Inc. -- En tergy 5485 U. S. Highway 61 N Bend · By letter dated March 8, 2005, Entergy submitted a License Amendment Request to use the ... RJK/WBB Attachment: 1. NUREG-0612 AND

-- En tergyEntergy Operations, Inc.River Bend Station5485 U. S. Highway 61 NSt. Francisville, LA 70775Fax 225 635 5068

RBG-46426

April 19, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAttn: Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555

Subject:

Reference:

River Bend StationDocket Nos. 50-458 and 72-49License No. NPF-47Supplement to License Amendment Request (LAR) 2004-26, "Use of the FuelBuilding Cask Handling Crane for Dry Spent Fuel Cask Loading Operations"

License Amendment Request (LAR) 2004-26, "Use of the Fuel Building CaskHandling Crane for Dry Spent Fuel Cask Loading Operations" dated March 8,2005

Dear Sir or Madam:

By letter dated March 8, 2005, Entergy submitted a License Amendment Request to use theFuel Building Cask Handling Crane (FBCHC) for dry spent fuel cask loading operations. Theattachment to this letter supplies a matrix comparing the FBCHC to NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612. This is provided as information to assist in your review. In the original letter, Entergycommitted to upgrade the FBCHC quality classification to 'Quality Assurance ProgramApplicable" by March 31, 2005. Entergy now plans to complete this action prior to the first caskloading campaign, currently scheduled during the third quarter, 2005. This change in thecommitment date was discussed with Mike Webb on April 18, 2005.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact368-5076.

Mr. Bill Brice at 601-

Rick J. KingDirector, Nuclear Safety Assurance

RJK/WBB

Attachment:

1. NUREG-0612 AND NUREG-0554 Comparison Matrix for the RBS Fuel Building CaskHandling Crane

10

RBG-46426Page 2 of 2

cc: Dr. Bruce S. MallettU. S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionRegion IV611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Senior Resident InspectorP. 0. Box 1050St. Francisville, LA 70775

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAttn: Mr. Michael K. Webb MS 0-7D1IWashington, DC 20555-0001

Louisiana Department of Environmental QualityOffice of Environmental ComplianceAttn: Mr. Ronnie WascomSurveillance DivisionP.O. Box 4312Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4312

Attachment to

RBG-46426

NUREG-0612 AND NUREG-0554 Comparison Matrix for theRBS Fuel Building Cask Handling Crane

Attachment toRBG-46426Page 1 of 44

NUREG-0612 AND NUREG-0554 COMPARISON MATRIX FORTHE RBS FUEL BUILDING CASK HANDLING CRANE

Document Guidance Evaluation Notesand Section

Safe load paths for heavy loadmovements have been defined atRBS. The FBCHC is prevented, The consequences of a postulated

Safe load paths should be defined for by design, from traveling over the drop of the MPC lid into the loadedthe movement of heavy loads to reactor vessel and the spent fuel MPC have been evaluated and found

NUREG-0612 minimize the potential for heavy loads, pool. Loaded spent fuel casks are to not result in an unacceptable fuelSection if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in not handled over irradiated fuel. configuration and the radiological5.1.1(1) the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel The MPC lid is the sole heavy consequences are bounded by the

pool, or to impact safe shutdown load handled by the FBCHC that previously evaluated fuel handlingequipment. must be suspended over exposed accident described in RBS USAR

spent fuel in the loaded canister Section 15.7.4.to properly conduct spent fuelcask loading operations.

Procedures should be developed to RBS' heavy load control programNUREG-0612 cover load handling operations for includes procedures to cover load Lift height limits, consistent with theSection heavy loads that are, or could be handling operations for heavy drop analyses will be included in the5.1.1(2) handled over, or in proximity to loads, including those handled by operating procedures, as appropriate.

irradiated fuel or safe shutdown teFCCequipment. the_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Crane operators are trained in thearea of heavy load handling, safeload paths, and the potential

Crane operators should be trained, consequences of load drops overSEction qualified, and conduct themselves in the reactor vessel, spent fuelSection accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI pool, and safe shutdown5.1.1(3) B30.2-1 976. equipment. They conduct

themselves appropriately inaccordance with this training. Thetraining is based upon ANSI_B30.2-1976.




The redundant rigging system (Figure3 of Attachment 2 to LAR 2004-26) iscomprised of upper links, lower links,

Thespecial liftingdevicesused and connecting slings. The upperwiththe FBCHC to handle heavy links are attached to the crane

NUREG061withd theqFBred tor hadle heavyg structure and are not a special liftingSection Special lifting devices should satisfy ldcask roading operati ns (is e device. The upper links are designedSection gielnsofASIN46 . lf caske loaing yoperaxtions(ioe, the with safety factors of 3 and 5 to yield

MPC lift cleats) satisfy the and ultimate strength, respectively.guidelines of ANSI N14 6-1993 The lower links also do not meet the

. 9. definition of a special lifting device.However, Entergy has chosen todesign them in accordance with the_guidance of ANSI N14.6-1993.

The lifting devices used with the Slings are used to lift and lower theFB3CHC to handle heavy loads empty MPC, the MPC lid, and the

NUREG-0612 Lifting devices that are not specially required for dry storage cask loaded MPCu and ar also part of thedSEction designed should be installed and used loading operations that are not re most horizonta transfergaskSection in accordance with the guidelines of specially designed (i.e., slings, for most horzontal transfer cask5.1.1(5) ANSI B30.9-1971. rigging, connecting devices) movements. The redundant load path

satisfy the guidelines of ANSI slings connect the upper and lowerB30.9-1984. crane links (see Figure 3 in

. 9. Attachment 2 to LAR 2004-26).The FBCHC is inspected, tested,

NUREG-0612 The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordanceSection and maintained in accordance with wipe r SI B30.2-1976. Two5.1.1(6) Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976. periodic inspections areperformed, on a 6-month and an

18-month frequency.


NUREG-0612 AND NUREG-0554 COMPARISON MATRIX FOR II THE RBS FUEL BUILDING CASK HANDLING CRANE


The crane should be designed to meet NRC Supplemental SER for RBSNUREG-0612 the applicable criteria and guidelines of The FBCHC was designed to dated January, 1985, Section 2.3.7Section Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976 and meet the applicable criteria and concludes that the FBCHC design5.1.1(7) CMAA-70 or suitable alternative guidelines of CMAA 70-1971 and complies with CMAA-70-1975 and

provided the intent of ANSI B30.2 and ANSI B30.2-1967. ANSI B30.2-1 976.CMAA-70 is satisfied.

The FBCHC is being upgradedonly to the extent that aredundant rigging feature is being

Special lifting devices that are used for incorporated in the design. Theheavy loads in the area where the redundant rigging is engagedcrane is to be upgraded should meet above the crane hook and,ANSI N14.6-1978, including Section 6 therefore, does not meet the

NUREG-0612 of that document. If only a single lifting definition of a special lifting Load drops have been postulated inSection device is provided instead of dual device. Below the hook, the lift the areas where the lift yoke5.1.6(1)(a) devices, the special lifting device yoke and MPC lift cleats are extension is used.

should have twice the design safety designed in accordance withfactor as required to satisfy the ANSI N14.6 with twice the designguidelines of NUREG-0612, Section safety factor. The lift yoke5.1.1(4). extension is designed in

accordance with ANSI N14.6 butthe design safety factors are notdoubled.



and Section Guidance Evaluation NotesLifting devices that are not specificallydesigned and that are used forhandling heavy loads in the areawhere the crane is to be upgradedshould meet ANSI 830.9- 1971,"Slings" as specified in NUREG-0612 ThFBHisbnguraeSection 5.1.1(5), except that one of the only to the extent that dafollowing should also be satisfied oednly ntoh exteint thatur a sbenunless the effects of the drop of the incorporated in the design. Theparticular load have been analyzed slings used in the redundantand shown to satisfy the evaluation sling use the rant

NUREG-0612 criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1: are designed in accordance whooSection ANSIB30.9. MPC lift slings, MPC5.1.6(1 )(b) (i) Provide dual or redundant slings lid lift slings, and other connection

or lifting devices such that the devices used below the cranefailure a single component failure desiused bl tecraneor malfunction in the sling will not hook are designed in accordanceresult in uncontrolled lowering of with ANSI B30.9 to twice the loadthe load; called for in meeting Section

OR 5.1.1(5).

(ii) In selecting the proper sling, theload used should be twice what iscalled for in meeting NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(5).

This criterion is not applicableNUREG-0612 New cranes should be designed to because the FBCHC is not a newSection meet NUREG-0554. crane. The FBCHC was designed5.1.6(2) metNRG05.before the issuance of NUREG-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0 5 5 4 . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _



DocumentaDoSeti Guidance Evaluation Notesand SectionInterfacing lifting points, such as liftinglugs or cask trunnions should alsomeet one of the following for heavyloads handled in the area where thecrane is to be upgraded unless theeffects of the drop of the particular loadhave been analyzed and shown tosatisfy the evaluation criteria ofNUREG-0612, Section 5.1:

Provide redundancy or duality such The lifting trunnions of the HI-(a) single lift or falill suchTRAC transfer cask have a

NUREG-0612 thata single lift point failure will not design safety factor greater thanSection the load; lift points should have a static the mamicoad.nA5.1.6(3) design safety factor with respect to static and dynamic load. A

ultimate strength of five (5) times dynamic load factor of 1.1 l5 isthe maximum combined concurrent applied to the mass of the liftedstatic and dynamic load after taking load.the single lift point failure.

OR

(b) A non-redundant or non-dual liftpoint system should have a designsafety factor of ten (10) times themaximum combined concurrentstatic and dynamic load.



and Section Guidance Evaluation NotesThe design stress limits of theFBCHC structural members arein accordance with CMAA 70-1971. Load-carrying parts other

The allowable design stress limits for than structural members andNUREG-0554 the crane intended for plant operation hoisting ropes are designed to aSection 2.1 should be those indicated in Table maximum stress level of 20% of(Item 1) 3.3.3.1.3-1 of CMAA 70 reflecting the ultimate strength of the material.

appropriate duty cycle in CMAA 70. The crane was also re-qualifiedby analysis in 2002 considering aload on the hook using CMM 70-2000 allowable stresses andloadings.

The sum total of simultaneously The FBCHC was designed not toapplied loads (static and dynamic) exceed material yield strengths

NUREG-0554 should not result in stress levels undee matial yic strengSRetion 21 causing permanent deformation, other conditions. Dynamic loading is FBCHC main hoist speed is 6 fpm.SIecto 2.1 than localized strain concentration, in addressed through the use of a(Item 2) any part of the handling system during 15% impact load factor based on

either the construction or the operation a hoist speed of 30 ft/min or less._phase.________________

The FBCHC main hook hoist isdesigned for stepped, variable

The effects of cyclical loading induced speed operation with a load onNUREG-0554 by jogging or plugging an the hook ranging from 0.5 fpmSection 2.1 uncompensated hoist control system (inching speed) to 6 fpm (normal(Item 3) should be included in the design speed). The use of inching

specification. speed during cask handlingprevents cycling due to jogging orplugging. Therefore, thisrequirement does not apply.



Documentand Section Guidance Evaluation Notes

A single-failure-proof crane should be Component parts of the FBCHCdesigned to handle the maximum are designed for an MCL of 125critical load (MCL) that will be tons - the maximum weight of the

G imposed. However, a slightly higher HI-TRAC transfer cask. TheNURE -0554 design load should be selected for intent of this guideline is met by

(Item 1) component parts that are subjected to requiring hoisting ropes and otherwear and exposure. An increase of load-carrying parts (other thanapproximately 15% of the design load structural members) to have afor these components would be a rated-load minimum safety factorreasonable margin. of five.

NUREG-0554 The MCL rating should be clearly The FBCHC MCL is marked onSection 2.2 marked on the crane. the crane.(Item 2) ______________

Single-failure-proof cranes may berequired to handle occasional The FBCHC is designed andnoncritical loads of magnitude greater used to lift spent fuel shippingthan the MCL during plant and storage cask components as

NUREG-0554 maintenance periods. For such cases, well as other waste containers.Section 2.2 the maximum noncritical load will be The heaviest of these lifts is the No lifts greater than the MCL (rated(Item 3) the design rated load (DRL). The HI-TRAC 125D spent fuel transfer capacity) are permitted with the

design of certain components may be cask, which has a maximum lifteddecided to a greater extent by the MCL weight of 125 tons. Therefore, therating even though standard MCL and the DRL are the samecommercial practice may be used for for this crane.the DRL rating.

NUREG-0554 The DRL rating should be marked on The MCL and DRL are the sameSection 2.2 the crane separately from the MCL for the FBCHC. Therefore, no(Item 4) marking. separate DRL marking is

required.



Document Guidance Evaluation Notesand Section Giac

The FBCHC is located inside theRBS Fuel Building and operatesboth indoors and outdoors. It iskept indoors when not in use.

The operating environment, including Because of its Fuel Buildingmaximum and minimum pressure, location, the FBCHC is notmaximum rate of pressure increase, affected by potential containment

NUREG-0554 temperature, humidity and emergency pressurization events; thereforeSection 2.3 corrosive or hazardous conditions the rate of pressure increase and

should be specified for the crane and the effects of a corrosivelifting fixtures. environment (i.e., containment

spray) are not applicable.Appropriate environmentalconditions of service areestablished in the procurementspecification.The FBCHC indoor test lift wasrequired to be performed at a Cask loading procedures will requiretemperature of 200F or higher. an ambient temperature > 700F for all

For cranes already built and operating; The actual indoor test lift was havy loadifs Thisis consiseNUREG-0554 such cranes should be tested by performed in September, 1983. with Nload lif2t Appendix CopageSection 2.4 subjecting the crane to a test lift at the The FBCHC outdoor test lift was wite (UREG-061n, AppenIX r, page(Item 1) lowest anticipated operating performed at a minimum load test in the future if experience

temperature. temperature of 74.50F. Dry spent dictatest an loweftroeraingxerecfuel cask loading operations will dictates a lower operatingnot be conducted at temperatures temperature is desirable.below 700F.




Cask loading procedures will require

Minimum operating temperatures The FBCHC's minimum design an ambient temperature > 70oF for allNUREG-0554 should be specified in order to reduce temperature is 20F. Dry spent heavy load lifts. This is consistentSection 2.4 the possibility of brittle fracture of the fuel cask loading operations will with NUREG-0612, Appendix C, page(Item 2) ferritic load-carrying members of the not be conducted at temperatures load test in the future if experience

crane. below 70 F.lodtsinteftrifxpincdictates a lower operatingtemperature is desirable.

In order to ensure resistance to brittle Cask loading procedures will requirefracture, material for structural . omembers essential to structural Structural steel used in the an ambient temperature> 700F for all

NUREG-0554 integrity should be tested in FBCHC is ASTM A36. Material heavy load lifts. This is consistentSection 2.4 accordance with the following impact certifications for steel used in with NUREG-0612, Appendix C, page(Item 3) test requirements. Either drop weight construction of the FBCHC do not C-2, item (2). Entergy may perform a

test per ASTM E-208 or Charpy tests include impact test results, load test in the future if experienceper ASTM A-370 may be used for dictates a lower operatingimpact__testimpactemperature is desirable.



Document Guidance Evaluation Notes

NUREG-0554Section 2.4(Item 4)

The minimum operating temperaturebased on the drop weight test shouldbe obtained by following procedures inParagraph NC-2300 of Section III ofthe ASME Code. The minimumoperating temperature based on theCharpy V-notch impact test should beobtained by following procedures inparagraph ND-2300 of Section III ofthe ASME Code. Alternative methodsof fracture analysis that achieve anequivalent margin of safety againstfracture may be used if the includetoughness measurements on eachheat of steel used in structuralmembers essential to structuralintegrity. In addition, the fractureanalysis that provides the basis forsetting minimum operatingtemperatures should includeconsideration of stress levels; qualitycontrol; the mechanical checking,testing, and the temperatures at whichthe DRL test is run relative to operatingtemperature.

For crane girder material sectionthickness over 64 mm (2.5 in), it isrecommended that the NC-2300requirements be used exclusively.

Structural steel used in theFBCHC is ASTM A36. Materialcertifications for steel used inconstruction of the FBCHC do notinclude impact test results.

Cask loading procedures will requirean ambient temperature > 700F for allheavy load lifts. This is consistentwith NUREG-0612, Appendix C, pageC-2, item (2). Entergy may perform aload test in the future if experiencedictates a lower operatingtemperature is desirable.




NUREG-0554Section 2.4(Item 4)(continued)

As an alternative to the aboverecommendations, the crane and liftingfixtures for the cranes alreadyfabricated or operating may besubjected to a coldproof test consistingof a single dummy load test follows:Metal temperature of the structuralmembers essential to the structuralintegrity of the of the crane handlingsystem should be at or below theminimum operating temperature. Thecorresponding dummy load should beequal to 1.25 times the MCL. If thedesired minimum operatingtemperature cannot be achievedduring the test, the minimum operatingtemperature should be that of the testuntil the crane is retested at a lowertemperature. The coldproof testshould be followed by a nondestructiveexamination of the welds whose failurecould result in the drop of a criticalload. The nondestructive examinationof critical areas should be repeated at4-year intervals or less.

Cranes and lifting fixtures made of low-alloy steel such as ASTM A514 shouldbe subjected to the coldproof test inany case.

I _____________________________________ L ________________________________ L



and Section Guidance Evaluation NotesN -Cast iron should not be used for load No cast iron is used for any

NUREG- Casrirong cpouenots sh ase frloa component subject to cyclic0554 bearing components such as rope stress, except for the main trolley

Section 2.4 drums. Cast iron may be used for traverse drive gear cases, wheel(Item 5) items such as electric motor frames bearing capsules, brake wheels,

and brake drums, and some brake parts.The FBCHC design does not includea main bridge. Seismic calculations

The cranes should be designed to The FBCHC main trolley, show that the main hoist wire roperetain control of and hold the load, and auxiliary trolley, and auxiliary exceeds its yield strength under SSE

0554 the bridge and trolley should be bridge are designed to ensure the loads but maintains a minimum factor

Section 2.5 designed to remain in place on their bridge and trolleys remain in of safety of 1.475 against ultimate(Ictemn 1.) respective runways with their wheels place and their wheels do not strength when the load is supported(Item 1) prevented from leaving the tracks leave their rails and no trolley part solely by the main hoist. Redundant

during a seismic event. falls during a seismic event. rigging will be engaged to hold theload in case of failure in the primaryload path in areas where load dropshave not been analyzed.

If a seismic event comparable to a safeNUREG- shutdown earthquake (SSE) occurs, The FBCHC is designed to0554 the bridge should remain on the ensure the bridge and trolleys willSection 2.5 runway with brakes applied, and the not leave their rails during or after(Item 2) trolley should remain on the crane a safe shutdown earthquake.

girders with brakes applied.



and Section Guidance Evaluation NotesThe crane should be designed andconstructed in accordance withregulatory position 2 of Regulatory The FBCHC was qualified for

NUREG- Guide 1.29, "Seismic Design normal operation assuming a Tcv0554 Classification". The MCL plus 1.1 o5 dynamic load factor and to heSection 2.5 operational and seismically induced remain on its rails and not drop rated load on the hook with the hoist(Item 3) pendulum and swinging load effects on the load during a safe shutdown rope extended to various lengths.the crane should be considered in the simceet

design of the trolley, and they should seismic event.be added to the trolley weight fordesign of the bridge.

Load girt and drive girt end

All weld joints whose failure could connection welds on the FBCHCresult in the drop of a critical load trolley were non-destructively

NUREG- should be nondestructively examined. All FBCHC welds were visually examined following recent0554 If any of these weld joint geometries examined. All welds of the main modifications implemented to0554 I.6 awo tld ointo goeries hoist gears, pinions, and shaft increase the trolley's seismicSection 2.6 would be susceptible to lamellar

tearing, the base metal at the joints assemblies were MT inspected. capacity. Other welds on the trolleyshould be nondestructively examined. were non-destructively examined on

a sampling basis to assure the qualityof the component.

A fatigue analysis should beconsidered for the critical load-bearing

NUREG- structures and components of the The FBCHC is a low duty cycle0554 crane handling system. The cumulative device. A fatigue analysis is notSection 2.7 fatigue usage factors should reflect required.

effects of the cyclic loading from boththe construction and operating periods.

NUREG- Preheat temperatures and post-weld Preheat temperatures and post-0554 heat treatment (stress relief) weld heat treatment of weldmentsSection 2.8 temperatures for all weldments should were performed and documented(Item 1) be specified in the weld procedure. as required by AWS D1.1-1 972.



Document Evaluation Notesand Section Guidance

All welding was performed and Per NUREG-0612, Appendix C, pagedocumented in accordance with C-3, item (3), some crane weldments

Welds described in the AWS D1.1-1 972. Other than the may not have been heat treated perrU- Wed eommendationso Shecto 26main and auxiliary hoist reducer Subarticle 3.9 of AWS 01.1-1972. As0554 recommendations of Section 2.6 weldments, which were thermally a substitute for weld heat treatment,

Setin .8 should be post-weld heat treated in werdmentsiwhich weres thermallyd welds whose failure could result in(Item 2) accordance with Subarticle 3.9 of AWS with all other bridge and trolley the drop of a critical load should be(IeD2 1.1, 'Structural Welding Code". withmeall oterbrde anotsbetd trole non-destructively examined to

weldhent wreanot stedt ascertain that the weldments arepost-weld heat treatment (stress acceptable. See notes for NUREG-relief). 0554, Section 2.6 above.

NUREG- All auxiliary hoisting systems of the The FBCHC auxiliary hook is not0554 main crane handling system that are employed to lift or assist inSection 3.2 employed to lift or assist in handling handling heavy loads during cask(Item 1) critical loads should be single failure loading operations.

The FBCHC main hoisting A complete review of caskAuxiliary systems or dual components mechanism is not single-failure operations, including potential load

NUREG- should be provided for the main proof by design. Redundant drops has been performed.0554 hoisting mechanism so that, in case of rigging is employed during most Evaluations and analyses ofSection 3.2 subsystem or component failure, the horizontal movements of the cask hypothetical drops required to be(Item 2) load will be retained and held in a to provide temporary single- postulated have been performed. No

stable or immobile safe position. failure-proof protection against unacceptable consequences of loaddrops. drops are predicted.




The main and auxiliary hoists have limitswitches that stop the hook in its highestand lowest safe positions. Two limitswitches, each of a different design andin series, limit upward travel of eachhook. A block type switch is used on thecable and a screw type on the drum,which are adjusted such that if one failsthe other will shut off power to the motorand set the brakes. The limit switchactuating mechanisms are located sothat the switches will trip under all

The automatic controls and limiting conditions of hoist load and hoist speed, The main hoist is equipped with andevices should be designed so that, in sufficienth time treven c heatofthve° alternator-excited eddy currentwhen disorders due to inadvertent or any part of the trolley. The main hoist lowering control brake system, whichoperator action, component is also provided with a slack cable limit is capable of maintaining a controlled

NUREG- malfunction, or disarrangement of switch to prevent hoisting or lowering lowering speed of the 125-ton rated0554 subsystem control functions occur against a slack cable. And with a load, in the event of a loss of all ACSection 3.3 singly or in combination during the load holding brakes in the event of an power or electrical failure of the(Item 1) handling, and assuming no overspeed. The centrifugal limit switch is hoist's motor controller. Emergency

components have failed in the located such that if a shaft or coupling lowering of the main hoist using thesubsystems, these disorders will not fails and causes disengagement of the eddy current brake requires that theprevent the handling system from main hoist motor and one holding brake, two hoist holding brakes be manuallypreventit would still trip upon the ensuingstopping and holding the load. overspeed and engage the remaining released.

holding brake to stop uncontrolledmovement of the load. The centrifugallimit switch is also located such that thereis no coupling between the switch andthe main hoist gears.

Each hoist is provided with an overloadcutoff that senses an overload on thehoist and stops the hoisting motion, butallows safe lowering of the load to thefloor. The load limiting device isadjustable up to 130% of rated load.




The FBCHC operator cabincludes a safety switch todisconnect the main power feed

NUREG- conductors from the motor control0554 An emergency stop button should be stations. The cab also includes aSection 3.3 added at the control station to stop all "reset-stop' pushbutton station(Item 2) motion. with a red stop button that opens

the main line electrical contactor.Opening this contactor will stopall motion.The FBCHC main and auxiliaryhoists are provided with holdingbrakes that are automaticallyapplied to the hoist motor shaftwhen the motor is de-energized.

The main hoist is equipped withA c e t an alternator-excited eddy currentA crane that has been immobilized lowering control brake system,

NUREG- becau se of malfunction or failure of which is capable of maintaining a0554 controls or components while holding a controlled lowering speed of theSection 3.4 critical load should be able to hold the 125-ton rated load, in the event of(Item 1) load or set the load down while repairs a loss of all AC power or

or adjustments are being made. electrical failure of the hoist's

motor controller. Emergencylowering of the main hoist usingthe eddy current brake requiresthat the two hoist holding brakesbe manually released.



DocumSent Guidance Evaluation Notes

Means should be provided for usingthe devices required in repairing, The main hoist is equipped withadjusting, or replacing the failed an alternator-excited eddy currentcomponent(s) or subsystem(s) when lowering control brake system,failure of an active component or which is capable of maintaining a

NUREG- subsystem has occurred and the load controlled lowering speed of the0554 is supported and retained in the safe 125-ton rated load, in the event of

Section 3,4 (temporary) position with the handling a loss of all AC power or(Item 2) system immobile. As an alternative to electrical failure of the hoist'srepairing the crane in place, means motor controller. Emergency

may be provided for safely transferring lowering of the main hoist usingthe immobilized hoisting system with the eddy current brake requiresits load to a safe laydown area that has that the two hoist holding brakesbeen designed to accept the load while be manually released.the repairs are being made.The design of the crane and itsoperating area should includeprovisions that will not impair the safe The FBCHC operates and is

NUREG- operation or safe shutdown of the maintained in the Fuel Building.0554 reactor or cause unacceptable release Its operation and maintenance doSection 3.4 of radioactivity when corrective repairs, nots oeaffect the mabiiynfthenranctor(Item 3) replacements, and adjustments are nto opferatte orbelt s fhutow seafely.

being made to place the crane to operate or be shutdown safely.handling system back into service aftercomponent failure(s).

A complete review of caskDesign of the rope reeving system(s) The FBCHC does not have a dual operations, including potential load

NUREG- should be dual with each system (re dundant) roe reevinn sstem drops has been performed.0554 providing separately the load balance ( ae reeving syst es . Evaluations and analyses ofSection 4.1 on the head and load blocks through mlthreevng arrangement Is a hypothetical drops required to be(Item 1) configuration of ropes and rope multi-part, doub e reeved system, postulated have been performed. No

equalizer(s),e unacceptable consequences of load__________ __________________________ ______________________drops are predicted.




The FBCHC sheaves areSelection of the hoisting rope or provided with cable retainers torunning rope should include prevent the cables from leaving

NUREG- consideration of the size, construction, the sheave grooves. The hoisting0554 lay, and means or type of lubrication, if ropes are right regular lay, pre-

Section 4.1 required, to maintain efficient working formed steel with independent(Item 2) of the individual wire strands when wire rope centers. Ropeeach section of rope passes over the lubricants (including those for

individual sheaves during the hoisting pre-lubricating the internal coreoperation. and rope lays during weaving)

are not water soluble.The effects of impact loadings,acceleration, and emergency stops The FBCHC wire rope wasshould be included in selection of rope selected so that the rated hoist

NUREG- reeving systems. The maximum load load plus the weight of the load0554 (including static and inertia forces) on block, divided by the number ofSection 4.1 each individual wire rope in the dual parts of rope does not exceed 20(Item 3) reeving system with the MCL attached percent of the nominal breaking

should not exceed 10% of the strength of the rope (a safetymanufacturer's published breaking factor of five).strength.




The ratio of wire rope yield strength toultimate strength may vary sufficientlyfor different production runs to The FBCHC hoisting ropes areinfluence the wire rope rating in such a designed so that the rated hoistmanner that the initial safety margin load plus the weight of the load

NUREG- selected would be too small to prevent block for that hoist, divided by the0554 the critical load from straining the wire number of parts of rope for theSection 4.1 rope material beyond the yield point hoist does not exceed 20 percent(Item 4) under abnormal conditions. It would, of the nominal breaking strength

therefore, be prudent to consider the of the rope (a safety factor ofwire rope yield strength as well as the fiterultimate strength when specifying wire five).rope in order to ensure the desiredmargin on rope strength.




The FBCHC is a 'stand-by"service crane (used

The maximum fleet angle from drum to approximately every 18 months), Per NUREG-0612, Appendix C, pagelead sheave in the load block or whre atigu t he wire C-3 item (4), in lieu of meeting this

betwen idiviualsheaes souldnotrope is highly unlikely. CMAA 70- C-,ie 4,i ie fmeigtibetween individual sheaves should not 1971 (the code of record for the fleet angle recommendation, a "moreexceed 0.061 rad (3-1/2") at any one RBC FBCHC did not of frequent inspection program" for thepoint during hoisting except that for the rBC F did fl not anspeclfy wire rope is acceptable for ensuring

NUREG- last 1 m (3 ft) of maximum lift elevation rope reeving flee ange the integrity of the rope. For this0554 the fleet angle may increase slightly. limitactins. Therna service, the crane manufacturerSection 4.1 The use of reverse bends for running manufacturer s internal standard recommends inspecting the wire ropeSec 4.1 wire ropes should be limited, and the practicef ist w.ir roPe either prior to, or after use of the(Item 5) use of larger sheaves should be reeving design was to limit the crane (i.e., on an 18-month interval)

considered for those applications maximum fleet angle at any point RBS maintenance procedures requirewhere a disproportionate reduction in deirees to ensure satisfacto inspection of the wire rope every sixwire rope fatigue life would be roe tofensure stisa ry months, which meets the NUREG-expected from the use of standard arrangement employed on the 0612 recommendation for moresheave diameters for reverse bends. RBS FBCHC does not expose frequent inspections.

the wire rope to a reverse bendcondition.

The equalizer for stretch and load onthe rope reeving system may be of For most horizontal load movements,either beam or sheave type or The FBCHC host s equippedundant rigging is engaged to thecombinations thereof. A dual rope with a sheve-t ie equalizer, not lift yoke to provide single failure

NURE revingsystm wih inivwith barsev-type equalizer , h noit protection against drops. A complete054attaching points and means for reigarrayp e mequaizer e muli- review of cask operations, including

Section 4.1 balancing or distributing the load pareeving double-eed istam potential load drops has been(Ie ) between the two operating rope uizngoepcefwreoe. performed. Evaluations and analyses(Item 6) reeving systems will permit either rope utilizing one piece of wire rope. of hypothetical drops required to be

system to hold the critical load and e crane des no ave a ua postulated have been performed. Notransfer the critical load without la pat rope reeving system. unacceptable consequences of loadexcessive shock in case of failure of drops are predicted.the other rope system.




The pitch diameter of running sheavesand drums should be selected inaccordance with the recommendationsof CMAA Specification #70. The dual For most horizontal load movements,reeving system may be a single rope The pitch diameter of the FBCHC redundant rigging is engaged to thefrom each end of a drum terminating at running sheaves is in accordance lift yoke to provide single failure

NUREG- one of the blocks or equalizer with with CMAA 70-1971. The hoist protection against drop s. A complete0554 provisions for equalizing beam-type reeving is a conventional double penial oad opsras bnSection 4.1 load and rope stretch, with each rope reeved system, utilizing one piece potential load drops has been(Item 7) designed for the total load. of wire rope. The crane does not performed. Evaluations and analyses

Alternatively, a 2-rope system may be have a dual load path rope of hypothetical drops required to beused from each drum or separate reeving system. postulated have been performed. Nodrums using a sheave equalizer or unacceptable consequences of loadbeam equalizer or any other drops are predicted.combination that provides two separateand complete reeving systems.

For most horizontal load movements,

In the event of a failure of either redundant rigging is engaged to theThe load hoisting drum on the trolley Inthe evenhit du hf rdu lift yoke to provide single failureshould be provided with structural and the main hoist drum shaft or drum protection against drops. A complete

NUREG- mechanical safety devices to limit the bearing at the drive end of thecask operations, including0554 drop of the drum and thereby prevent it drum, no mechanical or structural potential load drops has beenSection 4.2 from disengaging from its holding means are provided to prevent performed. Evaluations and analyses

brake system if the drum shaft or drumngagme of two holding of hypothetical drops required to bebearings were to fail or fracture. brakes. postulated have been performed. No

unacceptable consequences of loaddrops are predicted.




For most horizontal load movements,redundant rigging is engaged to the

The FBCHC is designed to lift yoke to provide single failure

NUREG- The head and load blocks should be maintain the vertical load balance protection against drops. A complete0554 designed to maintain a vertical load about the center of lift from the review of cask operations, including

Section 4.3 balance about the center of lift from load block through the head potential load drops has been(Item 1) load block through head block and block, but does not have a dual performed. Evaluations and analyses

have a reeving system of dual design. (redundant) reeving system of hypothetical drops required to bedesign. postulated have been performed. No

unacceptable consequences of loaddrops are predicted.

The load-bock assembly should be The FBCHC design does notprovided with two load-attaching points have redundant load-attaching(hooks or other means) so designed points. The main hook is of the

NUREG- that each attaching point will be able to sister-hook type and has a design NUREG-0612, Appendix C, page C-0554 support a load of three times the load factor of safety to ultimate of 5.0. 3, item (5) for operating plants allows

Section 4.3 (static and dynamic) being handled For most horizontal load for a sister hook in lieu of two(Item 2) without permanent deformation of any movements, redundant rigging is attachments points to meet the intent

e part of the load-block assembly other engaged to the lift yoke to provide of this guidance.than localized strain concentration in single failure protection againstareas for which additional material has drops (See Section 4.7.2 ofbeen provided for wear. Attachment 1 to LAR 2004-26).




The FBCHC structuralThe individual component parts of the components were designed forvertical hoisting system components, 100% static rated load (maximumwhich include the head block, rope critical load) and analyzed for areeving system, load block, and dual 1.15 dynamic load factor. The The following tests and inspectionsload-attaching device, should each be crane main hook was factory were not required by the FBCHCdesigned to support a static load of tested at 1.25 times its rated load. procurement specification (1975):200% of the MCL. A 200% static-type Hoisting ropes and load-carryingload test should be performed for each parts other than structural * 200% MCL static load test for

NUREG- load-attaching hook. Measurements of members have a design safety the hook(s)0554 the geometric configuration of the factor of five. Structural members * Measurements of theSection 4.3 hooks should made before and after are designed with stress

(Ie ) the test and should be followed by a allowables in accordance with geometoric configuaftion lofathnondestructive examination that should CMAA 70-1971. testingconsist of volumetric and surface * Volumetric inspection of theexaminations to verify the soundness The main hook was MT- hook before and after loadof fabrication an ensure the integrity of examined before and after load testingthe hooks. The load blocks should be testing. The main hook forging e Nonondestructively examined by surface billet was UT-examined to verify * NDE of the load block(s)and volumetric techniques. The results the soundness of the raw materialof examinations should be documented used to fabricate the main hook.and recorded. Examination results are

documented.The calculated maximum main hoist

The maximum FBCHC normal design "rated load" speed is 5.88 fpm,Maximum hoisting speed for the critical hoisting speed for the MCL is 6 recommeended in C 70- spee971 for

0554 lodsol elmtdt htgvn6nfmad"nhn pe"i . the maximum critical load. The 5.88Section 4.4 the "slow" column of Figure 70-6 of fpm. CMAA 70-1971, Table 70-6 the maximum hoit load yiel5.88

CMAA Specification #70. specifies 5 fpm slow speed for maximum rope line speed at the drumthis capacity crane. of 35 fpm, which is less than the

suggested line speed limit of 50 fpm.


NUREG-0612 AND NUREG-0554 COMPARISON MATRIX FOR ITHE RBS FUEL BUILDING CASK HANDLING CRANE


No specific provisions foraddressing the consequences oftwo-blocking are included in the

NUREG- The reeving system should be FBCHC design. Each hoist04 . includes limit switches to stop the0554 designed to prevent the cutting or hook at its highest and lowestSection 4.5 crushing of the wire rope if a "two- safe positions. Two differently(Iteml) blocking" incident should occur. designed limit switches, used in

series, provide redundancy anddiversity to limit the upward travelof each hoist hook.The FBCHC design includes loadlimiting devices that stop hoistingoperations upon indication of an NUREG-0612, Appendix C, page C-overload condition. No specific 3, item (7) suggests interlocking

The mechanical and structural provisions for addressing the circuitry to preclude bridge and trolleyNUREG- components of the complete hoisting consequences of two-blocking movement while hoisting the load in0554 system should have the required are included in the FBCHC lieu of load hang-up protection. TheSection 4.5 strength to resist failure if the hoisting sitE ost t FBCHC does not have this(Item 2) system should "two-block" or if "load highest andst the positions interlocking circuitry. Cask loading

higestandlowest safe positions. intrlockdreing cprcu iitry Cskmuloadngouhang-up" should occur during hoisting. Two differently designed limit FBCHC trolley and hoisting

switches, used in series, provideredundancy and diversity to limitthe upward travel of each hoisthook.




NUREG-0554Section 4.5(Item 3)

The designer should provide meanswithin the reeving system located onthe head or on the load-blockcombinations to absorb or control thekinetic energy of rotating machineryduring the incident of two-blocking. Asan alternative, the protective controlsystem to prevent the hoisting systemfrom two-blocking should include, as aminimum, two independent travel-limitdevices of different designs andactivated by separate mechanicalmeans. These devices should de-energize the hoist drive motor and themain power supply. The protectivecontrol system for load hang-up, a partof the overload protection system,should consist of load cell systems inthe drive train or motor-current-sensingdevices or mechanical load-limitingdevices.

Each hoist includes limit switchesto stop the hook at its highest andlowest safe positions. Twodifferently designed limitswitches, used in series, provideredundancy and diversity inlimiting the upward travel of eachhoist hook. A block-type limitswitch is used on the cable and ascrew-type is used on the drum.They are adjusted such that ifone limit switch fails the othershuts off power to the motor andsets the brakes. The actuatingmechanisms of the limit switchesare located so that they trip thelimit switches under all conditionsof hoist load and hoist speed insufficient time to prevent contactof the load block with the drum,upper sheaves, or any part of thetrolley.

Each hoist includes an overloadcutoff that senses the load on thehoist and stops the hoistingmotion in an overload condition.



and Section Guidance Evaluation NotesThe load control for the main Although the two main hoist holding

The location of mechanical holding hoist is provided by an eddy brakes are each capable of resistingbrakes and their controls should current control brake for hoisting the maximum hoist motor torque, theyprovide positive, reliable, and capable and lowering motions. cannot be "manually applied" in the

NUREG- means to stop and hold the hoisting Accompanying the control brake event an electrical control malfunction0554 drum(s) for the conditions described in are two independent shoe-type occurs and power to the hoist motorSection 4.5 the design specification and in this holding brakes that are cannot be shut off. In this event, the(Item 4) recommendation. This should include automatically applied to the hoist hoist brakes may be indirectly set by

capability to withstand the maximum motor shaft when the motor is de- either pressing the crane "powertorque of the driving motor if a energized. Both of the holding stop" button or by pulling the handlemalfunction occurs and power to the brakes have a minimum rated on the main line disconnect switchdriving motor cannot be shut off. braking torque of 150% of the (mounted in the operator's cab) to the

motor full load torque. "open/off" position.NUREG- The auxiliary hoist, if supplied, should0554 be equipped with two independent The FBCHC auxiliary hoist is notSection 4.5 travel-limit switches to prevent two- used in cask handling operations.(Item 5) blocking.

Lifting devices that are attached to theload block such as lifting beams,yokes, ladle or trunnion-type hooks,slings, toggles, and devises should be

NUREG- conservatively designed with a dual or See evaluation for NUREG-0612,0554 auxiliary device or combinations Sections 5.1.1(4), 5.1.1(5),Section 4.6 thereof. Each device should be 5.1.6(1)(a), and 5.1.6(1)(b).

designed or selected to support a loadof three times the load (static ordynamic) being handled without_permanent deformation.If side loads cannot be avoided, the Side loading of the FBCHC is not

NUREG- reeving system should be equipped required or expected during cask0554 with a guard that would keep the wire handling activities. All lifts areSection 4.7 rope properly located in the grooves on purely vertical.

the drum.________________________________



and Section Guidance Evaluation NotesThe FBCHC structural membersare designed so that the stress in

The proper functioning of the hoisting the material does not exceedNUREG- machinery during load handling can CMAA 70-1971 limits when lifting0554 best be ensured by providing adequate the rated load. FBCHC load-Section 4.8 support strength of the individual carrying parts other than(Item 1) component parts and the welds or structural members are designed

bolting that binds them together. with a safety factor of five againstultimate strength when lifting therated load.The FBCHC is not of the single- A complete review of cask

Where gear trains are interposed failure-proof design. For most operations, including potential loadNUREG- between the holding brakes and the horizontal load movements, drops has been performed.0554 hoisting drum, these gear trains should redundant rigging is engaged to Evaluations and analyses ofSection 4.8 be single failure f ad hd b f the lift yoke to provide single hypothetical drops required to be(Item 2) sin e proo an sou e o failure protection against drops postulated have been performed. No

ua esign.(See Section 4.7.2 of Attachment unacceptable consequences of load1 to LAR 2004-26). drops are predicted.

Each holding brake should have morethan full-load stopping capacity butshould not have excessive capacity The FBCHC main and auxiliary

NUREG- that could cause damage through hoist holding brakes have a0554 sudden stopping of the hoisting minimum rated braking torque ofSection 4.9 machinery. A minimum brake capacity 150% of the hoist motor full load(item 1) of 125% of the torque developedtoqe

during the hoisting operation at the torque.point of brake application has beendetermined to be acceptable.




The minimum hoisting braking system The FBCHC main hoist includesshould include one power control an eddy current control brake andbraking system (not mechanical or two independent shoe-type Normal main hoist motor shaft speeddrag brake type) and two holding holding brakes. The holding is 1800 RPM. The main hoist

NUREG- brakes. The holding brakes should be brakes are automatically applied lowering control is protected by a0554 applied when power is off and should to the hoist motor shaft when the centrifugal-type overspeed switch,Section 4.9 be automatically applied on overspeed motor is de-energized. The which is set to open (i.e., cut powerSItio 24 to the full holding position if a holding brakes have a minimum to) the lowering circuit, setting the two(Iem ) malfunction occurs. Each holding rated braking torque of 150% of hoist holding brakes, at an

brake should have a torque rating not the hoist motor full load torque. approximate motor shaft speed ofless than 125% of the full-load hoisting The holding brakes are designed 1950 RPM.torque at point of application (location to retard the load if uncontrolledof the brake in the mechanical drive). lowering is sensed.The minimum number of braking The FBCHC main hoist includes

NUREG- systems that should be operable for a cont andlude0554 emergency lowering after a single a control brake and twoSection 4.9 brake failure should be two holding leaving two brakes available in(Item 3) brakes for stopping and controlling the event of a single brake failure.

drum rotation.One of the two FBCHC main

NUREG- The holding brake system should be hoist holding brakes is located0554 single failure proof, i.e., any outboard of the gear case on anSection 4.9 component or gear train should be dual extended pinion shaft. There is(Item 4) if interposed between the holding no coupling between this

brakes and the hoisting drums. outboard brake and the gearcase.




Manual operation of the hoistingbrakes may be necessary during anemergency condition, and provisionsfor this should be included in the

deig codtin. Adeuae ea The main hoist is equipped withdesignan alternator-excited eddy currentdissipation from the brake should be lowering control brake system,ensured so that damage does not which is capable of maintaining aoccur if the lowering velocity is controlled lowering speed of the

NUREG- permitted to increase excessively. I hoist's 125-ton rated load in the0554 may be necessary to stop the lowering event of a loss of all AC power orSection 4.9 operation periodically to prevent electrical failure of the hoist's(Item 5) overheating and permit the brake to motor controller. Emergency

dissipate the excess heat. Portable (eddy contrake) Emergencinstruments should be used to indicate (hedd currnhit beurae) ha lowerigothe lowering speed during emergency thed mi hodint brakeq s twheich

to I a mlfunt~onof atwo hoist holding brakes, whichoperations. If a malfunction of a are spring-set on a loss of power,holding brake were to occur and be manually released.emergency lowering of the loadbecame necessary, the holding brakeshould be restored to working conditionbefore any lowering is started.

The FBCH main trolley includes aBridge and trolley drives (should be] hydraulically operated brake,

NUREG- provided with control and holding brake mounted on the main trolley The auxiliary bridge is not provided0554 systems that would be automatically motor extension shaft, to control with a separate drive. The auxiliarySection 5.1 applied when the power is shut off or if movement and an electric parking bridge is fixed to the main trolley and

(Item 1) an overspeed or overload condition brake that is only engaged when movement is controlled by the main(iem occurs because of malfunction or the magnetic main power line trolley drive.

failure in the drive system. disconnect is open (de-energizingthe motor).




To avoid the possibility of drive motorovertorque within the control system, The FBCHC The main trolleythe maximum torque capability of the hydraulic control brake has a

NUREG- driving motor and gear reducer for minimum braking torque of 100%0554 trolley motion and bridge motion of the of the main trolley motor full loadSection 5.1 overhead bridge crane should not motor torque. The electric parking(Item 2) exceed the capability of gear train and brake has a minimum braking

brakes to stop the trolley or bridge from torque of 75% of the main trolleythe maximum speed with the DRL motor full load motor torque.attached.

[Brige nd tolly] icreenta or Controls for the FBCHC mainNUREG- [Bridge and trolley] incremental or trolley are full magnetic reversible0554 fractional inhol mepovements whenuc with five steps of variable speed.Section 5.1 Items as variable speed controls or The main trolley also includes an(Item 3) inching motor drives. inching motor with a maximum

speed of 0.5 fpm.The FBCHC The main trolleyhydraulic control brake has a

NUREG- [Bridge & trolley] control and holding minimum braking torque of 100%0554 brakes should each be rated at 100% of the main trolley motor full loadSection 5.1 of maximum drive torque that can be motor torque. The electric parking(Item 4) developed at the point of application. brake has a minimum braking

torque of 75% of the main trolleymotor full load motor torque.

If two mechanical brakes, one for The FBCHC main trolley

NURE4G- control and one for holding, are hydraulic control brake is0554 provided, they should be adjusted with actuated by a foot lever located in

Section 5.1 one brake in each system leading the the cab. The electric parkingIt other and should be activated by brake only engages when the

(Iem 5) release or shutoff of power. This magnetic main [power] lineapplies to both trolley and bridge. disconnect is in the open position.




NUREG- The [bridge and trolley] brakes shouldalso be mechanically tripped to the

0554 5 "on" or "holding" position in the event of The FBCHC trolley brakes haveSection 5.1 a malfunction in the power supply or an no such feature.(em ) overspeed condition.

The FBCHC operating cabNUREG- includes a 'reset-stop" control0554 Provisions should be made for manual panel that opens the main

Section 5.1 emergency operation of the [bridge [power] line magnetic contactor,(Item 7) and trolley] brakes. cutting all power to the trolley and

hoist. The electric trolley parkingcan then be engaged.The FBCHC main trolley drive isequipped with a foot-operated,

NUREG- The [bridge and trolley] holding brake hydraulic shoe-type brake for0554 should be designed so that it cannot be normal service braking. TheSection 5.1 used as a foot-operated slowdown shoe-type parking (holding) brake(Item 8) brake. is non-foot-operated and

automatically engages in the"power-off' condition.The FBCHC has no drag brakes.A hydraulic brake is used for

NUREG- trolley control. The hydraulic foot-0554 [Bridge and trolley] drag brakes should operated brake is not self-be used. adjusting and receives periodic(Item 9) inspection and adjustment in

accordance with hemanufacturer'srecommendations.




The term "opposite drivenwheels" refers to the rotation ofthe drive wheel at each end of acrane bridge or trolley when

NUREG- Opposite-driven wheels on bridge or facing the end of each axle.0554 trolley that support bridge or trolley on When originally manufactured, The FBCHC main hoist does notSection 5.1 their runways should be matched and the FBCHC main trolley drive's have a bridge.

ae 1mechanically shaft connected,(item 10) should have identical diameters. "opposite-driven wheels" were

matched for diameter inaccordance with themanufacturer's specifiedtolerance limits.

Trolley and bridge speed should be The FBCHC main trolley has anNUREG- limited. The speed limits indicated for inching speed of 0.5 fpm and a

Section 5.1 slow operating speeds for trolley ad fpm, which is classified as(Item 11) bridge in specification CMAA-#70 are "medium" in CMAA-70-1 971,

recommended for handling MCLs. Table 70-6. ________________The FBCHC bridge and trolleydrive motors and electricalcontrols are not equipped witheither overspeed or overtravel

NUREG- Limiting devices, mechanical and/or protective devices. Overtravel is0554 electrical, should be provided to control stopped by contact of the bridgeSection 5.2 or prevent overtravel and overspeed of and trolley-mounted bumpers(Item 1 ) the trolley and bridge, end travel stops. The FBCHC is

precluded by design from traveloutside of the safe load pathdesignated for cask handlingoperations.



andSectiont Guidance Evaluation NotesThe FBCHC trolley is provided

NUREG- Buffers for bridge and trolley travel with bumpers having sufficient

0554 should be included at the end of the energy absorbing capability toSection 5.2 rails stop the bridge and trolleys when(Item 2) either is traveling at a speed of

40% of rated load speed.devices such as limit-type The FBCHC trolley does not haveSafety suchce limt-yp deics Bumpersyp

NUREG- switches provided for malfunction, such limit-type devices. Bumpers0554 inadvertent operator action, or failure are provided at the ends of theSection 5.2 should be in addition to and separate rails. The FBCHC is precluded by(Item 3) from the limiting means or control design from travel outside of the

devices provided for operation. safe load path designated forcask handling operations.The horsepower rating of the hoistdriving motor should be matched with The calculated required 125-tonthe calculated requirement that main hoist horsepower is 55.5,

NUREG- includes the design load and based upon an actual hoist speed0554 acceleration to the design hoisting of 5.9 fpm. This is 7-1/2% lessSection 6.1 speed. Overpowering of the hoisting than the rated motor horsepower(Item 1) equipment would impose additional of 60 hp. This surplus motor

strain on the machinery and load- horsepower is within acceptablecarrying devices by increasing the design limits.hoisting acceleration rate.




To preclude excessive drive-motortorque, the maximum torque capabilityof the electric motor drive for hoistingshould not exceed the rating orcapability of the individual componentsof the hoisting system required to hoist The two main hoist upper limitthe MCL at the maximum design hoist switches will interrupt the hoisting

NUREG- speed. Overpower and overspeed motion and set the two holding0554 conditions should be considered an brakes, each of which is capableSection 6.1 operating hazard, as they may of stopping the upward(Item 2) increase the hazard of malfunction or movement of the load block the

inadvertent operation. It is essential recommended 3 inches,that the controls be capable of preventing a two-block event.stopping the hoisting movement withinamounts of movement that damagewould not occur. A maximum hoistingmovement of 8 cm (3 in) would be anacceptable stopping distance.



and Section Guidance Evaluation NotesElectric circuitry design should becarefully considered so that thecontrols and safety devices ensuresafe holding of the critical load whencalled upon to perform their safetyfunction. For elaborate control The FBCHC design includes asystems, radio control, or ultimate radio remote controller. A transfercontrol under unforeseen conditions of switch and interlocking circuitrydistress, an "emergency stop button" permits control from only the

NUREG- should be placed at ground level to bridge-mounted control panel or0554 remove power from the crane the remote controller at any one For the FBCHC, the DRL and MCLSection 6.1 independently of the crane controls. time. The radio remote control are the same.(Item 3) For cranes with a DRL rating much system has the same operational

higher than the MCL rating, it may be features for bridge, trolley, andnecessary to provide electrical or hoist operation as the bridge-mechanical resetting of overload mounted control panel, includingsensing devices when changing from an emergency stop button.one operation to the other. Suchresetting should be made away fromthe operator cab location and shouldbe included in an administrative controlprogram.



Documentio Guidance Evaluation Notes

The (driver) control systems should bedesigned as a combination of electricaland mechanical systems and mayinclude such items as contactors, The main hoist controls arerelays, resistors, and thyristors in desin asa contion ofcombination with mechanical devices designedas a combination ofand mechanical braking systems. The electrical and mechanicalcontrol system(s) provided should systems as described, ininclude consideration of the hoisting accordance with the design(raising and lowering) of all loads, standards in place at the time.

NUREG- included the rated load, and the effects The mechanical and ewectrical0554 of the inertia of the rotating hoisting systems associated with theSection 6.2 machinery such as motor armature, hoist(s) have been designed with

shafting and coupling gear reducer, due consideration of the effects ofand drum. If the crane is to be used for all applicable and significantlifting spent fuel elements, the control loads, forces, and moments. Thesystem should be adaptable to include FBCHC is physically unable tointerlocks that would prevent trolley access individual spent fueland bridge movements while the load assemblies in the spent fuelis being hoisted free of a storage rack, racks.as may be recommended inRegulatory Guide 1.13, "Spent FuelStorage Facility Design Basis".




Means should be provided in the motor All motors meet applicable NEMAcontrol circuits to sense and respond to MG1 standards. The FBCHCsuch items as excessive electric main hoist motors are providedcurrent, excessive motor temperature, with thermal detectors embeddedoverspeed, overload, and overtravel. in the stator windings that trip theControls should be provided to absorb motors in the event they

NUREG- the kinetic energy of the rotating overheat. The main hoist motor0554 machinery and stop the hoisting controls also include the followingSection 6.3 movement reliably and safely through protective devices: current

a combination of electrical power overload protection, undervoltagecontrols and mechanical braking protection, phase loss protection,systems and torque controls if one overspeed protection, hoistrope or one of the dual reeving overtravel protection, hoistsystems should fail or if overloading of overload protection, and hoistan overspeed condition should occur. slack line protection.Increment drives for hoisting may beprovided by step-less controls orinching motor drive. If jogging or The main hoist and trolley are

NUREG- plugging is to be used, the control provided with inching motors that0554 circuit should include features to travel at 0.5 fpm. Jogging orSection 6.4 prevent abrupt change in motion. Drift plugging is not required for cask

point in the electric power system, handling activities.when provided for bridge or trolleymovement, should be provided only forthe lowest operating speeds.Safety devices such as limit-type The FBCHC is provided with limit

NUREG- switches provided for malfunction, The and load-limitNUREG inadvertent operator action, or failure swvitches. ands lod-limitingeSection 6.5 should be in addition to and separate devices. These devices are

from the limiting means or control separate from normal operatingdevices provided for operation. controls.




The operating control system,

NUREG- The complete operating control system including the "stop-reset" panel is0554 and provisions for emergency controls located in the operator's cab,Section 6.6 for the overhead crane handling located between the main hoistIt 1 system should preferably be located in and the auxiliary hoist at the end(Iem ) a cab on the bridge. of the auxiliary bridge facing the

centerline of the main trolley.

NUREG- When additional operator stations are The radio remote control device0554 considered, they should have control emulates all operations of theSection 6.6 systems similar to the main station. bridge-mounted control panel.(Item 2) ________________

Manual controls for hoisting and trolleymovement may be provided on the

NUREG- trolley. Manual controls for the bridge The radio remote control device0554 may be located on the bridge. Remote emulates all operations of theSection 6.6 control or pendent control for any of bridge-mounted control panel.(Item 3) these motions should be identical to

those provide on the bridge cab controlpanel.

The radio remote control stationNUREG- Cranes that use more than one control includes a transfer switch and0554 station should be provided with interlocking circuitry to restrictSection 6.6 electrical interlocks that permit only crane control to either the bridge-It 4 one control station to be operable at mounted control station or the

(Iem ) any one time. remote control station at anytime.

NUREG- In the design of the control system, The bridge-mounted and radio0554 provision for and locations of devices remote control stations include anSection 6.6 for control during emergency emergency stop button.(Item 5) conditions should be provided.




Installation instructions should beprovided by the manufacturer. These The crane operating and

NUREG- should include a full explanation of the Tenane mang as0554 crane handling system, its controls, maintenance manual was0554 and the limitations for the system and provided by the manufacturer toSection 7.1 should cover the requirements for Entergy and have been translated

installation, testing, and preparations into plant operating procedures.for operation.During and after installation of thecrane, the proper assembly of

NUREG- electrical and structural components FBCHC functional testing0554 should be verified. The integrity of all including no-load and full loadSection 7.2 control, operating, and safety systems tests of all motions.

should be verified as to satisfaction ofinstallation and design requirements.

NUREG- A complete check should be made of A complete mechanical and0554 all the crane's mechanical and electrical check of the crane wasSection 8.1 electrical systems to verify the proper made to prepare the crane for(Item 1) installation and to prepare the crane for testing.testing. 9-

Information concerning proof testing oncomponents and subsystems that was

NUREG- required and performed at the Documentation of all required0554 manufacturer's plant to verify the ability factory and field tests wasSection 8.1 of components or subsystems to factory andpfield te(Ieo 81 perform should be available for the required as part of the(Item 2) checking and testing performed at the procurement documents.

place of installation of the cranesystem.


NUREG-0612 AND NUREG-0554 COMPARISON MATRIX FOR ITHE RBS FUEL BUILDING CASK HANDLING CRANE


The crane system should be static load The FBCHC was load-tested bothNUREG- tested at 125% of the MCL. The tests indoors (as part of initial0554 should include all positions generating acceptance) and outdoors (as

Section 8.2 maximum strain in the bridge and aret ofapost-modification testing of(Itemn 1)2 trolley structures and other positions as thet ou otdoor ifcranstructue)tn atrecommended by the designer and the the rane load.manufacturer. 1.25 times the rated load.After satisfactory completion of the125% static test and adjustmentsrequired as a result of the test, thecrane handling system should be givenfull performance tests with 100% of the

NUREG- MCL for all speeds and motions for0554 which the system is designed. This The FBCHC was given a loadedSection 8.2 should include verifying all limiting and running test of all motions at 1.25(Item 2) safety control devices. The features times its rated capacity.

provided for manual lowering of theload and manual movement of thebridge and trolley during an emergencyshould be tested with the MCLattached to demonstrate the ability tofunction as intended.

Attachment toRBG-46426Page41 of 44



When equipped with an energy-controlling device between the loadand head blocks, the complete hoistingmachinery should be allowed to two-block during the hoisting test (loadblock limit and safety devices arebypassed). This test, conducted at Per NUREG-0612, Appendix C, Page

NUREG- slow speed without load, should C-3, item (8), the FBCHC main hoist0554 provide assurance of the integrity of A two-blocking test was not includes two travel limit switches,Section 8.3 the design, the equipment, the performed on the FBCHC. each of independent design, used in(Item 1) controls, and the overload protection series, and a load limiting device.

devices. The test should demonstratethat the maximum torque that can bedeveloped by the driving system,including the inertia of the rotatingparts at the overtorque condition, willbe absorbed or controlled during two-blocking or load hang-up.The complete hoisting machinery A load hang-up test was notshould be tested for the ability to performed on the FBCHC. Eachsustain a load hang-up condition by a hoist is provided with an overload The FBCHC does not have the

NUREG- test in which the load-block-attaching cutoff that senses an overload on interlock circuitry suggested by0554 points are secured to a fixed anchor or the hoist and stops the hoisting NUREG-0612, Appendix C, page C-

(Itemn 2)3 manufacturere moay. suges caddiioal motion, but allows safe lowering 4, item (9), Cask loading procedures(Item 2) manuactier load. sgest a nane of the load to the floor. The load will prohibit simultaneous FBCHC

or substitute test procedures that will limiting device is adjustable up to trolley and hoisting movement.ensure the proper functioning of 130% of rated load.protective overload devices.




Operational tests of crane systemsshould be performed to verify the A functional test of the FBCHC

NUREG- proper functioning of limit switches and was performed to verify its0554 other safety devices and the ability to complete range of travel andSection 8.4 perform as designed. However, special functionality with and without a

arrangements may have to be made to load on the main and auxiliarytest overload and overspeed sensing hooks.devices.Essentially, the MCL rating of thecrane should be established as therated load capacity, and the design The rated load for each hoist israting for the degradable portion of the clearlyedaroad on each thehandling system should be identified to aly marked on the crane. The

NUREG- obtain the margin available for the m aximum critical load is the0554 maintenance program. The MCL design rated load (125 tons). TheSection 8.5 should be plainly marked on each side crane receives periodic

of the crane for each hoisting unit. It is preventive maintenance andrecommended that the critical-load- inspection to address degradationhandling cranes should becontinuously maintained above MCLcapacity.




The crane designer and cranemanufacturer should provide a manualof information and procedures for usein checking, testing, and operating thecrane. The manual should also

NUREG- describe a preventive maintenance with the FBCHC. The0554 program based on the approved test recommendations in this manualSection 9 results and information obtained during have been included in the site(Item 1) the testing. It should include such recommendaintenance

items as servicing, repair replacement oprtn n aneacrequirements, visual examinations, procedures for the crane.inspections, checking, measurements,problem diagnosis, nondestructiveexamination, crane performancetesting, and special instructions.The operating requirements for alltravel movements (vertical andhorizontal movements or rotation,

NUREG- singly or in combination) incorporated with the FBCHCm The0554 intedesign frpmaetlnt recommendations in this manualSection 9 cranes should be clearly defined in the have been included in the site(Item 2) operating manual for hoisting and for oprtnadmitenc

trolley and bridge travel. The designer operating and maintenanceshould establish the MCL rating and procedures for the crane.the margin for degradation of wear-susceptible component parts.



and Section Guidance Evaluation NotesWhile it is a non-safety-related

A quality assurance program should be component, The FBCHC will be

NUREG- established to the extent necessary to designated as "Quality Assurance0554 include the recommendations of this Program Applicable" in the RBSSection 10 report for the design, fabrication, quality assurance program. AllItem 1) installation, testing, and operation of modifications, maintenance,(Iemcrane handling systems for safe testing, and inspections will be

handling of critical loads. performed as safety-relatedactivities.The FBCHC was a commercial-

In addition to the quality assurance grade purchase made in the late-program established for site assembly, grade While 10 in t einstallation, and testing of the crane, Appendix B requirements and

NUREG- applicable procurement documents R.G. 1.28 QA guidance did not0554G should require the crane manufacturer apply, the procurement

04on 10 to provide a quality assurance program specification required the supplierSctin m 2consistent with the pertinent provisions to have an inspection, testing,(Item 2) of Regulatory Guide 1.28, "Quality documentation program to

Assurance Program Requirements ensure the crane met the(Design and Construction)," to the requirements of the specification.extent necessary. In addition, certain key fabrication

n. steps were witnessed or verifiedby the architect/engineer for RBS.

NUREG- The (quality assurance) program NUREG-0554 did not exist at the0554 should address all the time the FBCHC was designedSection 10 recommendations in this NUREG. Also and fabricated. Crane operator(Item 3) included should be qualification qualifications are part of the RBS

requirements for crane operators. training program.

Documents

Inc. -- En tergy 5485 U. S. Highway 61 N Bend · By letter dated March 8, 2005, Entergy submitted a License Amendment Request to use the ... RJK/WBB Attachment: 1. NUREG-0612 AND