Integration Before Assimilation Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Canadian Polity

Société québécoise de science politique

Integration before Assimilation: Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Canadian PolityAuthor(s): John C. HarlesSource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 30,No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 711-736Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de sciencepolitiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3232254Accessed: 14/05/2010 10:51

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Integration before Assimilation: Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Canadian Polity

JOHN C. HARLES Messiah College

Integration is not synonymous with assimilation. Assimilation implies almost total absorption into another linguistic and cultural group. An assimilated individual gives up his cultural identity, and may even go so far as to change his name. Both integration and assimilation occur in Canada, and the individual must be free to choose whichever process suits him, but it seems to us that those of other than French or British origin clearly prefer integration. .... Canadian society, open and modem, should be able to integrate het- erogeneous elements into a harmonious system, to achieve "unity in diversity."

- Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism'

1

National integration is a fundamental task of any political system. The reason is clear: periodically the state requires its members to make sacrifices for the good of the whole; without a sense of collective destiny, individuals would find it difficult to subordinate private interest to public welfare. The call to military service is the most dramatic and ele- mentary example of the general point, but the issue of sacrifice applies to more mundane matters, too, taxation for instance. Not even the most doctrinaire capitalist will readily argue that the market can provide all desired social goods and services; the state must undertake some of the required functions that the market cannot or will not do. At the very least, provision must be made for domestic security, though the public catalogue of services is likely to be far more extensive. And all of these must be funded in large measure by tax revenues collected from individuals whose remittances may be quite disproportional to the personal benefits they bring. Belief in a common national identity, and conse-

1 Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Vol. 4 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), 5, 7.

John C. Harles, Department of Political Science, Messiah College, Grantham, Penn., USA 17027. E-mail: [email protected]

Canadian Journal of Political Science/ Revue canadienne de science politique, XXX:4 (December/ d6cembre 1997). C 1997 Canadian Political Science Association (I'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Sociti qubbcoise de science politique.

712 JOHN C. HARLES

quently an acceptance of mutual civic obligations, is one reason to forego individual interests for diffuse public goods. From the perspective of the citizenry this sense of a shared political fate may be termed polity, and from the perspective of the state, national integration.

It is a common belief among students of the Canadian political system that Canada is not a well-integrated and unified polity. Titles in the bibliog- raphy of Canadian political studies are indicative of this. Over the last few years they have included: The Roots of Disunity; Mosaic Madness; Deconfederation; The Unmaking of Canada; Canada at Risk; Reima- gining Canada; and perhaps most directly, The Collapse of Canada ?2

Scholarly assessments are equally forthright. For example, Anthony Birch asserts that "the level of national integration in Can- ada... may be lower than any other advanced democratic state";3 Carolyn Tuohy observes that "Canadian ambivalence extends to the very legitimacy of the state itself and to the identification of the political community" ;4 R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward remark that "this continuing ambivalence has perpetrated a set of conflicts about the essence of Canadianness that lies at the heart of the political system. Canadians divide between anglophone and francophone, old and new, immigrant and aboriginal, partly because there is no common meeting ground, no agreement on what constitutes a Canadian" ;5 and Charles Taylor maintains that, "A basic fact about Canada which we often have trouble accepting is that we are still far from achieving a universally agreed definition of our country as a political community."6 Even the British newsweekly, the Economist, weighs in: "It

2 David V. J. Bell, The Roots of Disunity: A Study of Canadian Political Culture (2nd ed.; Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992); Reginald W. Bibby, Mosaic Madness: The Poverty and Potential of Life in Canada (Toronto: Stoddart, 1990); David Jay Bercuson and Barry Cooper, Deconfederation: Canada without Quebec (Toronto: Key Porter, 1991); Robert Chodos, Rae Murray and Eric Hamovitch, The Unmaking of Canada: The Hidden Theme in Canadian History since 1945 (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1991); G. Bruce Doern and Byrne B. Purchase, eds., Canada at Risk: Canadian Public Policy in the 1990s (Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1991); Jeremy Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, Community and the Canadian Constitution (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994); and R. Kent Weaver, ed., The Collapse of Canada? (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1992).

3 A. H. Birch, Nationalism and National Integration (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 178.

4 Carolyn J. Tuohy, Policy and Politics in Canada: Institutionalized Ambivalence (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 5.

5 R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward, "The Making of a Canadian Political Citi- zenship," in R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward, eds., National Politics and Com- munity in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986), 76-77.

6 Charles Taylor, "Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late Twentieth Century Canada," in Alan Cairns and Cynthia Williams, eds., Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 221.

Abstract. As a strategy of immigrant inclusion, official multiculturalism in Canada is based on the premise that national integration is possible, even preferable, without assimilation. This article considers whether such an approach can be successful. Draw- ing on a qualitative study of Lao immigrants in Ontario, it is suggested that newcomers can in fact be disposed to high levels of political commitment, specific mechanisms of political assimilation aside, as a result of the process of immigration itself. At least in the short term, though perhaps mainly in the short term, the Canadian political order does not seem to suffer for lack of an assimilative emphasis.

Resume. Comme strat6gie d'inclusion des immigrants, le multiculturalisme au Ca- nada est construit sur la pr6misse voulant que l'int6gration nationale soit possible, sinon pr6f6rable, sans assimilation. Cet article examine si cette d6marche peut r6ussir. A partir d'une 6tude qualitative effectuee aupres d'immigrants Laotiens en Ontario, cette etude propose que les nouveaux venus peuvent, en fait, 8tre enclin d'afficher un niveaux 616v6 d'engagement politique compte-tenu du processus d'immigration lui-mame lorsque ne sont pas consid6rrs

les mecanismes d'assimilation politique. Au moins a court terme, voire meme principalement a court terme, I'ordre politique cana- dien ne semble pas souffrir de l'absence de pressions assimilationnistes.

seems unlikely that Canada's future is going to be as a country with a strong national purpose. The glue that holds the place together is no more adhesive than maple syrup, and there is little prospect of replac- ing it with something stickier."7

Canada's commitment to multiculturalism as a strategy for in- corporating immigrants can be understood in the context of such insights. Introduced as government policy in 1971 and constitutionally entrenched in 1982 in section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the dominant view of multiculturalism has been that it "should assist and encourage the integration (but not assimilation) of all immigrants."8 As a former federal secretary of state for multiculturalism and the status of women affirmed: "One can choose how one wants to live [in Canada] and there is no need to be assimilated. It is a matter of integration."9

Considering what is typically considered to be the indeterminate nature of Canadian nationhood, it could hardly be otherwise. Assimila- tion indicates conformity to the pre-existing cultural norms-political norms included-of a dominant social group. It nears its endpoint when outsiders come to identify most closely with the imperatives of that group and are accepted as equal participants in group life.' That said, assimilation appears an unlikely prospect for newcomers to Canada. The ambigu- ity of Canadianness suggests that conceptually there is little for immigrants to assimilate into, and no certain focus for their political identity.

7 "For Want of Glue: A Survey of Canada," Economist, June 29, 1991, 19. 8 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Multiculturalism, Multi-

culturalism: Building the Canadian Mosaic (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1987), 47. 9 Sheila Finestone, "I Don't Enjoy Neil Bissoondath," The Globe and Mail

(Toronto), February 7, 1995. 10 Raymond H. C. Teske and Bardin H. Nelson, "Acculturation and Assimilation:

A Clarification," American Ethnologist 1 (1974), 359-61.

714 JOHN C. HARLES

Indeed, the question of a consolidating political identity in Canada is regularly framed in terms of the need for a "pan-Canadian" nationalism, suggesting that to the extent national sentiment exists in Canada, it does not predominantly accrue to the Canadian state."

Should a country lack a clear understanding of its national character, it would seem also to lack the ability to equip immigrants with the collective convictions that mark a cohesive political community. Yet Canada's absence of a precise national sense is often judged as no bad thing. Foreshadowing the logic of integration without assimilation, a generation ago W. L. Morton observed that "there is no process in becoming Canadian akin to conversion, there is no pressure for uni- formity, there is no Canadian way of life."'12 On Morton's reading, "the society of allegiance [Canada] admits of a diversity the society of compact [the United States] does not, and one of the blessings of Cana- dian life is that there is no Canadian way of life, much less two, but a unity under the crown admitting of a thousand diversities."13

Following Morton, contemporary multiculturalists find a single integrative national identity too confining and static, inappropriate to postmodern political realities.14 In fact, proponents of multiculturalism sometimes argue that it may be easier to integrate immigrants into a Canadian political community that is not already well formed, that immigrants may more readily commit to a polity if they believe they can make some contribution to its character.'5 What is required, according to this analysis, is a constitutional provision for deep cultural diversity, official recognition that citizens can, and do, maintain multiple political commitments within the boundaries of a single state.16 Hence the integrative vision of the architects of Canadian multiculturalism-an ethnically responsive and equitable procedure of political decision making, the public approval of which might be transferred to

11 See, for example, Sylvia Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: The Politics of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991), 1-28.

12 W. L. Morton, The Canadian Identity (2nd ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 85.

13 Ibid., 111. 14 See, for example, Crawford Young, "The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism: Concept

and Reality," in Crawford Young, ed., The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay? (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 3-35.

15 See, for instance, William Kaplan, "Who Belongs? Changing Concepts of Citi- zenship and Nationality," in William Kaplan, ed., Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 255-56.

16 See, for example, James Tully, "The Crisis of Identification: The Case of Can- ada," Political Studies 42 (1994), 76-94; Gilles Paquet, "The Political Philoso- phy of Multiculturalism," in J. W. Berry and J. A. LaPonce, eds., Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 60-80; and also Webber, Reimagining Canada, 185-206.

Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Canadian Polity 715

those institutions within which the procedure takes place. By removing discriminatory barriers to, as well as expanding opportunities for, the social, economic and political inclusion of ethnic minorities in Cana- dian life, multiculturalism seeks to create the necessary conditions for immigrant incorporation. At the limit, multiculturalism itself offers an integrative identity, the Canadian identity:

Multiculturalism is not only commensurate with Canadian social norms. More to the point, multiculturalism is the quintessential Canadian value. It constitutes a distinctive feature of our celebration (however understated) as a people, and distinguishes us from the melting pot of the United States. As the corner- stone of Canada's nation-building process, multiculturalism shapes our identity, unites us in a distinct society with a national vision, and invigorates us as a people with a destiny.17

Of course, not all Canadians are persuaded. In Quebec, multiculturalism is disparaged as an attempt to undermine the province's status as a distinct society by making French Canadians appear as merely one of any number of equal contributors to a Canadian ethnic mosaic. For many anglophones, too, multiculturalism connotes the fragmentation of the social structure and the impossibility of establishing a single Ca- nadian identity, even less a viable object of immigrant assimilation.'8 On this appraisal, in the official account immigrants are perceived as members of the discrete groups constituting the Canadian polity-as "everlasting immigrants" '9-not as individuals who might be coa- lesced into some greater political totality.

Students of politics routinely regard assimilation as the primary vehicle for congealing into a stable political whole the cultural diversity that immigration promises to introduce, albeit on the presumption that the immigrants will come from countries with relatively well- established national identities.20 Among democratic theorists, John

17 Augie Fleras and Jean Leonard Elliot, Multiculturalism in Canada: The Chal- lenge of Diversity (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992), 125 (emphasis in origi- nal).

18 For instance, Leslie A. Pal, Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multi- culturalism and Feminism in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993).

19 Neil Bissoondath, Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada (Toronto: Penguin, 1994), 116.

20 See, for example, Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 150-54; Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 358 (1965), 55-57; and Louis Hartz, The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964), 14. For the American perspective, see John C. Harles, Politics in the Lifeboat: Immigrants and the American Demo- cratic Order (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 51-63.

716 JOHN C. HARLES

Stuart Mill provides the prototypical discussion: in Considerations on Representative Government, Mill maintains that "it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of free governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."21 If, for reasons of geography, the creation of distinct national governments is not possible, Mill instructs, "experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another.... Whatever really tends to the admixture of nationalities, and the blending of their attributes and peculiarities in a common union, is a benefit to the human race."22

Mindful of such assessments, this article considers a central question: can the Canadian approach successfully wed immigrants to the political system-can immigrants to Canada be politically integrated without assimilation? Because immigrant loyalties can be forged in the process of migration itself, shaped by the circumstances of an immigrant's departure from the homeland as well as the reception afforded that individual in the country of destination, it will be suggested that immigrants can be disposed to high levels of political commitment, specific processes of assimilation aside. In Canada this may mean that for immigrants, at least in the short term, though perhaps mainly in the short term, the political order does not suffer for any lack of assimilative emphasis. The claim is intentionally tentative. Anything more con- clusive would require a study of future generations, and not enough time has elapsed since the introduction of official multiculturalism to be completely confident of its consequences. Still, if it is not possible to say decisively that immigrants can achieve integration without assimilation, it does seem that they can, and do, achieve a measure of integration before assimilation.

A qualitative study of Lao immigrants23-specifically, testimony derived from "intensive" interviews conducted with 30 members of a Lao community in southern Ontario24-furnishes preliminary evi-

21 John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1867; rpt. Lon- don: J. M. Dent, 1972), 362.

22 Ibid., 363-64. 23 On qualitative methodology in general and on the intensive interview approach

in particular, see John and Lyn H. Lofland, Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Analysis (2nd ed.; Belmont: Wadsworth, 1984); also Betty H. Zisk, Political Research: A Methodological Sampler (Lexington, D.C.: Heath, 1981). The interview sessions took place in southern Ontario during the summer of 1992. Respondents were selected by means of a snowball sample. In an effort to keep the testimony more representative than exhaustive, only 27 of the 30 interviewees are cited in the present essay.

24 According to statistics compiled by Employment and Immigration Canada, between 1979 and 1990, 16,297 immigrants from Laos were resettled in Canada, over 5,800 of those in Ontario alone (Employment and Immigration Canada, Im- migration Statistics [Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1989], 20; and Em-


dence in support of this assertion. Although the author was interested in, and had contact with, the Lao community before the research proj- ect commenced, there are two further reasons that recommend the Lao as a good test case of integration without assimilation. First, beside the majority Anglo-Canadian or French-Canadian culture into which they are received, the Lao are clearly exotic-the sort of immigrants who might be expected to have the most difficulty adapting to the new society, and so the most unlikely to become integrated. Second, the overwhelming majority of Lao have entered Canada as refugees. Individu- als whose migration was not of their own choice, the urgency of flight not having allowed much premeditation, might be imagined to have only limited enthusiasm for the new society. In other words, although refugees experience more acutely the uncertainty confronting all immigrants, and thus may exhibit a heightened gratitude for the sanctuary of the host society, this may be outweighed by the involuntary nature of the act of migration. For both of these reasons, the Lao might be imagined to show an ambivalent commitment to Canada. As it happens, based on the evidence of this study, the Lao enthusiasm for Canada is anything but guarded.

So that readers might be able to associate a particular interviewee with his or her basic social characteristics, a biographical schedule has been provided (Table 1). After each quotation relating narrative in the text, a respondent number appears in parentheses. By referring to the same respondent number in the schedule, it is possible to formulate a demographic sketch of the source of the quotation without betraying confidentiality.

2

Perhaps the most profound mark of a well-integrated polity is the strong sense of belonging felt by its members. A fundamental integrative question about immigrants, then, is whether the newcomers' understanding of themselves- their idea of "us"- includes Canada. Do immigrants in any way "feel" Canadian? Ideally, such sentiments should extend beyond nominal attributions of citizenship, though a readiness to undertake civic duties is at least a partial indicator of integration. But deeper conceptions of personal identity are also at issue,

ployment and Immigration Canada, Annual Report, 1990-1991 [Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991], 50). These figures do not strictly distinguish individuals on the basis of ethnicity-rather, all individuals whose origins are some- where in Laos are regarded for statistical purposes as Lao. Neither do they differ- entiate "highland" Lao-most prominently Hmong and Mien tribespeople- from "lowland," or ethnic, Lao. It is the political orientations of this latter con- tingent, historically the politically and culturally dominant group in Laos, that the present study explores.

TABLE 1

BIOGRAPHICAL SCHEDULE

Years of Estimated Estimated Public Re- education be- Formal individual household social spond- Gen- Age at Year of Canadian fore coming education income, income, welfare ent der interview arrival citizen to Canada in Canadaa Occupation per annum per annum assistanceb

1 M 31 1980 Yes 9 Vocational Assembly line 30,000 60,000 Yes worker

2 M 39 1979 Yes 11 Vocational General machinist/ 42,000 N/A No Clergyman

3 M 39 1979 Yes 18 Vocational Computer programmer 30,000 55,000 No 4 M 58 1980 Yes 8 None Artisan 18,200 30,000 Yes 5 M 26 1979 Yes 6 University Mechanical designer 32,000 120,000 No 6 F 50 1980 Yes 3-4 None Assembly line 20,000+ 50-60,000+ No

worker 7 M 38 1980 Yes 7 Vocational Welder 30,000 46,000 Yes 8 M 26 1990 No 11 Vocational Assembly line 11,000 N/A No

worker 9 M 36 1979 Yes 15 None Assembly line N/A N/A No

worker 10 F 27 1981 Yes 1 Vocational Assembly line 16,000 36,000+ No

worker 11 F 42 1980 Yes 11 Vocational Assembly line 14,000 14,000 Yes

worker 12 M 32 1981 Yes 6 None Unemployed - 22,000 Yes 13 F 34 1980 Yes 4-5 None Assembly line 20,000 N/A Yes

worker 14 F 34 1980 Yes 15 None Unemployed - 35,000 Yes

00

z Oo

Z C)

jl

TABLE 1-Continued

Years of Estimated Estimated Public Re- education be- Formal individual household social spond- Gen- Age at Year of Canadian fore coming education income, income, welfare ent der interview arrival citizen to Canada in Canadaa Occupation per annum per annum assistanceb 15 F 35 1979 Yes 8 None Assembly line 18,000 18,000 No

worker 16 F 50 1984 Yes 8 None Housewife - 15,600 Yes 17 M 39 1980 Yes 6 None Press operator 32,000 50,000 Yes 18 M 35 1980 Yes 10 None Farm labourer 14,400 24,000 Yes 19 M 51 1979 Yes 18 University Clergy 37,000 37,000 Yes 20 M 45 1979 Yes 12 Vocational Machine operator 25,000 50,000 Yes 21 M 33 1980 Yes 11 None Machine operator 24,000 42,000 No 22 M 35 1983 Yes 17 Some univ. Social worker 22,000 22,000 Yes 23 M 37 1979 Yes 13 University Insurance agent 35,000+ N/A No 24 F 42 1980 No 8 None Assembly line 20,000+ 50,000+ No

worker 25 F 40 1980 Yes 6 None Assembly line 28,000 28,000 Yes

worker 26 M 26 1989 No 12 Vocational Student 18,000 18,000 Yes 27 M 22 1989 No 12 Some univ./ Hotel kitchen staff 10,000 17-18,000 Yes

vocational 28 F 24 1989 No 8 None Housecleaning 16,800 16,800 Yes 29 M 28 1990 No 11 None Unemployed - 22,000 Yes 30 F 39 1979 Yes 11 None Housewife - 37,000 Yes

a Exclusive of English language and any citizenship courses. b Excluding Family Allowance.

he

O

TWA

so

qA.

•o

-..

720 JOHN C. HARLES

those typically expressed in terms of love for, and loyalty to, one's country as well as solidarity with one's fellow citizens.

If the litmus test of national integration in Canada is the degree to which a given ethnic group aspires to comprise part of the Canadian "collective conscience,'"25 to borrow Emile Durkheim's evocative phrase, the Lao interviewed for this study clearly evince signs of integration. In the Lao view, to be a Canadian means that "you belong to this society-you understand its people-and you can adjust to it" (22); that you "feel like a Canadian ... and are part of the country and its government" (4); that you "belong to this country, you are one with its people... and you are a person who loves their neighbour" (11). For many Lao, the character of the receiving society quickens this sense of being Canadian:

Do I feel Canadian? Very much so. I try very much to be part of this community because I want to help out in any way I can. That is the best way to put yourself into the society that you are living in. I cannot look at myself as different from [Canadians] because they accepted us as one of them. (17)

Several Lao equate the security of being "at home" with being Canadian-understandable given the circumstances of Lao history. When asked whether he thought of himself as a Canadian in any way, one respondent related, "When I travel outside Canada, I feel unsafe. When I reach the border, and I cross, I feel that I am now at home. I have asked many Lao people about this and they say they have the same feeling" (19). At the extreme, such sentiments verge on the maudlin:

I consider myself a true Canadian. Sometimes when I am away from home, away from Canada-like I used to go on business trips to Detroit or New York-I feel insecure, and when I cross the border into Canada, I feel safe. Last year I went to a conference in New York-my company sent me there- and when I heard the Canadian anthem, my tears started coming down. (23)

For many Lao, the assumption of Canadian citizenship, a step taken by all eligible immigrants in the present study, is the apotheosis of their commitment to Canada.26 No doubt the Lao understand citizen-

25 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (1893; rpt.; New York: The Free Press, 1984), 60-61.

26 According to the 1991 Census, 10,000 Lao are Canadian citizens-more than 67 per cent of the total Lao population in Canada. The Lao also appear to obtain citizenship at a faster pace than do immigrants in general. For example, among individuals receiving citizenship in 1991, the Lao waited an average of 5.07 years before being naturalized; the average interval for all immigrants was 7.1 years (Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, Canadian Citizenship Statistics, 1991 [Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991], 22).


ship's legal and effectual value. The ability to travel on a Canadian passport was mentioned by almost all of the interviewees as a primary motivation for taking out citizenship papers-a benefit not to be gain- said as Lao families are commonly separated by country of residence. But the Lao are equally aware of the affective importance of becoming a citizen-citizenship as a matter of identifying with, and belonging to, the Canadian polity.27 Given that Canadian citizenship entitles the bearer to few privileges that permanent residence does not (mainly the right to vote and to run for office in federal and some provincial elec- tions, priority in hiring for certain jobs, and the right to leave and re-enter the country on a Canadian passport), the emotive reasons for naturalization should not be underestimated. Several individuals testified that they became Canadian citizens because they "wanted to be like everybody else" (9), or "because we are stateless and we feel we want to belong" (19). "I like this country and I wanted to live here," related an interviewee, "and it made us feel like... rather than being a refugee that we were more important, that we were now Canadian citizens" (14).

Expressions of readiness to take up arms on Canada's behalf, possibly the gravest demand of citizenship and the most severe measure of a newcomer's national identity, are submitted by the Lao as tokens of their political commitment. "I'd be willing to fight," avowed one respondent, "We are living here in our country and we have to love and protect it" (25). "The way I think about it is that this country gave me freedom, the right to come here and live peacefully.... So I have a responsibility. Whatever happens to this country, I know for sure that I am one of them. I will fight side-by-side to protect this country" (17). Considering the political violence that many Lao families endured in their homeland, assertions of fidelity to Canada-of the need to defend "our country'' -are all the more poignant.

Largely for cultural reasons, ties to the homeland die hard and the process of political transformation is not in all cases complete. This may explain why several of the interviewees periodically refer to Lao people as "us" and Canadians as "them." (Although the same individual might speak of Canada in terms of both us and them- see the testimony of respondent 3 [722]; 17 [720]; and 19 [721 and 725].) When one considers that official multiculturalism may have the effect of le- gitimating and entrenching such differences, and that because of immigration alone many Lao-especially the more recent arrivals-still

27 On the affective potential of Canadian citizenship, see Kaplan, "Who Be- longs?"; and also James S. Frideres et al., "Becoming Canadian: Citizen Acqui- sition and National Identity," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 14 (1987), 105-21.

722 JOHN C. HARLES

think of themselves as the guests of a host society, one begins to understand why Lao identification with Canada may not always be complete.

Yet as proponents of multiculturalism might hope, most Lao believe Canadian identity is permeable. Even those Lao with the most resilient cultural identities contend that they can yet be good Cana- dians:

I have no doubt about it, I am very proud to be a Canadian. To be a Canadian, that means to have a new life. ... I want to build a Canadian society according to Canadian ideas, not the ideas of Laos. That does not mean that we have forgotten that we are Lao; we are still Lao, but we are happy to be Canadian citizens.... I want to respect Canadian traditions and be a good citizen of the people of Can- ada, even though we don't want to forget our country of Laos. (3)

Though the process of political identification might take longer for the older generation, no one has any doubt that their children, with fewer of the cultural impediments-language prime among them-confronting them, will be fully Canadian. Concerned with the erosion of Lao cultural traditions, particularly filial obedience, a Lao mother related, "I remind my children all the time that they are Asian, but they tell me 'I am a Canadian. I was born here and I live here and I go to school here, and I'm completely Canadian' " (14).

In their generalized support for the structures of Canadian political authority, the Lao also bear the marks of an integrated people.28 Faith in the Canadian government, the institutional expression of the Canadian political community, is a consistent feature of Lao testimony. Not that the Lao are undiscriminating. Instances of perceived government shortcomings are noted, if regularly qualified.29 "I guess our government says that they will serve Canadians," observed one individual, "and they do actually serve us but sometimes they make mistakes and they don't accept the mistakes they make.... The politicians try to be honest, but sometimes they try to handle matters beyond their capabil- ity or understanding. They pretend to do something for the people because the people demand them to do something" (5). This particular response, authored by one of the youngest interviewees in the study and an individual for whom the balance of formal education-and,

28 See Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communica- tion and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 126; and Edward Shils, Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 4-5, 66ff.

29 The fact that the support of the Lao for the national political community might be more complete than for the Canadian government or for specific occupants of political office is consistent with findings on the political support of the Cana- dian citizenry at large. See Alan Kornberg and Harold D. Clarke, Citizens and Community: Political Support in a Representative Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. 107ff. and 254-55.


arguably, political socialization-has taken place in Canada itself, may well be a sign of accommodation to a Canadian democratic culture that encourages civic vigilance. Among Lao respondents without such cre- dentials (the overwhelming majority) unreserved affirmations of the goodwill and benevolence of the Canadian government are far more typical. "I trust the government," declared one interviewee. "Since I have been here I have seen them help the poor, and for people who lose their jobs and don't have any money, they can collect unemployment insurance" (4). "I think the policy of the Canadian government is a good policy," another respondent concurred. "I have nothing to complain about here. I know other people complain, but I have no problem living in Canada. The government is providing what I need and I am satisfied" (2).

Paternalism is not an infrequent feature of the Lao orientation on this point-unsurprising if one remembers that paternalism and patriotism, the latter a sentiment the Lao seem to have in ample supply, are of the same etymological tree. "Without a government," remarked an interviewee, "we wouldn't have anybody taking care of us or helping us. It would be like a family without any parents" (24). Occasions when the government might not be completely forthcoming are viewed from a similar perspective. One individual explained, "The Canadian government may not always tell the truth because they have to keep some things to themselves. You have to understand how they are gov- erning the country. The same as the father of a kid. You cannot tell the kid everything-there are some things he does not need to know" (17).

As might be anticipated, among the Lao the nature of the Cana- dian government is usually-though given a sceptical minority of respondents for whom all politics is corrupt, not always-contrasted with that of the homeland. That the "Canadian government listens to the people" (1) is frequently cited as one of the virtues of the country of resettlement:

I see that the government here is very different because it is conscious of the people. The government in Laos was not conscious of the people. Here, if the government passes a law, they publish it and they let the people know about it. Which is different than in Laos, because the government there tried for the most part to keep the people from knowing what was going on. (24)

Whereas the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) is frequently criticized for its intrusiveness, the Canadian government is not thought capable of similar behaviour, especially in light of the Lao dis- position to be obedient citizens. "I think the [Canadian] government has rules and we have to obey those rules," reflected one individual, "then we get along fine with the government. If we don't obey the law, then the government comes down on us and it creates problems. But

724 JOHN C. HARLES

ordinarily the government doesn't bother us" (24). Even taxation, while by no means relished, is often seen in terms of its benefits to the Canadian political community and thus rarely an unreasonable imposi- tion. Personalizing the issue, a respondent remarked that "they spend taxpayer money wisely because, for instance, if I lost my job then I know that the government has collected money and would use it to pay my unemployment insurance" (27). In truth, that many of the Lao are themselves the beneficiaries of social assistance may be a tangible reminder of the merits of redistributive government economic policies.

Professions of positive commitment to Canada are supplemented by political behaviour through which the Lao seek to show themselves committed. To be sure, they do not have overly participatory political inclinations. As with all immigrants, language, low social-economic status, disparity between the homeland's political conventions and those of Canada, and consequently a limited sense of political efficacy, are the most-often-cited barriers to sustained involvement. But a desire to present oneself as a dutiful member of the host society might also diminish activist inclinations, opportunities for democratic participation in Canada aside. One respondent allowed that "democracy is a good thing-unless someone goes beyond what they are permitted to do in a democracy. If they use their freedom too much, and disobey the laws of the country, then democracy is not good" (9). In the opinion of another respondent, government is not even a subject that should be pursued: "I don't discuss politics with my family or my friends because as a newcomer I just feel grateful to the people who brought me here" (2).

Political participation can be reduced by a variable even more fundamental. For many Lao, the very idea of politics is tainted by the homeland experience. "When I was growing up in Laos," one interviewee recalled, "we did not discuss politics and our parents did not tell us anything about it. Most of us were just afraid when we talked about politics.... The rulers in our country had too much power. And if they did something we didn't like, we just kept quiet about it because we were afraid" (24). The expatriate view that Lao politics are corrupt is an additional disincentive:

I don't like politics because I don't want to be disturbed or upset by anything.... The reason I don't like politics is because I saw so much happen in Laos when I was there. For instance, before I got married, I worked in the police department in Laos. I saw all the graft and the money. Also I know that the American government granted a lot of money to the Lao government for them to build this big building. It was never built; the money just went into the pockets of the politicians. And so I don't like politics and politicians because I saw how they stole money that was supposed to benefit the country. (6)


Any involvement in Canadian politics that might be viewed by the host society as at all untoward is absolutely ruled out by the overwhelming majority of Lao. For some individuals, fear of punishment, including repatriation, is at issue. When questioned about the inclina- tion of Lao people to seek to influence the Canadian government, one interviewee claimed that "they would be afraid that they would be arrested. They would be afraid that something might happen to their jobs and that they wouldn't have enough food to eat, or wouldn't be able to live here" (30). A fellow refugee agreed: "They would have fear, fear of being sent home. They have fear in their own country, in the camp, even here. They fear the authorities. My kids, when they were young, they saw the Salvation Army and ran away. It gave them bad memories of the police in the camps" (19).

Gratitude for the solace received in the country of resettlement is also a motivation. Asked whether she would feel free to demonstrate against the policy of the Canadian government, a respondent demurred, "I think that for Lao people, we have come here and we should be grateful-we should respect and obey the laws of the country. If we wanted to demonstrate against the Lao government, that's a different thing. But we shouldn't do it here" (10). Another respondent affirmed that "as a Canadian citizen, if something wrong was being done, I would have the right to demonstrate. But as far as I am personally concerned, I would never do that. I wouldn't be brave enough. I came here as a refugee. I'm in their country, and I would never want to offend them-ever" (16).

By contrast, when it comes to acts with symbolic political signifi- cance the Lao declare themselves to be eager participants in Canadian public life. Voting is often seen in this regard as primarily a means of identifying with the host society, and thus exercised more for its ritual- istic than its instrumental value. Although few Lao follow Canadian politics in any more than a cursory way, for those eligible, voting is considered virtually mandatory. In fact in the case of several respondents there was some confusion as to whether one was legally bound to vote. "They sent a letter that I have to vote," remembered one interviewee. "I don't know who I voted for-I saw four or five names on the paper and I just picked one" (15). No doubt this is hardly the democratic ideal, nor, debatably, is it the integrative ideal. But such lack of electoral discernment might be forgiven if it is recognized that for the Lao voting is most immediately a gesture of political allegiance. An individual related, "I voted because I felt it was my obligation to a country that has helped us a lot. I can't remember which party I voted for.... I just chose the old government because I was satisfied with that" (16). Indeed, civic rectitude often appears the major criteria of the voting decision: "I supported the party that is the proper party, the party that goes by what the people want" (4).

726 JOHN C. HARLES

In sum, although Canada does not possess a well-defined national identity, and hence that the processes of assimilation which elsewhere are believed to be necessary to coalesce newcomers into a cohesive political whole seem to be foreclosed, nevertheless the Lao immigrants interviewed for this study reveal an impressive level of national commitment. Broad statements of Lao political devotion to Canada are supplemented by expressions of trust in the Canadian government and in supportive political behaviours. Even without the benefit of assimilation, there can be little doubt that the Lao understand themselves as part of a decidedly Canadian nation.

3

In view of the received wisdom of much social science, the fact that the Lao give strong evidence of achieving integration before assimilation is an unanticipated finding. One explanation for this may be in the circumstances of Lao immigration, that is, the reasons the Lao left their homeland as well as the nature of their reception in Canada.

When students of immigration analyze transnational population movements, they often employ the vocabulary of push and pull.30 Push factors are those forces present in the country of origin that motivate individuals to emigrate; pull factors are those characteristics of the receiving society that attract immigrants. In any migratory stream both push and pull factors will have an effect, though the initial impetus for immigration will come more from one of these sources than the other.

This framework is useful in interpreting the political orientations of the Lao in Canada. As the great majority of Lao immigrants are refugees fleeing the turmoil of southeast Asia, push factors-what is perceived as an unbearable political and economic existence in the homeland-are of primary importance. Pull factors are not irrelevant, however. The Lao may be convinced of the merits of the country of adoption that they had little direct hand in choosing, a country which has qualities that might persuade them against the need to move elsewhere, to the United States, say. Lao immigrants have been forced out of their homeland, in effect, rejected by their country of birth or by the government that claims to represent it. It would not be so surprising if, in turn, the Lao repudiate their homeland and redirect their political commitments to the country that has offered them haven. Therefore, the pull of Canadian society-be it the availability of tangible social welfare benefits or, more broadly, the conviction that it is a place of freedom and security-serves to solidify a political commitment to Canada that most Lao are already more than willing to make. If this is so, Lao im-

30 The seminal work in this regard is E. G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (1889), 241-301.


migrants may not require, at least not immediately, mechanisms of assimilation to help them identify with the Canadian political community; their allegiance to Canada may be a function of the process of immigration itself.

Based on the oral testimony collected for the present study, it appears that something like this dynamic is in fact at work. With respect to push factors, the Lao interviewees have experienced intensely the fear that motivates much immigration, whether it be the gentler fear of lost economic opportunity and social status or the more brutal fear of political persecution. Several individuals recounted what they perceived to be the severity of the communist government that took power in Laos in 1975:

After the country was turned over to the communists, so many things changed. Most of this was political change. People got so much pressure from the communists. There was no longer any democracy. So people got scared and de- cided they could no longer live in Laos, and they tried to escape. First of all [the new government] tried to arrest the people who they thought were trying to escape-people who didn't even know what was happening. More than that, they tried to arrest people in the night time. Families did not know what was going to happen to them. When they took people away and nobody saw them again, that was very, very scary. (3)

Economic hardship, the reason for most immigration to Canada, is less relevant to the Lao immigration but not inconsequential. To be sure, political and economic motivations are intertwined, and the policies of the LPDR are held responsible for a low standard of living:

Some of the things about the communists were probably all right. But as far as our living is concerned, there wasn't enough food to eat, there was no liveli- hood for us there. Also there was no good care for our children-the hospitals were no good. There wasn't anything-not even any milk for the children. In Laos, things have not prospered or progressed at all. (14)

Such accounts are inescapably subjective. Yet even if the adversi- ties of life under the LPDR are exaggerated (and they may not be), the refugees' declarations are pertinent. Emigr6s may well magnify the deficiencies of the homeland, as the decision to leave is so momentous that the reasons for leaving must be extraordinarily convincing. This does not make the Lao unreliable sources, merely human ones. What must be recognized is that the testimony of refugees-or of immigrants in general-cannot be viewed as objective portrayals of virtue or vice. The importance of the testimony lies not in what it depicts but in the fact of depiction. What is of value is what the Lao say about their political world. And what they say about Laos is that their future in the country was so dismal that they had no choice but to leave.

728 JOHN C. HARLES

Harsh evaluations of the LPDR in place, Lao political identities appear available for recasting. That is not to suggest that Laos has been forsaken-cultural affinities are too durable for that. As one interviewee remarked, "Sometimes I think about going back there, if the government changed. It is my homeland. It is more comfortable than here. I was born there-I am used to it" (21). Nevertheless, it is clear that for the majority of respondents the homeland commands no particular political attraction. In part, fear of communist mischief is too pro- nounced:

As far as I know now, I'm not so sure I will trust [the LPDR] again.... They say it's all right for everyone to go back to Laos, but they don't say whether it is to live, to stay, or to visit. For me, I still fear communist ideas-I will never trust them.... Right now they are opening the country to everyone who used to live there, to come back and rebuild the country. But according to what I understand, they don't have laws to protect the people or a constitution to protect the country. I don't believe anybody there because things could be changed any minute. (17)

But neither is the prospect of one day resettling in a non-communist Laos of any great attraction. Several Lao simply related that they were "not particularly interested in what is going on in Laos-that's their country now and this is [ours]" (12), or that they were not much concerned with the homeland "because it is far away-because it is in the past" (19). Other respondents indicated the futility of any attempt to unseat the LPDR:

Many of the political groups that were in Laos have tried to form in the US and Canada in order to go back and fight. There are thirty or forty political parties here, each with a different direction, a different policy. That doesn't make sense. They are repeating Lao history. We don't want to hear it any more- nothing turns out to be true. Maybe some political party that wants to go back collects money from people to help to fight. Nothing happens, they just spend the money. ... They have no commitment to Laos. (2)

Among the Lao of the present study, there is little evidence of a "myth of return"'31 that might deflect political allegiances away from Canada.

If, according to Lao immigrants, the LPDR is the source of the unease that prompted their migration, Canada is regarded in precisely the opposite manner-as a repository of hope and security.32 Accord-

31 See Barbara Schmitter Heisler, "Immigrant Settlement and the Structure of Emergent Immigrant Communities in Western Europe," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 485 (1986), 76-86.

32 Other research has noted that immigrants tend to have a special affinity for their country of adoption. In circa 1970s survey data, for example, David Elkins found


ingly, Lao respondents often claimed there was nothing that distressed them about their new life (save the weather), several placing their re- marks comparatively. "Canada is peaceful-there is no war here" (18), is the most fundamental of its perceived advantages. Testimony to the freedom that Canada affords is similarly phrased:

I like how the government is organized in Canada, how they give freedom to the people. Like people are free to talk-you are free to give ideas about what you like and don't like.... In Laos, sometimes people didn't agree with what the government said, but they just kept quiet because it was a communist government. When someone disagreed with the government, the government would take those people to a seminar33 to learn about politics-the new politics. Some were taken away for a long time; some never came back. (26)

Between 1975 and 1985 over 98,000 Indochinese were resettled in Canada. As a proportion of its total population, Canada received twice as many refugees as did the greatest aggregate recipient of Indo- chinese during the same period-the United States. Since 1979, the Lao have been the beneficiaries of special legal provisions to facilitate the entry of Indochinese immigrants to Canada.34 Considering that this refugee recruitment has been undertaken not only by the Canadian government but by thousands of private sponsors as well (in certain years private resettlement efforts have actually outpaced public ones), it is not difficult to make the case that Canada has displayed a good degree of humanitarianism in its admission of the Lao. Maybe for that reason, certain Lao interviewees cited an openness to refugees as being what they especially appreciated about their country of resettlement. "Canada has opened its doors to a lot of people who have had trouble in other countries," attested one respondent. "I think that people outside of Canada should know that Canada is a country that shows love" (12).

General sentiments of approval are often augmented by praise for specific social benefits. What the sociologist Edward Shils has called "allocative integration,"35 the idea that provision of a certain standard

that feelings of "warmth" towards Canada were the least strong among native- born Canadians, stronger among long-term immigrants (those arriving before 1945) and strongest of all among short-term immigrants (those arriving after 1945). See David Elkins and Richard Simeon, Small Worlds: Provinces and Par- ties in Canadian Political Life (Toronto: Methuen, 1980), 12-13.

33 "Seminar" -the name given by the LPDR to labour re-education camps. 34 See the discussion in Howard Adelman, "Canadian Refugee Policy in the Post-

war Period: An Analysis," in Howard Adelman, ed., Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States (Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1991), 210-14. Also see Freda Hawkins, Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared (2nd ed.; Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 174-85.

35 Shils, Center and Periphery, 66.

730 JOHN C. HARLES

of living can be a vehicle for political incorporation-a claim not in- frequently advanced by social scientists whose focus is Canada36- seems to be borne out by this type of testimony. Thus, a respondent enthused that one of the best things about Canada is "the medical pro- gramme they have here. If anybody is sick and has to go to the hospital, they are taken care of-you don't have to pay for it" (7). A Lao woman observed:

We are well taken care of here.... I have a very peaceful heart because our children have the opportunity to study and to go to good schools. The government provides a lot of things that make life easy for us here. I'm a widow and have children, and I receive help from the government for taking care of myself and my children, and also for my housing. (11)

As factors of integration such estimations of material well-being may have greater weight among immigrants like the Lao, who tend to measure their level of satisfaction against the impoverished circumstances of their arrival.

Nonetheless, the Lao are not unambiguously supportive of government welfare provisions. Although the majority of respondents had received some form of public assistance other than family allowance, a number concurred with a relatively well-to-do respondent who argued that "the government shouldn't give so much welfare. I mean, welfare is fine but we get to a point where people become lazy and live off welfare. And then we hard-working persons have to support them" (5). This attitude may well be related to another feature of much of the Lao testimony, an opinion voiced by respondents even of modest means- that Canada provides significant opportunities to become prosperous if only individuals are sufficiently diligent. A respondent who arrived relatively recently in 1989 maintained, "In Canada I have a new chance. I can do anything I want. If I want to learn something, and I have the tal- ent or ability, I can do that. I started work as soon as I came here, to try and make a good life for my family" (27). Others went so far as to blame the plight of the poor on an absence of industriousness: "For the most part, people are poor because they don't want to work, or they are poor because they spend their money on things like drinks and ciga- rettes or gambling.... If people would live right and spend their money in the right way, and help each other, they would probably advance. They have the opportunity to do so" (11). In the context of their homeland, for many Lao, government intervention might imply the construction of barriers to prosperity, not their removal. But, more

36 See, for example, Bibby, Mosaic Madness, 158ff.; Mildred A. Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 248-52; and Keith Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (Mont- real: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1982), 119.


importantly, regardless of personal economic circumstances, Lao immigrants may be hesitant to expect that the Canadian government intervene on their behalf, because they believe that such a desire would be inappropriate. Considering themselves guests of a host society, the Lao may have no wish to wear out their welcome by making unseemly demands.

As a means of offering cultural freedom and by removing obstacles to the full economic and social participation of ethnic minorities in Canadian life, one might expect that the policy of multiculturalism itself operates as a pull factor for immigrants to Canada. The Lao generally voice approval for the way multiculturalism eases the cultural transition of immigrants to Canada and encourages appreciation for ethnic diversity. Multiculturalism means "there are equal rights and equal justice for the different groups who come to live in this country" (14). "Canada respects us, it doesn't expect us to throw away our old customs" (18), allowed a respondent. "I think multiculturalism is very good," remarked still another, "and I think that Canada has a very open heart, a very generous spirit, to invite all of these different people from different countries who are refugees to come to this country and live here" (16).

The Lao seem to find multiculturalism effective in combatting discrimination against visible minorities. Granted, not all the interviewees are certain that Canada is void of prejudice, or believe that Lao people are on an equal footing with Canadians of European descent. Upwardly mobile Lao, perhaps anticipating a "glass ceiling," appear particularly circumspect:

Yes, I think there are many opportunities here, but the Canadians, the real Canadians, they want to separate a little bit sometimes. Not all of them, but some.... Real Canadian-that means they were born in Canada. It's not like the Chinese, not like people with yellow skin; they have to have white skin.... Sometimes if Canadian people-white people-push a little bit, they will get the job. People with another skin color, they have to make sure they have the right accent. Then the problem is speaking English. (3)

Nevertheless, most respondents maintained that they experienced no evidence of prejudice in Canada. One interviewee insisted that in Can- ada "it doesn't matter if we are a refugee, or whether we have yellow skin, white skin, or black skin" (28). "I've seen a lot of people come into Canada," averred another, "and I've never seen that it made any difference what colour their skin was, they were still able to get a job" (15). Moreover, in the opinion of several Lao, what may first appear to be discrimination may in fact be attributed to a lack of appropriate cre- dentials:

732 JOHN C. HARLES

Over here, I believe, they don't have any discrimination. ... When I have con- tacted others about what I wanted to do, they have never refused. But sometimes you need to have a requirement. That doesn't mean it is discrimination. Sometimes when you come from far away, you don't have any diploma or any certificate. So they require you to go to school to get that before you can continue. But in this country they give everyone opportunity, no matter what your skin is. (17)

For all that, the Lao give multiculturalism pointedly mixed re- views. Although proponents of official multiculturalism often maintain that its solicitousness of cultural diversity is appealing to immigrants, that newcomers to Canada actually prefer integration without assimilation to integration with assimilation,37 the Lao express serious reserva- tions about the wisdom of trying to retain a separate cultural identity:

In my heart and in my thinking I am still a Lao. I have been here such a short time. I was in Laos from the time I was born, and ate Lao food and lived a Lao life. But I have to be very diligent about studying the English language. And I must also watch and be careful that I observe all the manners and characteristics of the people around me and try to assimilate to them. (29)

As Lao people we can't keep our old customs here very well because we live a completely different life than we did at home. ... We have to change our ways when we come to Canada and do things more like Canadians do them. We can't just bring our traditions into this country and expect to work here. We have to be more like Canadians. (13)

Despite being exactly the sort of immigrants that multicultural policy is designed to accommodate-individuals who by an Anglo-Canadian or French-Canadian standard are culturally exotic and who are a visible minority-the Lao seem to prefer, or say that they prefer, integration with assimilation.

When asked what one must do to be a "true" Canadian, the Lao offer indeterminate answers. The great majority respond simply in terms of the legal proprieties involved in naturalization. "There is nothing particular you have to do," related one individual. "You just have to come here and live and be willing to obey the laws of the country, and then later on you can become a citizen" (24). "You would have to know something about the laws of Canada and be willing to obey them," echoed another interviewee, "and you couldn't have any record with the police. Otherwise, you could be just like you are" (14).

37 See, for example, the Economic Council of Canada, New Faces in the Crowd: Economic and Social Impacts of Immigration (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 31ff.


Committed multiculturalists may find comfort in the open- endedness of such observations; individuals searching for more positive statements of Canadian identity will not. Nor will sceptics among the latter be dissuaded from believing that what newcomers like the Lao desire most from the host society is a clear statement of an integrative national identity, one establishing the criteria of social and political acceptance for discrete immigrant communities-something into which they can be assimilated. If that is so, Lao respondents might even lament the passing of the Anglo-Canadian political heritage:

When I came to Canada and heard about multiculturalism, [I thought] it is really good because at least we had our own culture to cling on to. But as time went by... I think the government has taken a different direction and ap- proached it in a totally wrong way. For example, a couple of years ago, [Prime Minister] Brian Mulroney said it was okay for an RCMP officer to wear a tur- ban. I think that took away our patriotism, our symbol for Canada.... I can see that we promote multiculturalism to keep people together because that's all we are-a group of different nations. But we went overboard as far as my opinion goes. (5)

Social scientists have sometimes suggested that a desire for economic mobility, and for participation in a political economy's central marketplace, exerts strong pressures on ethnic minorities to assimilate to the norms of the cultural group that dominates this activity.38 When the Lao indicate wariness about multiculturalism, however, their fundamental concern is not that the policy might serve to marginalize them economically but that it will isolate them socially and undermine the unity of their adopted country:

I think for the most part that multiculturalism is very difficult. [Cultural groups] all have their different beliefs and different opinions, and there are too many to try and become one. It would be better if the people who all came here would just become Canadians-they would become one united country and there would not be too many groups separate from each other. (4)

Multiculturalism means that people are supposed to study their own community. But they should accept Canada, they should build Canada-that's the point. Even if you have your own culture, you have to be Canadian first. Wherever you live, you have to support that country. (3)

38 See the discussion in Leo Dreidger, The Ethnic Factor: Identity in Diversity (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1989), 50-65; and also Milton Gordon, Assimi- lation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

734 JOHN C. HARLES

The main purpose of the government is to have all immigrants integrate into the community, but the reality is that is not really the case. Every group-like the Lao-they still keep to themselves. In a sense, the government has failed. It does not really help people integrate into the mainstream of society. (22)

Given that Lao immigration has been impelled by the disruptions of the homeland, and conscious of the esteem in which the country of adoption is held, it is not remarkable that the Lao are especially sensi- tive to the need for social solidarity in Canada. The Lao embrace an ardent Canadianism. Policies that risk national division are received with considerably less enthusiasm.

4

As this article has argued, an uncertain national identity influences Canada's approach to integration and assimilation. Political assimilation in Canada, in the sense of being socialized to the defining beliefs and values of a cohesive polity, is a process difficult to conceptualize. If, for generous motives, Canada has implemented a policy of official multiculturalism, as a means of consolidating immigrants into a unified Canadian political community, multiculturalism-integration without assimilation-may be the only policy that Canada can in fact pursue. All the more reason, then, to consider whether integration without assimilation has a chance of success. As this article indicates, advo- cates of multiculturalism have some reason for optimism. Notwith- standing the lack of explicit mechanisms of assimilation, the process of immigration itself, perhaps combined with policies of multiculturalism aimed at easing the transition for newcomers to Canada, can have a politically integrative effect. Despite lingering cultural affinities, the Lao immigrants interviewed for this study attest to the dissipation of their former political identities. In word and deed, the Lao are eager to identify with the Canadian political community and with the government that is the expression of that community. Regardless of any difficulties experienced in Canada, according to the Lao it is a far better life than in Laos. As long as the memory of the homeland and the flight from it endures, the Lao should continue to demonstrate steadfast fidelity to the Canadian polity.

No doubt this explanation of immigrant commitment to Canada, one centring on the forces of migration alone, needs refinement. Fur- ther research might explore the ways in which socio-economic status bears on an immigrant's political identity. In this investigation, though such observations are largely impressionistic, class does not seem to have an obvious effect. All the aforementioned signs that the Lao are being integrated into the Canadian political community-their general sense of belonging to Canada, their belief in the beneficence of the


Canadian government, their eagerness to display supportive political behaviour, their conviction that Canada is a place of freedom and prosperity, their wariness of multiculturalism because it may jeopardize national unity-are testified to by members of diverse income, occu- pational and educational strata. That the sample population is, on balance, of low socio-economic status relative to other Canadians (see Table 2) makes it all the more striking that the Lao display a marked absence of criticism towards the host society, nor do they demonstrate alienation from the Canadian polity.

TABLE 2

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS (1992)

Average annual income Highest level

Individual (full-time, Poverty of schooling Household full-year worker)a rateb < Grade 9

Lao respondentsc $36,800 $23,475 36.6% 33% All Ontarians $52,225 $36,031 13.3% 12% All Canadians $46,137 $33,714 16.1% 14%

a Data for Ontarians and Canadians are drawn from the 1991 Census of Canada. b Data are drawn from the National Council on Welfare, Poverty Profile, 1991

(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1994), 7, 24. c All data are self-reported. Only 25 of the 30 interviewees supplied information on

household income.

Implicit in these observations is a rejoinder to public concerns about the supposed drag of recent immigrants on the cohesion and sta- bility of Canada-that immigrant values and traditions are potentially at odds with what it means to be a Canadian. Not only are immigrants unlikely to threaten or destabilize the Canadian democratic order, since they are devoted to it, but they may be an asset to Canadian integration. Indeed, an eccentric though real implication of this research is that a constant flow of immigrants may help prevent the break-up of a mini- mally integrated polity. Because the research method for this study cannot establish causal relationships, an inquiry which in any case examines only a single immigrant group, such arguments are tenta- tively offered. Those taking part in the study cannot be said to represent the Lao population from which they are drawn in any statistical sense, let alone all immigrants to Canada (although one might well ask who the representative immigrant group is). Yet qualitative research consciously sacrifices mathematical precision for a density of evidence. For that reason, if quantitative assurances are not appropriate, informed conjecture and qualified conclusions are. Allowing that fun- damentally the Lao immigration experience may in fact parallel that of

736 JOHN C. HARLES

other newcomers, in the short term at any rate, immigrants to Canada would seem to be a source for integration in a political system commonly regarded as having an integration deficit.

At the risk of ending on a cautionary note, it must be said that the long-term prognosis is more uncertain. Loyalties created by the immigrant experience will not last forever. As the years pass and memories of difficulties in the homeland become less vivid, the country of adoption will be evaluated less and less on comparative grounds. Because the act of migration is so psychologically compelling, it is likely that memories will endure-possibly two or more generations will pass before the legacy of flight and subsequent sanctuary completely van- ishes. Political values can stick across generations, especially if those values have been fashioned according to subjective impressions of economic scarcity.39 Considering the economic and political status of many immigrants, their belief that Canada offers deliverance and thus merits their commitment may have a certain durability. Nevertheless, if the standard insights of social scientists are correct, this may only delay the forces of assimilation that ultimately must secure the integration of immigrants and their progeny. Barring significant changes in Canada's national self-conception, multiculturalism will have to bear the full weight of the integrative task, functioning not just as a facilitator of integration, but as its object. And yet, as this study shows, multiculturalism is a focus for identity about which many Canadians, foreign-born or not, are ambivalent.

One wonders what the political destiny of immigrants to Canada will be. Although the circumstances of immigration may induce the termination of old political allegiances and dispose newcomers to view the host society in the most favourable light, without the relevant assimilative mechanisms will new political commitments develop to replace the old ones? Or to put it another way, while immigrants to Canada may be prepared fully to integrate, is there anything definite to which they can finally be integrated? How Canada resolves that question may determine whether, in terms of unadorned political commitment, a Canadian will be an "immigrant with seniority"40 or an immigrant without seniority.

39 See Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 56ff.

40 Louis Melosky, National Director, Canadian Multiculturalism Council, as quoted in Alan C. Cairns, "Political Science, Ethnicity and the Canadian Consti- tution," in David P. Shugarman and Reg Whitaker, eds., Federalism and Politi- cal Community: Essays in Honour of Donald Smiley (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1989), 123.

Documents

Integration Before Assimilation Immigration, Multiculturalism and the Canadian Polity