The University of British Columbia Joint Infrastructure ...jiirp/JIIRP_Open_Publications/jiirp_i2c_038.pdf · Infrastructures Interdependencies Simulation (I2Sim) team Document #

The University of British Columbia

Joint Infrastructure Interdependencies Research

Program

Infrastructures Interdependencies Simulation

(I2Sim) team

Document # jiirp i2sim 038

J. A. Hollman, J. R. Marti, J. Jatskevich, K.D. Srivastava“Dynamic islanding of critical infrastructures:

a suitable strategy to survive and mitigate extreme events”IJEM Vol 4 Issue 1 - 2007

Vancouver March, 2007

Int. J. Emergency Management, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2007 45

Copyright © 2007 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

Dynamic islanding of critical infrastructures: a suitable strategy to survive and mitigate extreme events

Jorge A. Hollman*, José R. Martí, Juri Jatskevich and K.D. Srivastava Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of British Columbia 2332 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T1Z4, Canada E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] *Corresponding author

Abstract: This paper presents specific guidelines for policymakers with the objective to develop and enhance cooperation among critical infrastructures operators. The proposed actions are an effective means to increase the resiliency of the National Critical Infrastructures (NCIs) based on a dynamic islanding scheme, which depends on the considered emergency scenario. The present work emerges in response to the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of Canada Modernisation of the Emergency Preparedness Act consultation process (PSEPC, 2005) and is part of the Joint Infrastructure Interdependencies Research Project, sponsored by Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of Canada (PSEPC).

Keywords: national critical infrastructures; NCIs; islanding; survival; dynamic segmentation.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Hollman, J.A., Martí, J.R., Jatskevich, J. and Srivastava, K.D. (2007) ‘Dynamic islanding of critical infrastructures: a suitable strategy to survive and mitigate extreme events’, Int. J. Emergency Management, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp.45–58.

Biographical notes: Jorge Ariel Hollman received the degree of Electrical Engineer from the Universidad Nacional del Comahue, Neuquén, Argentina in 1996. He joined Schlumberger in 1995, where he worked as R&M Engineer and Quality Health Safety & Environment Manager until 1998. He earned the Master of Applied Sciences degree in 2000 and the PhD in Electrical Engineering in 2006 from the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. Currently, he is doing research with the UBC-JIIRP team as Project Coordinator. His main research interests are real-time simulation of power system networks and critical infrastructure interdependencies analysis. He is recipient of the José A. Estenssoro Award, and of the Kenneth George Wansacker Memorial Prize.

José R. Martí received an Electrical Engineering degree from Central University of Venezuela in 1971, a Master of Engineering degree in Electric Power (MEEPE) from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY in 1974, and a PhD in Electrical Engineering from the University of British Columbia,

46 J. Hollman, J. Martí, J. Jatskevich and K.D. Srivastava

Vancouver, Canada in 1981. He is known for his contributions to the modelling of fast transients in large power networks, including component models and solution techniques. Particular emphasis in recent years has been the development of distributed computational solutions for real-time simulation of large systems. He is a Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of British Columbia, a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE), and a Registered Professional Engineer in the Province of British Columbia, Canada. He is the principal investigator of the UBC-JIIRP, sponsored by PSEPC.

Juri Jatskevich received the Electrical Engineering degree (BSEE) from the Ukrainian National Agricultural University, Kiev, in 1994. He received the Master of Science in Electrical Engineering (MSEE) and the PhD degrees from Purdue University, West Lafayette, in 1997 and 1999, respectively. Since 1998, he also worked for P.C. Krause and Associates Inc., (PCKA), developing software and computer models of electro-mechanical systems. After receiving the PhD degree, he worked at Purdue as a post-doctoral Research Associate and Principle Research Scientist, on modelling and survivability of Naval and Aircraft Electric Systems. Since 2002, he has been an Assistant Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of British Columbia, and he is a co-investigator of the UBC-JIIRP.

K.D. Srivastava received the PhD degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK, in 1957. In 1966, after several years of R&D experience in the UK, he emigrated to Canada and was appointed Professor of Electrical Engineering at the University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada, and from 1972 to 1978, he was Chairman of the Department. In 1983, he was appointed Professor and Head of the Department of Electrical Engineering at the University of British Columbia (UBC), Vancouver, BC, Canada. From 1986 to 1994, he was Vice-President of Student and Academic Services at UBC. His research interests are in gaseous insulation and high-voltage engineering.

1 Introduction

A better understanding of critical interdependencies among core infrastructures is one of the most important requirements to mitigate the impact of extreme events and improve survivability. This knowledge allows implementing effective dynamic islanding schemes. This dynamic segmentation of critical infrastructures helps to assign valuable and limited recovery resources to the most critical areas, while avoiding the propagation of the emergency by cascading collapses of critical infrastructures to neighbour areas. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, forest fires and global disease outbreaks can dramatically impact at first the socio-economic well-being of countries, and in a more serious context, our basic survivability. The extent of the damage resulting from a catastrophe must and can be minimised by the implementation of better preparedness organisation and action plans among the National Critical Infrastructures (NCIs) operators at Federal, Provincial and Regional levels. Novel strategies to develop a more effective collaboration among public and the private sectors before and during the emergency period are highlighted in this paper.

Dynamic islanding of critical infrastructures 47

Major events such as the winter 2000 ice storm in eastern Canada, the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York City, the 14 August 2003 power blackout (US and Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004), and more recently the 2004 catastrophic tsunami in south Asia which claimed more than 200 000 lives, and the 2005 hurricane Katrina in the USA with an estimated 125 billion dollars of economic impact (Risk Management Solutions, 2005), prompt the importance of a fast dynamic, and coordinated action plan to increase the survivability chances of society. Emergency Preparedness is a dynamic process with many phases:

• long before the disaster

• shortly before the disaster

• during the disaster

• shortly after the disaster

• long after the disaster.

The anticipation of emergencies, especially those that threaten our survival as human beings, leads us to define our critical material and support service needs, including procurement, storage and delivery. During an emergency no infrastructure and the interdependent system of infrastructures can function in a dynamically stable mode unless the human operators and the public at large are both in sound emotional health and are not predisposed to panic. Thus, a very high level of collective self confidence, and a profound understanding of the characteristics and robustness of the interdependent systems are of paramount importance. The quality of civic leadership characterised by its ability to sustain optimism, hope and civil stability is perhaps the most important overarching socio-political parameter needed for survival.

2 Emergency management

Emergency management is based on four concepts:

1 Mitigation – Long before the disaster.

2 Preparedness – Long and shortly before the disaster.

3 Response – During and shortly after the disaster.

4 Recovery – Shortly and long after the disaster.

Mitigation refers to the sustained actions to reduce or eliminate the long-term impacts and risks associated with natural and human-induced disasters; Preparedness are the policies, procedures and plans for how to best manage an emergency; Response are the actions taken during or directly after an emergency occurs; and Recovery are the efforts taken to repair and restore communities after an emergency. A new emergency strategy based on dynamic islanding of NCIs (Martí et al., 2005), according to the type of emergency being faced by the country, province or region, can improve the survivability chances by balancing the focus between preparedness and response, which deals mostly with unexpected events and mitigation, which focuses on sustained measures to prevent or lessen loss of lives. By clustering areas sharing similar wellness, effective mitigation


actions can be taken to strengthen the wellness of those areas with unacceptable wellness indexes (Kruchten and Woo, 2005). The key areas of the mitigation strategies are: Leadership and Coordination, Hazard Identification, Education and Information Dissemination, Partnership and Incentives. The most efficient way to mitigate the effects of disasters is by knowing not only the weaknesses of the NCIs but also the critical interdependencies among NCIs. Those critical linkages will determine a rational priority of infrastructure investment with the best cost-benefit ratio. The main goal should be to guarantee a minimum acceptable level of wellness and resiliency for the natural islanding structure of the NCIs. Similarly to what happens in an electrical power flow problem, healthy islands can provide support to those in extra need within certain threshold. The focus must be put on those islands incapable to sustain the lower limit of that acceptable threshold during a given emergency scenario.

2.1 National critical infrastructures interdependencies

Two traits shared by industrialised societies are their enjoyment of a high quality of life, together with the commonly yet erroneously held assumption that essential services and infrastructures that provide these societies with high quality living standards will be at the disposal of their population even during strenuous times, as when a natural disaster strikes. Failing to realise that infrastructures such as clean water supply, electricity and other forms of energy, telecommunications, transportation, banking services and health facilities may be jeopardised due to interdependencies in the event of a catastrophe would be a tremendous oversight with the potential to derive into even more devastating consequences. Paradoxically, the same technological sophistication and robustness that may be considered an asset in normal circumstances may in fact be the Achilles’ heel of industrialised societies. These societies may in reality become very vulnerable and fragile when hidden interdependencies between NCIs trigger major disruptions of services due to cascading effects.

Since the various critical infrastructures are the essential structural/organisational elements that support our survival, we need a deep understanding of both the internal dynamics of each infrastructure and the mutual interdependencies of each infrastructure within the global system of national critical infrastructures. Canada, like other industrialised nations, has become critically dependent on a set of robust and secure infrastructure systems. We take for granted that essential services, such as energy, water/sewage, telecommunications, transportation, banking, health and security are available to all citizens, at all times. Modern energy, telecommunication and information technologies underpin these infrastructure networks, which, over the last several decades, have become very pervasive, extensive and complex. There are linkages and interdependencies, often unintended and unplanned, amongst the crucial infrastructures. These interdependencies, in a fragile and intertwined system, are prone to lead to cascading failures, with an enormous commercial, economic, personal and social impact. Among the triggering events leading to a state of emergency we may find natural phenomena, unforeseen technological design weaknesses, an imperfect understanding of the dynamics of highly interconnected systems, or acts of sabotage. Adding complexity to the problem is the fact that the interdependencies among NCIs are dynamic as illustrated in Figure 1. Each linkage line in the graphic represents a different temporal and hierarchical level of interdependency. The dynamics are introduced by the channel delays, operational hierarchies and the human decision layer.


Figure 1 Dynamic infrastructure interdependencies

2.2 Dynamic islanding to survive

To survive under emergency it is critical to understand not only the internal vulnerabilities but also how these are compounded by mutual interdependencies. The response of both the individual infrastructures and the interdependent system as a whole dynamically evolves over time and space. An effective way to improve our survivability is to strengthen the resilience of the core NCIs. It is proposed here that this objective can be achieved by implementing a strategy of dynamic islanding of our core NCIs (Kron, 1963; Strogatz, 2003; Martí et al., 1998; 2002). Dynamic islanding and local autonomy for action can effectively enhance preparedness, survival during the emergency, and recovery after the emergency has abated. This concept of islanding is well known across several environments, among which are the power system (Watts, 2003), military ship architecture, biological laboratories, etc.

We propose a four level assessment classification of infrastructures status as depicted in Figure 2, for which a different set of NCIs, a particular segmentation scheme, and a particular restoration plan have to be implemented. The core set of NCIs identified for each emergency phase deserves particular attention in the event of major catastrophic scenarios, since this core set is essential to increase our survivability. The proposed assessment status of different NCIs is briefly summarised in Table 1.

Oil and Gas

Electric

PowerPlant

Substation

Transmission

FoodDistribution center

Production centerLocal store

Water

PurificationPlantPump Station

Pipe

Refinery

Oil FieldCompressor

Station

CommunicationsPhone

InternetMobile

Transportation

Local road Bridge Regional Highway

Emergency Responders

FirefighterParamedic

Hospital

911 E-Comm

Critical EventLocal road

Initial failure directly originated by the critical event (level 1 failure)

Failure originated by an interdependency with level 1 (level 2 failure)





Figure 2 Time line response

Table 1 National critical infrastructures under different assessment status

Normal Alert Emergency Recovery

Power grids Power grids Power grids Power grids

Water/Sewage Water/Sewage Water/Sewage Water/Sewage

Comm. & IT Comm. & IT Comm. & IT Comm. & IT

Food Food Food Food

Transportation Transportation Civil order Transportation

Health Health Health

Financial Financial Financial

Safety Safety Civil order

Government Government

Manufacturing

Federal coordinationFederal monitoringAll NCIsGradual reconnectionof islands

Regional coordinationFederal monitoringCore NCIs onlyGovernment response

Federal coordinationFederal monitoringAll NCIs up with preventive islandingOn line Risk assessment

Island & regional coordinationFederal monitoringCore NCIs onlyLocal business & governmentresponse

Regional coordinationFederal monitoringAll NCIs up in synchronicityOn line Risk assessment


Months to years Days to weeks Hours to days Days to months

Physiological

Safety

Love/Belonging

Esteem

Being


As introduced in A Theory of Human Motivation (Maslow, 1943), humans have different levels of needs determined by their social-economic environment. A connection can be established between the human motivation theory and emergency management due to the dynamic characteristic of emergency conditions (see Figure 2).

Thus, for each particular emergency phase, a different set of basic needs has to be met. This set will define the core of Critical infrastructures during and after extreme events. As the recovery process takes place, the core set of NCIs will expand towards its maximum level (i.e., normal status as defined in Table 1).

As can be deduced, the mutual interdependencies and vulnerabilities can significantly reduce the effectiveness of mitigation and recovery plans. The information gathered from simulation and monitoring of vulnerable interdependencies among NCIs is used to define the proper scheme of islanding.

In addition, for each assessment state included in Table 2, a particular islanding scheme and monitoring scope can be defined. By segmenting the NCIs into self sufficient islands, the impact of the catastrophe due to cascading effects is minimised. In this way the emergency resources can be assigned more efficiently since a smaller area is affected and neighbouring islands can contribute to the relief effort by sharing resources.

Table 2 Islanding scheme under a different assessment status


Coordination Regional Federal Regional Federal

Monitoring Federal Federal Regional Federal

Islanding None Preventive Aggressive Reconnection

The advantages of this strategy are twofold: (1) emergency resources get to be distributed to the victims promptly, minimising the consequences of the ‘first impact’. This is particularly critical in the case of panic control and shelter; (2) spreading (cascading) can be significantly reduced by exerting fast initial control. The efficacy of self sufficiency plays a vital role in the success of the overall survival strategy.

In order to make this strategy successful, a dynamic assessment of the weaknesses in the NCIs is required (Borgonovo, 2001; Lemon, 2004; Michaud, 2005).

The evaluation of the vulnerabilities has to be done according to different scenarios: Normal, Alert, Emergency and Recovery. This is of key importance because it is common to see that emergency plans try to keep the NCIs functionality to the maximum during the emergency state by assuming full availability of interdependent critical infrastructures, a situation that often leads to a bigger failure of the NCIs. The isolation of the NCIs into subsystems is performed by identifying the location of the natural islanding boundaries. The NCIs must provide these islands only with the basic needs to survive until the normal functionality can be re-established. The island boundaries can be defined based on a combined analysis of socio-technical, geographical, threat-risk analysis or geopolitical criteria.

The methodology to identify the dynamic location of natural NCIs islands was presented in the CNIP2006 (Martí et al., 2006). A simulator (I2Sim) under development by our research group has the capability of identifying vulnerable points resulting from interdependencies among NCIs. This information is then used to plan how to island the system in order to maximise resources and avoid a cascading effect. At the modelling


level, the basic concept is to create an integrated representation of the transportation matrix problem with multiple NCIs computing the wellness index of the cells, which once aggregated considering similar levels of wellness define the natural NCIs islands.

It is important to recognise that the segmentation of NCIs will follow different rules according to the type of emergency scenario considered, since the interdependencies among NCIs will show different sensitivities. One of the key elements of this methodology is the comprehensive analysis of interdependencies among NCIs as illustrated in Figure 3. A two stage iterative process based on:

1 survey of NCIs and analysis of decision charts and emergency contingency plans

2 modelling and simulation of physical and human layers to define most convenient dynamic islanding strategy.

Figure 3 Dynamic interdependencies flow analysis

The analysis presented here needs to be extended beyond the traditional physical layout to include the human decision layer, which in some occasions can be the most relevant one. Examples of this type of situations are highlighted in the emergency contingency plans. Most of them rely on a high quality of service of critical infrastructures, if not a 100% of their capability, present when in reality some of them will be simply not even available to provide the most basic services.

Surveyinfrastructure

operatorsIdentification of

interdependenciesbetween

infrastructures

Modelling andsimulation of

networkinterdependencies

Selection offundamental

NCIs

Identification ofcritical

interdependenciesand

risk analysis

Analysis of decision chartsand emergency

contingency plans

Re-definition of islands innetwork infrastructures,

considering criticalinterdependencies, toincrease survival rate


3 Effective partnerships

3.1 Federal government, public and private NCIs operators

We recognise the importance of a strong communication and coordination between the Federal and Provincial governments and Private NCIs operators. The Federal government can lead the establishment of an effective partnership between the public and private sectors by actively facilitating a framework for a systematic dialogue among the public and private operators of NCIs (Johnson, 2005). A possible schedule can be three annual meetings for the Eastern, Central and Western regions in addition to a yearly meeting for key national players of the core NCIs. These meetings will promote confidence among NCIs operators to disclose their vulnerabilities and as a result coordinate the best strategy to cope with them. It would be positive if the government allowed for a degree of privacy among the operators if requested by them, in order to maintain and enhance the productivity of this process. A strong communication between NCI operators would be amply beneficial. As proposed in Figure 4, the facilitator role fulfilled by the government become pro-active at the moment of detecting vulnerability or a threat affecting any of the NCIs. In this situation the government will monitor the corrective actions deployed by the private and public NCI operators and, if necessary, provide them with financial and technical resources as shown in Figure 5. In the case of the core NCIs, a more intensive monitoring by the government is necessary in order to assure an optimal coordination and enforcement of standard and contingency plans among them.

Figure 4 Government dialogue facilitator roles

Agency as facilitator ofdialogue among NCI

Private and Government

Private meetingsamong NCIoperators

Private andGovernment

meetings

Private

Exchange ofcritical Info

Exchange ofcritical Info

Action plan toaddress

vulnerabilities


Figure 5 Government and private sector interaction

3.2 Government, food retailers, transportation companies and media

A second level of coordination has to be initiated and established by the federal government with some national business operations, such as major food retailers, air transportation and ground transportation companies, among others. Simple accords between the government and the business sector can provide a superb advantage to cope with catastrophes in the initial stages of the emergency state. An example of the effectiveness of in-advance planning and coordination of contingency actions is the fact that in the event of an earthquake, for instance, food retailers can assist with their local infrastructure and stores in the very first period (hours to days) providing food to assist the survival efforts, instead of waiting for the arrival of government assistance. The same is valid for the transportation companies, which can offer their assets to start the recovery stage. By means of this approach the government will save money and even more important it will enhance the efficiency of the immediate response. Also, the media can play a fundamental role during the emergency and recovery stages by knowing in advance up to certain extent the emergency plans to be broadcasted to the affected

Pro-activemonitoring of NCI

Private and Government

Awareness ofvulnerability

Correctiveaction

Agencyparticipation

YesTechnical andfinancial

Vulnerability fixed No

Private

Government

Time frameexhausted

No

Yes

Yes PublicDisclosure


communities during the emergency state. A framework needs to be established so that the media knows beforehand who their government liaisons are, and who they should contact to receive updated emergency information. These actions would dramatically decrease the degree of anxiety and reduce the panic among the population.

3.3 International cooperation

Globalisation brings new kinds of vulnerabilities to our nation. Highly contagious disease outbreaks can spread extremely rapidly across countries and continents. The Avian Flu or Foot and Mouth disease constitute recent examples. The economic loss due to trade restrictions and the associated risk to human population should prompt the federal government to increase the partnership with health and agricultural agencies overseas to quickly monitor and implement protection measures. Canadian transportation and immigration authorities need to put in place action plans to successfully prevent the transit of persons or goods in the event of an outbreak, taking advantage of the characteristics of the transit hubs. For instance, the west coast authorities should increase partnerships with Asian health and agricultural agencies, while the east coast agencies have to improve the partnerships with the European ones. Transportation schemes would have to be adapted in the case of a detected outbreak. For instance, if a flu outbreak is detected in Asia, it makes sense to avoid direct flights from Asia to Toronto or Montreal (since most of the flights from Asian cities have a Vancouver destination). Instead, under this emergency situation, the first landing port should be Vancouver for all the flights connecting Asia and Canada. Only after proper assessment, should flights be allowed to continue their route to the east coast transportation hubs. By doing this, the risk of spreading any possible disease from one coast to the other by means of human or goods circulation is minimised.

Other fronts in which international cooperation becomes vital are the Information Technology and Financial infrastructures. Cooperation with agencies such as the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) (UK National Infrastructure Coordination Centre, 2006) in the UK should be expanded since it can be mutually beneficial.

3.4 Federal government and research institutions

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of Canada (PSEPC) can greatly benefit by establishing strong partnerships with Canadian Universities and Research Institutions since this relationship can provide a rich variety of analysis of NCIs vulnerabilities. In particular, a dynamic and multi infrastructure methodology of analysis has to be put in place at a Federal level to identify those critical vulnerability points in our NCIs as well as the interdependencies among them. This is by far the most critical task to face, since it can determine the success of the emergency and recovery action plans. NSERC and PSEPC should actively facilitate and encourage the creation of multidisciplinary research groups. The collaboration between mathematics, technology and social sciences will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding and modelling of the socio-technical aspects of emergency decision making as presented in the Focus Magazine (2005, pp.1–2). In addition, Research Institutions should develop curricula to disseminate the content of emergency plans throughout the community in an effective way. The extended


benefit of having in place emergency educational programmes for both the elementary and high school levels cannot be overstressed. This type of educational programmes not only reaches the students but also has the potential to reach indirectly their families. Only when emergency action plans become widely available to the entire community will they achieve the maximum effectiveness. Education is probably the most cost-effective path to increase survivability by avoiding panic and maximising the effectiveness of emergency resources.

4 Reliable and resilient critical infrastructures

A direct consequence of the implementation of the dynamic islanding of the NCIs’ strategy is the associated strength of their resiliency. The most common response to the question of increasing resiliency is to augment the current infrastructures capabilities or to add redundancy, but this methodology is not always cost effective. By segmenting the NCIs into self sufficient islands, in the worse-case scenario, a group of islands may go out of service, but even in that case neighbouring islands could temporarily supply the basic core of NCIs needs to allow the users to survive the emergency. Furthermore, if critical interdependencies among NCIs are not addressed, the risk of extended disruption is still present due to a cascading effect, exacerbated by those hidden vulnerable links.

The federal government should not only require the NCIs sector to develop standardised business continuity plans, but also monitor their implementation and verify their effectiveness. It would be reasonable to request a minimum acceptable regional and provincial level of critical infrastructure reliability standardisation at a first stage and, in a second stage a national standardisation. For the core set of NCIs the standardisation practise should be enforced by the federal government. The cost of strengthening the core NCIs has to be shared by the private and public NCI operators with the participation of the government when required. The range of possible penalties deserves special attention because the socio-economical impact of the NCIs failures needs to be commensurable.

5 Conclusion

The modernisation of national and regional emergency preparedness plans presents itself as an excellent opportunity to create a more flexible and efficient framework to manage NCIs. This can be achieved by means of the following proposed actions:

• facilitate dialogue among NCI operators

• establish a unified operation standard for the core set of NCIs

• perform an online monitoring of NCIs and their interdependencies

• identify and plan possible dynamic islanding schemes of NCIs in the event of catastrophes

• put in place self-contained action plans for the emergency periods for each NCI island.


A thorough knowledge and understanding of resources and assets along with their temporal and spatial distributions/variations is a pre-requisite for a successful preparedness strategy. During a cascading and evolving emergency, the content, quality, quantity and technology of information exchanges among NCIs operators and central/regional decision coordination centres, is often an overlooked parameter. Either too little or too much information may be poor strategies and may impair viability and autonomy for local action. The information exchanges must dynamically evolve, with respect to content, quantity and technology, as the emergency progresses. This is where the cognitive skills of experienced operators become a fundamental asset. Such cognitive skills have to be nurtured and honed long before we face a catastrophe and during the debriefing phase after an emergency.

Behavioural and social science skills should be an integral part of all operational teams in critical infrastructures. The civic leadership, at all levels, must be actively engaged in developing and implementing survival strategies. To develop a robust, resilient and operationally sound system of critical infrastructures the economic and regulatory regimes have to be re-examined in detail by the civic leadership.

It is important to note that even though this framework was developed within the Canadian context, the authors believe it is worthy to explore how its capabilities would need to be adapted in order to be applied in different contexts, such as the more decentralised European one.

References

Borgonovo, E. (2001) ‘Risk-informed decision making: sensitivity analysis and applications’, PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Nuclear Engineering.

Focus Magazine (2005) Coordinating Response to Quell Catastrophe, Institute for Computing, Information and Cognitive systems, Vol. 16, No. 2, http://www.icics.ubc.ca/publications/pdfs/ 2005fall.pdf (cited 2 February 2006).

Johnson, C. (Ed.) (2005) ‘First workshop on safeguarding national infrastructures’, Proceedings of the First Workshop on Safeguarding National Infrastructures, Glasgow, Scotland.

Kron, G. (1963) Diakoptics; The Piecewise Solution of Large-Scale Systems, London: Macdonald.

Kruchten, P. and Woo, C. (2005) ‘Modelling disasters’, JIIRP Seminar Presentation, Vancouver, Canada (cited 26 September 2005).

Lemon, D.M. (2004) ‘A methodology for the identification of critical locations in infrastructures’, PhD Thesis, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Nuclear Engineering.

Martí, J., Linares, L., Calviño, J., Dommel, H. and Lin, J. (1998) ‘Ovni: an object approach to real-time power system simulators’, Proceedings of the Power System Technology International Conference (POWERCON ’98), Vol. 2, pp.977–981.

Martí, J., Linares, L., Hollman, J.A. and Moreira, F. (2002) ‘Ovni: integrated software/hardware solution for real-time simulation of large power systems’, Proceedings of the 14th Power Systems Computer Conference (PSCC’02), Seville, Spain.

Martí, J., Srivastava K.D., Jatskevich J. and Hollman J.A. (2005) ‘Dynamic islanding for survival’, JIIRP Seminar Presentation, Vancouver, Canada (cited 2 August 2005).

Martí, J., Hollman, J.A., Ventura, C. and Jatskevich, J. (2006) ‘Design for survival. Real-time infrastructures coordination’, Proceedings of the International Workshop on Complex Network and Infrastructure Protection (CNIP2006), Rome, Italy.

Maslow, A.H. (1943) ‘A theory of human motivation’, Psychological Review, No. 50, pp.370–396.


Michaud, D. (2005) ‘Screening vulnerabilities in water supply networks: risk analysis of infrastructure systems’, PhD Thesis, S.M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology System Design and Management.

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The University of British Columbia Joint Infrastructure ...jiirp/JIIRP_Open_Publications/jiirp_i2c_038.pdf · Infrastructures Interdependencies Simulation (I2Sim) team Document #