FINAL REPORT TONATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

CONTRACTOR: The University of Chicago

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Jeffrey Brooks

COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER: 628-7

DATE: March, 1985

The work leading to this report was supported in whole or inpart from funds provided by the National Council for Sovietand East European Research.

TITLE: Information and Power: The SovietParadigm for Revolutionary CulturalChange,.1921-28

AUTHOR: Jeffrey Brooks

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

The power and influence of the Soviet paradigm for radicalchange owes much to the idea that the Revolution was swiftlyfollowed by a period of rapid cultural development during whichpoor and illiterate people learned to read. The notion that theBolshevik Revolution liberated ordinary people from a prison ofilliteracy is one of the central legitimizing myths of theSoviet system. It also serves as a powerful ideologicaljustification for Soviet-style revolutions elsewhere. Thepurpose of this study prepared by Professor Jeffrey Brooks ofthe University of Chicago is to explore the reality behind themyth and to identify the meaning of literacy for the Russiancommon reader of the 1920s.

Four principal findings emerge from Professor Brooks' exam-ination of the most popular Soviet newspapers of the period:

> The disruption of the primary school system andpublishing industry during the Revolution reducedthe surprisingly high literacy rates of pre-1917Russia.

> Soviet journalists used the danger of war and xeno-phobic images of the outside world to help legitimizeand consolidate political authority at home.

> The print media had a significant economic role indiscouraging activity in the private sector and inencouraging the energetic and ambitious to seek suc-cess within the institutions of the new Soviet state.

> In the realm of public information, the period ofthe New Economic Policy (1921-27) was not a liberalinterlude between two periods of more extreme policy.

The essay is divided into two parts. The first concernsimages of success and mobility in the newspapers. Sovietjournalists projected the image of a society open toopportunity, but the opportunities were found exclusively in thepublic sector. By showing a world in which success could befound only in institutions and organizations, in whichbureaucratic rather than entrepreneurial skills broughtmobility, and where position and privilege rather than moneywere the desired ends, they helped to propogate the values thathave come to be identified with the Soviet system of the 1930s.

*Prepared by the Staff of the National Council for Soviet andEast European Research.

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The second section is about images of political authorityand of foreign enemies. Soviet journalists used the threat offoreign intervention to legitimize the Soviet government andcreate an image of the governing power that could serve as abasis for the loyalty of its citizens. The response of earlySoviet journalists to their readers' interest in the rest of theworld showed the tendency of the government to make informationa restrictive instrument of policy.

Professor Brooks' study holds interest far beyond the policydebates of the Soviet Twenties. He examines the means throughwhich revolutionary cultural change is brought about withinSoviet-styled revolutionary systems. While technology hasrendered the newspaper nearly obsolete, recent events in CentralAmerica and the Caribbean suggest that the basic patterns iden-tified by Professor Brooks remain recognizable even today.

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CONTENTS

Executive summary i

Introduction: The Press and the Common Reader 1

Part I: Images of Success and Mobility 8

1. Success in the Party, Government, and Army 10

2. Success in Industry and Agriculture 15

3. Bureaucratic Success 23

Part II: Political Authority and Foreign Enemies 29

1. The War Scare of 1923 34

2. The War Scare of 1927 37

Notes 42

Appendix A: Tables 43

1

INFORMATION AND POWER:

THE SOVIET PARADIGM FOR REVOLUTIONARY CULTURAL CHANGE, 19 21-28

INTRODUCTION: THE PRESS AND THE COMMON READER

The power and influence of the Soviet paradigm for radical

change owes much to the idea that the Revolution was swiftly

followed by a period of rapid cultural development during which

poor and disadvantaged people learned to read and became

socially active. Pictures of peasants receiving instruction in

literacy, reading newspapers posted on walls, and holding

newspapers in their hands are among the most compellng positive

visual images of the transformation of Russian society in the

first decade of Soviet power.

A close look at data on literacy and the functioning of the

publishing industry in the pre and post revolutionary periods

brings into question the most basic assumptions of this view of

the Soviet Revolution. Literacy rates were surprisingly high on

the eve of the Revolution, and an enormous quantity of printed

material was commercially produced to satisfy the demands of

literate people of common origins. Soviet educators had

trouble reestablishing the primary school system after the

Revolution, and Party leaders emphasized propaganda among adults

over basic instruction for children. Moreover, Soviet

publishing authorities found it extremely difficult to rebuild

the publishing industry, and they succeeded in reaching

prerevolutionary levels of production only toward the end of the

1920s. Addressing popular demand for information and for

2

particular kinds of reading materials proved even more complex

than the material side of publishing, and the printed word took

on special functions under a state publishing monopoly.

The present study is intended to help explain the uses of

literacy under these conditions and the purposes to which the

Soviet government put the printed word. This work is a

continuation of my earlier research on the prerevolutionary

period, and it is part of a larger investigation of literacy and

publishing under Soviet power. I discuss the spread of literacy

in prerevolutionary Russia and the development of the popular

publishing industry in my forthcoming book, When Russia Learned

to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861-1917 (Princeton

University Press, 1985). I explain the difficulties Soviet

leaders had in establishing a state publishing industry and the

paucity of popular printed material throughout the 1920s in "The

Breakdown in the Production and Distribution of Printed

Material, 1917-27," in Bolshevik Culture (Indiana University

Press, 1985), edited by Abbott Gleason, and also in "Studies of

the Reader in the 1920s" (Russian History, nos. 2-3, 1982).

This essay is based on a reading of the Soviet newspapers

that were intended for and most likely to have reached a

lower-class audience. The newspapers include Bednota (The

Poor), from 1921 through 1929, Krest'ianskaia gazeta (The

Peasant Newspaper, from its founding in 1923 through 1929, and

Rabochaia Moskva (Workers' Moscow) , in 1922 and 1923, the only-

years available. The newspapers were also sampled for content,

and the results of the content analysis of four issues a year of

each newspaper appear in Appendix A.

3

These newspapers, despite the difficulties the authorities

had in producing and distributing them, represent the Soviet

government's greatest success with the printed word. At a time

when radio was not yet a medium for mass communication in the

Soviet Union, these publications were the government's most

important and reliable means of communicating with ordinary

people. The emphasis in my discussion is on the content of the

newspapers rather than Soviet publishing policy or the

intentions of Bolshevik leaders.

Bednota was intended initially as a Soviet successor to the

cheap so-called "boulevard newspapers" of prerevolutionary

times, and it was actually printed on the confiscated press of

one of the oldest of the boulevard newspapers, Moskovskii listok

(The Moscow Sheet) (B3/27/1923).* "Our newspaper will serve a

great cause, the struggle of the urban and rural poor for the

ultimate liberation of labor from the power of capital," wrote

the editors in their first issue on the 27th of March, 1918.

Nevertheless, as much as 75 percent of all copies issued during

the civil war went to the Red Army.** The paper soon lost

whatever urban focus it had, and it was redirected toward the

ordinary peasant reader. By the end of 1923, however, Party

leaders decided to produce a new paper for the rural common

reader, Krest'ianskaia gazeta. Bednota was refocused again,

*References in the text to newspapers include the month, theday, and the year. The name of the newspaper is given inabbreviation; B for Bednota (the Poor), KG for Krest'ianskaiagazeta (The Peasant Newspaper), and RM for Rabochaia Moskva(Workers' Moscow).

** For these and other figures of newspaper circulation, see theappendix at the end of the essay.

4

this time to serve the needs of rural elites. The appearance of

the paper changed back and forth several times during this

period between a tabloid and a full-sized format, before the

editors finally settled on the less-popular and larger size.

Bednota then became in the words of its editors a newspaper for

"the advanced stratum" of village society, "those who worked in

the Party and the Soviets," whereas Krest'ianskaia gazeta was "a

class paper" for those who were not ready for more serious

material" (B3/12/1925) .

The editors' difficulties in appealing to the common reader

were reflected in the tumultuous drop in circulation that

followed the introduction of paid subscriptions in the New

Economic Policy in 1921. Until that time the newspaper was

distributed free of charge, and the editors assumed that it

reached its intended audience. The size of the edition of

Bednota rose from 50,000 copies a day in 1918 to perhaps as many

as 800,000 in 1921, on the eve of the NEP. When readers were

compelled to pay for the newspaper, however, circulation fell

rapidly. At its lowest, in 1923, only 35,000 copies were

printed. Circulation then rose slowly to 60,000 in late 1924.

The most important newspapers for ordinary workers included

Rabochaia gazeta (The Workers' Newspaper), Gudok (The Whistle),

and the regional newspaper Rabochaia Moskva. Rabochaia gazeta

was intended for all workers, and the editors were able to claim

some success in reaching factory and white collar workers in the

mid-1920s.2 Circulation reached 200,000 by 1924.

Krest'ianskaia gazeta was the single most successful newspaper

5

for the common reader during this period. Circulation

approached half a million in the first year of publication and

almost a million in the late 1920s.

The editors of the Soviet mass newspapers explained their

purpose in terms that were similar to those of the popular

prerevolutionary newspapers. Through the newspaper, the editors

of Bednota explained in their first issue, the people in remote

places can learn about "what happens in the wide world"

(B3/27/1918). The newspaper was also promoted as a source of

useful information on such topics as the laws of the land, how

to improve harvests, and where to get seeds (B6/16/1922).

Subsequently the editors of the other newspapers stressed more

political purposes. Krest'ianskaia gazeta was called "the

bulwark of the poor and middle stratum of the village"

(KG6/30/1924), and Rabochaia Moskva was proclaimed "a workers'

newspaper," which raised ail the questions of interest to

workers (RM2/7/1923) .

The newspapers were responsible to the Party leadership and

not to the readers, however. The editors were aware of whom

they served, and each of these newspapers was officially an

organ of the Party. As the editors of Rabochaia Moskva

explained in response to criticism from Lunacharsky about their

lack of sensitivity to cultural issues, "There is a control over

our newspaper, Comrade Lunacharskii, the control of the Moscow

Soviet, of the Moscow Provincial Soviet, and the main control of

the Moscow Committee of the Russian Communist Party, an organ of

which Rabochaia gazeta is" (RM10/28/1922).

6

The editors' attention to the changing demands of the Party

leadership helps to explain the difference between the content

of the Soviet newspapers and their prerevolutionary

predecessors. The successful prerevolutionary editors found a

formula for satisfying readers' demands and for selling

advertisements, and they stuck to it as long as it seemed towork. Soviet editors, on the contrary, were at the mercy of

every whim of the leadership. As a result, the content of the

newspapers had an arbitrary character. When a campaign was

announced, as for example in support of the Air Force in 1923,

the newspapers were filled with articles on this subject until

the directive was forgotten or replaced by something else.

The arbitrary nature of the content of the newspapers is

apparent from my sampling, as shown in the tables in Appendix A.

For example, articles about national Party and government

leaders appeared only at the times of Party or Soviet

congresses, despite the fact that one would expect readers to

have a continuing interest in the doings of their rulers.

Similarly, the attention given to a subject such as law and

taxes varied enormously over the period, depending on whether or

not Party leaders were interested in informing readers of new

laws. Even differences between Rabochaia Moskva, with its close

attention to factory life, and the peasant newspapers, which

contained little on this theme, show the bias of the Party

leaders, rather than readers, since, judging from the

prerevolutionary era, peasants were interested in city life.

7

Despite their weaknesses, however, Soviet mass newspapers

had no competition, and ordinary people who wished to read a

newspaper read these. It is difficult to evaluate Soviet

journalists' success in making the newspaper serve the purposes

defined by the Party, but a logical place to begin is to explore

their treatment of the central issues of the time. Two subjects

stand out in this regard: war and peace, and success and

mobility. The first concerns the establishment of the authority

of the Soviet government as the representative of Russia and the

interests of its citizens. The second involves the message the

leaders sent to ordinary people about how they might better

themselves under the new conditions of Soviet society.

The study of both of these issues leads to a critical

perspective on the notion that the printed word had a liberating

purpose in the post revolutionary period. Soviet journalists

broke sharply with the past in their treatment of these two

issues, but the information they provided enhanced the power of

the new Soviet authorities rather than that of the individual

readers. The values they promoted had much in common with those

generally associated with the 1930s, rather than those

identified with the more liberal 1920s. In this respect, the

press was truly Leninist in the NEP, since it led the population

toward the future, and that future was the Stalinist Russia of

the 1930s.

PART I: IMAGES OF SUCCESS AND MOBILITY

The role of the Soviet media in the creation of a new type

of society is epitomized by the portayal of success and

mobility. Almost from the outset, Soviet journalists and

publicists showed a world in which success was found only in

institutions and organizations, in which bureaucratic rather

than entrepreneurial skills brought mobility, and where position

and privilege rather than money were the desired ends. The

revolutionaries did not invent Russian bureaucracy, and the

bureaucratic ladder of success predated the Revolution by many

centuries, but in the late imperial period official

bureaucracies offered a relatively restricted field of

opportunity for the newly literate. The bureaucratic modes of

mobility were not the predominant ones in the minds of ordinary

people in 1917. The popular success stories of the

prerevolutionary era were exclusively about mobility in the

private sector, and the heroes and heroines were independent

individuals making their way in the marketplace, rather than

functionaries gaining merit through service.

Soviet journalists and publicists who cast aside the values

associated with success in the prerevolutionary perspective

presented their readers with an accurate picture of the evolving

pattern of employment in Soviet Russia. The expanding

bureaucracies of the new regime were the most secure and

promising fields of endeavor for people of common origins

9

who aspired to better themselves. The journalists expressed the

values of the Party leaders who controlled the press as well as

their own when they praised the opportunities available in the

public sector and the disadvantages of work in the private one,

and promotion of these values helped to realize them. By

portraying the Soviet Union as a land of opportunity, Sovietjournalists helped to recruit cadres. They also legitimized the

new hierarchies, since they made mobility seem the fruit of

merit.

The Soviet Union was presented in Rabochaia Moskva, Bednota,

and Krest'ianskaia gazeta as a society open to initiative,

talent, and energy, particularly for those who could claim

proletarian or peasant origins. Readers were urged to strive

and succeed in local government, the army, the Party, the

educational system, scientific and technical establishments,

management of state industrial enerprises, agricultural

administration, and in literature and the arts. The continuous

emphasis on openings and opportunities in these areas was

reinforced by revelations of misdeeds and stories about people

sacked for them. In this respect, the continuing stress on the

availability of desirable jobs in all areas may have had

something to do with periodic purges.

The promise that the Soviet Union was a country open to the

talent and ambition of those formerly at the bottom of society

was enthusiastically expressed in the newspapers. "The

worker-peasant republic can say to its sons: the road to

knowledge is open to you," wrote a journalist in 1922

10

(B12/19/1922). "We need new people, and the path to this end is

Communist education," wrote a correspondent of Rabochaia Moskva

in 1923, on the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the

Sverdlov Communist University (RM6/20/1923). There were many

articles with captions such as "Workers and Peasants on the Path

to the Institutions of Higher Education" (B9/19/1922). Such

reports reminded readers that there was room for the ambitious

in a wide variety of jobs. As one journalist, who identified

himself as a student at a rabfak (a workers' program at a

university) explained in 1921, "any peasant straight from the

plow can become an agronomist, an engineer, a doctor, or, in

general, any kind of scientist or scholar" (B2/8/1921). The

emphasis on opportunity continued throughout the period.

Kalinin spelled this out when he replied in 1926 to an

unemployed former Red Army soldier and propagandist, who

complained that he had not been rewarded adequately for his

service to the state. Kalinin avowed that he would trade places

immediately: "To be 25 years younger in the Soviet Republic?

What could be more valuable than that? If you do not know how

to do something with your riches — then blame yourself"

(KG4/13/1926).

SUCCESS IN THE PARTY, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE ARMY

The Party offered mobility for many people. Although publicists

were sometimes cautious about proclaiming Party membership as

the path to personal mobility, the importance of Party

membership for those who wished to get ahead was stressed

11

repeatedly in the newspapers. The importance of becoming a Party

member and of having the support of members was shown repeatedly

in the newspapers. "Active, Soviet Party and professional

employees, having a secondary education, ought to be sent to the

rabfaks," read an article in 1922 (RM8/15/1922). In "A Thirst

for Knowledge" readers learned about a Moscow factory girl who

was not,selected by her factory Party cell for the rabfak, but

she was eventually able to convince the committee, and a place

was found for her (RM10/6/1922). Party membership was also

identified with advancement for peasants. For example, the

editors of Bednota asked their readers in an insert in bold type

in 1923: "Is there a cell of the Komsomol or the Communist Party

in your village? If you write that the youth want to study and

develop themselves, but there are no activists (rabotniki) who

could satisfy their wish, then turn to the nearest volost

Communist Party cell" (B6/23/1923). This message was also

brought home in letters from people who expressed their

eagerness to join "the Leninist family," as one woman put it in

a letter captioned "Why I Knock at the Door of the Leninist

Family" (KGl/25/1927/4). The power of Party members was

highlighted by the publicized fact that prospective Party

members needed recommendations from established members

(B5/17/1923).

Under such circumstances, calls to join the Party took on

the character of an invitation to the ambitious and energetic,

despite an apparently egalitarian veneer. The Party was

pictured as an institution open to ambition, although the

12

emphasis of the appeals was on service rather than mobility

until the middle of the decade. The author of an article in

1923 warned that people should join because they wanted to serve

the republic rather than reap personal rewards (RM2/11/1923).

Such statements hardly concealed value of Party membership for

advancement in any field and the possibility of fulfilling

ambition within the Party itself. Appeals to join the Party

were also made to peasants, and the possibility of a peasant

becoming a Party member "straight from the plow," was stressed

on occasion (KG12/17/1924). Articles about peasant Party

members became more common in the second half of the 1920s and

the difference in status between a working peasant and a Party

member was illuminated in captions such as "A Peasant from the

Plow — In the Party" (KG5/17/1926). Even at times when Party

membership was being curtailed, the existence of places for

worthy new members was stressed (KG10/19/1924).

An image of the Party as an enormous corporation in which

advances were always being made by rank and file employees and

people at the middle management level was created by a

continuous stream of articles about successful and unsuccessful

local Party organizations. These appeared in sections of the

newspapers devoted exclusively to local Party affairs throughout

the 1920s. Captions such as "A Good Secretary — A Good Cell"

(KG1/6/1925) and "The Bolshevik Shumilova at Work" (KG5/17/1926)

meant recognition and perhaps eventual promotion, whereas

stories such as "The Mistakes of Our Cell" (KG12/21/1924) and

"Everything is Not All Right with Us" (KG12/21/1924) conveyed

13

the opposite message. Workers were reported to have found these

reports "boring," but Party members may have responded

differently.3

The government itself was portrayed as an institution in

which ordinary people could make careers. Reports of the

congresses of Soviets carried pictures and sometimes interviews

with delegates who were identified as peasants or workers

(KG1/20/1924; KG4/19/1927). The message was that those who began

at the bottom could rise to the top. I. Gavrilov, a journalist

and member of the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of

Soviets described himself in Bednota as a poor peasant who began

serving the Soviet government in 1918 (B6/14/1922). This was

also the message communicated by articles such as "From the Plow

to the People's Commissariat," about an official in the People's

Commissariat of Agriculture (1/13/1925) .

The accessibility of the government to those with ambition

and devotion to the Soviet cause was shown in a series about the

chairmen of Raion (district) Soviets in the Moscow region

published in Rabochaia Moskva in March 1922. "From the first

days, of Soviet power to the present time Comrade Maslov

continuously participated in state-building and occupied various

responsible posts" (RM3/14/1922). Participation in local

government and in the local Soviets was presented as a path to

future opportunities, particularly for peasants. For the

peasantry, as one journalist explained, local government was "a

big Soviet school," whose graduates would comprise "a new army

of Soviet employees" (10/19/1924).

14

There was a genuine effort to show opportuntiies for women

in local government. "Anna Vakhrusheva - Chairman of the Local

Soviet," reads the caption of an article praising a woman who

was active in cooperatives, mutual aid committees, and

education, as well as local government (B2/2 1/1923). In another

story, a local official who had been a cook explained that her

life story confirmed the truth of Lenin's statement in State and

Revolution that "every cook should learn how to govern the

state" (KG3/2/1926). Similarly, a female member of the Moscow

Soviet recounted her rise in the world under the caption "How I

Became a Government Employee" (obshchestnennaia rabotnika)

(RM12/21/1922). The opportunity for peasants to enter the

apparatus of the government as employees of the People's

Commissariat of Agriculture was often emphasized (KG12/7/1924).

The army was portrayed frequently as no less open to energy

and initiative than local and national government. In this case

too there were appeals to those who" dreamed of success, despite

the contraction of the Army at the end of the civil war. "Be a

Commander," read the caption of an article about the officer

corps (RM5/23/1923). "They enter the military schools often

without any learning, half literate, but with a burning thirst

to study and to serve," observed another journalist, who hailed

the officer trainees as "our own Soviet, worker-peasant

intelligentsia" (B2/20/1923). Another columnist explained that

"the path is open" for sailors to become technical experts or

officers (Bl/14/1923). The same was true of the air force. "The

doors of the educational institution of the Air Force are open

15

wide to proletarian youth," explained a journalist in 1923

(B7/3/1923).

SUCCESS IN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

Success in industry was portrayed in Rabochaia Moskva and

there were occasional articles on this theme in the rural

newspapers. The "red factory directors" symbolized the workers'

opportunities to rise to positions of top management, and

articles about workers and peasants who became managers were the

Soviet equivalent of American "rags to riches" fables. "He gave

up the plow for the city in childhood," read one such story in

Bednota about a factory manager in which readers could follow

the manager's rise from day laborer to factory worker to factory

manager (BI0/17/1922). The promoters of success in this field

also let the glamour of life at the top shine through their

stress on the lowly origins of the managers. A story in

Rabochaia Moskva about the director of a Chemical factory

featured a picture of the director (RM5/12/1922). Under the

caption "Comrade I. S. Puchugin, Hero of Labor," readers could

see a man of prosperous appearance, with an enormous hat of

Persian lamb perched jauntily on his head and a coat with a

puffy fur collar. "Comrade Pichugin was born in a poor peasant

family in 1882," the biography began.

The image of these ordinary people catapulted into the upper

ranks of management, where comfort and prosperity accompanied

honor and respect, stood out brightly against the image of urban

mobility in the private sector. For the shopkeepers, for those

16

who made money carting goods to the cities, for all those who

profited from the market economy and tried to "rake in the

money," there was contempt and mockery (RM9/17/1922). In 1922,

Rabochaia Moskva had a regular Sunday cartoon strip satirizing

and threatening the profiteers of the NEP. The warning to those

who got rich on moonshine was particularly curt. "The moonshiner

(samogonshchik) ought to be punished in the same way as the so

called White Guard or foreign spy caught at the explosion of an

ammunition dump or a railroad bridge," suggested an author

(RM9/14/1922).

The journalists and publicists did not exclude the

agricultural sector from the picture of Soviet society as open

to opportunity and initiative, but the opportunities they

promoted were in the public sector. Political organizing in the

countryside and not farming was the activity that was shown to

bring rewards. For those who set up cooperative enterprises,

disseminated political propaganda, spread information on how to

improve farming methods, or led others toward collective

agriculture, vistas of opportunity opened. "Take the Example of

these Three," read the caption of an article about three

peasants who opened a cooperative shop with the support of the

local Soviet (KG5/25/1924). "How We Began to Manage Things in a

New Way" was the caption of an article in which an organizer

from Saratov explained his role as an "innovator" in leading

local peasants to collective forms of farming (B3/31/1923).

Similarly, a local activist in the cooperative movement and

political propagandist who tried to convince peasants to use

17

modern methods was lauded as "One of the Builders of the

Advanced Village" (KG3/16/1926). In fact, in some of the few

cases in which peasants were praised for being good farmers

readers were told that the peasants in question had abandoned

farming for organizing (B12/30/1922). In one such case at the

peak of the NEP in 1925, a good farmer legitimized his success

by devoting his energies to convincing his neighbors to follow

his methods (KG7/7/1925). The lesson was plain for all to see.

Becoming active in any of the many local organizations that were

springing up was a way for peasants to put their feet on the

bottom rungs of a ladder to success. Achieving prosperity on a

private farm led in a very different direction.

Despite the failures of collective farming, there was a

steady stream of articles about the shining prospects of this

form of agriculture throughout the NEP in columns with headings

such as "How Collective Farms Work" (7/13/1924) . "There, where

the lord's oats whispered, the village sovkhoz has grown up like

a mushroom," wrote one author in Bednota in 1922 (B9/6/1922).

"If You Want to Escape from Need — Form Agricultural

Collectives" was the title of another article (KG7/7/1925). The

success of collective ventures in agriculture satisfied

ideological needs if not economic ones. "Now the peasants no

longer laugh at collective labor, and they believe that much can

be gained collectively" wrote a journalist in 1927

(KG8/30/1927) .

18

The disincentives that confronted private farmers were as

clear as the incentives for organizers. Although the NEP was

intended to provide a legal framework and incentives for small

private farmers to increase their productivity, the newspapers

carried a very different message, and it is remarkable under

these conditions that the agricultural recovery progressed as

far as it did in the 1920s. The government's policies to

establish secure tenure in land, to allow peasants to plan for

tax policies, and to encourage peasants to improve their

holdings were not effectively communicated in the press. Large

sections of Bednota and Krest'ianskaia gazeta were devoted to

explaining official tax policies, rules for land use, and the

policy of the state toward various groups of peasants, including

agricultural laborers, poor peasants, middle peasants,

prosperous peasants, and rich peasants. The policies changed

so often, however, and the descriptions published in the

newspapers were so confused that at no time during the NEP could

a peasant who relied on popular newspapers for information

assume that land tenure was secure. Nor could one surmise, from

the newspapers, what the tax policy would be even a few months

ahead.

These problems were most dramatic in questions of land

tenure. Peasants were told again and again throughout the 1920s

that the land they farmed was theirs for the foreseeable future

and that they could invest in it and improve it with

confidence. From reports in the newspapers, however, an

agronomist's complaint in 1922 that the land was like "a girl

19

who sleeps around" (guliashchaia devushka) and that "no one is

sure to whom today's land will be granted tomorrow" was also

true at the height of the NEP (B9/3/1922). An example is a

story published in the spring of 1926 about villagers who

established private farmsteads in 1922, and now saw their

improved land merged with the lands of peasants who had remained

in the commune (KG5/24/1926) .

Fluctuations in the policy toward the peasant commune added

to the confusion about land tenure. At times the commune was

promoted as a step toward socialized agriculture, and other

times it was condemned as a feudal remnant. In 1922 peasants

were granted the right to choose among the traditional commune,

private farming, or some sort of collective agriculture

(BI0/8/1922). Readers of Krest'ianskaia gazeta were told in the

spring of 19 24, however, that "The prosperous muzhik is for the

most part the one who wishes to separate," since "there beyond

the eyes of the peasant commune and of the authorities he can do

what he wants to the agricultural laborer" (5/1/1924). By early

1927, the families on private farmsteads were enemies of the

people; the private farmer was "not a person striving for

socialism, but most of all a venomous proprietor" (KG1/11/1927),

and peasants were told that "the path to socialism is only

through the peasant commune" (KG1/18/1927).

The NEP was a period of fundamentally ambiguous policy in

agriculture, and the ambiguity was communicated to readers of

the popular press. Peasants were encouraged to improve

production, but there were articles warning of the machinations

20

of kulaks throughout the period, and the difference between

"strong," "prosperous," and "rich peasants," on the one hand,

and the kulaks, on the other, was always vague. Charges against

kulaks in the press were often threatening. For example, as

early as the summer of 1922, kulaks were accused of being in

league with the foreign bourgeoisie and creating famine

conditions (B8/11/1922). By early 1927 charges that they were

"wreckers (vrediteli) of the Soviet village" were common

(KGl/11/1927).

The half-hearted attempts in the press to soften some of

these threats at the peak of the NEP were hardly likely to

encourage peasants to seek prosperity through private farming.

Kalinin announced, for example, in Krest'ianskaia gazeta in the

summer of 1925 that there was no danger from kulaks

(7/14/1925). He even suggested that an agricultural laborer

might prefer to work for a rich peasant rather than a middle

peasant, since the food provided would be better. There was no

follow up to the article, however, and before another growing

season had begun the line had changed. By March of 1926, the

kulaks were again said to present a danger (KG3/23/1926). A

letter was published at this time in which a peasant complained

that many were afraid to become prosperous because they could

lose their vote and see the lands they had improved exchanged

for forest or scrub (KG6/1/1926). In reply, Kalinin reaffirmed

the government's alliance with the poor, adding almost as an

afterthought that the authorities had nothing against peasants

who became prosperous through their own labor. Similarly, local

21

officials were sometimes cautioned against attacking the middle

peasant (KG3/23/1926), but they were ne"er urged to respect the

prosperous ones.

The hopeless situation of those who sought success as

farmers was summed up by one journalist, who advised young

peasants against splitting their farms among family members. If

they kept the farm together, he suggested, parents could work

the farm while the younger members volunteered in local

organizations and established themselves on the first rung of

the bureaucratic hierarchy in local government or the Party

(B2/15/1923).

The disincentives that faced private, farmers contradicted

the message associated with much of the popular agronomy of the

period. Although the journalists discouraged the energetic and

ambitious from seeking prosperity through farming, they provided

information that seemed intended to help them do just that in

the form of detailed articles on agronomy. A substantial

portion of the rural newspapers was devoted to agronomy, and

again and again readers were told that if they would only listen

to the voice of science they could become prosperous. A

journalist made the point, with reference to high American

yields, that if only the peasants would take "the path indicated

by science, than we would quickly restore our economy and catch

up with other countries" (B9/14/1922). This was the message of

"A Peasant Poem" published in Bednota in 1922 (Bl/5/1922). "Why

do the people live poorly in Russia and why does the muzhik

manage his farm so badly? The whole reason is that he has no

22

science." The same argument was made in the special pages

devoted to agronomy in the rural newspapers, although there the

peasant was often promised a good crop, or, on occasion, a fist

full of money. In one such story, in Krest'ianskaia gazeta in

1925, hands were shown clutching money, and peasants were urged

to plant flax (KG5/19/1925). In another, the caption read "Let

Clover Go to Seed and Earn Big Money" (KG6/23/1925). The fact

that peasants did not take this advice freely offered supported

those who blamed the agricultural crisis on the backwardness and

intransigence of the peasants, rather than on the faulty

incentive system. Collectivization, with reduced scope for

decisions made by individual peasants, had a strong appeal to

people who felt that peasants on their own willfully refused to

adopt more modern methods of farming.

It was not surprising that under such conditions suggestions

appeared in the press that the peasants should be forced to use

modern methods, since such a decision would accord with the

interests of the organizers as well as with the logic of

science. The obvious conclusion in view of the peasants'

refusal to follow good advice, according to one columnist in the

spring of 1923, was that "the business can be put right only

with the help of the state organs" (B5/24/1923). The same view

was expressed by a columnist writing in late 1927 on the eve of

collectivization. "The peasants live closely together," he

complained, "but they think separately, each one about himself"

(KGll/29/1927).

23

BUREAUCRATIC SUCCESS

The most remarkable characteristic of the image of success

in the Soviet media during the 1920s was that it was formulated

exclusively in bureaucratic terms. There were possibilities for

ordinary people of lower class origins to find jobs and

opportunities in the public sector in the prerevolutionary era,

but private opportunities were the ones that were portrayed in

the popular success stories.

The power of the bureaucratic idea of mobility was also

reflected in literature and the arts, and science and

technology. The independence associated with the creative life

made literature and the arts a potential exception to the idea

of success through bureaucratic advancement, but when

journalists treated these subjects they often stressed the

institutional aspects of achievement. Thus the poets discussed

in Rabochaia gazeta were largely those of the Workers' Spring

group of proletarian poets, with whom the newspaper had a

special relationship. There were fewer articles on cultural

subjects in the newspapers intended for rural readers, but those

that appeared usually carried the message that official ties

were important. For example, the editors of Krest'ianskaia

gazeta stressed the need for a union of peasant writers, to make

sure that "talented people would have the chance to publish"

(KG12/1/1925)

An exaggerated but revealing example of the bureaucratic

idea of mobility in the arts is an account in Bednota in 1926 of

a self-taught sculptor named Solov'ev, whose search for

recognition began in his own villgage, with a statue of Lenin

24

(B8/17/1926). When asked later why he chose Lenin as a subject,

he explained: "Because he is always before my eyes; I love

him." His successful effort to get into an art school in Moscow

began when he presented busts of Lenin and Kalinin to Party

members at the district center. They were pleased. They sent

him to Rostov, the provincial capital, where he again

demonstrated his skill, and from there he went on to Moscow.

The fact that the regime itself had complete control of

success in every area was expressed most clearly in the contempt

for money. For example, although state lotteries were actively

promoted, the winners were never shown contemplating their legal

bonanzas. The journalists even tried to reassure readers on

occasion that possessing money or earning money was not

dangerous, but these articles often seem unconvincing. For

example, readers were told during a campaign to increase savings

accounts in the state bank that "a depositor is not a kulak"

(KG3/30/1926). In the same vein was an article published in

1928 amidst a campaign to convince peasants to invest in dairy

farming, horticulture, and bee keeping. "Does a young person

lose in the social sense or all the more in the material sense

if he becomes a horticulturist or a horticulturist-beekeeper?

Speaking more simply, does he ruin his life career? A thousand

times no." (KG5/15/1928). One did not have to be very clever to

realize that the author protested too much.

The fact that the authorities remained the source of all

benefits, even for private farmers, was also highlighted by

articles about peasant petitioners who came to Moscow to see M.

25

I. Kalinin, the editors of the rural newspapers, or simply

whomever they could find at "the House of Peasants," a cultural

institution that was frequently described in the rural press.

One story of this sort, "To the Ministry of Agriculture for a

Horse," was the tale of a poor orphan boy whose father had been

killed in the civil war. The boy appealed in desperation to the

Ministry of Agriculture to provide his family with a horse

(B3/8/1923). The journalist described how his hopes were

fulfilled by the friendly officials he met at the House of

Peasants.

Stories about common people who rose in one of the several

bureaucracies of early Soviet life were accompanied by stories

about other people who did not rise, but excelled at their

modest jobs as workers or peasants. These stories were usually

about elderly workers who were honored and rewarded for superior

performance in their allotted station in life. The praise of

such people implied that all jobs had their merit, and one did

not have to rise in society to be worthy of respect.

This was perhaps an important lesson at a time when mobility

was so much in evidence. Such people included the model workers

of industry. "She served 50 years at the factory, inspiring the

young," read one such account (RM3/17/1922). "Glory and honor

to this heroine of labor." Another hero was "Uncle Uvar," an

inspiring older worker without whom the factory in question

could not function (RM6/3/1922).

26

Peasants who fit this mold distinguished themselves by

producing a prize vegetable or achieving a record harvest,

usually on a small piece of land. Such feats were hailed under

headings such as "150 Poods per Desiatin" (B3/4/1923) and, in

one case, "A Hero of the Land" (B12-21/1922), about a farmer

whose yield was almost eight times the average for his

district. The farmers where never shown to derive any benfits

from their achievement beyond the publicity; neither the prize

winning cabbage nor the remarkable yield made them rich. The

achievements of the model workers and peasants have something in

common with the feats of martyrs to duty, such as a soldier who

died when he refused leave his post in a burning building

without the permission of his commander. He was praised under

the caption "The Feat of the Red Army man Chernyshev"

(RM8/15/1922). Worker, peasant, and soldier were all shown

simply to be doing their best without calculation of personal

gain.

The picture of a world of opportunity open to initiative and

in which merit is rewarded had the effect of legitimizing the

new Soviet hierarchy of privilege and authority. The emphasis

on mobility and merit, however, also implied that those who

found themselves at the bottom of the pyramid were not there

unjustly. Stories about model workers and peasants can be seen

as an attempt to soften the dichotomy between the deserving who

advanced and those who did not. Stories about dignity in

ordinary jobs, about respect for authority, about elders who

inspired young people to be proud of their work at whatever rank

27

they found themselves, carried values important for promoting

stability in a time of rapid social change.

By projecting the image of an exclusively bureaucatic

society and discouraging activity and initiative in the private

sector, early Soviet journalists and publicists transmitted the

reality of their own state service to the reading public. The

Party was the boss of their newspapers, and the journalists knew

only one employer. Their image of success was similar to that

of the Party leaders, and in doing their job the journalists

helped to channel the efforts of the population at large into

the public sector and to prepare the more ambitious among the

ordinary people for life in the 1930s. In this respect early

Soviet journalists resembled their prerevolutionary

counterparts. The image of success that they presented to

readers was closely patterned on their own experience. In the

prerevolutionary period, that experience was in the rapidly

developing private sector in publishing. In the early Soviet

period, journalists moving up did so in the state bureaucracy of

the new publishing industry. In both the prerevolutionary and

the early Soviet period, popular journalists appear to have

shared the social experiences of their readers. In both

periods, the state influenced the content of popular media,

although the degreee of control of the Soviet press was much

greater than that of the prerevolutionary popular media. Even

with strict governmental and Party control of the media,

however, journalists communicated to readers an idea of success

as they had experienced it. That success was achieved through

28

the bureaucracies set up by the Party and the state, and it was

a true reading of the opportunities for upward mobility in early

Soviet society. In this very particular sense, early Soviet

journalists told the truth to their readers.

29

PART II: POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN ENEMIES

The single most important task that Soviet journalists faced

was to legitimize the new Soviet government and create an image

of political authority that could serve as a basis for the

loyalty of its citizens. The very nature of the government

itself complicated this task, and journalists were hard pressed

to explain how the Soviet system worked beyond what became a

standard reference to the Congress of Soviets. The differing

roles of the Party and the government were never explained, and

sometimes readers were told that Central Executive Committee of

Soviets was "the highest organ of the Republic" (B10/20/1922),

but other times they were informed simply that "The Party Gave

the Order" (KG7/14/1925). This confusion was compounded by the

myriad short formulas that were used to refer to the ruling

authority, including not only "Soviet Power," the Central

Executive Committee of the Soviets, the Party, the republic, and

the government, but also "the center," Moscow, and sometimes

simply "authority," "the apparatus," or even "the organs." For

example, "What Have our Highest Organs Decided?" read a caption

in Krest'ianskaia gazeta in 1923 (KG12/2/1923), and another

article was titled simply, "The Eye of the Center is Needed"

(KG12/7/1924).

30

Nor could journalists discuss the politics or the lives of

Party and governmental leaders. Much of what happened in the

Party was secret, and journalists were reduced to making

laudatory commentaries on the leaders' speeches, which were

often printed in full. The result was predictable, and

according to a survey of the readers of Rabochaia gazeta in

1924, workers found the Party life section of the newspaper dull

and uncritical. Even when Lenin died, the journalists were

unable to tell their readers who would rule, and depending on

the newspaper the successor seemed either A. I. Rykov, the head

of the government, or M. I. Kalinin, the chairman of the Central

Executive Committee of the Soviets. Although Stalin's rise to

absolute power is evident in the newspapers, and there was even

a letter from some early "Stalinists" (Stalintsev) in

Krest'ianskaia gazeta at the end of 1924, his power was never

discussed.

The vagueness of Soviet political authority was not

dispelled by the special role given Kalinin, "the all-Russian

peasant elder," whose peasant origins were repeatedly

mentioned. He was portrayed as as a tribune of the people, who

granted pardons and petitions. "Comrade Kalinin Grants Amnesty

to 260 Prisoners" read the heading of a typical article

(KGl/18/1927). In other articles he was shown receiving

peasants, who asked for "Mikhail Vanych" (B9/29/1922). Peasants

humbly submitted their requests to this important person, and

Kalinin was often shown distributing largesse. Such fables may

have had symbolic meaning for some peasants, but they could

31

hardly substitute for a well-defined image of the ruling

authority. Even the assiduous praise of the institutions of

compulsion, which was also characteristic of the Soviet press in

the 1920s, could not substitute for the absence of visible

central government. Once Lenin died and Trotsky began to slip

from view, even praise of the Red Army became vague.

Nothing served so well to crystallize a clear notion of

Soviet political authority as the image in the newspapers of

strident opposition between Soviet Russia and the surrounding

world. Bolshevik leaders had ideological and historical reasons

to fear and condemn their capitalist neighbors. Yet the image

of Russia versus her European neighbors suggests that the

external threat was primarily a means to legitimize and

consolidate domestic political authority.

The section on foreign affairs was the most popular part of

the Soviet mass newspaper, according to a survey in 1924 of the

readers of Rabochaia gazeta, and a substantial portion of the

three newspapers was devoted to the world abroad throughout the

period. Roughly a fifth of all the space in Rabochaia Moskva

and in Bednota were devoted to this subject, and even in

Krest'ianskaia gazeta the percentage of total space allotted to

the world beyond Russia's borders seldom dipped below 15

percent.

Attention to the outside world focused heavily on Europe,

particularly Britain, Poland, and the small states on Russia's

border. The relations of foreign states with Russia occupied

32

well over 50 percent of all the space allotted to foreign

relations in each of the three newspapers. War and danger to

Russia rather than the prospects for revolution abroad were the

subjects of most of these articles. The stories about the

threat to Russia dwarf those about revolutionary movements and

the horror of life under capitalism. Revolutionary activity was

most important in the paper for the rural cadres, Bednota, and

there was considerably less on this subject in the other

newspapers.

The Europe Soviet journalists presented to their readers

was confusing and frightening, and headlines such as "Bloody

Events in Italy" (KG9/2/1924) and pictures, such as one of

Bulgarian soldiers shooting communists (KG9/12/1924), were

typical. These stories served to highlight the ever present

danger of war. Again and again throughout the 1920s, Soviet

journalists brought their readers rumors of war. "The War

Continues," read a headline in Rabochaia Moskva in the spring of

1922, and a quote from a month old speech by Trotsky followed in

which the chief of the army warned that the capitalists of

Europe were unwilling to relinquish their dreams of Russian oil

(5/11/1922). "The Danger of a New War has not Passed" read a

headline from Krest'ianskaia gazeta in 1926 (2/16/1926/7). A

cartoon in the same year showed Churchill, sitting on England

and glowering evilly at the Soviet Union (3/30/1926) • A

cartoon in Rabochaia Moskva at the end of 1922, captioned

33

"Evacuation," showed two ferocious dogs looking back at a meaty

bone (RMll/17/1922).

The sense of violence and peril on the frontier may also

explain the emphasis on danger from Poland and the Baltic

countries. Poland, Russia's bitter enemy from the civil war,

was "the Poland of the Pan" or the lord until Pilsudskii's rise

to power, when Soviet journalists dubbed it "the kingdom of

Pilsudskii." "Be on Guard," read a caption in Rabochaia Moskva

in the spring of 1923; "The Poland of Pans thirsts for the blood

of the workers" (RM3/28/1923). "In the Poland of the Pan," read

the caption for another a typical article, "Repression of

Peasants, Hunger Riots in the Cities, In the Prisons — No Extra

Places" (Bl/6/26). An equally distressing and threatening

picture was drawn of the Baltic countries, which were portrayed

as continually scheming against Russia. A visit to England by

the foreign ministers of Estonia and Latvia was prominently

reported under the heading "A Capitalist Plot Against the USSR"

(KG7/21/1925).

The sense that the horrible fate of living in one of these

countries could await Soviet citizens was brought home to the

readers of the newspapers by the many articles about the

suffering of Bessarabia and Western Belorussia, regions lost to

the Soviet Union after the World War. "The Bloody Pacification

of Peasants in Bessarabia" (KG10/12/1924) and "The Free Order of

the USSR is Not to Rumania's Taste" (KG9/28/1924) were

characteristic.

34

THE WAR SCARE OF 19 2 3

The most important foreign stories in the 1920s, however,

and the ones that lent substance to much of the other reportage

were the war scares of 1923 and 1927. In each case, British

threats were used to generate support for the Soviet government.

In neither instance was the outbreak of hostilities likely, and

the Soviet government never prepared for war, but both war

scares coincided with periods of domestic stress. During the

spring and summer of 1923 Lenin's health deteriorated and the

New Economic Policy had yet to produce its benefits. In 1927

the threat of war was used to crush the opposition of Trotsky

and others to Stalin's hegemony. Both scares were opportunities

for journalists to portray the Soviet government and its

leaders as defenders of the nation. There were demonstrations

in support of the government during these times, appeals to

beware of spies and to support the secret police and the army,

and there were also public subscriptions to raise money for the

air force.

The occasion for the war scare of 1923 was a British note

threatening to break off diplomatic relations with Russia in ten

days if the Soviet government did not satisfy Britain on a

number of issues, including Soviet involvement in Central Asia,

fishing rights, and religious persecution. The note, dated May

2nd, was received by Russian representatives on the 8th. The

journalists replied with a spate of articles stressing Britain's

greed for Russia's mineral riches and the insult to Russia's

pride. Newspaper coverage began on the 12th and 13th, and mass

meetings were organized throughout the country.

35

The editors of Rabochaia Moskva played on the themes of

foreign greed and envy in their lead editorial on the 12th. "An

international gang of incendiaries named the Entente is uneasy

while the worker and peasant republic lives, develops, and gains

in strength,'" wrote the editors of Rabochaia Moskva in their

lead editorial (RM5/12/1923). They continued: " But when

fountains of oil spurt in this republic, when incalculable

deposits of iron ore are discovered in this republic, when the

chimneys of factories and plants pour forth smoke with

increasing force — then the hands of this gang begin to itch;

their eyes burn rapaciously; and they will not stop at any crime

in the name of robbery and conquest." A cartoon of a ferocious

bulldog captioned "The Real Mug of the English Note" appeared on

page two of the same issue.

The scare also provided an opportunity for Soviet leaders to

appear as nationalists before the country. "The Soviet

republics will not submit to humiliation," Chicherin proclaimed

on the first page of Rabochaia Moskva on the 15th. "England will

never convert us into an ocupied zone," announced Bukharin on

the same page; and Trotsky promised that although the British

were used to commanding other people, "the word command does not

reach Red Moscow."

The insult to the dignity of Russia was also stressed in

Bednota. "Hands off Soviet Russia," read the headline on the

12th; "We were not frightened by Vrangel, and we will not be

frightened by Notes." The banner headline on the next day was

"Before the Threat of a New Attack." As in Rabochaia Moskva,

36

brief quotes from statements by Soviet leaders followed: "We do

not want war," announced Chicherin, "But let the imperialists

know that we will not give up an inch of our independence." "We

want peace," Trotsky proclaimed, "but if they attack us all the

same, the Red Army and Red Fleet will fulfill their duty to the

end." To this was added a statement by "a worker": "Comrade

Chicherin, don't be afraid of threats." There was also a

statement from "a peasant": "Our hand is used to plowing and

wants to plow, but it knows how to hold a gun."

The crisis fit perfectly with the campaign to promote the

Soviet Air Force, and to the menace of the foreign enemy was

added the terror of attack by air. The airplane was largely

ignored in the press in 1922, but in March of 1923 Trotsky

proclaimed its importance. The public campaign for an air force

was underway when the war scare began. Stories such as one in

which Russian readers were invited to imagine a capitalist air

attack heightened the sense of danger (B3/4/1923). "We are

Surrounded by Enemies Armed to the Teeth," ran the caption for a

story about the air forces of the capitalist powers

(RM/6/20/1923). "Red falcons of the USSR," wrote

Antonov-Ovsenko, the Minister of Defense, "the predatory

carrion-crows of imperialism threaten us. We should oppose them

with the bright force of a powerful flock of Red falcons of the

USSR" (RM/6/24/1923). The story was illustrated with a cartoon

of a terrifying capitalist monster under attack by the Red

falcons.

37

THE WAR SCARE OF 19 2 7

The war scare of 1927 was similar to that of 1923, except

that it lasted longer. The rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations on

May 26th, following a British search of the building of the

Soviet trading company Arcos and the Soviet trade delegation in

London on May 12th, provided the occasion for the scare. The

British accused the Soviets of espionage, but they continued to

trade with the USSR.

The scare had its own build up in the press. Stories about

spies, saboteurs, arsonists, and other villains helped to create

a sense of danger. Rykov, the titular head of the government,

warned in April that capitalists could not sit by and watch

Russia prosper. "The imperialists hate us for our socialist

construction," he explained. (KG4/26/1927). Then, on the 7th of

June, almost two weeks after the rupture in Anglo-Soviet

relations, a warning from the Central Committee was given a

banner headline in Krest'ianskaia gazeta. The story was

illustrated with a cartoon of a single Soviet soldier protecting

a peaceful and thriving land against a band of blood-thirsty

capitalists. Stalin had a personal role in the scare, and on

the 28th of July the text of his speech on "The threat of war

and about China" appeared in both newspapers.

The artificial quality of the scare was revealed in the

difference between the coverage in Bednota, the cadres'

newspaper, and the mass newspaper Krest'ianskaia gazeta. The

editors of Bednota played down the scare. They even informed

their readers in the middle of August, during the height of the

33

scare, that conditions were not ripe for the international

bourgeoisie to attack Russia, much as they might like to do so

(8/13/1927). Krest'ianskaia gazeta told its readers a different

story. "The International Capitalists and Landowners are

Preparing a War Against the Country of Laborers; Peasants be on

Guard" read a banner headline in that paper on the 21st of

June. An accompanying photo showed a peasant trying on a gas

mask. "What peasant is not alarmed at the threat of war?" began

the lead article. "Who now in the laboring Union does not know

how world imperialism, with the most bandit-like English in the

lead, prepares new attacks on the Soviet Union?" Such warnings

were repeated throughout spring and summer. "The Capitalists

Prepare War in order to Smash our Construction! Advance the

Fighting Power of the SSSR!" read a headline in July

(7/5/1927). At this time there were lead articles on topics

such as "Peasants and the Defense of the Country" (KG7/19/1927) .

The war scare of 1927 was distinguished from the earlier by

its campaign-like atmosphere. The newspapers were full of

testimonials from citizens expressing their loyalty. The

editors of Krest'ianskaia gazeta claimed in July that they

received hundreds of letters every day from peasants and workers

"who affirm that they will not give up their fields, factories,

and plants to anyone"(7/12/1927). Some of the testimonials bear

a formula like quality. For example, a peasant-administrator

(krest'ianin-vydvizhenets) was quoted as proclaiming: "Comrades,

we, the peasants, are told that the capitalists want to attack

39

us. For the peasant the most important question is this one:

can we give up the land which we now have?" (KG6/28/1927).

An unintended result of the repeated warnings was panic

buying of necessities in the countryside, and the response of

Krest'ianskaia gazeta suggests that people in authority

preferred the panic to allaying readers' fears about the threat

of war. Initially, class enemies were blamed for the panic and

the danger of war was down played (KG7/26/1927). Then came

Stalin's speech, and the editors took a different tack. A rural

correspondent from Smolensk described the panic in his region in

an article captioned "The Threat of War and Panic Buying"

(KG8/16/1927). He too blamed the panic buying on class enemies,

but the way he condemned them made it seem as if the war would

begin the following day. "In my opinion," he explained, "only

conscious enemies of the people and unconscious little groups

can act this way; in my opinion, each person ought to work as if

the war has really begun, but live and act as if there is no

war." As if to dispel any doubt about the immediacy of the

danger he concluded: "Even when the war has come, each peasant

should only buy as much as he usually buys when there is no kind

of panic." The editor of the newspaper, Ia. A. Iakovlev, added

a note in which he promised readers that more goods would be

made available, but he did not say a word to dispel fear of war.

Stories about spies and saboteurs added to the image of

crisis conveyed in Krest'ianskaia gazeta in 1927. Readers were

called to preserve the country from "foreign spies,

40

incendiaries, and murderers, together with their monarchist and

White guard allies" (KG6/24/1927). In an article published on

June 14th, foreign terrorists were accused of carrying out a

rash of attacks on Soviet officials and leaders, of starting

fires and wrecking trains, and of planning to kill Bukharin and

blow up the Kremlin. Other stories of this sort followed

throughout the year.

For Stalin and his followers, the war scare was a useful

weapon against Trotsky and the opposition. Letters were

published, statements were issued, and journalists harped on the

need for unity. In a typical letter, a Siberian rural

correspondent accused the opposition of "factional blindness,"

at a time when "our enemies hold a sword over our country"

(KG11/29/1927). A characteristic statement from a Party member

expressed the belief that that "our leaders will take all

measures to preserve the peace" (KG10/20/1927). Readers of

Krest'ianskaia gazeta were assured that the country, united

around the Party, would "repel the attack of the enemies with

an iron hand" (KG6/14/1927). "No one can shake the unity of the

Party," another journalist concluded (KG7/5/1927).

The conclusion that can be drawn from the portrayal of the

danger of war and generally xenophobic character of the Soviet

coverage of the world abroad is that Soviet journalists found

this theme one of the easiest to use both in attracting the

attention of readers and in promoting loyalty to the regime. On

a deeper level, however, the response of early Soviet

journalists to their readers' interest in the rest of the world

41

reveals the tendency of the government to make information a

restrictive instrument of policy. Soviet citizens were not

given the information they would have needed to participate in

the decision-making process. Nor was the broadening curiosity

and increasing familiarity with the rest of the world that

prerevolutionary common readers had been exposed to continued

after the Revolution. This surely was both a cause and a

symptom of the increasing insularity of Soviet Russia.

42

NOTES

1. Figures on literacy and schooling are given in Jeffrey

Brooks,"The Zemstvos and the Education of the People," in The

Russian Zemstvo, eds. T. Emmons and Wayne Vucinich (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 243-78; Figures on

publishing and the circulation of periodicals are found in When

Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature,

1861-1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). In

press.

2. Ia. Shafir, Rabochaia gazeta i ee chitatel' (Moscow, 1926).

3. Ibid., pp. 171-79.

4. Ibid. pp. 171-79.

5. Ibid., p. 100.

43APPENDIX A: TABLES

TABLE 1: CIRCULATION OF SOVIET MASS NEWSPAPERS

Circulation of19181919192019211921(end)pre-nep11/211/2212/2223/5/232/245/24+ first issue 2

Circulation ofafter 3 months6 molyr2yr1/243/2411/241/253/2511/2512/251/262/263/263/264/266/27

Circulation of2/2210/221/23

Bednota50,000240,000570,000350,000275,000600-800,000*600,000375,00075,00030,00050,00050,00060,000

7 March, 1918. *75%

Krest'ianskaia gazeta50,000240,000480,000600,000600,000120,000480,000600,000600,000600,000600,000800,000916,000980,0001,015,000956,926850,000

Rabochaia Moskva24,00035,00062,000

SourcesBrooks, "The Breakdown."

3/27/1923/147711/2/21/10651/13/22/112312/19/1922/13995/4/24/ low point in NEP5/23/1923/15212/15/1924/17404/5/24

to Rd Army

Sources11/17/25/10111/17/25/10111/17/25/10111/17/25/1011/13/1924/593/23/26/1211/17/1924/1011/13/25/593/23/26/1211/17/25/992/2/1926/5(112)2/2/1926/5(112)2/2/1926/5 (112)3/9/26/10(117)3/23/26/124/27/26/176/7/27/23

Sources2/7/23/27(299)10/21/22/2122/7/23/27 (299)

The sources refer to the newspaper in question unless otherwiseindicated.

44TABLE 2: THE CONSENT OF RABOCHAIA MOSKVA(in percent of column inches per issue)

Sources: A sample of four issues per year when available. Issues weretaken from the 15th of February, May, August, and November. Sundays andMondays were excluded.

WorkersPeasantsLocal PartyNational PartyLocal GovernmentNational GovernmentChild EducationAdult EducationOctober RevolutionArmy and Civil WarTax and LawReligionCommon CrimeEconomic CrimePolitical CrimeNationalitiesHuman InterestArt and CultureScienceQuestion and AnswerSpecialistsAdvertisementsFictionPoetryMisc. Domestic StoriesForeign Subjectstotals

192225.5.6.2.7.2.0.53.0.4.0.0.3.3.0.50.0.1.2.0.0.5

12.0.1.0.5

21.599.5

19239.50.4.50.53.53.51.7.0.3.0.

10.1.1.0.50.0.0.56.3.50.

13.0.4.52.

25.5100.0

Sources: A sample of four issues per year when available. Issues weretaken from the 15th of February, May, August, and November. Sundays andMondays were excluded. See Table 2 for a full list of topics.

45TABLE 3: THE CONTENT OF BEDNOTA

(in percent of column inches per issue)

WorkersPeasantsParty Loc.Party Nat.Gov. Loc.Gov.Nat.Child Ed.Adult Ed.RevolutionArmyTax & LawReligionCrime Gen." Economic" PoliticalMinoritiesHuman Int.Art & Cult.ScienceQ & ASpecialistAds.FictionPoetryMisc.Dom.ForeignTotals

192014.517.50.0.6.3.1.3.51.

17.4.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.55.0.0.0.0.3.0.

23.99.0

19212.

20.0.0.2.1.2.2.0.

14.28.0.0.0.0.0.0.2.

150.0.0.0.0.1.

14.103.

19224.

21.52.1.1.51.0.0.0.2.

14.1.50.1.0.0.0.1.

14.0.0.0.50.1.0.

32.98.0

19232.5

24.2.50.3.1.0.51.507.6.54.1.0.0.1.5

0.513.0.0.4.0.1.0.

23.96.5

19243.

19.4.50.

12.0.50.2.2.2.55.0.2.0.0.50.0.1.

21.1.52.4.0.0.2.5

14.99.0

19255.5

23.56.5.57.58.50.103.2.50.1.53.2.1.504.3.1.1.2.0.1.53.

14.100.5

19266.

13.3.0.7.7.51.1.50.0.5.1.4.2.1.0.1.2.2.

11.1.54.1.50.0.4.

24.599.0

19278.

18.50.

15.3.55.0.1.2.1.1.0.5.0.0.0.1.53.5

11.0.0.51.0.0.1.22.5

101.0

19284.5

34.4.5.5

4.1.0000.4.50.1.4..5

0.1.52.9.0.54.2.0.0.3.17.598.0

19294.

36.4.

10.52.0.0.52.500.50.1.0.6.

. 1.5000.5.0.0.6.2.0.2.

15.98.5

Sources: A sample of four issues per year when available. Issues weretaken from the 15th of February, May, August, and November. Sundays andMondays were excluded. See Table 2 for a full list of topics.

46TABLE 4: THE CONTENT OF KREST'IANSKAIA GAZETA

(in percent of column inches per issue)

WorkersPeasantsParty Loc.Party Nat.Gov. Loc.Gov.Nat.Child Ed.Adult Ed.RevolutionArmyTax & LawReligionCrime Gen." Economic" PoliticalMinoritiesHuman Int.Art & Cult.ScienceQ & ASpecialistAds.FictionPoetryMisc.Dom.ForeignTotals

19234.

16.0.0.1.4.8.4.0.4.

16.1.0.2.0.0.0.0.

10.5.0.4.0.3.0.

16.98.

19243.

19.4.50.8.53.0.5.2.1.5.50.0.0.50.0.0.50.9.52.5.

11.0.0.4 .

15.99.0

19253.5

16.1.8.

10.10.50.1.0.54.6.0.2.1.2.53.0.0.6.0.1.

10.0.0.0.5

15.101.5

19264.

21.9.0.7.0.0.0.1.8.9.0.6.0.0.0.2.2.8.0.0.7.0.0.1.

16.101.

19275.5

21.2.

11.10.5.1. •0.4.2.1.0.0.2.2.0.0.50.4.50.0.

13.50.1.0.

11.97.0

19288.

25.51.7.4.4.1.3.1.0.52.0.3.57.0.0.1.0.

10.0.0.

10.0.0.0.

11.99.5

192928230.0.5.50.0.53.0.0.0.4.0.6.0.0.10.50.4.50.0.8.0.0.0.6.5

99.5

total56.0

141.517.526.46.026.510.516.8.5

19.539.55.11.518.54.53.

14.52.

52.57.6.

63.5•

4.5.590.5

695.5

47TABLE 5: FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN RABOCHAIA MOSKVA BY REGION

(in percentage of total columnn inches devoted to foreign affairsin each year)

TABLE 6: FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN RABOCHAIA MOSKVA BY THEME(in percentage of columnn inches devoted to foreign affairs

in each year)

TABLE 7: SCIENCE IN RABOCHAIA MOSKVA BY THEME(in percentage of columnn inches devoted to science

in each year)

EuropeNorth America.Far EastNear EastOtherCominterntotals

192250.1.2.0.4.

43.100.

192396.4.0.0.00

100.

Revolution AbroadCriticism of Life AbroadForeign VisitorsForeign WarsOther Stories about Life AbroadForeign GovernmentsRelations with RussiaOther Diplomatic RelationsForeign Science and Tech.Foreign Military PowerOthertotals

192247.6.4.0.0.6.

30.3.0.0.3.

99.

19235.2.0.5.02

79.4.4.0.0.

101.

ReligionSuperstitionElectricityMechanization of IndustryMechanization of AgricultureAgronomyMedical and Public HealthAirplaneRadioOthertotal

19220.0.

10.7.0.0.

58.00

24.99.

19230.0.0.

18.0.0.

16.0.9.

58.101.

48

TABLE 8: FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN BEDNOTA BY REGION(in percentage of total columnn inches devoted to foreign affairs

in each year)

TABLE 9: FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN BEDNOTA BY THEME(in percentage of columnn inches devoted to foreign affairs

in each year)

EuropeN. Amer.F.EastN.EastOtherCominterntotals

192098.2.0.0.0.0.

100.

192182.18.0.0.0.0.

100.

192249.1.1.51.7.

40.99.5

192376.3.9.2.

100

100.

192487.8.4.0.0.0.

99.

192564.4.

19.3.9.0

100.

192687.4.53.6.0.0.

100.5

192733.9.

20.1.

37.0

100.

192878.5.

11.4.20

100.

192972.3.

22.0.3.0

100.

RevolutionNeg. lifeVistorswarsOther lifeGovs.Rel. W/ROther RSciencemilitaryOthertotal

192016.04.00.0.0.0.

76.51.0.0.0.

97.5

19210.

14.0.0.0.0.

75.7.4.0.0.

100.

192256.11.0.0.0.0.

40.4.0.0.0.

101.1

192314.4.0.8.0.1.

59.12.50.0.0.

98.5

192427.11.0.0.0.0.

60.1.0.0.0.

99.

192542.17.10.0.0.

23.5.3.0.0.0.

100.

192625.25.7.0.0.

12.18.10.2.0.0.

99.

192733.6.

26.0.0.2.

30.2.0.0.0.

99.

192830.5.0.

11.0.5.

18.26.0.5.0.

100.

192942.18.0.0.0.4.

36.0.0.0.0.

100.

49TABLE 10: SCIENCE IN BEDNOTA BY THEME

(in percentage of columnn inches devoted to sciencein each year)

ReligionSuperst.ElectricMech/ Ind.Mech/Ag.AgronomyMedicalAirplaneRadioOthertotal

19200.0.0.0.0.

71.29.0.0.0.

100.

19210.0.0.0.0.

99.0.1.0.0.

100.

19222.0.

14.0.0800.300

99.

192311.0.3.5.0.

80.0.1.0.0.

100.

19240.0.0.0.

17.77.2.4.0.0.

100.

19250.0.9.

13.13.51.4.

10.0.0.

100.

19260.0.0.5.0.

88.3.0.0.3.

99.

19270.0.1.

11.0.

58.0.0.9.

20.99.

19280.0.0.

17.8.

12.0.

29.35.0.

101.

19290.0.0.

33.44.0.0.1.1.

22.101.

EuropeN. Amer.F.EastN.EastOtherCominterntotals

1923100.

0.0.0.00

100.

192493.4.2.0.0.0.

99.

192584.0.9.5.2.0.

100.

192665.0.0.0.

35.0.

100.

192767.20.0.0.

13.0.

100.

192859.0.

27.3.

11.0.

100.

192952.15.18.0.

15.0.

100.

TABLE 11: FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN KREST'IANSKAIA GAZETA BY REGION(in percentage of total columnn inches devoted to foreign affairs

in each year)

50

TABLE 12: FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN KREST'IANSKAIA GAZETA BY THEME(in percentage of columnn inches devoted to foreign affairs

in each year)

TABLE 13: SCIENCE IN BEDNOTA BY THEME(in percentage of columnn inches devoted to science

in each year)

RevolutionNeg. lifeVistorswarsOther lifeGovs.Rel. W/ROther RSciencemilitaryOthertotal

192312.0.0.0.0.0.

88.0.0.0.0.

100.

192412.0.0.0.0.9.

74.5.0.0.0.

100.

19257.5.5.4.0.5.

72.0.0.0.2.5

100.5

192617.16.0.

17.0.

10.32.6.0.1.0.

99.

192722.0.0.0.0.0.

78.0.0.0.0.

100.

19284.

16.0.

16.0.

10.40.14.0.0.0.

100.

19290.0.0.0.0.0.

100.0.0.0.0.

100.

ReligionSuperst.ElectricMech/ Ind.Mech/Ag.AgronomyMedicalAirplaneRadioOthertotal

192314.0.0.0.0.

81.0.6.0.0.

101.

19240.9.7.0.2.

77.1.0.

c.5.

101.

19250.0.0.4.0.

96.0.0.0.0.

100.

19260.0.0.0.0.

91.0.0.9.0.

100.

19270.0.5.4.6.

85.0.0.0.0.

100.

19280.0.2.0.5.

92.1.0.0.0.

100.

192928.0.1.

15.13.43.0.0.0.0.

100.