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Indian Ocean Tuna Fisheries:Policy Analysis with

Reference to Future Development Op onsInterna onal Perspec ves

BOBP/WB/OPP/REP 14

DRAFT

i

Indian Ocean Tuna Fisheries: Policy Analysis with Reference to Future Development Options

(1.) International Perspectives

By

Arthur E. Neiland PhD

Consultant, IDDRA Ltd, United Kingdom

Website: http://www.iddra.org

Email: [email protected]

A Report for the World Bank/GEF-funded

Oceans Partnership Project (OPP) – Bay of Bengal

Implemented by the

Bay of Bengal Programme Inter-Government Organisation (BOBP-IGO)

Chennai, India

28 September 2016

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REPORT OVERVIEW

OVERVIEW

This report is a contribution to the World Bank/GEF-funded Oceans Partnership Project (OPP) for the Bay of Bengal implemented by the Bay of Bengal Programme Inter-Government Organisation (BOBP-IGO) based in Chennai, India. It represents a preliminary examination of Indian Ocean tuna fisheries from an international perspective drawing mainly from published literature and technical reports from key organisations. In this context, the current performance of tuna fisheries management policy is analysed and the key issues affecting the outcomes are identified and examined. In light of this analysis, the prospects and options for the future of the tuna fisheries are also considered.

While there are a range of institutional arrangements in place, the current report focuses on the role, operation and impact of the Regional Fisheries Organisation (RFMO) for tuna – the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). A complementary report will examine the wider institutional set-up.

A further set of complementary reports, taking into account both national and regional perspectives – for India, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh – will also be produced by the BOBP-IGO by the end of 2016. These reports will document and examine the current state of fisheries policy, with particular reference to tuna fisheries, drawing upon national information and literature sources.

KEY FINDINGS

First, an assessment of the current performance of the Indian Ocean tuna fisheries was attempted. In terms of the key policy objectives of the IOTC - which includes fish stock conservation, optimum utilisation and sustainable development - the indicators for success focus on stock status (an environmental outcome), with limited reference to economic or social outcomes. Besides the Yellowfin tuna stock (for which there is some concern of overexploitation), the other four principal market tuna stocks are considered to be healthy. There are, however, widespread concerns about the status of many of the neritic (coastal) tuna stocks, but a comprehensive analysis is constrained by a lack of appropriate data.

Second, the results of a Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) analysis revealed a range of important opportunities, and also challenges, at the international level. Most significantly, the large and renewable potential wealth of the fish stocks could make a major contribution to sustainable development, but this would depend on the establishment, above all things, of effective fisheries management systems. A review of fisheries governance, as part of this report, showed that there are important principles and international lesson-learning, which might be applied, particularly from the tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO).

Third, the latest IOTC performance review (2016) suggests that major reform is required – especially to upgrade fisheries management. The challenge of reforming a large RFMO is a major one, but as shown in the case of the WCPO, important institutional changes and improvements are possible. Drawing upon the ‘change management’ literature, some entry-points for a transformational process are highlighted. Early steps include the need to inspire action, ensure cooperation and urgency amongst key players, to install a guiding team of external experts (or enhance the capacity of the existing organisation), to develop a vision and strategy, and put in place appropriate funding support and investment. Finally, it can be argued that the IOTC has been faced a hugely complex challenge in attempting to manage IO tuna fisheries, and that its work to date, especially in fisheries analysis, provides the essential basis for moves towards improved exploitation arrangements in the future.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABNJ Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction ADB Asian Development Bank AU African Union BOBP-IGO Bay of Bengal Programme Inter-Governmental Organisation CCRF Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries CMM Conservation and Management Measures (IOTC) CPC Contracting Parties to the Commission (IOTC) CS Coastal States DWFN Distant Water Fishing Nations EBA Ecosystem-Based Approach to fisheries management EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EU European Union FAD Fish Aggregating Device FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations FFA Foreign Fishing Arrangements FFA Forum Fisheries Agency FM Fisheries Management FMS Fisheries Management System FMU Fisheries Management Unit GDP Gross Domestic Product GEF Global Environment Fund HMS Highly Migratory Species IO Indian Ocean IOC Indian Ocean Commission IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission IPOA International Plan of Action IQ Individual Quota ITQ Individual Transferable Quota IUU Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing MCS Monitoring, Control and Surveillance MEY Maximum Economic Yield MSC Marine Stewardship Council MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield OPP Ocean Partnerships Programme PIC Pacific Island Countries PNA Parties to the Nauru Agreement PNAO Parties to the Nauru Agreement Organisation QMS Quota Management System RFMO Regional Fisheries Management Organisation TAC Total Allowable Catch UK United Kingdom UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea USD United States Dollars VDS Vessel Day Scheme SWIOFC South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission WCPO Western and Central Pacific Ocean WCPFC Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

CONTENTS

Page Report Overview ii Abbreviations and Acronyms iii

1. Introduction and Objectives 1 2. Methodology and Concepts 2 2.1. Approach 2 2.2. Concepts and Perspectives 2

3. Governance and Tuna Fisheries – Key Themes 4 3.1. Governance and Fisheries Management 4 3.2. Realising Fisheries Development – Critical Sequencing 5 3.3. The Nature of Tuna Stocks and Fisheries 5 3.4. Legal Framework and Other Instruments 6 3.5. Basic Governance Principles Re-affirmed 7 3.6. RFMO Performance 8 3.7. Economic Principles and Impacts 9 3.8. Innovative Institutional Reform in the WCPO 10 3.9. Success Factors for the PNA-VDS 11 3.10. Markets and Fisheries Management 12

4. Indian Ocean Tuna Fisheries – Key Features 13 5. Policy, Policy Instruments and Policy Performance 17 5.1. Overview 17 5.2. Policy 17 5.3. Policy Instruments 17 5.4.Policy Performance 18

[1.] Indian Ocean Tuna Commission – Profile – Plus Summary of Review Comments (Legal and General) – Derived from 2nd IOTC Review (2016)

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6. Factors affecting Policy Performance 21 6.1. Overview 21 6.2. Strengths 21 6.3. Weaknesses 22 7. Future Policy Issues 24 7.1. Overview 24 7.2. Opportunities 24 7.3 Threats 27 8. Institutional and Organisational Change Management 29 9. Conclusions 32 10. Bibliography 33

Appendices 36

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1. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES

The Indian Ocean (IO) contains valuable tuna resources which have the potential to make a significant contribution to sustainable development in the countries of the region. However, this will depend crucially on the establishment and implementation of appropriate and coherent policies for fisheries development and fisheries management at national, regional and international levels.

In general, tuna fisheries are no different to any other fisheries, which need to be managed effectively in order to generate valuable benefits, and to also avoid both economic and biological overexploitation. However, many tuna fish stocks are highly migratory, and can be distributed on a seasonal basis between the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)1 of different coastal states and also in high seas areas (or Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, or ABNJ)2 – characteristics which complicate the possible arrangements for management and which require a common approach to the exploitation of shared resources between the nations involved.

Furthermore, in the case of the IO, compared to other parts of the world, there are also specific challenges and further complications which must be addressed. For a start, the tuna resources are shared by a large number of nations (up to 40) – the majority are coastal states (CS) – and the rest are distant water fishing nations (DWFN). These nations vary in size, level of national development and economic development, and institutional capacity, and have different fleet, fishing and sectoral characteristics, including both small- and large-scale fishing sub-sectors and value-chain activities.

A regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO) – the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) – was established under the FAO Constitution (Article XIV) in 1993 (and came into force in 1996) to provide a coherent and overarching management approach involving all the nations concerned. However, despite the efforts of the IOTC, there are concerns over the current status of the IO tuna fisheries and also concerns about their future prospects.

In the following report, the primary objective is to examine the current performance of tuna fisheries management policy in the IO at an international level, and to identify and analyse the key issues involved. In light of this analysis, the prospects and options for the future of the IO tuna fisheries will also be considered. The IOTC will, therefore, be a major focus of the report.

A complementary set of reports, taking into account both national and regional perspectives – for India, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh – will also be produced by the BOBP-IGO by the end of 2016. These reports will document and examine the current state of fisheries policy, with particular reference to tuna fisheries, drawing upon national information and literature sources.

1 The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other states are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. (UNCLOS, 1982, Article 55). In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; (UNCLOS, 1982, Article 56).

2 Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ) encompass the high seas, defined in Article 86 of UNCLOS as ‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state and the Area defined in Article 1 (1) (1) of UNCLOS as ‘the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (Druel, 2013).

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2. METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTS

2.1. Approach

The approach for IO tuna fisheries policy analysis used in this study has five components as follows:

First, to provide an essential background, key themes concerning international fisheries governance will be identified and examined from the international literature, with particular reference to tuna and other highly migratory species.

Second, the main features and characteristics of the IO tuna fisheries will be summarised to set the scene overall, and again this information will be drawn from published literature.

Third, a standard approach to analyse tuna fisheries policy performance at the international level will be used initially (Table 1). The IOTC will be the main focus. The key policy objectives will be identified from the main policy documents. The extent to which the objectives have been achieved over a given time period will be used as a measure of success.

Fourth, the key factors and issues which have affected recent policy performance will then be identified and evaluated.

Fifth, in light of the results of the current policy performance and the key issues involved (above), at the international level, the future prospects for IO tuna fisheries will be examined and discussed, with reference to future development options.

2.2. Concepts and Perspectives

The five-part approach presented above represents a starting point for the policy analysis. A number of other perspectives will also be considered in order to extend the analysis, as follows:

First, as indicated above, the methodology outlined is based on a standard approach focusing on the extent to which policy objectives have been achieved. There are alternative approaches – including an integrated approach – which broadens the analysis with reference to sustainable development, examining the impact on key outcomes (economic, social and environmental) (see Neiland et al. 2011). An attempt will be made to assess the impact of IO tuna policy on sustainable development.

Second, the standard approach above is based on a linear policy process (Table 2), whereas in reality, the policy process tends to be non-linear. In this context, Barenstein (1994) termed the unplanned outcome of multiple factors in transition as ‘policy dissonance’ – commonly associated with weak governance and a high level of complexity. Political-economy analysis can help to understand the policy process under these conditions, and will be included below where there is relevant information.

Third, the standard approach (above) of assessing policy performance is to compare outcomes to objectives. The major drawback with this approach is that if the objectives are mis-specified then success in achieving them may still not equate to successful fisheries policy (World Bank, 2006). This issue will be considered in the final section of the current report.

Fourth, in order to build upon the initial analysis (above), better quality information and a higher level of stakeholder engagement will be required. A follow-on methodology will be developed under the OPP-BOB in order to take account of these requirements.

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TABLE 1. POLICY ANALYSIS - STANDARD METHOD

Simple 4-step approach

Steps Key questions 1. Identify Policy Profile What are the key features of the current fisheries policy,

including objectives and policy instruments?

2. Assessment of Policy Performance For a given policy, how well has it performed in relation to specific success criteria?

3. Evaluate Policy Performance For a specific policy, how can the level of policy performance be explained?

4. Identify Options for Policy Change In what ways can policy and the policy process be improved in order to achieve the objectives of policy?

Source: Neiland et al. (2011)

TABLE 2. THE POLICY PROCESS – LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR MODELS

8. THE POLICY PROCESS – (I) LINEAR MODEL

1. Agenda Phase what is the issue? Why is it important? What needs to be done?

2. Identifying possible options What are the possible courses of action to deal with issue?

3. Evaluating options What are the advantages / disadvantages of each alternative?

4. Decision Phase Choose the policy option which offers best solution

5. Implementation phase (and evaluation to follow up)

9. THE POLICY PROCESS – (II) THE NON-LINEAR MODEL

Operationalising

Facts and Knowledge

Values and Decisions


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3. GOVERNANCE AND TUNA FISHERIES – KEY THEMES

In this section, a series of key themes will be presented concerning fisheries governance, and with particular reference to tuna and other highly migratory fish species. The information has been drawn from the international literature and represents a contemporary overview of some of the important areas which will need to be considered in the follow-up analysis.

3.1. Governance and Fisheries Management

First, a number of key definitions relating to fisheries governance will be presented. These apply to all exploited and managed fish stocks.

Governance in general refers to the whole array of processes whereby elements in society (government and non-government) wield power and authority, and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life, and economic and social development (World Bank, 2004).

Within this context, a fisheries management system may be defined as the institutional structure and administrative routines intended to (i) generate the information needed to make effective decisions on the use of limited financial and personnel resources with the purpose of optimising benefits from fisheries resources for society; (ii) to make those decisions, and (iii) to implement them and assess their efficacy (World Bank, 2004).

The design and implementation of effective fisheries management systems can be very challenging. In recent years, in response to weak fisheries performance associated with government-driven (‘top-down’) science-based approaches, greater attention has been given to understanding the underlying factors determining successful fisheries management – and the use of multi-disciplinary approaches, which reflect the complexity and dynamics of fishery systems.

On the basis of both theoretical and empirical analysis, at least seven factors needed for successful fisheries management have been identified as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3. SUCCESS FACTORS FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

[1] Creating appropriate incentives [2] Institutional capacity [3] Holistic approaches to fisheries management planning and stakeholder participation [4] Dealing with complexity and change in fisheries management [5] Cooperation in fisheries management [6] Resource rent as a central concept in fisheries management [7] Appropriate policy framework Source: World Bank (2004)

The design and implementation of an effective fisheries management system can also be considered in seven steps, according to McClurg (2014, p.73-74), as follows:

(i) Define the fishery management unit (species, area, method) (ii) Identify the right holders within the fisheries management unit (iii) Agree upon the allocation of rights between those right holders (iv) Agree upon the collective management objectives for the fishery (v) Agree upon the management decision rules, management measures, and sanctions against

non-compliance with those measures

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(vi) Monitor the fishery and analyze performance against the collective management objectives (vii) Review objectives, rules, and measures in the light of real time performance

3.2. Realising Fisheries Development – Critical Sequencing

In terms of fisheries development, the sequencing of actions and interventions is a, if not the, key determinant of success. The main elements of the sequence are presented in Table 4, starting with the calculation of the sustainable economic value of the fish stocks. In particular, empirical studies have shown that sectoral development (generating and using the economic value above) will be dependent on establishing the appropriate core governance framework (questions 2 –7) - a process consisting of agreeing a sectoral vision, followed by a coherent policy, backed up by an enabling legal framework, then the design and implementation of fisheries management system]. In reality, the remaining elements (institutions, finance and support) (questions 8-10) should be considered in parallel to the core governance sequence, but for simplicity sake here, they have been included at the end.

TABLE 4. THE FREETOWN FISHERIES FRAMEWORK:

ASSESSMENT OF FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL

1. Has the sustainable economic value of the fish stocks been determined?

2. Is the national vision and strategy for the sector appropriate and agreed?

3. Is there a well-defined fisheries policy?

4. Does the fisheries law provide an enabling framework?

5. Is there a high degree of policy coherence?

6. What is status of the fisheries management systems?

7. Is there a well-defined work-plan for policy implementation?

8. Is there sufficient institutional capacity for implementation?

9. Is there appropriate finance and investment available?

10. Is there support in place from national, regional and international organisations?


3.3. The Nature of Tuna Stocks and Fisheries

Third, by their very nature, tuna (and other highly migratory) stocks present a serious challenge to the design and implementation of effective fisheries management systems. The term ‘highly migratory species’ (HMS) has its origins United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Article 64). These high trophic level oceanodromous species undertake migrations of significant but variable distances across oceans for feeding, often on forage fish, or reproduction, and also have wide geographic distributions. Tuna and other HMS are found both inside the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones of many countries and also in the High Seas (or ABNJ) outside these zones. They are pelagic species, living in the upper parts of the water columns and mostly in the open ocean, although they may spend part of their life cycle in near-shore coastal waters.

Highly migratory species can be compared with straddling stock and trans-boundary stocks (Table 5). Straddling stock range both within an EEZ as well as in the high seas. Trans-boundary stock range in the EEZ of at least two countries. A stock can be both trans-boundary and straddling. In terms of the development of a fisheries management system, therefore, two immediate challenges are (i) the definition of the FMU (given the huge distances often involved, and uncertainties over stock

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distribution); and (ii) the identification of the resource owner and agreement over cooperative management arrangements for shared resources and fisheries (given the often widespread distribution between different EEZ and the high seas, and the number of possible owners, and resource users, involved – resource owners can both exploit the resource themselves or grant permission (use rights) to third parties under agreed arrangements).

It should be noted that the principal market tunas, such as Yellowfin and Skipjack, are classed as HMS. The neritic tunas, such as Longtail Tuna and Kawakawa, tend to be found in coastal regions and do not undertake long migrations – they are often economically important at local and regional levels (see Section 4 for further information).

TABLE 5. TYPES OF HIGH SEAS STOCKS

Source: FAO in Long (2011)

3.4. Legal Framework and Other Instruments

Fourth, there is an international legal framework for the management of fisheries within the EEZ and in the high seas areas beyond. The 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (the so-called ‘Constitution for the Oceans’) covers the establishment and recognition of Territorial Seas and EEZ, as well as the defining the freedom of the seas for purposes such as shipping navigation. Within an EEZ, a coastal state has ‘sovereign rights’ over the exploitation and management of natural resources, and shall promote the objective of ‘optimum utilisation’ (not defined). UNCLOS confirms that claims over the high seas are invalid, whereas all States are free to fish on the high seas, but have a responsibility to agree on conservation measures for shared stocks, as follows:

“Where the same stocks or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclusive economic zone and in area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate sub-regional or regional organisations, to agree upon the measures for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area” (UNCLOS, 1982, Article 63,2.)

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Following on from UNCLOS, a series of international instruments have been put in place in recent years. The 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), through the establishment and operation of RFMO, introduced a large number of modern fisheries management provisions into the international regime for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks (especially to deal with ‘free-riding’ by non-cooperating states). The 1995 UNFSA commits its parties to the sustainable use of such stocks; it endorses an ecosystem approach and a precautionary approach to the conservation of these stocks.

Although the RFMO regime appears to apply only to ABNJ fisheries (UNFSA Article 3), Article 7 states that the management regime for a relevant stock in the adjacent high seas and the regime for the management of that stock within the EEZ must be compatible so that the stock is to be managed as whole (World Bank, 2014). The key legal question is whether states that have yet to ratify UNFSA and that allow their vessels to fish in RFMO waters in a manner contrary to the RFMO fisheries management regime are in violation of their obligations under UNCLOS Articles 116 - 120. If so, given that these articles have achieved customary international law status, then RFMO members would have a clear legal case for action against unregulated fishing (World Bank, 2014).

Other non-binding instruments followed. The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) was also finalised in 1995, and a number of International Plans of Action (IPOA) from 1999. The IPOA for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries; the IPOA for the Conservation and Management of Sharks; and the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity. In 2001, the IPOA - Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), and the Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem. Other important initiatives have included Port State Measures, Flag State Measures and Market State Measures.

In taking an overview of the array of instruments and measures relating to fisheries management, Long (2011) concludes that there are certain trends emerging – increasing prescription, a proliferation of instruments and bodies, greater regionalisation, but also a convergence of legal regimes. He also identifies some of the major challenges including – regulatory complexity, gaps in scientific knowledge, so-called “implementation drift” and a lack of necessary funding to deal with these issues.

The possibility of applying a rights-based fisheries management approach (one of the ‘success factors’ above) more generally to the high seas has been questioned by Hannesson (2011) – without the jurisdiction conditions which characterise EEZ. He concludes that the current management regime of high seas fisheries lacks the necessary enforcement apparatus, which makes it necessary to apply trade sanctions, port measures and blacklisting to support regulations of high seas fisheries. It is argued that such measures are likely to be the second best, compared to further extending coastal state jurisdiction – an option which is likely to gather increasing support into the future, and a revision of UNCLOS and other key frameworks.

3.5. Basic Governance Principles Re-affirmed

Fifth, Freestone (2009) has suggested in attempting to clarify the debates over the emerging high seas governance regime, that the basic principles that the international community has already established and agreed to, in existing legal and policy instruments, in relation to the use and exploitation of the high seas should be re-affirmed (Table 6). All these principles have been generally accepted by the international community in a range of global and regional instruments, as well as in the decisions of many international courts and tribunals. Some represent established international law; others agreed

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international minimum standards. All however require much more rigorous implementation as the first steps in the development of a robust and appropriate system of international governance for the high seas.

TABLE 6. MARINE AND FISHERIES GOVERNANCE – KEY PRINCIPLES

1. Conditional Freedom of the Seas 2. Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment 3. International Cooperation 4. Science-Based Approach to Management 5. The Precautionary Approach 6. The Ecosystem Approach 7. Sustainable and Equitable Use 8. Public Availability of Information 9 Transparent and Open Decision Making Processes 10. Responsibility of States as Stewards of the Global Marine Environment Source: Freestone (2009)

3.6. RFMO Performance

Sixth, there are ten regional fisheries management organizations (RFMO) - five primarily responsible for the conservation and management of high seas straddling stocks and - five regional organizations responsible for tuna species, including the IOTC. It has been widely recognised that many of the charters of the tuna RFMO need to be updated. It is intended that the outcomes of a series of independent performance reviews which commenced with a meeting of all RFMO in Kobe, Japan, 2007 (leading to the so-called ‘Kobe Process’) will lead to such reforms in the future.

Some RFMO perform better than others, and attention has been focused on understanding how improvements can be brought about in general. The structure, organisation, processes and capacities of RFMO have been brought into focus by a range of published analyses as follows:

[1] Large RFMO, with many members, face the challenge of securing common agreement, and questions over the fairness of allocation processes have been raised (Bailey, 2013). According to the World Bank (2014), finding a solution and ensuring sustainable outcomes can be achieved by “sub-coalitions” – smaller groups of members, with more at stake, who are prepared to assume leadership, and compensate other members. This happened in the Pacific Islands region through the formation of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) sub-coalition (see below).

[2] The RFMO composition (often involving both developed and developing countries) may itself create challenges in agreeing rights and responsibilities, and deciding upon what is a ‘fair outcome’. (Azmi et al, 2016). In relation to bargaining power between coastal states (CS) and DWFN over Foreign Fishing Arrangements (FFA), which may also impact on high seas fisheries, it is possible for CS to develop this substantially, as long as the fisheries management regime is strong, as shown by the recent experience of the Pacific Island Countries (PIC) (Clark, 2014).

[3] On-going cooperation between RFMO members and maintaining necessary incentives (by effective management and elimination of ‘free-riding’), along with differences between members in terms of management goals (asymmetry), and how to deal with these issues (through compensation mechanisms for example – see below – but also through ensuring “national reputation” by adhering acceptable governance practices ) have also been highlighted (World Bank, 2014).

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[4] The issues of transparency (information, decision-making, compliance) and political interference in RFMO operations have also been raised as serious issues (Gilman and Kingma, 2013).

[5] For some commentators, RFMO show serious implementation weakness (the gap between intent and action) (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, 2010).

[6] Early attempts to improve fisheries management, for example, through the introduction of quota management systems (QMS), have been questioned because of serious differences in institutional capacity between different countries (Nowe and Mfodwo, 2012).

[7] In other situations, the need to create greater coherency between active fishing enterprises and management institutions in terms of timeliness of operational decisions is crucial (Blasiak et al, 2015).

[8] If some, or all, of the relevant coastal state fishery resources are highly migratory or straddling stocks, extending beyond the EEZ into the adjacent high seas, where they become subject to RFMO governance, then additional complications arise. If the management of these stocks within the high seas is seriously inadequate, this inadequacy will undermine the intra-EEZ management of the stocks and the viability of existing FFAs relevant to the stocks. That being said, well-designed FFAs can, in fact, play a role as negotiation facilitators (or ‘side payments’), serving to strengthen RFMO resource management programs (Munro, 2014).

[9] Clark (2014, p.69) is critical of certain features of tuna RFMO – a focus on biological fishery objectives and the continued domination of existing fleets, as follows:

“RFMOs, at least tuna RFMO, have inherent tendencies: a) to manage a stock down to BMSY [Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)] levels because of the focus on biological sustainability rather than optimal utilization, and because of consensus-based decision-making which tends to result in lowest common denominator type outcomes; and b) to entrench existing fleets through the development of flag-based limits based on historical catches or e�ort, by flag, that become quasi-rights, reinforced by capacity limits that make it harder for developing countries to secure fair opportunities to participate, especially in high seas tuna fisheries, or even to establish competitive arrangements for access to their waters, since fleet capacities are largely locked down. These tendencies can be compounded and reinforced by developed fishing state domination of RFMO processes”.

[10] The idea of transforming the RFMO into some kind of “tuna corporation” whose role is to manage the exploitation of the tuna stocks for which it has responsibility on behalf of its shareholders (coastal states and others), along with other operational management ideas, have been flagged up by the Bellagio Conference (2011) (for a summary see https://igcc.ucsd.edu/_files/10fisheries.pdf).

3.7. Economic Principles and Impacts

Seventh, despite widespread concern about the status of fisheries management for tuna, an innovative approach developed in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) by seven countries (the Parties to the Nauru Agreement or PNA) – the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) – has proved to be more successful. An overview of PNA-VDS will follow in the next sub-section. However, beforehand, it is important to re-confirm some of the economic principles which underpin the ‘drivers’ of particular patterns of fisheries development, and which can also help to provide a better understanding of the

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conditions needed for more effective tuna fisheries management, drawing on the recent World Bank (2014) publication, as follows:

[a] Wealth and welfare: Marine fish resources represent valuable natural capital that, if managed carefully and sustainably, have the potential to make a perennial contribution to economic growth (and sustainable development and welfare) through the resource rents that they can generate.

[b] Ownership, rights and incentives: EEZ fish resources are the property of the coastal state. As such, the objective of managing these resources is to optimize sustainable net economics returns—broadly defined to include both market and non-market—to benefit the coastal state as a whole rather than just those who participate in the domestic fishing industry.

With an increasing trend away from free and open access to fish resources toward access regimes based around use and property rights of di�erent kinds (and incentivising behaviour which can be aligned towards sustainable outcomes), the level of benefits generated all along the value chain is likely to increase. Immediate benefits from the harvesting entry-point will be further amplified through increasingly profitable trade in both commodities and fishing services.

[c] Comparative advantage: A coastal state can benefit by importing the services of foreign fishers if they have a comparative advantage in the following areas - fishing (due to skill or access to capital enabling them to operate more e�ciently in capital- intensive fisheries); processing (due to the scale of operations); and marketing (due to market access, proximity to customers, and product branding).

Comparative advantage may also arise because the coastal state has other portable sectors that can make better use of its capital and labour resources than can the fishing industry or the distant water nation may have few other opportunities and may be prepared to fish at very low cost. Comparative advantage will determine the gains that are available from trade. These gains will be shared between stakeholders according to the terms of trade. Munro (2014) shows how Game Theory and Principal-Agent Analysis can be used to examine these inter-relationships.

[d] Impacts on EEZ and ABNJ (high seas) relationships: As coastal state fisheries management improves, fishing e�ort might be transferred toward areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). The most e�ective way of addressing this may be to strengthen coalitions of coastal states and their linkages to regional fisheries management organizations (RFMO), making it more expensive for distant water fishers to fish the high seas. High-seas performance could be taken into account in the allocation to foreign fishers of fishing opportunities in adjacent coastal states’ EEZs.

3.8. Innovative Institutional Reform in the Western Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna fisheries

Eighth, Clark (2014) highlights the key features of the PNA-VDS as follows:

[1] A management scheme establishing tradable e�ort limits in fishing days in the tuna purse seine fishery in the PNA EEZ (and Tokelau) that are allocated among PNA Members and Tokelau;

[2] The VDS is not a FFA or arrangement, and foreign fishing interests are not directly involved in any aspect of the VDS;

[3] It is an instrument for PNA to manage purse seine fishing in their EEZ in their interests and in conformity with their international obligations, including the conservation and management measures of the WCPFC;

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[4] It has also been adopted by the WCPFC as part of the regional management framework and WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure 2013–01 requires Commission members to support the ongoing development and strengthening of the PNA VDS including implementation and compliance with the requirements of the VDS;

[5] Some of the defining features of the VDS as an economic instrument are: a) It aims to create scarcity of access to make access valuable; b) It aims at creating competition between fleets for access; c) It allows for days to be traded between Parties; d) It allows each Party to use their allocation to meet their own national interests; e) It can provide e�ective leverage for promoting domestic development.

The impact of the VDS has been significant. (a) Since 2007, the value of a fishing day has increased dramatically such that the rate of return on licensing fees has increased on average from 5–6% of catch value to 8–13% (Havice, referenced in Clark, 2013); (b) the terms and conditions for the Treaty with the United States have been renegotiated increasing fees from $21 million annually to $63 million annually from mid-2013 for more limited access than previously; c) the fisheries revenues of Marshall Islands, Nauru, and Tuvalu have all grown significantly; and, (iv) in terms of government revenue, for the second year in a row Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru and Tuvalu have done better than they expected and it is all a result of the Vessel Day Scheme put in place by the 8 tropical tuna countries that are Parties to the Nauru Agreement (Asian Development Bank, referenced in Clarke, 2014).

Clark (2014, p.86) also indicates that the VDS is still very much “a work in progress” as follows,

“The VDS is still in a very early stage of development, and far from fully successful or e�ective, with a mix of successes, di�culties, and failings in its performance. There are a number of weaknesses to be addressed and there is scope for improvements that can be expected to improve outcomes, and reduce risks to its sustainability.”

Havice (2016) identifies that while the economic benefits flowing to the CS has increased, the possibility of switching to an output-controlled management system is under consideration to address fishing effort impacts and long-term stock sustainability issues.

3.9. Success Factors for the PNA-VDS

Ninth, Clark and Clark (2014) and Clark (2014) have identified many of the factors which have enabled the formation and development of the PNA-VDS including:

[1] Increased human and institutional capacity at national, regional, and sub-regional levels;

[2] A focus on competitive access fees (and a rejection of certain bio-economic advice to reduce effort especially from purse-seiners);

[3] A focus on both rent creation and rent extraction in order to generate appropriate benefits;

[4] The right blend of cooperation and independence for PIC (e.g. for VDS participants, the jointness of the VDS secures each country’s rights, but leaves them largely free to use their national PAEs in their interests and in response to their own comparative advantages, and they all exercise those rights di�erently);

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[5] Recognising the limits of RFMO (e.g. for shared stocks their actions can have very large implications for FFA: Furthermore, they are inherently tilted against developing country interests in securing benefits from FFA);

[6] Appropriate development assistance is important. For PIC, the regional organizations and programs (FFA and SPC), have been important agents in the process of converting donor funding (presented as fixed term projects) into coherent streams of support;

[7] The PNA increased its independence and reduced its dependence to make the VDS work. According to Clark (2015, p.70)

“The PNAO and some commentators have ascribed some of the recent success of the PNA and the VDS to the increased self-reliance of the PNA since it established its own o�ce and financing sources, that reduced its dependence on donors and organizations with links to major fishing states. In fact, the initial report on the VDS was financed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and its development was very largely supported by the FFA. However, there was little support, and some opposition, from key donors, when the PNA adopted the VDS and then set up its own o�ce, largely to implement the commercial aspects of the VDS”

[8] Realistic assessment and replicability: the PIC have not yet been able to extend the VDS into the longline fisheries (replicability is clearly not straightforward);

[9] The key requirement is clear specification of the rules that apply to those wanting to engage in fishing, and preferably transparent processes for allowing and monitoring that participation (for both domestic and foreign vessels). The VDS has accelerated this process because of the premiums that can be earned from more competitive processes and the additional importance of transparency when there is so much more at stake.

Under PNA leadership, the Pacific Island countries (PIC) agreed to Harmonized Minimum Terms and Conditions for Foreign Fishing Vessel Access, established a foreign vessel register on which distant water vessels must be in good standing and otherwise risk being banned from all member coastal state EEZs, implemented compliance provisions that required distant water governments or boat owners associations to police their vessels while in the PIC EEZ; and then established a Vessel Day Scheme.

3.10. Markets and Fisheries Management

Tenth, the fact that tuna and other highly migratory fish are globally important for the seafood industry and a market has serious implications for future governance arrangements. Mullon et al. (2016) assert that increased market demand could exacerbate fisheries overexploitation, unless fisheries management is improved, and there is a need, therefore, to include both demand- and supply-side considerations (a strategic and holistic approach).

According to the World Bank (2014), it is easy to underestimate the influence that markets can have on supply-side governance arrangements. For example, given the key role of FFA in international seafood trade, demand-side arrangements such as corporate responsible procurement policies and labelling schemes (covering social, economic, and ecological dimensions) are increasingly likely to impact the arrangements under which fish are caught and traded. The market dimensions of IO tuna fisheries will be explored in greater detailed by the OPP-BOB in the future.

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4. INDIAN OCEAN TUNA FISHERIES – KEY CHARACTERISTICS

In this section, the key characteristics of the Indian Ocean (IO) tuna fisheries are summarised in order to set the scene for the analysis to follow. A profiling framework was used to organise the information (Table 7). More detailed information is presented in Neiland (2016) and Townsley (2016).

The IO (27 million square miles) has diverse aquatic environments, but a relatively narrow continental shelf in many locations. Marine and fisheries productivity are relatively low compared to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. There are 15 tuna and tuna-like species in the IO, including the highly migratory (principal market) tropical species, such as Skipjack and Yellowfin, and the neritic (coastal) species, such as Longtail and Bullet tuna. Stock distribution follows particular patterns (Fig.1 and 2.). The principal tunas are located mainly in the Western IO, and to a lesser extent in the Eastern IO. The neritic tunas are found in coastal waters, and are less migratory.

MSY estimates (by the IOTC) for principal market tuna include: Yellowfin (421,000 t), Bigeye (231,000 t), Skipjack (684,000 t), Albacore (33,300 t) and Southern Bluefin (33,000 t). Yellowfin is the only tropical tuna considered overfished and where overfishing is taking place. For temperate tunas, Albacore is not considered to be overfished or subject to overfishing. The Southern Bluefin is heavily overfished, but measures have been put in place to reduce overfishing. The IO accounts for 20% of the World’s tuna catch, after the WCPO. Total catch for the four principal species (excluding SBF) was 1,003,400 t (2014) (2% increase from 2013). The total catch of all tuna and tuna-like species exceeds 1.7 million tonnes. Total catch by weight (2010-14) was distributed as follows: Skipjack (44%), Yellowfin (41%), Bigeye (11%), and Albacore (4%).

Up to 40 countries currently record landings of tuna and tuna-like species from the IO (Fig.3 & 4). The largest producers are Indonesia, Iran, the EU (Spain, France and others), India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, with an increased catch since the early 1980s. There are unsurprisingly a large number and range of fishing fleets, strategies, methods and gears in operation. Industrial vessels (>15m LOA) increased rapidly in the mid-1980s to 6,532 (at present). EU purse-seine vessels also arrived at this time, to increase the overall fishing capacity in the IO. The two largest categories (by number) are longliners (2,041) and gillnet/longliners (2,482). Small-scale fishing vessels (numbering over 584,000) catch over 915,000 t of both principal and neritic tunas.

Once captured, tuna is processed and stored, to enter different marketing chains. The two major categories are fresh and frozen tuna, and canned tuna. Tuna is a widely-traded international commodity, and the trade routes can be complex, involving conversion to different product forms. The largest international markets for tuna are North America, Japan and Europe. For ‘Fresh and Frozen Tuna’, the main IO markets are Mauritius, Seychelles, Iran and Indonesia (each valued at up to USD 200 million annually), which have developed tuna processing and canning facilities. For ‘Canned Tuna’, the IO market is relatively small, compared to the major international markets. Major exporters of ‘Fresh and Frozen Tuna’ include IO nations (Indonesia, Maldives and Sri Lanka) (up to USD 200 million annually). For exports of ‘Canned Tuna’, IO nations also appear in the Top 25 including Indonesia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and Kenya (up to USD 279 million annually) (Fig.5.) The Seychelles, Mauritius and Indonesia are major processing and export centres.

Recent price trend analysis show that Yellowfin tuna (Indian and Atlantic Oceans) has increased from USD1.6/Kg to USD 2.5/Kg, whereas Skipjack prices have declined (about USD1/Kg). Bigeye and SBF have attained higher prices. Canned tuna from Thailand exported to the USA has varied from USD3.6 - 4.6/Kg. This is approximately 3.5 times higher than the ex-vessel price for Skipjack (Fig.6).

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Overall, market demand for canned tuna (USA and EU) is in decline, giving rise to lower imports, despite a decline in raw material prices. EU canneries have increased demand for cooked loins as prices have declined. In contrast, imports grew in the Middle East, East Asia and in non-traditional markets in Latin America as prices have softened. In Japan, the weak Yen has impacted negatively on tuna imports. During 2015, fresh tuna imports declined significantly, with sharp drops in Yellowfin and Bigeye supplies. Salmon sales have exceeded tuna both in the supermarket and sashimi markets. Japanese consumers are also buying more meat. The estimated potential annual sustainable economic value of both the principal and neritic tuna stocks in the IO is USD 2.058 billion (the capitalised asset value of the fish stocks (@ 8% return is USD 26 billion) (Neiland, 2016). The current value of the IO tuna fisheries according to Pew (2016) is USD 2.32 billion (based on landings and market prices). The IO tuna sector, compared to other regions, has a significant small-scale fishing component (50% catch) which underpins employment in many coastal areas, in both catching and onshore activities (processing, transport etc), particularly in India, Indonesia, Pakistan and coastal Africa.

Although the IOTC is mandated to manage IO tuna fisheries (with 25 member countries or Contracting Parties to the Commission plus 7 cooperating non-CPC), there are also many other institutions and organisations which have an impact at both regional and national levels (e.g. IOC, AU, SWIOFC). The collective impact and interactions are not well-understood. The IOTC sets the overall policy framework for the IO tuna fisheries with a focus on conservation and optimal utilisation. IO countries (and DWFN) also have policies for other fish stocks and fisheries. Many IO nations focus on increased fish production (primarily), and the extent to which regional national policies are effective and coherent requires further analysis. Many countries (e.g. Seychelles, Mauritius) with significant tuna stocks within their EEZ operate FFA (with DWFN such as the EU, Korea and Japan), which provide a range of benefits including financial returns, market access and development cooperation.

Fisheries management arrangements for tuna in the IO are shaped by a number of key elements. The IOTC has established a series of Conservation and Management Measures (CMM) in relation to its policy goals, and continues to put further CMM in place to address new issues as they arise. The CMM are agreed by the IOTC members, who must implement and comply through their national institutions and processes. The IO principal market tunas are treated as single stocks. There has been limited work on the identification of more localised FMU for either principal or neritic IO tunas. There is significant variation in the implementation of CMM, due to differences in the institutional capacities of the IOTC member countries. IOTC has increased its effort to monitor the compliance and share this information of both CPC and non-CPC. CPC report on tuna fishing in both their EEZ and by flagged vessels in the ABNJ. Currently, only IO Yellowfin is considered overfished with evidence of overfishing. There is no assessment of economic or social performance by IOTC.

International trends include (a) Supply-side – a reasonably constant tuna catch in most regional fisheries for the principal tunas, some concerns of overfishing (Yellowfin), and especially for neritic tunas – RFMO performance has been criticised and is under review – positive impact of the PNA-VDS has been noted (b) Demand-side – global markets (USA, Japan, Europe) remain important – but recent emergence of new markets in Middle-East and others – products and prices show on-going fluctuations related to changing demographics, consumer preferences and raw material availability.

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TABLE 7. IO TUNA FISHERIES SECTOR – PROFILING FRAMEWORK

Environment (I) Environment and Major fish stocks

• What the major aquatic environments and their characteristics? • Identify the major fish stocks, distribution and status

Economy (II) Production and landings

• What are levels of annual and seasonal production by fishery? • What are the overall production trends by key species and fleets?

(III) Fishing fleets and fishing activity

• Identify the fishing vessel and gear characteristics by fleet • Has technology changed over time?

(IV) Post-harvest, trade and markets

• How is the catch utilised? What products? • What are the main markets, trends, exports and imports?

(V) Economic valuation

• What is the economic value of the fishery (potential and actual)? • What is contribution to the economy? (local and national)

Social (VI) People and social aspects

• What is the level of employment in the sector? • What are the structure and the activities of communities?

Institutions (VII) Institutions and organisations

• What are the major institutions and organisations? • What is their role and inter-relationships?

(VIII) Policy and law • Identify the key fisheries policy and associated legal framework; • What are the key objectives and implementation mechanisms?

(IX) Fisheries management

• Identify and describe the fisheries management system; • What the key objectives, performance and factors affecting?

Trends (X) Global Trends, changes and issues

• What are the key global trends relevant to the fisheries sector? • What are the major factors of change? • Are there specific regional issues affecting the fisheries?

Fig.1. Skipjack tuna: Densities of releases (in red) and recoveries (in blue). Data as of September 2012. (IOTC, 2013)

Fig.2. Yellowfin tuna: Densities of releases (in red) and recoveries (in blue). The black line represents the stock assessment areas. Data September 2012. (IOTC, 2013)

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0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

1950

1954

1958

1962

1966

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

1998

2002

2006

2010

2014

Land

ings

(ton

nes,

000

s)

Year

Fig.3. IO Landings, principal and other tuna (IOTC Database)

Principal

Othertuna

0

100

200

300

400

500

1

Land

ings

, To

nnes

, (th

ousa

nds)

Fig. 4. Landings by major nations, all tuna (IOTC Database)

Indonesia Iran EU India Sri Lanka Maldives Others

0

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4000

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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

USD

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ions

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Fig. 5. Exports, Canned Tuna (Top 10 countries) (FAO Globefish, 2014)

EU TotalCote d'IvoireViet NamPhilippinesSeychellesChinaMauritiusIndonesiaEcuadorThailand

0.000.501.001.502.002.503.003.50

Pric

e, E

x-ve

sel,

USD

/Kg

Fig. 6. Monthly Tuna Prices, Ex-Vessel - Seychelles (S) andCote d'Ivoire (CI) (FAO Globefish, 2014)

SKJ (S)

YFT (S)

SKJ (CI)

YFT (CI)

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5. POLICY, POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND POLICY PERFORMANCE

5.1. Overview

For the Indian Ocean, the IOTC – A Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) - provides the overarching institutional framework for the management of tuna and other highly migratory species.

In the following section, the policy, policy instruments and policy performance of the IOTC will be identified and examined using the methodology outlined in Section 2 (above).

The analysis will be underpinned, in particular, by the detailed information provided by the recent IOTC Performance Review and the IOTC Legal Review – which have been summarised in Appendix 1 (below).

5.2. Policy

The term ‘policy’ means to define a general direction, or strategy, for an organisation, leading to the achievement of particular objectives and outcomes, and using a particular set of tools or a mechanism.

The term ‘policy process’ can be used to incorporate these inter-related elements, including both objectives and implementation. For fisheries policy, a key component of the implementation mechanism is the fisheries management system, underpinned by an appropriate legal framework.

The IOTC is a RFMO which focuses on tuna resources, although in recent years, its mandate has been extended to include other tuna-like species, such as swordfish, and also sharks.

The IOTC Agreement (1996) Article V (1) (see Appendix 1: B) defines the following objectives:

“To promote cooperation among its members with the view to ensuring, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilization of stocks covered by this Agreement and encouraging sustainable development of fisheries based on such stocks”

5.3. Policy Instruments

The implementation of policy is coordinated by the IOTC Commission. The functions of the Commission are described in Article V, paragraph 2 of the IOTC Agreement. This includes a general reference to principles expressed in the relevant provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) and outlines that when carrying out the functions and responsibilities, the Commission shall

i) review, analyse and disseminate scientific information and other data, ii) encourage, recommend and coordinate research and development activities, iii) adopt, on the basis of scientific evidence, conservation and management measures, iv) keep under review economic and social aspects and v) to carry out such other activities as may be necessary to fulfil the objectives.

This is coupled with the general clause contained in Article V, paragraph 3 that gives the Commission power to “adopt decisions and recommendations, as required, with a view to furthering the objectives of this Agreement”.

It is also important to understand that the IOTC’s policy implementation is shaped by the structure and operation of the organisation (see Appendix 1: A5) which includes:

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• RFMO under the auspices of the UN FAO

• a Secretariat (based in Male, Seychelles) which supports the work of the Commission

• the Commission (representing its members) meets annually

• A Scientific Committee and Series of Working Groups which provides technical guidance

• A group of 25 full member countries (Contracting Parties to the Commission or CPC)

• A group of 7 countries or Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties to the Commission, or Non-CPC

• There is also a small group of Non-cooperating Non-CPC

The Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission was concluded in 1993, and came into force 27 March 1996. The IOTC is an intergovernmental organisation (IGO) established under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution. It was established before the landmark 1995 United Nations Fish Stock Agreement (UNFSA) which, along with the LOSC, sets the framework for the exploitation and management of international tuna resources, along with other highly-migratory species.

The IOTC has since its inception focused on the assessment and monitoring of the fish stocks (mainly tuna) within its area of competence (FAO Areas 52 and 57). The work has been undertaken by the various Working Groups, made up of both national experts and international consultants.

Given the scale of the task – focusing on highly migratory tuna ranging over thousands of miles, and involving many countries and fisheries of different types and scale – the scientific analysis and its associated methods and information systems have become large and complex, and in many ways have come to dominate the work of the IOTC. The work of the IOTC Scientific Committee has been further guided over the years by the FAO (Fisheries Department) and key frameworks such as the Ecosystem-based Approach to Fisheries Management (EBA), the Pre-Cautionary Approach, and the International Plan of Action on Capacity Reduction (IPOA).

Set against this background, and also taking account of the fact that the IOTC Agreement pre-dates the UNFSA, and therefore is acknowledged to be weak in certain key areas (see Appendix 1: A1-5), an extensive series of Conservation and Management Measures (CMM) have been put in place to address fisheries development and management issues.

At the Commission sessions, Contracting Parties generally adopt Conservation and Management Measures by consensus, either as Resolutions which are binding, having due regard to the objection procedures (i.e. those measures adopted pursuant to Article IX of the IOTC Agreement), or Recommendations which are non-binding and thus subject to voluntary implementation (Appendix 1:A8).

The implementation of CMM is therefore ultimately the responsibility of the CPC, through their own national policy and legal processes. It is also the responsibility of the CPC to monitor and enforce these measures, and to deal with any violations. The IOTC Compliance Committee established in 2003 meets annually for three (3) days immediately prior to the Commission meeting to advise the Commission on compliance matters including reviewing CPCs implementation of, and compliance with, measures adopted by the Commission.

5.4. Policy Performance

Policy performance for the IOTC can be considered from three perspectives.

[1] First, to what extent have the IOTC objectives (outcomes) been achieved?

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The key outcomes specified in the policy statement (above) are:

“....... the conservation and optimum utilization of stocks covered by this Agreement....”

“...... and encouraging sustainable development of fisheries based on such stocks........”

It is not clear from the IOTC Agreement or subsequent documentation (on the IOTC website) whether any indicators for success, against which these outcomes could be measured, have ever been defined completely.

However, the most prominent success indicator for the work of the IOTC is clearly the ‘status of the stocks’ as defined by the so-called ‘Kobe Plots’ (Fig. 7). The Kobe Plots and the assessment of stock status for the five principal market tuna species within the Indian Ocean (IOTC area of competence), on the basis of the best available data, indicate that 4 out of 5 stocks are neither overfished, or threatened by overfishing. The only stock which appears to be under threat at the moment is the Yellowfin tuna.

The extent to which this outcome (assuming this can be judged as successful stock conservation) is attributable to the work and actions of the IOTC and its membership is difficult to determine. The measurement and performance of the other elements – optimum utilisation, and sustainable development of fisheries – appears not be undertaken or known at present.

Fig. 7. Combined Kobe plot for bigeye tuna (black: 2013), skipjack tuna (brown: 2014), yellowfin tuna (grey: 2015) and albacore (white: 2014) showing the estimates of current stock size (SB) and current fishing mortality (F) in relation to the interim target spawning stock size and interim target fishing mortality. Cross bars illustrate the range of uncertainty from the model runs. Note that for skipjack tuna, the estimates are highly uncertain as FMSY is poorly estimated, and as suggested for stock status advice it is better to use B0 as a biomass reference point and C(t) relative to CMSY as a fishing mortality reference point (Source: IOTC-SC18 2015 )

[2] How effective has the IOTC been as a fisheries development and management organisation?

Based on the assumption that a well-established and effective fisheries organisation, aligned to the achievement of its policy objectives, will lead to the achievement of the defined outcomes – can the status (quality) of the institution be determined? (This represents an indirect method – a way of assessing the potential for realising a policy outcome).

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In recent years, the IOTC has been subject to two performance reviews (2009 and 2016), which have identified key areas which need to be upgraded. The extent to which the initial recommended reforms (2009) have been completed are summarised in Table 8 below.

TABLE 8. IOTC – FOLLOW-UP ON PERFORMANCE REVIEW (2009) – CURRENT STATUS

Recommendation Area No. Completed

(%) Partially completed & ongoing

Pending Priority

IOTC Agreement Reform 1 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (100) High IOTC Agreement – Legal Analysis 1-2 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (100) High On Conservation and Management 3-46 8 (18) 31 (53) 5 (11) Low-High On Compliance and Enforcement 47-62 2 (13) 10 (63 ) 4 (25) Medium-High On Decision-making and Dispute Settlement 63-65 0 (0) 1 (33) 2 (66) High On International Cooperation 66-77 1 (8) 9 (75) 2 (16) Low-High On Financial and Administrative Issues 78-81 1 (25) 0 (0) 3 (75) Medium-High Total 82 12 (15) 51 (62) 19 (23) Data source: IOTC-PRIOTC02 (2016)

Overall, there has been an improvement in the quality of the organisation, but there are still some serious issues concerning its structure and function, especially compared to other RFMO – the Agreement itself and the Legal Framework are considered to be weak and remain ‘high priorities’ (but still ‘pending’). This suggests that the IOTC requires further development and reform before it can provide a high quality enabling environment for successful policy implementation. Some of the major issues involved will be discussed in the next section below.

[3] To what extent have the IOTC tuna fisheries contributed to Sustainable Development outcomes?

Assuming that sustainable development outcomes, for the IOTC member countries, are related, in part, to the generation of benefits in three key areas – economic benefits, social benefits and environmental benefits – from the tuna fisheries concerned, there may be data available to provide a basis for an assessment. Unfortunately, the information and assessments from the IOTC at present only deal with the environmental aspects (the status of the stocks). There is little or no consolidated analysis or knowledge of the other two benefit types – economic benefits (e.g. economic rent or financial returns) or social benefits (e.g. employment or food supply). The emphasis on ‘consolidated’ is important – to have an overview for the IO fisheries – because there is certainly a wide range of information available on economic/social benefits impacts throughout the IO at the national and fishery level which could form the basis of such analysis.

Overall, then, it seems highly likely that the IO tuna fisheries are making a positive contribution to SD in many IO countries, but it is difficult at present, without further analysis, to say whether these impacts are occurring at a high (or optimal) level. However, both theoretical and empirical evidence from many fisheries throughout the world have shown, without doubt, that unmanaged fisheries will inevitably become economically and biologically overexploited, with severe social impacts.

The question of whether the IOTC provides the right institutional arrangement and mechanism to manage the IO tuna fisheries into the future therefore becomes all the more important as new developments and pressures start to emerge – for example – there are various national tuna fishery development plans (e.g. India, Iran) now in progress which are likely, if implemented, to significantly increase fishing effort and put at risk both the stocks of principal and neritic tunas. This and other issues will be explored in the next section below.

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6. KEY ISSUES AFFECTING POLICY PERFORMANCE

6.1. Overview

In the following section, the key issues which appear to be affecting IOTC policy performance will be identified and examined. Drawing upon the information summarised in Appendix 1 and supplemented by the international literature, a Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (or SWOT) framework was used initially to summarise the main points (Table 9).

TABLE 9. SWOT ANALYSIS – KEY ISSUES AFFECTING IOTC POLICY PERFORMANCE Strengths

Weaknesses

1. Well-established IGO (RFMO) under FAO auspices, and part of UN system;

2. Policy plus supporting institutional arrangements and processes (PIP) in place;

3. Established constituency (CS and DWFN forming CPC) and links to other key players (Cooperating parties);

4. Good standard of fisheries science analysis to support decision-making;

5. Institutional adjustments in progress following on from two external reviews;

1. IOTC Agreement pre-dates the 1995 UNFSA and other instruments, shows weaknesses and mis-alignment;

2. Limited focus of Agreement (science-based, stock monitoring); economics and social perspectives lacking;

3. Fisheries management approach and implementation are weak;

4. Members’ Compliance with CMM is patchy; 5. Lack of institutional capacity at both

Commission and national levels (staff, expertise, processes, funding);

Opportunities

Threats

1. Huge renewable wealth of IO tuna resources, which could be harnessed fro SD, using suitable FMS;

2. Learning from the experiences of other RFMO globally;

3. Institutional learning and reform based on external reviews;

4. Greater engagement with non-CPC; 5. International funding to support future reform;

1. IOTC becomes side-lined by the national policy and implementation activities of IO CS and DWFNs (e.g. fleet development plans, fishing capacity increases);

2. IOTC does not fully represent nations with a ‘real interest’ in fishing;

3. Compliance by IOTC members does not improve (and even declines), and collaboration/agreement between nations is not achieved;

4. Loss of reputation and credibility due to various factors (reform inertia, FAO relationship, political influence of some nations in decision-making);

5. Rate of change within fisheries exceeds ability or capacity of IOTC processes to adapt or react in future;

The current level of policy performance shown by the IOTC (above) has been shaped, to a large degree, by the ‘Strengths’ and ‘Weaknesses’ identified in the SWOT analysis. The ‘Opportunities’ and ‘Threats’ will be dealt with in the next section on Future Issues.

6.2. Strengths

In terms of ‘Strengths’, first, there is no doubt that the IOTC is a well-established inter-governmental organisation and RFMO under the auspices of the UN FAO (Appendix 1:A8). This means that the current policy, institutional and process arrangements should be operating to a high standard in terms of international good governance norms for accountability, transparency and participation. The IOTC administrative system (e.g. personnel, finances, decision-making) is also integrated with and overseen

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by the UN FAO, which should also adhere to high operating standards. In terms of technical aspects, the IOTC can draw upon the in-house expertise of the FAO, particularly the Fisheries Department, and has ready access to the latest technical frameworks and information (e.g. Ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management, EBA).

Second, the IOTC Agreement does have a defined policy statement, which provides a focus for the RFMO. The policy objectives are set within institutional arrangements and processes, which should be geared towards the achievement of the associated outcomes, including a defined Secretariat, a Commission and supporting Scientific Committee and Technical Working Groups (See Appendix 1:A5).

Third, the realisation of the IOTC Agreement, aimed at key policy objectives and implemented through instruments such as the CMM, is underpinned by a large constituency of IOTC member countries. In other words, almost all the relevant CS and the DWFN with a ‘real interest’ in tuna fishing are Contracting Parties to the Commission (CPC). A number of countries also have the status of “Cooperating Non-CPC”. A small number of countries are classed as “Non-Cooperating and Non-CPC”. There are a number of initiatives underway to strengthen the IOTC membership, and ensure that all countries with a ‘real interest’ are included under the IOTC, consistent with other RFMO (see Appendix 1: A4, and A8).

Fourth, it has been acknowledged that the scientific analysis underpinning the work and decision-making is of a high standard (Appendix 1:A11). This concerns the programme on stock assessment and fishing exploitation analysis, in relation to the Kobe Plot reference points. It has also been recognised that significant efforts have been made to improve data quality and reporting from all the IOTC countries. The monitoring and assessment of the stock status for tuna and tuna-like species (and some sharks) is the largest and most involved programme operated by the IOTC.

Fifth, and finally, the current institutional arrangements for IOTC have been the subject of two external reviews in 2009 and 2016. The results and recommendations have enabled the IOTC to re-examine its PIP and to consider how specific reforms and adjustments may contribute to improved policy performance in the future. A number of programmes are now in place to act upon the recommendations of the external reviews (Table 8).

Overall, therefore, the ‘Strengths’ identified for the IOTC show in particular that this RFMO is a well-established organisation with defined policy, institutional arrangements and processes, formed and operated under the auspices of the UN FAO. There is a large and quite comprehensive membership – forming a constituency of countries with a ‘real interest’ in tuna fishing. In principle, these arrangements provide an enabling environment for the achievement of [1] the defined policy objectives of the IOTC; [2] the efficient and effective operation of the organisation; and [3] a positive contribution to sustainable development (economic, social and environmental benefits). In reality, however, the level of policy performance can be judged to be relatively low, and certainly partial (as highlighted above). Some of the reasons for this outcome have been identified in the next section.

6.3. Weaknesses

In terms of ‘Weaknesses’, the first major issue is that the IOTC Agreement pre-dates the pivotal 1995 UNFSA – which sets out the international framework and instruments for the exploitation and management of tuna and other highly-migratory fish stocks. As a result, there are a number of important deficiencies and shortcomings in the IOTC Agreement (see Appendix 1:A1). It has been proposed that the current IOTC Agreement should be replaced (modernised) (Appendix 1: E).

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Second, the IOTC Agreement has a particular focus on fish stock assessment and monitoring. While this science-based approach to fisheries assessment is important, it is also important to consider other dimensions, and especially both economic and social aspects (which together can be used to assess the contribution to SD). Both of these areas are inadequately analysed and reported under the IOTC, and do not appear to be part of any decision-making process by the Commission (Appendix 1: A5).

Third, the approach to fisheries management and its implementation under the IOTC has been identified as weak (see Appendix 1:A.3 and especially Appendix 1: C). Appropriate fisheries management systems and processes, drawing upon the principles outlined in the 1995 UNFSA, have not been adequately developed (e.g. the definition of Fisheries Management Units, Fisheries Management Plans and Catch Allocation ) (see Appendix 1: A.4 – 5 - 9). Instead, the IOTC has reacted to fisheries management issues by the development of further CMM for consideration, adoption and implementation by the CPC – although the IOTC provides limited guidance on implementation duties and obligations (Appendix 1A:10).

Fourth, related to the major issue of fisheries management is the relationship between member states and their willingness to cooperate and share responsibility for rules to be implemented within the shared tuna fisheries of the IO. It is clear that at present the level of compliance over the implementation and enforcement of CMM varies greatly between countries. Without a high degree of compliance, the level of success which can be achieved for the management of shared fisheries will be low. The Compliance Committee has only become more active in recent years (Appendix 1:A5).

Fifth, and finally, despite the many developments which have taken place in recent years under the IOTC Agreement, and particularly improved stock monitoring and the development of relevant CMM, the overall policy process and its implementation is constrained by a lack of institutional capacity at both Commission and national levels. This includes numbers of staff, relevant technical expertise, development of key processes for fisheries management and operational funding (Appendix 1:A11) (Also Appendix 1:E.3).

Overall, then, the ‘Weaknesses’ identified above certainly help to understand the reasons why the level of policy achievement is both low and partial. The IOTC policy development and implementation processes have not yet fully taken account of the 1995 UNFSA (and other international instruments), and there continues to be a large emphasis on fish stock assessment and monitoring (as a primary activity), without consideration of other elements (economic and social) relevant to SD.

The most serious lacuna in the whole set-up is the area of fisheries management, which points towards the need for the future development and implementation of appropriate fisheries management systems. While this remains a major challenge, there are important lessons which can be learned from other RFMO concerned with tuna (see below). The critical issue of compliance within the IOTC clearly has the potential to seriously undermine any attempt to manage shared fish stocks unless it addressed, and once again there are lessons from both theoretical and empirical sources from around the world which can be used in the future (see below).

Finally, the development and implementation of fisheries policy depends on a critical level of institutional capacity. It is clear that this is an area which requires serious attention if shared fisheries management arrangements are to work for IO tuna in the future.

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7. FUTURE POLICY ISSUES

7.1. Overview

In the following section, a range of future policy issues will be identified and examined. The first entry-point for this exercise is the SWOT analysis (above) – focusing in particular on the ‘Opportunities’ and the ‘Threats’ – and second, with further information from the international literature.

7.2. Opportunities

In terms of “Opportunities”, the first major issue concerns the potential economic value of the IO tuna fish stocks, and how a better knowledge and understanding of this value could be used to stimulate the reform and strengthening of the policy framework, along with an appropriate fisheries management system in the future.

In an earlier and related report (Neiland, 2016), it was shown that there is limited information on the economic characteristics of the tuna fisheries of the Indian Ocean. In this regard, two recent and alternative economic valuations are shown in Table 10 below. Both indicate, albeit based on relatively simple methodology, that the IO tuna resources have a high (potential) value, and also are significant in the context of the current value of economic activity in the Bay of Bengal Region as a whole.

TABLE 10. INDIAN OCEAN TUNA RESOURCES – ECONOMIC VALUATION

[1] Pew (2016) (based on tuna landings and market prices)

Global landings: 4.99 million metric tons Dock value (ex-vessel value): USD 9.76 billion

End value (end of value chain): USD 42.21 billion Indian Ocean Landings

Dock value USD 2.32 billion End value USD 8.72 billion

[2] BOBP-IGO/Neiland (2016) (economic rent based on landings and market prices)

Indian Ocean landings (mt)

Estimated potential annual sustainable economic Value (rent) USD 2.06 billion Capitalised asset value of tuna stocks (giving 8% return) USD 26 billion

Value of current economic activity in the region: India USD 2,067 billion

Tamil Nadu USD 167 billion Kerala USD 77 billion

Sri Lanka USD 67 billion Maldives USD 2.3 billion

For a majority of fisheries worldwide, policy objectives have focused mainly on increasing sustainable catches, measured in terms of the physical weight of fish (tonnage). Fisheries management systems and the underpinning science-based decision-making processes have also been aligned to this objective, along with investment and development policies aimed at capitalising and expanding fleets, fishing effort and infrastructure. Unfortunately, in many countries, while fisheries expanded rapidly,

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the fisheries management systems were often ineffective, unable to keep pace and unable to prevent both economic and biological overexploitation.

By taking an economic perspective on fisheries exploitation (and the generation and use of fisheries benefits), a new set of important policy issues are revealed as follows:

[i] The large ‘economic’ values for tuna fisheries (Table 10) show ‘what is at stake’ in exploiting these huge ocean resources. Fish stocks are valuable forms of natural capital, and when managed carefully can generate a resource rent (the inherent wealth). This important characteristic of renewable natural resources has been analysed and measured both theoretically and empirically. The consequence of weak and ineffective management can be measured in terms of the loss of potential wealth.

Furthermore, it is important for policy-makers to understand the potential impact of different policy choices in terms of the level of wealth generation, and the trade-off involved when economic objective are not prioritised.

[ii] Understanding how ‘economic values’ are defined is also important (e.g. a simple arithmetic valuation of fisheries turnover (landings x price) takes no account of the cost of fishing, and it is well known that unmanaged (or weakly managed) fisheries will tend towards overexploitation – a situation whereby costs equal (or exceed) revenues - as fishermen increasingly compete with one another for a greater share of the potential catch.

[iii] For a well-managed fishery, the expected sustainable level of resource rent will be at least 40% of the turnover of the fishery (a useful ‘rule of thumb’). With further dedicated management and sector adjustments (as fishing firms react to appropriate market incentives, adopt greater operational efficiencies and consider alternative product development), the level of rent generation will increase (as the gap between total costs and revenues widen);

[iv] Once the inherent wealth of the fish resources is generated, it can be shared by the stakeholders involved (government and industry in the first instance). What is often overlooked, however, is that the wealth generated has the potential to contribute to economic growth through different routes. Re-investing the fisheries wealth (the investable surplus) in the fisheries sector is certainly one option – but this investment should also be weighed against other non-fishery investments also – in order to secure the best return – which will be good for economic growth and good for society too in the long run.

[v] The actual (current) economic value of the tuna stocks in the IO is not known (in terms of the current levels of resource rent being generated). However, it seems unlikely any of the fisheries involved is generating economic rents at a level close to the potential value (above) under current management arrangements. The OPP-Bay of Bengal will address this issue in the future through various follow-up studies.

[vi] The realisation of the potential economic returns from both the principal market tuna and neritic tuna fisheries, indicated above, would be significant for the countries involved. Improved economic performance in the future could come from three routes: (1) critically from improved management at the harvesting level, (2) from increased catch up to MSY and (3) from improved performance throughout the value chain (but 2 and 3 depend on 1 of course). It should be noted that these results are at the resource level, but the results at country level will depend on how the resources or the economic benefits from their exploitation are shared.

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[vii] At present time, there are no estimations of the economic value of the tuna stocks on a national basis using the type of approach shown above (to estimate asset value and economic rent). Clearly, this information would be useful to fisheries policy-makers in the future.

Second, a comparative analysis of RFMO performance, on a worldwide basis, in relation to recent policy, structural and process reforms (to varying degrees) presents a good opportunity for lesson-learning for the IOTC. There are 5 tuna RFMO with responsibility for fisheries management in 91% of the world’s ocean area. The recent IOTC external review has made reference to a number of other RFMO and agreements in certain places to highlight some key entry-points. For example

“Other international arrangements (e.g. the Antigua Convention, the WCPFC and the GFCM) recognise, at least to some degree, the relevant provisions of the LOSC, the UNFSA, and the Compliance Agreement. Specifically, the amended preamble of the GFCM Agreement and the preamble of the WCPFC Convention note that effective conservation and management require the application of the precautionary approach and the best scientific information available, and to take into account ecosystem considerations as it recognises the need to avoid adverse impact on the marine environment, preserve biodiversity as well as to maintain the integrity of marine ecosystems.” (Appendix 1, Section A)

However, for international tuna fisheries management, the case of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCFO) is particularly interesting. With an annual output of over 4 million mt, the largest tuna fisheries in the world are shared by some 15 PIC (with large adjoining EEZ and peripheral ABNJ), and exploited mainly by DWFN (from Japan, Korea, EU, Korea and others) under a variety of different fishing arrangements (e.g. FFA, chartering etc) with the PIC. The DWFN account for the largest share of the catches, and operate large modern fleets. Up until recently the PIC received a comparatively low level of benefit from the tuna fisheries, measured in terms of local catches, and some revenues from the agreed fishing arrangements (estimated as rate of return on licensing fees of 5-6% of the total value of the annual fish landings) (as highlighted in Sections 3.8 and 3.9 above).

However, in recent years, the benefits received by the island states has increased significantly (to over 8-13% of the value of annual fish landings) due to important institutional changes and reforms. In 1982, eight PIC signed an agreement to work together to manage their shared tuna resources within a large combined EEZ. The so-called Parties to the Nauru Agreement Countries (PNA) initially established uniform terms and conditions under which the Parties may licence foreign vessels to fish, and principles for granting access, and eventually established a Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) selling access rights to DWFN in a coordinated manner (as explained more fully in Section 3.8. above). The PNA-VDS is continuing to evolve and improve, but it is has certainly proved to be a positive ‘game changer’ for tuna fisheries management in the WCPO. The key principles underpinning the PNA-VDS have now also been incorporated into the RFMO (the WCPFC), and there are increasing opportunities to apply and leverage the FM processes in both the EEZ and ABNJ, which is really important given the extensive distribution of the tuna stocks.

There is no doubt that the PNA-VDS does not offer a blue-print for future IO tuna fisheries development and management. The two situations are very different in terms of geography, the types and numbers of fishing nations involved, and the types of fisheries involved. However, there are important lessons which are relevant, in particular, to the reform of institutional arrangements, and investment in new arrangements for the future, which were also indicated earlier (Section 3 above), including:

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- Understanding what is at stake (the potential sustainable value of the fish stocks – Section 3 above);

- Understanding the key economic principles; - Agreement on collective action between regional stakeholders on fisheries management; - Leadership from a coalition of stakeholders with greatest interest in the fishery (so-called

“Champions for Change”); - Capacity-building for institutions in key areas (analysis, MCS, negotiation); - Early external support and investment; - It takes time, but early benefits can consolidate and grow;

Third, the recent external reviews of the IOTC also offer a number of important opportunities for the design and implementation of institutional reforms concerning the IO tuna fisheries. The recommendations of the recent review, in particular, are highly relevant to new thinking about the future. Three areas can be highlighted (Appendix 1: E) as follows:

- the need to capitalise upon the framework provided by the 1995 UNFSA in designing new policy and management arrangements, and promoting compliance;

- the importance of capacity-building and enabling participation by all countries with a ‘real fishing interest’ (possibly creating a platform for a coalition sub-set to initiate innovative changes);

- the option of dis-engaging from the FAO and allowing the IOTC to develop as a standalone organisation (even by adopting a corporate approach as suggested by the Bellagio Conference, highlighted earlier);

Fourth, in terms of the relationships between the countries with a ‘real interest’ in fishing in the IO, there are currently a number which remain outside the IOTC, as non-cooperating and non-CPC (accounting for <5% total annual tuna catch at present). Recent experience has shown that it is possible to engage with these States, and that in the long-run, it is in the general interest to seek a more inclusive approach to fisheries management. Diplomatic routes for communication have proved successful in recent years, and there may be further opportunities to pursue this in the future.

Fifth, the reform of the international institutional governance arrangements for the IO will take time, and will require investment and funding support. This could come from many sources – multi-lateral funds, national funds and private funds – or some combination. The development of an initial strategic plan for reform should be accompanied by an investment strategy and business plan to provide an entry-point for investors. At the beginning, an appropriate organisation (e.g. development agency or multi-lateral donor) could provide the initial investment and support to kick-start the process (a factor which was important in the WCPO also, as indicated in Section 3 above).

7.3. Threats

In terms of “Threats”, the first issue to highlight is the possibility that the IOTC will become sidelined in the future management of IO tuna by the increasingly powerful impact of national policy and implementation activities by certain IO coastal states and some DWFN. For example, it is well-acknowledged that the cumulative fishing capacity proposed under fleet development plans by CS is predicted to far exceed what the IOTC scientific advice considers to be appropriate in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of the tuna fisheries (see Appendix 1:C).

Second, it is also well-recognised worldwide, that for an RFMO to be effective, it must include all nations with a ‘real interest’ in fishing as part of its constituency. The only way that shared stocks and HMS can be managed is to ensure cooperation between the fishing nations, both CS and DWFN,

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involved in the fisheries. At present, there are some concerns over this issue, and the IOTC will be weakened into the future unless it is resolved (Appendix 1:A4).

Third, the effective operation and successful impact of an RFMO depends on the compliance of its members with policy decisions and implementation. There are also on-going concerns about the level of compliance under the IOTC. Although steps have been taken to improve the situation (by increased transparency for example) in recent years, there is still an urgent need to improve the level of compliance even further (Appendix 1:A7).

Fourth, there is a threat to the standing and the credibility of the IOTC as an effective RFMO due to a number of factors. For a start, the extent of reform within the organisation, following the 1nd IOTC performance review (2009), has been relatively slow (only 15% of recommended changes have been completed as shown in Table 8 above). Furthermore, there are concerns over the continued relationship with the UN FAO (and whether a fully independent RFMO would work more effectively) (Appendix 1:A8) (Also see Appendix 1: E). Also whether the internal governance of the IOTC favours the long-established members, with significant fishing fleets, who may exert political influence over key decision-making processes (the fact that at least six CPC, on average, do not attend the annual meeting of the Commission is also relevant).

Fifth, and finally, there are indications that certain stocks (e.g. Yellowfin and various neritc tuna) are threatened by overexploitation. The IOTC scientific work has been recognised to be a good standard, despite on-going problems with data availability and quality. However, even if the scientists monitoring the stock status are able to better predict and monitor important changes in the future – such as a stock decline or an environmental impact - which require a coordinated and timely response in terms of fisheries management, it seems unlikely that the current IOTC fisheries management arrangements would be adequate for this task (Appendix 1: C).

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8. INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE MANAGEMENT

The analysis of the current institutional arrangements for tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean which focus on the IOTC – the RFMO established to provide the overarching framework and mechanisms to manage the huge IO tuna resources, spread over a vast ocean and shared by nearly 40 countries – reveals both the significant opportunities as well as the serious challenges involved.

The IOTC is a relatively youthful organisation (20 years) and two recent performance reviews have identified a range of areas where improvements and adjustments are needed urgently.

In reviewing the SWOT (above), it can be argued that the reforms required to establish an appropriate organisation capable of creating an enabling environment through appropriate institutional development for the effective management of the IO tuna fisheries requires more than the current ‘incremental approach’ which is being adopted (see also Appendix 1:E).

The alternative approach would be to adopt a ‘transformational approach’. One which is characterised by a wide-ranging series of reforms at all levels (a so-called ‘root and branch’ approach).

The discipline of ‘change management’ is well-established worldwide and draws extensively on empirical experience from both the public and private sectors3. It is viewed in a very positive manner by successful organisations throughout the world, who understand the need to continue to innovate and adapt to changing context and conditions in order to maintain and improve performance. Among the numerous approaches, the “Eight Step Change Model” developed at Harvard Business School by Kotter (2012), is well-recognised, and provides a useful basis for considering how a process of transformational change might work for the IOTC in the future. It is also interesting to compare this framework with the fisheries development framework, which focused on a series of sequential steps, presented in Table 4 (above). There are many commonalities.

The result of the application of the Kotter Model to the case of the IOTC, drawing on the earlier SWOT analysis, is presented in Table 11. A series of key entry-points concerning the possible reform of the IOTC have been identified. The early steps are particularly important including - the need to inspire action and promote urgency (and also cooperation) amongst key players (to focus on the huge potential sustainable wealth of the tuna fisheries, and, also the threat from overexploitation), - to install a temporary guiding team of external experts (or enhance the existing organisation through capacity-building), - to develop a vision and implementation strategy (working with stakeholders, perhaps focusing on ‘early wins’ and possible demonstration pilot fisheries), and – to ensure appropriate investment funding to support the transition process (which can also be cast as an opportunity for the public and /or private sector to engage and secure a ‘bankable investment or

3 The literature on organizational change management, in particular, is large and diverse. Two websites which provide useful

entry-points include: (http://managementhelp.org/organizationalchange/index.htm) (http://www.businessballs.com/changemanagement.htm)

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project ’ for the future, that will yield a good return based on social welfare and /or private benefit criteria).

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TABLE 11: TRANSFORMATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE FRAMEWORK (Kotter, 2012)

STEP ACTIONS POSSIBLE ENTRY-POINTS FOR IOTC 1 Increase urgency Inspire stakeholders and

constituents to be pro-active; Make objectives real and relevant.

• Focus on the potential sustainable wealth of the tuna resources, and the contribution to SD;

• Also the potential loss to in-action assessed; • The current risks of overexploitation highlighted; • Enable the ‘leaders’ to emerge

2. Build the guiding team

Get the right persons in place with the right commitment, and the right mix of skills and levels.

• Enhance the current Secretariat through capacity-building, or

• Recruit a specialist team (on contract) with a view to creating a new ‘IO Tuna fisheries authority’

• Or both the above, using a transition process 3. Get the vision

right Get the team to establish a vision and a strategy; Focus on innovations to drive improved service and efficiency.

• Agree a visioning process (for /with whom?) • Develop a vision in relation to SD benefits • Introduce new approach to fisheries management • Consider working on a fishery by fishery basis

(building blocks for the future) • Develop and agree strategy

4. Communicate for buy-in

Involve as many stakeholders as possible, communicate the essentials simply, and to appeal and respond to needs; De-clutter communications and make technology work for you rather than against;

• Develop a communications plan in relation to the transformation process

• Compare communications options, and select specific methods

• Capacity-building for communications.

5. Empower action Remove obstacles, enable constructive feedback and lots of support from leaders - reward and recognise progress and achievements.

• Focus on strategy implementation • Establish /agree financing plan (‘Bankable projects’) • Build further institutional capacity

6. Create short-term wins

Set aims that are easy to achieve - in bite-size chunks. Manageable numbers of initiatives. Finish current stages before starting new ones.

• Focus on most valuable fisheries initially, and also stakeholders with ‘greatest interest’; Clear reforms and changes implemented where significant returns (impacts) can be achieved;

• Also clearly identifiable ‘pilot’ fisheries for longer term strategy;

• To demonstrate new approach to FM; • To show how objectives (benefits) can be realised • Also how sustainability increased, risks reduced;

7. Capitalise on early gains

Foster and encourage determination and persistence - ongoing change - encourage ongoing progress reporting - highlight achieved and future milestones

• Positive outcomes from both early interventions and pilot fisheries documented and communicated;

• Lessons learned incorporated into Phase 2 strategic plan, and agreed reached with cooperating parties;

8. Re-enforce change

Reinforce the value of successful change via recruitment, promotion, and new change leaders. Weave change into culture.

• Further institutional capacity-building aligned to strategy implementation;

• Political support rallied and directed; • Financing plan as a core activity also.

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9. CONCLUSIONS

The current report examines the tuna fisheries of the Indian Ocean from an international perspective, and focuses, in particular, on the role, operation and performance of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). There are five main conclusions as follows:

[1] The tuna fish stocks of the Indian Ocean represent a large and valuable renewable resource which can make a significant contribute to sustainable development for the IO coastal states, in particular, into the future. However, at the present time, there is relatively little analysis or information on the scale or nature of this contribution, and the current report draws on recent calculations from both the Pew organisations, and the BOBP-IGO, to support this claim.

[2] The international nature and characteristics of the tuna stocks and the associated fisheries are identified in this report, showing that nearly 40 nations, mainly CS, are involved, along with some of the major DWFN, such as the EU, Japan, Korea and China. Given the highly migratory nature of the principal market tuna, such as Yellowfin and Skipjack, the fisheries are located in both EEZ and ABNJ (high seas) areas. The IO fisheries show wide diversity in terms of fleets, fishing methods, markets and products – representing a major challenge to developing a coordinated approach for the management of the shared fish stocks.

[3] The majority of the nations with a ‘real interest’ in the IO tuna fisheries are members of the IOTC – a tuna-RFMO established in 1996 under the auspices of the FAO. Analysis of the policy performance of the IOTC revealed a partial outcome – the status of the major tuna stocks was considered to be healthy (with some concerns for Yellowfin) (a positive outcome for the environmental objective) – however, it was difficult to make an assessment of performance in terms of economic and social outcomes (in order to establish the possible contribution to sustainable development in these three dimensions – the so-called ‘triple bottom-line’).

[4] The results of a SWOT analysis, underpinned by the recent external performance review of the IOTC, highlighted important opportunities, and also challenges, at the international level for the IO tuna fisheries. Most significantly, the large and renewable potential wealth of the fish stocks could make a major contribution to sustainable development, but this would depend on the establishment, above all things, of effective fisheries management systems. A review of key themes concerning fisheries and tuna fisheries governance, as part of this report, also revealed that there are important principles and international lesson-learning, which might be applied in the IO. The case of the PNA-VDS, also part of the WCPFC, demonstrates a new and innovative approach to shared fisheries management, in both EEZ and ABNJ, and the increased generation and use of fisheries wealth.

[5] The major challenge for the IO tuna fisheries will be the design and operationalisation of appropriate fisheries management systems in the future. The recent IOTC performance review suggests that serious reform is required – especially to upgrade fisheries management. The challenge of reforming a large RFMO is a major one, but as shown in the case of the PNA and the WCPFC, it is possible to make changes and improvements. The current report highlights some of the entry-points to initiate a transformational process, drawing lessons from the PNA-VDS and elsewhere. Early steps include the need to inspire action and urgency, to install a guiding team of external experts (or enhance the existing organisation), to develop a vision and strategy, and ensure appropriate funding investment. Finally, it can be argued that the IOTC has been faced a hugely complex challenge in attempting to manage IO tuna fisheries, and that its work to date, especially in fisheries analysis, provides the essential basis for moves towards improved exploitation arrangements in the future.

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Mullon, C., P. Guillotreau, E.D. Galbraith, J. Fortilus, C. Chaboud, L. Bopp, O. Aumont, D. Kaplan (IN PRESS) Exploring future scenarios for the global supply chain of tuna. Deep Sea Research Part II: Topical Studies in Oceanography.

Munro, G. (2014) The Legal and Economic Principles Underlying Foreign Fishing Arrangements. Appendix A. Pp.45-61. In: World Bank. Trade in Fishing Services: Emerging Perspectives on Foreign Fishing Arrangements. Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice Discussion Paper #01. Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank Group Report Number 92662-glb. 153pp.

Neiland, A.E. (2016) Preliminary Characterisation of the Fisheries Sector in the Indian Ocean with particular reference to Tuna Fisheries in the Bay of Bengal: (I) Environmental and Economic Aspects. Report for the World Bank/GEF-Funded Oceans Partnership Project (OPP) – Bay of Bengal implemented by the Bay of Bengal Programme Inter-Government Organisation (BOBP-IGO), Chennai, India. Neiland, A.E. , Cunningham, S. , Arbuckle, M. , Baio, A. , Bostock, T. , Coulibaly, D. , Gitonga, N. , Long, R. and Sei, S. (2016) Assessing the Potential Contribution of Fisheries to Economic Development —The Case of Post-Ebola Sierra Leone. Natural Resources, 7, 356-376.

Neiland, A.E., Sampath, V.S. and Srinivasan, R. Integrated Fisheries Policy Analysis Toolbox (IFPAT). Fisheries Management for Sustainable Livelihoods (FIMSUL) Project in Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, India (FAO/UTF/IND/180/IND). Work-Package 2: Fisheries Policy Development.

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Noye, J. and K. Mfodwo (2012) First steps towards a quota allocation system in the Indian Ocean. Marine Policy, Volume 36, Issue 4, July 2012, Pages 882-894

World Bank (2004). The nature of success in fisheries management. PROFISH series policy brief ; no. 1. Washington DC; World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/930521468314050467/The-nature-of-success-in-fisheries-management

World Bank (2004). Key concepts part one: fisheries management systems and governance. PROFISH series policy brief; no. 12. Washington DC; World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/898841468153270025/Key-concepts-part-one-fisheries-management-systems-and-governance

World Bank (2014) Trade in Fishing Services: Emerging Perspectives on Foreign Fishing Arrangements. Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice Discussion Paper #01. Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank Group Report Number 92662-glb. 153pp.

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APPENDIX 1: Indian Ocean Tuna Commission – Profile – Plus Summary of Review Comments (Legal and General) – Based on the 2nd IOTC Review (2016)

PROFILE COMMENTS (1) COMMENTS (2)

Reference and Date

Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) Agreement (1996)

Legal analysis IOTC–PRIOTC02

Review and Recommendations IOTC–PRIOTC02

(A) Institutional Setting and Processes

[1] Overview (IOTC Article 1) Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (Agreed 1993, in force 27 March 1996). An intergovernmental organisation established under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution, prior to the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), which provide a global framework for the implementation of the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) for straddling and highly migratory fisheries resources. Moreover, the IOTC is the only tuna-RFMO located with the FAO framework.

There is no reference to the elements contained in the UNFSA Article 8 including, inter alia, that States with a real interest becoming members of the RFMO and only members to the organisation or those who agree to apply measures established by such an RFMO shall have access to the fishery resources. (p.70)

The Agreement sets out basic functions and responsibilities of the Commission that are more consistent with the LOSC, but do not take into account the additional details provided in UNFSA. Specifically, the Commission is only required to review the condition and trends of the stocks, gather and analyse scientific information (catch and effort data) relevant to the conservation and management of the stocks; undertake research and development activities (e.g. transfer of technology or training); adopt Conservation and Management Measures based on scientific evidence; and to keep under review the socio-economic aspects of the fisheries (Article 2, paragraph 2). Other international arrangements (e.g. the Antigua Convention, the WCPFC and the GFCM) recognise, at least to some degree, the relevant provisions of the LOSC, the UNFSA, and the Compliance Agreement. Specifically, the amended preamble of the GFCM Agreement and the preamble of the WCPFC Convention note that effective conservation and management require the application of the precautionary approach and the best scientific information available, and to take into account ecosystem considerations as it recognises the need to avoid adverse impact on the marine environment, preserve biodiversity as well as to maintain the integrity of marine ecosystems. (p.15) As ratifications of a new or amended agreement by all Members may take a rather long time, the PRIOTC02 noted the interim solution by the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, declaring that the amendments shall apply when interpreting and implementing the Convention until such time when the amendments have entered into force (http://www.neafc.org/system/files/London-Declaration.pdf). (p.14) The IOTC Agreement does not contain a provision on “definitions”/“use of terms”, but some terms are found in various provisions throughout the text. All modern treaties contain definitions of “fishing”/”fishing activities”, “fishing vessel”/”vessel”, while the amended

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GFCM Agreement also define “fishing capacity, “fishing effort” and “fishing related activities” (p.15)

[2] Areas of Competence (Article II) The Agreement refers to the Indian Ocean as defined by the FAO Statistical Areas, specifically areas 51 and 57, and the adjacent seas, north of the Antarctic Convergence zone, as its area of competence.

The treaty does not specify the application to exclusive economic zones, territorial seas or archipelagic waters. However, the obligation is on states to implement compatible measures in waters under national jurisdiction in accordance with Article 7 of UNFSA remains.

There are four key fisheries in the Indian Ocean under the IOTC: [1] Small scale fisheries: mainly within the EEZs of CPCs and account > 50% of all IOTC catches; for almost all neritic species and a share of tropical tunas, swordfish and Albacore. [2] Industrial and semi-industrial fisheries (three main segments): [2.1.] Purse seine fishery and the pole-and-line fishery: Targeting schools of skipjack tuna, but also catching Yellowfin tuna and Bigeye tuna bound for canneries for the European and American markets. [2.2.] Longline fisheries: One component of the longline fishery targets adult Bigeye tuna and Yellowfin tuna bound for the sashimi markets, primarily in Japan. A second component of the longline fishery operates at higher latitudes targeting swordfish primarily in the western Indian Ocean, and Albacore throughout the Indian Ocean (but increasingly in the eastern Indian Ocean). [2.3.] Gillnet fleets: Including multi-gear fisheries mainly operating through Asia and the Middle East, with all species targeted. (p.8)

[3] Species and Stocks (Article III) The Agreement covers and lists 16 specific species. There are species listed in LOSC that the IOTC Agreement does not have a specific mandate to conserve or manage. .

Other RFMOs, for example WCPFC simply states that the Convention is consistent with the UNFSA thereby requiring the provisions to be interpreted and applied in the context of and consistent with the LOSC while also referring to the UNFSA.

The limited scope of the IOTC Agreement means that there is incomplete fisheries management and conservation coverage in the Agreement’s area of competence. However, despite the limited scope of the Agreement text itself, the Commission has expanded its mandate, through a number of decisions, to other species, which the tuna fisheries impact upon, for example seabirds, marine turtles, marine mammals and sharks.

[4] Membership (Article IV) Membership is restricted to members and associate members of FAO, however, States that are not members of FAO, but members of the United Nations might be admitted to become parties of IOTC, provided that their application receives support by two-thirds of the IOTC parties. In addition, both categories of applicants must either be a coastal State wholly or partly situated within the Convention area or vessels flying their flag fishing for stocks covered by the IOTC Agreement. However,

Article 8 of UNFSA provides that States with a ‘real interest’ in the fisheries may become members of the relevant RFMO but the term ‘real interest’ is not defined. In practice real interest is generally taken to be that members of RFMOs at least should include coastal States situated within or facing the RFMO’s regulatory area and States fishing for stocks in the area. UNFSA applies to all fishing players, meaning that all having a real interest in a fishery

There are currently 32 Contracting Parties (Members) and five (5) Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties to the IOTC Agreement (p.10) Since the IOTC legal framework was negotiated and entered into force, several international instruments concerning the management of world fishery resources have been agreed. Key global legally binding instruments are: a) the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) b) the FAO Port State Measure Agreement (PSMA) c) the FAO Compliance Agreement. Interestingly, the comparison of which IOTC Contracting Parties are party to these overarching international instruments, also highlights constraints limiting the ability of the IOTC to perform effectively and efficiently (not all CPC are party to all the instruments). (p.14) Both the Antigua Convention and the WCPFC Convention would allow all fishing players to participate in the work by their respective commissions. The WCPFC Convention lists those

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in practice the IOTC has never been asked to consider a membership application, rather new members simply deposit an instrument of accession with the depositary – the FAO.

managed by an RFMO should be entitled to become members of that RFMO. The IOTC should establish clear guidelines to assess real interest particularly in light of memberships from States such as Sierra Leone and Guinea.

States who are entitled to become members by ratification, while others might become members by accession after the Convention entered into force given they have vessels and nationals wishing to conduct fishing in the Convention area for stocks covered by the Convention. Accession requires consensus. Only a few technical and clarifying changes are made to the membership provision of amended GFCM Agreement, which means that only members or associate members of the FAO and such non-member States of the United Nations may join the organisation. In contrast, parties to the previous IATTC Convention of 1949 are entitled to become party to the new Antigua Convention, and this entitlement further applies to States with a coastline bordering the Convention area and those who have a history of fishing for stocks covered by the Antigua Convention. (p.16)

[5] Functions and Responsibilities The relevant paragraph of the article makes reference to the relevant articles of LOSC (Article 119), but not UNFSA.

The functions of the IOTC Commission are limited and do not take account of functions described in UNFSA such as agreeing participatory fishing rights and a means of accommodating the fishing interests of new members in relation to catch and/or effort allocations or appropriate levels of fishing effort relative to the sustainable use of the resources; establishing minimum standards for responsible conduct of fishing operations; obtaining and evaluating scientific advice and setting minimum standards for the collection and verification of fisheries data related to the target, non-target, associated and dependent species and the ecosystem more broadly; establishing and implementing cost effective monitoring, control and surveillance measures; dispute settlement and cooperation with national fisheries agencies.

The Commission is the governing body of the IOTC and composed of member countries according as set out in Article IV of the Agreement. (p.9) The functions of the Commission are described in Article V, paragraph 2 of the IOTC Agreement. The provision includes a general reference to principles expressed in the relevant provisions of the LOSC and outlines that when carrying out the functions and responsibilities, the Commission shall i) review, analyse and disseminate scientific information and other data, ii) encourage, recommend and coordinate research and development activities, iii) adopt, on the basis of scientific evidence, conservation and management measures, iv) keep under review economic and social aspects and v) to carry out such other activities as may be necessary to fulfil the objectives. This is coupled with the general clause contained in Article V, paragraph 3 that gives the Commission power to “adopt decisions and recommendations, as required, with a view to furthering the objectives of this Agreement” (p.17) Note: The WCPFC, the Antigua and the GFCM treaties correlate to the UNFSA, and also go further, also the GFCM (see list of functions, p.17) Sessions of the Commission are normally held annually. The officers of the Commission are elected from the delegates or alternates present at Commission meetings and hold office for a two-year term which can be renewed for a further two years (one additional term). (p.10) Article XII of the IOTC Agreement establishes the Scientific Committee, but the IOTC Agreement does not give any guidance on the functions or tasks of the Scientific Committee, nor does it establish any formal link between the Scientific Committee and the Commission. The functions and mode of operation of the Scientific Committee are provided in the Commission’s Rules of Procedure (2014). The Scientific Committee was formally created at the 1st Session of the Commission. (p.11)

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Other RFMOs have stand-alone provisions to describe the functions of the Commission, which are consistent with the provisions of UNFSA.

In practice the Scientific Committee advises the Commission on research and data collection, on the status of stocks and on management issues. Participants in the Scientific Committee are associated with the delegations from the Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties (CPCs), observer organisations and invited experts. In additional to the permanent Scientific Committee, there are a range of permanent working parties that work together to provide advice to the Commission. (p.11) The primary function of the Scientific Committee’s working parties is to analyse, in detail, technical issues related to the management goals of the Commission. For example, working parties related to the different species analyse the status of the stock and offer options to the Scientific Committee for management recommendations to the Commission. The Working Parties are open to interested and technically-competent participants and their reports are directed to the Scientific Committee. There are currently seven (7) Working Parties, mandated under the IOTC Rules of Procedure (2014) that meet annually: � WP on Billfish (WPB) � WP on Data Collection and Statistics (WPDCS) � WP on Ecosystems and Bycatch (WPEB). � WP on Methods (WPM) � WP on Neritic Tunas (WPNT) � WP on Temperate Tunas (WPTmT) � WP on Tropical Tunas (WPTT). (p.11) There are three other committees (p.11): [1] Compliance Committee established in 2003, but it has only been in the recent past that the Commission has taken a more active approach to compliance of its members. The Compliance Committee currently meets annually for three (3) days immediately prior to the Commission meeting to advise the Commission on compliance matters including reviewing CPCs implementation of, and compliance with, measures adopted by the Commission. At present, the Compliance Committee is not supported by any Working Parties. [2] Standing Committee on Administration and Finance is the subsidiary body that provides advice on administrative and financial matters and was established in 2003. The Commission adopted its Financial Regulations in 1999, and is guided by Article XIII of the Agreement. The Commission is required to adopt, by consensus, its own autonomous budget and apportion contribution payments according to the schedule adopted by the Commission. The scaled contribution fee, payable to the FAO, consists of a fee base fee, a component based on per capita income and a third component based on a three year rolling average annual catch. Other basic financial governance arrangements exist, including undertaking independent audits, but ultimately the IOTCs financial rules are governed by the FAO’s rules. (3) Technical Committees on Allocation Criteria established in 2010 to provide advice to the Commission on what principles could be used in making a possible future allocation of the

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resources managed by the Commission. This Committee has met twice; in Nairobi, Kenya in 2011 and Muscat, Oman in 2012. Deliberations are ongoing. Pursuant to article V (2) (b) of the IOTC Agreement, the Commission shall have due regard to the special interests and need of members in the region that are developing States when it comes to transfer of technology, training and enhancement as well as participation in fishing. Developing States are also indirectly recognised concerning financial contribution as a contribution formula shall take into account per capita income of each member. However, the Article is quite limited and provides only limited guidance to the Commission. 71. The UNFSA acknowledges that lack of/or limited capacity in many developing States is a serious impediment to the implementation of the agreement, and emphasises the need to build capacity and provide technical assistance to developing countries, including financial assistance, assistance relating to human resource development, technical assistance, transfer of technology and advisory and consultative services. Specifically Articles 25 and 26 of Part VII set out the forms of cooperation and the ways that the RFMOs shall assist developing States. (P.21) Both the Antigua Convention and the GFCM Agreement contains a provision recognising the special requirements of developing States including enhancing their ability to develop fisheries. But it is the WCFPC Convention that contains extensive provisions relating to the requirements of developing States; mirroring the relevant provisions of UNFSA (P.22).

[8] Administration (Article 8) The Article outlines the role of the FAO in the administration of the treaty and includes the role of the FAO Director-General in the work of the Commission and that the financial regulations of the FAO apply to the Commission.

UNFSA highlights that for effective conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fishery resources, that all those with a real interest to be party to the treaty. Moreover, Article 13 of UNFSA outlines the need to strengthen existing organisations and arrangements to improve their ability to establish and implement conservation and management measures for highly migratory fishery resources. The current administrative arrangements do not provide for the participation

New and/or amended RFMO treaties build on these global instruments whose fisheries management principles overlap, particularly those in the UNFSA and the Code. (p.14) The international community has adopted a range of voluntary soft law instruments. These soft laws serve to guide and/or provide tools to effectively manage fisheries, for example,

• FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (the Code) and its associated International Plans of Action (IPOAs),

• International Guidelines on By-catch Management and Reduction of Discards, • Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-scale Fisheries, • Guidelines on Flag State Performance

A number of international bodies provide high level guidance and dialogue on fisheries, e.g. • United Nations General Assembly’s Sustainable Fisheries Resolution, • FAO Committee of Fisheries (COFI) and in relation to tuna specifically the five tuna-

RFMOs – Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), ICCAT, IOTC and WCPFC -

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of all those with a real interest in the work of the Commission to be party to the treaty and the Commission has insufficient decision making and administrative autonomy.

have agreed to a Course of Action (the Kobe-process) that emphasizes actions required to improve performance by those RFMOs. (p.14)

The IOTC is an organisation established under article XIV of the FAO Constitution, implying that FAO rules apply. This applies across the full breadth of the IOTC’s administration from financial regulations (see 3.10) and employment arrangements including the salary packaging and hiring/firing of staff, to amendments to the Rules of Procedure or engaging external consultants for expert assistance (p.18) The current administrative arrangements do not provide for the participation of all those with a real interest in the work of the Commission to be party to the treaty. Moreover, the administrative arrangements constrain the Commission’s decision making and administrative autonomy. (p.18) Decisions and recommendations of the IOTC shall as a general rule be taken by a majority vote. Adoption of Conservation and Management Measures as well as the adoption and amendments of the IOTC Rules of Procedure requires, however, two-thirds majority. The budget shall be adopted by consensus, but if consensus cannot be reached, the budget shall be adopted by two-thirds majority. Amendments to the IOTC Agreement requires a three-quarters majority. But the decisions of the Commission are still subject to the approval of the Director-General of the FAO and in accordance with the FAO rules and the Agreement (p.18) Article 10 of UNFSA sets out standards for decision-making in RFMOs whereby States shall cooperate by agreeing “on decision-making procedures which facilitate the adoption of conservation and management measures in a timely and effective manner.” As a point of departure, all members of an RFMO should be entitled to take part in decision-making (p.19). Most other RFMO agreements contain stand-alone provisions for decision-making, underpinning their importance. Decision-making based on voting is the traditional process agreed to in most RFMOs. Some RFMOs require that decisions of substance shall be taken by consensus. The Antigua Convention and the WCPDC also require consensus voting. An interesting element of the IOTC decision-making procedures is the objection procedures. Contracting Parties of the IOTC have an opportunity to object to adopted Conservation and Management Measures, irrespective of whether they are adopted by vote or consensus, and thereby not being bound by the measure in question. Unlike other RFMOs where the grounds for the right to object are restricted, the IOTC Agreement is silent on this: the objector does not have to provide any justification regarding the reasons for the objection and nor does the Commission have any way to assess the validity of the objection. The amended GFCM

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Agreement requests the objecting member in written form to explain the reasons for objecting, and where appropriate, proposals for alternative measures. (p.19)

[9] Procedures concerning Conservation and Management The Agreement literally outlines the procedures for the adoption of Conservation and Management Measures.

Of concern is that the Agreement calls for proposals from sub-commissions established under Article XII, which limits the ability of an individual party to bring forward proposals for the Commission consideration. Also concerning is the lack of reference to key provisions of UNFSA, namely articles 5, 6 and 7. UNFSA provides great detail regarding the conservation and management of highly migratory fisheries resources. Article 5 outlines the general principles to be taken into account when developing measures. Article 6 outlines how the precautionary approach is to be applied. Article 7 provides that measures, without prejudicing the rights of coastal States, should be compatible between high seas areas and areas under national jurisdiction.

The IOTC Agreement does not contain general or management principles per se, but it could be argued that these principles might be found indirectly in Article V, that describes the functions of the Commission. In Article V, paragraph 3 there is a saving clause, giving the Commission power to “adopt decisions and recommendations, as required, with a view to furthering the objectives of this Agreement”. But as highlighted these do not provide overarching principles to guide the work of the Commission. (p.16) In contrast, Article 5 of the UNFSA sets out the general principles to be applied by all States in respect of fishing for highly migratory fish stocks to conserve and manage these stocks and provide a range of explicit actions for States (re: issues relating to “long term sustainability”, optimum utilisation, best scientific evidence, precautionary, fishing impacts on marine ecosystems and the ecosystem approach to fisheries management, the precautionary approach, measures to eliminate over-fishing and excess capacity) (p.17) All modern treaties include these elements either by cross-referencing the relevant parts of the Code and the UNFSA. Furthermore, the Antigua Convention implements the provisions of the UNFSA concerning the adoption of measures for species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the target stocks; the adoption of measures to minimise waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, catch of non-target species, and impacts on associated or dependant species, in particular endangered species. The amended GFCM Agreement also focuses on similar principles, but includes additional points such as ensuring economic and social viability of fisheries, paying particular attention to the potential impacts on small-scale fisheries and local communities as well as combatting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) fishing. (p.17)

[10] Implementation Article X provides some guidance on member’s duties for the implementation and includes a variety of topics relevant to implementation, such as adoption of national legislation, the duty of members for imposing adequate penalties for violations of IOTC measures and providing statements

UNFSA devotes an entire section (Part V, Article 18) to the duties of flag States, specifying the flag State role, responsibilities and duties with regard to vessels flying its flag and obligations in relation to the implementation of the treaty for vessels on the high seas. In addition, Article 19

Although it is obvious that members of RFMOs shall implement decision to which they are bound, taking into account the decision-making process, most RFMO agreements make this very clear by including a provision on the obligation in the statutory document, the treaty. The IOTC Agreement contains references to Contracting Party duties Re: implementation, information to be provided, adoption of national legislation, duties for imposing adequate penalties for violations of IOTC measures, providing statements on actions taken in that regard. Also mandates for MCS, and monitoring activities of non-members. Also obligations to submit data and provide the Commission with copies of domestic legislation relevant to the implementation of the IOTC measures (p.19)

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on actions taken in that regard. The provision also mandates IOTC parties, through the Commission, to establish a system for monitoring, control and surveillance as well as monitoring activities of non-members..

considers compliance and enforcement by flag States, including enforcing measures, undertake immediate investigations, and ensure that a vessel does not engage in fishing on the high seas until all sanctions are complied with. Other RFMOs contain similar provisions, but are more extensive and explicit about member duties and the possible consequences of failing implementation

The IOTC has adopted a series of measures related to MCS and to counteract IUU fishing, both binding conservation and management measures as well as non-binding resolutions. However, the IOTC Agreement, due to its age and unlike other RFMOs, is silent on regarding the specific monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) tools and the functions and role of the Compliance Committee and does not provide for those elements outlined in the UNFSA. Moreover, the IOTC Agreement does not specify, consistent with Article 18 of the UNFSA, the duties of flag States (p.23) The UNFSA makes specific provisions for high seas boarding and inspection (Article 21, 22) port State measures (Article 23), regional observer programs (Article 18(3)(f)(g)(ii)), transhipment (Article 18(3)(f)); the IOTC Agreement itself makes no provision for these elements, although as highlighted above some issues have been address through the adoption of binding Resolutions. Moreover, modern treaties such as the Antigua Convention and the WCPFC Convention contain numerous provisions on monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement (p.23) Other RFMO instruments contain similar provisions, but recent instruments are more extensive and explicit when referring to member, flag and port State duties and possible consequences of failing implementation. (p.19) For example the amended GFCM Agreement requires parties to report on their implementation of adopted recommendations and their monitoring, control and surveillance activities. In addition, the GFCM will address non-compliance and shall define appropriate measures to be taken when parties are identified as being in prolonged and unjustified non-compliance. (p.19) The Antigua Convention also put emphasis on the duty of one party to take actions when a vessel flying the flag of another party is suspected of being engaged in activities that undermines the effectiveness of applicable measures and there are some obligations concerning landing and processing of fish. (p.19). It should be noted, however, that many other agreements distinguish between measures for control and enforcement purposes and other obligations. The WCPFC Convention contains a stand-alone provision on obligations of members of the Commission, which include the duty to implement relevant decisions as well as the information required being submitted by parties. In addition, WCPFC members shall take measures to ensure that its nationals, and fishing vessels owned or controlled by its nationals comply with the provisions of the Convention (p.19)

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Article XXIII of the IOTC Agreement sets out how possible disputes shall be settled. Any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of the agreement shall be referred for settlement to a conciliation procedure to be adopted by the Commission. If a dispute is not settled by the conciliation procedure, it may be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless the involved members agree to another method of settlement. (p.21) Articles 28 and 29 of the UNFSA provide for the prevention of disputes by efficient and expeditious decision-making procedures and for the prompt resolution of technical disputes by ad hoc expert panels. In the WCPFC, a member may go along with a consensus and then lodge an objection or request a review by a panel. Details about review panels are set out in the WCPFC Convention and in the amended GFCM Agreement. (p.21)

[11] Information Article XI of the IOTC Agreement provides for the collection of relevant fisheries data from parties and enables the Commission to determine the scope, form and timing of data submissions. However there is very limited detail provided in the Agreement text itself.

Annex 1 of UNFSA outlines very detailed data collection and reporting requirement for highly migratory fisheries resources. The obligation on States to cooperate and provide a range of fisheries data is reinforced throughout UNFSA see for example Articles 5(j), 10(e)(f), 14, 18(3)(e), 21(11)(b). Other RFMOs, for example WCPFC, provide greater emphasis and are more explicit regarding the requirement of parties to collect and submit relevant fisheries data including outlining the information required for all vessels fishing for highly migratory fisheries resources in the Convention Area

The UNFSA provides that RFMO members shall request non-members, which have fishing vessels in the relevant area to cooperate fully with such RFMOs in implementing their conservation and management measures. Moreover, Members of RFMOs shall according to Article 17(4) of the UNFSA exchange information with respect to activities of fishing vessels flying the flags of non-members, which are engaged in fishing operations for the relevant stocks, and shall take measures to deter activities that undermine the effectiveness of conservation and management measures. (P.23) Pursuant to article IV(1)(3) of the IOTC Agreement, members of the Commission are encouraged to take initiatives towards States which are entitled to become members to accede to the Agreement. The Agreement does not contain any guidance on how to deter activities by non-members that undermine the effectiveness of applicable conservation and management measures and/or negatively affects the implementation of the objective of the agreement. (P.22) The Antigua Convention, the WCPFC as well as the amended GFCM Agreement contain stand-alone provisions on the RFMOs relationship to non-members, reflecting the content of the UNFSA provisions (P.22) Status of living Marine resources: The PRIOTC02 noted that the IOTC uses comprehensive and data poor stock assessment methods for the majority of species under its mandate. For species with limited data available, the Scientific Committee makes use of more qualitative scientific methods that are less data intensive. Data poor approaches are already being applied to a number of stocks of billfish and neritic tunas and plans have been developed to consider options to rank stock status

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determinations for data-poor stocks using a ‘Tier’ approach to assist in the interpretation of the level of uncertainty in the evaluation methods applied. (p.23) The PRIOTC02 noted that since the PRIOTC01, the IOTC Scientific Committee and its Working Parties have commenced the use of the ‘Weight-of-Evidence’ approach to determine stock status for data poor fisheries, as an addition to the approach of relying solely on fully quantitative stock assessment techniques.(p.24) The transparency and associated supporting information in the form of the IOTC species executive summaries have been substantially improved since the PRIOTC01 which is highly commendable and are easily accessible for interested stakeholders via the IOTC website (p.24) The PRIOTC02 noted that the IOTC Scientific Committee and its subsidiary bodies are well structured and generally function in a way that produces the best scientific advice possible with the information available, and is generally in line with the “Best Practices” identified in the Kobe Process. However, advice is often based on limited information, due to the failure of CPCs in meeting data collection and reporting obligations and, in some cases, due to limited involvement of developing coastal States in the science processes. Some adjustments and enhancements could be considered to further improve the certainty of the science advice provided to the Commission. (p.24) Data collection and reporting States are, in accordance with Article 5(j) of the UNFSA, required to collect and share complete and accurate data concerning fishing activities on, among other things, vessel position, catch and fishing effort, as set out in Annex I of the UNFSA, as well as information from national and international research programmes. The UNFSA stipulates that data should be collected though agreed formats and in a timely manner, and should include catch and effort statistics by fishery and fleet, catch by species for target and non-target species, discards by species, the time and location of fishing and at-sea transhipment, as well as identification and the characteristics of the capacity and gear of vessels. Most data collation and sharing are carried out under the auspices of scientific bodies of relevant RFMOs or international institutions providing advice to RFMOs. These bodies are, however, dependent on data provided by national scientists and institutions regarding the fisheries activities of their flag vessels on both high seas and in coastal State waters. (p.24) The IOTC has adopted a wide range of measures concerning collection of fisheries data and vessel information (p.25)

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Since the PRIOTC01, the IOTC has modified the timing of and deadlines for reporting as well as scheduling of meetings of the Scientific Committee and Working Parties. The PRIOTC02 noted that the timeliness of data provision from CPCs remains a key issue facing the IOTC. CP (p.25) The IOTC has established a regional observer scheme as recommended. It is based on national implementation through Resolution 11/04 and is now operational. All non-Member States identified in the PRIOTC01 have acceded to the IOTC Agreement, including important coastal States such as the Maldives, Somalia and Yemen. Importantly, Taiwan Province of China attends IOTC meetings, despite not being able to actively participate due to the legal structure, and provides some fisheries data required through a specially developed relationship. (p.25) A major strength of the IOTC Secretariat has been its ability to cope with work required based on Scientific Committee recommendations and Commission-adopted policies regarding data reporting obligations, and the PRIOTC02 commended the work undertaken since the PRIOTC01. (p.25) The PRIOTC02 noted that the broader IOTC membership have substantially benefitted from extra-budgetary funds in addressing the failings of data collection and fishery monitoring. The IOTC Secretariat currently includes 3 full-time staff dedicated to data collection and data capacity building activities, but needs to be increased. (p.25) The IOTC Secretariat coordinates data submissions, stores and manages the data. As the timeliness, completeness and accuracy of data submissions by CPCs varies, the IOTC Secretariat interacts with CPCs by providing guidance for data reporting and sending reminders for data submissions. The IOTC Secretariat undertakes considerable work to check and validate data. (p.26) The Commission, through its Compliance Committee, needs to strengthen its compliance monitoring in relation to the timeliness and accuracy of data submissions (p.27) The PRIOTC01 recommended enhancing the capacity within the IOTC Secretariat in relation to data collection. Improving the dissemination and quality assurance is an ongoing activity and has been enhanced through the appointment of a Fisheries Officer (Statistics) and access to datasets via the new IOTC website. There are currently numerous ongoing capacity building projects, workshops and collaboration with other regional initiatives, and budget allocations as well as financial support though the capacity building fund (Resolution 10/05) being undertaken by the IOTC Secretariat and supported by the Commission. The PRIOTC02 noted the success of the Compliance Missions in relation to developing capacity at a national

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government level including increased understanding by CPCs of their obligations and the need to give effect to the Resolutions as adopted. The increased engagement by developing CPCs, and in particular by developing coastal States, was likely a direct result of this capacity building initiative. (p.27) The PRIOTC02 noted several approaches to the provision of scientific advice have been adopted by the tuna RFMOs. At one end of the spectrum, IATTC makes use of a full-time scientific and data management/collection staff to carry out all scientific analysis and development of scientific advice to the Commission. The IOTC formulation is closer to the ICCAT model than the others, although the staff dedicated to the stock assessment theme is too small given the complexity of the fisheries and the demands of the Commission for stock status advice for the substantial number of stocks. The IOTC Secretariat currently includes 2 full-time staff wholly or partly dedicated to scientific analysis, but needs to be increased. The use of consultants and invited scientific experts to address assessment and/or other quantitative issues of concern is moving in the direction of a WCPFC ‘service provider’ approach and should be continued or intensified, at least in the near term. At present, some IOTC CPCs have much greater scientific capacity and engagement than others, which can lead to a real or perceived loss of objectivity in the advice produced. External non-scientific influences may also politicise the advice provided. It is important to take steps to assure a high level of objectivity and independence, both through application of transparent processes and in the frequent use of independent peer review of process. It is critically important to maintain a clear separation between scientific advice and management influences. There is a need to further improve the Scientific Committee’s functioning so that there is broader understanding amongst national scientists and managers of what is being recommended each year to the Commission. (p.28).

[13] Finances Article XIII of the IOTC Agreement gives the framework for the financial arrangements. In essence the provision empowers the Commission to adopt a budget and to establish a contribution formula as well as obligations on members to contribute in accordance with that agreed formula. IOTC has adopted a scheme for calculation of contributions to the administrative budget of the

In all RFMOs, except for IOTC and the General Fisheries Commission of the Mediterranean, adoption of the budgets of the organization require consensus. In IOTC voting may take place also on the budget if the efforts to achieve consensus fail. UNFSA is largely silent on the administration of RFMO budgets, but it does make

IOTC has adopted a scheme for calculation of contributions to the administrative budget of the Commission, which is an annex to the financial regulations. Formula commonly takes into account variable factors such as national wealth, the state of development of the member concerned and the amount of catch taken by each individual member. (p.20) The IOTC Agreement states that in addition to an equal share, consideration shall be given to catches and landings as well as per capita income of each Contracting Party. It should be noted that the WCPFC Convention, in addition to considerations similar to those of the IOTC, also should take into account the ability of members to pay. (p.20)

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Commission, which is an annex to the financial regulations. Being an organisation set up under Article XIV of FAO, IOTC has special relations to FAO concerning financial issues. This is reflected in article V about the objective, functions and responsibilities of the Commission requiring the accounts and autonomous budget to be transmitted to the Director-General of FAO, and article VI about sessions of the Commission stating that the financial regulations shall be consistent with principles embodied in the Financial Regulations of FAO. The Finance Committee of FAO has the power to disallow the IOTC financial regulations and any amendments thereto if it finds them inconsistent with the FAO Financial Regulations.

references to the need to provide financial assistance to developing State members of RFMOs (preamble, article 25(2) and Annex 1). Like IOTC, other RFMOs have established permanent subsidiary bodies to deal with financial issues, which are responsible for reviewing the operation of the budget for the current year and examining the draft budget for the coming year. Financial committees are not, however, established through the conventions itself, but more likely in accordance with powers given to the Commission. The WCPFC Convention, for example, includes three specific articles related to the financial affairs of the Commission: Article 17 regarding funds of the Commission, Article 18 regarding the commission’s budget, Article 19 regarding the annual audit of the Commissions finances.

[15] Coastal State Rights The Article recognises the legitimate rights of coastal States to their exclusive economic zone consistent with LOSC (Part V).

However the Article does not apply the provisions regarding developing States consistent with UNFSA. Moreover the article does not provide clear linkages regarding the need to implement compatible measures in waters under national jurisdiction (Article 7) and thereby providing for the effective management of the resources throughout their range. Part VII of UNFSA

Many RFMO instruments also contain a provision on the need for compatibility between management measures for the high seas and the national waters. Both the Antigua Convention and the WCPFC Convention contain specific provisions on the topic, the WCPFC being rather detailed by also referring to the elements to be taken into account when determining compatibility. (p.21)

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includes Articles 24, 25 and 26 and outlines the requirements of developing States. Article 24 includes recognition of the special requirements of developing States including related to the duty to cooperate and when adopting conservation and management measures. Article 25 outlines the forms of cooperation that the Commission provide to developing State. Article 26 outlines the specific assistance required to implement the provisions of UNFSA itself.

(B) Key Objectives

According to Article V(1) of the IOTC Agreement the objective is “to promote cooperation among its members with the view to ensuring, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilization of stocks covered by this Agreement and encouraging sustainable development of fisheries based on such stocks”

The objective of UNFSA is ‘to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks through effective implementation of the relevant provisions of the Convention’. Other RFMOs have stand-alone provisions to describe the objective(s) of the Commission, which are consistent with UNFSA.

The objective of the Antigua Convention is “to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks covered by the Convention, in accordance with relevant rules of international law”. (p.16) For the WCPFC Convention, the objective is “to ensure, through effective management, the long-term conservation and sustainable and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the western and central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982 Convention and the Agreement”. (p.16) The objective of amended GFCM Agreement is “to ensure the conservation and sustainable use, at the biological, social, economic and environmental level, of living marine resources…”. (p.16)

(C) Key Instruments (CMM)

At the Commission sessions, Contracting Parties generally adopt Conservation and Management Measures by consensus, either as Resolutions which are binding, having due regard to the objection procedures (i.e. those measures adopted pursuant to Article IX of the IOTC Agreement), or

- Article 5 of the UNFSA sets out the general principles to be applied by coastal States and States fishing on the high seas in order to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. Article 5 provides, among other things, that in order to conserve the stocks concerned, States are required to adopt measures to ensure their “long term sustainability” and promote the objective of their optimum utilisation, to ensure that such measures are based on the best scientific evidence available and to apply the precautionary approach in accordance with Article 6 of the UNFSA. Annex II of the UNFSA provides guidance for the application of precautionary reference points in conservation and

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Recommendations which are non-binding and thus subject to voluntary implementation. (p.38)

management, aiming at reducing the risk of overexploitation and depletion of fish stocks.(p.29)

• Since the PRIOTC01, the IOTC has commenced work to establish a system of catch limits any other relevant measures for the main target species (Resolution 14/02).

• In the face of uncertainty in the scientific advice, the Scientific Committee has responded by initiating a development of a management strategy evaluation process.

• Despite the ongoing legal constraints related to the IOTC Agreement, the IOTC has adopted several Conservation and Management Measures to give effect to modern fisheries management principles such as the precautionary approach and ecosystem based fisheries management.

• The Commission adopted Resolution 12/01 on the application of the precautionary approach consistent with the UNFSA Article 6, and reinforced some elements through the measure on reference points and decision framework (Resolution 1510).

• In relation to the ecosystem based fisheries management, IOTC has adopted measures concerning bycatch of seabirds (Resolution 12/06),

• marine turtles (Resolution 12/04), large-scale driftnets (Resolution 12/12), cetaceans (Resolution 13/04) and whale sharks (Resolution 13/05) all aimed at encouraging fishing practices that protect marine biodiversity and reducing harmful fishing on the marine environment. (p.29)

In relation to the key fisheries species, the PRIOTC02 noted that in general, effective fisheries management measures are lacking. The Commission has adopted some species-specific Conservation and Management Measures related to albacore (Resolution 13/09), in relation to bigeye tuna (Resolutions 14/02, plus the existing Resolutions 01/06, 05/01) and related to the three marlin species (15/05). (p.30) The PRIOTC02 noted that despite the Scientific Committee advice there are no specific Conservation and Management Measures for longtail tuna or swordfish. Importantly the Commission has adopted Resolution 15/06 which prohibits the discard of species such as bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna and yellowfin tuna from purse seine vessels and two Resolutions to manage fishing capacity through limitations (Resolutions 15/11 and 03/01) applicable to tropical tunas and swordfish. (p.30) The key management measure for the three key tuna species is covered in Resolution 14/02. The PRIOTC02 noted that earlier iterations of this measure included a time-area closure and that despite the scientific advice highlighting that it was ineffective as a conservation and management tool, the Commission only altered the measure due to conflict regarding the

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spatial extent of the measure. The measure now simply calls on the Commission to develop an allocation system or developing other management measures for these stocks and as such does not provide any real management of these stocks. (p.30) Overall, the PRIOTC02 noted that the Commission has not given effect to the advice of its Scientific Committee and the associated Working Parties. There are inadequate management measures implemented for most species and the ongoing paucity of scientific data continues to hamper the ability to make informed management decisions. Finally, the PRIOTC02 noted that the Commission continues to use the data paucity as a reason not to implement the advice of the Scientific Committee despite their adoption of the precautionary approach (Resolution 12/01). (p.30) According to Article 5(h) of the UNFSA, measures shall be taken to prevent or eliminate over-fishing and excess capacity and to ensure that levels of fishing effort do not exceed those commensurate with sustainable use of fishery resources. Management of fishing capacity serves the aim of a stable and enduring balance between the fishing capacity of the fleets and the fishing opportunities over time.(p.31) The PRIOTC02 noted that the IOTC has still not been able to identify fishing capacity levels that are commensurate with long-term sustainability and optimum utilisation of relevant fisheries. Any estimate of overall fishing capacity requires assessment of the relative effects of different categories of vessels and gear on the various stocks. The information required to generate reliable estimates of vessel-specific fishing capacity is not available (p.31) Notwithstanding the difficulties estimating the optimal fishing capacity, the Scientific Committee has regularly provided advice on bigeye tuna, yellowfin tuna, albacore and swordfish and to a lesser degree skipjack tuna and recommends the need to limit fishing effort to specific levels. The IOTC has over the years implemented a series of measures to limit fishing capacity and effort by trying to control the numbers and tonnages of vessels (p.31)

• The first attempt at limiting fishing capacity was in 2003 when the Commission agreed to freeze the capacity of those Contracting Parties with 50 or more vessels over 24 meters to the current level, but allowed those Contracting Parties with less than 50 vessels over 24 meters to develop their fleets through a fisheries development plan (Resolution 03/01)..

• Subsequent measures have been introduced several times, the latest one in 2015 (Resolution 15/11), all of them also making cross-references to the fisheries development plan from 2003.

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• The current measures include limitations of fishing capacity of fleets targeting tropical tuna to the capacity measured in gross tonnage of active vessels in 2006 and to the 2007 level for those fleets actively targeting albacore and swordfish. However, to date these measures have not resulted in strong control on fishing capacity. In fact since the adoption of this measure there is a sustained trend increasing the global fishing capacity. (p.32)

The current effort (capacity) limitation mechanisms in the IOTC are not effective, primarily due to the existing capacity combined with the Fleet Development Plans submitted to the IOTC being well in excess of assumed sustainable levels. The PRIOTC02 recognised the limitation of the capacity limit, as previously noted by the Scientific Committee, because of its generic nature and the challenges in differentiating across gear types and fisheries (p.32) The IOTC has not taken any particular measure aimed at ensuring compatibility between Conservation and Management Measures adopted by the coastal State with respect to national waters and those adopted by the Commission. It seems, however, that measures established by the Commission are designed to apply throughout the migratory range of the stocks with coastal States implementing compatible measures in waters under their jurisdiction. (p.32) The PRIOTC01 recommended that CPCs should be invited to promptly implement IOTC Conservation and Management Measures. The PRIOTC02 recognised that this is an ongoing requirement of Contracting Parties and that they are reminded annually about the responsibility of integrating adopted measures in their national legislation. The PRIOTC02 noted that strengthening the compliance assessment process is likely to enhance the mutual understanding among members regarding the actions taken by each CPC to ensure there is effective management throughout the range of the IOTC stocks. (p.32) Noting that the IOTC Agreement has no provisions or principles to guide the allocation of the resources, the PRIOTC01 recommended that the IOTC should explore the advantages and disadvantages of implementing an allocation system of fishing quota. This work is now in progress as the IOTC has adopted an action plan for the establishment of an allocation system (quota) or any other relevant measures for the main target species (Resolution 14/02), but has not yet agreed on a process for allocation. To date there has been two meetings of the Technical Committee on Allocation Criteria, however the PRIOTC02 noted that the meetings were not able to progress the discussion very far. (p.33) In relation to fishing opportunities, the Commission, through Resolution 15/11 (formerly Resolutions 12/11, and 09/02), has provided the opportunity for CPCs to submit a Fleet

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Development Plan. The Fleet Development Plans afford primarily developing coastal State CPCs the opportunity to exercise their legitimate rights enshrined in the LOSC to develop their fisheries. However the PRIOTC02 noted that if all development aspirations were realised, without a commensurate reduction in fishing capacity, that the total level of fishing capacity would be well in excess of sustainable levels. In addition the PRIOTC02 noted that the IOTC has not addressed the nature and extent of participatory rights of new Contracting Parties. 4 (p.33)

(D) Policy Performance [1] Standard approach [2] SD impacts

See Main body of Report (above)

(E) Most Recent Official Policy Evaluation and Recommendations

[1] The PRIOTC02 AGREED that the IOTC Agreement needs to be amended or replaced in order to incorporate modern fisheries management principles, such as the precautionary approach, ecosystem based approaches, inclusion of highly-migratory species caught in IOTC fisheries, protection of marine biodiversity, reducing the harmful impacts of fishing on marine environment and to allow the full participation of all fishing players. The weaknesses and gaps are, or have a potential to be, major impediments to the effective and efficient functioning of the Commission and its ability to adopt and implement measures aimed at long-term conservation and sustainable exploitation of stocks, according to model fisheries management instruments. More fundamentally, these deficiencies are likely to prevent the Commission from achieving its basic objectives. The PRIOTC02 RECOMMENDED that the Commission establish an ad-hoc Working Party on the Modernisation of the IOTC Agreement, based on the following scope: a) Develop proposed language for the IOTC Agreement that takes into account modern principles of fisheries management; b) Develop a multi-year Program of Work that outlines the specific priority issues to be discussed using the legal analysis contained in Appendix III of this report to inform the working party deliberations;

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c) Proposals to enable the participation of all fishing players with direct fishing interest in IOTC; d) That all CPCs should participate in the Working Party and that funds be provided to support the participation of developing coastal States in the meetings; e) That the working group meet at least annually and to the extent possible progress its work inter-sessionally using electronic means. [2] The PRIOTC02 RECOMMENDED that: a) while continuing to work on improving data collection and reporting, the Scientific Committee should continue to utilise qualitative stock assessment methodologies for species where there is limited data available, including ecological risk based approaches, and support the development and refinement of data poor fisheries stock assessment techniques to support the determination of stock status. b) confidentiality provisions and issues of accessibility to data by the scientists involved needs to be clearly delineated, and/or amended if necessary, so that stock assessment analysis can be replicated. c) chairpersons and Vice-Chairpersons of the Scientific Committee and respective Working Parties, in conjunction with the IOTC Secretariat, develop guiding principles for the provision of papers to ensure that they are directly related to the Program of Work of the respective Working Party and/or Scientific Committee, as endorsed by the Commission, while still encouraging for new and emerging issues to be presented. d) ongoing peer review and input by external scientific experts should be incorporated as standard best practice for Working Parties and included in the Commission’s regular budget.[p.24] [3] The PRIOTC02 RECOMMENDED that: a) the Commission make further investments in data collection and targeted capacity building, which is necessary for further improvement in the provision and quality of data in support of the Commission’s objectives, as well as to identify the sources of the uncertainty in data and work towards reducing that uncertainty. b) while there are budgetary implications, the IOTC Secretariat staffing dedicated to data collection and data capacity building activities should be increased from 3 to 5 full-time data staff. c) the IOTC Secretariat should facilitate discussions with coastal State non-CPCs and other non-CPCs fishing within the IOTC area of competence to formalise long-term strategies for data submission to the IOTC Secretariat, including all relevant historical data sets. d) steps to gain access to fine-scale data to be used in joint analysis, with sufficient protection of confidentiality, should be taken. e) where budgets and other resources permit, to encourage data preparatory meetings preceding stock assessment review meetings (Working Parties). f) innovative and/or alternative means of data collection and reporting should be explored and, as appropriate, implemented, including a move towards electronic data collection and reporting for all fleets (p.26)

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[4] The Commission, through its Compliance Committee, needs to strengthen its compliance monitoring in relation to the timeliness and accuracy of data submissions. To that end, the PRIOTC02 RECOMMENDED that: a) the Commission review its compliance monitoring program conducted by the Compliance Committee, including identification of priority obligations (e.g. timely and accurate data reporting, catch and effort limits, accuracy of the supplied registered fishing vessel information, etc.). b) the compliance monitoring program review all priority obligations and undertake the compliance review by obligation and by CPCs and that the Commission publish a report of each CPCs compliance by obligation and CPC. The reports of all Compliance Missions should be appended to the compliance report of that relevant CPC and where the CPC has identified an action plan, that they not be assessed for that obligation. c) the Commission develop a scheme of responses (in accordance with the IOTC Rules of Procedure (2014) Appendix V, para. 3b (iv)) to priority non-compliance areas, including the preparation of CPC Implementation Action Plans that outline how the CPC will, over time, implement its obligations and alternative responses to serious violations of IOTC CMMs taking into account the FAOs Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance. Reforms to the compliance monitoring program should include the ability of developing CPCs to identify (though the preparation of an Implementation Action Plan) and seek assistance for obligations that they are currently non-compliant with, including for example requesting capacity assistance, capacity building, resources, etc., to enable it, over time, to implement its obligations. d) to facilitate thorough reviews of compliance, the Commission should invest in the development and implementation of an integrated electronic reporting program. This should include automatic integration of data from CPCs into the IOTC Secretariat’s databases and automatic cross-referencing obligations and reports for the various obligations, in particular related to the provision of scientific data. [5] The PRIOTC02 RECOMMENDED that: a) the Commission expand its current data support and data compliance missions and that the IOTC Secretariat should be granted increased autonomy to seek and attract external donor funds to support the work approved by the Commission, including supporting actions and/or capacity building initiatives from Compliance Missions that are applicable to more than two CPCs. b) the IOTC should continue the workshop series aimed at Connecting the IOTC Science and Management processes. The aims of the workshop series should be to: 1) improve the level of comprehension among IOTC CPCs on how the scientific process informs the management process for managing of IOTC species and ecosystem-based management; 2) increase the awareness of IOTC Contracting Parties to their obligations, as stipulated in the Commissions’ Conservation and Management Measures which are based on rigorous scientific advice; 3) improve the decision making process within the IOTC; and 4) to provide direct assistance in the drafting of proposals for Conservation and Management Measures (p.27)

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[6] The PRIOTC02 RECOMMENDED that: a) the Scientific Committee should continue the good work undertaken since the PRIOTC01 and strive to make further improvements in the way it communicates information about stock status and future prospects for the stocks to the Commission. b) an independent peer review process (and budgeting mechanism) for stock assessments should be implemented if IOTC science is to be considered to be in line with best practice and to maintain a high standard of quality assurance. c) the Scientific Committee, through its Working Party on Ecosystems and Bycatch should pursue the application of ecosystem modelling frameworks. d) continue to develop and adopt robust target and limit reference points, and species or fishery specific harvest control rules through management strategy evaluations, noting that this process has commenced for several species and is specified in IOTC Resolution 15/10 on target and limit reference points and a decision framework. The mandated Resolution 14/03 on enhancing the dialogue between fisheries scientists and managers, will benefit from having communication between the Scientific Committee and the Commission more formally structured, facilitated dialogue to enhance understanding and inform decision making. e) the Commission and its subsidiary bodies continue to ensure that meeting schedules and activities are rationalised so that the already heavy workload of those involved, and budgeting constraints, are taken into account. f) the Commission fully implements Resolution 12/01 On the implementation of the precautionary approach, so as to apply the precautionary approach, in accordance with relevant internationally agreed standards, in particular with the guidelines set forth in the UNFSA, and to ensure the sustainable utilisation of fisheries resources as set forth in Article V of the IOTC Agreement, including ensuring that a lack of information or increased uncertainty in datasets/stock assessment, is not used as a justification to delay taking management actions to ensure the sustainability of IOTC species and those impacted by IOTC fisheries. g) while there are budgetary implications, the IOTC Secretariat staffing dedicated to scientific analysis should be increased from 2 to 4 full-time science staff. (p.28) [7] The PRIOTC02 RECOMMENDED that: a) the Commission acknowledge the inherent difficulty in managing small scale and data poor fisheries and continue efforts to adopt adequate fisheries management arrangements and to assist developing coastal States to overcome constraints to implement the CMMs. b) as the IOTC has faced the management of the main targeted stock under its purview only through a regulation of the fishing effort; other approaches should be explored, such as those envisioned in Resolutions 05/01 and 14/02, including catch limits, total allowable catch (TAC) or total allowable effort (TAE). c) the Science-Management Dialogue is strengthened to improve understanding of modern approaches to fisheries management, including the implementation of Harvest Strategies through the use of Management Strategy Evaluation. The Commission adopt a formal process of developing and implementing Harvest Strategies within a prescribed timeframe. (p.31)

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[8] The PRIOTC02 RECOMMENDED that: a) the IOTC should establish a stronger policy on fishing capacity to prevent or eliminate all excess fishing capacity, including options to freeze capacity levels as an interim measure, while alternative management measures are considered. As current capacity limits are generic and apply across all fleets and their ability to control catch of particular species is limited, therefore alternative management measures should be considered which may include spatial-temporal area closures, quota allocation, etc. b) the Commission undertake a formal process to develop transfer mechanisms to developing coastal States, and in particular the least developed among them, with a view to realising their fleet development aspirations within sustainable levels. (p.32) [9] The PRIOTC02 RECOMMENDED that if needed, CPCs request assistance from other CPCs or the IOTC Secretariat to assist in the assessment of the legal needs to effectively implement IOTC CMMs, noting that this process has already commenced with a number of IOTC Contracting Parties. (p.32) [10] The PRIOTC02 RECOMMENDED that the IOTC develop allocation criteria or any other relevant measures as a matter of urgency through the established Technical Committee on Allocation Criteria (TCAC) process, and that it include consideration of how catches by current non-CPCs would be accounted for. This process should not delay the development and adoption of other management measures, based on the advice of the Scientific Committee. (p.33) Other Recommendations (Pages 33-46) In the following areas, it recognised that although some progress has been made by the IOTC, though putting in place measures, there is still further development work to be undertaken: Compliance and Enforcement [a] Flag State Measures (Agreement should be amended and upgraded) [b] Port State Measures (Further upgrade) [c] MCS (Continue to development further upon existing system already established) [d] Follow-up infringements (Development a more enhanced approach and scheme) [e] Cooperative mechanisms to detect and deter non-compliance (Strengthen current system) [f] Market-related measures (Strengthen this approach further) [g] Fishing capacity (Address non-compliance with CMM measures) Decision-making and Dispute Settlement [a]Decision-making (Establishment mechanisms to settle disagreements) [b] Dispute settlement (Also improve this area, avoiding long processes)

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International Cooperation [a] Transparency of information (further improvements, especially for access agreements) [b] Relationships to Cooperating NCP (key issue of IOTC membership and what it means) [c] Relationship to Non-Coop Non-members (strengthen diplomatic routes) (few countries) [d] Cooperation with other RFMOs (Should be increased to great advantage) [e] Special requirements of developing countries (especially means to increase participation) [f] Participation (IOTC/FAO not consistent with UNFSA, real interest in fishing) Finance and Administration [a] Availability of resources (incentives and actions against ‘non-payers) [b] Effectiveness and efficiency (conduct audit and review) FAO [a] Key question of whether IOTC should be standalone outside FAO (assessment needed)

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