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United States—which for decades championed protection-ism and imported capital—emerged as a creditor nation,exporting goods and capital, and committing to an openglobal trading system institutionalized in the post-1945Bretton Woods regime, U.S, imperialism, however, had lit-tle to do with globalization and free trade. The U,S, did notneed to pry open closed economies in Latin America,because they had been opened up in the nineteenth centu-ry, and the U.S. became tbe major beneficiary of that open-ing in the twentieth. Latin American protectionism, orinward-oriented development as it was called, causedsome concem in the U.S. from the 1930s onward, but U.S.corporations proved adept at supplanting European rivals(with the aid of World War II) and at making money inprotected Latin American markets.

Meanwhile, U.S. interventions in the circum-Caribbean had httle to do with markets or investments.Cuba was already within the U,S. economic orbit in1898. The Nicaraguan and Haitian markets were mini-mal. Tbe U.S, intervened for geopolitical reasons: to pro-tect the approaches to Panama, to avert European(including Soviet) infringements of the Monroe Doctrine,and to prevent the establishment of unfriendly regimes in

the region. Even in Mexico and South America, wherethe U.S. preferred informal mechanisms of control andinfluence, geopolitics and security have tended to trumpglobalization (meant here as the free movements of fac-tors of production within a global trading system).

Globalization therefore remains partial, and the par-tiality reflects the balance of power. The United Statescontinues to protect its agriculture, while policing itsborders against illegal migrants (as does the EuropeanUnion). Globalization is favored in some sectors (capi-tal flows) but not others (labor). The WashingtonConsensus mandates fiscal stringency, whileWashington mns up the largest deficits in history. Likeprevious Empires or "hegemons," the United Stateswants to have its cake and eat it, too. We might recallhow the old triumphaUst British refrain "Britannia rulesthe waves" was reformulated as "Britannia waives tberules." The U.S., clearly, can also make up—and bend—the rules to suit itself. As a White House aide told abemused reporter in 2002, "We're an empire now, andwhen we act, we create our own reality."^^ Tbat is, ulti-mately, the privilege and prerogative of an imperialpower •

Inclusion Through Autonomy:Zapatistas and Dissent

Neil Harvey is an

associate professor of

govemment ai New

Mexico State

University and the

author of The

Chiapas Rehellion

The Struggle for

Land and

E)emotracy (Duke

University Press,

i998).

12

by Neil Harvey

THE ZAPATISTA MOVEMENT IS PROBABLY ONE

of the best-known examples of dissentagainst the neoliberal model of economic

globalization. On January 1, 1994, over 3,000indigenous people staged an armed uprisingagainst tbe govemment of then-President CarlosSalmas de Gortari and issued a list of demandsfor basic social and political rights. The rebellionwas timed to coincide with the start ofthe NorthAmerican Eree Trade Agreement (NAETA), anaccord tbat reduced most tariffs on tradebetween the United States, Canada and Mexico.The Zapatista's principal spokesperson,Subcomandante Marcos, argued that NAETA

represented a death sentence for Mexico's indige-nous people and called on all Mexicans to partic-ipate in their own ways for a more democratic,just and sovereign nation.^

More than eleven years have passed since tbe21apat!stas first caught intemational attention. Inthat time, otber social movements haveexpressed similar demands for social justice andgreater participation in decision-making bodies.Meetings of the G-8, World Economic Eorumand World Trade Organization have routinelybeen met with large-scale protests highlightingthe common perception that economic globaliza-tion is occurring without the kinds of democrat-

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REPORT: EMPIRE AND DISSENT

ic constraints that are necessary for ensuring the defenseof human rights and environmental protections.Although their precise demands and forms of organiza-tion may differ, activists have often referred to theZapatistas as a source of inspiration. The possible rea-sons for this identification are worth noting, and theyhighlight the unique character of the Zapatistas' prac-tices of dissent. In particular, their decision to maintairtindependence from poUtical parties and the state hasopened up new arenas for participation and experimen-tation in self-government. Disillusionment with existingforms of representation is not, of course, restricted toMexico, and the Zapatistas' hope is that thts situationcan give way to the emergence of alternative channels forachieving social change.

Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of theZapatistas is the fact that their demands immediately res-onated with so many people around the world. In part,this was due to the rapid-fire transmission of their com-muniques and letters through the Internet, but it was

also related—perhaps more so—to the growing realiza-tion of linkages between decisions taken in one part ofthe world and events in another.^ The Zapatistas provedadept at connecting their own experiences with those ofother communities facing similar experiences of eco-nomic exclusion and political marginalization—bothwithin and beyond Mexico. Such connections wererestated in the Zapatistas' "Sixth Declaration of theLacandona Jungle" released in June 2005, This docu-ment provides an analysis of the national and intema-tional effects of neoliberalism, calls for the developmentof a national alternative program from the left, andinvites solidarity groups and social movements fromother countries to help organize another "international

meeting against neoliberalism and for humanity" (similarto previous meetings held m 1996 and 1997).

Although the Zapatistas emerged from complex andconflictive local histories of dissent, their rebellion is also asign of the cnsis and transformation of capitalist statesaround the world, particularly in Latin America.^ At theglobal level, we have witnessed the decline of state-leddevelopment models m which vanous degrees of nationaleconotnic regulation allowed for redistributive programsof a broadly supported welfare state. The dismantling ofthis model in favor of greater deregulation, trade liberaliza-tion and private enterprise has been a common experiencefor many countries, including Mexico.

POLITICAL THEORISTS MICHAEL HARDT AND ANTONIO NEGRI

have argued that this transformation is best conceptualizedas a passage from imperialism to Empire.'* In their analy-sis, imperialism refers to a system in which dominantnation-states compete for control of territory and resourcesin order to enhance their own national power. Empire, on

the other hand, has no national home,although some nations are clearly more influ-ential than others in directing its operatiotis.Instead, Empire is a global network of powerrelations that perpetuate capitalism throughthe constant reorganization of social life andnatural resources.

With Empire, dissent does not emanatefrom a space that is "outside" the global capital-ist system (that is, in the sense of combating theimposition of a foreign power, for example),but rather it is located "inside" the system.Empire does not have an outside, so anyalliances of political dissent must be made withthe same goal in mind; to expose and tran-scend Empire, rather than reform national gov-

ernments. Under this analysis, it no longer makes sense totalk about "national liberation." Hardt and Negri add thatthe way we think about dissent has also shifted away fromthe idea of a unified people to a greater emphasis on diver-sity From their perspective, this change opens up greaterpossibilities for more novel and creative forms of politicaldissent. In doing so, value is placed on the uniqueness ofeach person and group as they confront Empire in theirown ways. The unified "people" tums out to be a diverse"multitude" with little desire or need for centralized organ-ization and leadership.5

Are the Zapatistas an expression of the multitude? Someauthors have adopted this line of argument. Mexico-basedscholar John HoUoway for example, stresses the Zapatistas"

13

A Zapatistacommunityblocks amilitaryincursion inioGaleanainJanuary 1998,)ust two weeksaflef

paramilitariesmassacred 48Zapatistasympalhizersin Acteal.

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NACEA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

search for a different approach to politics itself,̂Rather than seeking power for themselves, theZapatistas call on all peopie to construct new spacesfor dialogue where the dignity of each is upheld.Their strategy is not to seize power and wield it overothers, but to democratize power relations in everysphere of society This, continues Holloway, willretnam an "uncertain revolution" in which defini-tions, programs and theories will always be dis-placed by the ambiguities and contradictions of anysocial movement. The novelty is that the Zapatistashave recognized this uncertainty and, with a strongdose of irony, have turned it into one of their mainsources of strength. In Holloways words, "ThetZapatista] revolution is a moving outwards ratherthan a moving towards,"'' By this he means ihat theZapatistas seek alliances in the construction of a broadand flexible agenda for social change, rather than claim toknow in advance the final point towards which all actionsshould be directed.

How convincing are these arguments? Some would saynot very. Why would any group, particularly one thataspires to change the basic structures of a highly unequalsociety, try to avoid the exercise of power? Argentine writerAtilio Boron claims that the postmodem celebration ofdiversity and local autonomy is symptomatic of the left'sretreat from class struggle,^ For him, the popular move-ments cannot afford the luxury of ignoring the struggle forstate power, especially in Latin America, where direct orindirect forms of U,S, imperialism have so often under-mined national sovereignty

It can also be argued that nationalism and imperialismhave not given way to Empire, as conceived by Hardt andNegri, Instead, some would say U,S, imperialism is stillthe dominant force in intemational politics, particularlyafter the attacks of 9/11, U,S. policies have been deliber-ately unilateralist rather than directed towards a globalconcert of interests. In this context, activist and writerTariq Aii has argued that the Zapatistas have failed tomake serious gains, because the proposal to "change theworld without taking power" is only a "moral slogan" thatdoes not pose any threat to dominant groups in Mexicoor their foreign allies,^

As one might expect, local events in Chiapas do notconform entirely to these more global analyses.Nevertheless, the particularities do not detract from paral-lels with other instances of dissent throughout LatinAmenca, What must be kept in mmd is that the Zapatistashave been concemed not only with national or intema-tional alliances, but also with the consolidation of local and14

Zapallstasupportersin thevillage ofOvenlic atthe firstanniversaryofthefounding ofthe

Caracoles

and theJuntas deBuenGobierno.

regional autonomy To paraphrase Holloway, the Zapatistarevolution is not solely about "moving outwards," bul alsoabout "moving inwards."

IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE ZAPATISTAS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN

concemed with strengthening their local bases of support.This was evident during the peace talks in 1994 and 1995,and became particularly important in showing suppon forihe Zapatista delegation as it negotiated with the govem-ment a set of minimal accords on indigenous rights andculture. The San Andres Accords, named for ihe townwhere they were signed tn February 1996, represented anhistoric moment for Mexico that many hoped wouldachieve political and peaceful solutions to the Chiapasrebellion. However, the govemment of Emesto Zedillofailed to implement the accords, arguing thai the provi-sions for indigenous autonomy potentially threatenednational unity Further talks were suspended and, as theconflict worsened in 1996, a multiparty legislative body(the Commission for Peace and Reconcilialion inChiapas, COCOPA) produced a revised document thatmet v^th the approval of the Zapatistas but still failed toget Zedillo's support.

The historic defeat of the Institutional RevolutionaryParty (PRO in the 2000 presidential elections raised hopesthat the new president, Vicente Fox of the National ActionParty (PAN), would get congressional backing for theCOCOPA law. But the PRI-PAN majority passed a watereddown version in Apnl 2001- The new law restrictedindigenous autonomy to communities within singlemunicipalities and denied constitutional recognition ofindigenous peoples as collective subjects with the right todetermine their own forms of govemance and develop-ment, 11 also maintained a patemalistic relationship in

SEPTEMBER OCTOBER 2005

REPORT: EMPIRE AND DISSENT

which the federal govemment would provide social servic-es to indigenous communities.'"

The Zapatistas rejected these revisions and suspendedall contacts with the federal govemment (a situation thatcontinues to the present). Nevertheless, the constitutional-ly requisite number of state legislatures subsequently rati-fied the reforms, although, significantly, it was rejected inthose states with the largest indigenous populations—including Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero. In addition,anomalies in the ratification process led to a series of legalchallenges conceming the validity of the entire procedure.Despite the fact that these appeals were still awaiting a rul-ing from Mexico's Supreme Court, President Eox decidedto promulgate the new law, and it went into effect onAugust 14, 2001, A year later, the Supreme Court declaredthat it could not rule on the legal appeals thaihad been submitted and the new law continuesto stand.

From the passage of the watered-downindigenous rights law in April 2001 to therecently released Sixth Declaration of theLacandona Jungle, the 2^patistas have focusedtheir efforts more on the intemal aspects of theirmovement. The consolidation of autonomy hasbeen the main goal, and relationships withother groups have been organized with this taskin mind. In July 2003, the Zapatistasannounced the creation of five regional autonomous gov-emments that encompass over 30 autonomous municipal-ities. In part, this reorganization was designed to ensuregreater inclusion and fairer distribution of the resourcesprovided by solidarity groups among all Zapatista commu-nities.

The new Juntas de Buen Gobkmo (Councils of GoodGovemment) are experiments in local democracy, attend-ing to the day-to-day conflicts that etnerge in areas whereZapatistas coexist with supporters of other political organ-izations and parties. In making their services open to all,the Zapatistas aim to gain support for gradually establish-ing autonomy as a viable alternative to the official politicalsystem. Programs in health care, education and organicagncuiture are supported through networks of commum-ty-level promotores.^^ Autonomy may not have gained thekind of constitutional recognition that would demonstratethe tmpact of the Zapatistas at the level of the state, but thisdoes not mean that it is a politically weak form of dissent.On the contrary, autonomous forms of govemment haveemerged as the Zapatistas' most significant politicalachievement and have become a reference point for simi-lar demands in other parts of Mexico. In Chiapas, the

Autonomy may

not have gained

recognition at the

level ofthe state,

but this does not

mean that it is a

politically weak

form of dissent.

demand for self-govemment has only increased since1994, as demonstrated by the large number of newlyestablished municipalities, multi-ethnic autonomousregions or autonomous rebel municipalities {a few of thesebeyond the state of Chiapas).^^

The autonomous municipalities and regions are gener-ally seen as the most tangible gain of the Zapatistas,However, as evidenced by the Sixth Declaration of theLacandona Jungle, extemal alliances remain an importantelement for achieving change in Mexico and beyond. TheSixth Declaration calls for groups on the left to work withthe Zapatistas in developing a national program for thepolitical and economic transformation of Mexico, the for-mulation of a new Constitution and the promotion of newforms of political engagement. In order to accomplish

these goals, the Zapatistas have formed specialsub-groups to travel throughout Mexico andmeet with organizations and groups that declaretheir support for the Sixth Declaration. In addi-tion, the Zapatistas called for an intemationalmeeting against neoliberalism, tentativelyscheduled for December 2005 or January 2006.The Zapatistas acknowledge the risks associatedwith this effort. Previous experiences of nation-al alliance-building have not been as successfulas the local consolidatioti of self-governingZapatista municipalities. However, the risks

may be minimized if the national campaign builds on theexperiences of grassroots organizations rather than com-peting for ideological leadership.

IN THE SPRING OF 20021 HAD THE OPPORTUNITY to meet witha group of indigenous farmers in the municipality ofTumbala in northern Chiapas, The group includedZapatista supporters as well as members of other socialorganizations. We shared our views about the local effectsof the Zapatista rebellion, the problems facing small pro-ducers and the potential impact of the then-recentlyannounced large-scale development project knovm as thePlan Puebla-Panama (PPP). "The PPP is not like the war in1994, but it is a cold war," said one of the men with con-cern. "It is carried out no longer with bombs and aircraft,but it IS a cold war.,,, It is a war of low prices, so that wedie off, but we are going to continue fighting. We have tocreate our own, new plans in order to defend ourselves."

His use of the term "cold war" is obviously not in refer-ence to the conflict between the capitalist and communistsuperpowers prior to 1989. Rather, he is describing thelocal experience with economic globalization, a phenome-non that conceals its inner workings as it pushes down

15

REPORT: EMPIRE AND DISSENT

NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

conmiodity prices, threatening the viability of indigenouscommunities. As such, this testimony is not unique toChiapas, but could be recounted by millions of peoplearound the world, many of whom have organized todemand inclusion and participation in the decisions thataffect their lives, cultures and environments.

Although the demand for inclusion is a common one,its meaning is not reducible to any single form. Theappeal of earlier forms of inclusion, such as those putforth by official labor unions and mass parties, has beenincreasingly eroded—in part as a result of the shifttowards pro-market economic policies. These older formsof inclusion were also limited in most Latin Americancountries due to the relatively small size of the formalworkforce, and they tended to reproduce authoritariancontro! to the benefit of co-opted leaders rather thanworkers, campesinos and voters. Independent unions andgrassroots movements have long struggled for inclusion bytrying to expand the number of channels for public par-ticipation. In Chiapas, such struggles were traditionallymet with arrests, harassment and violent repression ofdissent, leading many to support the Zapatistas as theyprepared to rebel.

The comments by the farmer in Tumbala also reveal adesire to build and defend viable alternatives to currentprocesses of globalization. Rather than see their com-munities dismantled by the impact of low prices,indigenous people are experimenting with their ov^ndistinct forms of economic and political organization.Access to common property and social solidarity arecentral to such dissent, because globalization advancesthrough the enclosure of more and more areas of socialactivity, dividing up tasks and resources among special-ized groups of community members.

The flexibilization of rural labor is a necessary part ofcontemporary capitalism as production is geared to par-

16

ticular segments of global markets. In this model,labor IS still seen as another factor of production, butIt is valued for particular skills in unregulated marketsrather than as a permanent feature of a stable economy.This precariousness is expressed in the way peoplebecome interchangeable and frequently disposable.Autonomy can therefore be seen as an attempt todefend access to common property in the face of cor-porate strategies that rely on flexible labor, competi-tive specialization and cultural fragmentation.

At first glance, these twin demands for inclusionand autonomy seem to contradict each other.However, the contradiction only arises if it isassumed that the two are mutually exclusive, a form

of reasoning that continues to block the full recognitionof indigenous nghts in Chiapas and around the world.Until the 1980s, the political importance of culturaldiversity tended to be subordinated lo other concernsrelated lo matters of state formation and economicdevelopment. In Mexico and other Latin Americancountries, inclusion assumed adherence to a singlenational identity that was decidedly non-indigenous.

Attempts to depoliticize ethnic identities were notentirely successful, however, and the government's oviTisocial programs led to the emergence in the 1970s and1980s of new indigenous leaders that began demandinga much greater role in the design and implementationof policies. By the end of the 1980s this demand wasvoiced in local, national and international arenas. In1992, the Mexican government amended Article 4 ofthe Constitution, recognizing the country's multicultur-al nature for the first time. For indigenous organizationsthat had emerged in the day-to-day battles over land,crop prices, bilingual education and health services,inclusion first required reform of the legal and institu-tional forms of the state. This effort was given a hugeboost by the Zapatista uprising, although, as demon-strated by the 2001 indigenous rights law, the resultsare uncertain and highly contested. At stake is the scopeof indigenous autonomy along with its relationship tothe existing form of constitutional government inMexico.

This issue is not unique to Chiapas and Mexico.Throughout Latin America, national governments haveresponded in different ways to demands for indigenousautonomy. In some cases, constitutional reforms weremore far-reaching—at least on paper—because of morefavorable circumstances that allowed indigenous organ-izations and leaders a greater presence in nationaldebates. The depth of political crises m Colombia and

SEPTEMBER OCTOBER 2005

REPORT: EMPIRE AND DISSENT

Ecuador, for example, led to the holding of constitution-al assemblies in both countries in the 1990s, At the timeof the constitutional debates, indigenous movementscould count on an important bloc of allies in politicalparties that were sympathetic to their goals. This momentof political opening allowed the ratification of some pro-visions for indigenous autonomy, ̂ -̂

In contrast, Mexico has not held a constitutionalassembly since the constitution was first written in 1917,and the opportunities to present proposals for constitu-tional reforms have been limited. Moreover, the majorityof current deputies and senators belong to parties that, forthe most part, opposed the San Andres Accords after theywere signed in 1996. However, the long-term viability ofindigenous autonomy may depend more on its appropri-ation at the local level rather than on the revision of legalstatutes. In this regard, autonomy is best thought of as amarker of political identity rather than a legal concept.Autonomy can even encompass the relations establishedbetween communities that span long distances, such as

the networks of migrant workers who cross national bor-ders but retain important ties to their home communities.

The Zapatistas have raised important questionsregarding the future of indigenous peoples in Mexico. Atthe same time, many of their demands have resonatedviith individuals and groups from other parts of theworld. The lack of secure access to work, education andadequate health care are common problems facing manypeople today. If the nation-state was traditionally seen asthe main political guarantor of human security, it isbecoming increasingly apparent that this is no longer thecase. The privatization of social services only benefitsthose who can afford to pay, while the rest find their sit-uation increasingly precarious.

While it is important to keep reminding the state of itssocial obligations, it is also necessary to recognize therole played by social movements, indigenous organiza-tions and transnational migrant networks in the continu-al experimentation with novel and altemative forms ofsocial inclusion and political autonomy. •

Empire of Knowledge

byRicardoD. Salvatore

FOR THE PAST CENTURY, U.S. DOMINATION

over Latin America has been a multifac-eted process with military, economic,

technological, financial, cultural and intellectu-al dimensions. Depending on the historicalmoment, the United States has employed partic-ular aspects of this power through a mutuallyreenforcing pattern of persuasion and coercion.The informal U.S. Empire has shaped its rheto-ric regarding its mission in the world to justifythis contradictory array of generosity and extor-tion, benevolence and violence, justice andpaternalism.

U.S. intellectuals and scholars have helpedshape the contours of imperial discourse by

making significant contributions to major foreignpolicy discussions. They were instrumental, forexample, in defining the incorporation of territo-nes m the Caribbean and in determining theimplications of the Monroe Doctnne, They havealso shaped U.S. public opinion on the meaningsof Latin America. Perhaps their most profoundimpact, however, was in Latin America itself.They counseled governments—as well as theU.S. State Department—on everything from theeradication of tropical diseases to central bankreform.

These scholars and the institutions supportingtheir work have been crucial agents in the dis-semination and consolidation of benevolent con-

Ricardo D. Salvatore

IS professor of

modern hisiory a!

Universidad Jorcuato

di Telia,

Buenos Aires.

17

REPORT: EMPIRE AND DISSENT

NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS

such an approach be doomed by compromise and stagna-tion? Broadly stated, the two competing left currents inBolivia are generally associated with Evo Morales, on theone hand, and radical Aymara leader Felipe Quispe and hisallies on the other.

Since the 2002 elections in which Morales lost by lessthan 2%, he and his cocaiero-based party, the MAS, havefocused on local elections as a springboard for v^inning thepresidency. Quispe leads the much smaller IndigenousPachakutik Movement (MIP) party and is closely linked tothe militant Aymara communities of the altiplano. Whenasked about his relationship with Morales and the MAS,Quispe charged, "Evo Morales wants the presidency; wewant our autonomy.... While we're fighting in the streets,they are there, happy, on the balconies watching us, andthen at the last minute when we're about to overthrow thegovemment they join us." '̂̂

At the June 17 meeting of the MAS, its bases called foran allegiance, "principally, with other sectors of the social

movements."11 Morales has subsequently begun con-structing an "ami-neoliberal coalition" for the Decemberelections. But in an effort to gain middle class support.Morales' first move was to ally with the MovementWithout Eear (MSM) party, which opposes the nationaliza-tion of the hydrocarbons industry. It seems like the begin-ning of a now-familiar Latin American story.

Regardless of the electoral outcome, the social move-ments will continue to be a dominant, oppositional forceno matter the govemment in power. Moreover, the all-or-nothing ties between political parties and the social move-ments are currently much more fluid and flexible in Boliviathan in other Latin American countries. But for now, thecountry's fate is sealed in the outcome of the constituentassembly that will convene in 2006 to rewrite theConstitution. Only then will it be seen if the new countrythat emerges from that process will be capable of translat-ing the demands from the street into the actions of thegovemment. •

NOTES

Empire. Hegemony and Globalization in the Americas

1- For Rumsfeld quote, see. "U.S.: A Bigger Stick—And No Longer SpeakingSoftly," Christian Science Monitor, January 15, Z004. For Bush quote, see<htlp://www.whilehouse.9Ov/news/releases/2002/n/Z0021111-2.htmt>

2. Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise ofthe British World Order and theLessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003); Colossus: The Biseand Fall of the American Empire (London: Penguin, 2005). In a similar vein seeDeepak Lai, In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order [Uew 'ioi^:Pa\qraveMacmiNan, 2004).

3. Though the usual phrase is "collaborating elites." the collaborative arrange-ment may also involve non-elites; however, it requires elites to make it work.

4. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of AmericanEmpire (New Yor*;: Metropolitan Books, 2000). It cites 800 "Department ofDefense facilities" dotted around the world, p. 36.

5. The Roosevelt Corollary stated that since the Monroe Doctrine vetoedEuropean interventions in the Americas, the U.S. would police the region, thusremoving the justification for European intervention.

6. Jules R. Benjamin, The United States and the Origins of fhe Cuban Revolution(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990), p. 64,

7. See Bruce J, Caider. The Impact of Intervention: Uie Dominican Republic Duringthe U.S. Occupation of 19W-24{A\isi\n Univ. of Texas Press, 1984] and HansSchmidt, The U.S. Occupation of Haiti. 1915-34 (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ.Press 1995).

8. While recognizing the Spanish legacy, we should be very careful not to perpet-uate crude cultural stereotypes of Spanish-American backwardness, supersti-tion, corruption, patrimonialism, machismo and all the rest. Though enduring,this legacy was neither uniform nor immutable (which is why Costa Rica is verydifferent from El Salvador, or Chihuahua from Chiapas}.

9. "Between consent and force stands corruption/fraud (which is characteristic ofcertain situations wtiere it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function andwhere the use of force is too risky)." Antonio Gramsci, in Quintin Hoare andGeoffrey Nowell Smith, eds.. Selections from the Prisor) Notebooks (London:Lawrence and Wishart, 1971|,p 80.

10. PaulW.Drake, The Money Doctor in ffie Andes: The Kemmerer Missions. 1923-33 [Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1989).

11. K. H. O'Rourke and J G. Williamson, "When Did Globalisation Begin?,"European Review of Economic History, Vol. 6 (2002), pp. 35-39.

12. Ron Suskind, "Without a Doubt." New York Times Magazine. Dctober 17,2004,p . l l .

Inclusion Through Autonomy: Zapatistas and Dissent

1. See, George Collier (in collaboration with Elizabeth Quaratiello), Bastal Landand tbe Zapatista Rebellion in C/"3/MS (Oakland: Food First Books, 1999), NeilHarvey, The Chiapas Rebellion: The Struggle for Land and Democracy {Durham:Duke Univ. Press. 1998); XochitI Leyva and Gabriel Ascencio, Lacandonia al filodel agua (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1996); John Womack,Rebellion in Chiapas: An Historical Reader (New York: The New Press, 1999).

2. Thomas Olesen, International Zapatismo: The Constniction of Solidarity in theAge of Globalization (London and New York Zed Books. 2005),

3. Jan Rus, Rosalva Aida HemSndez Castillo and Shannan L Mattiace. eds.,Mayan Lives, Mayan Utopias: The Indigenous Peoples of Chiapas and theZapatista Rebellion{lar\t\3m: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).

4. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Empire (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press,2000).

5. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the AgeofEmpireiHevi York: Penguin Press, 2004).

44

SEPTEMBER OCTOBER 2005

NOTES

6. John Holloway, "Dignity's Revolt," in Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution inMexico[london: Pluto Press, 1998), pp. 159-198.

7. Ibid.p 1658. Atilio Bor6n, "Poder, contrapoder y antipoder. Notas sobfe un extravio te6rico-

poKtico en el pensamiento critico contempor^neo," Revista Chiapas. No. 15(2003),pp.143-lB2.

9. Sergio Rodriguez Lascano, "iSlogan Moral? Dtra forma de hacer la politica,"Rebeldia. No. 23, September 2004, pp. 25-30.

10. Nicholas Higgins, "Mexico's Stalled Peace Process: Prospects and Challenges,"Intemational Affairs. Vol. 77, No. 4.2001, pp. 885-903.

11. Gloria Mufioz Ramirez, "Los Caracoles: Reconstruyendo la naci(5n," Rebeldia.No. 23, September 2004. pp. 3-24.

12. Araceli Burguete, "Chiapas: Nuevos municipios para espantar municipiosaut6nomos," in Rosaiva Ai'da Hernandez, SareSa Paz and Maria Teresa Sierra,eds., £! Estado y los Indigenas en tiempos del PAN: Neoindigenismo, legalidade identidad{MeMCO City: Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores enAntropologia Social, 2004), pp. 137-171.

13. Donna tee Van Cott, "Explaining Ethnic Autonomy Regimes in Latin America,"Studies in Comparative Intemational Development, Vol. 35, No. 4,2001, pp.3O-58.

Venezuela: Defying Globalization's Logic

1 Hugo Chavez Frias, Habia elcomandante(interviews by Agusti'n Blanco Munozj(Caracas. UCV, 1998), p. 311.

2 Steve Ellner, "Venezuela's Foreign Policy: Defiance South of the Border," ZMagazine. November 2000, <http://vvww.zmag.org/ZMag/articles/novOOell-nerhtm>.

3. This attitude went beyond the Venezuelan opposition. An article in ForeignAffairs, for example, ended ominously with the statement: "the political clockin Venezuela is running out" Kurt Weytand. "Will Chavez Lose his tuster?"Foreign Affairs. Nov-Dec, 2001.

4. HernSn Gruber Odrem^n, Mi voz en la prensa (Caracas: Fondo Nacional 19991,pp. 14,47.

5. Some anti-Chavista political commentators accuse Chevron-Texaco of proppingup the Chavez regime See, Tom Fenton, RadNews: The Decline of Reporting,the Business of News and ttie Danger to Us <4//|New York: Regan Books, 2005),pp. 20B-209.

6. Michael Hardt, "Porto Alegre: Today's Bandung," New Left Review. No. 14,March-April 2002, pp. 114-115. This article refers specifically to the Vi'orldSocial Forum held that year See also Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Empire(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2000).

Cuba: New Partners and Old Limits

1 Marifeli P6rez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution Origins, Course and Legacy(Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 1999), p 164.

2. Volker Skierka, Fidel Castro. A S/ograp/iy (Cambridge. Polity, 2004), pp. 269-270.3. Ibid., pp. 282-287; P6rez-Stable 1999, p. 176.4. Adolfo Gilly, "Fallujah y Mosul: ellos y nosotros," La Jomada. November 18,

2004, p. 33; "Promete Rice una politica sin concesiones contra Cuba y IrSn," iaJomada. January 19,2005, p 25

5 Gerardo Arreola, "Firman Cuba y Venezuela pacto alternativo al 'perverso'ALCA," La Jomada, December 15, 2004, p. 30.

6. Ibid , p. 30.7 "Lleg6 Hu Jintao a Cuba para concretar significativos acuerdos de inversi6n,"

La Jomada, December 9, 2004, p. 31.8. "Suavizar las sanciones politicas a Cuba, solicitan representantes de pafses de

ia EU," La Jomada, December 15, 2004, p. 31.9 Arif Dirlik, Vinay Bahl and Peter Gran, History After the Three Worlds: Post

Eurocentric Historiographies (Lanham: Rowman & Littiefieid, 2001), pp. 7-8.10. David Slater, Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South

Relationsllonaan: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 194-195.11. Ibid., pp. 201-204, 216-221.

12. Tzvi Medin, "Ideologta y conciencia sociat en Ia Revoiuci6n Cubana," EstudiosInterdisciplinarios de America Latina y el Caribe, Vol. 8, No. 1, Jan-Feb (1997),electronic version, p. 7.

The Emerging Threa t ' of Radical Populism

1. All the quotes from Gen. James Hill in this section are from the "PostureStatement of General James I Hill. FY 2005 Budget—Defense Programs,"House Armed Services Committee, March 24,2004. Available on line.<http: //wvw.senate.gov/-armed_services/statement/2004/April/Hill.pdf>

2. Maristella Svampa and Sebastian Pereyra, Enlre la ruta y el barrio. La experi-encia de las arganizacionespiqueteras[Buenos Aires. Editorial Biblos, 2003), p.202. Also see Maristelia Svampa, "Las dimensiones de las nuevas protestassociales," EIRodaballo, Buenos Aires, No. 14, Winter 2002, pp. 26-33.

3. Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (Cambridge Harvard Univ Press. 1986).cited in Javier Auyero, La protesta, Relatos de la beligerencia popular en laArgentina democr^tica (Buenos Aires: Libros del Rojas, 2002), p. 11.

jBolivia de pie!

1. Ttie from a popular Bolivian protest chant heard frequently in El Allo: "El Altode pie, nunca de rodillasl" ("On your feet. El Aitol Never on your knees!). Alsoborrowed from Luis A. G6mez's authoritative blow-by-blow account of the 2003"Gas War": Luis A. G6mez, El Alto depie: Una insurrecidn aymara en BoliviailaPaz: Self-published, 2004)

2. For a comprehensive account of Cochabamba's "Water Revolt" see the infor-mation compiled by Jim Shultz of the Cochabamba-based Oemocracy Center,<http.//www.6emocracyctrorg/bechtel/>.

3. Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson, Revolutionary Horizons: Indigenous andNational-Popular Struggles in Bolivia, 1781-2005, (New York. Verso, forthcom-ing).

4 Sonia O^viia, "In Another Vein," NACLA Report on the Americas, "Bolivia: ThePoverty of Progress," Vol 25, No. 1 (1991), p. 12.

5. See, <http://www.democracvctr org/bechtel/>.6. "Bolivia: Privatized Water Company Defeated," NACLA Report on the

/^ericas. "Social Movements: Building from the Ground Up," Vol. 38, No. 5(2005), pp. 41-43.

7. Jim Shultz, "Deadly Consequences: The IMF and Bolivia's 'Black February',"(Cochabamba Oemocracy Center, April 2005),<http://www.democracyctrorg/publications/imfreport.htm>.

8. Alvaro Garcia Linera, "La segunda batalla por la nacionalizaci6n del gas," ElJuguete Rabioso (La Paz), Vol. 5 No. 131, p. 6.

9. "Comunicado de la Coordinadora de Oefensa del Gas," June 10, 2005. postedon r te Narcosphere.<tittp://nafcosphere.narconews.com/story/2005/6/10/165054/060>,

10. "Evo Morales quiere la presidencia, nosotros, nuestra autonomfa: FelipeQuispe," Interview, CrdnicaMemo). June 10, 2005

n . Walter Chavez, "El MAS y el MSM optan por un frente tradicional," ElJugueteRabioso (La PazI, Vol. 5, No. 132, June 25, 2005, p. 8

coming next time...The Politics of Race and Globalization Part III;

The Diaspora Strikes BackEduaido Bonilla-Silva •Juan Flores •

Deborah Thomas • Roberto Lovato • George Yudice

Pius.,,An Investigative Report: U.S. Democracy Promotion in

Bolivia, Hail! and VenezuelaMining in Neoliberal ChileHuman Rights in Argeniina

45