furope interpretedthe victory, the seemiingly invincible ''rks had been swept from the seaby the irresistible and-cl miraculous hland of God: it even evoked imagesof the diowning of Phltraohl's ariny in the Red Sea in that well-knownbiblical mianifestation of Divine Providence.'

()verall, Italy was of central importance in the mainitenan6ce of Span-ish hegemony in the Mediterranean and Europe in the early moderil pe-riod. The Spanish crown ruled about half of Italy directly: Milan, Naples,Sicily. andi Sardinia, But it also had important, if at times strained, ties toseveral other leadting Italian states: Vetice, Genoa, Florence, and the Pa-pal States. Central amlong the links of this Italian-Spanish bonid was the

fact that bothl Italy and Spain were staunchly C atholic areas in the ageof thie Reformation. This fact, however, also gave rise to the ambivalentstance of many italians: while they generally supported Spanish effortsagainst the TRrks in the south and the PErotestants in the north, theyxvere also amnmous to prevent a tuiversal "Spanish Preponderance,"which had been greatly facilitated by France's descent into the Wars ofReligion.' Even so, while the Italians had good reasonls to fear the co1n-

n-aval war see N. &. M. Rodger The Saj8guard qf the Se3aA Waval Hkistoy qfBr'itain7, 660-

t6'49(New forii, 199T), pp. 238-296.'As an example of Italian (Vtnetian) financing. see the petitioni of Marco di Geronimo

MOrosini £nr ihle equpipping ¢of a galley in 1570,- ISM. V Saenato, Irra,Iiiza 109, in DavidChambers and Brian Puilan (edsj , itenkce:Ai Docurfnentap' Histoy, 1450- 1630 (Oxfibn.1992), pp. 255-256,

"b'in KIur-will, op. cit, E :- E,' 7, `News-Lcter 1-orn the Christian Arrmada,' October 8,1r71; ilylch, op. cit., 239-250; Hlenry, arKacn Golden Age .SpWnn (Atlantic Highlands,NewJerse 1983, pp. 7-8t Geoffey Parker, The Grand Strategv of Philip t17 (New Havcrn,1998),pp. t10t-10.Western Christendoinviewed the ad'.en: of printing as a providentialaid in the anti-itirkish cusacde, anrd, tiereibre, this was the first "reLfgions muoverment" tomake usc of the printinig press, see Elizabetih E.. Fsensteni, The Printng Revolution inE.arly odere L'uEnpe (New York, 1983rp. p4i-

1Peter Pier'sin, Philip i 45/fmm?a (L1ondon, 1975), p. 36.

646i

13Y ROBRT E. SCULLY, S. J.

siderable military threat posed by the Turks (as at Lepanto), that wascertainly not the case regarding the English, who posed no militarythreat to Italy. Many Italians did realize, however, that Protestant Eng-land could tip the scales in the great religious struggle of the Reforma-tion.

Therefore, as the preparations for a great Armada against Englandwere underway, Phlip received considerable support from his ovn Ital-ian domains, as weLl as from other parts of the peninsula. As one Italanofficial wrote:"On religious grounds many Princes are on Your Majesty'sside." He went on to say that it was m31ost appropriate that "the CatholicKing" should wage this "war on behalf of Christendom "Moreover, muchassistance evidently awaited this enterprise:"We are assured of the helpof the Virgin Mary, and of Germiany, so grievously haried by theheretics." With regard to the English Catholics, the official opined that,'although I do not care to trust themn blindly, Ithey wil] in all probabil-ity make some sort of diversion in our favor." Another factor workingagainst the English government was that"the Queen of England has noIndia at her call to replace the cost." The official concluded by nioting,"The whole enterprise ties in the hands of God. Your Majesty has theright on your side. .. .8 Thus, this great undertaking was cast in a pri-marily relgious mold.

Perhaps the most complex and fascinating of all of Philip II's dealingsin Italy was with the papacy, especially with the strong-willed and opin-ionated Pope Sixtus V ( 585-1590). As was the case with most of thepopes of the period, Sixtus was torn between supporting the "CatholicKing" in matters that would strengthen the universal Church, and, at thesame time, trying to prevent any expansion of Spain's seeming strangle-hold on Italy and Europe. Therefore, the very strained personal relationsbetween the king and the pope only exacerbated this relgious/politicaldivide.9

By contrast, the monarch that the- pope had the greatest admirationfor was, ironically, Elizabeth I. As he told the Venetian Ambassador earlyin 1588:"She certainly is a great Queen, and were she only a Catholicshe would be our dearly beloved. Just look how well she governs; sheis only a woman, only mistress of half an island, and yet she makes her-

Won Kiarwill, op. dJI., 147-154, Cavaliere Fra Tiburtio Spanocchi to Philip Ii,Lundated.'See Ludwig von Pastor, The History of trie Popes from the Close of the Afidd"e Ages,

Ralph Francis Kerr (ed.) (London, 1932),Vol.XX3 andvol.XXII, 1-312;these volumes pro-vide a somewhat dated but stfll indispensable portrait of Sixtus V and his eventful pontif-icate.

64-,

"68 'I'HEI CONFIDENT HOPE O1F A MI(RACE"

self fearedl by Spain, by France. by the Empire, by all. She enriches herkingdom by Spanish booty, besid1es depriving Spain of Holland andZealand."" Still, as this fascinating commnetlt reveals, althiough the popemilght swoon. over Elizabeth, he still believed that as thle Vicar of Christ,he had to suipport Philip's efforts to regain northern lands for tileChurch. Accordingly, a league with. Spain was co inctuded and, with re-gard to the Armada, the pope proposed the following:"a million of goldotn news that a landing has been effected. The island is to be invested inthe King of Spain or his nominee; and if anyone interferes to hinder theenterprise adequate steps will be taken against hitm."

By August of 1588, however, before any news of the Arimada hacd yetreached Rome, the pope's frustrations, never far from the surface,boiled over Huge amoutnts hadT been e_xpended, 'upwards of thirteenmillions," andn othing had been accomiplished. lfe criticized Philip butagain praised Elizabetth, as well as Drake! He offered a pessimnistic butprophetic observation: "We are sorry to say it, but we have a poor opini-ion of this Spanish Armada, atnd fear some disaster.9 Yet, ironically, cde-spite the pope's genuinely ambivalent feelings, the English evidentlyviewed SixtuEs V as quite vehement in bothi his support fIr "'tle Enter-prise" and his opposition to England and its queen, I'his was due to hisrenewal of the bulls of excommiunicatanoln against Elizabeth and hisgranting of plenary "Indulgences to aall that gave their Help and Assis-tance" against England." Evidently, what was true in the m1ind of t'hepope was generally, true throughout Italy: a victory for the Catholiccause had to be puirsuied, even at the risk of strengthening the Spanishjuggertnaut. In other wors, althouglh nost ltalians tent their support, ittrickled through various filters, especially in Rome and Venice .I

"Calendar ofStiate Papers and .Manuscripth, Rekltintg o English Affairs. Existing inthe A. eb bkvs and Collections of Vzeice (Londo_n 1894) (hereafter CSPNT). ,VfI, 345-s46,GioWvanni Gritti to the Doge andl Senate. Mareh 19,1588. For some surprissngiy positiveSpanish views of Ehizabeth, se' Henry Kamen, P7ilip of .Spain tNew Haven, 1997),op. 319-320.

"1Von Klarwil,op. ci, IL. 163.Roinejumne 25, l588;(SPXVIlII 363, Giovsnni Gritti to theDoge and Senate,July 2. 1588; Parker, Grand Strategl f Philip I1 pp. 190-191.

'2

(`S;PNVRII 379, Ciovanni C'ritt to tihe LDoge and Senate,August 20, 1588; WxIliam Cam-den., The History of the Most Renkowined and ctorions Pt incess Elizabeth Tate Queenof England, ed. Waflace T EMacCaffrey (Chicago, 197'0), p. 31 hi According to onc report ofthe excommundation, Elizabeth was "dispossessed of her kingdom., her lands and her sub-fects, being lon-,g since a condemoned hieretic" In her place, Philip was appointed 'g ofEnglgand and Ireland, and Protector of the Catholic Faith in tilat coutry" it von Kiarwill,op. cit.. L122-123,Salzburg,july 14,1588.

'J. N. iliigarth, Tle Miror of Spain. 1500- W700: The Fbrmaiion of a lyth (AnnArbor 2000), pp. 295-308.

68

B"Y ltoBERT E. S0iLY, S. J.

Another example of divided and ambivalent loyalties was Portugal. In1580, when the Portuguese throne became v-acant, Philip 11 made goodhis claim and brought about the union of the two great European over-seas empires under the Spanish crown. Portugal was as staunch as Spainin its support for the Catholc cause in the age of the Reformation, buta number of Portuguese bitterly opposed the annexation of their coun-try by the seemingly voracious Spanish. As one example, just prior tothe Spanish takeover, the Viceroy in Portuguese India wrote to Usbon,"They would rather have a revolution and would submit to Turkish rulemore readily than to Castilian[!] " On the other hand, an observer in Lis-bon noted, "Al the best people here are in favor of Spain but dare notlet it be seen. But when the King of Spain appears here with his armyhe will be better received than he expects."" Many aristocrats evidentlysaw the "Catholic King"as a source, not only of patronage, but of greaterunity oF purpose and effort-religious, economic, and otherwise-forall of Iberia, even though, as in Italy, this would come at the cost of au-tonomy."

By 1588 this ambivalent relation.ship between Philp II and hlis Por-tuguese subjects was made more so by the preparations fir the Ar-mada, which was gathering in Lisbon. There were those who supportedthis combined Catholic effort against England and the Protestants ofthe north; but, at the same time, the financial and humaan toll was clearlybeing felt. Some Portuguese representatives went to Philip to implorehim to remove the burden of the Armada from them because, they ar-gued (though without success), it was contributing to the ruin of thecountry. 6 This heightened tension between religious and political aspi-rations can be seen in the intriguing career and short-lived fame of the"Nun of Lisbon."

Mary of the Visitation, the Mother Prioress of the Convent of the An-nunciation in Lisbon, gained the aura of a saintly figure who was sup-posedly blessed with mystical revelations and the stigmata, the fivewounds of Chirist. Her claims appeared to be confirmed through severalexaminations by Church officials and, therefore, her predictions of great

"Vion Klarwill. op. cit., iI, 36,Antwerp, February 13,1580; ibid., il, 37-38, Lisbon, Febru-ary 26,1580;and see ibid., 1, 29, 43.

"See Kanmen,Pbilip of Spain, pp.27,168-177,242-245.As one important example of

interdependence, in manning its arnadas and fleets in the sixteenth cetstury, Spain reliedfor about one-fifth of its crews on non-Spzniards, especially Portuguese and Italians, seePablo E. Perez-Mallaina, Spain's Men of the Sea: Daily life on the Indaies RCeets in the Six-

teenith Centny, trans. Carla Rahn Phillips (Baltimore, 1998).

16CSPVVIlI, 334-335, Hieronimo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate,January 20, 1588.

649

' LJ TEIE t-ONFIDENT HIOPE OF A tlAtIRAC

success for the Armada boosted religious and military morale. But thiefacade of sanctity crumbled when it came to light that two friars of herorder, the Dominicans. hacd thus inducced her and that the stigmata' hadin fact been painted on her body. Evidently, the plan had been to havethe Mother Prioress use her spiritual prestige to convince Philip IL atsome fture point, that he was bountid by God to withdraw from Portu-gal and hand it over to Doi -Antonio. The two friars wvere sent to pris-ons of the lnquisition and the nun was conde£mned 'to perpetual prisonin a convent not of her own order outside the city' This incident pro-v-icies a particularly telling illustration of dramatic opposition betweenreligious and political aspirations, between a desire for a combinedCatholic victory over Englandc and yet, at the same time, for a Por-tuguese political rictory over Spain by meanis of the restored indepen-dence of Portugal. Although this is ani admittedly unusual example, ifeven a nutn in a cloistered conivent atnd sone friars could feel so stronglythese divergent impulses, so too undoubtedly could inany of their na-tive couinttrymen anid women.

The country where the political antd religious situatio,n was espe-cially complex an(d bloody was France. Few states in the sLxteenth cenr-tury were as fractured by the religious wars as was "the eldest dtauighterof the C hurch? King Henry III as a politique, usually tried to steer a m,id-die course between the Protestants (thle Hutguenots under Henry ofNavarre) aind thie Catholics (organized into the Catholic League underHenry of Guise). The resulting "War of the 'Mree Henries" devastatedFrance ancd drew it evxer m-ore deeply in to the European-wide religiousand political divide." TRhis can be see-n in a particularly dramatic lightwith regard to Spain: and the Armada.

Although Spain and France were traditional eniemies in the earlymodern period, opinions concerning the Armada generally broke dowtnalong religious lines, even though these did not necessarily coincidewith political affinities. While awaiting news of the Armada, the Vene-tian Ambassador in France noted that both the Catholics and the

on olfwilOp. CG.,I, 114-i £21,L,shun,Novci-ber 10,l1587;,CESPVVt.'s418- 49,421,

Ltppomano to vite Dogt and Senate, December 14 and 31, 1588. With regard to Spanishattitudes towmard visionaries, especially in the years surrounding thce Armada, see lKAmen,Philip ofSpain, pp. 281-283. See also the intriguing article on fem-tale spirituahty, alleged

possession, arnd carly mod6ern 'onx-ents, Moshe s5hhovsky, "rhe Devil in the ConventiA4tmcrlcan HilHosrlral Retfvew, II7 (2002), 1379-1415 .

'"For ie French context, see Mack P Bolt T'he Frelnch Waos of ReIgionf 1562-1429(Cambridge, 1995), Barba)ra B. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics andF ugnenots

in Sixteenth-Century Paris (New Yofr, 1991).

650)

BY ROBERT E. SCULY,. S. 6

Huguenots feared a loss for their side, and undoubtedly summed up theopposing sentiments by concluding that "a great blessing or a great mis-fortune for France hangs upon the issue." 19 In the months after the Ar-mada, this samne ambassador commented on the attempts of both Spainand England to win the amity of France, seen as crucial to the outcomeof the conflicts raging in Europe. The Spanish Ambassador in his meet-ingS with Henry III tried to win h-im over to the wider C atholic cause,pronising that if the King of France helped in the war against the Eng-lish, the King of Spain would letnd him support against the Huguenots.'On their part, the English were inclined to believe that, although therewas a danger of the Catholic League lending ships and opening Frenchports to the Armada, they expected "neither the French King, nor thehavens and port towns that statad for the King," to give any assistanceto the Spaniards. In fact, in 1589 the Englishl proposed a far-reachingaffiance with Henry Ill and other states against Spain." Among theFrench, tensions were probably especially acute for many in the Cath-olic League, devoted as they were to France, but also to the triumphof Catholicism, seeing in Spain an ally of co-religionists in their struggleagainst the Protestant King of Navarre. 22

The situation in Scotland was ambivalent for reasons that were notonly religious and political, bitt also quite personal. The execution ofMary, Queen of Scots in February, 1587, resulted in a range of strong re-actions in Scotland and across Europe. Most important-and ambiva-lent-was the reaction of Mary's son, James VI, King of Scots. He hadnever really known his mother, and her deposition had allowed him toascend the Scottish throne. In addition, she had been a Catholic,wvhereas he had been raised as a devout Calvinist. Still, he had inter-ceded on her behalf (though how earestly is open to debate), atnd thebeheading of a consecrated monarch who also happened to be hismotlher caused James some undoubted grief and gave rise to quite a"storm" in Scotland. Although some Proitestants were glad to hear ofMary's death, it also stoked Scottish nationalism and resentment of theirtraditional enemy, England.21

"CsPV,VII. 376, Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate,August 15, E1588.

1biWd,VI1, 410-41 l, Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, November 6,1588."John Knox Laughton (ed.), State Papers Relating to the lDefeat of the Spanish Ar-

mada t2 vols.;London, 1894),1,236-237, Advertisemnent toWalsinghatn;Ibid.,1,245-248,Howard to WaLsinghamrJuly 6,1588;R.B.Wernharn,Afler the Armnada:ElizabetbanEng-land and the Strugglefor Western Europe, 1588-1595 (Oxford, 1984), p. 143.

22Hig-Rath, Op. cit, pp. 334-339.

5See Calendar of the Staite Papers. Relating to Scotland,Vol. 1 (1.ondon, 1858) (here-

after CSPScot), 535-545.

651

' IN THE (.ONFIDENT IOPE OP A MIRA(CII'

Relations between the two "British" monarchs were strained for sometime, but mutual dependenicies prevented any permanent rupture. Elz-abeth wrote to Janmes, insisting "hov innocent I am in this case..'' Inresponse, James expressedt the desire for "a full satisfaction in all re-spects," seeing this as a means "to strengthen and unite this isle," as wellas to "establish and malntain the true religion, . , "' Elizabeth needed tomaintain peace on her northern border as the threat of the Armadatoomed ever larger, whereas james was committed to Protestantisin andalso hoped to succeed to the English throne at thie queen s death.

Additionally, with regard to the execution of the Queen of Scots, Eliz-abethl wrote to win back the support of Henry HI, buit he remained coolfor some time because of "the cruLel andS inihuman act" of the executionof Mary, who had been, both a Catholic monarch and his sister-in-iaw.2 5A1n intriguing expression of English sentim2enit regarding these develop-ments can be seen in a conmmient of L-)rd Howard in January of 1588:"Ihave made of th-e French King, the Scottish King, an-d the King of Spain,a Trinity thlat I mean never to trust to be saved by," and he clearly hopedthat others, especially the queen, were of dle sane opinion.16

On their part, the Spaniards hoped that, in spite or' religiosus dliffer-ences, the resentmeint felt by james and the Scots over tihe Fnglish exe-cution of thie Scottish queen would lead to support for the Armada.There was even talk of the possible opening of Scottish ports to Span-ish vessels." That, of course, was not to happen. For James, his deeplyheld Protestant convictions reinforced h-iis broader political inlterestsand proved decisive. Thus, for thie King of Scots, his "continual good Af-fection to the trte Religion and the Queen" factored into his shrewdstrategic assessmient and prevented PhHilp II from getting his foot in theScottisht d.oor. In fact, james took action against Scottish Catholics, aswell as other steps to thwart the Spanlish designs.28

By thie summer of 1588, James had evidently comn-e full circle in hissupport for Elizabeth. He informed the queen that he embraced 'vourgodly and honiest cauise, whereby your adiversaries mnay have ado notwith Englnd but with the whole isle of Britain." He wished for success

"Leah S. Markus, Janet Moueller, and Mary Beth Rose (edst) Hiztabet J: Collected Wore-s(Chicago, 2000) (hereafter, CO), pp. 296-297, Elizabeth to Jamies, February t4, i5887, .todJamies to Elizabeth,_March. 1587.

"11,/id., p. 298, Flizabeth to Henry itl, May, 1587; CSPSeot. 5459, fenr'y Itl to Moms. DeCourcelles June I1, 1587.

2t'iaughtor9, Oft c#t., t, 48-50, EHoward to Walsin4ham,january 27, i588.

WVon KlArwii, op. Cit., ,, 145 Antwerp November 5,1587."Caniden, op. cit, pp. 31 3-314.

652

BY ROBERT E. SCULIY, S.J.

against "God's professed eneniies, and one of his officials even claimedthat the king was willing"to hazard his Crowvn and life in defense of herMajesty" The rhetorical flourish aside, James's loyalty was undoubtedlystrengthened by the pension of one hundred thousand crowns a yearthat Elizabeth had begun to pay him?.9 Even so, the King of Scots waswiUing to play the Catholic card as well as the Protestant one-on botlhthe domestic and foreign fronts-and he may have received moneyfrom Spain as well as England. 0

In any event, when the Armada retreated north around Scotland.James forbade "delivery to the Spaniards of food or munitions on painof death:' He evidently had concluded that a Spanish (and Catholic) vic-tory was a threat not only to England, but to Scotland as well. The king'srather amusing, classical assessment was:"That he looked for no otherFavour from the Spaniard than what Polyphemus promised tJlysses,namely, that after all the rest were devoured, he should be swallowedthe lastY01 Therefore, in spite of centuries of often intense English-Scottish animosity, there would be no help for Spain's war against Eng-land from Calvinist Scotland or its devout but opportunistic king.

Perhaps most interesting of all in this world of religious and politicalalliances and intrigues was the role of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) inthese ongoing conflicts. On the one hand, Christian Europe saw theTurks as religious infidels and as a very real military threat, both inthe Mediterranean and in central Europe. On the other hand, the clas-sic adage that "my enemy's enemy is my friend" was operative. In par-ticular, the Most Christian Kings of France played the Turkish cardthrouglout the sixteenth century in their ongoing conflicts with theHabsburgs.t1 Nlany, especially the Most Catholic King of Spain and HisHoliness the Pope, were exasperated by what seemed to be shamefulconsorting withi the archenemy of Christendom.

Although the existence of the Franco-Turkish alliance is generallywell known, it raises some compelling and unanswered questions, es-peciallv in the context of the Armada. It is intriguitng to specudate as towhy so many in Christian, and largely Catholic, France were willing to

'9CW, pp. 356-357,Jarnes to Flizabeth,August 1, 1588; ('SPScoti 550, WiViam Asheby toLord Burghley,August 6, 1588; C'SPFVVI11 374,Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, August

11, 1588."See Ruth Grant,"The Brig o' Dee Affair, the Sixth Earl of Huntly anld the Politics of the

Counter-Refbrmation," in julian Goodare and Michael Lynich (eds.), The Reign of James V7(East Lothian, Scotland, 2000), pp .93-10 9.

'Von KlarwHll, op. cit., If, 175,Antwerp, September 3,1588; Camden, op. cit., p. 3293'2See von Klarwill, op. cit, 11, 76-77,82-83, 104-105.

653

"IN flIt CONFIDENT HOE 01' A AMIRACLE"

consort with the Muslimn Turks, but generally inot with the ProtestantEnglish, against the Spaniards. Although political realities and advan-tages were clearly important factors, the religious conundrum remainsand has not been adequately addressed. Among othier calciulations, per-haps there was little hope for the conversioni- of the Muslim "iifidels,'but greater hlope of winning back the Protestant"heretics.' In any event,ambivalent, if niot contradictory, religious and political stanices coouldhardly be starker.

On its part, England made overtares to both the Tirks of the OttomanEmpire and the Moors in Morocco, especWily as the threat of the Ar-mada drew ever closer. In her search for allies, Queen Elizabetl tried tomake comnmon cause with the Turkish and the Moroccan rulers againstthe Spanish menace. 'rhe Turks spoke aboout equipping a fleet againstthe King of Spain and, in return, the Queen of England sent subsidies toIstanbul (Constantinople). "3 Even Spain made some overtures to the Sul-tan, but it did not have 'a regular and respectable embassy [at] thePorte,?' and its diplomacy with the Islamic world was clearly less sue-cessful than- that of England.3 In fact, during the 1580's, the first ambas-sadors fromn the Ottoman Empire and the Kinigdom of Morocco arrivedin England to foster their countries' interests.'"

There were several compelling reason-s why the Englisth sought to de-velop good relations with the major Muslim states, and from the Miuis-lims' point of view these arrangements were mutually beneficial. Thus,a range of coummercial, diplomatic, and nmilitary ties were frtnred on thebasis of muLtual opportunities and threats to security, especially with re-gard to Catholic Spain andc its- enmpire. Yet, on the part of the English, orat least somic of them, they uEndoubtedly experienced anxiety and dis-comfort due to the fact t:hat their "godly," Christian nation was consort-ing with the followers of Muhamnmiad. One means by which thisunorthodox alliance may have been justified, and perhaps even seen as"holy" by some Britons, was through the linking of Cathoicism-andespecially Spain-with idolatry. An1 example of this mindset is revealedin a remarkable petition addressed to the Sultani by the English Anmbas-sador in 1589. In it hie boasts of 'the most Holy Alliance" that their twocountrnes had formed against "our common foes, all of them accursedidolaters. ... " These included, in particultar, "the King of Spaln, the chief

"lbid., i1. 120, Constantinople, October I, I 586; CSPX7 VIII, 350. Giovanni (Gritti to theDoge and Senate, April 16, 1588 Parker, Grand Shrategyl of Phinip UI, P. 192

'Von Klrll, op. dl, 11.31-132. Constantnople. April 5 1587."For an Interesting discussion of several of the issues nosed here. see Nabil Matar,

TurAks, oors, and DFglishrnen in the Age of Diseorvy (New York, 1999),esp. pp.3 -42.

654

BY ROBF.I E. SCULLY. S. J.

of all idolaters," and the Pope, who "is looked upon by these [Catholicirulers as in some wise a God upon earth." in all, the anibassador used

the word "idolaters" six times and concluded that "the proud Spaniardand the lying Pope will be cheated of their assured hope of victory andwill suffer chastisement for their presumption."-6

This suggests that the strong iconoclastic traditions of Islam andProtestantism may have formed a bond between these otherwise dis-

parate religions (or at least were presented as sLuch), thereby distin-guishing them from their "idolatrous" Catholic enemies. Aolog thoselines, in addition to the centuries-long and resolute iconoclasm of Islam,the condemnation of images became a hallrmark of Protestantism, espe-cially in the wake of the "second Reformation" from the late sixteenthcentury onward.." In other words, although there were many commer-cial and military benefits to justify the English-Muslim alliance, the trou-blesome religious nature of this union was rationalized in a number of

ways, including the argument that the terrible sin of Catholic idolatrywas being stamped out by this otherwise strained Protestant/Islamicaxis.

At the same time, political and religious realities and alliances were

yet more complex becauise the Turks were able to enjoy good-or atleast workable-relations with some Catholic powers. 'he case ofFrance has already been discussed, and Venice provides another exam-

ple. There were, of course, geopolitical forces at work, but, in addition,the Turks may have viewed these states as less inflexible in theirCatholicism than Spain and the P-apal States. For its part, Venice tried to

steer a middle course through these troubled and murky waters. Evenso, not long before the launching of the Armada, the Sultan complained:"The Venetians are not behaving as well as they used to. I am informedthat they are helping the King of Spain, who is my enemy, against theQueen of England, who is my ally.7 Tlhe Venetian Ambassador denied this

and even enlisted the support of the English Ambassador on bis behalf.On the other hand, shortly after the Armada had been launched, theVenetian Ambassador in Madrid wrote: "We now await the news of its

voyage, which, pray God, may be successful." 38 These varied sentimentsare not merely a reflection of different diplomatic posts. More funda-

-Von Klarwill, op. cit., U, 205-207, Constantinople, November 8,1589."See, for example, the vehement coitcemnation of 'idolatry" in a letter from Wiliam

Bedell, chaplain to the English amnbassador in Venice, to Adam Newton, Dean of Durh4m,January 1,1608, in Chambers and Pulan, op, cit., pp. 19'5-196.

`CSPV VJII, 357-i58, Morn to the Doge and Senate, May 18, 1588; Ibit., Vill, 371, Lip-

pomano to the Doge and Senate,July 29, E 588.

655

"iN TIE TCONPsEN'I 1fPHE OF A4 MWrACU±

meentally, they demonstrate Venetian ambivatenice: hoping for a Catholicvictory, but also desiring to remain on good term-s with all in order to re-tain Venicie's stil important position in the Mediterranean world.

As for the Armada itself, preparations had long been underway andthere were few illusions of a simple or assured victory. Although, as wehave seeni, there were political and economic considerations in play, thereligious factor was front and center. In an engraving of Phiip Ei as de-fender of the faith the motto read:"Religion is the highest priority." Itis true, of course, that Phiip made use of religious propaganda, thoughless so (and generally less successfully) thian Elizabeth I and some otherrulers."o At the same timie, Philip's religious convictions were deeperthan those of maost other sixteenth-century monarchs. In addition to thematerial preparations for the Arnada, which cost a total of about ten mil-lion ducats, the spiritual component was seen as vital. Both before andafter the £aLmacng of the Armada, Phlip and miuch of Spain prayed forsuccess. It was reported that the King "passes day and nigh-t in prayer,"and that "Spaui is full of processions, austerities, fasting and devotion Itwas even sai that the entire royal family prayed before the BlessedSacrament for three hours dailv im relays in the clhapel of the Escorial.Overall. inany Catholics in Spain and elsewhere believed that the "Enter-prise of England" was directed to? the service of God. and they, inlessence,"sacralized" this undertaking. 4 ' Even i-n a society that had foughta centunies-ong Reconquastlu against the Moors, the spiritual prepara-tions for the Armada appear to have been grounded itn decidedly morethan miere religious rhetoric.

In fact, the Armada gave thie appearanace of a religious crusade, as op-posed to a primnarily secular mi-litary endeavor. In his Geeneral Orders tothe fleet, the comnmander, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, stated that theexpedition was being undertaken for "tlhe service of God and the resti-tution of many people to the bosom of the Church. Therefore all offi-cers are to see that their subordlinates come on board confessed andcommunicated." In addition, impious activities were forhidden-Includ-

"Parker, Grand Strategy f Pillp .1, pp. 93-95.'cotnpawr lir example, Kamen, Philip q(/Spain, esp. pp 228-232, with Carole evin,

`lh7e Hiecart and Stomach of a King' ' Elizabeth I and the Politics of Sex and Power(Philadelphia, 1994).

41,'csyVlil, 363, Lipponanno to the Dogc and Senatc,jufy 2, 1588; Parker, Grand Strit-egy of Philip 1T, pp. 201-203,269.

656

BY ROBBWR E. SCULLY, S J.

itlg the removal of more than six hundred prostitutes from the fleet justbefore sailing-and various religicous observances were mandated., 2

Other indications of the crusading mentality included the fact that theships had red crosses on their sails and the "principal men" of the fleethad crosses on their garments. Moreover, the Duke of Parma's flagshiphad the royal standard on one side and, on the other, an image of thecrucified Christ surrounded by the Blessed Virgin Mary and St.John theBaptist. : 3

Although the English also prayed, for victory, they prepared more ef-fectively than the Spaniards for the coming titanic battle. And thisbrings to the forefront one of the biggest myths of the Armada cam-paign: the perception of a Spanish Goliath bearing down on an EnglishDavid. Military leaders in England played upon this apparent disparity,in part to nudge the queen away from her pacific and parsimonious ten-dencies. Sir Francis Drake urged his sovereign to increase English forcesby land and sea, warning:"There was never any force so strong as thereis now ready or making ready against your Majesty and true religion,"while also claiming. "The Lord of aJl strengths is stronger....'°" The re-ality was that the English held the advantage in terms of the number, thespeed, and the maneuverability of their ships, and in the range and fire-power of their artfllery As the English commander, Lord Howard of Eff-ingham, boasted in the month before the engagement, Queen Elizabethhad "the strongest ships that any prince [in] Christendom hath." TheEnglish were, in fact, well prepared in both the quality and quantity oftheir fleet to meet the enemy on more than equal terms.4 5

Much ado was also made of the legendary "Protestant" wind, whichsupposedly swept the Spaniards from the seas. One particularly dra-matic English account clained that due to the "very great storm," manyof the enemy would never see Spain again. This was clearly seen as the"work of God, to chastise their malicious practices, and to make themknow that neither the strengths of men, nor their idolatrous gods canprevail, when the mnighty God of Israel stretcheth out but his finger

11CSPV VII, 356-357."Genenod Orders tc- be obeyed throughout the Fleet during thisCampaign,' May 8,1 588;Von Klarwill, op. cit., I, 121-122, Madrid, May 18,1588.

4'Laughton, op. cit., 1, 21-22, June 23, 1588; ibid., l, 223, September 12, 1588; Parker,

Grand Strategy of Pbllip 11, p. 24 0. See also "Las Banderas de la Gran Armada 1588," Re-vista de Historia Naval, 7 (1989), 7-32.

"Laughton, op. cik,, 147-149,Drake to the Queen, April 13,1588.45Ibid.,1, 201, Howard to Walsingham,June 14,1588; Camden, op. cit., pp. 311-312 32 1-

323.

657

6iN THL CONFi?-tN I iii CHFOP A .MIRA I.E'

against themi."I But here, too, the situation was more complex. At vari-ous points during the length of the canmpaign, in late July aind earl Au-guust of 1588, the winds favored or distressed both the Spanish and theEnglish. It is true, of course, that off the coast of Gravelines the Englishgained and generally held the weather-gage, and having the wind intheir favor certainlyr added to thieir tactical advantages. Bujt, perhapsmost importantly, nature was believed to be at God's command, andtales, both true and false, of how "the winds of Goci" had devastated theenem-iy were widelvy used to shape the interpretation of the Arimada'sdemise-especially with regard to its supposed religious implications.47

The conttemporary religious "spin'" on the Armada can also be seen ina fascinating way by looking at the various rum-ors that spreadi aboout itssuLpposed success or failure, before thie triue story became wvidelyknown. Although much. of the propaganda and niaiiy of the rumorswere not true, theyi provide intriguing insights into thie mentalities ofthe period, as well as the important role of rumor-mongering in an ageof pre-modern communications; As an example, a re-port in mid-Tulyfrom the Venetian Ambassador in Prague stated that there was newsfromn Cologne "that the Armada h-as had an engagement witlh the Eng-lish fleet, and: been victorious, taking one hundred ships, and lositngforty....' But, he wisely added, little credenice was given to the reportat that early date. Also, a dispatchi. -froni an ltalian official in Rouen inearly August gave thanks to God for the "good news" that, supposedly atter a lotng battle,"victory rcmained with us, as we sank fifteen of the en-einy, including the flag ship." Clearly. there was empathy in Catholiccircles well beyon(d Spain for the Armnada campaign, despite the risk ofeven greater Spanish hegemony in Europe. -

On the other hand, the news durinig the samie period in Hamburg (acenter of Protestantism in north Germany) was that "eighteen shiips ofthe Spanish Armada, were sunk by gunfire, and eight taken and broughtto England,' while the rest of the fleet lied to the French coast. At thesame time, in wvhat was perhaps a nationalist versioni of a plaguLe onboth their houses, the accouint concluded: "If this is true it will som-Ie-what abate Spanish insolence and give the English fresh coulrage,tioughl they have no lack of insolence either." In fact, during this period,

'Laughton, op. cit., 1t, 41 -42, Thomas Thnner to Walsiftgham,u.Aduguist 4, 1588 (emphasisadded).

`ibid.,d1, 215, 224-226,II, 36-37, 208-209;Caffiden, Op. cit,,pp. 310, 320. Maittaigtly, Op.cit., pp. 390-39 1; Howartth, op. cit. Ip 87 Fernandez-Armaesto. Opf ,it, p. 268.

ScPVy Vlli, 370, Vincenz,o (amdenigo tt) the Doge and Senate. July 190 1588, d.b/d VIiti,380-38I.August -', 1588.

658

BY ROBERT E SC(IJLLY S. J.

exaggerated reports of victory and booty were circulating in London,and one claim in mid-August was tat "altogether 36 [Spanish] shipshave been brought to this country." 9

Even by late August and early September, optimism still abounded inmany Catholic capitals. The Venetiani Senate sent the following dispatchto its ambassador in Spain:"From mnrly quarters we hear of thie successof the Armnada, and we rejoice. We order you to offer our congratula-tions to his majesty." In Prague, an announcement stated that "the Span-ish Armada has fougit the English and the English have succumbed. Atthis the rejoicing here is universal"5" An even more astounding reportreached a number of Catholic cities, including Rome and Prague, ac-cording to which: "Parma had effected a junction with the Armada,' anEnglish port had been seized, and the Spanish had "landed eight thou-sand infantry and thirty pieces of artillery." Still, Pope Sixtus V was skewtical and refused to hand over the promised million ducats to Spainwithout solid proof of the landing of the Armada in England."

A final example of rumors is provided by far-away Istanbul. As late asOctober, conflicting reports were circulating about the fate of the Ar-mada. An exaggerated account by an Englishman claimed "The navy ofhis Queen has defeated the Spanish Armada, captured most of it andkilled the Spaniards." On the other side was the contention that "newshas already been received here in print assigning the victory to theSpanish Armada? In the middle wvere several Catholic ambassadors whowished to steer a cautious diplomatic course and thus,"The French andVenetian ambassadors are said to have declared that they know nothingdefinite about the Armada.? Therefore, in an Islamic capital, too, reli-gious and political calculations determined how the voyage of the Ar-mada was to be interpreted.52

The reality was that England had won an important victory overSpain, but the extent and long-term significance of that victory, as wellas the overall implications of the Armada venture, were to be disputedat the time and ever since. Even as the Armada was being dispersed inthe Channel in early August, Queen Elizabeth made a dramatic appear-ance and spoke to the troops assembled at Tilbury. She concluded "We

WNon Klarwill,op. cit. 11, 168-169,Hamburlg,August 3 and 4, 1588;ibid.,t1, 173, London,August 14,1588.

"C%SPV,VIII,381,Doge and Senate to Lippomano,A-agust 27,1588;von Kiarwill,op.cit.,11, 175, Prague, August 30. 1588.

"CSPVVIII, 380,Gritti to the Doge and Senate, August 27,1588; von Kiarwil, op. it,H,174-175, Rome,August 27,1588: ibid, It, 175-176, Prague, Septemnber 8, 1588.

5'Ibid., II, 179-180, Constantinopie, October 7, 1588.

659

6.N THE CONFNDENT HOPE 01 A MESA' [F'

shall shiortly hlave a famous victory over these enemies of my God andof my kingdom."' Thus, with her uisal astuteness, Elizabeth empha-sized both the religious and political nature of her commitment. In on-eof her public prayers, the "Christian Deborah" gave thatnks to God say-ing, 'Thou hast this year made [your bounty] serve for instruments bothlto daunt our foes and to confound their mahce.'So too in one of her po-ems, the queen recalled the God who had saved the chosen people ofold, and who now "bath done wonders in my days./ He made the windsand waters rise/ to scatter all mi-ne enemnies."'

Btit celebrations were also of a very public nature. Queen Elizabethcommanded public "Prayers and Thanksgiving to be used throughoutall the Churches of England," and the queen herself "gave most heartythanks to God, and heard a Sermon, wherein the Glory was given toGod alone." Several coins were struck to commemorate the victory, in-cluding one "with a Fleet flying with frill Sails, and tis Inscription,Venit, vidit, fugit, that is, It came, it saw, it fled .."" in November tlherewere major celebrations for the thi-rtieth anniversary of Elizabeth's ac-cession and for the Armada victory, with prayers and thanksgivings atSt. Paul's Cathiedral and throughiout the countr. According to onie ac-count:"Like Pharaoh, the Kinig of Spain has been piunished. During thesethanksgivings the Queen seemed very magnificent and devotut."I

Not only in England, but in many other Protestant areas as well, a"Providentialist" view abounded: victory had been won by the hanld (orbreath) of God in support of the true faith, Thus, the States of Zealandcompared Philip 11 to the Pharaoh whose heart had been hardlened, andconcluded that Elizabeth's "justice anid innocence will prevail over -hispride:' The Council of the UTnited Provinces praised Elizabeth for being"the defender of God's church and of thiis country." Ttie Dutch also is-

CW3 pp. 325-326, "Queen Elizabeth's Armada Speech to the Troops at TIlb'dyb ` Au-gust 9, i588.

'ibid., pp. 424-425, "n the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, September, 1ii8; 'bd.,pp. 410-411, "Song on the Armada X7ictory," December, 1588 For anr overview of QEueerMizabeth's religious views and policies, see Sasan loran.-llizabeih lfand Religion, 1558-1603 (London, 1994), esp. pp. 6-9.

"Camden. oxp. cit., pp. 327-328."6Von Klarwill, op. cit.,I, 184,Middelburg Deccmhber 6.1588; ibid., }, 185, Aotwerp, De-

cemrber 24,1588; Martli and Parker, op. cft., p. 254. For a wide range of contemporary Fng-Hsh maps, illustrations, and 1liesenmie playing cards celebrating the Armada victory, seeRoger Whiting, The Enterprnse of E,ngla nt Th7e Spannb 47A rrat (New York, 1188)

660

BIY ROBERT E. SCU LLY, S.J1

suied a medal celebrating the Armada's demise, which had the inscrip-tion: God blew and they were scattered."5 '

Moreover, a Dutchman. Emanuel v-an Meteren, wrote one of the bestcontemporary accounts of the battle of the Armada: "The miraculousvictory achieved by the English Fleete." He provided a reasoned religious and military account, though his Protestant poinit-of-view was ev-ident. He observed that'"humble prayers and supplications" had arisenfrom throughout England and the United Provinces, and it was consid-ered most apparent "that God [had] miraculously preserved the Englishnation.'" 9 Van Meteren concluded his work with a poem written byTheodore Beza, the French Calvinist scholar and theologian. Beza endedhis paean to Queen Elizabeth with these highly charged words: "Andnow, 0 Queene, above all others blestj For whom both windes andwaves are prest to light,! So rule your owne, so succour friends op-prestJ . .. That England you, you England long enjoy,/ No lesse yourfriends' delight, then foes annoy. 59

This belief in the role of Divine Providence was widespread in thesixteenth century. Even the practical English saw this as vital. When theEarl of Leicester discussed the need for the queen to continue prepara-tions against the impending Armada. he also acknowledged a depen-dence on God to "miraculously give her victory" against the mightyenemy. 5" On their part, most Spaniards viewed this as indispensable ifthey were to achieve victory. This was expressed perhaps most dramat-ically by one of the captains of the Spanish fleet. As the Armada was be-ing prepared, he said, evidently with a combination of despair andhope "unless God help us by a miracle the English, who have faster andhandier ships than ours, and many more long-range guns... [will]

"Laughton, op. cit., 11, 48-52,The States of Zealand to the Queen, August 6,1588; ibid.,II 71-72, The Council of State of the UJ£nited Provinices to the Queen, AuguLst 8, 1588;Parker, GCnad Stratiegy of Philip I1, pp. 98-99.

imanutiel van Meteren,"'The miraculous victory achieved by the English Fleete ...ULpon the Spanish huge Armada" (1598), In Arthur E Kinney (ed.), Flizabethan Back-grounds: Ilistorical Documnents of the Age of Elizabeth I (Hamden, Connecticot, 1990),pp. 245-274. Van Meteren's account, as well as a brief account of "Sir Francis Drake atCadiz,' may also be found in Richard Hakluyt, Voyages and Discoveries: The PrincipalNavigations, Voyavges, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, ed.pack Beechlng(London, 1972), pp. 309-326.

"'Thteodore Beza, "Ad Serenissimiamn Elizabetham Angliae Reginamn' in Kinney, op. cit.,pp.274-275.

'1.aughton,op. cit.,l, 318-32 1, Leicester to Walsinghasn,July 26,1588.

66,1

66 iN 'TEE CONFIDENTHOPE OF A \HRA(1 I

knock us to pieces with their cuivErins, without our being able to dothemii any serious hut." Therefore, he conetidced, "we are sailing againstEglatnd in the conlfidient hope of a uniracle[!l' 6'

For the Spaniarn.s. a mtamle did -not naterialize, and the reaction inSpain and other C'athotic areas was a decidedly mixed one. The inmme-diate effect was a genetral mood of despair and resigiation to the some-times inscntable will of God. As Philip 1I himself said of tde attack onEngland:f -w7as not moved by desire for new kingdoms; I am well cona-tent with those given me by his divine Mfajesty I have consuEmed mvpatrintonv. vThe cause is (God's and touchies the honior of myself and mykinigdom.'' A sense of loss and even disaster was widespread throughoutthe coLmtry. At the same time, a sense of propriety and trust in the waysof tod was maintainded: public mourning was prohibited, prayers and aforty days' fast were ordered for thie return of missing ships, and solemnMasses of thanksgiving were ordered, both for those who had returnedsafely, and- (as the King prayed) for continued divine guidance in fuittureactions "which shall be most to Hlis service, tihe exaltation of His church,[and] the good and preseivation of Christendom....

To that end, the Spanish mood of despair was tralsformed into one ofdefiance anId renewed confidence hi the rightness of their cause. Fromnthie Spanish cotmmunity in Rome to the Cortes in :Madrid, there was a con-viction that God would bless fuither efforts and that they wouLild be suc-cessjfl. icn fact.representatives of the Cortes told the king that theywould"vote lhur or -five milions of gold, their sons, atnd alt that they possess sothat he [might] chastise that woman and wipe out the stain which thisvear has fallen oin t:he Spanish nation. . ." Most of Pilip's subjects re-mained devoted to him, and one report noted that many places in Spainoffered to build new ships-along Enlglisth litnes-and supply men to "I§sSacred Majesty' for another Armada. Some tim.e later, the cing was "gmti-fied to hear of the grant of eight miffions of du cats which His Majesty'ssulbjects" offered to continue the war against England."4

"'Quoted in Matlingly. op, cit., pp. 2 16-21 7."'CsPV VitI, 402, Philip IE tc the Frocurators of the Cortes, October 7, 1588; ibid.

pp. 404-405, Philip 1I to all Spanish prelates, October 13, 1588; von Kianv, op. dtit ,I 130,Middelhnrg, Novembefr 1' 1588; Parker, Grandc Swtegy of Pbilip II, pp. 269-271.

6'Von Klitwdl, op. cit.,1, 181-1,i82, Rome, October 29 !588; CSPV,VI, 412,1tippoManoto tte DIoge and Senate, November 16,1 588

"Von Karwil, op. cit.. Ii, #3-184, Rome. November 26, 1588. ibid_ 11. 188-i89.Venice,March I17, 1589.

662

BY ROBlRT E. SCULLY, S.J.

From Philip's Italian dominions, too, aid was forthcoming in 1589. 1twas reported that the Kingdom of Naples. "in addition to the recentlyannounced one million two hundred thousand crowns, has decided tosend as much again this year to assist the King of Spain. It is hoped bythis to give a good example to the Duchy of Milan." Moreover, Philipmade use of religious loyalties to raise additional money in Italy-fromFlorence, Genoa, and the Papal States.65 Another very interesting indica-tion of support came from Venice: "Some declare they have seen anagent of the Queen of England here who has asked thle government tohand him over for cash 6000 muskets. But this was at once refused, asthe arms were sure to be used against the Catholics." This was mnorecredible than an earlier rumor that had circulated in Venice: "Some herethink that the King of France night possibly cede Calais to the King ofSpain so that the Spanish fleet might shelter there in case of need."64 Itwas remarkable, indeed, that the rumor mils could even suggest thatFrance might turn Calais over to Spain after its relatively recent "libera-tion," only thirty years earlier, endin4g more than two centuries of Eng-lish control. Once again, some contemporary voices were suggestingthat political realities should give way to religious sensibilities, whileothers held firm to the mandate of raison dtat.

Another aspect of the contfict between Spain and its enemies thatwas undoubtedly colored by the growing religious divide was the de-velopment of the "Black Legend.' The origins of this multi-pronged at-tack on Spanish beliefs and behavior-whether reaL or, in many cases,inagined-can be traced to the Low Countries and the growing reli-gious and political chasm between the Spanish and the Dutch. Thisblackening of the Spanish character spread widely, especially in Protes-tant Europe. As the Anglo-Spanish war commnenced in 1585 and continl-Lued for nearly twenty years, the level of animosity between theseantagonists grew particularly bitter. Still, although Spanish propagandamade usse of the concept of "perfidious Albion,' it was in no way com-parable to the depth and ferocity of anti-Spanish sentiment that devel-oped among the English. In his perceptive study of this phenomenon,William Maltby suggests three factors that contributed to the develop-ment of the Black Legend in England. the onset and progress of theReformation; a growing sense of national consciousness: and, most di-

'Ibid.,II, 186, Rome, February I1, 1589; ibid., 11,194, Genoa,uly 9, 589."Ibid.,11, 200-201 , Vece, Juary 26. 1590; ibid., II, 183. Venice, November 25.1588.

(665

6IN IE CONFIDENF HOPE OF A MiRACLi7'

rectly, the outbreak of the Anglo-Spanish war, cmWi-inating in the Ar-mada".6-

Thlc deptlh antd irrationality of such feelings can be seen in some ofthe contemporary popular English songs and iallads written abo:ut theArmada (about twent-four of which are still extant). Among th ise thatwere perhaps most vociferously anti-Spanish were the ones prodcucedby Thomas Deloney, a balladeer, novelist, and yeoman weaver In "A joy-fil new Balladi, he opens with the words: "- Noble England fall downI

upon thy knee! And praise thy GOD, with thankfl hieart, which stillmaintaineth thee!" lie goes on to discuss the horrors that England hasallegedly been spared, with one particularly memorable stanza describ-ing the desigtns of the malevolent Spaniards:' Our pleasant couintry, sobeautiful and so fair.! They do intend, by (deadly war, to make both poorand bare./ Our towns and cities, to rack and sack likewise,! 'to kill andmnurder man and wife as malice dot arise;! And to detlour [siC] our vin-

gins in our sight;/ And in the cradle cruelly the tenider babe to smite./GOD's Holy Truth, they mean for to cast downl,! And to deprive our no-ble Queeni both of her life and crown?."

hlus, it is alleged, the goal of the heartless Spainiards wv as to over-throw, by any, means necessary, both "God's Holv Truth" (i.e., Protes-tantism) and Queen Elizabeth, who was sustaining it. This dangerous

link between Spain and Catholicism is miade clear in another of De-

loney's ballads, where he. warns his listeners against "what the Pope and

Spaniards both prepared fur our gain." He thieni dcescribes instruments of

tortuire that were supposedly found on some of the Spanish ships:"Onesor2t of wh1ips, they had for men,! so smarting, fierce, and fell.! As like

could never be devised by any devil in hell ... Delonev; thereby raisesthe dreaded specter of the inquiisition. This demonic imagery was, in

fact, a figment of the imagiation as no such devices were found on the

Armada. As Maltby correctlv concludes, this is a manifestationt of'"theBlack Legend with a vengeance.'"9 Antd it suggests, sadly, that rejligiousimpulses and hatreds were at thie heart of this profound anirnus thatcould conijure Lup such hiellish threats evidlently emanating from thcSpanish and Cathbolic worlds.

"lIfiEgarth, op. cit., pp. 309-327, 376-395; Wifliam S. M altby, Te Blakk Legend in Eng-landk TEe Development of Anti-Spanish Sentimenthen 558-1660 (Durham, Northl Csa-olin-a, 19i), pp. 133-136; P.lRkter, Grand Strategy qfl'builp lA,p. 201E

""A. F Pollard (ed)., Tudor (maets: 15322-1588 (New Ytrk, 196 0, pp. 485-491f Marfinand Parker, op. cit, p. 261.

"Pollard, op. cit., pp. 498-502; Maltlsy, op. cit., pp. 82-83

6)64

BY R£OBERT E.SCULLY, S.j

The Black Legend was also reinforced by ani English "reinvention" ofthe Armada, transforming it into the supposedly "Invincible Armada.' Inactuality, in Spanish and Catholic circles, it had been referred to as the"Great Armada" (which in size it certainly was) or as the "Catholic Ar-mada" (stressing the religious nature of the undertaking). In contrast, it

was Lord B1urgliley who wrote a pamphlet about the Armada campaignand concluded with the ringing phrase:"So ends this account of themisfortunes of the Spanish Armada which they used to call INVINCI-

BLE." This was also picked up by Camden, who wrote that the Spanishfleet was the best furnished "of anyi that ever the Ocean saw, and calledby the arrogant name of Invincible...."70

This clever and ironic bit of propaganda added yet another dimen-sion to the Black Legend: in addition to tyranny and ambition, theSpaniards were also guilty of cowardice and incompetence. Never mindthat such assessments flew in the face of evidence that Spanish disci-pline ancd fortitude had been commendable, even in the worst of thefighting, or that the English, for all their advantages, had suffered theirown toll and had not destroyed the Armada. As an English master gun-ner wrote to Burghley: "What can be said but our sins was the causethat so much powder and shot spenit, and so long time in fight, and, incomparison thereof, so little harm?"7 1 It is qtuite instructive that even intheir own assessment, the English believed that the extent of the vic-tory over the Spaniards had been limited by their own sinfulness.

There is no doubt, however, that the battle of the Armada was in facta great victory for England and added to the prestige of the Elizabethanage. At the same time, reports of the demise of Spain were very muchexaggerated. 2 With regard to Spanish sea power, the thought-provokingassessment of Garrett Mattingly is certainly correct: "The defeat of the

'°CSPV, VIIE, .369, Lippomano to the Doge and Senate, July 14,15838; Martin and Parker,op. cit.,p. 26 1; Camden,op. cit., p. 318.

'Maltby, op. cit., pp. ,76-77; Mattingly, op. cit., p. 310; Laughton, op. cit, II, 258-260,

William Thomas to Burghley, September 30,1588; and see- ibid ,II, 138-1i39,213-214. It istrue that the English had 'out-sailed, out-ranoeuvred, and out-fought the Spaniards asthey hael always expected to do. But they had neither broken the Armada's fortnation nordestroyed its ships by their gunfire as they had belkved with equal confidence that theywould,> in Wernbam, op. cit., p. 407. According to another assessment, "The English werefull of the euphoria of victory, but at the same time perplexed what to do next. The fail-ure of their new weapons to achieve the devastating effects they had expected was wor-rying, in Rodger, op.cit, p. 272.

,'In factt more thani a vear after the defeat of the Armada. in November, 1589, Pope Six-tus V indicated the continued predominance of Spain and Philip II by frankly admittingthat in his capacity as the temporal sovereign of the Papal States, the pope was "like a fly

665

6IN IIRE (CONFIDANT HOPE OF A MNACL E'

Armaada was not so much the end as the beginning of the Spanish navyThe Spaniards learned from many of their mistakes and built better,faster ships to replace those that had beeni lost. Not onlfy did the trea-sure fleets contintue to sail but in the period from the defeat of the Ar-mada to the death of Elizabeth, more American treasure pouLred initoSpain fromn the Ncw World than in any comparable period in SpanifshhistorVy7 Althouglh English cruisers tried to intercept the treasure shps,they were generally quite unsuccessful. As atn example, a report in 1590lauded "thie arrival in SeviHe from New Spain of the fleet with eight il-lions in gold . More ships are expected to arrive shortly,.which h-ad to re-main behinid on account of stornms. Thiev are bringing a further foturmillions!'4

Overall, Spain did not succtm1b to a priolonged period of defeatism. Infact. many Spaniards manifested a naioodt of de-fiance and renewed refligious fervor, and reasserted their conmmitment to fight fo-r both faith andcountry, for God and king..Although somie disillusionmient iAth Philip ifsurfaced in the last decade of h1is long reign (as well as after ins death),he was still widely viewed in Spain and otlher parts of the Catholicworld as the- great defender of the faith, as thie "Catholic King." Even af-ter the significant setback of the Armada, divine favor was still believedto rest upon him. This is clearly suggested by a remarkable story of a"terrifying miracle in 1590: "One morning, as the King after praying inhis oratory before a crucifix . .. wished to kiss the image of Christ, thelatter turned away from him. This greatly horrified and frightened theKing and he once miiore begani to pray that God might forgive him hissins. He thereuipon once more tried to kiss the image of Christ, whichagain withdrew from hEim" "Distraught, Philip sent for his Father Confes-sor, who prayed for discernment. He had the king send for two of hiscouncilors "and bid thern kiss the crucifix. They did so and soon. there-after fell sick and died:' As the account concluded, Some aver that thecrucifix was poisoned so that the King might lose his life there-by".

The belief that the cr ucified Christ had acted directly and miracu-lously to save the life of his anointed servant--and the f-act that this

conmpared to an etephlant before the kUng on whose dom.inions the sun never set," In Pas-tor, op. cit. I XXI, 273.

7'MattinglyT o. cit, pp. 397-398'7 Fenandez-Armesto, op. ciT. ppJ 269-27(0.NVonl Kiarwll, op Cit. l, 142-s43. Venice, Januarv 12,1590. Over the long haul, thie

'dream of both thfe Frencch and the English had always, been to capture the fabulouswealth of a flotca, anid this became a dominant, perhaps the dominant theme in Englishtnaval strategy not only in the sixteenth century but weU into the eigh1xteenmh. They neversucceeded, 'in Rodger,fo.tit., p. 242.

,'Von Klarwol, op. ci, 1, 148, Venice, Apri, 6, 1590.

6G66

BY ROBEii'iE. SCU. Y, S. J.

story evidently spread widely-suggests that, although Philip's costlywars demanded great sacrifices arid clearly aroused some opposition,many of his subjects still believed that their king was blessed with di-vie invor. interestingly, a parailel miracle was reported some years laterin which another Catholic monarch, Henry IV of France (who had con-verted to Catholicism), was prevenited from receiving a poisoned host

at Mass-in this case througl the intervention of a particularly pre-scient dog!76 In an age of religious conflict, such stories reinforced the

belief, at least in many Catholic circles, that not only the Most CatholicKing of Spain, but other Catholic Kings as well, were under divine pro-telion.

As for Spain, although the Armada went down to defeat, it held on toalmost all of its empire-and all of its Catholic lanids-not only throughthe reign of Philip IT b5ut well into the future. Although the seven north-ern, mostly Protestant, provinces of the Netherlands broke away, the tensouthern, mostly Catholic, provinces remained under the Habsbturgcrown. As for Portugal, an attempt by the English in 1589 to capture lis-bon and ignite a Portuguese rebellion against the Spaniards was a fail-ure and enlisted little support.7 Portugal was ruled by neighboringSpain for aniother half-century, until 1640. Spanish crown lands in Italy,as well as in the Americas, remairned part of the empire into the eigh-teenth or, in the latter case, the nineteenth century."'

Outside the Spanish Empire, the independent states of Italy contin-ued to support Spain, at least in its 'Catholic" enterprises, despite thepotential political pitfalls. Several months after the events surroundingthe Armada, the Venetian Ambassador in France reported with approvalthe words of the Spanish Ambassador concerning England: "Peace wreshall never make; [the queen] has not one shore only to defend; wehave now to attack her on all sides of her kingdom, and what is morewe have learned from experience that her Armada is not invincible.'"9

Thus, the Spaniards tried to turn the tide on the issue of "invincibility,"

'hIbid., I, 246,XVenice.July 16 1604."On the Portugal Expeditioni of 1589, sec Wernbam, op. cit., pp. 92-130; Wallace Mac-

Caffrey, Elizabeth I: War and Politics; 1,588- 1603 (Prlnceton, 1992), pp. 73-96; Rodger,

op. cit, pp. 272-274."With regard to the interesting debate concerning the supposed"decine" of Spain, see

J. H. Elliott- Spain and it.s Word, 1500-170U.:Selected Essays (New Haven, 1989), Part IV;Kamen, Golden Age Spain, pp. 61-63; Hilgarth, op. cit. pp. 503-519, 528-544; David

Goodman, Spanish Naval PTuwe 1589-166 5: Reconstruction and Defeat (New York,

1997).7'CSPvViII, 413, Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate, November 2t, 1588.

667

668 IN llaE CONFID3NT HOPE OF A MMWI '

and they evidently believed that they could rely on Veniice, and pre-sum-ably on other Catholic powers as well, for various levels of support.

Yet, Venetian retations with Spain continued to be parnicularly com-plex. Venice's comitment to the Catholic cause was tempered, or atleast mediated, by its perceived economic an-td political necessities.Thus, with the assassination of Henry III in 1589 and France's firtherdescent into chaos, Venice and much of the rest of Europe feared thatSpanish hiegemoiny on the Continentt would be evermore unopposed. Inthat year, the Florentine Ambassador wrote to his duke concerningthese developments " [It] seemPis that the Venetian government is deeplydisaffected towards [the Kinig of Spaini, and suspects him more deeplythan his good intientions deserve antd their own prudence denmands." Headded, perhaps withl a touch of hyperboie,"lt would not be surprisinlg ifthey began to have dealings with the rks and the Huguenots, in orderto create diversions when the need arose.."""

Venice continued to steer a carefuil course, balancing political and re-ligious interests, well into the fuiture. In a report by th:e Spanish AmKbas-sador in Venice c. 1618, he referred to "the arrogance of our commonenemy the Turk:" but also astutely informed his sovereign:"The Repub-lic greatly fears Your Majesty and the Turk,' the two great Mediterraneanpowers that had the potential to threaten Venetian independence.Thus, as an equally astute English ambassador had noted a few years ear-lier concerninig the Venetians, "Their general course in all divisions be-twt other Princes and states is to maintaine a neutrali½ which dothgive them-n the advantage of tiine."?8 As it was, Venice had supportedSpain in the Armada campaign and continued to support other ven-tures of the Catholic "Coutnter-Retformation," so long as these did notthreaten Venetian well being and "reason of state:' Paradoxicalil, the"Serene Republic" continued to be both "extremely worldly" and 'ex-tremelv religious.,

With regard to France. it was embroiled in religiouis w-ars untilthe end of the sixteenth centurv and beyond. But Spanish support forthe Catholic L.eague wv-as one of t£he mlajor factors which precipitated

'Chambers ancd Puilan, op. it., pp. 82-#3. Raffle de'Medici to Ferdinanoo, GrmadDuke of luscaniy, April 18, 1 589.

"Ibid- pp. 26-35. A Report byi the Spawish Amrbassador; c. t618, and The English Ami-bassador's Notes. 1612.

`See Gary Wills, Vetnice, Lion CAiy: The Religion fof Empire (New York, 2001), esp.pp. 367-371 At the same time, many non-Spaniards evidently believed that Spanish reli-gion consistcd of "an unhappy mnixture of the profane and tite sacred . . . " Hilgarth, op.cit..pp. 125-159,esp.p. 147,

1'Y ROBERT E. SCULlY, S. J.

Henry [V's conversion to the Catholic faith in 1593, an event that was agrievous blow to his former co-religionists such as Theodore Beza, andnot least to Henry's Protestant 'sister;' Elizabeth. She wrote to him ingreat distress:Ah what griefs, 0 what regrets, 0 what groanings felt I in

my soul at the sound of such news.... He who has preserved youmany years by His hand-can you imagine that He would permit you to

walk alone in your greatest need?' Perhaps Flizabeth asked this ques-tion of herself as of Henry, but, even so, she is knowv-n to have sent hin

funds even after he turned from Protestantism.8 " In any event, France as

a whole remAined solidly within the Catholic fold, although it contin-

ued its ambivalent stance toward Spain: some unity of purpose with re-gard to reigion-especially antipathy toward the Haguenots-butgreat divergence with regard to political interests.,"

Therefore, in spite of what had seemed to be a disaster for Spain and

the Catholic cause, i.e., the defeat of the Armada, events seemed to sug-gest a less drastic and more complex result. In this instance, as in many

others, although political and economic factors were of considerableimportance, religious loyalties often proved decisive. There were somecompelling reasons why many Portuguese, Italians, and others living

under the Spanish crown, as well as many French, Italians, and othersliving outside it, might have sided with England in the Armada crisis or

afterward. After all, fear of Habsburg universalism was not unfounded.But, for many, a commitment to the Catholic cause was of central im-portance, especially when the struggle was seen as so cruciai to the fu-ture course of the Reformation. By the same token, for many DuLtch,

Scots, Huguenots, and others, devotion to the Protestant cause lessenedsomie of the animosities that they felt toward the English.

Thus, in spite of often-divergent political and economic interests, re-ligious convictions remained strorg and were at the core of the men-

tality of most early modem people. And therein lies the great paradox:althoughl the Reformation turned much of traditional religion on its

head, and despite many other dramEatic changes in the early modern pe-riod, religious mentalities remained in many ways remarkably tradi-

99cw, pp. 370-371, Elizabeth to Hcnry iV,July, 1593; Wernham,9op. cit., 475-513.

'For an insightfuLl, classic presentation of the ongoing conflict between Spain and

France into the seventeenth century, and its sometimes strange adnixture of religion and

politics, see C. V Wedgwood, Richelieu and the French Monarchy (New York, 1962). See

also a more recent, thoughtful discussion of these and related issues, in Anthony Levi, Car-

dinal Ricbelieu and the MakinLg of France (New York, 2000), esp. pp.251-259.

6699

6'iO LN 11E (CONFIDENT iEOPh OF A IIRACI.E'

tional, especially in terms of the intenstty of relilgous feelings, and thiswas true for both Catholics andt Protestants.

As for the Anglo-Spanish war, extensive fighting, both at sea and es-pecially on land, occurred throughout tihe 1 590's, with many ambitiousEnglish and Spanish war plans coming to naught.The long struggle continued beyond the death of Philip II and just beyond the death of Eliza-beth I, finally ending in 1604 with a peace treaty betweeen Philip III andJames I. Philip 11's "messianic impeialism" had convinced him that, inspite of the enormous costs, the war against England. as well as againstthe Protestant Dutch and Huguenots, had to be pursued tof a just end.Elizabeth's own religious anid political beliefs convinced hier that shle,also, had to continue thie struggle against the Spanish and Catiolic menace. Altiough the Protestant Qtueeni was not as religiously committed(some have argued not as fanatical) as the Catholic King, she was a rea-sonably devout Christian (Anglican) and believed, like Philip 1, thatGod was on her side.,"

There certainly were instances in the earlv modern period where re-ligious beliefs were not the ultimate factor in determining sides in vari-ous conflicts. But, in the great battle of the Armada, the lineup wasessentially along religious lines, wit£h both Catholics and Protestantshoping tihat God woutd bless them witb a victory, if not a miracle. And,even after the Armada's defeat, religious loyalties continued to reinforcethe determination of many on both sides of the great religious divide tofight on, to continue the crusade for the true faith, even if this some-timies camEe at the cost of forgoing very tempting political and eco-nom'ic alternatives.

"Parker, Grand Strategy 03 P141/p II, pp. 7i 114.

670

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

TITLE: “In the Confident Hope of a Miracle”: The SpanishArmada and Religious Mentalities in the Late SixteenthCentury

SOURCE: Cathol Hist Rev 89 no4 O 2003WN: 0327403959002

The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and itis reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article inviolation of the copyright is prohibited. To contact the publisher:http://cuapress.cua.edu/related.htm

Copyright 1982-2003 The H.W. Wilson Company. All rights reserved.