Infrastructure Interdependencies Project Mitigation of Extreme Event Risk: E lectric Power Outage and Infrastructure Failure Interactions Presented by

Infrastructure Interdependencies

Project

Mitigation of Extreme Event Risk:

Electric Power Outage and Infrastructure Failure

InteractionsPresented by

Timothy L. McDanielsUniversity of British Columbia

USC Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE)

Symposium on the Economic Costs and Consequences of Terrorism20-21 August 2004


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Acknowledgements

Co-authorsStephanie Chang, University of British ColumbiaDorothy Reed, University of WashingtonKrista Peterson, University of British Columbia

ContributorJoey Mikawoz

Funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation


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Outline

• Introduction • Structure and components of overall project• Infrastructure interdependencies• Conceptual framework for IFI measures• Examples of IFI measures for major outages

– 2003 Eastern NA blackout– 1998 Quebec Ice Storm– 1993 Inauguration Day Storm in PNW


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1. Introduction

• Terrorism: an extreme kind of “extreme event”– “New kind of trouble”: no “all clear”,

deliberate

• NSF definition of extreme event:– Low p, high consequence, systems

interactions, nonlinear response, outside of standard “coping” range

• New metrics, analytical methods needed


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Introduction (2)

• Major electrical outages are the outcome of many kinds of “extreme events”

• These outages create spillovers into other infrastructure systems

• We call these “infrastructure failure interdependencies” (IFIs)

• Managing IFIs helps mitigate the effects of big outages or other extreme events


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Introduction (3)

• Conference theme: analyzing economic costs of terrorism attacks

• Helpful for guiding priorities for prevention and mitigation investments

• Our project: guidance for mitigating effects of big power outages in terms of effects on other infrastructure systems (IFIs); helpful also for terrorism


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2. Project Components

• Three broad components (three years):1. Develop metrics and methods for

characterizing IFIs (this paper)2. Develop influence diagrams and

scenarios as simple models of IFI patterns3. IFI mitigation options; ranking by experts


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Kobe earthquake interdependencies

Table 1. Interdependent Effects of Electric Power Outage in the 1995 KobeEarthquake(after Nojima and Kameda, 1996)

DependentInfrastructure System

Type ofInteraction

Description of Interaction

Transportation Functional damagepropagation

Malfunction of traffic signals due to poweroutage

Telecommunications _ Loss of satellite communications for emergencycommunications, due to power loss atprefectural control center

Telecommunications _ Malfunction of 285,000 telephone subscribersÕlines due to loss of power at telephoneexchange centers

Telecommunications _ Unavailability of public emergency phonesystem, which relies on electric power to readtelephone cards

Hospitals _ Blackout due to loss of power supply andfailure of emergency generators from lack ofcoolant

Water _ Loss of filtration plants and pump stations dueto power loss

High-rise buildings _ Loss of elevators and pumps to move water toroof tanks

Disaster response Recovery interruption Inability to mobilize rapidly due totransportation disruption (indirectly due toelectric power outages)

Natural gas Compound damagepropagation

Fire ignitions due to natural gas leakage andelectric power sparks

Emergency shelters _ Lack of heating due to power loss


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Influence Diagram of Electric Power Reliability

(after Keeney et al., 1995)


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Approaches Guiding Mitigation Ranking

• Large literature on risk ranking generally• Our approach: not E(V), but rather:

conditional E(V), given a major outage (Haimes, 1998, partitioned multiobjective risk method), so no probabilities of outages or extreme events needed

• Multiple objectives matter as basis for ranking mitigation alternatives

• Domain experts to create and rank alternatives


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3. Concepts for IFI Analysis

• Rinaldi, et al, IEEE, 2001 provides important framework for “critical infrastructure interdependency” studies

• Definition: “bidirectional relationship between two infrastructures through which the state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the other.”

• Often called “lifeline interactions”


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4. Conceptual Framework for IFIs

• We are interested in finding out which interdependencies (and failures) are most important to society

• We propose a new framework that builds on previous work just discussed

• Provides a typology of IFIs for systematically gathering, structuring and analyzing data about actual outage events

• We focus on electrical outages; could be used for any IFI


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Conceptual Framework (2)

• We want to address two questions:– What are the channels by which electric power

outages cause failures in other infrastructure systems?

– Which of these channels are the most important?

• Three components: aspects of the outage (initial failure), aspects of the interactions, and aspects of the consequences


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IFI Dimension Characteristic Example Values

OUTAGE Initiating event internal to electric power system; external

Spatial extent local; regional; national; international

Duration minutes; hours; days; weeks

Weather moderate temperatures/ conditions; extreme


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IFI Dimension

Characteristic Example Values

INTERACTIONS Type of dependency physical; geographic

Type of interdependent failure

cascading; escalating; common-cause; compound damage propagation

Order direct; second-order; higher-order

Complexity linear; complex

Feedback to electric power yes; no

Operational state of dependent system

at/near capacity at time of event; well below capacity

Potential for adaptive response

high; low

Restart time for dependent system

minutes, hours, days, weeks


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IFI Dimension Characteristic Example Values

CONSEQUENCE

Severity of impact minor inconvenience; moderately disruptive; very disruptive

Type of impact economic; health; social; environmental

Number of people impacted

few; many

Duration of impact minutes; hours; days; weeks


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Comparing our categories to others

DatabaseAffected System

U.S. GovernmentCritical Infrastructure Sectors

(White House, 2003)

Canadian GovernmentCritical Infrastructure Sectors

(PSEPC)Building SupportBusiness Defense Industrial Base

Chemical Industry and HazardousMaterials

Manufacturing

Emergency Services Emergency Services SafetyFinance Banking and Finance FinanceFood Supply Agriculture

FoodFood

Government Government GovernmentHealth Care Public Health Health CareTelecommunications Information and

TelecommunicationsCommunications and InformationTechnology

Transportation Transportation TransportationUtilit ies Water

EnergyEnergy and UtilitiesWater

Postal and Shipping


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Applications of IFI Framework

• Used published newspaper accounts and reports to create a database of IFIs for a given major outage event

• Used the categories of the framework to structure the database

• Developed a “severity index” for categorizing consequences

• Developed graphic approaches to summarize findings


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DISRUPTION SCALE

6 = Very disruptive to many people5 = Very disruptive to a few people4 = Moderately disruptive to many people3 = Moderately disruptive to a few people2 = Minor inconvenience to many people1 = Minor inconvenience to a few people

Definitions

Many people Few people

More than 100,000 people Less than 100,000 people

Very disruptive Moderately disruptive Minor inconvenience

Requires significantmodifications in daily routine orplans and causes considerablehardship to the person or entity

Requires a few modifications indaily routine or plans and causessome hardship to the person orentity

Requires minor modifications indaily routine or plans and causesnegligible hardship to the personor entity

Disruption Scale


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2003 Northeast Blackout

Largest blackout in North American history

Photo by Reuters/Chip East


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Duration of outage by city

City Length of Outage (in hours)

Cleveland 26Detroit 36New York City 29Toronto 41


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Outage Begins

1 Day

2 days

4 days

Weeks

5 Hours

11 Hours

People trapped in elevators rescued

Water pumps begin working again

Power restored to alarms, appliances, gas and water pumps, and sewage treatment plants

Trading light on stock exchange

Bank branches openPublic health concerns, such as food poisoning from spoiled food, decreaseCellular phones service reliability restoredLimited service at airport1500 traffic signals still not working properly

Canadian National Exposition opens 4 days lateSubways and streetcars start running Oil refineries resume operationsFresh food supplies still low in grocery stores, food banks

Blood and vaccine supplies lowMany government offices closed for 11 days to conserve energyMajor industries operate at half capacity to conserve energy Some nuclear reactors take weeks to get back onlineHomes flooded with sewage cleaned up

IFIs Begin

Outage Ends

IFIs End

Timeline ofToronto’s IFIs


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Mines

Retail

Computer Systems

Manufacturing

Restaurants

Hotels

HVAC

Elevators

SecurityWastewater

Water

Conservation

Oil

Sanitation

Nuclear Power

Roads

Rail

Air

Gas Stations

Mass Transit

Bus

Offices

Services

Transportation

Production

Storage

Preparation

Ambulance

911

Police

Fire

Stock Exchange

Credit Cards

Banks

ATM

Hospitals

Public Health

Cable

Media

Internet

Land Line Telephones

Cellular Telephones

Business

Building Support

Utilities

Transportation

Finance

Government

EmergencyServices

FoodSupply

HealthCare

Tele-communications

2003 NEPowerOutage

Event

Affected Infrastructure Systems

Affected Infrastructure Subsystems

Very disruptive to many people

Very disruptive to few people

Moderately disruptive to many people

Moderately disruptive to few people or minor inconvenience to many or few people


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1998 Ice Storm

• Affected Northeastern U.S. and Canada

• 1.4 million people in Quebec and 230,000 in Ontario without power

Photo by CP PHOTO/Jacques Boissinot


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Water

Oil

Roads

Air

Gas Stations

Mass Transit

ServicesProduction

Storage

Police

911

Shelters

Fire

Cable

Media

Land Line Telephones

HVAC Security

Plumbing Garage Doors

Banks

ATM

Daycare

Schools

Retail

Hotels

Restaurants

Manufacturing

Hospitals

Public Health

Business

Building Support

Utilities

Transportation

Finance

Government

EmergencyServices

FoodSupply

HealthCare

Tele-communications

Education

1998 Ice Storm and

Outage


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1993 Inauguration Day Storm

January 20 windstorm that affected the Pacific Northwest

Photo by Seattle City Light


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Building Support

Coordination of repair crews from BC Hydro

and western states

Utilities

Transportation

Government

EmergencyServices

FoodSupply

HealthCare

1993 Storm Power Outage

Pumps unable to fill storage tanks: extreme

water conservation measures imposed

Raw sewage overflow and dumping

Gasoline pumps not working

Reversible lanes on I-5 not working

Traffic lights dark on surface streets

Elevator problems in high-rises

Alderwood Mall closes early

Interpoint manufacturing plants down, Boeing 777

plant briefly out, Microsoft out for 12 hours

Gas stations closed: commuters unable to

drive to work with low or no gasoline, gasoline

required for small generators

911 flooded with calls about

power restoration

Many restaurants close, others may have

sanitary problems due to lack of hot water

Schools close; some students remain overnight

Olympia legislative session curtailed

32-year-old man electrocuted when a

treetop hit a power line

Hospitals report more cases of communicable diseases such as E.Coli,

possibly due to lack of hot water for properly

washing hands

Public safety threat: Many power lines down and

lying in the streets

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Affected Infrastructure Systems

Description of Event

Interdependencies

Very disruptive to many people

Very disruptive to few people

Moderately disruptive to many people

Moderately disruptive to few people or minor inconvenience to many or few people


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Summary and Conclusions

• Study seeks to identify important IFIs and promising mitigation strategies for them

• Preliminary analysis shows IFIs vary depending on type and duration of outage, early indications are that impacts on transportation are especially severe

• Next step is expanding the database using the conceptual framework


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Conclusions and Comparison

• Our approach contrasts with the work of other researchers here

• We are working from the bottom up to identify “low hanging fruit” in terms of opportunities to mitigate the IFIs from electrical outages from any cause

• The result would be more resilient response to disasters


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Documents

Infrastructure Interdependencies Project Mitigation of Extreme Event Risk: E lectric Power Outage and Infrastructure Failure Interactions Presented by